Nazi Gold: Information from the British Archives: Part II by FCDO Historians

History Notes Issue 12 [May 1997]

Nazi Gold: Part II Information from the British Archives

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Foreign & Commonwealth Office General Services Command

HISTORY NOTES

Nazi Gold: Information from the British Archives: Part II Monetary gold, nori-monetary gold and the Tripartite Gold Commission

Histon••s, LRD

No. 12

May 1997

History Notes are produced by the Historians in Library and Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. For further infonnation contact FCO Historians, Library and Records Department, Clive House, Petty France, London SW I 9HD, Tel. 0171-270 421 5 Already published: 1. Korea: Britain and the Korean War 1950-51: June 1990 Second edition (revised) January 1995 ISBN 0 903359 53 7

2. The FCO: Policy, People and Places, 1782-1995: April 1991 Fourth edition (revised) February 1995 ISBN 0 903359 54 5 3. Locarno 19 2 5: The Treaty, the Spirit and the Suite: October 1991 ISBN 0 903359 48 0 4. FCO Records: Polley, Practice and Posterity, 1782-1993: August 1992

Second edition (revised) November 1993 ISBN 0 903359 50 2

5. FCO Library: Print, Paper and Publications,. 178~路1993: March 1993 ISBN 0 903359 49 9 6. Women in Diplomacy: The FCO, ISBN 0 903359 51 0

178~-1994:

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7. 'My Purdah Lady'. The Foreign Omce and the Secret Vote, 1909: September 1994ISBN 0 903359 52 9

8. FeO Library & Records,

178~-1995:

178~-路

June 1995

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9. IRD. Origins and Establishment of the Foreign Omce Information Research Department, 1946-48: August 1995 ISBN 0 903359 60 X 10. The Katyn Massacre: an SOE Perspective: February 1996 ISBN 0 903359 64 2

Nazi Gold: Information from the British Archives: September 1996 Second edition (revised) January 1997 ISBN 0 903359 6g 3 II.

Nazi Gold: Infonnation from the British Archives: Part II Monetary gold, non-monetary gold and the Tripartite Gold Commission Historians, LRD

ISBN 0903359715

FOREWORD The Foreword to the Second Edition of FCO History Note No. 11, Nazi Gold: lriformation from the British Archives, stated that we were conducting further research on the origins of the monetary and non-monetary gold recovered by the Allies after the War, and what was done with it. The question had been raised whether non-monetary gold, and in particular gold taken from victims of Nazi persecution, might have found its way into the Tripartite Gold Commission's monetary gold pool. The results of our further research are embodied in this new Note. Not all records of the immediate post-war period swvive, but every effort has been made to conduct a comprehensive survey of the material available. Extensive use has been made of the records of the Foreign Office (which include the records of the British Element of the Control Corrunission for Germany), and of the Treasury. As before, the Bank of England archive has provided valuable assistance. All the records consulted were and are open to public inspection, either in the Public Record Office or, in the case of Bank records, at the Bank of England itself. Based on material from the British archives, the Note is written from the perspective of the British Zone of Germany. It describes how gold was found there, its origin as far as can be determined from the records, and what happened to it. The story includes the establishment and role of the Tripartite Gold Commission (rGC), to which monetary gold tram the British Zone was transferred. It explores the possIbility that some non-monetary gold, taken from victims of Nazi persecution, may have found its way into the TGC's gold pool. It is clear from the records that when gold and other effects taken from concentration camp victims were found, these were scrupulously kept separate from monetary gold; and that those responsible for the division of gold found elsewhere made every effort to allocate only monetary gold to the TGC pool. It is also clear, however, that a relatively minute quantity of gold taken by the Nazis from individual victims may have found its way into the monetary gold poo~ in two ways: either in bars, smelted by the Germans before the Allies occupied Germany, in which victims' gold may have been included; or as coins, many of which were found in circumstances which made it impossible to establish their origin.

CONTENTS Page

Summary Contents Glossary

Introduction

I Allied respoDSlDility for Nazi gold

The Paris Coriference on Reparation, 1945

Gold in the British Zone of Germany A. Control arraageDlents 路 B. Monetary gold in the British Zone The Tripartite Gold Commission definition of monetary gold The Tripartite Gold Commission and tht Bank of England Law 53 gold in tht British Zone The Tripartite Coriference in Brussels> 1950 Gold excludedfrom tht TGC Pool The transfer of monetary gold.from tht British Zone C. NOD-DlOnetary gold in the British Zone Definition Discovery and custody }Ion-monetary gold and tht Allocation of a Reparation Share to Non-Repatriahle VICtims of German Action The Fwt-Power Coriference ofJune 1946 Restitution and Relief in tht British Zone The transfer of non-monetary gold.from tht British Zone

Conclusion

7 7 8 11 17 22 24

25 28 31 31 33 34 36 37 40 42

ANNEX I

Part of the Fmal Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation Part I, Article 8 of the Fmal Act

43 44

ANNEX IT

Conclusions I and n of the Brussels Conference, January 1950 ANNEX

Agreement on a plan for allocation of a reparation share to nonrepatriable victims of Gennan action, 14 June 1946

Guide to Sources

SUMMARY CONTENTS Introduction (po 1) • at the end of the Second World War, Allies decide not to keep captured Gennan gold but to use it for restitution

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purpose of Note is to show how this was done

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key questions are defiDitioD, what happened to gold found in Germany, the role of the Tripartite Gold CollllDission, the collection of gold for the Pool, and the disposal of non-monetary gold

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story to be told from perspective of British Zone of Gennany

I Allied respoasibility for Nazi gold (po 3) • Allied forces find hoards of Nazi gold, mainly in US Zone, and victims' gold near concentration camps (pp. 3-4) •

Military Government Law 53 requires delivery to Allied custody of all gold in Gennany

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Paris Conference on Reparation Nov.-Dec. 1945: Fmal Act lays down that all monetary gold found in Germany shall be pooled for restitution to fonnedy occupied countries in proportion to their losses: non-monetary gole (Plus proceeds of Gennan external assets and heirless funds) to be used for rehabilitation and resettlement of non-repatriable victims of Gennan action: no definition of 'monetary' or 'non-monetary' gold agreed at Paris (pp. 5-6)

n Gold in the British Zone of Gennany (po 7) A. Control arrangeDlents • British Element of Control Commission for Gennany (CCG(BE) takes over civil tasks of military government responsibility for gold lies with Finance Division but other divisions and branches have an interest: political and economic direction from London shared by 'multiplicity of interested parties with divided but overlapping responsibilities'; confusion results (p. 7) •

US Zone gold collected and inventoried at Frankfurt Exchange Depository: British Zone gold collected into local Reichsbank branches

Bo Monetary gold in the British Zone (po 8) • CCG(BE) and London departments struggle with problem of definition of different types of gold in British Zone and its possible fate: Fmance Division

C. Non-monetary gold in the British Zone (p. 31) •

limited definition of non-monetary gold extended at Council of Foreign Ministers in 1947: revised definition 'all unidentifiable articles of intrinsic value looted from persons confined by Nazis in concentration camps': difficulty in distinguishing between gold from concentration camp or other victims leads CCG(BE) to agree to US suggestion to extend definition even further to include all valuables 'seized or obtained under duress from political, racial and religious victims of Nazi Government' (pp. 31-3)

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non-monetary gold in British Zone mainly from Belsen and Neuengamme: collected in regional Reichsbank branches, but time-consuming and labourintensive task of preparing inventories put off (p. 34)

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US proposal to allocate non-monetary gold to non-repatriable victims of Nazi persecution agreed at Paris Conference on Reparation: Five-Power Conference held in June 1946 to implement F'mal Act: non-monetary gold to be handed over to Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (pp. 34-37)

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CCG(BE) not convinced that early surrender of non-monetary gold serves best interests of victims: possibility of restitution to victims or heirs indicates delay: overlap with Zonal and quadripartite schemes for restitution and compensation: US press for progress on handover to IGC (August 1946): important UK 'should not seem to be lagging behind the Americans' (pp. 37-39)

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non-monetary gold in British Zone gathered into Central Claims Registry: administrative, legal and practical problems delay restitution: gold handed over to IRO (successor to IGC) between 1951 and 1955 (pp. 40-41)

Conclusion (p. 41) •

story of gold in British Zone microcosm of problems faced in dealing with Nazi gold

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TGC faced many difficulties but succeeded in adjudicating all claims submitted to them and in distributing to claimants the major part of the gold in the monetary gold pool

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neither the Commissioners, their Governments nor the account-holding Banks knew exactly where all the gold deposited in the TGC Pool originated

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impossible to say no gold originating with concentration camp victims was included in TGC Pool, but could only have been minute amount

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two main conclusions from archives: gold which was known to be taken from concentration camp victims was kept separate and used for the purposes intended; and after full consideration of issues, Allies regarded all gold bars as monetary under terms of Paris Agreement

iii

Nazi Gold: Infonnation from. the British archives: Part

Monet~

gold, non-m.onetary gold and the Tripartite Gold Commission .

Introduction The first History Note on Nazi gold l was concerned primarily with Nazi Germany's wartime acquisition of gold, whether by purchase, dispossession or barter, and with the Allies' attempts to prevent their enemies from profiting from this acquisition. It also concentrated in particular on Allied attempts in the immediate post-war period to discover and gather in Nazi gold both from Gennany and from those cOWltries, especially the neutrals, to which it had been sent The purpose of this second Note is to describe in greater detail Allied efforts to ensure that this gold was put to use as part of the reparation, restitution and compensation programmes agreed at international conferences at the end of the war. Of all German assets, gold was the most valuable and of the most value to those countries devastated and bankrupted by six years of war. German industrial equipment, coal, iron and steel dedicated to the reparations programme were all of immense importance to the rebuilding of Europe's economy, but gold meant being able to buy what was needed to restart a country's industry, produce its raw materials and feed its population. Liberated countries who lost their gold during Occupation wanted it back. Countries like the United Kingdom who had not been occupied or lost their gold but had crippling European and global responsibilities wanted the Nazis' ill-gotten gold distributed in a way that would relieve their own financial burdens, much increased by their responsibility for a defeated Germany. On a broader scale, the Allies saw gold as a way of making restitution, in a spirit of equity and justice, to those who had lost everything. Although well aware of the scale of individual loss and destitution suffered by victims of Nazi persecution, they believed that the most practical way of using gold to benefit those victims was through their governments. The decision that all captured German gold should be used for restitution, rather than giving back gold with clearly identified ownership, was based on this belieÂŁ German gold came in many fonns, and the vexed question of definitionof monetary, non-monetary, or other types of gold-impeded Allied efforts to dispose of the gold according to their stated intentions. In order to Wlderstand

I FCO History Note No. II, September 1996 (Revised edn.January 1997), N~ Gold: lrifonntJlion from tJu BriJisn ArchiDts. Hereafter referred to as N~ CoM J.

what happened to azi gold whether mon tal)' r n of key issues, interrelated and interd p nd n mu t

• the evolving definitions of mon tary and n n·m n • what happened to the gold, both mon ry d n n·monetarv found in Gennany (information in th British hiv mainly to the British Zone); • the role of the Tripartite Gold Commis ion • the collection of gold for the TGC gold 1 DOD• the fulfihnent of international agr n th D10netary gold 1bis Note will explore these questions authorities, both in London and Germany, in control rm y ut th Most German gold was found in the US Zon of the efforts of those responsible for its disposal in th British Zon ill complexity of the problems faced by the Allied Occup ti n uth riti three Western Zones (the Soviet Union having r noun d t th th Conference, any claim to gold found in G rmany), and Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold, stabli h d in 1946 to implement the Allies' stated intention of givin ba possible to those countries whose gold res rYes had n1

The monetary and non-monetary gold found in th handed over to the relevant authorities by 1955. Th tory broader scale, and of the Tripartite Gold Commission d and indeed has not ended yet. It was, howev r, th v n f th and immediate post-war period which set the agenda for this . Note ~ deliberately restricted in scope in order to try and m complex story comprehensible to the general reader.

I Allied responsibility for Nazi gold Allied efforts to control the wartime traffic in Nazi gold2 foreshadowed a responsibility on their part to take positive action in regard to gold when the war ended. The Final Act of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods from 1-22 July 19443 enjoined participating countries to uncover, segregate, control and hand over enemy assets to the post-liberation authorities, and to call upon neutral countries to do the same. The task of uncovering, segregating, controlling and handing over enemy assets in Germany fell to the Occupation forces and the military government and control authorities they set up.

As Allied forces advanced through Germany, they looked for hidden German assets, especially gold They found it in caches where it had been hidden either by individual Nazis or-as in the case of the Kaiserode ~t mine at Merkers in Thuringia, where US forces found 90% of Nazi gold holdings-where the gold had been sent by the Reichsbank in an attempt to hide it from the Allies. They found it, in sombre circumstances, at or near concentration camps when they opened them up: gold and other valuables of this type were taken into custody under Military Government Law 52, which provided for such property to be set aside with a view to restitution to its owners or their heirs. In addition, the operation of Military Government Law 53, which was posted up progressively in each area of Germany as it was occupied by the Western armies, required the delivery to Allied custody in the nearest branch of the Reichsbank of all disposable foreign exchange assets, which included not only foreign currency but all precious metals in coin or bullion form. Ibis meant that the Occupying forces also took charge of a third class c1 gold, which in practice included not only bullion and coin but gold in other fonDS, such as gold for industrial use (sheets, wires etc), gold from jewellers' stocks, and privately owned gold objects.

Allied authority over all German property was embodied in the Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of Supreme Authority with respect to Germany by the Governments of the UK, USA, USSR and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, signed in Berlin on 5 June 194-5.5 By the time of the Berlin Conference held in Potsdam from 17 July to 2 August 19456 the British, French and US Occupation forces had already found the major part c1 Nazi gold they were

2 Nu:i. Gol.d I, pp. 4-6. , Cmd. 6546 of 1944. 4 Allied negotiations with the neutrals were discussed in Nae. Gold I. 5 Cmd. 6648 of 1945, also printed in Brilish and Foreign SIQk Papers, vol. 145, pp. 796-802. , 1be procccdings of the Conference and related documents are printed in Docummls on Brilish PolU:y 0tJemtu (hereafter DBpo), Series I, Vol. I: 1M Cor(mnct at POlsdamJul,J-Augwt 1945 (HMSO, 1984).

ever to find (most of it-over S260m worth-in th Z n ), ld h ard eli ov r d continuing to collect gold under Law 53. Th Merkers Mine at Kaiserode in April 1945, lat r r m v d th Exchange Depository (FED) in the Reichsbank builclin US custody, included a large quantity of mat rial whi in the possession of the SS, including ornam n , w t h gold and silver dental crowns, bridges and plat .8 r concentration camp victims, such as the 313 contain rs f and other valuables found in a cave outsid Buchenwald, al this type.9

r th

What was to be done with all this gold? Should it on a 'finder's keepers' principle? Should it fonn p rt f th rall n reparations plan? Should it be given back if identifiabl ? Was th r agreed meaning of the tenns 'booty', 'loot', 'r stitution' and 'r paration ? ? . .on Could Law 53 gold be released for legitimate industrial these questions, on which opinion was divided both betw n th Alli and within their political and military authorities, was carried on at a number of levels, official, military and intergovernmental. 1o Th Occupation authoriti s looked to their governments for guidance, but discussion and d cisions t th intergovernmental level were confined to questions of principle r th r than practice. The American, British and French Governments agreed in principle that they should not keep the gold they found in Gennany in recompens fc r th ir wartime expenditure, but that it should be used for th b ne6t of all Alli d governments in their task of postwar reconstruction. At the nd of th war th British Government considered it 'of pri.m ary importance that the European Allies should be entitled to restitution of identifiable and recov rabl monetary gold, valuables and securities which were their property b for occupation and were looted by the enemy . . . The inclusion of id ntifiabl monetary gold in any Restitution policy agreed at Terminal [I.e. th Potsdam Conference] would materially lessen the bitterness with which other European Allies, especially the French, would look upon a poli~ ttl d by the three Great Powers without consultation with th m.' 1 The U Government, however, favoured the idea of a 'gold pot' on the grounds that 7 Memo. by Commanding General, US Forces European Theatre (USFET), 19 Augu t 1945, end in memo. of 22 August from US Group Control Council to US War Department, Bank of England documents. 8 Memo. by Combined Civil Affairs Committee, Washington, CCAC 184, 28 April 1945, al 0 CCAC \84/1,12 May 1945, CAB 88/70. 9 SHAEF telegram VOG 526 from Air Chief Marshal Tedder to War Office, 21 June 1945, Bank of England documents. 10 See, for example, the memorandum of 16 July 1945 by Mr. E. Playfair of HM Tre ury, giving an account of negotiations in Moscow on reparations, printed in DBPO, Series I, Vol. I, No. 165. II Foreign Office telegram No. 133 to Mr. A. Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affai , in Berlin, 21 July 1945, printed ibiIi., No. 352.

'Gennan disposition of some looted gold, and the impossibility of identifying the origin of other gold, require for the sake of equity a modification of the simple principle of restitution' .1 2 The French Government inclined towards the US view and the British Government decided, in order to avoid 'endless deadlock', to accept the principle that all captured Gennan gold should be used for -restitution. 13 In other words, all gold found in Germany would be pooled and given back to those countries who had lost their gold resexves in proportion to their losses. Discussions in Moscow in the summer of 1945 between members of the Allied Reparation Commission touched upon the relative definitions of booty, loot, restitution, etc., but the classification of types of gold was not attempted. Nor was there any detailed discussion of gold at the Potsdam Conference, although it fell within the scope of the final Protocol in Part m, Reparations .from Gerrnat!Y, which also stated that the Soviet Government made no claim to gold captured by the Allied troops in Gennany.14 Between Potsdam and the Paris Conference on Reparation responsibility for gold lay tk facto with the UK, us and French Governments through their Military Commanders in charge of their zones of occupied Germany.

The Paris Conference on &paration, 9 Novemher-21 Decemher 1945 The Paris Conference was the first intergovernmental forum at which the future of Nazi gold was seriously discussed, and its Fmal Act, embodying an agreement between the eighteen participating powers l5 on Reparation from Germany, the Establishment of an I.nter-Allied Reparation Agency and the Restitution of Monetary Gold, 16 contained specific provisions for the disposal of both monetary and non-monetary gold. The definition of these categories, however, was not addressed. The records of the Conference and other related discussions at this time indicate that delegates made a general assumption that monetary gold meant gold bars and coins, looted from banks and, by implication, from governments, since in many countries private citizens had not been permitted to hold gold. Non-monetary gold was considered to mean 'private' gold in the form of dental gold, wedding rings etc. taken from concentration camp inmates. I7 'Ibis crude, and in some

•5

See Foreign JU/4Iio1lS of tile Uniut1 SI4Us (hereafter FRUS), 1945, vol. iii, pp. 1257-60 . DBPO, Series I, Vol. V: Gmntmy fJ7Ui Wulml Eunpe 11 August-31 Dtctmber 1945 (HMSO, 1990), No.

32.i . Potsdam Protocol or ~ of2 August 1945 is printed in DBPO, Series I, Vol. I, No. 603 . 1bese were the governments of Albania, the USA, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, the UK, Greece, India, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, South Mrica and Yugoslavia. 16 Cmd. 6721 of 1946. The Fmal Act came into operation on 24 January 1946. 17 See, for example, record of a meeting in the Foreign Office on 14 November 1945 which considered the explanation by Sir D. Waley (Treasury, British Ddegate to Reparation Commission) that nonmonetary gold meant 'gold articles removed from their victims by the Gennans either before or after ,execution' (f 236/1478). •+ The •5

respects misleading distinction und rlay th rrn th applied to gold. It took no account of gold urr nd r d und r

Nevertheless, the relevant provisions of th Conference formed a constant point of re拢4 r n next five years and are set out in Annex I to this gold was dealt with in a single article as Part ill f th mal that all the monetary gold found in Germany by th AlIi d coins of numismatic or historical value) should b p I d restitution to the formerly occupied countries, in proportion t losses of gold through looting or wrongful r moval monetary gold was dealt with in Part 1, Artiel 8 of th ina! stated that all non-monetary gold found by th Alli d Ann d Germany should be made available to the Inter-Gov mm ntal mmitt on Refugees (or its successor agency under th Unit dation ) for th rehabilitation of non-repatriable persons who had suffer d t th hands f th Nazis. The implementation of Part ill of the Fmal Act of th Pari nit d led to the establishment by the British, Fr nch and Governments of the Tripartite Commission for the R stitution f on tary Gold in September 1946. The implementation of Part I, Articl 8 1 d tion Five Power Agreement of 14 June 1946 on a Plan for All Reparation Share to Non-Repatriable Victims of G rman tion whi regulated the disposal of non-monetary gold. How v r, th failur agree on or even discuss the definitions of monetary and n n-ffion tal)' old meant that the whole issue remained bedevilled by rnisund rstandin and imprecision. Even before the end of the War it had becom cl r that Id of apparently so tangible, was nebulous of definition. It came from a vari sources and in many shapes and foIlllS, and while a straightforward division into monetary (bars, coins) and non-monetary (personal effi cts) s em d n accessible solution it quickly proved problematic. Not all bars w i h d or were worth 路the same: some bore clear marks of origin; 80m had b n obliterated or falsified by the Nazis. What about industrial gold, sh ts, wir ? What about gold found in banks but not part of the national reserv ? Military Government officials in the Western Zones of Germany who found themselves custodians of German gold soon realised they needed clear definitions of monetary and non-monetary gold before they could dispose of it as directed in the Fmal Act In the absence of any agreed definition either before or at the Paris Conference, the Control authorities in the British, French and US Zones had to tackle the issue themselves.

II Gold in the British Zone of Gennany A. Control arrangements Control of the British Zone lay with the British Element of the Control Commission for Germany (CCG(BE), a term which originally covered all officers whether in London or Germany. Since the middle of June 1945 civil divisions of CCG(BE) had gradually been taking over from 21 Army Group's military government functions, and had absorbed them entirely by September. Headquarters were divided between Berlin (Advanced HQ) and Liibbecke (Main HQ), where the executive work of administering the Zone was handled. As CCG(BE) divisions gradually moved from London to Germany to take over the civil tasks of militaIy government, political responsibility in London for the Control Commissions for Austria and Germany was left with the War Office and Control Commission London Bureau (CCLB) until it was assumed by a new government department, the Control Office for Germany and Austria (COGA), in October 1945. 18 As far as gold was concerned, responsibility in Gennany fell to Finance Division, in particular Banking Branch (who handled monetary matters, therefore gold bullion and coins) and Property Control Branch who handled private property and therefore gold items. Responsibility for gold collected under Law 53 varied according to its fonn. Since it had been decided that all German gold was to be used for restitution, CCG(BE)'s Reparations, Deliveries and Restitution (RDR) Division was also involved. In London, questions regarding gold fell within the province not only of COGA but of the Foreign Office, Treasury and the Bank of England (and, before their demise, the M.inistty of Economic Warfare and Trading with the Enemy Department). It is not hard to see how confusion arose from this multiplicity of interested parties with divided but overlapping responsibilities. Similar problems were encountered in the US Zone, where the Occupation forces were also in correspondence with a variety of government departments and agencies in Washington. The most urgent task faced by the control authorities was the custody and safekeeping of the gold they found hidden, or gathered in under Law 53. In the US Zone, where more than 90% of German gold was hdd, it was centralised in the Frankfurt Exchange Depository (FED), where it was sorted, weighed and valued by a group of experts from the USA, Britain and France, including two specialists from the Bank of England who assisted in the laborious task of sorting the gold found at Merkers, matching the' bars to German records where possible, and weighing them. Although worksheets .8 See DBPO, Series I, Vol. V, No. I, note I and Calendar iii, and No. 48. When COGA came into existence on 22 October 1945 a number of officials dealing with Gennany were transferred to the new department, including the Economic and Industrial Planning Staff, FO Gennan Economic Department and part of the War Office Civil Main Directorate.

from the Reichsbank Precious Metals D partIn nt had n fc un Merkers hoard, the British experts wer told th t th ir 'merely to evaluate the bullion and not to rnak ownership of the gold,.19 The report on th experts, dated 15 August 1945, was call d th 'How Howard, Assistant Director of the US Mint committee of experts. 20

with th

In the British Zone, where only a small amount (including, however, the so-called Ribbentrop or hoard), it was initially held in local Reichsbank branch found Unlike the well-organised evacuation of th R i h Kaiserode, most of the gold hoards discovered in th British Z n w accompanied by documentation attesting to their w i ht r pr v n n although some bore marks of identification. Gold SUIT nd r d und r was also collected in local Reichsbank branches. Gold found in n n camps was taken over by Property Control Branch and d Reichsbank branches in closed boxes, the contents of which w r n stage inventoried or made known to Banking Branch.2I In Fmance Division informed :Military Government Detachm n Munster, Kiel, DUsseldorf and Hamburg that an inv ntory 'all repeat all gold and silver bullion deposited with R ichsbanks under law 53 or surrendered or captured', detailing its wight was deposited: state and privately owned gold was to b own 22 and a similar inventory was required for coins. Th aim seems to have been to produce a compo .t figur f( r ld h ldin Zone, and to ensure complianc with w 53. supposedly laid down what was to happen to th ld n authorities soon found that the term of th Final in principle than in practice.

B. Monetary gold in the British Zone The day before the Fmal Act of the Paris Conference cam into per ti n on 24 January 1946, CaGA asked Finance Division of CCG(BE) f4 r r tum of all monetary gold captured or surrendered in the British Zon: n 3 1 January they extended their request to non-mon tary gold w 1l.2s Correspondence between CCG(BE) and London during the n xt f4 w months shows that while both sides were well aware c:i the ne d to h m 19 Notes by F.E. Coulton (Bank of England), 30 September 1945; also letter from C. . R England) to Playfair (Treasury), 22 August 1945, both Bank of England documen . 20 Howard Report of 15 August 1945, Bank of England documen (copy end Control Council memo. of 22 August: ee note 7 above). 21 Correspondence between Banking Branch, Property Control Branch and tnanee Echelon, 25 July and 8 November 1945, 29 March 1946, FO 1046/205, 267. 22 Fmance Division, CCG(BE), to Military Government detachments, 16 ber I 3, from provincial HQs, FO 1046/205. 23 S.P. Hampshire (COGA) to Banking Branch, 23 and 31 January 1946, FO 1046120~.

definition of these categories before any return could be prepared, there was considerable confusion regarding the tenns of such a definition. Finance Division and RDR Division were inclined to take the view that gold bars (of a specified fineness) and coins were clearly monetary, while everything else was not. The Treasury were broadly content with this division, except on two points: having been informed by the Bank of England that a number of gold bars held by the Americans in Frankfurt were of a fineness lower than that usually required of good delivery bars, they considered that no restriction should be placed upon fineness in the definition; and with regard to nonmonetary gold, they considered that the definition should provide for the release of gold for industrial purposes. 2+ , Both these points were of importance to the Control authorities in dealing with the gold in the British Zone. Although very little bar gold was under British control, Finance Division were aware from their own experience and from infonnation received from London that the provenance of Nazi gold was often suspect The Nazi regime had systematically melted down looted gold (bars, coins or objects) over a long period and resmelted it into bars under the Prussian Mint imprint. CCG(BE) had neither the documentation, the expertise nor the time to differentiate between 'good' and 'bad' bars, and as all gold bars were to be classified as monetary gold the simplest solution was to ignore the question of the fineness-a problem which, they assumed, would fall to the authority responsible for redistributing the gold. The question cf releasing gold for industrial purposes in Germany was c:f even more pressing relevance to the Control authorities. Apart from the special provision made when 229.29 gms of gold was requisitioned for FieldMarshal Montgomery to present a shield and eight gold spoons to Marshal Zhukov,25 Finance Division, enforced the rule that bullion surrendered to the Reichsbank under Law 53 should not be released for industrial or other purposes. The US Control authorities took the line that 'commercial' gold or silver, defined as 'gold or silver whereof less than eighty (80) percent c:f the value derives from the value of the gold or silver content', was not subject to delivery under Law 53 and could be used for the manufacture of goods under authorised production programmes. In the British Zone, however, all gold and silver bullion was regarded as subject to Law 53 with quadripartite agreement required for its release. 26 Although in practice some small amounts of silver were released, and the Deutsche Gold-und Silher-Scheideanstalt (Degussa) retained its licence for the manufacture of dental gold and wedding

2t Correspondence between Banlcing Branch, RDR Division and COGA, 4 February and 28 March 1946, Treasury to COGA, 8 April 1946, FO 1046/557, T 236/986. 2S See correspondence on FO 1046/2 17, July-October 1945. 26 Mn. E. PoUack (COGA) to MUs DJ. Turner (Treasury), 16 September 1946, T 236/986, USFET authorization AG 400, 2+ October 1945, Banking Branch to Chief, Fmance Division, 24 November 1945, Banking Branch to Commercial Branch, Economic Division, 19 December 1945, all FO 1046/216.

rings on an exchange basis,27 the ban on r leas

f bulli n m

was no gold available for essential medical, industrial

n .al Although the question of using gold to meet considered by the Allied Control authority, no r olution September 1950 a US proposal was put to th Alli d Finance Committee for the release of pr cious m tal d . d und r in 53, whereby metals which were not subj ct to restitution n r the TGC Pool should be delivered to the Fed ral ov mm nt t r Ii current shortage in Germany. Betw en 1945 and 195 h w r Control authorities faced the difficult task of reconciling th r qui~ m n military government law with those of the industries in th ir Z n : th h ld a raw m t rial' but gold they could not use; Gennan industry needed gold to import gold into Germany seemed 'most undesirabl m v ry . ,"28 View.

In all these discussions the Treasury, Bank of land d tended to refer to Law 53 gold as 'non-monetary', par 'cularly if it the fonn of bars or coin. However, this usage was a qu ti n in terminology rather than misunderstanding; 'not mon tary' w uld have been a more accurate tenn. The limited definition n n-m"' ......Âˇ ~ . . â&#x20AC;˘... ' gold as 'unidentifiable gold looted from the bodies of p opl kill d Nazis in the concentration camps' was well understood in th Bri ' following an exchange of correspondence with COGA in th rly m n 1946. As Mr. Hampshire made clear to Mr. Hoar of Banking Branch i non-monetary gold did not cover jewellers stocks, industrial merel~ 'pieces of gold found in places like Dachau', and item'. 1bis restriction, however, was of little help to lnan were struggling with definitions of monetary and non-mon tary appeared to mean that a large part of the gold in th British Zon under Law 53, seemingly fell outside both categories. Extensive correspondence between the Treasury, B COGA and CCG(BE) in the spring of 1946 failed to prOOuc a definition which covered all the gold in the British Zon. 27 Banking Branch (Hamburg) to Banking Branch (Berlin), 23 ebru ry 1946, HQ Military Government North Rhine Region to Banking Branch, 28 March, Degu to Mill ry mm nt Metallurgy Department and note of conference on silver, 8 April \946, FO 1046/2 16, 217. 28 DFIN/Memo.(46)84, 17 May 1946, FO 1046/217, FIN /PSC/p(50)67, 27 eptembcr 1 50 Wahnerheide telegram 511 Saving of 5 October 1950, CJ 4257, 4294, FO 371/85968. 29 Hampshire (COGA) to Banking Branch, 23 April 1946, FO 1046/205, Ritchie (COGA) to J ennin (freasury), 29 April 1946, T 236/986. 30 COGA attempted a synthesis of this correspondence for RDR Division on 13 May 1946 propo ' n that monetary gold should be dermed as 'aU gold [coins] and gold ban of any 6neneIa', and non-rnon ry gold as 'all unidentifiable gold, looted from the bodies of people killed by the Nazis in concentration camps, etc., and found there when the camps were entered by the British and American fo '. Th r w however, two additional categories of 'non-monetary' gold which in COGA'. view were duded from distribution under the Paris Act: gold objects of virtue or historical value; and item jeweUe ' d industrial stoclcs: Ritchie (COGA) to G. Witham (RDR Division, Berlin), FO 1046/205.

circumstances it seemed to the Control authorities that the decision to set up the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold (usually referred to as the Tripartite Gold Commission or TGC) to implement Part ill of the Fmal Act of the Paris Conference held out the promise of reaching a less convoluted-more 'definitive'-definition of monetary gold.

T7u Tripartite Gold Commission definition of TTlIJ1letary gold The idea for a Tripartite Commission to implement Part ill of the Paris Fmal Act grew out of a French suggestion on 1 FebruaI)'" 1946 that the three governments should take the opportunitr of the forthcoming negotiations with the Swiss Government in Washington3 to discuss 'l'ensemble des questions posees par la restitution de l'or monetaire spolie,.32 Although the view of interested government departments in Britain was unanimous in rejecting the idea of combining discussions on gold with Safehaven talks,33 the idea of dealing with gold on a tripartite basis outside Germany was attractive. When the US Government took up the French proposal and suggested instead an infonnal committee of experts meeting in Brussels, the British Government were happy to fall in with the idea:

in general we were little interested and could leave the initiative to the country which holds the gold and the country which wants it 34 The establishment of the TGC was not fonnally announced until 27 September 1946.35 In the preceding few months, however, the three Commissioners designate (i.e. the British, French and US delegates to the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency in Brussels) began drafting a letter and accompanying questionnaire to claimant countries, and soon discovered both that a definition of monetary gold was an essential preliminary. and that the three governments held differing views. The most basic point of disagreement was as to whether cIaims on the TGC would be restricted to central bank holdings or extended to private holdings: the American and French Governments were inclined to the wider definition, but the British Government was quite clear that 'to extend the limit of claims to include private holdings will in fact mean that no-one will get any gold at all for a

GoI4 I, pp. 12-14. Letter from M. Wormser (French Embassy, London) to Mr. Coulson (FO), 1 February 1946, UE 461/112177, FO 371153162. ss 'Safehaven' was a rode word for the project of discovering enemy assets outside Germany, and the talks with the Swiss Government were part of a series of discussions with neutral countries on this subject: cf. N~ GoI4I, pp. 7 and 12-14. 54 Letter from Waley (freasury) to Sir Desmond Morton (lARA, Brussels), 26 June 1946, T 236/986. See also correspondence on mes UE 112177 and UE 22177, February-March 1946, FO 371/53135, 53162, and in T 236/979, February~une 1946. 55 Press notice on TGC, 27 September 1946, T 236/980: printed in Th Tunes, 28 September 1946, p. 3; see also NtUi. GoI4I, Annex A. 51 .N~

very long time',36 and it was ev ntually d bank holdings would be admitted.

'd d th t

The French Government also fought hard f4 r th dust, an idea which the Bank of England on· d r Paris Act', 37 and also to cover gold which at th tim was destined for a country's central bank bu h d n t y th impasse was finally broken when it was explain persisted in trying to extend the TGC d finiti n th to admit a larger number of claims, as a r sult of which less gold. 39 After further negotiation a d finition m n the TGC was finally reached at the end of ov m r 1 4 All gold which, at the time of its looting r n was carried as part of the claimant un tty' reserve, either in the accounts of th !aim itself or in the accounts of th claimant un or other monetary authority at hom or abro d.

11ris definition was intentionally narrow and, as Mr. tinS n th England pointed out to Mr. Bielinky, only applied 'to clai n th could not define the amount of gold to go into th P 1. r th pwpose it will probably be necessary to omit the words "whi th its looting or wrongful removal was"; oth rwi y u uld Reichsbank's unlooted gold.'''! Sir Desmond Morton furth Colonel EJ.W. Hellmuth of Finane Division that th would not be concerned with the collection of th gold pool distributed (though they might receive it and a t as custodi concentrate on inviting and adjudicating claims: This means that the Commission will at pr s nt r fu part in arguments whether any particular par I should or should not be put into the pool. It also all Commission to employ a different definition of mon tary

36 Letter from Sir Desmond Morton, British Commi loner designate to the G , l Mr. Ru his US counterpart, 26 June 1946, T 236/986. 57 Rogers (Bank of England) to Turner (freasury), 13 September 1946, contained the Bank's view of monetary gold: "'Monetary gold" is a recogn ' ble term and is generally understood to c.over coins (other than those of historic or num' mati vaJu ) d b certain weights and fineness . . . Ban of other weights and fineness, aJthou h not • ood deli • nevertheless be held as monetary reserves . . . As far as the quality or type of Id· tin ownenhip-is concerned, I think this is the farthest one could go in l definition which "monetary gold".' ,. Undated note by Morton, T 236/986; note by L. Bie1inky (Treasury) for Jennin , o4 October I 236/987. S9 Morton to M. Paul Gargam (Secretary-General, .&nqIU d, FrtI1f&'), • October 194-6 236/987 . 40 BielinJcy (Treasury) to Pollack (COGA), 23 January 19-47, T 236/987. 4. Gunston (Bank of England) to Bielinky (freasury), 23 October 1946, T 236/987 .

for the purpose of claims to that which may have to be used by Governments as a definition in collecting the pool. 42 The Bank of England attempted to inject a note of caution by pointing out that while it was the responsibility of governments to decide what would go into the gold Poo~ the TGC had the responsibility for announcing the total value of the Pool in due course, and would therefore need to be sure of 'the precise quantity and physical existence of the gold in the pool', which could only be ascertained by accurate weighing, and where necessary assaying. Not only would bars of German wartime melting not be accepted as good delivery in London, but claimants might question the fine ounce content of bars allocated to .them: 'There is therefore much to be said for immediate remelting and re-assaying of all the doubtful gold by recognised people. In this manner the question of taint should also no longer arise. ,43 . Discussions between Mr. Gunston and M Gargam show that French technical experts were also concerned about verification, particularly of the gold held by US forces at Frankfurt. 44 At this stage, however, the Commissioners were clearly more concerned with the verification of claims than Âˇ of receipts: as Sir D. Morton wrote to Mr. Raven, 'The three Governments intend to settle amongst themselves what ic; the total value of the pool', although he 'cordially' agreed 'that it is very necessary for someone to pay attention to the question of the value of the pool and to safeguard their conclusions'. 45 The question of the fineness of the gold to go into the pool-which was of course closely connected with the type of gold-was deferred until the imminent receipt of gold from Gennany in 1948 forced its reconsideration. At first it seemed that the TGC definition of monetary gold, so laboriously reached, would be of little benefit to the Control authorities in the British Zone. By July 1946, on the instructions of Finance Division, Military Government detachments had centralised their gold holdings as far as possible in their main regional Reichsbank branch (ReichshankJuzuptstelle), and were submitting monthly returns to Berlin. 46 These custodial and recording functions were exercised by Fmance Division in the hope and expectation that once the TGC definition had been agreed, monetary gold in the British Zone would be handed over to the Pool. The realisation that the longawaited definition still left unclear what should happen to Law 53 or newly

Morton (Brussels) to Hellmuth (Fmance Division), 5 November 1946, FO 1046/557 . â&#x20AC;˘, Letters from Gunston (Bank of England) to Mr. Raven (Rothschilds, adviser to TGC) and Bielinky (Treasury), 26 and 29 October 1946, T 236/987. 44 Bielinky (Treasury) to Gunston (Bank of England), 14 February 1947, enclosing 'Note roncemant les problemes techniques reIatifs a la restitution de I'or monetaire', 11 February 1947, T 236/934. tS Morton (Brussels) to Raven (RotbschiIds), 2 November 1946, T 236/987. 46 Audits & Investigations Branch, Fmance Division (Bedin) to Banking Branch, 18 July 1946, Banking Branch (Hamburg) to Banking Branch (Berlin), 26July 1946, FO 1046/557. .2

mined gold or to industrial stocks left Banking Branch and th ir Fmance Division frustrated and confused.路 7

A suggestion from the Treasury and Bank of England th t definition of monetary gold might include 'all other 100 d gold n t u ~ t t direct restitution as artistic objects or to disposal und r Arti 8 of Part I the Paris Act' provoked Colonel Helhnuth to express surpri th t th r w any question of including in the gold pool gold which was n t tri t1 monetary', adding that his US colleagues agreed and w r th m Iv following the practice of restricting monetary gold 'to what th y t rm 'mint bars" and coins . . . We feel that any other gold which . n ubj t to restitution and falls outside the eventually agreed d finition f n n-m n ry m y w gold should be available for the German economy. In th consider that all gold mined or refined since 8th May, 1945 should fr to be used for industrial purposes as should also any gold r sulting from th melting down of manufactured articles not subject to restitution or classifi d as ,48 non-monetary gold. COGA were not unsympathetic to the difficulties encount r d by Finan Division. Consulting the Treasury for help in drawing up a d finition for CCG(BE) which '(a) is capable of clear interpretation by th R ich bank and (b) won't involve, at any rate at this stage, any larg scale pr ing th gold', :Miss Turner concluded that: the main question is the interpretation of our original dictum to Berlin that monetary gold must be 'gold coin and bars of any fineness'. The list of gold held by the Reichsbank in th British Zone illustrates the difficulties with which Berlin ar faced, in that they have to instruct the Reichsbank on th point at which a gold object Qump, sheet) becomes a gold bar. Their suggestion of a 'fineness' qualification is not in lin with our original instructions to them; the US suggestion of 'mine bars presumably means imposing some conditions of siz or assay (the former was German pre-capitulation practic ). W have pointed out to Berlin the difficulty of imposing such conditions in view of the possibility that the German tampered with the gold when it was looted, but they still ne d some definition of what is meant by a 'bar'. Is ther any kind of description or condition that Berlin can use which will avoid this difficulty? The Treasury's response was to suggest that the Control Commission

might, after all, adopt a definition similar to that drawn up by the Tripartite Gold Commission, i.e. on the lines of 'All gold carried as part of a monetary 47 See, for example, minute from Mr. Potter, Banking Branch, to Director, 2 December 1946, 1046/557. 48 Hellmuth (Fmance Division) to PoUack (COGA), 12 December 1946, FO 1046/557.

reserve either in the accounts of a Government or in the accounts of a central bank or other monetary authority': A definition of this sort would have two main advantages: (I) it would make the definition of monetary gold for filling the pot consistent with the definition of monetary gold for sharing out the pot and (2) there would be no need to establish a criterion as regards the shape, weight, size or fineness of gold bars. The work in Gennany would be restricted to checking the records of the Reichsbank and any other monetary authority.49 Fmance Division agreed on 9 April 1947 to accept the TGC definition for use in the British Zone, but while the adoption of this definition enabled Banking Branch to proceed with authority in dealing with gold bars and coins, it offered little help with the other categories of gold in the British Zone. Mr. Potter admitted on 2 May that he was 'not sure in my own mind precisely what the "Treasury" definition would actually cover', and expressed some swprise at its adoption: 'We wish to avoid bringing up the whole question but it was always anticipated that for filling the pot a wider definition would be necessary.' He pointed out that the TGC definition seemed likely to exclude gold which may have been looted from monetary reserves and was now deposited under Law 53, though not actually in the name of a government or monetary authority. so The TGC definition left Law 53 gold in an ambiguous position: on the one hand, it appeared to allow its inclusion in the gold pool in the fonn of 'all other gold bars and coin'; on the other hand, Law 53 gold was not looted, and though held in the Reichsbank was not part of German monetary reserves, and might not be in bar or coin fonn. Nevertheless, nearly all the gold held in the British Zone had been surrendered under Law 53: Fmance Division declared in April 1947 that there was no gold from Reichsbank holdings in the Zone, but that the total of monetary gold surrendered under Law 53, including some restitutable gold, was 3894kg gross weight, or 3248 kilos fine weight, including bars, sheets and coins of varying fineness. Applying the TGC definition, they took the view that this gold was deliverable to the Pool In answer to a fonnal request from the TGC Commissioners in July 1947, the Chief of Finance Division replied that of monetary gold held by the Reichsbank under Law 53 there were 422.769kg fine weight of gold bars, and 851.176kg fine weight of coins, adding that 'we have figures of gold bars and coins of unknown standards, but 49

Turner (COGA) to Bielinky (HM Treasury), 15 January 1947, and Bielinky to Pollack, 23 January,

IDe &iL, T 236/987. so Potter (Banking Branch) to Pollack (Gennan Section, Foreign OfficeÂˇ), 2 May 1947, FO 1046/557 . â&#x20AC;˘ On 23 April 1947 the Control Office for Gennany and Austria was incorporated in the Foreign Office under the direction of the Secretary of Swe for Foreign Affairs, assisted by the new Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Lord Pakenham, who had offices both in Downing St. and at Norfolk House, previously COGA headquarters. TIle new Gennan Section comprised departments covering Gennan political, internal affairs, educational, refugee, trade, industry, supply, general economic, finance and administrative matters.

the amount involved is comparatively small and has been excluded from the figures,.51 Following further correspondence with the TGC and Tr asury on points of detail, a fonnal return was finally made to the TGC on 29 December 1947 stating the total amount of monetary gold in the British Zone as 2,117 .070kg, based on the definition of monetary gold as 'gold bars and gold coins, except coins of numismatic or historical value, which would have been eligible to fonn part of the gold reserve of a Central Bank or Central Monetary authority'. 52 The amount in question, as Mr. Bie1inky noted on 23 October, was 'negligible': Altogether there has been an excessive amount of trouble about the small amounts held in our zone . . . The question of gold has been held up long enough and it is time the gold was available for distribution. 53 CCG(BE) would undoubtedly have endorsed this view. At the beginning of 1948 it seemed as if the transfer of monetary gold from the British Zone to the TGC Pool might be imminent a telegram of 20 January from the Foreign Office asked Berlin to report 'urgently on (a) location of gold ... (b) whether the gold bars are ~ood delivery, (c) your final summary inventory of total gold for hand-over'. 5 The gold had now been largely concentrated in Reiihsbankhauptstelle Hamburg, where its weight and fineness had been examined 'by means of the available vouchers' revealing some differences from the fineness originally stated, necessitating slight amendment of the returns. A commentary by the Deputy Adviser to the TGC on 'Gold found in the British Zone' indicated that there remained points of detail to be clarified, but that preparations could then be made for transfer. However, he also questioned whether Law 53 gold should, in fact, fonn part of the Pool at all: Before this gold could be made available for restitution, the three Governments sh uld take a decision of principle that the gold collected pursuant to Law 53 must be included in the Pool . . . It would be appropriate, if such decision is taken, to ensure that Law 53 is interpreted and applied in identical ways in each of the three western zones of Gennany.55 51 Pollack (COGA) to Bielinky (Treasury), 9 April 1947, T 236/988; TGC to Director, Banking Branch, 3July 1947, FO 1046/557; Chief, Finance Division, to TGC, IOJuly 1947, T 236/931. Th were interim figures. 52 See correspondence between Banking Branch, FO Gennan Section, Treasury and TGC, JulyDecember 1947, in T 236/931, 932, FO 1046/557; letter from Chief, Finance Division, to TGC, 29 December 1947, FO 1046/537. 5S Minute from Bielinky to Mr. D.H. Maitland (both Treasury), 23 October 1947, T 236/984. ~ Telegrams 640 Basic and 1047 Basic to Berlin, 20 and 30January 1948, T 236/985. 5S RnchsbanJcJeiultlle Hamburg to Finance Division, Berlin, 2 February 1947, FO 1046/563, memo. by M. Hirigoyen, Deputy Adviser, TGC, 8 March 1948, letter from Morton to Maitland (Treasury), 15 March, both T 236/985. 'The need for a common UK/US policy was strengthened by the fact that the British and US Zones of Gennany had been combined for economic purposes on 1 January 1947,

The position was neady swnmed up in a letter of 18 March 1948 from Mr. Maitland at the Treasury to Mr. CD. Potter in the Foreign Office German Section, reporting the doubts expressed by the Secretary of the TGC: 56 It is possible to argue on the main point both ways, but we would not wish to be committed either way at this stage. On the one hand, the intentions of the Paris Agreement were to use the monetaIy gold resources of the German State to return to the ex-Occupied Countries as much as possible of their losses by 'looting or wrongful removal' from their central monetary authorities by the Gennans. Gold collected from private individuals cannot really be considered to fonn part of the German State's gold resources, nor as having been taken from the central monetary authorities of the Occupied countries. On the other hand, Law 53 was applied in order to make available all Germany's foreign exchange resources to pay Germany's debts. It can therefore be argued that since the most important of these debts ~ reparations, and since gold reparations are specifically provided for in the Paris Agreement, gold collections under this Law should be added to the Monetary Gold Poo1. 57

The Tripart;ik Gold Commission and the BanJc of EnglaruJ The onset of doubt regarding the eligibility of Law 53 gold for the Pool coincided with TGC governments' negotiations with the Bank of England both for the transfer eX gold from the Frankfurt Exchange Depository to the Bank of England, and for the opening of an account at the Bank for the deposit and eventual distribution of TGC gold. Difficulties encountered in these negotiations may well have prompted more serious consideration c:i those problems foreseen by the Bank in 1947, but not tackled by the Commissioners at the time. 58 h these problems affected the British Government both in relation to gold in the British Zone and to their participation in the Tripartite Gold Commission, they need to be explored in some detail. The proposal to move the Frankfurt gold to the Bank of England arose from doubts as to whether all the bars in the FED were of good delivery. In beginning a new phase of control machinery whereby many functions of government were progressively handed over to the Gennan l.iiIuJ6 authorities in fulfdment of a policy to devolve upon the Gennans the maximum responsibility for managing their own affairs (CCG(BE) HQ Directive, 1 January 1947, FO

10491 39}. 56 M. Hirigoyen had been Secretary to the TGC until 23 February 1948, when he was appointed Deputy Adviser and ColonelJA Watson was appointed to the new post of Secretary General. s, D .H. Maitland (freasury) to CJ.D. Potter (FO), 18 March 1948, T 236/985; see also Potter (FO) to Potter (Fmance Division) and reply, 6 and 13 April 1948, FO 10461563. sa See pp. 12-13 above.

August 1947 Mr. DOlT had admitted to his fellow Commi .on rs that man ingots had assay certificates but either no stamp or conflicting stamps and that many assay certificates bore false dates. M Rueff had point d out the Commission's responsibility for all these ingots: (a) If the fineness is incorrect, the Commission may b hort of gold. Therefore, there should be no doubt whatsoev r as to the fineness. However, it would not be necessary to r m It all the bars but a detailed examination should be mad and assurance given by individuals accustomed to assaying. (b) Regarding the unstamped ingots, they might hav hoI s or contain other metal than gold. 59

The Commissioners suggested that the suspect bars (mor than 1100) might be sampled for assay in situ, but the experts consulted, such as Raven of Rothschilds, were quite clear that these suggestions did not go far enough to ensure accuracy: IT the three Governments concerned wish to b assur d without doubt of the fine gold content of the gold recov r d from Germany, I think it imperative that the gold should b removed at once from Germany to a Central Bank or Banks ... No alternative suggestion comes to my mind which wiD enable the Commission to state with accuracy the amount of gold available for distribution. 6O The decision by the TGC in October 1947 to assume responsibility for th Frankfurt gold in order to use it for the preliminary distribution to Fr n (for Belgium and Luxembourg) and the Netherlands61 underlined th probl ms with verification: according to Sir D. Morton, the repre eritativ th d Federal Reserve Bank who went to Frankfurt to h lp with th packin distribution of the gold reported almost immediately that all the information about the gold bars in Frankfurt hith rt given to the Commission by the United States Authoriti wrong ... A relatively small number of th bars at rankfurt are of proven assay and good delivery. The cor f th trouble is that the United States Authorities, who hav had charge of the gold up to last week, when . . . th thr Commissioners most unwillingly agreed to take charge and become responsible, have failed to cause any good assay to b made of the doubtful bars. In consequence, w, th S9 Draft minutes of TGC meeting, attached to letter from Colonel Ronald Wingate (Alternate to ir D. Morton) to Raven (Rothschilds), 11 August 1947, T 236/1019. 60 Raven (Rothschilds) to Bielinky (Treasury), 13 August 1947, FO 83711279; palled on to TGC by Wmgate, 22 August, T 236/1019. See also Raven's estimates of the cost of removal to London, letter to Bielin1cy, 21 August 1947, T 236/1019. 61 See Nazi Gold I, Annex A.

Commission, now responsible for this gold do 'not know how much gold we have got 62

In these circumstances the French Government, who were to receive 4,000 bars in the preliminary distribution, were asked to make up their share with doubtful bars 'subject to later adjustment on the basis of New York analysis'. By the end of 1947 the British and French Commissioners had infonned their American colleague that their governments would take no responsibility for the remaining gold at Frankfurt until it had been moved to one of the three governments' Central Banks. The US Government eventually agreed that the gold, starting with the coin, should be transferred to the Bank of England, who, however, imposed a number of conditions before accepting the gold, insisting that the three governments must authorise the Bank to hold gold and request fonnally that an account be opened in the name of the Tripartite Gold Commission.63 The TGC already hdd gold at the Federal Reserve Bank in ew York, where the 1,659,119.140 oz of fine gold transferred by the Swiss Government in 1947 in accordance with the Washington Agreement of 1946 was held. 54 On the instructions of the US Treasury the Federal Reserve Bank had opened an account designated 'Tripartite Commission for the Restitution eX Monetary Gold', but they had received no fonnal documentation relative to the operation of the account and could not carry out any instructions from the TGC until then. The Bank of England refused to accept any gold without legal authority to hold it, and the assurance that risks connected with the gold were for the account of His Majesty's Government 65 egotiations on practical arrangements for the transfer a the Frankfurt gold were protracted and awkward, largely owing to the refusal of the US military authorities in Gennany to hand over the gold, which was packed in catalogued, sealed boxes, unless all three Commissioners would sign a receipt (before the gold was examined at the Bank of England) certifying that the TGC had received the quantity of fine gold calculated by the US authorities on the basis of the Howard Report a 1945. 66 Following considerable ~ Morton (Brussels) to].E. Abbott (Treasury), 17 October 1947, Washington telegram No. 5678 Basic to FO German Section, 16 October 1947, both T 236/984. 55 Memo. by Morton, 'Removal of Frankfurt Gold to the Bank of England', 25 March 1948, minute by Maitland (Treasury), 7 February 1948, both T 236/1019. .. Playfair (Treasury) to TGC, 7 November 1947, T 236/984. 1be amount actually credited to the TGC account was 1,659,121.321 oz, the discrepancy arising from the fact that the ban were taken from Swiss holdings and gold in the Federal Reserve Bank was not fungible: see p. 20 below. See also No.O Gold I, p. 14. e Federal Reserve Bank, New路 York, to TGC, 26 June 1947, T 236/1019, minute by Maitland, 7 February 1948, 1芦. tiL "Cf. p. 8 above. Mr. Abbott (Treasury) commented in a minute of 10 April 1948: 'n~ne, not even the United States authorities, can possibly claim that the fmdings of the Howard Report are the last word

argument between the TGC and the US Military Government Authoriti s shipments from Frankfurt to the Bank of England of coin, then bars b gan in June 1948, the process ending in August. Meanwhile the Bank of England had received a formal r qu st from HM Treasury to open a gold set-aside account for the French, UK and Governments, to be operated by their representatives on th TGC. Th Bank made it clear to the Treasury that 'they acted merely as bail and that the gold was in fact the property of two foreign Governments jointly with HMG', which would rule out legal action against the Bank; and that as trustee the Bank would be unable to carry out instructions except ov r th signatures of accredited representatives of all three of th Gov mm n concerned', so that 'the gold deposit could be effectively froz n by any on of the Governments instructing its representatives to withhold their signatures .67 The Bank took what steps it could to safeguard itself against legal probl IDS but nevertheless was almost immediately enmeshed in what proved to b a very complex and long-running legal dispute regarding 64 bars of gold in th second consignment from Frankfurt which were claimed as th pro rty of the Societe FraTlfaise Dollfos-Mieg. 68 The Bank of England's examination of the Frankfurt gold reveal d om discrepancies with the accompanying inventories. With regard to bar gold, i was not assayed (the time and cost involved being deemed unacc ptabl ) but all bars not bearing the stamp of an approved refinery (which in practic meant all bars except those identifiable as the property of a non-G rman central bank) were melted down and resmelted into good delivery bars against London market standards. This was done with any oth r gold of doubtful delivery received in the TGC account, such as a number of Prussian mint bars included in a consignment received from the Bank for Int mationa! Settlements. The Bank's concern was not for the content but for th fin n of the gold (affecting its saleability). TIlls was in accordance with th chang in Bank of England policy on gold in 1940, whereby bar gold was th r aft r recognised as fungible, i.e. it was held on a fine ounce basis rather than as specific bars, and customers withdrawing bars would not get back th sam bars they had deposited. This policy was reversed in 1950 (partly b cau of the Dollfus-Mieg case), but it meant that as far as the TGC gold r c iv d

on the exact quantity of gold which is being moved. If it was, there would be no occasion to move the old. It could be distributed where it lies' (T 236/1019). 67 Treasury to Governor of Bank of England, 9 March 1948 and reply, II March; telegram from B nk of England to Treasury, 5 February, 1948, Morton to Rueff, 7 February \948, letter from Bank of England to Treasury, 25 March 1948, all T 236/1019; Treasury Solicitor to Maitland (f ury). " May 1948, T 236/ I 020. 68 TGC to Bank of England, 16 July 1948, T 236/2021. An account of the DoUfu Mieg en in Elizabeth HeI'UleSI)', T'Ju Bank of ÂŁntlanti: a domtstU history (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 2+6-7 . It w eventually settled in 1952 when the House of Lords found in favour of the three Govemmen .

during the period up to 1950 was concerned, there was and tracing what happened to the bars deposited. 69

no way of

As far as the coins received from Frankfurt were concerned, they were, literally, a 'mixed bag': some bags were found to contain 'medals, plaques and tokens', and coins no longer in currency which had probably come from bank vaults or museums. While these items were not strictly speaking 'monetary gold in the sense that they ever could have been currency', they were equally clearly not personal items taken from concentration camp victims, and therefore did not fall within the accepted definition of nonmonetary gold. In agreement with the Bank, Sir Desmond Morton consulted an expert from the British Museum whose confirmation that they were not of a high historical or numismatic value was welcomed by the UK Commissioner: There has been a slight difficulty in interpreting the 'words "of a numismatic or historical value" [m the Paris Fmal Act], but the Tripartite International Commission [sic] set up, of which I am a member, has felt for a number of reasons that the wording of the Treaty must be read in the sense of coins of a really high numismatic or historical value. For example, if among these coins was found an ancient Greek gold coin worth many hundreds of pounds, whereas the gold content might only be a couple of dollars, that coin should be extracted and specially dealt with. On the other hand, I feel sure that the Commission will feel that if the numismatic value of a coin is only four or five times that of the gold content, and if as you say and as I suspected, that the order of the number of such coins can be measured in tens rather than in hundreds, the game is not worth the candle. The Commission will thus decide to melt them all down for their gold content alone. 70

The experiences of the TGC in arranging for the transfer of the Frankfurt gold and the setting up. of the Bank of England account, together with those of Bank of England officials in dealing with the gold, must have produced increased caution regarding accepting Wlverified parcels of gold into the Pool. The British Zone's Law 53 gold, though in principle a welcome addition to the TGC's coffers-at the end of 1947, when the Belgian, Luxembourg and Netherlands Governments had received a first distribution, only 151,OO5kgs of gold was estimated as available for further distribution71 -was also an unknown quantity, and it seems likely that the Commissioners wanted to make quite sure of its provenance before arranging for its delivery; from the British point of view, it was also important to establish that their practice â&#x20AC;˘ See Hennessy, ofJÂˇ cit, pp. 24+5. 70 Morton to Abbott (freaswy), 6 July 1948 and to Wmgate (fGC) 7 July, letten between (British Museum) and Morton, 17 and 18 August 1948, all T 236/1020. 71 M. Hirigoycn (Secretary to TGC) to Morton, 12 December 1947, T 236/984.

J. Allan

accorded with that of the Americans and the French, though it appeared that they had very little Law 53 gold in their Zones. 72

Law 53 gold in the British ZOT/ÂŁ On 13 July 1948 the Foreign Office German Section were infonned that it had been decided to exclude Law 53 gold from the TGC Pool: The intentions of the Paris Act were to use the monetary gold resources of the German State to return to the ex-occupied countries as much as possible of their losses by looting or wrongful removal from their Central Monetary Authorities by the Germans. Gold collected from private individuals cannot really be considered to form part of the German State's gold resources nor as having been taken from the Central Monetary Authorities of the occupied countries. 73 Despite the apparent finality of this communication, Finance Division CCG(BE) were asked to confirm that the ruling covered all their gold. They replied on 2 September 1948 that of the gold coin held, 1755. 7458kg fine originated with the German Foreign Ministry but had been added to the gold coins delivered under Law 53. Of the bar gold, total holdings were now 425.3221kgs fine, of which 63.8769kg were 'owned by persons said to be foreigners', and seven bars were claimed by the Netherlands Government. H The situation was not therefore entirely clear-cut, and was further complicated by the British authorities having evolved a category of gold, called, confusingiy, 'identifiable non-monetary gold', which fell neither within the TGC definition and thus (as they had thought) to the Pool, nor within the narrow definition of non-monetary gold to be handed over to the IRO. 1bis 'third category' was regarded as available for direct restitution, an interpretation which put the British authorities at odds with the French and American colleagues and underlined still further the need to formulate a common policy with the French and US authorities. 75 No resolution to the problems of what was to happen to the monetary gold in the British Zone was reached during 1949, and the keeping of accurate records on gold holdings was complicated by the transfer of former Reichsbank records to the new Land Banks, whose records were the responsibility of the Allied Banking Commission, and by the change in control 72 On 16 August 1947 the Supreme French Command in Gennany declared to the TGC that they had taken charge of 2.625kg in gold bars and a quantity of coin under Law 53 (enclosed in letter from Bielinky (Treasury) to Pollack (FO Gennan Section), 4 September 1947, T 236/932). An unsigned Treasury note of 4 May 1948 lists American gold deposits under Law 53 as 618. 180kgs (Fa 1046/563). 7S AJ. Collier (Treasury) to Potter (FO Gennan Section), 13 July 1948, CJ 3358, Fa 371171003. See also Monon to TGC Secretary General, 15July, T 236/985. 74 Investigations Section (Berlin) to Investigations Section (Hamburg), 2 September 1948. LmuieszmlrtJibank tier HanseslallJ Hamburg to Finance Division, Berlin, 20 September, both FO 1046/537. 75 Draft brief by D.N. Royce of Fa General German Economic Department on Restitution of Monetary Gold, 12 December 1949, T 236/2543.

arrangements following the establishment of the Federal German Government and the Allied High Commission. 76 Requests for information to the Bank Deutscher Liinder, however, met with little success. 77 By the end of 1949 it had become clear that the fate of monetary gold in the British Zone, and of a number of outstanding questions regarding the restitution of monetary gold in general, could only be resolved if the definition formulated by the TGC and extended to the collection of gold in Germany was revisited By this time both the Tripartite Gold Commission and the Occupation authorities were struggling to interpret the definition in a way that fitted their particular problems. A Brief prepared in the German General Economic Department set out the situation in December 1949 as seen from the German Section of the Foreign Office. 78 As far as the TGC was concerned, the Commissioners had collected detailed data eX gold losses from all the countries entitled to claim, had reached decisions on most claims ' and had made a preliminary distribution at the end of 1947. Their most difficult problem, however, had been to establish that gold claimed was monetary gold within the definition used by the Commission. It had emerged that Central Banks, unhelpfully, did not show in their accounts specific swns of gold which constituted a State's monetary reserves; moreover, in some countries gold could only be held on private account under licence, so that any gold held there might be regarded as part of the monetary reseIVe. The Commissioners had been forced to use as a point of reference the Paris Fmal Act rather than the precise terms of their own definition: for example, they had provisionally admitted a Yugoslav claim on account of gold mined in the Bor Mines and taken from Yugoslavia by the Germans, although it had never been carried on account in the Yugoslav National Bank, because Yugoslav law stated that all gold produced in Yugoslavia must be handed over to the State. Although the Foreign Office Legal Advisers advised that the TGC definition was 'tightly drawn' and had acquired, through use, 'considerable legal force, the more so since there is no other internationally agreed definition of monetary gold', and warned of the dangers of accepting claims for gold which was not monetary, the UK Commissioner maintained that the 76 The Allied High Commission came into existence at 11.00 hours on 21 September 1949, when the West Gennan Chancdlor, Dr. Adenauer, announced that the ftnt Federal Government had been fonned in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law (provisional constitution) which had already been approved. Military Government in the Western Zones of Ge~y then carne to an end, and the Bipartite Board for the British and American Zones and Bipartite Control Office were dissolved. Authority with respect to the control of Gennany was transferred from the Military Governors to the three High Commissioners: the British High Commissioner was Sir B. Robertson. 77 Zonal Office, Minden, to Fmancial Adviser, Berlin, 5 March 1949, Fmancial Adviser to Allied Bank Commission, 9 March, both FO 10461718, Financial Adviser (Frankfurt) to .Bank Dtutsclur Under, 17 March 1949, reply, 25 April and further correspondence, FO 1046/563. 78 Brief by Royce, 1ÂŤ. ciL

TGC had not applied the definition because the 'accounts of the claimant government or its central bank' did not exist. However: The discrepancy between the practice followed by the Gold Commission and that recommended by the Foreign Office legal adviser is more apparent than real. The definition of monetary gold can be interpreted as meaning that gold claimed must have formed part of the monetary reserve of the claimant country (whether it was officially labelled as such or not is immaterial), and it must be established that the gold was shown on the books of the monetary authority of the claimant Government either in the name of the Government itself or in the name of the Bank. The US and French governments are believed to interpret the Definition in this way. 79

As far as the collection of monetary gold in Germany was concerned, 'HMG's policy ... has been to regard as eligible for inclusion in the Gold Pool any gold uncovered in Gennany which would fall within the definition of monetary gold used in sifting claims for looted gold', i.e. the TGC definition. Their creation of a third category of 'identifiable non-monetary' gold meant that in practice Law 53 gold was excluded from the Pool, whereas as far as could be established the American and French authorities rejected the concept of 'identifiable non-monetary gold' and considered it should all go in the Pool. This was also a matter of concern to the TGC, since the amount of gold available to the Pool was considerably less than the total claimed and the Commission wished to draw into the Pool all gold which could be classified as monetary in order to augment the amount available for restitution: however, they had to safeguard against further problems with suspect gold. Against this background of confusion and mutual misunderstanding a French suggestion for an intergovernmental meeting to discuss outstanding questions regarding the restitution of monetary gold was timely, and welcomed by the British and American Governments.

The Tripartite Conference in BrusseLr on Looted M01UUzry Gold Matters, 1950 Representatives of the Governments of France, the UK and US met in Brussels from 5-1 January 1950, with the TGC Commissioners present as advisers. 80 They discussed a wide range of intractable problems which had arisen in connection with the restitution of monetary gold, but the chief achievement of the Conference was to reach agreement on a definition of .monetary gold and its application to Law 53 gold. Conclusions I and IT of the Conference established the future points of reference on this matter, and are

째

79 Ibid., para. 17. eo Records of the Conference and its Conclusions are filed in T 236/2543.

set out in Annex to this Note: as fur as the TGC (and the British Zonal authorities) were concerned, their importance lay in opening the way to the inclusion of Law 53 gold in the Tripartite Gold Commission Pool by deeming that all gold which, in German law, belonged to the state could be classed as monetary. The effect of this definition was in fact to return to the narrower, Paris Act provisions, while regaining freedom of action in respect of the gold which had never been provided for at Paris and which had caused problems ever since. If deemed monetary under German law, Law 53 gold could go into the Pool: but the way was also open to use it for other pwposes too. Equally, the return to the Paris definition left non-monetary gold confined to a very narrow -category. Conclusions I and IT of the Brussels Conference constituted a solution to the monetary gold problem which appeared both compendious and ingenious. By basing the definition on German law and the law of claimant countries the TGC was enabled to overcome the difficulties caused by differing regulations on gold ownership in those countries. It also meant that Law 53 gold could be transferred into the Gold Pool. Conclusion IT, by excluding from the Pool all gold except that covered by Conclusion I unless a 'substantial quantity' were involved, gave the TGC discretion to decide to include gold not covered by Conclusion I if it saw advantage in doing so. The Foreign Office Gennan Section considered that Conclusion I had the advantage of consistency since the law of Germany thus becomes the basis of the decision as to what gold is put into the Pool, just as the law of the claimant countries is taken into consideration in deciding the validity of the claims. It will moreover be possible in case of need in future to demonstrate that the Gold Pool has claimed no gold found in Germany which under German law was not claimed by the German State. 8!

Gold exclutkd.from the TGC Pool Conclusion I had cut through much obfuscation regarding Law 53 gold. There remained, however, areas of confusion, particularly in regard to gold excluded from the Pool. Did this mean it was non-monetary, and should be made available to the refugee organisations? The Foreign Office were quite clear that this was not the case in regard to industrial gold: to dispose in this way of the gold excluded from the Pool under Conclusion IT would be contrary to the agreed United States/United Kingdom interpretation of the intention of the Paris Conference that only gold recovered from concentration camps and the victims of Nazi persecution should be delivered to the International Refugee Organisation . . . much of the gold in the British Zone, which in accordance with Conclusion

.1 FO tdcgram 336 to Wahnerheide, 29 March 1950, T 236/2543. 25

II will be excluded from the Pool, consists of industrial gold (dental gold, gold powder, shaving, wire, sheets, etc.). We doubt whether it was our intention under Law 53 that this industrial gold, which as we are now prepared to recognise ~ not bullion, should have been surrendered. 82 In other words, it was intended to make use of this gold to rebuild German private industry and thereby relieve the burden on the British exchequer. Recognising, however, that this interpretation 'might lead to complaint from the IRO or from some signatory of the Paris Agreement on the ground that all gold found in Germany which is not disposed of as monetary ~ nonmonetary gold within the meaning of Article 8 of Part I of the Paris Agreement', it was decided to consult the French and US Governments on this point, and to ask the High Conunission in Gennany to consider the disposal of all gold excluded from the Pool except that destined for the IRO.83 Discussions in the Allied High Conunission Finance Committee, including consideration of a British proposal of 26 September 1950 on excluded categories of gold, led to approval by the Committee on 6 October 1950 of a .paper on the Disposition of Gold coins which listed the exceptions to the rule that all gold coins deposited under Law 53 should be considered as monetary. These decisions were passed on to the Federal Government in 1951 together with the information that gold and silver coins of numismatic or historical value which were delivered under Law 53 fell within the purview of the release of precious metals presendy under way in the three Western Zones. 84

Before the Control authorities in the British Zone could hand over their monetary gold to the TGC there were still outstanding matters to he resolved, in particular with the US authorities, regarding gold excluded from the TGC Pool under Conclusion IT of the Brussels Conference. Severa] problems were raised with the Foreign Office by the State Department in July 1950: gold which was returnable to its previous owners; the definition of coins of numismatic or historical value for the pwpose of exemptions under Conclusion I; and the question of ' ten gold bars in the United States Zone which were made by the Germans by melting down gold teeth, etc.,

IlJid.

Correspondence between FO Gennan Section and HM Embassy, Washington, March-May 1950, FO 1030/24-5, CJ 1715,2093/6/182, FO 371/85964-. 84 See pp. 9-10 above. British proposal of 26 September 1950 to Allied High Commission Finance Committee on excluded categories of gold, CJ 4-158, FO 371/85968. The paper approved by Finance Committee on 6 October 1950 was attached as Annex C to a memo. of 27 October 1950 from Office of the Financial Adviser, CCG(BE), Wahnerheide, to Land Senior Finance Officen, instructing them to arrange for sorting of gold in their regions in order to prepare a notification to TGC of amounts and locations of monetary gold available for distribution, CJ 4489, FO 371/85968. FIN/FIC/Memo.(5J )6 of 7 March 1951, draft letter to Federal Chancellery on Disposition of Gold Coins, CJ(W) 14-97123, and letter from Chairman of Allied High Commission Finance Committee to Dr. Fritz Schaeffer, Federal Minister of Fmance, 13 March 1951, CJ(W)1497/24-, both FO 371/94039. 83

removed from Nazi victims in Czechoslovakia', and which US agencies wished to regard as monetary gold. 85 The US Government's concern on the first point was expressed initially in tenns of questioning whether gold excluded from the TGC Pool and returned to its former owners would be used for the maximum benefit of the German economy_ As discussions progressed during 1950 and into 1951, however, it became clear that in the US Zone in particular the lines between the restitution of non-Pool gold and the implementation of the overall Four Phase Restitution programme had become blurred, and that some gold had been released to foreign owners. 86 In the British Zone, on the other hand, the Control Authorities had 'always interpreted [part ill of the Paris Act] literally, and monetary gold has been consigned to the Pool even when identified as being of Allied ownership'. 87 After protracted correspondence on the question of gold coins owned by non-Germans (and in particular by nonsignatories of the Paris Act), and despite the Foreign Office view that

in so far as Part c:i the Paris Act does not provide for any exemption from the operation of Article A of gold in Germany claimed in ownership by non-Germans, the principle that gold should not be exempted on this account may be regarded as established by the Act88 it was eventually decided that as the practice of releasing such gold was followed in the French and US Zones, the British Zone should follow suit.89 The question of the definition of coins of numismatic or historical value for the pwpose of exemption under Conclusion I of the Brussels Conference did not prove problematical, the British Government being willing to agree to US proposals that small proportions of gold forming part of a larger collection of coins should be exempt from inclusion in the Pool. The matter of the bars containing melted down teeth, however, led to some discussion in the Foreign Office of the US proposal that they should be included in the Pool. The initial 85 Letter from Chancery, liM: Embassy, Washington to FO Gennan Section General Economic Department, 14 July 1950, CJ 3247, FO 371/85966. 16 See, for example, Wahnerheide telegram No. 435 Saving of 10 May 1951, CJ(W) 1497128, FO 371/94039. In 1948 a Four Phase programme of Restitution and Reparation, agreed on a tripartite basis, was begun in each of the three Western Zones. Phase I oovered External Restitution (foreign securities), Phase Internal Restitution (identifiable property), Phase property of owners not subject to Control Council Law No. 5 Q.e. Vesting and Manhalling Legislation, see DBPO, Series I, Vol. V), and Phase IV Reparations. The complexity of this programme, summarised with admirable clarity in a report ofJanuary 1955 by Mr. D. Caldecourt on 'Financial Reparation and Restitution Deliveries from Gennany' rNG 14919/ I, FO 371/ 118398), makes any confusion between the multiple strands of restitution entirely comprehensible. FO telegram No. 217 Saving VICI1M to Wahnerheide, 23 February 1951, CJ(W) 1497111, FO 371/94039 . â&#x20AC;˘ Note by Mr. A.H. Lincoln, FO, 29 May 1951, CJ(W) 1497/33, FO 371/94040. 19 FO ck:spatth No. 419 to Sir Ivme Kirkpatrick, British High Commissioner, CJ(W) 1497172, 26 November 1951, FO 371/94042.

British ~eaction was that in view of their origin these bars should be regarded as non-monetary gold due to the International Refugee Organisation, and the State Department were asked to elaborate 'by what logical process the Americans conclude that they should be regarded as monetary'. The State Department replied that 'proof as to the origin of the gold is not as clear cut as may have appeared', and that 'regardless of origin the gold is in bar fonn and under German law was part of Gennany's monetary reserve'.90 Mr. Goodchild in the German General Economic Department was 'not entirely happy' about this argument, finding it 'hard to accept that the Refugees should be denied this gold merely because the Germans "legitimized" their action by making neat bars of the teeth and incorporating them into the Reich's monetary reserve'. Mr. ].L. Simpson, a Foreign Office Legal Adviser, disagreed, however: It seems to me that the origin of this gold does not matter one way or another. The Paris Act does not, as you know, contain a definition of 'monetary gold' but the implication is that monetary gold is gold which fonned part of Germany's monetary reserves, and this interpretation is consistent with conclusion I of the Brussels Conference. I think, therefore, that the State Department is right in saying that this gold should be treated as monetary gold and distributed through the machinery of the Tripartite Commission. 91 The British Control Authorities were infonned that 'we now aree that these bars should be regarded as monetary gold due to the Pool'. 9 It is not clear from the British archives, however, what eventually happened to these bars.

'ThÂŁ transfer of monetmy gold.fr()Tn the British Zane to the TGC Following the acceptance by governments of the conclusions of the Brussels Conference, and a decision in the Finance Committee of the Allied High Commission on what coins were to be regarded as monetary, it was possible to proceed with arrangements for the disposal of the monetary gold held in the British Zone. \Vhile discussions on the problems of excluded gold proceeded at length, the Control Authorities made progress with the collection and classification of the monetary gold available in the British Zone of Gennany for the gold Pool. This process was virtually complete by the end of January 1951, and the Fmancial Adviser, CCG(BE) sent the Foreign Office a final statement of British Zone gold holdings on 20 February.93 90 FO telegram No. 171 Saving VICTIM to Wahnerheide, 31 July 1950, CJ 3247/6/182, Washington telegram No. 490 Saving to FO, 8 August 1950, CJ 3556/6/182, both FO 371/85967. 91 Minutes by Goodchild and Simpson, 11 and 15 August 1950, CJ 3556/6/182, FO 371/85967. 92 FO telegram No. 828 Saving VICI'IM to Wahnerheide, 16 August 1950, CJ 3556/6/182, FO 371/85967. 9S Goodchild (FO Gennan Section) to Abbott (I'reasury), 24 January 1951, Miss L. Bristow (freasury) to Goodchild, 30 January, CJ(W) 1497/9, WJ. Castle (Office of Financial Adviser, Wahnerheide) to

When the French Government proposed that an account for the TGC in the name of the three governments should be opened at the Banque de France in Paris, to which the gold &om the British Zone could be transferred easily, this seemed sensible for ease of transport and to avoid delay. The British and American Governments agreed to the French proposal, and arrangements were set in hand in the British Zone for the concentration of the gold in Land Bank Head Offices and its collection and transport to Diisseldorf, from where it was to be flown to Paris. 94 Following a series of delays (including a hold-up because the Banque de France was unwilling to open the necessary account until the US Government had sent a fonnalletter requesting it), the gold was flown to Paris in two consignments on 18 and 25 October 1951 and deposited safely in the vaults of the Bank. The TGC issued an acknowledgement of receipt on 20 December 1951 cf 2,343. 1434kg of fine gold,95 more than me years after British forces moved through Gennany collecting gold. Despite the exhaustive discussions on what gold should go into the TGC implementing a coherent and consistent system of collection, custody and sorting in the British Zone meant that some problems . were inevitable. Following the transfer, it was discovered that mistakes in sorting by Land Banks had led to some gold being delivered in error to the Pool. This included gold coins which might belong to nationals of countries not members cf the lARA (mcluding five coins which had belonged to Wlknown prisoners in Neuengamme), and historical coins such as ten 18th and early 19th centwy Spanish coins and a number of late 19th century Reichsmarks.96 Where these coins were clearly of historical or numismatic value they were returned to Germany, together with any other restitutable items found to have been included in error, though items where the ownership could not be discovered were left in the Pool. Nevertheless, both the TGC and the Control Authorities continued to observe the definition of monetary gold as strictly as possible. When, for example, CCG(BE) Internal Restitution Section declared that they held 3 gold bars, apparently taken from a Pole, which had 'no marking whatsoever and may represent looted jewellery which has been melted down', together with some silver and a quantity of gold watches and jewellery, they were informed that Poo~ the difficulties

Lincoln (FO German Section), 20 February 1951, CJ(W) 1497/18, and supplemental)' letter of 22 February, CJ 1497/19, all FO 371/94039. 94 Wmgate (rGC) to Goodchild (FO Gennan Section, 3 July 1951 and reply 11 July, CJ(W) 1497/43, Note from French Emba.y, London, to FO, 10 July, CJ(W) 1497/46, K.D. Jamieson (HM Embassy, Washington) to Goodchild (FO Gennan General Economic Department), 24 July, and reply, 4 August, CJ(W)1494/44, FO 371/94034, Brussels telegram No. 153 to FO, 26 July, CJ(W) 1497/52, Office of Fmancial Adviser, CCG(BE), Wahnerheide to Lo.tuf Senior Fmance Officers, 16 August, CJ(W) 1497/49, FO 371194040, 94041. !IS See coilcspolldc:nce on file CJ(W) 1497, September-December 1951, FO 371/94Q4.1-2. Letter from Secrewy-General of TGC to Office of the Fmancial Adviser, CCG(BE), 20 December 1951, CE(W) 1492/1 , FO 371/99961 of 1952. â&#x20AC;˘ Conesponclcnce between Office of the Economic Adviser, CCG(BE), Secretary-General, TGC, and FO, ovember 1951 , CJ(W) 1494, FO 371/94036, May:July 1952, CE(W) 1492, FO 371/99969-70, AprilMay 1953, CW 14913, FO 371/104117.

these items all fall to be classified as unidentifiable nonmonetary gold, and should therefore under the terms of Article 8 of the Paris Agreement on Reparation be placed at the disposal of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees or its successor.97 The underlying problems of dividing gold into 'monetary' and nonmonetary,' described in this section of the Note, meant that uncertainties and problems were bound to arise in relation to deposits of gold into the TGC Pool, particularly where the origin of the gold was unclear. They were mirrored by the problems the Commissioners faced in adjudicating claims where the pre-seizure provenance, ownership or location of gold was uncertain, or where the line between looting, barter and legitimate sale of gold was muddied. The Commissioners, able to act only as agents for their Governments, strove to stick as closely as possible to their guidelines and definition in the face of political pressures, such as US unwillingness to allow Czechoslovakia, as a Communist country, to receive its allocation; of legal constraints such as those imposed by the lengthy and complex Dollfus-Mieg case; or of conflicting interests, such as Italian and British claims to Albania's gold allocation.

97 Correspondence between Internal Restitution Section, Office of the Economic Adviser, Wahnerheide and FO Gennan General Department, 5 July 1952 to 8 May 1953, CE(W) 14919, FO 371/100002, CW 14910, FO 371/104109.

c. Non-lDOnetary gold in the British Zone The problems presented by non-monetary gold in the British Zone were less complex than those caused by monetaIy gold, though nonetheless thorny. According to the narrow definition adopted, there was very little nonmonetary gold in the British Zone: it was kept separate; it was not reclassified; its disposal was provided for by international agreement; and apart from some confusion with more general schemes for restitution and relief, its disposition proceeded as planned, if very slowly. Definition By the end of 1945, the definition of non-monetary gold as gold articles removed by the Nazis from their victims in concentration camps was understood and accepted in discussions on reparation and restitution even if not fonnally codified in agreements such as the Paris Fmal Act The Control Commission's understanding of this definition was confumed by the fonnula set out by CaGA in May 1946,98 and although in correspondence between the Treasury, Bank a England, CaGA and CCG(BE) Divisions the term 'non-monetary' was used in the loose sense as meaning gold which did not fall into the 'monetary' definition, the definition of non-monetary gold used by Fmance Division, CCG(BE) in relation to the disposal of gold in their custody was confined strictly to 'unidentifiable gold looted from the bodies of people killed by the Nazis in concentration camps'.

In November 1946 the US Government proposed that the definition of non-monetary gold be extended to cover Austria as well as Germany, and to include other valuables as well as gold. In fact the US authorities had already adopted this wider definition, and were apparently interpreting it even more flexibly to include to all articles of intrinsic value which had been looted, even if they might fall within the definition of monetaIy gold. 99 The US proposal was discussed at the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in March 1947, where it was agreed that the definition should be widened to include valuable articles other than gold articles, though restricted to unidentifiable articles since identifiable articles would be subject to restitution under the pr~sed plan for the restitution of property to victims of Nazi persecution. 1 The revised definition, agreed with Berlin, stated that; Non-monetary gold means all unidentifiable articles of intrinsic value looted from persons confined .by Nazis in â&#x20AC;˘ 101 concentrabon camps.

See pp. 5 and 10 above. Letter from US Embassy, London to FO, enclosing draft directive to US Commanding Generals in Gennany and Austria, 21 November 1946, Bank of England documents; Propeny Control Branch paper on Non-monetary gold, 10 April 1947, T 23611479. 100 See note 82 above. See correspondence between FO and UK Delegation to Council of Foreign ~isters in Moscow, 26 March-20 April 1947, in T 236/1479. 101 Hampshire (FO German Section) to Bie1inky (Treasury), 21 May 1947, T 23611479. 98

Indicating his acceptance of this formula to his U and counterparts on 28 June 1947, the Chief of Finane Divisi n, enquired whether they were using it in the preparation of inv n 路 articles to be handed over to the Inter-Governmental ommitt 102 Refugees. The US authorities, however, favour d a still wid r d whi based on their experience of discovering unidentifiable personal arti could not definitely be said to have been taken from con ntration camp victims: SS gold found at Merkers was an example of this. uch gold clearly 'victim' gold, and should not be excluded from th prop rty to b pt mb r handed over for the benefit of non-repatriable refug es. On 13 1947 Mr. Hampshire of FO German Section informed Mr. Bielinky that Property Control Branch now proposed to work to the following d finition closely based on that used in the US Zone: All valuable personal effects which represents [sic] loot iz d or obtained under duress from political, racial and religiou victims of Nazi Government or its satellite governments or nationals thereof, subject to following conditions: (a) that th article cannot be restituted, because determination of national origin is impractical, (b) that the article cannot b restor d to lawful owners either because lawful owner has di d without legal successor or because determination of individual ownership is impractical. Ownership interests in r al prop rty located in Germany, German currency or instruments of exchange payable in German currency and Jewish boo manuscripts and literature of cultural or religious importan are not considered to fall within the definition of nonmonetary gold. 103 1bis definition was agreed on a tripartite basis in S ptemb r 1947 although the British and French Governments also agr ed that whil th definition could now be used to enable inventories to be made, no article which was identifiable would be handed over to the IRO until a suffici nt period had elapsed to allow any possible claimant to submit a claim. 104

The decisions of the Tripartite Conference in Brussels in January 1950 introduced temporary confusion by apparendy creating a n w cat gory of non-monetary gold, i.e. that excluded from the Pool under Conclusion I. 'o~ However, as the Foreign Office explained to Washington, it was clear that this gold, 'which was probably not in any case "foWld by the Allied AImed Forces'" had never been intended to go to the IRO; indeed, there was doubt 102 Chief of finance Division, CCG(BE), to Chiefs of Finance Division in French and US Zon , 28 June 1947, FO 1046/557. . 10' Hampshire (FO Gennan Section) to Bie1inky (freasury), 13 September 1947, T 236/1479. 104 Correspondence with Property Control Branch, CCG(BE), 19 and 29 September 1947, 236/1479 and FO 1046/563. 105 See p. 25-27, and Annex II.

whether this industrial gold, as distinct from bullion (which would go into the Pool) should have been seized under Law 53 in the first place. 106 The question of the 'not monetary', as opposed to 'non-monetary' gold was referred to the High Commission in Germany. The fate of the true nonmonetary gold was unaffected.

Discovery and custo4J Gold belonging to concentration camp victims was found by the Allied forces moving through Germany in 1945 both at or near the camps discovered and opened by Allied troops, and in Nazi hoards, although in the latter case its provenance was more uncertain. For example, although the SS loot found by US forces in the Merkers hoard found in the Kaiserode salt mine contained gold which was obviously 'victim' gold,I07 the former owners of gold ornaments, rings etc. had not necessarily ended up in concentration camps. Reichsbank documentation and evidence from interrogation reports enabled the US authorities to build up a fairly detailed picture of the composition of the SS loot, but the sheer amount of material involved and the length of time over which it had been collected made precision impossible. As the Assistant Chief of the US Fmance Intelligence Branch concluded, the swns estimated by Albert Thoms, chief of the Reichsbank Precious Metals Department, for loot handled by the Reichsbank since 1942 appeared an understatement: Certainly, they cannot begin to represent the total extent of the operations of the SS 'economic department' which for 12 years has disposed cl the personal and household valuables cl millions of racial and J><?litical victims of the calculated Nazi policy of extennination. 108 Reporting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Merkers hoard, Lt.-Gen. W.B. Smith, US ' Chief of Staff, expressed the view that the SS material represented 'loot taken from individuals who have been murdered' and might constitute evidence: 'agencies engaged in the determination of evidence for the prosecution of war criminals should be informed, and at the proper time should be permitted to inspect and investigate this part of the property,.I09 The difficulty cl distinguishing between gold which came from concentration camps or from other victims led to the broadening of the definition in 1947: the US Zonal authorities wished to be able to transfer all 'victim' gold to the International Refugee Organisation. 110 FO telegram 1456 Saving to Washington, 29 March 1950, T 236/2543. See p. 4. 108 Report from SHAEF G-5 Special Fmancial detachment at Frankfurt on 'Disposition of SS Loot by the Reichsbank', 8 May 1945, sent to CCG(BE) by Headquarters, US Group on 1June, FO 1046/33. Smith to Secretaries, CCS, 20 April 1945, enclosed in CCAC 184 of 28 April, loco cit.: see note 8 above. 110 See SeymourJ. Rubin and Abba P. Schwartz, 'Refugees and Reparations', in lAw and Contemporary Probllnu, issue on War Claims, Duke University School of Law, Vol. 16, Summer 1951, No.3, pp. 385-6, tq)Y kindly supplied by US Stale Department. 101 107

Holdings of non-monetary gold in the British Zone of Gennany w re 1 extensive than those in the US Zone, and originated mainly from th camp at Belsen and Neuengamme. llJ Consisting mainly of dental gold, w dding rings and ornaments, this gold was collected, together with all th other it ms belonging to concentration camp victims, by Property Control authoriti s in the region concerned-Hannover (for Belsen) and Schleswig-Hols~ in (for Neuengamme). Other items found at lesser camps and els wh r w r apparently added to these stores, which were kept quite separate from oth r fonns of gold and precious metals, and deposited in regional R ichsbank branches for safekeeping. During the latter half of 1945 and early 1946 this non-monetary gold and other property was kept safe but left relatively undisturbed, although orne work was done on preparing inventories-Property Control Branch later reported that Allied Liaison Officers had spent 'many weeks' ~r paring an inventory of the property of fonner inmates of Neuengamme. 12 How v r there were a number of reasons why the preparation of detailed inv ntorie of concentration camp victims' property were accorded a low r priority than the examination of bullion, coins etc.; for one thing, some records aIr ad existed, according to Property Control Branch: the Nazis carefully parcelled and catalogued their gleanings in gold from the victims in the concentration camps, and . . . these parcels and cataloguings are still extant. 113 At this stage, it was also assumed that most of the owners of th nonmonetary gold were dead, although schemes were later set in pIa to enable possible survivors or their relatives to claim identifiable property. Th preparation of inventories of non-monetary gold and other victims' prop rty was also a time-consuming and labour-intensive task, and Military Government officers were already overstretched. It is not swprising if in th face of repeated requests from London for statements of gold in th British Zone priority was given to accounting for the more valuabl gold bulli n and coin. Another reason why the non-monetary gold lay undisturbed for m time was that until the Paris Conference on Reparation no decision had b n taken as to what was to happen to it.

Non-monetary gold and the Allocation Vu;tims of German action

of a &paration Slime

/I) Non-&patriah~

The proposal to allocate all the non-monetary gold fOWld in G rmany to non-repatriable victims of Nazi persecution was first made by Jam III On concentration camps in the British Zone, and for an account of the Briti h fore ' rrivaJ at Belsen, see F.S.V. Donnison, CWiJ Affairs aM MiLikzry GODmrmmt North-West EurDfJI 1941 -1946

1961), pp. 219-24. 112 Property Control Branch (Berlin) to Banking Branch (Hamburg), 11 JWle 19%, 0 I 046/20~ . These inventories presumably fonned the basis for those produced in 1947: see note 131 below. 113 Property Control Branch to Banking Branch, 9July 1946, FO 1046/557.

S Representativ to the Allied Commission on Reparations, in o ember 1945 as part of an American plan to give a share of reparatio~ and restitution to tatdess persons, originally proposed in the margins of the Potsdam Conference and fonnalised in preparatory cJiscmsions for the Paris Conference. I .. The British Government, while sympathetic to the US scheme in principle had doubts about its practicability, and the whole question ~came enmeshed with cJiscmsions on Displaced Persons (DPs) with the nited ations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and complicated by the US decision to regard Jewish DPs and persecuted German Jews as non-repatriable and segregate them on a racial basis pending their removal to Palestine or other non-European destination. I 15 There was no British objection, however, to the idea of allocating to victims of azi Germany the non-monetary gold 'which we understand to consist primarily of gold objects seized from the Jews'. 116

Angell,

. Angell was able to reassure Sir D. Waley regarding a nwnber of British objections to the plan, including the stipulation that any such scheme must cover aD non-repatriable victims of the Nazis and not merely Jews. I 17 Agreement on a US resolution was eventually reached at Paris, despite bitter opposition from the Yugoslav and Czech Governments who maintained that they had no non-repatriable refugees, only 'traitors whom they were anxious to have back in order to hang them'. The text adopted on 18 December provided that the non-monetary gold found in Gennany should be placed at the disposal of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees as soon as a plan of administration had been worked out by the governments of France, the UK, US Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. I IS During the early months of 1946, as instructed by COGA, regional finance and banking authorities in the British Zone were preparing returns of the monetary and non-monetary gold in their custody.119 In the case of nonmonetary gold, tim meant setting in train the preparation of inventories where they ctid not exist, and arranging for the assay and valuation of gold and gold items. Disct.sions c1 the definition of monetary gold threatened to derail this process, but the FIVe-Power meeting held in Paris inJune 1946 to •• 4 Coulson (FO) to Playfair (freasury), 9 August 1945, Waley (UK Reparations Delegation, Paris) to Playfair (freasury), 8 ovembcr, both T 236/1478. • IS See .DBPO, Series I, Vol I, Nos. 302 (Cabinet paper . of 17 July 1945 on Non-repatriable Refugees) and 583 and oL V, 05. 9.v, 41, 48, 57, 73.v and 98, and in particular No. 66.iv on Compensation for

Victims of azi Penecution. 116 FO telegram o. 156 VICTIM Saving to Paris, 16 November 1945, UE 5531/624177, copy in T 23611478. 111 AngdI to Wa1ey, 29 November (under cover of letter of I December from Coulson (FO) to R.C.G. SomerveU (Board of Trade», T 23611478 . • 11 Playfair (Treasury) to Dent (FO), II and 17 December 1945, Paris telegrams Nos. 22 VICTIM and 101 VICTIM Saving, 19 December, aD in T 236/1478. See also Annex I to this Note. 119 Cf. p. 8 abcM. For thcIe returns tee, for example, Banking Section (Schleswig-Holstein region) to Banking Branch (Hamburg) I April 1946, Property Control Branch (Berlin) to Banking Branch

(Hamburg), 20June 1946, both FO 1046/205.

discuss the implementation of Article 8, Part I of the Pari Act b u t th question of non-monetary gold and its disposition firmly ba on ~ the international agenda. The Five-Power C{)Tljerence ifJwu 1946 As agreed at the Paris Conference on Reparation, r pr S ntativ th governments of the USA, France, the UK, Czechoslovakia and together with representatives of the Executiv Committ Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, met in Paris from 11-14 Jun 1946 to discuss suitable measures for implementing the provisions of Artiel 8 Part I of the Paris Final Act. On 14 June they signed an agr m nt hi of relevance in the broader context of Nazi gold, and is r produ d ill to this Note. The Agreement provided for the establishment of a fund for th rman non-repatriable victims, to comprise S25m from the proc ds of assets in neutral countries, all the non-monetary gold found by th Alli d Anned Forces in Germany, and swns made available on r qu st by Alli d Governments by neutral countries from the assets in those countri s of victims of Nazi action who had died and left no heirs. All th fimds w r to administered by the Intergovernmental Committee on R fug or i successor organisation: the letter of instruction sent to the Dir ctor of th IG by the French Government on behalf of the five Governm nts whi had signed the Agreement stipulated that for 90% of the S25m fund and the nonmonetary gold, and 95% of the 'heirless assets,' the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the Jewish Agency for Pal stin w r th designated field agencies, while appropriate field organisations would b chosen to administer the fi.mck for eligible non-:Jewish victims. Th I tt r also laid on the IGC responsibility for obtaining the advance fX 50m . ran from the liquidation fX Gennan assets provided for by the Washin n n Agreement of May 1946, and 'to obtain from the Allied representativ the Allied-Swiss Liquidation Commission the remainder of th tw nty-fiv million dollar priority which is being made available for the rehabilitation and resettlement of non-repatriable victims of Gennan action.' Th was also to obtain tide to and to liquidate all 'non-mon ry gold', or any the occupying other valuable made available as such authorities. It ~ possible that caches of 'non-monetary gold' may not as yet have been uncovered by the Allies, and it . therefore deemed desirable that this subject be explor d with the competent authorities. 120 120

Texts of the Agreement, letter of instruction and a letter to the neutral poweR, together with reJevant

annexes, were printed for the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency as IARAI AS/Doc.85 of 26 July 1946,

236/1479. For an FO view on the Agreement 236/1478.

ICe

Refugee Department minute

17 June 1

egonanons .th the neutral countries on both Gennan external assets and heid finxk ere protracted and complex. 121 With respect to nonmonetary gold, ho er the onus was thrown back on the Control uthoriti in Gennan . In the British Zone, those authorities were not convinced that the stipulations of the June 1946 Agreement in regard to nonmonetary gold necessarily served the best interests of victims of Nazi persecution.

RestiJuJion and &lief in the British Zone The question rA assistance and compensation for Vlcttms of Nazi persecution and in particular for Jewish victims, had been under consideration by the British Government since before the end of the war. 122 The Secretary cf State for Foreign AfFairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin, made his government s 路 clear in a parliamentary statement on 13 November 1945: The plight of the victims rA Nazi persecution, among whom ere a large number ofJews, ~ unprecedented in the history of the world. His Majesty's Government are taking every step open to them to try to improve the lot of these unfortunate people. The Jewish problem ~ a great hwnan one. We cannot accept the view that the Jews should be driven out of Europe and should not be pennitted to live again in these countries without discrimination, and contribute their ability and their talent towards rebuilding the prosperity of Europe. 123 easures ere introduced at the end of 1945 by the Control Authorities in the British Zone to provide special assistance for persons persecuted under the azi regime, and further proposals were drafted in 1946 to provide relief for the -inmates of concentration camps. In addition, an examination of the position ofJews in Europe who had been the victims of Nazi persecution had been undertaken by the joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, set up in ovember 1945 with particular reference to the question of Jewish immigration to Palestine, and which reported in 1946. 124 121 Cf. aQ. GoIi I, also Report of the Director to the 6th Plenary Session of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, December 1946, WR 3835/1/48, FO 371/57683. For a retrospective view see e.g. Treasury minute on Payments to the Paris Reparations Refugee Fund, 16 November 1955, T 236/5480, Ole by lARA Secrewy-General, 19 April 1957, T 236/5482. See also records of Tripartite Oiscuaions on German External Assets and the Future of the lARA, held in London 24 January-7 February 1956, in file G 1493, FO 371/ 124658-60. 122 See, for example, DOtes by Trading with the Enemy Department on '1be Question of Compensation for Gcnnan Jews who have suffered propeny losses from Nazi persecution or legal discrimination', 22 September 1944, FO I ()461l 36. Its HtIIfJlII't, House of Commons, vol. 415, col. 1927. 124 For Zone Policy Insuudion. No. 20 of 4 December 1945 on Special Assistance for Persons Persecuted under the aD regime ICe Zonal Advisory Council paper ZAC/P(46)94 of 17 October 1946, FO 1014/ 854. On the AngI~American Committee and the question of Jews in Europe generally see DBPO, Series 1, 01. V, No. 98路 see also telegram SUGRA 214 from COGA to CCG(BE), 22 November

In the summer of 1946 proposals were being submitted to inan of CCG(BE) for quadripartite agreement on the setting up commission to consider the question of the restitution of pr p rty t Nazi oppression, following agreement between th puty Governor and the Pennanent SecretaI)' to the Control fEc that m pr p rti must be taken towards the r~stitution to the original own rs which th~ were dispossessed on racial or political grounds und r th regime' .1 Meanwhile, in the British Zone, restitution claims w r handled by RDR Division. In 1948, the Four-Phase Restitution pr came into operation/ 26 and on 12 May 1949 a British military v law (No. 59) provided a machine I)' for the submission, adjudi ti n uld settlement of claims for restitution of identifiable property; claims 127 submitted up to 30June 1950. In this context, while the Control Authorities were clear th t n t concentration camp victims was strictly non-monetary, th y th convinced that it should all be handed over to the IGC as qui Agreement ofJune 1946 stipulated. Although the US and Fr n h uth nO maintained that they did not hold any identifiable non-mon ta.ry Id in th ir Zones, Property Control Branch felt that the catalogu s f camp victims' gold prepared by the Nazis should enabl t 1 non-monetary gold to be identified: Property Control feel that in a vel)' large num r there must be swviving relatives whom they would onsid r t be entitled to inherit when they can establish th ir claim : in some cases the original owner will have survived and would, it is asserted, be entitled to recover his property. It . n t considered that in such cases the gold should b appli d t any other pwpose until a reasonable time has n giv n t original owners and their heirs to come forward and 1 dg their claim. It is felt that those for example who suffered in B Is n h uld be given a generous opportunity of recovery and that Id . period of say, two years, should be allowed befor th disposed o~ in order to afford the victims an opportunity of establishing their claims. Property Control hav accordingly 1945, and memo. by CCG{BE) Legal Division, Berlin on Position of Jews in GennUlY, 1 December 1 both Fa 1046/434. I~ Property Control Branch, (Berlin) to Internal AtTain and other di . ions, Berlin, m m . n of Nazi Oppression, Restitution of Property, 29June 1946, Fa 1049/522. 126 See note 85 above. 127 Caldecourt (Economic Adviscn' Office, Wahnerheide) to Fa, 28 Novem r 1 32 see also Wahnerheide despatch No. 178 of 14 July 1952 on the Federal Republic' li compensation for victims of Nazi penecution. CE(W) 14919/53, both Fa 371/100003.

i lim

d that th definition for non-monetary gold should ld fc und in oncentration camps, the ownership of not tablish d a date to be detennined' ... It E rno 0 r fc It that if the principles above stated are agreed to, th amount gold left 0 er after all claims have been saOLStl<::cl will relati small. 128 all

ontrol Branch proposed that in the light of these arguments rk on the preparation of inventories of non-monetary nd gold CO hO\i er while agreeing that 'Clearly where the gold ~ id ntifiabl and th re are claimants, it could not be included in the fund', insisted that Th compilation of in entories will have to be made, whatever definition f1 non-mon tary gold E quadripartitely agreed, or whatever curren of restitution cross the issue'.I29 They conceded, however, that Pro Control Branch had raised 'a substantial point of principle':

Th plan for restitution to owners of property of which they re dispossessed by the azis (now under discussion in the Quadripartite Property Control Committee) provides for a time limit to allo victims or their heirs to register their claims and th proposal' to fix this time limit at two years. If these proposals adopted the position would be that the unid ntifiabl gold hich IGCR are due to receive under the t nns ~ Articl cannot be pronounced unidentifiable until th '0- ear limit under the restitution plan has expired. o hand an of it 0 er to IGCR before the limit had expired would to 0 rride the rights of heirship as provided for in ISO th Plan. Pr ure on th British authorities to get on with the inventories was increased b a letter of 23 ugust 1946 to the Foreign Office from the US Em in London stating that Th nited tates has made and is continuing to make intensi m tigations in its zone of occupation for all possible each s of azi loot, of which it has already discovered consid rable amounts. These valuable will shortly be made availabl to the Director of IGCR for the pwposes of the non-repatriable fund It would be very helpful if you would ascertain hether any non-restitutable Nazi loot has been found in the British zone of occupation and, if so, at what time th will be made available to the Director of the IGCR. Sending a cop of this letter to Colonel Hellmuth, Mr. Hampshire stressed that it was important that we should not seem to be lagging behind the I. 1 I

Hellmuth \Ilance Di . 'on, Berlin) to Pollack (COGA), 19 July 1946, FO 1046/557. Poll.ack (COG ) (0 Hellmuth mance Division), 1 August 1946, FO 1046/557. Hampshire (COG ) to Bidinky (freasury), 3 April 1947, T 236/1479.

Americans'. 131 Finance Division duly pressed Property Control Branch t produce returns of restitutable and non-restitutable non-mon tary gold, ut little progress was made until the extended definition of non-mon tary Id was agreed at the Council of Foreign Ministers in March 1947. I 2 On 28 March 1947 Military Government regional headquart r' r p rty Control officers were instructed to prepare inventories of non-mon tary g ld using the definition agreed at Moscow, pointing out that 'unid ntifia I meant 'all articles in respect of which the name and addr ss f th form r owner (given in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt of th id nti the former owner) is not known'. Identifiable articles would not hand d a ). over to the IGC until 'a reasonable time had elapsed (probably Inv nt ri : Property Control authorities were asked therefore to prepar of non-monetary gold, other valuable articles, and valuabl articl from other sources, both identifiable and unidentifiabl in ch example of the inventories produced in this way can b s ninth pr p lists of the N euengamme Concentration Camp, a sober compilation of form r property taken from camp inmates, listing the name and addr 133 owners where known.

The transfer of 1UJTl-1TUJT/ÂŁlIzry gold fr()T!l the British Zrme By August 1947, when the US authorities had made $750,000 w rth non-monetary gold available to the Preparatory Commission r th International Refugee Organisation (PCIRD-succ ssor to th ) neither the UK nor French governments had yet made any non-m n tary gold availahle. l34 As far as the British Zone was concern d, th r w number of reasons for this. A Central Claims Registry had been t up t B d Nenndorf, to investigate claims for the return of property 1 ft concentration camp victims to their legal owners, relations or h irs, d th non-monetary gold in the Zone was centralised there. Gold b came ugh up in the wider issue of restitution, where the British authorities w r in implementing their legislation and had soon built up an unmana hI backlog of cases. 135 In practice, however, most of the gold and other concentration mp victims' property was 'heirless', as the Property Control authoriti point d out Hampshire (COGA) to Hellmuth (Finance Division), 30 August 1946, FO 1046/557. Finance Division, Berlin, to Property Control Branch, 4 September 1946; c. a1 HeUmuth Oi " ,3 1 (Fmance Division) to Hampshire, 7 November 1946, and memo. by C hief of man December 1946, all FO 1046/ 557 ; see pp. 29-30 above. Property Control Branch, Berlin, to regional HQs, 28 March 194', 0 1 1557. Neuengamme property lists are faled in FO 1006/61 5- 18. 154 FO to Abbott (Treasury), 29 August 194-7, T 236/1479. ISS See on this question the Rlport of tIu O'S&dLivan CommiJlII em thI propss rruuJ, in tIu dis/>O 41 of inJmuzl rtJtiJutiqn cl4ims in tIu BriJish Z01U of Gtmumy, 30 June 195 1 (HMSO, 1951). 151

152

It was going to be impossible to trace the heir of many bits of property since the whole family had been extirpated. Where cannot find the heirs to the property, then the property ould go to IRO to be realised for funds to assist International Refugees. 1 Quadripartite discussions on the principles to govern the settlement of claims and on lCtim Law proved protracted and awkward, and Property Control Branch were left with the task of dealing with claims and deciding which property could not be restituted. Their task was further complicated by the ongoing devolution of responsibilities from CCG(BE) staff to German staff under the Bizone arrangements. An undated 1947 memorandum on the functions and staffing of Property Control Branch gloomily speculated that their work aright continue 'for many years, perhaps to the end of the period of occupation'. 1'7 However, as far as non-monetary gold was concerned, the process was largely completed in 1951: according to the Frnal &port on

Fuumcio1 lUparation and RestitutUm DeliveOO }rom Germany: The unidentifiable assets which were handed over on the 24th

of January, 1951, to a representative of the International Refugee Organisation consisted for the most part of watches, cigarette cases and rings. Such of the remaining items as were identifiable and therefore outside the definition were sorted according to the nationality c1 the ascertained owners and handed over on request to the appropriate Governments for distribution to the owners or their next of kin. IgS The remainder of unidentifiable objects were sent via London to the Paris Reparation Refugee Fund (following the liquidation of the IRO) in New York in 1955. The consignment consisted of 34 parcels containing mainly rings, watches and ornaments, together with a small number of dental crowns, three bars and some strips of gold, and some pieces of silver and platinum (mcluding a quantity of industrial platinum). 139

ate for Deputy Chief of Fmance Division, 17 October 1947, FO 1052/464. Undated report, 1947, on Fmance Division Functions, FO 1046/171. I. Fmal Report on rllWlcia1 Report and Restitution, 28 January 1955, loco tiL 1 See file G 1492/37, FO 371/118389. IS7

Conclusion The story of what happened to Nazi gold found in the British Zone of Germany is, of course, only a small part of the picture. It is, however, a genuine microcosm. The problems faced by the British Element of the Control Commission for Gennany were the same as those faced by the French and American authorities: they were the same as those faced by the TGC Commissioners; and those faced by the three Governments who had taken on the task of implementing the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation. All of them had to contend with confusion-both endemic and created; with trying to interpret rules and procedures in a constantly shifting landscape of political, legal and economic imperatives; with a range of governmental, military and financial authorities so wide as to inspire not obedience or acquiescence but an independent spirit born out of frustration and a genuine desire to get on with the job. As far as the Tripartite Gold Commission was concerned, its position was awkward, its authority uncertain and its procedures fraught with difficulty. Nevertheless, it succeeded in adjudicating on a large number of claims of varying coherence and substance, and in distributing the major part of the gold in the Pool. Neither the Commissioners, their Governments nor the account-holding Banks knew exactly where all the gold deposited in the TGe Pool originated. They were aware of this at the inception of the TGC in 1946, and their definition, procedures and decisions were based upon this knowledge. The purpose of the TGC, however, was to effect the restitution of as much monetary gold as possible to those countries who had lost it The Pool was never sufficiently large to allow for more than 64% of claims to be met. The demarcation line between monetary and non-monetary gold was maintained as far as the infonnation available on the gold allowed. It would be wrong to assert that there was no possibility that some gold bars deposited in the Pool, smelted by the Nazis, contained gold items which had belonged to concentration camp or other victims. Two conclusions can, however, be drawn from the records on this point:

gold which was known without question to have been taken from concentration camp victims was kept separate and used for the pwposes intended; and the Allies, after full consideration of all the issues involved, decided that it was right to regard any such gold in bar fonn (which could only have been a relatively minute amount) as monetary, regardless of its origin, under the terms of the Paris Agreement, and therefore eligible for inclusion in the Pool.

ANNEX I

Part

of the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation (monetary gold)

A All the monetary gold found in Germany by the Allied Forces and that referred to in paragraph G below (including gold coins, except those of numismatic or historical value which shall be restored directly if identifiable) shall be pooled for distribution as restitution among the countries participating in the pool in proportion to their respective losses of gold through looting or by wrongful removal to Germany. B. Without prejudice to claims by way of reparation for unrestored gold, the portion of monetary gold thus accruing to each country participating in the pool shall be accepted by that country in full satisfaction of all claims against Germany for restitution of monetary gold. C. A proportional share of the gold shall be allocated to each country concerned which adheres to this arrangement for the restitution of monetary gold and which can establish that a definite amount of monetary gold belonging to it was looted by Germany, or, at any time after the 12 March, 1938, was wrongfully removed into German territory. D. The question of the eventual participation of countries not represented at the Conference (other than Germany but including Austria and Italy) in the above-mentioned distribution shall be reserved, and the equivalent of the total shares which these countries would receive, if they were eventually admitted to participate, shall be set aside to be disposed of at a later date in such manner as may be decided by the Allied Governments concerned. E. The various countries participating in the pool shall supply to the Governments of the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom as the occupying Powers concerned, detailed and verifiable data regarding the gold losses suffered through looting by, or removal to, Germany. F. The Governments of the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom shall take appropriate steps within the zones of Germany occupied by them respectively to implement distribution in accordance with the foregoing provisions. G. Any monetary gold which may be recovered from a third country to which it was transferred from Germany shall be distributed in accordance with this arrangement for the restitution of monetary gold.

Part I, Article 8: Allocation of the Reparation Share to

on-

Repatriable VictUns of Gennan Action (non-lDonetary gold)

In recognition of the fact that large nwnbers of persons hav heavily at the hands of the Nazis and now stand in dir n d promote their rehabilitation but will be unable to claim the assistan Government receiving reparation from Germany, the Governm nts United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, in consultation with the Inter-Governmental Committ on Refugees, shall, as soon as possible, work out in common agre m nt a plan on the following general lines: A A share of reparation consisting of all the non-monetary gold found by the Allied Anned Forces in Germany and in addition a sum not exceeding 25 million dollars shall be allocated for the rehabilitation and resettlement of non-repatriable victims of German action. B. The sum of 25 million dollars shall be met from a portion of th proceeds of German assets in neutral countries which are availabl for reparation. C. Governments of neutral countries shall be requested to mak availabl for this purpose (in addition to the swn of 25 million dollars) ass ts in such countries of victims of Nazi action who have since died and 1 ft no heirs. D. The persons eligible for aid under the plan in question shall b restricted to true victims of Nazi persecution and to their immediate families and dependants, in the following classes: (i) Refugees from Nazi Germany or Austria who requir aid and cannot be returned to their countries within a reasonable . time becaus of prevailing conditions. (ii) Gennan and Austrian nationals now resident in Gennany or Austria in exceptional cases in which it is reasonable on grounds of humanity to assist such persons to emigrate and providing they emigrate to other countries within a reasonable period. (iii) Nationals cA countries fonnerly occupied by the Gennans who cannot be repatriated or are not in a position to be repatriated within a reasonable time. In order to concentrate aid in the most needy and deserving refugees and to exclude persons whose loyalty to the Unit d Nations is or was doubtful, aid shall be restricted to nationals or former nationals of previously occupied countries who were victims of Nazi concentration camps or of concentration camps established by regimes under Nazi influence but not including persons who have been confined only in prisoners of war camps. E. The sums made available under paragraphs A and B above shall be administered by the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees or by a United Nations Agency to which appropriate functions of the Inter-Governmental Committee may in the future be transferred. The 44

sums made a ailable under paragraph C above shall be administered for the general purposes referred to in this article under a program of administration to be fonnulated by the five Governments named above. F. The non-monetary gold found in Gennany shall be placed at the disposal of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees as soon as a plan has been worked out as provided above. G . The Inter-Go emmental Committee on Refugees shall have power to carry out the purposes of the fimd through appropriate public and private field organisations. H. The fimd shall be used, not for the compensation of individual victims, but to further the rehabilitation or resettlement of persons in the eligible classes. I. othing in this Article shall be considered to prejudice the claims which individual refugees may have against a future German Government, except to the amount of the benefits that such refugees may have received from the sources referred to in paragraphs A and C above.

ANNEX II ConclusioDS I and D of the Brussels Conference, January 1950 CONCLUSION

The Meeting agreed to recommend to their Governments that for the purpose of the recovery of gold from Gennany under paragraph A of Part ill of the Paris Agreement on Reparations from Germany and the Restitution of Monetary Gold of January, 1946, monetary gold should be held to include gold which under German Law and regulations was monetary gold. In accordance with this agreement gold which is in the fonn of fine gold bars, gold alloy bars, or gold coins (except those of numismatic or historical value), including gold in those forms which was surrendered or should have been surrendered under Military Government Law No. 53 in the US, British and French Zones of Occupation in Germany, should be made available to the Gold Pool. As to the definition of monetary gold for redistribution pwposes the Meeting considered it to be consistent with the past practice of the Commission to take into account the law of the claimant country in making its decisions whether gold claimed as looted was monetary gold. It was deemed that this latter practice of the Commission should help the Allied High Commission, if necessary, to justify the transfer of monetary gold collected under Law 53 into the Gold Pool if and when the propriety of such transfer should be questioned in Gennany at any later time. CONCLUSION IT The Meeting agreed to recommend to their Governments that for reasons of administrative convenience their authorities in Germany be instructed to exclude from the Gold Pool gold other than that referred to in the second sentence of paragraph 1 of the Record cf Conclusion No. I of the Conference, even though treated under German Law as monetary gold, unless a substantial quantity of such gold should prove to be in question.

ANNEXm Agreement on a plan for aDocation of a reparation share to non-repatriable victh:us of Gennan action, 14 June 1946

In accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of the Fmal Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation, the Governments of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, in consultation with the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees, have worked out, in common agreement, the following plan to aid in the rehabilitation and resettlement ci non-repatriable victims of Gennan action. In working out this plan the signatory Powers have been guided by the intent of Article 8, and the procedures outlined below are based on its tenns:

In recognition of special and urgent circumstances, the sum of $25,000,000, having been made available by Allied Governments as a priority on the proceeds of the liquidation of German assets in neutral countries, ~ hereby placed at the disposal of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees or its successor organization for distribution to appropriate public and private field organizations as soon as they have submitted practicable programmes in accordance with this Agreement. A It is the unanimous and considered opinion of the Five Powers that in light of Paragraph H of Article 8 of the Paris Agreement on Reparation, the assets becoming available should be used not for the compensation of individual victims but for the rehabilitation and resettlement of persons in eligible classes, and that expenditures on rehabilitation ~ be considered as essential preparatory outlays to resettlement. Since all available statistics indicate beyond any reasonable doubt that the ovelWhelming majority of eligible persons under the provisions of Article 8 are Jewish, all assets except as specified in Paragraph B below are allocated for the rehabilitation and resettlement of eligible Jewish victims of Nazi action, among whom children should receive preferential assistance. Eligible Jewish victims of azi action are either refugees from Gennany or Austria who do not desire to return to these countries, or Gennan and Austrian Jews now resident in Germany or Austria who desire to emigrate, or Jews who were nationals or fonner nationals of previously occupied countries and who were victims of Nazi concentration camps or concentration camps established by regimes under Nazi influence. B. The swn of 2,500,000, amounting to ten percent, arising out of the 25,000,000 priority on the proceeds of Gennan assets in neutral countries, ten percent of the proceeds ci the 'non-monetary gold', and five percent of the 'heirless funck' shall be administered by the InterGovernmental Committee on Refugees or its successor organization through appropriate public and private organizations for the rehabilitation and resettlement of the relatively small numbers of non-

Jewish victims of Nazi action who are in need of resettlem nt. Eligible non:Jewish victims of Nazi action are refug es from G rmany and Austria who can demonstrate that they were persecuted by th azis for religious, political or racial reasons and who do not d sir to r tum or German and Austrian nationals, similarly p rsecut d, who d ir to emigrate. C. The Director of the Inter-Governmental Committe on R fug s or the Director-General of the successor organization shall und r th mandate of this Agreement make funds available for programm submitted by the appropriate field organizations r ferr d to in Paragraphs A and B above as soon as he has satisfied himself that the programmes are consistent with the foregoing. Only in xceptional circumstances may the cost of resettlement programmes exc ed a maximum of $1,000 per adult and $2,500 per child under tw Iv y ars of age. The action of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees or its successor organization shall be guided by the intent of Articl 8 and by dris Agreement which ~ to place into operation as quickly as possible practicable programmes of rehabilitation and resettlement submitted by the appropriate field organizations. D. In addition to the $25,000,000 sum the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees or its successor organization is hereby authorized to take title from the appropriate authorities to all 'nonmonetary gold' found by the Allies in Germany and to take such steps as may be needed to liquidate these assets as promptly as possible, due consideration being given to secure the highest possible realizable value. As these assets are liquidated, the fimds shall be distributed in accordance with Paragraphs A and B above. E. Furthermore, pursuant to Paragraphs C and E of Article 8, in the interest of justice, the French Government on behalf of the Five Governments concluding this Agreement, are making representations to the neutral Powers to make available all assets of victims of Nazi action who died without heirs. The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia are associating themselves with the French Government in making such representations to the neutral Powers. The conclusion that ninety-five percent of the 'heirless funds' thus made available should be allocated for the rehabilitation and resettlement of Jewish victims takes cognizance of the fact that these fi.mck are overwhelmingly Jewish in origin, and the five percent made available for non:Jewish victims is based on a liberal presumption of 'heirless fimds' non:Jewish in origin. The 'heirless funds' to be used for the rehabilitation and resettlement of Jewish victims of Nazi action should be made available to appropriate field organizations. The 'heirless funds' to be used for the rehabilitation and settlement of non:Jewish victims or Nazi action should be made available to the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees or its successor organization for distribution to appropriate public and private 48

field organizations. In making these joint representations, the signatories are requesting the neutral countries to take all necessary action to facilitate the identification, collection, and distribution of these assets which have arisen out of a unique condition in international law and morality. If further representations are indicated the Governments of the United States of America, France, and the United Kingdom will pursue the matter on behalf of the Signatory Powers. F. To insure that all funck made available shall inure to the greatest possible benefit of the victims whom it is desired to assist, all funck shall be retained in the currency from which they arise and shall be transferred therefrom only upon the instructions of the organization to which the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees or its successor organization has allocated the funds for expenditure. G. The Director of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees shall cany out his responsibilities to the Five Governments in respect of this Agreement in accordance with the tenns of the Letter of Instruction which is being transmitted to him by the French Government on behalf of the Governments concluding this Agreement.

GUIDE TO SOURCES Published Sources The documents published in the official publications Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO) and Foreign Relations 0/ tJze United States (FRUS) provide an introduction to the subject In particular they document the principles underlying the Allied approach to the occupation of Gennany, the treatment of Gennan assets and the policies adopted towards the various neutral counnies. Docummts on British Policy Overseas (DBPO) Series I, Volume I The Conference at Potsdam 1945 (HMSO, 1984) DBPO, Series I, Volume n Conferences and Conversations 1945: London, Washington, and Moscow (HMSO, 1985) DBPO, Series I, Volume V Gennany and Western Europe, 11 August-31 December 1945 (HMSO, 1990).

Foreign Relations of the Unikd States (FRUS) FRUS, 1945 Volumes I and n The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) (Washington, USGPO, 1960)

Inventory 1945-1955 of the files of the Control Commission for Gennany (British Element) (KG Saur, Munich, London, II Volumes, 1993).

FSV Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government Nurth West Europe, 19441946 (HMSO, 1961) Elizabeth Hennessy, A Domestic History (Cambridge, CUP, 1992)

0/ tJze Bank 0/ England, 1930-1960

Original Sources Relevant British official records may be found in the files of the Foreign Office, the Treasury and the Control Commission for Gennany (British Element) deposited at the Public Record Office, Kew. Bank of England files are not deposited at the PRO but can be consulted at the Bank of England Archive. General Foreign Office political correspondence ~ filed in FO 371. Also useful are Embassy files (e.g. Washington Embassy, FO 115). The files of the Minisay of Economic Warfare are in a Foreign Office class, FO 837, which also includes the papers of the postwar Economic Warfare department which was part of the Foreign Office. The files cf the Control Commission for Germany (British Element) are contained in a large number of classes listed in the published guide cited above. 'This guide is also an index to these files, which contain a mass of

detailed infonnation on, for instance, losses by individual German citizens during the war and postwar claims for compensation and restitution. General Treasury correspondence is filed in T 236. These files, as well as the files of the Control Commission for Gennany (British Element), frequently contain papers from more than one year; all files are listed below under the first year which they cover. The following files have been consulted in the preparation of this memorandum and are listed here as an aid to further research.

1939 T 236/721

Movements of gold holdings in United Kingdom

1941 T 236/722

Movements of gold holdings in United Kingdom

1942 FO 371/32221-225 FO 115/3847

Allied Administrative Affairs War: Allied Policy

1943 FO 371/36368-372 FO 115/4143 FO 115/3936 FO 115/3988 FO 115/3991 FO 115/4148 T 236/911

Allied Administrative Affairs Gold War Trade Staff. Post War Interests General Reports on Financial Conditions in Europe Finance: Portugal Policy Trading with the Enemy: Intercepted Messages Declaration by Allies on looted gold

1944 FO FO FO FO FO FO

371/40579 115/4149-150 115/4151 115/4153 115/4154 945/599

T 236/62

T 236/120 T 236/121

Allied Declaration on Looted Gold Trading with the Enemy: Intercepted Messages Sofindus Intercepts Eastern Province Administration UK/US Relations with Thailand German concentration camps: representations of Jewish Agencies (1) Gold Shipments from United States of America; division of expenses and losses with joint selling programme (2) Expenses and losses for gold sales in the Middle East and India Recovery from Nazis of their ill-gotten gains (directives) Looted gold acquisition by Neutrals

T 23 1931

T 23 II 2 T 23 13253

1945 FO 115/4181 F 371/467 -97

FO 1014/854 FO 1046133 FO 1046/74 FO 1046/118 FO 1046/134 FO 10461136 FO 10 1147 FO 1046/163 FO 1046/205 FO 1046/216-217 FO 1046/245 FO 10461246 FO 1046/267 FO 1046/275 FO 1046/747 FO 1046/763 FO 1046/764 T 2361127

T 236/932 T 236/956-957

T 236/1478 T 236/1987

(1) Claims against Germany for return of looted gold (2) German holding of gold (Merkers Treasure) Looted gold: acquisition by neutrals Regulation o. 7 control of axis and satellite territo under allied occupation

Bank for International Settlements Punishment of Gennans and Austrians for atrocities other than war crimes; reports on Gennan concentration camps pecial Assistance to Nazi Victims Gold and Valuables Found in Germany German External Assets Papers of the Chief of the Fmance Division, CCG Property Control Jewish Confiscated Property Restitution Policy Property Control Bullion in the British Zone Industrial Gold and Silver Gennan Bankers Advisory Board CCG (BE) Currency Section German Gold Hoards German External Assets Property Control Reports External Loot Internal Loot Currency disposal problems: (a) Currency found in Germany (b) Currency captured from Wehrrnacht in liberated territory (c) Currency impounded in Germany (I) Claims against Gennany for return of looted gold (2) German holding of gold (Merkers Treasure) Principles to be followed in view of (a) reparations and (b) economic security, regarding removals of property belonging to United Nations or neutral nationals. Stateless persons reparations and restitution Disposal of German property in the United Kingdom and UK claims against Gennany

1946 FO 371/55813 FO 371/60479 FO 192/197 FO 192/198

192/199 837/1265-1269 837/1275 1036/381 1046/181 1046/747 FO 1049/367 FO 1049/522 FO 1049/625-626 FO 1049/777 T 2361934 FO FO FO FO FO FO

T 236/958

T 236/979-981 T 236/986-987 T 236/989

T 236/1479 T236/2353 T 236/4312 1947 FO 371/65163-67 FO 192/200-201 FO 192/202 FO 192/203 FO 192/204 FO 192/205 FO 837/1279-80 FO 837/1281

Fonner Gennan concentration camps: reports of atrocities Allied claims to German assets in Switzerland Joint Commission Minutes Disposal of German Assets (Allied-Swiss Negotiations) Implementation of Washington Agreement (Part II) Safehaven Reparations. Restitution of Monetary Gold Release and Delivery of Foreign Securities Victims of Nazi Persecution Periodical Reports Treatment ofJewish Displaced Persons Compensation for Nazi Victims Situation ofJews in Germany Relief Payments for British Subjects in Germany (1) Claims against Germany for return of looted gold (2) German holding of gold (Merkers Treasure) Principles to be followed in view of (a) reparations and (b) economic security, regarding removals of property belonging to United Nations or neutral nationals. Constitution and operation of tripartite commission on monetary gold (1) Definition of monetary gold to implement Part ill of the Paris Act (2) Gold questionnaire issued by tripartite commission on monetary gold Claims of inter-allied reparation agency powers to share in the restitution of monetary gold Stateless persons reparations and restitution Swiss Safehaven Agreement ding with the enemy: release of assets belonging to refugees

Restitution of gold to various countries Implementation of Washington Accord Minutes ofJoint Commission Meetings (part IT) Safehaven in Switzerland Swiss-Allied Accord of 25 May 1946. Progress Reports Swiss Compensation Office Reparations and Restitution of Monetary Gold Working Papers from monetary gold conference

23 1 88 T 23 I

T 23 11019

23 12 T 236/3151 T23/3153 T 23 13621 T 23 13 23 T 23 15084

1948 FO 371/71002 FO 371/71003 FO 371/71027 FO 371/71059 FO 371 17 1074

F0371/71115

192/206

FO 192/209

Ion ta.ry Gold Prope of Inmates of euengamme Concentration Camp R fuge s Organisation Agreement Volume I British Zonal Budget Bullion in British Zone nimum Reserves Treatment ofJews Poli towards JeWs in British Zone Constitution and operation of tripartite commission on monetary gold (I) Definition of monetary gold to implement Part of the Paris Act (2) Gold questiormaire issued by tripartite commission on monetary gold Claims of inter-allied reparation agency powers to hare in the restitution of monetary gold ovement of monetary gold from Germany by the Tripartite Commission for the restitution of monetary gold Trading with the Enemy; Progress Reports German . restitution of monetary gold to Poland and Danzig Germany; restitution of monetary gold to the etherlands Restitution of monetary gold to Austria Restitution of monetary gold to Italy Restitution of Monetary Gold to Albania by Tripartite Commission

Bizonal economic administration. Functions of Control Commission. Economic condition of Gennany and international repercussions Claims on German gold Polish participation in Monetary Gold Pool Admittance of Italy to Monetary Gold Pool. Restitution to Yugoslavia of gold looted by Italy Report of National AdvisoI)' Council on international monetary and financial problems dealing with foreign countries' gold and short-term dollar reselVes Approach to Switzerland on Dutch gold looted by the Germans Berne Swiss-Allied Accord of 25 May 1946

Lists of Assets/Liabilities in Switzerland and Liechtenstein of persons resident in British Zone of Germany Berne FO 192/211 FO 1035/181 Refugees Organisation Agreement Volume IT FO 1036/382-383 Release and Delivery of Foreign Securities: General Policy FO 1046/140 Transfer of Responsibilities for Property Control Bullion FO 1046/563 Gold and Precious Metals FO 1046/565 Gold and Precious Metals FO 1046/566 Restitution Policy FO 1046/599 Allied Bank Commission FO 1046/682 FO 1049/1338-1339 Restitution to Victims of Fascism Gold sales policy T 236/723 Movement of monetary gold from Germany by the T 236/1020 Tripartite Commission for the restitution of monetary gold Claim by Dollfus :Mleg and Co; for recovery of gold T 236/2021 bars lodged at Bank of England Trading With The Enemy Act 1939: gold held in T 236/2371 the United Kingdom on behalf of enemies or persons in enemy occupied countries Movement of monetary gold from Germany by the T 236/2785 Tripartite Commission for the restitution of monetary gold Claim by Dollfus Mieg and Co for gold looted by T 236/3870 Germany during World War Two FO 192/210

1949 FO 371/77236-37 FO 371/78203 FO 192/212 FO 192/214-215 FO 1014/595 FO FO FO FO FO FO FO

1030/245 1035/182 1036/864 1046/159 1046/556 1046/567 1046/630

Dutch claims against Switzerland in respect of gold looted by the Germans and deposited there Allied Liaison Branch, CCG, Report No. 14 for Dec. 1948~an. 1949 Compensation claim by Switzerland for War Damage Conference: Protection of War Victims Gennan Legislation: Special Assistance to Victims of Nazi Persecution Restitution of Looted Monetary Gold Refugees Organisation Agreement Volume III Victims of Nazi Persecution: General ARC Property Control Sub-Commission Office of the Financial Adviser to the CCG Gold and Precious Metals AHC Finance Committee

FO 1046/649 FO 1046/718 FO 1049/1770 FO 1049/1774-77 T 23612543

T 236/3154 T 236/3155 T 236/3871

1950 FO 371185961-69 371/86117 192/217 192/223 1030/246 1035/183 1036/922 10461151 1046/568 o 10461582 T 236/2967 T 236/3156 FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO

T 236/3872-74T 236/5085-86

Property Control Reports Monetary Gold Treatment of Victims of Fascism Restitution to Victims of Fascism Inter-Governmental talks between US, UK and France on the restitution of monetary gold looted by the Gennans from occupied territory Gennany; restitution of monetary gold to the etherlands Advisory Committee on Distribution of Gennan Enemy Property Act 1949: terms of reference and general papers Claim by Dollfus Mieg and Co for gold looted by Germany during World War Two

Restitution of looted monetary gold; claims for gold looted by Gennany Yugoslav claim for restitution of monetary gold British Interests Gennan Assets Former Reichsbank Gold R~es Organisation Agreement Volume IV General Claims for Compensation: Policy Joint Allied Reparations Agency Gold and Precious Metals Foreign Interests in Germany Trading with the Enemy; Progress Reports AdvisoIY Committee on Distribution of Gennan Enemy Property Act 1949: terms of reference and general papers Claim by Dollfus Mieg and Co for gold looted by Germany during World War Two Restitution of Monetary Gold to Albania by T~teCo~on

1951 FO 371/94033-36

FO 371/94039-42

Restitution of monetary gold looted by Gennany European countries in wartime; claim by DollfusMieg & Company SA in respect of gold bullion; Yugoslav claims; activities of Tripartite Co~on for the Restitution of Monetary Gold, in Brussels Distribution of monetary gold; future of the Gold Commission; disposal of gold bars; minutes of meetings of the Gold Co~on; shipment of gold found in the British Zone of Gennany to the

FO 371/94081 FO 371/95946 FO 371/95947

FO 942/112-113 FO 1036/385-386

FO 1036/850 FO 1046/24 FO 1046/135 FO 1046/210 FO 1046/274 FO 1046/434 T236/3157

T 23613158

T 236/3875

1952 FO 371/99878-79

FO 371/99961-72

FO 371/100001-03

FO 371/100006

account in the Bank of France opened in the name of the three governments of the Western Powers Reports of meetings of the IGG on the progress of reparations by Gennany; final report of the lARA, circulated to governments only Meetings of the Executive Committee and reports of the Sixth and Seventh Sessions of the General Council of the IRO Tenth Session of the Executive Committee & summary records of the Eighth Session of the IRO General Council; report of the UK Delegate to the Eighth Session Restitution Release and Delivery of Foreign Securities: General Policy Jewish Trust Corporation: Reports and Expenditure Reichsbank Organisation Property of UN Nationals Gennan External Assets Gennan External Assets Miscellaneous Banking Matters Advisory Committee on Distribution of German Enemy Property Act 1949: terms of reference and general papers Amendments to Distribution of German Enemy Property Act 1949 Claim by Dollfus Mieg and Co for gold looted by Germany during World War Two Miscellaneous correspondence regarding claims for restitution of German assets; negotiations concerning payment of liquidated German assets for the relief of victims of Nazi persecution and for a German contribution to IRO Claims dealt with by the Tripartite Commission for Restitution of Monetary Gold Internal restitution cases in Gennany; conversion rate for monetary compensation; report on work of inspection by the Restitution Authorities in Germany under Military Government Law No. 59 in the British Zone; complaint by Poland of obstruction by UK of recovery of Polish property FlI'St annual report of the Jewish Trust Corporation for Germany Ltd; request for financial support from Occupation Costs in the British Zone as in the US

Z ne of 0 upation of Gennany; HMG m nt to meet this request nnan . restitution of monetary gold to Poland and Danzig Restitution of monetary gold to Austria laim b Dollfus Mieg and Co for gold looted by nnan during orId War Two R titution of onetary Gold to Albania by Triparti~ Commission R parations: payments from Gennan Reparations ipts to IRO

23 /5 79

1953 o 371/1

37 1/ 1

-1 3

37 1/1

11 7- 18

37 1/ 1

123

37 1/ 1058 16

T 236/3877 T 236/ 5088 T 236/5480

1954 FO 371/109426-27

FO 371/109691-95

.tution for victims of Nazi oppression; organisation of the Board of Review in the British Zone of Gennany FRG legislation covering compensation for victims of azi persecution Reparation claims dealt with by the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold; discussions on winding up the Gold Commission Claims of the Jewish Trust Corporation against the fonner Gennan Reich; HMG waiver of repayment of 1 million DM loan to the Corporation for initial administrative expenses Tripartite discussions on waiver of claims to looted gold; US delegation memorandum on powers of Allies to aive claims by countries participating in the gold pool Tripartite Commission for restitution of monetary gold: suggested waiver of claims against Portugal and Sweden Restitution of Monetary Gold to Albania by Tripartite Commission Reparations: payments from Gennan Reparations receipts to IRO

Gennan assets and looted gold in Sweden; negotiations for settlement of claims and reparations, settlement of ownership and restitution of looted gold Wmding up of Tripartite Commission on the Restitution of Monetary Gold; final adjudications

1955 FO 371/118372 FO 371/118389-91 FO 371/118392-93 FO 371/118394 FO 371/118395-96 FO 371/118397

FO 371/118398

T 23615089

Administration of Enemy Property Department: transfer of responsibility of AEPD to Foreign Office Winding up of Tripartite Commission on Restitution of Monetary Gold; final adjudication Disposal of German assets in Italy Disposal of German assets in Trieste Claims against Administration of Enemy Property Department; disposal of German external assets Bulk settlement claims: Jewish Trust Corporation Fmal report on financial reparations and restitution deliveries from Germany Restitution of Monetary Gold to Albania by Tripartite Commission

1956 FO 371/124656-57 FO 371/124658-60

T 236/5090 T 23615481-82

Tripartite Gold Commission Conference held in London to discuss German assets Restitution of Monetary Gold to Albania by Tripartite Commission: Operational and Briefing Problems Reparations: payments from German Reparations receipts to IRO

1957 FO 371/130830-31

T 236/5091-92

Tripartite Gold Commission of UK, US and France: discussions on distribution of gold Restitution of MonetaI)' Gold to Albania by Tripartite Commission: Operational and Briefing Problems

1958 T 236/5093-94

T 236/5460

Restitution of MonetaI)' Gold to Albania by Tripartite Commission: Operational and Briefing Problems Refugees or victims of racial etc persecution (19391945 war): establishment of fund to recompense late claimants

1959 T 236/5096

Restitution of MonetaI)' Gold to Albania by Tripartite Commission: Operational and Briefing Problems

Refu I lat

or victims of racial etc persecution (19395 \\"aI'): tablishment of fund to recompense

1960 /~

RefuQ'e s or victims of racial etc persecution (1939I 45 war): tablishm nt of fund to recompense late claimants