Diplomacy and Diplomatists in the 20th Century

BRANCH

FCO HISTORICAL

PAPERS

OCCASIONAL

_______

r-'

`_

ham'.

No. 8 Diplomacy

Diplomatists and

Foreignand CommonwealthOffice

in the 20th Century

August1994

FOREWORD

The international in Henry the twenty-first to system century will, according Kissinger in his latest book Diplomacy, be marked by both fragmentation and By former Cold he the the the globalisation. after means re-appearance War of a number lesser ones of major powers of and a multiplicity States European the resembling system of the eighteenth and nineteenth for international By he first that, time, the centuries. globalisation means becoming instantaneous truly a relations are global with communications, issues the population economy such as the environment, world and dealt basis, being be have to tackled on a world-wide explosion, etc., which by diplomatists. with from development diplomacy the time of collection of essays spans the his in if be had the purpose of to one piece returned when a royal envoy business is diplomacy be a mission was not to vitiated to the present when between just longer by concerned carried on about relations specialists no but involved their governments and who, with overseas public opinion thanks to modern are themselves part of the policy communications, in lectures held in in 1993 FCO Two the a process. of the papers were Sir Century.

Eyre Twentieth The in Diplomacy the one on series on Campbell Reception in Crowe Sir Alan Locarno by delivered the was Room in March

by Dr Hamilton's 1994. It is nicely complemented paper Great Sir last Ambassadors'!

These Francis Bertie: `the the two papers of on very has Office flavour how in particular Foreign much the work of the of give a importance but the to continuing of the remind us of changed also serve for foreign basic diplomatic the successful prosecution of policy skills needed in a fast changing world. They are also a delight to read.

This

Richard

Bone

Library and Records Department August 1994

Foreign & Commonwealth HISTORICAL Occasional

Office

BRANCH Papers

No. 8

August 1994

CONTENTS

page Continuity

and

Change

in Modern

Diplomacy

Richard Langhorne Sir Francis `The

Very

Bertie, Last

1-11 1844-1919

of the

Great

Ambassadors'

Keith Hamilton

12-30

Sir Eyre Crowe, 1864-1925 Sir Alan Campbell Opening Richard

Note

Diplomacy Bone

31-45

Open and

Government 4.6-52

Contributors on

Copies of this pamphlet

53

deposited be National the will with

FCO Historical Branch, Library and Records Department, Clive House, Petty France, London SW 1H 9HD

Crown Copyright ISBN 0 903359 46 4

Libraries

CONTINUITY

AND CHANGE IN MODERN

DIPLOMACY

Richard Langhorne

Any writer considering this topic is bound to be conscious of joining a popular club, one which has already attracted a substantial and serious But minded membership. a visitor to this club might well observe that many its be to of members seemed quite aged and venerable, that the younger few in in be to members were number and some cases seemed speaking diplomacy in language.

In this occasional paper, about a separate, coded, be begin discussion to the psycho-codes such will not used and with will focus on developments with which the older club members would be quite familiar. is wise to remember diplomatic the when considering changes that in last hundred has its basic the that practice years or so, undergone most of before the nineteenth structure considerably century. was well established Diplomacy is an old human activity, its the perhaps one of oldest, and at basic it frequently the that most understanding reflected more was to hear the message than to eat the messenger. Its sanctions advantageous important diplomatic immunity, were originally religious, so was essential at felt be; least from it became to the and messages murder, carried as is A deal the contemporary complex as societies and rules. needs of good known about the needs and some of the results of Sumerian diplomacy, as but deal not a great well as of other early empires, about the accompanying Not diplomatic between there the a until was conjunction practice. development history believable and the emergence of of a group of societies in Ancient Greece whose diplomacy important to them, can was particularly diplomacy like.

In this case, thanks to was actually we get a picture of what Athenian foreign Thucydides, policy making we also get a picture of some dj채 it sense of vu. and with a remarkable It

diplomatic is by designed this that period practice was chiefly emerges hoc, There to serve the objectives of occasional, ad embassies. were clear hospitality, immunities to attached mainly and some privileges of frequency both journeying The of these while and after arrival. ambassadors and the procedures whereby messages were missions was plainly remarkable discussed in or publicly an assembly, and their contents given, sometimes became Much familiar, if of the substance of negotiated not standardised.

It diplomacy of war. the making of alliances and the outbreak concerned just deal to not was clear that the effectiveness of the system owed a great but also to the common language, culture and religions of the its frequency What

Greek It has ancient city states. remained true ever since that complex diplomatic relationships have depended on a reasonable commonality of language, cultural and political expectations. The first diplomatic collisions between Europe and China in the late eighteenth indicated in their century failure likely happen if this was not so. utter to what was There

the sense that the size of the mission, gifts was not yet, however, given and received and the social station of the ambassador and his retinue both importance the were signals of of the sender and, in the eyes of the the embassy. The receiver could sender, the status of the ruler receiving kind in he the through the achieve same of signal manner which entertained This kind became embassy. and accommodated a visiting of signalling during Byzantine height in late mediaeval the period and reached a general Europe. From the beginning in the the more of seventeenth century, except Ottoman Russia for Empire, backward the this aspect and areas, example, into decline.

The Byzantine however, diplomatic period, of practice went importance. long-term development heralded diplomatic The of greater a in maintaining faced by Constantinople increasing difficulties the Byzantine difficulty Empire, the success against military of achieving and particularly Emperors from Asia, invasions to turn to the waves of caused successive for assistance. This was partly to be delivered by using diplomacy diplomacy to send a general message about the special, god given and everlasting City, diplomacy by the a new purpose: the position of and partly giving both information internal political gathering of about the affairs, and Empire. the the economic, of societies and rulers now established round The principal had been the to send messages and receive role of embassy it information least bank to to a answers; now of was at as much contribute kept at Constantinople designed his to the and emperor which was enable ministers

to

intervene,

destabilise

dissension

in

and among in The the neighbouring entities most effective way. effect was to create a dealing diplomacy double in for a reputation which acquired spying and but long this the beginning tradition, also of a never entirely washed away The to make a major and vitally cheap contribution to Byzantine security.

Venetians, learnt from long their association with the much who economic Byzantines, Venetian the that chiefly ambassadors also continued notion Signory, for information the served abroad to the purpose of supplying although in their case that information was not so much a matter of military or other security, but of economic and commercial significance. and

sow

The next seriously important development in diplomatic practice occurred in Italy, though not as was once thought as a direct result of Venetian consular representation. The appearance of a collection of small, independent, city states concentrated in northern Italy during the fifteenth century produced

2

familiar from Greece.

No Ancient some effects the experience one state of for long the could obtain primacy over others and period there was no a invasion.

Yet their physical threat credible external or actual proximity brought it dealings have to with an inescapable need with each regular other, and a shared language and culture made those dealings practically The by to the easy arrange. pressures thus generated were reinforced imposed, military stalemate which small size and roughly equal resources by forces.

Diplomacy the crippling to and costs of resorting mercenary became the alternative The to warfare and it did so in two principal ways. first was an increase in the role invented for it by Byzantium as the gatherer information its of about neighbouring role as the cities and an extension of by both getter of subversion supporting sides, or one side, or occasionally internal divisions. information In political addition, correct and punctual for diplomatic best the timing to the gave opportunity possible moves Secondly, diplomacy by the only means advantage. was which alliance be forged, bring the to combinations could and attempt about the magic last break deadlock became the combination at which would power an hysterical diplomatists.

All their these of rulers and almost preoccupation hectic exchanges led to a new development it inevitable as which was as Without the emergence of the resident was unpopular: a ambassador. he resident no ruler could make the system deliver representative what in fields immediate the not needed and particularly of gossip or political On hand, for the other actual subversion. exactly the same reasons, no ruler for to the resident representatives wished receive of other rulers, and a time between the need to receive information there was a struggle and the if instinct The to at all possible. give any, not result was the covert by tolerated ambassadors, reciprocally resident existence of rulers pursuing for freshest information.

In time, not only did the the their relentless need duties take the over many of associated with the parallel resident come to hoc by had that the they missions, so seventeenth century system of ad but they spread over the whole of northern largely disappeared, and central during Europe in the wake of the growth the the of secular state Renaissance in Reformation the to needs of princes. and response hundred this most result of creeping one year process was first hands in the there the that century, at of emerged, seventeenth diplomacy.

Richelieu Even Cardinal in France, the notion of continuous deliver messages and return while the older system of sending missions to being by there was still no the residents, supplanted with replies was for diplomatic a relations, of the need reliable sense of the permanence of did relationship which not continuous and near neighbours with neighbours have any precise object in view. One reason for this was the patchy in development far itself some parts of the state more advanced which was The

important

3

Europe of diplomatic

in led than others and to an equally uneven development of the Another but process. reason was related more precisely departments duty the emergence significant: of of state whose was the foreign followed by their flowering into conduct of affairs, eventual departments duty it The foreign whose sole was. emergence of ministries development the further confirmed and made possible of continuous diplomacy.

They provided the flow of instructions and comment and the for They to central point which reports were sent evaluation. maintained negotiations records of previous and relations with other states. They also began to be the organisers of sometimes elementary diplomatic training, so foreign development that the of service as a profession became possible, and being the preserve of the privileged the sense of representation abroad By for in it the end gain, was reduced. either personal or political amateur, had European acquired the states all significant century, of the eighteenth largely foreign standard and a ministries of apparatus usual administrative did Europe Beyond for this not their embassies abroad. pattern of staffing developed China Imperial Ottoman Empire similar nor apply: neither the institutions or practices.

feature foreign The appearance of of embassy establishments as a routine It there that meant problems. absorbing and capital cities produced new dealt be therefore and with to than embassy one was always more distinctions to be made between them: in short, the problem of precedence be long have difficulties In to since ceased an age when such and protocol. feeling intensity difficult it is of and to appreciate the a serious matter, Disturbance disputes particularly about precedence generated. action which duels and murder not to the process of negotiation was commonplace, from The places at table and unknown. range of possibilities was enormous: This the opera. order of signature to positions at royal audiences or even at last caused an unseemly brawl in London in the early eighteenth century between the French and Russian ambassadors which was only resolved be duel between them. an eventual There had earlier been a particular problem which could delay negotiations It became before common. the resident embassy very seriously even In by held delegated concerned the validity of the an ambassador. power be formidably it times when communication could slow, was painfully damaging to discover that some minor technicality of wording had allowed a ruler to reject the arrangement made by his ambassador. Repairing the damage might take literally years. Thus it seemed quite reasonable to take months - or more - to establish the absolute reliability of an ambassador's full powers. The onset of continuous diplomacy and the accreditation of resident ambassadors rendered the process unnecessary, but yielded the new

4

increasing The of problem precedence and procedure. pace and seriousness diplomacy during however, the of made states eighteenth century, increasingly delay disputes their negotiations, to to and reluctant allow such to there grew up a tendency to preface exchanges with an agreement famous formal led . his to the abandon all procedures. experience in its Settlement Vienna aftermath agreements associated and with the 1815 which regulated most of these matters for the first time. The signature by in listing the of treaties alphabetical order and the of embassies simply date of the arrival of each ambassador or minister were important examples in diplomatic this, the characters of of the seniority as was regulation of' have Since 1815 1818. then such questions only rarely protocols of and however, been, disturbed diplomatic There has the one scene.

European the the comparatively recent example, status of when uncertain deal Community be fitted into to a system which expected only could not difficulties In anachronistic resulted. a curiously with states, and protocol being used to send signals about the relative way, protocol was once again involved.

This the actors power positions of episode revealed the continuing distribution of of protocol significance of matters as signals of the So did international the contemporary tendency power. also of new and fullest insist diplomatic to the on observance weaker states of ordinary it in had been asserted that themselves protocol respect of when confidently their arrival on the scene would lead to the rejection of the whole corpus of diplomatic procedure as an unnecessary anachronism.

The

two

between

1600

1800

the gradual centuries and also witnessed The to the problem another related of settlement resident embassy. families last the embassy staff, and servants, some of presence of substantial being of the receiving state's nationality, raised the difficult question of what immunities far into how diplomatic an and privileges were, and exactly hoc 'l'he sanctity staff they extended. of ambassadors and ad embassy's but implied kind that on such a what was very clear; missions of the old be "l'his thorny to a question. matter produced vastly extended scale proved from immunity huge volumes of discussion, particularly the on questions of' and the role that embassies sometimes played as sanctuaries, or prosecution less houses.

Eventually, the applied, principle of reciprocity was more or safe be being that there and although agreement could reached; no general Convention Vienna these the on matters were not resolved until some of Relations by 1961, Diplomatic there the end of the eighteenth century, of basis servants working which avoided allowing understood was a generally but hand, from prosecution for murder immunity expected on the one by dealt diplomats be their own to with accredited and withdrawn local but in be Debts taxes, not paid, governments criminal cases. were to Governments besieged longer embassies suspected of' customs or excise. no

5

harbouring the opposition, but embassies did which so on an embarrassing had to expect to be expelled. The final sanction, as always, was the scale declare foreign diplomat persona non grata. ability to any The

beginning of the nineteenth therefore, century, marked a point at diplomatic had its familiar the which system acquired most of rules, behaviour It lacked, however, characteristic and administration. one be attribute, attribute to significant an which came a primary need of states in the post-Napoleonic Everything that had led to the creation of postarea. diplomacy had flowed from the need to represent one sovereign mediaeval It was the most efficient creature and representative to another. of the fully its in These relations states. other sovereign sovereign state with be bellicose, but basically they were not actually might relationships form functioning in of cooperation: their and allowed only one adversarial have deploy diplomacy If to the wish of rulers the alliance. a was asked to for in 1814 it international there no way was system, managed, cooperative, Great Power do Nonetheless, cooperative, to an essentially oligarchic, so. before had 1814 international agreed, even system was what the victors of They in be thought of their objective making peace. the war ended, would Tsar famous, devices, of which was or notorious, the most various 1815, September Alliance Alexander's Holy envisaged which a of Christianity `born kind based again' of cooperative on the tenets of a system feelings both described the representing of and was vividly and accurately `piece Minister, British Castlereagh, by of sublime mysticism as a the others, November Paris (20 Treaty At of the making of the second and nonsense'. into incorporating by 1815), the problem was eventually a renewal resolved international Quadruple Alliance to resolve problems of the a commitment 1815, by holding regular peacetime In this was a wholly new conferences. idea. Such meetings had not occurred before, except as part of the process holding had habit congresses of making a peace, and even as that, the of decision fallen into desuetude during the eighteenth In 1815, the to century. international device the of use peace time conferences as the regulatory system was not so much a revival of the congress of old, as an extension of Its in Napoleon. last formed the practice success of the coalition against impressive been had difficult remaining united through some very periods 1814 from January fact and was correctly to the that attributed until November 1818 Hardenberg, Tsar Metternich, two years - nearly Alexander, Nesselrode his been Castlereagh had or minister, physically and had long From hoc together and constituted a conference. running ad December 1814, Talleyrand, French the foreign the of restored minister had joined the group, thus pushing the cooperation regime, of the allies beyond into the wartime situation a peacetime association of the great The decision incorporated powers. to use the conference method a new

6

importance has been element practice which of the greatest led to the permanently conferences ever since, and eventually constituted fundamentally is.

It has Nations League United the also which was and the led to the almost automatic is if that there a conference a problem notion be held it. by The the government that should about rejection of convention been Germany have Wilhelmine in held 1914 the to of after the war was breach the proximate of cause of accepted practice. war and a shocking into

diplomatic

in diplomacy it can be seen that the basic structure were of modern from flowed by What the early nineteenth a place century. was to come functioning in the nature and of the communications revolution and changes both have led in the range and pace of to state: an enormous expansion in diplomatic installation The telegraph midactivity. of the electric its Europe to the rest of the and nineteenth century subsequent extension in became the early the transoceanic cables operational world when had international twentieth the effect of creating a global century naturally increasing diplomatic Because system and thus greatly communication. brought largescale empires were geographically close to each other and because the great land mass states of Russia and the USA were enabled to from internationally their there was an operate physical extremities, inevitable business which governments increase in the diplomatic have to in transact. This vast geographical the extension was particularly obvious in Far East.

There important business the originating growth of was also an in that posts which had been deeply isolated for diplomats development for example, the British Embassy at Peking from the home department brought from time, communication within a rapid reduced months were now in to minutes in some cases. It has been usual to comment on the reduction first in independence Constantinople which this caused, ambassadorial at This doubt 1850s then true at moments the of elsewhere. was no and but the effect was certainly crisis, not any reduction severe and unexpected It is quite clear from the sheer quantity in activity. of traffic that the closer instructions, to obtain or modified which enabled ambassadors connection instructions, to take a greater willingness gave them a greater confidence, less excuse to delay for lack of direction initiatives and infinitely or approval.

These pressures changed the role of an ambassador to some degree and before, but did him they not more of an agent of the centre than made felt foreign in The his level ministries same effect was of activity. reduce fell, issues also upon whom the weight of greater activity and wider range of later the albeit expanding staffs, nineteenth century witnessed and in all major states. reluctantly,

Thus

These tendencies were reinforced by the consequences of changes in the industrial The revolution and the technological scope of government action.

7

fields in from it flowed created new which governments advances which This beginning domestically. was the were expected to act of the process lead to to the collectivist and corporatist states of the twentieth which was century and the consequences for diplomacy were sometimes almost States found that when they in home intervening overwhelming. at were be matters such as transport, posts, and health such interventions might threatened by a failure on the part of neighbours either to do the same, or at least cooperate at frontiers. A flood of international legislation followed on such points which had to be initially negotiated, subsequently managed and about which disputes had to be settled. It was a whole new world of international exchange and it foreign increased diplomatic the and greatly ministry workload. It is not surprising to discover that commercial and military attaches date from this period, nor that a new preoccupation with legal questions, in beyond drafting going the surfaced of treaties, strengthened legal departments. This last was particularly significant when the legal route to the settlement of disputes worked remarkably successfully in administrative questions and thus led to a greatly increased interest in arbitration as a device to be tried in international relations more generally.

The

has seen further factors, but development twentieth century of these in The communications the direction more of continuity than change. revolution paused after the installation system world wide, of the telegraph so that while the telephone network developed, to the point where it would have been technically Grey have if Sir Edward difficult, for possible, to very Bethmann-Hollweg in July 1914, even by 1939, the spoken to Chancellor , had links telephone not reached the complete the satellite usefulness that happened, When were to make possible in the later twentieth that century. it served to reinforce a development in had become that other ways obvious for The and other reasons. tendency for prime ministers and presidents to far play a greater role in foreign affairs had begun after the first world war, in the meetings of the Big Four at Paris in 1919. This was as epitomised USA partly a consequence the of entrance of the as a major player on the international stage and partly a consequence of the greater significance of in Total highly warfare an age of advanced and advancing weaponry. war involved domestic for leader the total government, a and political rewards foreign in became This important. has could show affairs who success been has true remained reinforced where the government and of weak has become have the and overseas states activities of unstable, rulers may in important domestically.

The their to ability on stay power repercussions factor however be bolstering disadvantage image that, this can of while an from be happened to a ruler of power, as ousted may abroad, a president honorary degree Warwick University Nigeria in an at receiving while Britain. The tendency for heads of governments to turn up at bodies such as

8

League of Nations, Nations, the United conferences or the summit have in 1938 and were felt to be which occurred at intervals since Munich important between 1955 and 1985, has been a significant particularly development, forward by pressed the increasing ease of communication and formalised difficulties the desire to be seen to triumph the over which the

interpose between The summit professionals might tension and solution. in form between in known the conference the of meetings monarchs was later, it deplored by ages and middle and was almost universally expert The risks of failure commentators and professionals. were too great; bad things they to monarchs got temper so that there wrong; were prone deliberate a risk of personal was attack or and such meetings capture, bridges behind took, generally place on over rivers and wooden trellises to Some have been assure physical security. modern experiences similar II of Germany and Nicholas II of Russia got things wrong and were William by their governments afterwards repudiated at a personal after arriving in Kennedy-Khrushchev Vienna the twentieth the agreement early century; disastrous failure in in 1961 different summit a was a way.

There

has been a constant tendency for far too great public expectations to is It the of such meetings. ride on outcome clear that unless the prior for has been professional summit meetings preparation very complete, heads follow, do not make the best that and success will not of government Thus international intrusion heads the the net effect of negotiators. of of diplomacy has into been government public probably me apparent than real, is likely is doubt in as where appearance no any case the principal object of has been the tendency for prime ministers and the exercise. More significant by feature to to talk telephone, each other presidents a particularly clear Community However, European in states. among this case it is not so clear it is an international in that exchange the fullest sense that such business Community be the represent, since the conversations of can at least as much essentially domestic as foreign. feature, last factor introduces another notable twentieth century which in had its 1919 Foreign the origin post also world. affairs have become more diverse, and nowhere more so than in the field of economic diplomacy.

The has talk to each other range of matters about which governments continued for has to grow, and with this come a tendency quite wide areas of foreign hands foreign to move out of the ministries negotiation of and The involvement finance Treasuries Ministries services. of and after the foreign felt 1914 war was particularly obvious, ministries and many This was the more galling to be losing ground. themselves since the been first by have itself held the the to outbreak of some world war was had failure by diplomacy, consequence of a as an activity whose reputation

This

9

plunged, and thus made it easier for whole areas of diplomacy to escape into the hands of others. Some ground was recovered between the but wars, be further lost So to only after the second war and in its aftermath. international the complicated were politics of the period of reconstruction, and so technical the weaponry and alliance systems of the nuclear age that the age of negotiation by experts soon arrived. Moreover the emerging problems of the post-imperial era proved to be in many ways less purely political and more technologically oriented - the provision of aid and technical assistance for example - and the discussion of environmental Arms control negotiations, questions showed similar requirements. too, depended on highly qualified experts who spoke a language of their own.

For all these reasons, diplomacy developed activities conducted by experts, inevitable only loosely supervised by professionals, which operated in parallel familiar forms. with more is development, particularly obvious aspect of this which again involvement direct has been EC, in the the the among members of diplomacy of department of government other than the foreign ministry.

Matters of fishing, for example, often raise temperatures between states, but lie it is most likely that the lowering of such temperatures will with dealing with each other and with the relevant part of agriculture ministries in frequent fields, There in Brussels. the organisation other examples are EC, degree in lesser and outside relations with states outside the and to a Europe altogether. This factor, too, increases the numbers of officials and in diplomats. experts who are effect acting as A further

finds further diplomatic erosion of older patterns of activity in in join for tendency the growing associations of confirmation states to UN from The to, the system. some sort or another, separate and additional EC is the most prominent example, and the most developed, but there are degree lesser of complexity. many other regimes organised to a greater or These entities are rapidly developing the need to talk to each other, a diplomacy', has be known `group to as well as to process which as come individual states. The recent negotiations between the GATT and the EC have been a recent example of this, as were those of the 1970s between the USA and the Pacific Fisheries Forum.

This

What

these examples have in common is that they all relate to the most international decay major the of political change of the contemporary world: the state. In addition to the obvious effects this development has already had in introducing the diplomacy and diplomats of international associations at every level and of every type, there are further questions for the future.

The flight of authority from the vertical structures of states has been most

10

in international finance, banking in complete particularly and the global but based these areas have not as yet yielded horizontally stock markets, institutions When they of their own and thus the need for representation. do, there will be a further expansion in global diplomatic activity.

This

has Diplomacy thought. expectation prompts a concluding served a in formation in It their their relative power. variety of masters, various and has itself responded by developing The trend and expanding. of this development has been evolutionary but the underlying and expansionary; At day, is has it is the the the activity end of not changed. continuity which has proved impressive; its he activity than temporary more enduring basic behaviour its have masters, and needs yielded a structure of rules and This representation. may seem which relate to the necessity of effective do diplomats that they states who sense not act as perverse to representing did from be and who may well significantly as once they suffering -ing as state structures contract and economies and underpayment understaf however, The larger diplomacy that suggests are made. picture, now involved more authorities, more topics, more varied methods and, above all, diplomat before.

The be but like than the more people ever may poor, he is poor, or she always with us.

i

11

SIR FRANCIS `THE VERY

LAST

BERTIE,

1844-1919

OF THE GREAT Keith

AMBASSADORS'

Hamilton

International

history has more to say about great statesmen than great ambassadors. The achievements of those responsible for formulating foreign discernible than the accomplishments policy are more easily of those it. Diplomats have traditionally distinguished charged with implementing themselves through the accuracy of their reporting, the quality of their inspire in their their advice, skills as negotiators and the confidence they foreign In own and governments. earlier times an envoy of the ability and Sir distant Stratford Canning stature of capital, might, when posted to a Yet during the nineteenth century exercise almost proconsular powers. by foreign in technology advances communications and the adoption limit bureaucratic the scope of to ministries of modern methods tended for independent The taking ambassadors advent of electric action. telegraphy led administrative reformers to question the merits of maintaining Queen doubted Victoria the wisdom of expensive missions abroad, and even Nevertheless, a robust personality making new ambassadorial appointments. instructions, British triumph telegraphic and ambassadors of could still over far from Edwardian being the late Victorian eras were and mere Over forty for in London.

Lord their mouthpieces years ago political masters Vansittart, a former Permanent Under-Secretary, singled out one of them for special mention in his autobiography.

He recalled that Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador at Paris from 1905 to 1918, was `not only a last but the the therefore troublesome of great great ambassador - and very ambassadors'.

Bertie's

by He standards. modern career would seem very odd 12 the was, after all, already afternoon of sixty years of age when on January 1905 he arrived at Paris to assume the duties of British Ambassador he have there. Few of his colleagues that then anticipated would could in the occupant remain the the of what was one of most coveted posts diplomatic for he True had been the service thirteen next years.

Ambassador Rome at since January 1903, but his career during the previous , forty years had been spent almost Foreign entirely within the confines of the Office. Only on two occasions before 1903 had he been to travel required in abroad an official capacity. In 1878 he had been a member of the British delegation Berlin, later he had to the Congress of three and years the Earl of Fife on a mission to invest the King of Saxony with accompanied Berrie was nonetheless ill-endowed the order of the garter. in not either in diplomacy

12

Indeed, he claimed to possess an ability or pedigree for his new position. hereditary title to the Paris Embassy. One of his ancestors, Lord Norreys of Rycote, had been an envoy of Elizabeth I at Paris, and more recently his father-in-law, first Earl Cowley, had been Ambassador during France the to III. the reign of Napoleon

Born on 17 August 1844, the second son of the sixth Earl of Abingdon, Bertie was educated at Eton, and then despatched abroad to perfect his languages. At nineteen, at a time when his father was in somewhat impecunious circumstances and when he himself was probably in need of an him that occupation would provide with early and steady remuneration, Bertie sat and obtained the highest marks for his year in the competitive for into Foreign Office.

There he the examination entry progressed steadily in ladder January he 1894 the professional up until was appointed one of State.

For he the two Assistant Under-Secretaries the two of next years American business Asiatic Department, the the supervised of and and then from 1896 onwards he was primarily concerned with the affairs of the Far East and Britain's African protectorates.

To his contemporaries Bertie had appeared to be a rather timid youth, too first his Foreign Office.

Yet by to the the time shy even arrival at announce Secretaryship, his Assistant-Under he had to of elevation an already earned for himself a reputation for hard work, firm resolve and strong language. A he boundless He task-master. man of near energy, was a strict admired and in his required subordinates and peers alike, and to fail to meet efficiency his standards was to risk an explosion his of to violent temper. According first James Rennell Rodd, a diplomat served under him in the Eastern who Office, he in Department `master Later the the a was of art of quarrelling'. frankness blunt Paris, his lead junior tongue to the and caustic at were staff Some him baptize `The Bull'. found in Embassy his the to of aversion to flavour dying `A the of ancien regime. a propriety conventional world', wrote his dilated nostrils'. Less poetically Lord Vansittart, `breathed through and French Caillaux, less Premier, Joseph the sympathy, maintained with much But he `as thirty-six those who could that as gendarmes'. reactionary was Rabelaisian found his beneath his bullying and condone rebukes, withstand impish Bertie's gruff exterior a far gentler soul. His joviality and pranks were later his home Esme Howard, delight the who of colleagues at and abroad. how in his Washington, became British Ambassador on memoirs at recalled in disliked discovering he Bertie, lady particularly on a whom one occasion her, behind Secretary's Office, in Foreign Private tip-toed the the room imaginary in dance, Indian complete silence an waved an executed war her, her head, having pranced tomahawk over scalped and successfully Bertie door.

And and triumphantly abandoned out of the although

13

discouraged the playing of stump cricket in the corridors of the Foreign Office, he was always ready to contribute to the enjoyment of the assistant by demonstrating how his high he kick, clerks ability to cut could and in two with a sword. candles his served apprenticeship was still which determination than the the rather administration primarily concerned with late did, business during 1890s however, Pressure the allow the of of policy. department for taking a much greater opportunity permanent officials of the Bertie freely volunteered his advice, and initiatives.

In these circumstances, by the turn of the century a prodigious number of memoranda and minutes bear witness to what Sir Edward Grey later called his `clear, crisp opinions'. fact by British Their the that time at a was enhanced when significance becoming diplomats ever more conscious were of their and statesmen in Britain's interests declining those areas which global position, country's fell Bertie's keenly be administration menaced most within seemed to become He thus to entangled with the affairs of southern was province.

Africa both before and during the war there, and he was to play a key role in East Britain's Far in in helping to formulate the early part of the policy increasingly But in became Bertic this same period critical of this century.

UnderPermanent by his immediate the the methods employed superior, Secretary, Sir Thomas Sanderson.

The

Foreign

Office

in

Bertie

Sanderson A methodical bureaucrat, `Lamps' was altogether and painstaking he discreet Bertie in to than proffered more cautious and the advice which Lords Salisbury and Lansdowne.

In Bertie's estimate he was too bound up `red however, department.

Sanderson the tapeism' the no more with of was, fastidious than Bertie in his attitude towards administrative Indeed, matters. both he and his successor found good reason to complain of the excessive issues fussiness displayed by Bertie in the handling minor of comparatively former A in despatching the numbering such as mistakes of telegrams. and his junior Sir if he John Tilley, later colleagues that or clerk, remembered his 'apt find in its Bertie to put on were unable to a paper proper place was floor fling the whole contents of a press on to the and make us gloves and Bertie's is Moreover, there them'. that to work was sort no reason suppose Salisbury Sanderson.

In 1897 highly that of than any more valued Underfor Permanent Bertie the candidate considered a possible Secretaryship Colonial Office, but finally dismissed idea the on the of the discharge his duties he there was though grounds that would unimpeachably, `not much original power' in him. Bertie, however, considered himself to be junior force he for clerks, who amongst the a courted popularity change, and intellect having to waste time and upon the at were as ever grumbling decyphering drudgery despatches, telegrams. and and cyphering of copying

14

He also sought, not without foster the careers of some of some success, to These Charles included Hardinge, the rising stars of the foreign service.

Louis Mallet, Cecil Spring-Rice William individuals Tyrrell, and who shared both Bertie's antipathy towards Sanderson and his fears with regard to the intentions Wilhelmine Germany.

Yet in later years when policies and of Ambassador Paris he indignant at was when youthful advice ran counter to One former member of his staff later complained his own opinions. that he found `a certain enjoyment in trampling on anyone with spirit at all, whom he might have power over'.

Bertie seems to have entertained hopes himself' day he that some might one Under-Secretary. become Permanent His chance of doing so were, however, limited by the fact that Sanderson, who was grooming his own candidate for the post, was only a little older than Bertie and was not due to retire until 1906. And after having failed in the summer of 1902 to secure Hardinge's Under-Secretary, began for Assistant Bertie to the as an appointment work Rome.

Such Embassy in The the to a course was not unusual. succession demanding less duties of warmer and not prospects were weather O[rice. functionaries Foreign Both Martin to the senior of unappealing Gosselin and Francis Villiers, Bertie UnderAssistant who served with as first, Secretaries, But, to their careers abroad. complete at were Lansdowne, to lose Bertie's services in the Foreign Secretary, was reluctant He had. known Bertie since their schooldays and evidently London. valued his advice. Bertie had, however, the good fortune to be able to count the Francis Knollys, amongst his King, Edward VII, and his Private Secretary, friends.

With he their threat that support, and closest personal a would he Bertie age, reached pensionable resign as soon as was able to secure Italy.

Ambassador to as appointment Bertie's first two years abroad were not the happiest of his career. Lord Rome `only left Rosebery have in the the as pleasant post' may regarded because it had But despite, diplomatic that, or perhaps of also service.

Chirol, become what Valentine the foreign editor of The Times, called `a A serious heart condition for our decrepit diplomats'. "place "of embalming" Sir Philip Currie, immediate had made Bertie's predecessor, a virtual invalid, and Sir Francis Ford, who had preceded him, had been inclined to hoped Minister, had Giulio Italian Foreign Prinetti, insobriety. that the by himself laid low But Prinetti Bertie would be an improvement. a was Bertie for in January 1903 the the remainder of year and stroke syphilitic Italian Admiral had to deal at the Consulta with an ineffective who would Minister former his have much preferred of to return to as appointment Bertie was in any case soon bored by life in 1Zome. His two main Marine.

Edward by King in diplomatic 1903, achievements the arranging of' a visit

15

diminutive King Victor VII to Pope Leo XIII the the and of persuading III to wear black knee breeches during a visit to the court at Emmanuel involved Bertie in long and wearisome Their Windsor, negotiations. in Anglohardly however, the political significance with compared outcome, Japanese alliance, which in the previous year Bertic had played a large part in bringing It must have been particularly to fruition. galling to a man of in find himself Rome Bertie's ability and experience to exile virtual at at a drifting Russia Japan towards time when war, and when were and lead in discussions April in 1904 Lansdowne to which were to was engaged Street', Downing Bertie `In lamented the conclusion of the entente cordiale. least former `one pull the wires whereas can at to a an colleague, Ambassador

is only a d-d marionette'.

It was doubtless with a view to securing a position which would allow him in Italy, for less his than a year the exercise of more scope talents that after Bertie set his sights upon the Paris Embassy: a post which was considered to be a branch department fall due Office, Foreign to of the and which was Bertie was able to rely upon royal vacant at the end of 1904. Again patronage and during the next five years King Edward was to be one of the Bertie's relations with most regular of guests at the Embassy. And although George V were in he VII, never as close as those with Edward succeeded his royal connection. maintaining When in April 1918 Lloyd George finally had Bertie unceremoniously in Embassy from Paris to order the evicted from for Lord loudest Derby, make way the querulous the protest came Windsor.

Sanderson

load lighter Italian that with the work climate and a `some of the asperities' had from which Bertie's previously colleagues Bertie disappear. during But fifteen suffered would the which months his actually graced Rome with his presence did nothing temper. to mollify Nor did they lead to any improvement in He remained in his manners. he did, lacking, some respects an overgrown many of those schoolboy, as Music diplomat. be social qualities that might and expected of a senior literature in him, he had interest the visual arts to meant nothing and no Captain beyond for erotica. an enthusiasm collecting eighteenth century Howard Kelly, who was for some time naval apache at Paris, commented for functions invitations Embassy `were to that the social more sought for brought than they the they to the conferred prestige ritual pleasure had little Bertie In truth recipient'. very patience with such social events as daily his His likely in January 1906 of a to treatment routine. upset seemed from Royal College Music led the and orchestra of their choir visiting Stanford, Charles Sir bitterly Foreign Office to to the complain conductor, Not had London.

Ambassador left his box in to their the only return after had hoped

16

the middle of the concert but, according to Stanford, he had addressed him if he `crossing as were a sweeper'.

Bertie

he was nevertheless punctilious of etiquette, maintained great and Embassy.

Nearly fifth his for the at the post was state one of allowance his full dress from he drive the spent upon stables, and on occasions would Embassy in the Rue du Faubourg St Honore Elysee to the neighbouring in fittings palace a sumptuous coach with silver and embroideries, and bearing his arms writ large upon its panels. The impression which he sought His to convey was matched by his own picturesque appearance. white curly hair offset a rosy complexion, for in he though and made up short stature, high hat: `only this by invariably top the one', an exceptionally wearing forth from democratic Kelly, Howard `to the police commented call a salute had Paris'.

To Caillaux like he stepped out of a of a character who seemed

by Dickens

novel blowing large a

Thackeray: or

head held

high,

`stick en bataille,

whiskers

in his in the wind over-adjusted and sporting waistcoat, corseted ... blue and white spotted cravat'. `He made one feel', Vansittart be finest in His Britannic Majesty's `that the to the thing wrote, world was Ambassador Paris'. at By contrast Bertie's wife did not cut a fine figure in French society. The France, daughter of a former British Ambassador Feodorowna Wellesley to had been a rather plain young lady with a distinguished but few name, other She had Bertie in 1874, social graces. married and to all outward happy Nevertheless, for a man who in the marriage was a one. appearances his youth had enjoyed the company of pretty and amusing women, and who during his years at Paris was to delight in the friendship beautiful the of Gordon-Lennox, Bertie's choice of partner appeared strange.

Lady Algernon Those who knew Lady Feo well found her to be kind and good humoured, her

knitting

between

August

1914 and for Belgian

November

1915 and of seventy both her to comforters refugees attest scarves and woollen in devotion But her her the to allied cause. manner she was charity and because inclined be to and rather vague, and perhaps of this she retiring diplomacy, despite her long hostess.

Embassy a poor association with was, bored her, her the to embarrassment receptions of guests she and much feelings. her Her disguise to one consuming passion was made no attempt in, the card table, a pleasure her husband never engaged and she would Carlo hours Monte into the the early of morning. readily play poker until in found its difficult that temptation to casino were a she resist, and and later years she was to spend much her time there. of dined Embassy Ponsonby, during the the royal visit who at Spring of 1914 found that she knew none of the diplomatic She was, he concluded, `quite impossible as Ambassadress'.

17

Sir

Frederick to Paris in the by sight. corps

Some six months before Bertie took up his duties at Paris, Louis Mallet him: Ambassador France have `The to next wrote to a great role to will Mallet had in Anglo-French the play'. evidently mind recent settlement of differences But he the colonial entente cordiale. which constituted was also thinking about Britain's relations with Germany. `It seems to me', Mallet France is `that a close understanding with a great safeguard to us observed, be Germany isolated. keep He ' has `it to to object ought added: - and our have [at Paris] his been to so necessary eyes open and never someone with German designs'.

With Bertie these to sentiments, above all agreed.

Germany he replied, `has never done anything for us. She is false and grasping and our real enemy politically and commercially'.

It is with the expression of such overtly anti-German views as these that Bertie's name is frequently associated by historians of British foreign policy.

Some of his contemporaries certainly considered him to be a pronounced Germany.

April In Radolin, 1905 Prince Hugo Polish the critic of von German Ambassador German Paris, to the at aristocrat who was wrote Chancellor that according to a reliable source whereas in England Balfour, the Prime Minister, was not regarded as Germany's friend, and Lansdowne Secretary her Bertie Foreign f端r `gilt the not was regarded as enemy, ...

Gegner Deutschlands'.

Germany Bertie's einen ausgesprochenen mistrust of for his Anglo-French indeed be the two of the to and support entente were in his in international thinking the most consistent elements about affairs decade before 1914. He himself always denied that he had any bias in his attitude towards Britain's continental neighbours. In a conversation with the Baron von Stumm in December 1911 Bertie refuted the charge that he was Germanophobe.

He he insisted, Nevertheless, Anglomane. the a was, an defence of what he defined as Britain's interests did lead him to give lines he to overriding support such conceived of policy as might contain what be Germany's to ambitions. foreign in British It may seem hardly surprising the that one whose career began following Ministerin Bismarck's the year appointment as service President four Prussia, of the of and ended weeks after the conclusion have treaties of Brest-Litovsk, exhibited some apprehension about should forty Bertie During in the growth of Germany's that the spent power. years had to accommodate the Foreign Office British governments themselves to Prusso-German foremost its the creation the the of state, as evolution industrial its the military power of alongside continent, emergence and for Britain's in Africa Pacific. the older rivals as a competitor and empire Shortly before his death in 1919 Bertie claimed that it was during the time that he had spent in Bonn after leaving Eton that he had learned the `real German have This been true. Yet such correspondence character'. may of

18

Bertie's as dates from the 1870s does not reveal any great hostility towards Germany.

Nor for that matter is there any indication that by the turn of the Bertie Germany century regarded as posing any greater threat to Britain's imperial France Russia. felt He than security and still able to assure the Count Billow, German State Secretary, he the von met at whom in November Sandringham 1899, that Englishmen `the generally regarded between Germany bickering in England in the and press and elsewhere as the nature of family squabbles which are carried on with great heat and disappear in time of common danger'.

German What Bertie did find objectionable in the manner was which foreign policy was conducted.

He was especially irritated by the brusqueness heavy diplomacy, by habit bringing he `the their their termed out of of what he in But above all, resented the way artillery on every occasion'. which the increasingly in be Britain's Berlin to to seemed ready exploit authorities intervention in in Their difficulties to their own advantage. the negotiations future Portugal Britain the over control of the which was engaged with bay important hostile Delagoa to the their railway, reaction strategically boats during South African British seizure and search of German the mail British to support to the occupation opposition of war, and their reluctance large tracts of northern China by Russian forces, were all in Bertie's opinion Other instances either of German duplicity or chantage. powers, of course, Germany's fashion. in But conduct acted a similar was not what was let friendly from power, alone a member of the expected a professedly Bertie was inclined to judge Germany family. Like many of his generation by higher standards than he applied to France and Russia. The latter were Germany badly: behave to was not. expected Germany his It was partly because of his growing towards antipathy and German diplomacy distrust of the motives behind that Bertie vigorously in in government circles opposed the notion, which gained some popularity In he 1900s, Anglo-German a memorandum the early alliance. which of an bound by drafted in November 1901 he argued that even if Germany were in AngloBritain to an an alliance, she would never offer any effective aid by European Russian to participate conflict unless she were obliged On hand, he thought that such an arrangement the other considerations. friction between Britain limit and rather than would tend to perpetuate The problem France and Russia, the powers of the Dual Alliance. with but its diplomatic its Germany economic and military strength, was not Germany Bismarck's had through alliances constructed carefully weakness.

Europe dominated with continental politics and provided and alignments far But, Bertie that was twenty years of relative recognized, stability. as `surrounded from true of William II's Germany he was maintained, which,

by Governments do not like her'.

distrust her dislike and peoples which who or at all events

Bertie also claimed to perceive the emergence of certain fundamental differences of interest between Britain and Germany which were bound to between to the two powers. undermine any attempt establish an alliance These differences were for the most part imperial and commercial, the in Bertie's Germany's in Thus Middle East the product eyes of world policy. he saw the German sponsored Bagdad railway concession as likely to lead interest between Germany Britain in to an inevitable clash of and Mesopotamia and the Persian gulf. But far more disturbing than this, Bertie thought, was Germany's determination to become a great naval power.

This, he assumed, would lead her to seek naval bases and coaling stations overseas, the acquisition of some of which Britain would be bound to resist.

Indeed, Germany's need for such points d'appui soon became for Bertie a German diplomats to the rationale with which explain activities of and in From Mogador, from Madeira the to the merchants all parts of world.

Canaries to Cabinda, there was hardly a bay, estuary, island or headland that might not in Bertie's estimation be transformed into a German naval base. If Bismarck had his nightmare of continental coalitions, then Bertie had his dread of German coaling stations. An armchair strategist, Bertie had little time for Admiralty explanations that such establishments would be British fleet in to the the and attack at time of war. exposed mercy of `What we have got to do', he wrote from Rome in June 1903, `is to prevent Germany from obtaining coaling stations and so becoming a Great Naval Power for war purposes beyond the immediate neighbourhood of her own differences between France Germany to encourage coasts, and so as to and make a naval accommodation between them impossible. ' The continuing German in Germany's the the expansion of role navy, Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911, and the growth of German influence in East, reinforced Bertie's apprehensions the Near and Middle about Germany's intentions. In central Africa he also came to believe that the Germans were determined to expand their colonial domain from the Atlantic to the Indian ocean by acquiring territories at the expense of Portugal and Belgium. But Bertie thought the Germans to have more in first he Moroccan During than territorial the mind crisis simple advantages.

Britain's thought one of Billow's objectives to be the undermining of new found friendship with France, and the achievement for Germany of a quasihegemonial role on the European continent.

To meet this manifold German challenge Bertie British government should endeavour to outbuild

20

that the recommended Germany in warships;

German to smaller powers encourage resist pretensions; avoid any German `mammon to the concessions gratuitous of unrighteousness'; and for Power in `Balance the the preservation the European system'. of of work It was in the attainment last that the Anglo-French of this objective entente for Bertie its during his Embassy Paris. assumed special significance at Bertie did not initially basis future the conceive of this understanding as of a defensive Nor, however, did he regard it simply as a colonial alliance.

Britain's to any relevance settlement without relations with the other The by Lansdowne powers. continental achievement of an accord which bring friction Anglo-French to to twenty an end over years of purported over Egypt had in Bertie's estimation it deprived Germany one great advantage: her leaders diplomats had known that and of opportunity which previously differences with France. At the same time the entente for exploiting Britain's danger European to the the of a coalition of remove other powers seemed fear Great have Germany from Britain. `We if to nothing against we remain he Mallet in France', June 1904, `She to terms wrote on good with cannot Power France Some injure the such as active support of a naval without us'.

Sir later he in Arthur Nicolson, to a similar vein seven years wrote who was Office: by then Under-Secretary Foreign Permanent `Our the at from danger France has French the saved us of a reconciliation with attack in a war with Germany. ' the

just

instrument keep to an with which entente was more than Friendship France itself European in neighbours apart. a with was Germany's be Bertie to considered acquisitive means of curbing what German in Emperor's Tangier Barely six weeks after the aspirations. visit to March Britain 1905 he suggested to Mallet that an should make France for defence Anglo-French interests the of certain arrangement with Germany by in Holland of any political position such as the non-acquisition Morocco.

Atlantic Both her the coast of at the and colonies, or any port on during Agadir he Algeciras the time of the and crisis saw close conference Germany France keeping between Britain as a means of and co-operation intervening he his in Morocco, the gave enthusiastic and years out of Office Foreign to promote to the efforts collaboration of the support interests between British and French financial to contain and commercial German influence in Near East further the and economic extension of any his Bertie's in Spain. Nevertheless, one of abiding pre-occupations remained be into drawn desire to ensure that France not any political should Germany. little As Bertie there was recognized, chance of combination with The Germans. in formal France becoming enmeshed a alliance with the had created too French defeat of 1870 and their loss of Alsace-Lorraine keenly between But Bertie that. to the two was permit powers great a gulf for in France that there those political and economic were aware who But the Britain's

21

favoured

Germany

based rapprochement with reasons upon an agreement on Such issues. possible territorial extra-European covering an arrangement, in Africa and on railway central changes and an agreement west Ottoman in in found France the support construction considerable empire, German in this way they might overcome amongst those who thought that in Morocco.

And French to the opposition establishment protectorate of a impossible that the achievement of such an accord was not was demonstrated by the fact that in February 1909, at a time when Georges Clemenceau, French Anglophile of politicians, reputedly one of the more in Prime Minister, France Germany did concluding succeed an was and future in Moorish agreement upon co-operation affairs.

But Bertie foresaw much greater dangers than a limited colonial accord of this nature. Uncertain as to whether they could rely upon receiving any from he French Britain, adequate military support government might, a feared, if faced with an international crisis, yield to a threat of force from Germany and perhaps abandon the ententewith Britain. Worse still, France German in by be European the event of a might military might, crushed war Germany Europe. hegemony be left and of with the virtual France that account was that of possibility also took Britain, Russia, but the aid of a military achieving with without during Germany. he This the war crisis of envisaged victory over situation Britain Grey desirability 1914. he Thus the summer of the of was to urge on determine 'locus in in the to the war slandi participating order to gain a diary, in his `could he France', `A reasoned conditions of peace'. victorious interests be terms with to consider making when not expected our it had Germany. ' Bertie's argument in 1914. remained much the same as France been during the previous nine years: Britain must either work with be her Germany to terms that might on unfavourable or see settle with British interests.

One other in alliance

into

Bertie

Nevertheless, until the outbreak of war in 1914 the notion of collaborating in Bertie's did France the require necessarily estimation not with formal into that to similar which a alliance the transformation entente of France had with Russia. Indeed, he thought there were good reasons for 1907 `we Mallet in April He to must not wrote avoiding such a course. land French to rely on our material support to the extent of encourage the French Germans'.

The beard nationalism after the revival of making them 1911 seemed only to confirm Bertie's apprehensions in this respect. One Grey in June 1913, he French for told an alliance, not offering the reason Germany. defiant In be it towards to too might encourage them was that Steed Wickham in he following to of much the same sense the spoke year

22

The Times. The

it he that the made the advantage of entente, claimed, was in German French their and to more confident aggression power resist `restraint Britain's threats, while the uncertainty a of aid acted as military in French in them very prudent the way of making government on the German in the order not to appear as government with confrontations from Bertie did however, advocating not, withhold aggressors or provokers'.

January In instances. in France the offer of military specific assistance to lest their confrontation 1906, at a time when the French were apprehensive if Britain Grey lead Bertie Germany that could to war, warned should with diplomatic France support or neutrality, of more than continuing not assure feeling danger be `serious on the of there would of a complete revulsion a Convinced in France'.

French and public opinion government part of the it be be France if given must effective, were to armed support of also that for Anglo-French he insisted the need on at the outset of a conflict, in May 'be 1911, Nicolson he Everything, told should planning. contingency forces French British and of to meet the contingency arranged unofficially he For much having to act together'. the the same reason opposed Governments German British between of any the and conclusion from Britain speedy military rendering arrangement which might prevent he by So in France the apparent the event of a war. upset was assistance to Grey formula in French the non-aggression which of the acquiescence Anglo-German basis 1912 in March that the accord to of an make proposed Poincare, the French Premier, he even went so far as to persuade Raymond London. intervene to at between It was similarly the with a view to ensuring effective collaboration in July 1912 Bertie in to that time endeavoured crisis of entente partners in for French Grey's pro quo naval collaboration acceptance, as a quid secure first he had Mediterranean, put to version of a proposal the of a modified in the spring of 1905. This was for an exchange between the two Mallet joint interests, defining their respective and and generally governments if they would confer together on what they were endangered stating that be Grey be if considered this to taken to safeguard them. any, should steps, done been hitherto had further and that than anything much going Cabinet like the the rejected subsequently and alliance, an something direction in Bertie's In this achieved was an the end all efforts proposal. in November Ambassador Grey French between and the exchange of notes 1912 which bound both parties to consult with each other in the event of a threatening

situation.

One reason why Bertie was so critical of Grey's efforts in 1912 to improve Britain's relations with Germany was because he was afraid of how the France. in be British initiative in direction received this might news of a

23

Throughout

the years of his Embassy at Paris Bertie constantly stressed the he it, `to French'. the the tender need, as put safeguard of susceptibilities After all the entente was far more dependent and policies upon personalities instrument.

And so long as Bertie had to deal than upon any diplomatic in France fluctuating based parliamentary with governments majorities upon he could hardly ignore their critics and possible successors. At times Bertie Grey in his desire his to ensure that seemed almost neurotic and colleagues do in England's French friendship. that should confidence nothing might sap Even a proposal from the Portuguese Government that Britain should send in to participate a representative to mark the centenary celebrations of the frowned by The Bertie. `Royalist, peninsular war was upon nationalist, and German French he `make subventioned newspapers predicted would', , it'.

In Grey he `choke capital to of such circumstances advised off the Portuguese'.

Much, however, as Bertie was attached to the entente he never lost sight of France imperial the fact that Britain and remained rivals and potential He for enemies. opposed the starting the erection of a subscription of a Queen Victoria Nice because, he if ill-feeling statue to at argued, were to between future in be liable `it would the two countries the arise to disfigurement insult'.

On level he to and exposed a more serious made every French influence to effort counter any extension of might which place Britain at a disadvantage in a future conflict. In the aftermath of the Agadir Quai d'Orsay he the to the to crisis so strenuously objected efforts of for foothold France in Moroccan the neighbourhood acquire a on the coast from Tangier had long Admiralty to the of an area which wished exclude involved he became in an open quarrel any other major naval power - that French Caillaux.

So incensed Premier, Joseph latter by the the with was Bertie's attitude that he insisted that had it not been for her understanding Germany'.

England, `France long have terms could with ago with come to Such words were almost the equivalent blasphemy Bertie's Yet to ears. of in many ways they only substantiated his own claims with regard to the Caillaux's Britain. both In the to the end the entente survived value of entente dispute over Tangier.

But in the years that `wild talk' and the Anglo-French War World First there was one other aspect preceded the outbreak of the her This disturbed Bertie. foreign France's alliance with was of policy that Russia.

Bertie's attitude towards Russia had been shaped by forty years experience in the Foreign Office: years in which Russia had seemed to present, if not Britain's the threat to most consistent always the greatest, at any rate Angloimperial he And the the of though conclusion welcomed security.

Germany's limiting Russian convention for 1907 room as a means of of

24

he diplomatic British the manoeuvre, never shared of some enthusiasm like Nicolson and Hardinge, diplomats, for all things Russian. He personally Alexandre disliked and distrusted Izvolsky who, after having been Russian from 1911 Foreign Minister, Russia's Ambassador Paris.

He was onwards at Russia disapproved to of any concession of the straits on the opening between during Balkan the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the and he his distaste for Panslavism, to made clear repeatedly and opposition wars Russian influence in Near East. he At the time the of any extension same being in fears French by `dragged' that their the were about ally expressed he `often thought the support of what merely or sentimental were Russian interests'.

The have Paris Ambassador to need at an unavowable for if French their ally's cause, necessary, moderate enthusiasm who would, he for Nicolson the the gave opposing reasons nomination of as was one of his own successor.

Russia's

did his `Balkanic to about much zeal', apprehension colour following July 1914.

In during the week the war crisis of the attitude Serbia, it Austrian despatch to ultimatum was very much upon of the for deciding whether or Russia's shoulders that he placed the responsibility European he `I he in his there war. cannot', a general wrote would not diary on 27 July, `believe in war unless Russia wants it'. -1r) he observed, Russia `the Emperor adheres to the absurd and obsolete claims that she of however bad is is protectoress ' their conduct, war of all slav states, possible.

That same day he wrote privately to Grey urging him to put pressure on the French to encourage the Russians not to assume the role of protectors of Grey he 30th Slavs.

And against giving any assurance of the warned on the Russia.

France `Russia he `become to and would', claimed, assistance armed follow in her France ' would wake. more exacting and Bertie's

Bertie

held

the view that if a Francothe crisis throughout from in Balkans, France the the to situation result were and Britain And must participate. annihilation, with once were menaced Germany Russia, German between forces hostilities and and commenced increasingly he became Luxembourg, to ensure that concerned entered have deserted France. by Yet 4 Britain to though, should not appear he Austria for August, he was ready to blame Germany the war, and was diary On Russia's August he in his by 7 1914. disturbed a policies. added still German May 'it but military power. prophetic note with regard to cautious he be by `arid to that of another an an end', noted, not replaced come Russia'. power such as

Nevertheless, German war

During reticent

inclined the summer of 1914 Bertie was, if anything, to be more in the advice which he oflcrcd to Grey than in previous periods of

25

international tension. A wealth of private correspondence covering the years his his desire impress his Embassy Ministers to of attest to opinions on and in influence had in London Paris.

But he colleagues and what upon the foreign in his British What in these making of policy years? was role entente diplomacy? left a formidable impression He certainly on the minds of his in `A big landmark tower time of trouble contemporaries. of strength and disappears with Lord Bertie's recall', observed one member of his Embassy in Sir Eric Phipps, British Ambassador April Paris, 1918. staff another at later wrote of him that he had `succeeded in making himself part of the Paris landscape his English surrendering a particle essentially of without Others less flattering.

He Lord to characteristics'. were was according Esher, who had the misfortune to cross swords with Bertie, a representative `class long of a since passed away whose conversational powers were in Strawberry Holland House Hill'. the distant atmosphere matured of and In Caillaux's he English the estimation possessed soul of an country squire had left his hole, firmly who never and a mind closed to any elevated foreign conception of policy.

There

in Caillaux's

Bertie's international charge. views on judgements his issues on specific pragmatic, in He thought terms almost entirely of a

was substance affairs were empirical and peremptory and absolute.

European state system composed of great and small powers, each of which Only had clearly did he detailed definable interests. rarely offer any factors foreign domestic their to consideration of political and relevance is, for There instance, in Bertie's policy. nothing papers that resembles that Crowe German Eyre attempted clear and penetrating analysis of policy that invariably in his celebrated Bertie January 1907. almost memorandum of issues.

Nevertheless, tended to over-simplify complex political and economic his logic was not without its impact.

Grey,

Foreign

Secretary

for

who was years that eleven of the thirteen Bertie spent at Paris, readily praised his work and his opinions.

Indeed, in December he knew 1911 Nicolson Bertie that of no other assured Ambassador in in higher the trust placed respect of position who occupied a him by the government.

Yet it would be difficult to try to assess the degree Grey, influence Bertie had of or to select any occasion on which which upon he may be said to have exercised a decisive influence on the determination France Britain's he Many relations the with of policy. expressed on of views by dissimilar held Germany to those other officials who were and were not Secretary.

Foreign in closer the continuous contact with and more Grey. disagreed he Moreover, He with clearly on some matters of policy for in Grey little Britain for the efrorts which advantage could example see better Anglo-German his through to relations naval and made colleagues

26

Since,

however, Grey to and colonial accords. prepared was generally improved Germany to the maintenance subordinate of the relations with France, Germany in to entente with and since concessions almost any part of

by Bertie as contrary the world were usually portrayed to French interests, Grey frequently by by Bertie the policies advocated and the ends achieved coincided.

Grey probably judgement Bertie's to tactical on the attached more value broader day to day management his Paris than the to of affairs at advice on issues of policy. He was in any case prepared to concede to the Ambassador French.

Thus discretion in the choosing which courses to pursue with wide during the early stage of the Agadir crisis, at a time when Grey wanted to Germany Congo in French the to make a settlement the with encourage he had in detail the sort of arrangement basin, he wrote to Bertie outlining in mind. But he also left Bertie free to reveal to the French as many of This permitted these ideas as he might think `discreet in conversation'.

Bertie, who was highly critical of any notion of applying pressure on the least Grey's French in this matter, the opportunity to modify at the tone of communication. from having friends in high places.

To some extent Bertie also benefited his ally in the days of Sanderson and Landsowne, Permanent Hardinge, was from 1906 until 1910, and Mallet and Tyrrell both Under-Secretary to were Grey.

Berrie friendship Secretaries his Private to also maintained act as failed latter, Embassy King But Edward. to the the who rarely on visit with from France, his journeys the to and south of was sometimes more of an from diplomatic The King, than a point of view. an asset embarrassment foreign British in in the policy was much exaggerated making of whose role individual be Bertie France, stubborn and on occasions a rather could in difficulty he to that ensuring said nothing considerable encountered be heart French politicians that might construed as a change of on the part Edward did Moreover, VII in London. not always choose of the government for Paris. it In 1907, time to visit the most propitious example, proved in the French capital on May day, impossible to dissuade him from arriving despite the fact that this left the prefect of police with the responsibility day both for ensuring the monarch's order on a safety and maintaining Edward King labour It demonstrations. to traditionally would, given over deny Revolution'. him Events Ponsonby, `interest to see a conspired to told diplomatic him that spectacle, but even then his visit was not without a he for he Porte Dauphine was so railway station arrived at the when upset French ignored he by the the prefect of police that virtually monopolised Foreign

Minister

had gone specially who

27

him. to meet

George

V was no less of a problem, especially when it came to arranging his first insisted Bertie's King Paris.

Much distress, to the new state visit to at his brother Berlin St in Vienna, that he should sovereigns and visit Petersburg before going to Paris: a course which Bertie thought would be interpreted French And to the as a slight republic. when a royal visit was finally arranged for April

by Queen 1914 matters were further complicated Mary's objection to sharing a carriage with the wife of President Poincare.

Mme Poincare had what was quaintly termed a passe orageuse: she had been divorced, her former husband, a Marseilles cab driver was still alive, and, it before had been M Poincare their the was rumoured, she mistress of from by After relationship was regularised vigorous protests a civil ceremony.

Bertie, the Queen did agree to ride with Mme Poincare at the entry to Paris and at a proposed military but she resolutely refused to accept review, ladies French the requirements the the two that should of protocol Bertie began to wonder if it accompany each other on all official occasions. be Queen better if Queen home, the the to would at and remain were herself urged the King to abandon the visit altogether.

Ponsonby complained `like to Bertie that the French protocol the middle class who wished were They were always on the lookout for slights and to be thought gentlemen. frightened for fear losing dignity'.

It their of making concessions of was, the Queen remarked from Germany different their recent trip to quite where they had `only to express the slightest wish and this was carried out'. Driven Queen by Mary's Tyrrell: despair Hertie to to attitude, complained nearly

The ailment attributed to Mme Poincarc [ie divorce] is not catching it first if the contact - to which no and were measles one and is infect her The to companion. other objection made - would suffice drives would not add to the danger. The ways of providence and of inscrutable. heads are crowned When `violent cyphering' between the Embassy and London failed to change Queen's Bertie had French the to persuade the authorities to respect mind, her wishes. Nevertheless, no harm was done to the entente. Indeed, the visit Queen it Ponsonby was such a success that according to was rumoured that Mary's `out of date hats and early Victorian gowns would become next fashions! ' year's by those the arranging of royal visits were trivial presented such as in in European developments this period. politics when compared with other Crowe Eyre Nevertheless, long termed what so as the entente remained its frame it `nothing to avoid giving seemed wise of mind', more than a it its doubt In in France such circumstances was validity. supporters cause to in Bertie have Government British for important to the a equally Paris the respect and confidence of representative who commanded at Upsets

28

French senior politicians and diplomats. Bertie's vigour and the length of his Paris in Clemenceau's him at stay combined to eyes make part of that city.

But Clemenceau was himself one of those few French politicians for whom Bertie had a genuine affection. Though at times impulsive and over-hasty in his judgements, he was, Bertie claimed, amenable to reason and ready to temper his actions to the needs of the entente.With other Frenchmen Bertie found it frankly bullying to to tactics. sometimes necessary resort what were Stephen Pichon, the Foreign Minister in the governments of Clemenceau Briand infrequently His long the and was not victim of such exercises. from Paris his absences and apparent aversion to work led Bertie to seek the support of other French ministers and departments to apply pressure So him.

Bertie in in this that the autumn of successful was upon respect 1910 that Grey wrote to congratulate him on `taking to some extent, and for Pichon French Minister Foreign Affairs'. the very successfully, place of as intermediary.

Of Yet Bertie also had serious shortcomings him Grey as an in he dissent 1924 by `ironical that could express an question even wrote direct Grey forcibly by He than things, negative'. a more would say noted, `that were crisp even to the point of brusqueness, and yet make the person feel he he disposed friend'. them that to whom said and a was well invariably Unfortunately this was not the case. Even one as sympathetic found Vansittart him him `unnecessarily towards as rude at times'. What Caillaux Grey termed an `ironical by `sneer'. question' was regarded as a Caillaux's Bertie's diplomacy To a minister temperament of seemed his language frank. deliberately too and much provocative Others

found

Bertie's

lack In of complain reason also of caution.

Emperor financier, December 1905 the German Alfred to the protested Belt, that the language recently used by Bertie to the German Ambassador justified latter have him Paris duel.

Even the challenging to at would a Bertie's his those, there they colleagues were who while amongst admired felt he far. for A that too carried matters skills, man noted argumentative his great likes and dislikes, Bertie could reduce differences over policy to in The in level 1911 the the manner spring of of a personal vendetta. which he sought to warn Pichon's successors against the advice of Louis Renault, a jurist, leader French delegation distinguished the of who, as at a recent had had disagree Bertie, temerity the to caused some conference, with Office. Eyre Crowe appealed to Grey to intervene dismay in the Foreign Bertie's halt `valuable of the attacks upon a servant and and trusted' he reasoned, M. Renault's French state. Bertie's conduct, has `provoked hatred is (which) to prove very of our embassy most violent calculated M. in British interests in and expensive to which embarrassing other matters Renault is always consulted'. to

29

The

enthusiasm with which Bertie gave voice to his opinions may also have both in France and in Germany to a misunderstanding contributed of Britain's issues.

There is standpoint to suggest that on certain evidence during the first Moroccan Bertie in Delcasse, to crisis may an effort steel him to the French Foreign Minister, against his opponents have encouraged believe that he might rely on more than just British diplomatic And support. it seems likely that such loose talk as Bertie is reported to have engaged in Delcasse about giving muscle to the entente may have helped to convince for French that Lansdowne's to the plea consultations amounted with the Similarly, Bertie may also have persuaded French offer of an alliance. to adopt courses that they might otherwise have neglected. In governments 1912 he urged Poincare to oppose more vigorously the efforts of the Liberal formula Germany, government to work out a political and two years with later he suggested to Doumergue, the French Premier of the day, the basis Anglo-French Grey. he of an to consultative pact that propose might Nevertheless, demonstrate there is no conclusive evidence with which to 1914 Bertie did not endeavour interpret that before the to accurately Lansdowne Grey Quai in his dealings wishes of the and official with d'Orsay. If on occasions the advice that he offered to France's leaders went far beyond it was not so much because he the letter of his instructions, his masters as to influence them. sought to misrepresent In truth Berrie was never content simply to act the part of chief spokesman for the Foreign Office Paris. he his From Embassy the at poured out issues, thoughts in private letters and memoranda some of on a variety of had He Anglo-French tenuous which only a relations. could connection with draw long dealing after all experience of of upon a with the administration foreign British His half affairs. more than a century of career spanned diplomacy.

It had begun in the era of Palmerston; it ended in the age of Lloyd

George. Within Office Foreign Bertie had his the striven to make heard, had had he those to the champion voice cause of who seemed and Yet, Paris, he its sought to reform after nine years at was to administration. find it very difficult to adapt his methods to the conditions of war, one effect between his intermediary the of which was to severely circumscribe role as diplomatic Moreover, Paris. in London older governments although and Bertie New Diplomacy', '. the to practices were would survive the advent of have been a misfit in the post-war world. When Lord Derby arrived at the folded Embassy into four in 1918 he found every paper there neatly docketed on the outside, tied with pink tape and filed in one of four or five dated back to the middle of the nineteenth century. series; a system which Victorian bureaucrat In one sense Vansittart Bertie, the was perhaps right. his last kind. the abroad, was of

30

SIR EYRE

CROWE,

Sir Alan

1864-1925

Campbell

I am neither historian did I distinction being a nor ever achieve the of Permanent Under-Secretary State.

I hope that those of you who are of historians or former or present Permanent Under-Secretaries forgive my will in presumption speaking about Eyre Crowe simply on the basis that his has interested first I him in always personality me ever since read about Nicolson's books Harold (notably Peacemaking Carnock) Lord some of and many joined Service When I Foreign Second World War the the ago. years after in bosses 1950s Strang, William himself the then early one of my was Under Secretary, who had as a young man served under Crowe Permanent him.

It Strang junior in Northern the admired as a and much was Office Foreign in first Department 1924 the of minuted who on the letter when it reached the Foreign Office from the Secret Service Zinoviev Crowe in involved a most embarrassing and then episode. I remember discussing this with Strang and I remember Crowe Eyre talking also about been Crowe's Sir Bland had Nevile Private Secretary. later Then to who Strang kindly I by Crowe the sent me a copy of when was abroad article on Dr Rohan Butler of 1954 which is still in many ways the most balanced be More I in to thought recently written. of assessment my retirement Crowe Eyre but discovered I myself about gave writing something up when daughter Sibyl was already in from Rohan Butler that Crowe's engaged father based biography her documents a of on published and on writing As I expected you family papers such as letters which she had inherited. has now been published under the title Our Ablest Public know, this biography Corp, though unfortunately died Servant by Sibyl Crowe and Edward she here draws I have before the book appeared in 1993. Naturally to say what Zara heavily on her book, but also on other published sources, particularly Foreign Office However, before 1914.

I the about historians to try avoid treading on the grass of the who may or may not shall is The basis lecture I agree with what of my published say. works, some discussions personal or recollections and my own experience as a member of Service between do is What I 194.6 1979. try to relate the to shall and his Eyre Crowe to the circumstances his at time, to assess performance of his he left behind indicate the marks which on career and to each stage of lecture devoted he his life.

At to the service the end of my and which I sum up I shall also comment before legends on various myths and Crowe letter. including Zinoviev the the concerning episode of Steiner's

brilliant

book

31

family First I must say something his in the about origins and setting which Sir Joseph Crowe, his early career was to be spent. His father, was a journalist became talented as a man who after some years working well known Consular historian HM Service then as an art and entered to in be in engage reporting, now called commercial what would mainly Germany.

Eventually he became Commercial Attache for the whole of Europe, stationed in Paris. Joseph Crowe's wife, Eyre Crowe's mother, was German, Asta von Barby, who came from a Prussian family. Eyre Crowe father's his brother, Eyre Crowe, their third was son and was named after a in England in the middle painter of some eminence of the last century.

Because his father was stationed in Germany Crowe Eyre young was wholly first in in D端sseldorf Berlin then that educated country, at and until the age he for England Foreign Office to to the of eighteen came cram when examination.

His ambition, from which he never deviated, into to the Foreign go was Office become Under-Secretary.

Permanent Yet when he and rise to in England in he have his 1881 fellow to tutors arrived must seemed and Scoone's ill into Foreign Office, let the to students at suited singularly get He had been English he to the top. to an alone get school or university; not imperfect his French English; spoke and wrote was not very good; and his family were not at all well off. He was not the type of well educated and in Foreign 1880s to the the enter connected aspired well young man who Office. Yet he did. He lived frugally, he worked like a beaver and he came in in fortunately 1885 the there were two places second examination when be After he health available. a scare about whether ploughed on would he joined Office he later In the that year. grounds appearance was tall, a little over 6 ft with a rather military bearing, flaming red hair and blue eyes.

I must remind you that the Foreign Office in 1885 was a very small service, from Diplomatic Service, in the quite separate which you might expect to if in it building the this you stuck spend whole of your career out until in Transfer Diplomatic to the gradually moving retirement, very up seniority. highest level.

Service was possible though the except at not at all easy Secretary State for Foreign There Minister, the of was a single senior Parliamentary Affairs, who was of course a member of the Cabinet, and a business since dealt with House of Commons Under Secretary who normally House Lords.

Secretary State When the the member of of of was often a Crowe joined the Office the Secretary of State was Lord Granville and the A few years later his Sir Julian 1'auncefoote.

Permanent Under-Secretary , both Salisbury, Prime Minister Lord who was ministerial chief was the great Sir Under-Secretary Thomas Permanent Secretary, Foreign and the and Tape The Abuse Red for Use Sanderson, the of and author of a treatise entitled

32

in the Eastern, Western and American Departments, and also of various Outside this building it was then too a very different world children's stories. from our own. We had not yet lost any of the Empire except North America in and other parts of the world we were still expanding.

Juniors

I should remind you also that the Foreign Office in which Crowe had been completed only in 1868 and consisted only of this corner worked building to the North West of the central quadrangle facade giving with one St James's Park looking Guards Horse the the onto and other across to Parade. Quite larger Office India the separate and somewhat was next door and then on the other side the Colonial Office, facing along Downing Street. The old Home Office on the east side of the quadrangle its with facade Whitehall, incorporated in Foreign giving onto the now and Office, was of course also quite separate.

Commonwealth Perhaps

At this time (1885) a system prevailed under which the young men who had for in entry a very stiff examination competed were then expected to spend for duties, despatches, time their all some years on strictly clerical copying decyphering documents, duplicating telegrams, translating and encyphering distributing be It before they papers and so on. and would several years be for initiative for allowed any scope or assuming any except the would for Crowe, less limited Fortunately than a year after responsibility. most four Resident Clerks. in joining he was appointed This those one of was day in in job for bachelor lived days too a since you my -a marvellous - and flat here bachelor's floor, above on the top organised as a small an excellent looking lake Buckingham Palace to the out over and mess, with rooms North across the Horse Guards parade. In exchange for some drudgery and free hours board lodging.

Working on a roster system and you got unsocial distribute Crowe and his fellow clerks had to decypher, copy and all the in incoming the telegrams received after 7 pm until the department opened be decide They had to sent out also which of the telegrams should morning. during the night to the Secretary of State or a senior official. There was a dull Crowe but does deal have to minded that and not seem of great work it never seems to have crossed his mind that his talents might be more in job.

For his duties in employed some other constructively regular usual he first hours in Department, Western in the then successively the was office in Department 1902 African Protectorates Consular the after and found he dealt Department that the although where questions with were by junior less interesting there was a little more scope for initiative clerks than in the Western Department.

By the time he had served ten years as a junior clerk he was beginning to have be given occasional jobs of rather more importance the and to

33

long deeply reputation of a serious young man who would go quite a way, having I think been spotted by Sanderson as the result of a memorandum He Constantinople. in jurisdiction on some complicated question of was international by informed certainly the mid-nineties about unusually well but incoming dispatches through affairs also an astonishing not only reading fluently books in languages he range of the three that now spoke and wrote English, French and German. he His was music and was main recreation having he an excellent pianist, was even composed some piano pieces while Resident Clerk. joined His He interest Volunteers. a the other was the Royal Fusiliers in 1890 and rose to the rank of Captain, spending two or depot. drills at their London three evenings a week at training regimental But for his health he would probably have gone off to South Africa to fight in the Boer War in 1901 if the Foreign Office had been willing to release him. By then he had resigned from being just ten a over years after Resident Clerk and was living with his widowed Carlyle Square, in mother Chelsea. He continued his cousin to live there until he himself married Clara von Bonin in February 1903. It proved an extremely successful and happy marriage. He was then thirty-nine.

Obviously he he be his should was assessed at that stage of career? increasingly hard-working, outstandingly and able, reliable very knowledgeable.

Yet although he was liked and respected by his colleagues I doubt if he would at that stage have been regarded as a future Permanent Under-Secretary.

This may have been partly for snobbish reasons since in Crowe Office itself 1900s Foreign the early the a social elite and considered fashionable in interested of such considerations was scornful and was not bit he But I it been have too that think thought society. was a may also had little too much zeal, and was one of those people who shine serious, a However, juniors in later such an their as and then rather peter out career. in if be the next ten years assessment, proved quite wrong made, was to Office. in Crowe the official when emerged as the most outstanding How

First there into force Lansdowne few years

Office involvement in Foreign his reforms which came the was by Lord first for reform in 1906. The impetus provided was In in 1900.

State Secretary he the next took over as of when debate internal lively a radical and eventually there was

the transform method of entirely would proposed which was filing involve This the creation of registries and papers. would in division by turn would allow the clerks and this systems manned second for giving advice and carrying senior clerks to assume greater responsibility increasing diplomatic scale as they gained transactions on a gradually out devolve The to the most to responsibility was point experience. essential from the outset of a young initiative junior level possible, thus encouraging reorganization dealing with

34

Crowe became involved in having in been 1904, this clerk's career. only all Sanderson by Treasury to the that what was proposed was enlisted convince both feasible and economical.

He then seems to have become the driving force which eventually prevailed over all the Treasury objections so that the be brought into just January 1,1906, new organization could operation on before Sanderson He Crowe first head the appointed retired. as of the Central Registry in order to ensure that the new system worked Sir Charles Hardinge Permanent Undertook satisfactorily. as over who Secretary in 1906 gave his full backing to the reforms and subsequently have himself he largely for to that convinced seems even responsible was but them - this was, to say the least, a pardonable exaggeration clearly the have been his successful without support. reforms would not Crowe

be Head Western Department to the moved on and of leading in on played a part and providing analysis important the on all most questions of policy until the recommendations in Western Department 1914. not of war outbreak was then responsible Germany but for France Austria, Bavaria, also our relations with and only Tunis, Wurtemberg, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden Newfoundland, Borneo Norway, Netherlands, Morocco, the and Archipelago, European Eastern African the the and powers. colonies of and Quite a big parish. Crowe's views on the major questions arising in this vast Permanent Foreign Secretary to the through the area were submitted doubt 1907 Secretary. The best known of his many memoranda the was no in but large this was only one of a which number of papers memorandum, he expressed his view that it was to the interests of Britain to remain loyal Germany France Entente to to to the and not attempt appease a with her because be impossible deal had herself to to of shown with which

After from

this then

This her blackmailing tactics. and was the general view ambition Crowe's 1914.

Foreign Office between 1905 and about officials of senior force for have that and clarity and minutes were always expressed with but looking the gist of those those at the archives reason caught the eye of Under-Secretary Hardinge later Sir Nicolson Permanent Arthur and of as of Grey but broadly be by Their the similar. accepted was views appeared to feeling Secretary of State was of course painfully aware of the anti-French Cabinet his colleagues and of uncertain public and parliamentary of some of fact his In it is how the officials, well much not really clear views of support. doubts his him helped the they to colleagues, of overcome argued as were, hankered after as well as anti-French and many of whom were anti-Russian Germany.

However it an accommodation with was not only giving advice during Crowe on policy that and making recommendations was engaged on He also had to take part these years as Head of the Western Department.

Hague Secretary in several negotiations: British Delegation the to as of the insatiable

35

Conference Delegation

British the on representative in 1908-09 and the further little to show as a negotiations there was but Crowe himself in the course result of any of these arduous negotiations, law international of them acquired much detailed knowledge and related of him for questions and also won a reputation which set skilful negotiation from Conference he his After Hague the apart any other official of seniority.

CB, Legal Adviser, Hurst, both the and an exceptional awarded the were honour Office for a forty Foreign The also year old counsellor.

0300 that he and Hurst should each be given a gratuity recommended of , but this was turned down by the Treasury Grey decided not to press and 300 High He settled instead for a Treasury the matter. the to grant of , School for Boys in Constantinople, it `exceedingly that was commenting hard line on Crowe and Hurst'.

What Crowe and Hurst thought of this bizarre is somewhat outcome not recorded.

1907, Office Foreign the of as London Naval Conference the at in Paris in 1910. In the upshot

An even more unusual excursion from his regular Foreign Office duties was Crowe's appointment in 1911 to represent the British Government in the This Savarkar case before the Court of Arbitration Hague. was one at the been but have headline now news of those episodes which at the time made forgotten by almost everybody. Savarkar was a young Indian anarchist who India back in United Kingdom to to the after court proceedings was sent In July for including to murder. abetment stand trial various alleged crimes 1910 he escaped from a P&O steamship when the ship called at Marseilles but was arrested by the French gendarmerie and returned to the ship. After deputies French had board Savarkar the ship some sailed on with on in Indian the to the sympathetic cause raised a question nationalist Chambre des Deputes, alleging that there had been a violation of the right formal decided As French Government to make a of asylum. a result the his for Savarkar's French that request territory on the ground return to had been British by Marseilles the gendarmerie request arrest at at law.

The international tantamount to an act of extradition and contrary to last thing that Grey wanted in 1910 was a row with the French and it was best October in by thing that the the two government of that year agreed British Crowe do the agent to to was chosen as was to go to arbitration.

Tribunal five Arbitral before Government's British of an represent the case His 1911. in February in Hague chances of success the members sitting by himself he Office Foreign in highly was no and the were not rated very Tribunal before his it However, the speech means confident. appears that in French in He preference to using spoke was something of a masterpiece. judgement in delivered Tribunal later interpreter the an and a week Britain's favour. Crowe was warmly congratulated on all sides and was KCMG. made

36

Looking

1904-1914. it is clear that with every year he at the decade his He have known been strengthened the principal reputation. to was Office Foreign the of animator reforms of 1904. He was the most eloquent be Office Foreign the might called of what classic analysis and European ie the steady support of the regarding our recommendations policy Entente. And he had shown considerable both skill as a negotiator and as international before By he 1911 tribunal. an an advocate was emerging as a Permanent Under-Secretary, by then possible or even probable especially as did like him, had being Hardinge, Viceroy India, not gone off as who of Under-Secretary Permanent Sir by Arthur Nicolson replaced as who quickly him. formed a favourable In he 1912 Assistant opinion of was promoted both Western Department Eastern Under-Secretary, the the supervising and Russia and Turkey), by it had (which included been 1913 Department and Nicolson Sir Francis Paris Bertie, to that to succeed when went agreed Under-Secretary.

However Crowe should move up again to be Permanent Bertie pleaded for another year in Paris taking him to the end of 1914 and in In August led 1914 the the to this was granted. upshot outbreak of war Crowe both Nicolson freezing and of all appointments and the were cheated of their expectations.

I do not propose to trespass on the very well trodden field of the crisis of July 1914 and the First days of August before the outbreak of war. Most of far Britain took place very near to where the action so as was concerned State's in Secretary this the evening of room along the we are assembled it in Permanent Under-Secretary's below the room and across the passage, Room Cabinet 10 Downing Street. in I the think personally that at street from building is by described this within the crisis as seen most vividly father in his biography his but Nicolson into Harold to of enter all that So far Crowe he the evening. as was concerned, would occupy the rest of his best did forward his and clearly and very put views eloquently naturally his Cabinet Grey to provide which would convince with the arguments he interest But France.

British that the was was to support colleagues Government that the as a whole was not painfully - even agonisingly - aware fully accepting or even perhaps understanding his arguments, preferring until last to entertain the possibility some the very moment of reaching Germany it It with which would avert war. was only when accommodation became clear to Grey and the Cabinet that Germany was going to violate Government decided France.

Belgian neutrality that the to support had behaved in Britain Crowe that the event relieved was enormously but of course from the personal point of view this was a sad honourably, deeply he He himself half-German indeed horrifying and was was - situation.

Germany.

Also, he for his German his in was wife and sorry wife's relations

37

formidable a that the what realized confident forward Germany be.

He numerous turn out to put opponent would in including for German one which was the schemes countering war cirort fact carried out for seizing all German ships in British ports. According to at harnessed by least one account he was becoming bit of a nuisance until a Contraband became Arthur Nicolson in the charge of what wise old and put It Department Blockade. later Ministry the was a task which tested of and into himself full he Crowe's knowledge threw the and and experience to the fray with his accustomed late 1914 between and mid-1918. energy and skill Robert Lord From 1915 he was the senior official of the new Ministry with ironically Cecil as his Minister.

In 1917 he was made KCB. Meanwhile, he became his in his activities, enough patriotic war-time view of views and the victim of a campaign got up by various sections of the press, supported in his being Suffragettes, by him the a traitor view of of also accusing for several years and German mother and wife. This went on intermittently Grey in his him to order to offer resignation even got to the point of causing Cecil Grey, John But Government. to the and not to cause embarrassment his Grey Simon defended him to accept refused and all vigorously last fling had Suffragcttees September In 1918 their and the resignation. demonstrators 3000 had attempting the police to ward off a crowd of some far his front Crowe's Road.

Had house in Elm Park they got as as to reach by a tall resolute figure armed with a door they would have been confronted far

from

Government

revolver.

Office Foreign September 1918 Crowe returned at the proper to the State Secretary (in Assistant Robert Cecil become had of request of who had latter The State) Balfour.

Minister taken modern parlance of under Secretary be Foreign from Grey in December 1916 until over and was to Crowe had Curzon later. by Another three years change affecting succeeded in in 1916 had last been Nicolson taken place when allowed to retire at Under-Secretary Permanent for become Hardinge to order to make way Hardinge India. from his being Viceroy still seems to of again on return UnderPermanent for have regarded Crowe the post of as unsuitable Graham Ronald Secretary and did his best to promote of the candidature for Crowe in Rome). Fortunately (later to be a very successful Ambassador Hardinge's influence and power of patronage were no longer what they had Crowe Under-Secretary been in his first Permanent and tenure as him be when man to succeed to continued as the obvious regarded Crowe Embassy.

Paris hoped, he Hardinge, himself was given the as Conference Peace for briefs the the preparation of most of the supervised finally in 1919, Delegation British lynch became the pin of the and then Ministers Council Supreme the British after on the acting as representative it appears that in this setting had left Paris in July of that year. Indeed, , In

38

have Crowe found himself very much at home and his personality to seems Always his briefs he blossomed. the master of a acquired also quickly he Not that personal standing. was always successful position of exceptional but he his best.

This I this think period at at was when, was or always right, Clemenceau Harold Nicolson, him `Crowe, to c'est of remarked according homme 채 part'. un But when the Peace Conference was over there was still a serious obstacle George, Permanent Under-Secretary, Lloyd his namely as to appointment Peace he had the crossed swords on several occasions at with whom is that he There was no mutual respect there. My impression Conference.

George ignorant be Lloyd George Lloyd to and crooked, whereas thought Curzon by however, be him then to and stubborn. arrogant thought formidable he his State, Secretary mind to advocate when set was a of himself.

His Hardinge importance to relations with were poor. something of There was at that time a speaking tube connecting the Secretary of State's Permanent Under-Secretary below, there the as that such of with room in large in be order to convey orders to the chauffeur. motor-cars used to between For all the superficial two ex-Viceroys affability - calling each other for honeyed George and Charlie the tube speaking was not a conduit like being like did Hardinge treated a chauffeur not while the words. found he blew down Marquess that the tube and when was aggrieved Hardinge had gone home. He was determined Hardinge as to get rid of He him.

Crowe have Under-Secretary Permanent to succeed appointed and in getting Lloyd George to agree that Hardinge had great difficulty should Crowe him difficulty in Paris to agree that getting and even more go to George he Lloyd But Hardinge's eventually persisted and place. should take September in 1920.

Both appointments were agreed gave way.

Crowe's Permanent As it turned out the postponement as of appointment for over five years was I think a blessing for himself and for Under-Secretary Blockade Ministry his Service.

During the of years as a senior official of the higher in become known he had had the opportunity the to reaches of Ministers have Whitehall at and to contact with other senior officials and difficult Government.

He too negotiations with was concerned the centre of him States Sweden United of a new experience and which gave with the from Conference Peace his kind. Even more important spell at the was by Fortified had he reputation. emerged with a greatly enhanced which into he the new as anybody to peer these experiences was as well qualified Europe which was taking shape in the early 1920s. Furthermore, although have his ferocious to seems personality on paper, or even vitriolic often his is by on the number of observers who comment struck matured and on in Clemenceau his was not alone personal charm. powers of persuasion and

39

been have Hardinge his right may quality. recognizing Under-Secretary Crowe's be Permanent to suitability think that by 1920 Crowe was eminently well qualified

to have doubts about before 1914, but I in every respect .

State Curzon Crowe as Head of the Office served three Secretaries of January-November MacDonald (who was also Prime Minister) 1920-23, November 1924 to April 1925.

1924, and Austen Chamberlain

Crowe demanding chief much admired him, was a during his Lausanne the conduct of negotiations at especially perhaps Conference of 1920. Curzon often kept him unreasonably late in the Office him his but is he doubt to there clarify that they own mind no used when harmoniously together, each respecting the other's quality, and they worked difficult through times especially when Poincare some very came creditably Prime Minister.

Curzon his French but he own of course master was was Crowe's heavily relied on advice and expertise.

Although

Curzon

It it was an entirely different With Macdonald he that matter. seems and MacDonald trust and respect. achieved a relationship of mutual quickly Secretary, Foreign both Prime Minister MacDonald, had and was who German in dealing Dawes report on reparations notable success with the French for from troops the eventual withdrawal of the which paved the way Ruhr and the opening of what looked like a new era of stability in Western but he Europe. Crowe was his principal adviser on these questions was not improve Soviet involved in MacDonald's the to relations with attempts indeed Government in badly was one of various ways and which turned out Government later in factors fall leading the year. the to the of the Zinoviev However, MacDonald's the term of office came at the very end of letter affair which blew up during the election campaign of October 1924. I far Crowe's but in as so relations shall comment on this affair a moment, liking MacDonald it that with seems that the respect and were concerned they had for one another were not adversely affected.

Secretary State In November 1924, Austen Chamberlain took over as of Crowe Secretary From he be last Foreign that the would serve. and was to friendship and mutual they quickly moved to close slight acquaintance been ideal Chamberlain Crowe have to an combination seem affection. and hard last the they to exploit opportunity presented and which at worked itself, with moderate leaders in power in France and Germany (and here I March far-reaching Cabinet 20,1925) `to conclusion of reach a quote a for frontiers the providing mutual guarantees on security of settlement hand between Germany on the one and Belgium and France on the other, Germany, Belgium Britain, France be After to which and would parties'.

40

Treaty initialed October Locarno 16, protracted negotiations a was at on 1925 and formally signed in this room on December 1. But Crowe had died in April of that year.

Before offering some comments on the mark left behind by Crowe I propose briefly him.

To to some myths and controversies to refer about start with Crowe's is his his Many there the most trivial, accent and of appearance.

German his hand did to the refer accent; some on not contemporaries other Sibyl his daughter it denied he had that and strongly any un-English notice I have heard have been From I that there think all and read must accent.

German intonation accent or at moments of stress or emotion; a trace of a be if it it Not there that surprising matters very would were not. after all funny is in it but things that strike many people as quite one of those much, English in hierarchy. the somebody so senior One he his dressed in Bohemian there were allegations that of a way. hat; his long Borsalino to and refers unfashionably overcoat colleagues look his dowdy But if talks of appearance. at photographs you another find justify Most these times to of criticisms. taken at various nothing you in him dress them show conventional morning with a stick-up collar and the he him in Widmerpool taken a while sort of overcoat was only one showing for in Flanders 'visiting in hardly 1917 the the trenches occasion a was have he Towards his Savile Road turn-out. the end of career when would been received from time to time by the King there is no record so far as I by know that he fell short of the standard of dress traditionally the expected

Then

monarch.

I come to a more serious myth, or at least what I think is a myth, him Germany.

Crowe's Vansittart is to say ropes that attitude to cheerfully historical in as sharing his own views about the fundamental and wickedness like Crowe's do Germans, but I not think that views were anything of the 1907 It is of course true that in his famous memorandum Vansittart's. of I think he would be astonished to hear quoted so much (which incidentally in by historians) he analysed German policy in the previous twenty-five years far his in in too accusations some cases going a very adverse sense, possible faith. he indeed But bad that profoundly time, even at when was of German he Fully distrustful aware - none more so of current policies, was himself German in he the the merits of culture of was soaked since in every aspect of civilisation.

And when after the 1914 war he Germans he Secretaries foreign played a was the most senior adviser of successive Germany bring leading part in trying to reconcile France and Germany and have I back into the European thus said earlier of nations, as community for Locarno Pact 1925.1 the the agree entirely with what of way opening

Then

41

Sibyl

Crowe

in her hook says on this point. letter. I do not propose the Zinoviev

But I am by no means so sure detail in here. about the to tell story It all started, from intercepted letter as you will probably recall, an be Comintern, by Zinoviev, Secretary purporting to the signed of the which instructions in the gave to the comrades in this country to stir up disaffection forces Office in The Foreign factories. armed the and received a armament October letter from Secret-Service in the copy of this the second week of 1924 and were told that it was thought to be authentic.

Crowe on seeing it Ramsay be MacDonald that recommended to made a strong protest should to the Soviet Government through the Soviet Embassy in London and that Ramsay delivered. be published been it had this should as soon as MacDonald drafted Note draft.

A then agreed and asked to see a was and his him Aberavon in Wales in he the sent election at middle of where was it back it He it, to campaign. and sent made a number of amendments saw Crowe day learned to Crowe on October 24. On the afternoon of the same that the Daily Wail had got hold of a copy of the letter and were going to it following Confident he the publish that out was carrying morning.

Macl)onald's instructions Crowe thereupon Department to send off told the it to the Note at once, as amended by the Prime Minister, to and release its in However, its delivery. the press immediately the appearance on after Crowe following day dismay MacDonald that told and press the expressed it.

It he had expected to see the draft again before deciding to send was been has Crowe's be The dismayed. then endlessly turn to whole affair debated from every point of view and some very odd theories put forward, from the allegation that the whole thing was a monstrous conspiracy ranging Government Labour by Office Foreign to the the to embarrass the got up (to my mind) equally absurd idea that Crowe did not realize that this was a father her Sibyl hot Crowe that made politically stoutly potato. maintains don't I but did think that really no mistake and therefore not admit to any Crowe I Of' be fully last this can agree that course accepted as the word. failed fact in faith but he to carry out what turned the acted good was that have MacDonald if be intentions Prime Minister's may the even out to Several been also at fault in not making his intentions other people clear. in it have I been but think was the sort of mix-up may partly responsible blame has I Permanent Under-Secretary take the to and simply which the don't for I disagree.

Crowe himself be if think a should astonished were to but it is life his it alleged sometimes that as moment actually shortened him have certainly must at the time. mortified I must now try to give balance to my view of Crowe's career by commenting if his I as you will see they are two weaknesses - even on what perceive as First, I think he in each case the other side of the coin of his strengths. during bit his the especially too much, a of sometimes point view pressed

42

he Head Western Department Assistant Under period when was of and Secretary in the decade before the 1914 war. Many of his minutes and brilliant illuminating but are memoranda or there are so many of and wise, Secretary State did feel them that I wonder whether the of not sometimes badgered.

One bit for fact must make allowance the a that the habit, now Ministers briefing themselves by having meetings with the of quite common, did officials concerned, not then exist, so that official views would normally be put to the Secretary of State in writing.

But poor Grey! His eyesight not fond He liked too good and anyway too not of reading! and respected Crowe but he must sometimes have been wearied by the sheer volume of his writing.

Secondly, I think that there is a certain narrowness in Crowe's point of Vansittart bit he Crowe the too that put point a crudely when said view. interested in Bach Foreign Affairs.

This is and was only unfair when you Crowe's think of the extent of reading over a very wide range of subjects.

Crowe was the arch professional Yet there was some truth in the criticism. despised he `meddlesome busy bodies' journalists called and what such as or He does have been of parliament. to not members seem aware of the dangers to his own profession to be isolated from public of being thought His insistence high opinion. parliamentary and on professional standards led his in to to the recruitment opposition several overdue reforms and even Service.

Foreign In be he I the think these respects of can structure having too narrow an outlook. criticised as But

his

First

him points strong were very strong. as a one thinks of Office.

His in Office into the the of role reforming moderniser old an important bureaucratic he machine was very and efficient was to preside by bureaucrat his the the this at end ace of career as which time the over Service had been amalgamated Office and Diplomatic (in 1920).

Foreign by his insistence He must have irritated meticulous on correct office people but if he believed that only papers to your you presented procedures in a neat and orderly fashion could you expect your advice to be Minister This general does I taken seriously. principle am sure still command inside Office, Permanent Under-Secretaries the and most since acceptance in Office his time have given much thought to the best organisation of the it Secretary instrument in hands to the of make an efficient of the order State. he was without is doubt if the that any an effective operator for the the rapid transaction means of person responsible right word -I business by drafting Government letters by the of papers or negotiating or He in had diplomacy texts of agreements. some experience of multilateral Secondly,

43

but his his early forties at the Hague and in other pre-1914 negotiations, he in Paris Conference Peace quickly great opportunity where came at the found his feet and emerged influential the of the senior most as one of Curzon Ministers At Lausanne too, when officials and was who took part.

Foreign Secretary, he showed his quality as a senior negotiator.

He was not always successful any more than he was right about his recommendations of is impressive. policy, but his record of negotiation Thirdly, he was evidently in his latter a man who, particularly years, won the loyalty and affection of those who worked with him or under him by his Harold Nicolson is difficult him `It personal example. to speak of wrote of Eyre Crowe without lapsing into the soft ground Many of sentimentality'. had Crowe his kindness others who served under personal wrote or spoke of in moving terms. It was I suppose his warm personality, his combined with legendary mastery of his profession, which left such a deep impression on the Office officials such as William Strang who generation of young Foreign Service immediately into is It 1914 the too came after the notable war.

Whitehall he he Under-Secretary Permanent that within when was commanded great respect. Hankey and Warren Fisher were not particularly disposed Foreign Office but both towards the well spoke of them Crowe.

His approvingly of example of trying to establish cordial relations by Treasury Cabinet followed Office been has I the the think and with his most of successors, certainly the most recent ones. is Perhaps I should mention final Crowe's one point about ethos, and that his attitude State to the Secretary of which was one of total and even fierce loyalty.

He was always very insistent that while inside the building be freedom there must to express one's opinion or anybody, on anything State Secretary there must be no hint of criticism to outsiders. of the of Sir The same point was put rather cynically late few by the a years ago Churchill's John Colville, Winston Private Secretary, when he wrote in one his books Foreign `whenever believed be that they the think they of will hero'.

Office loveable insist that their Secretary State is of a wise and Crowe's fairly his be opinion accurately private of successive chiefs can deduced I think but by high there would and no means was uniformly have been no question of his failing to defend his Secretary of State in all is believe I Office.

This too still the tradition circumstances outside it I in day though maintained, came under strain. recall that my at times having leave, been died in Dorset on April 28,1925, while on sick insisted he Chamberlain by his doctors have Austen that to ordered a rest. lent him his he for long own should go away even as as was necessary and he him in might go the country so that motor-car to stay with and chauffeur Crowe

44

Crowe, had for drives. been far But Al never physically, out who was too had been ill He in his life, had had times at various gone. a serious in his kidneys has from 1913 on and operation suffered a prolonged period in in 1924.

He himself had for last 1919 the and again realized of overwork he had long it live.

When his known that to that not was year or so hopeless him to an official message was sent condition was asking whether to be held in honour in his he would to agree a memorial service he been for Abbey.

But he declined had Westminster this honour since it in be thought to and wrong commemorated some years agnostic in he longer believed. the rites of a religion with which no accordance Chamberlain's King However, the gave as a mark of respect and at request, Office flown half day for flag be Foreign the to of at mast on the permission his funeral at Studland. His old friend and designated successor, Sir William Office funeral.

Foreign Tyrrell, the at the represented late That is the end. But I cannot resist adding a postscript the to relating in Belgrade Athens in Peake who was Ambassador Sir Charles the and him.

1950s and as a young man served under Crowe and much admired by Strang, William The told to a me many years ago story was friend, Charles it by Peake and a close who prefaced of contemporary had Charles have known that to a number of psychic was explaining day in May he Strang's 1925 is William that one was story experiences. from Office having lunch Foreign at the across the park to the returning Club when he met Charles Peake emerging from the park door, Traveller's Charles' William `what high `Well, in said excitement. a state of apparently is it? Why are you looking so excited? '. Charles replied that he had just seen Eyre Crowe. `What do you mean, Charles? ' said William seriously - since William, like Eyre Crowe himself, attached great importance to the truth. `Well' said Charles `as I was coming down the stairs just now I met Eyre began to say.

William Crowe on the way up, looking preoccupied'. `But -' I know what you arc going to say' said Charles `but it was `Ah, William, Eyre door I down I that that poor to the park remembered got only when Crowe

died three

weeks ago'.

45

OPENING

DIPLOMACY

AND

OPEN GOVERNMENT Richard

`Have you informed

Bone

the police? '

`No sir', said the Prime Minister `To inform the police must in the ... long run, mean to inform the public. That is what we particularly desire to avoid'. `And why, sir? ' its in importance is that the question of such lead to might publication very easily -I might say probably is European It the of not too much to complications utmost moment. it is hang issue.... that aimed all say that peace or war may upon the be have it is by its taken those who that generally at contents should known. ' `Because

document

`you think, ... ' war?

document that sir, unless this

is recovered

there will

be

`I think it is very probable'. `Then, sir, prepare for war'.

Minister Prime Aficionados at will recognise this as a conversation with the Stain.

Second The Adventure 22l b Baker Street at the beginning the of of is important be important have Also Documents can and can consequences.

The known. become their the question editor of of when contents should Foreign Royal Commission Economist in `If 1914: the to a the observed little deserve Office gave out a little more daylight, more a they might foreign In policy. other words we should also tell people about sunshine'. in May 1992 when The Secretary of State made the same point differently he said: letting `About four years ago we began opening windows more and Whitehall in Britain light into the musty corridors the culture of of ...

Office Foreign I too the am anxious to make secrecy went wide ... at ' changes.

This quotation usefully makes the link between my twin themes of Open Government and Open Diplomacy. The latter is an expression associated World First during both before British foreign the and with critics of policy

46

War. It was contrasted `secret diplomacy', with the kind the critics did not like. Ramsay MacDonald, Leader future Foreign the Labour and a Secretary, spoke of `the handing over of foreign policy to a handful of men drawn from the aristocratic Like Douglas Hurd, and plutocratic classes'. later, he `opening but in seventy years also spoke about windows', it in MacDonald's let in democracy'. `fresh to case the was order air of Possibly this is the same as light?

When Britain, `a small group of islands lying off the north-west coast of leading Europe constituted in (Paul Kennedy) few the nation world affairs' in the that seriously questioned people role aristocrats and plutocrats played fact Secretaries Sir Foreign Edward British politics that the to or all up Grey were drawn from the aristocracy.

When, Lord Clarendon, in wrote individuals 1869 that `Governments than no more can afford nowadays to he had in mind a very different public opinion from despise public opinion', let Ramsay in MacDonald's 1914, `handful then. that alone since of men' described Office: Foreign the nineteenth century accurately nonetheless Secretaries, long hours Foreign excessively managed without working had British They Civil to control scarcely any external relations. personally Foreign Office Service advisers and very few clerical In 1914 the staff. including door 176 keepers and cleaners, people, and the employed Consular between 4.1.6 Diplomatic together only and services comprised little Service, The home the them. and abroad, was a cost of running at Office had For long time, the only a small part a under one million pounds.

Foreign It little than the to play in the formulation of policy. more was Secretary's clerical support. Lord Salisbury rarely consulted his PUS on any did home.

The PUS importance his much of of matter and work at him, indeed did it incumbent proper, to volunteer on or not see as probably his Minister (Strang). to advice on policy in least for diplomacy part, a reaction to was, at campaign more open informed failure Parliament keep to the and public opinion of governments Critics Sir foreign in Grey Edward 1914. the to policy run up of about if he had diplomacy have that the public would not practised open claimed into France develop the to entente a quasi-alliance allowed with and Germany. have been dragged into Douglas Britain would not a war with Club in Hurd lent some support to this view in his speech to the Travellers September he be 'could that those treaties pre-1914. signed when said British knowing the public educated what they were really about'. without Grey, in other words, never had to worry about being door-stepped

by CNN BBC. the or

The

47

Open Diplomacy also became, key in for `new a element a campaign a diplomacy' (another buzz phrase has which recently resurfaced) which was in Woodrow Wilson's appeal for `Open covenants of peace openly echoed arrived at'. The revolution in Russia and the Bolshevik decision to publish the secret treaties of the former Imperial government led to a rash of articles and pamphlets on the origins of the war, many of them based on half truths from the archives, and to a debate in the Foreign Office on how best to respond to Soviet propaganda by making documents more freely available to the public. Of course once the Bolsheviks had established themselves in power they firmly slammed the door on the archives again. It remained shut for the next seventy years only to be re-opened, partly, with Glasnost.

Advocates

of open diplomacy did not argue that diplomatic negotiations should take place in public. They inveighed against the deals which they thought had brought Armageddon. Even Wilson, when he came to negotiate the post First World War peace settlement, shut himself up with Lloyd George and Clemenceau and refused to allow any formal record to be kept.

Arguably

is a reflection the need for secrecy in delicate negotiations of their The Norwegian hack Foreign Minister's seriousness. channel arrangements is led PLO Agreement between Israel to the a classic which and the Other both diplomacy. example of such examples unconventional and secret include: War, Falklands Anglo-Argentine the the after the negotiations Lancaster Kong, Hong Peking future the negotiations of with over the Peking House talks on the future of Rhodesia, Kissinger contacts with the in US China the the end of war over recognition of as a step towards insulate The Vietnam, Owen Bosnia. /Stoltenberg to need the talks over domestic delicate from power struggles negotiations public pressures and is does, however, pre-suppose is acceptable and generally an outcome which become known. details Vox by the public reaction when the not scuppered pop cannot be ignored forever and, in many cases, not for long.

Parliament that and public advocates of open argued Even better be informed at that time the should of what was going on. lose had Foreign Office included believed to that nothing we people who being given to our transactions to gain by publicity and everything with foreign countries. inner informing This, however, probably the circle meant influential to the views of of newspaper editors and politicians sympathetic from the `official mind' aloof as already which, noted, was somewhat however, The itself, importance `ollicial everyday politics. was mind' of the beginning from being Office began to grow as the a support changing mechanism executing the Foreign Secretary's orders to one providing advice:

Early

diplomacy

48

function in in increase a change which was partly a result of the sheer downwards from the Foreign telegrams and letters which forced delegation Secretary and the Cabinet. An early example of technology-led change.

Office In one narrow Foreign both the respect at was ahead of others, in 1909 it advanced for its home and abroad: date the public access to from fide 1780 bona historians 1837 to access records while were permitted inter1860 (previously 1850).

These to to openings were a response an up departmental had (1908) that all government report recommended which date be be 1837 this ten to that advanced open up and every years records Some Others decade. date. did departments lagged behind 1837 the not a Office Foreign However by 1913 the and the open their records at all.

Office had opened their records to 1837 and, by 194.8, even up to Colonial date Public implementation 1958 1924. It remained the that the of at until be Records introduced Act which 50 to the was years rule and which further later 50 Act by ten reducing years to our current a year's amended 30 years. dates 1902, 10 1837 the successive release and and of year rolling departments denied if judged it be the to records could still releases, access however, be interest.

Access be in the public or their could, granted not to discretion known `duly department's to as accredited persons', what was at including foreigners historians, `competent and responsible' on the such as did We this regularly embassies. of their up to the recommendation 30-year introduction rule. of the

Despite

had be before decision 1958 to the to of considerations weighed Some in 50-year them the reached. rule was of re-appeared discussions during led Open last the to summer's which recent months White Paper. For example, Government there was the reasonable enough be handicapped by that government administration should not proposition information.

No doubt of confidential the premature publication some far be Another judged 50 to too premature. year proposition was people be impaired `unselfconsciousness' if of would that the quality any official in knew that what he wrote would be made available for public inspection his lifetime. Try telling that to the Scott enquiry ...

A number introduce

in inevitably 1965 Some of these arguments when the question re-appeared first 30 from 50 4.0 to to the closed period and then came up of reducing 30-year Curzon Although Lord had talked a rule of adopting once years.

Ambassadors, Office officials Foreign expressed argued that the views of become difficulty if junior they officials, could cause real when they were known when they reached their later eminence. Foreign governments would,

49

it was said, seek material in the PRO to discredit HMG. Files `only 30 OfTice for business in The years old' were often needed the current etc. 'unselfconsciousness' argument about officials re-appeared: senior officials find journalists, by themselves pilloried might without the right unscrupulous Secretary by to reply. Such FO views were unsuccessfully the pressed of State, and although it was believed in the FO that nothing would happen for sometime, the 50-year rule because the 30-year rule on 1 January 1968.

It took another 25 years before any further significant change took place last dealing Open Before Government White Paper. with summer's with that there is a separate aspect of open diplomacy and open government.

Arguments in support of reducing 50 to 30 years included the hypothesis that if we did not write the history of decolonisation the governments of the then newly independent countries would. The British side of the story would by default.

Lord Acton, less, go no was quoted: `To keep one's archives barred against the historians leaving one's history to one's enemies. '

is tantamount

to

documents British were reasonable enough argument, was that States.

Another United in available elsewhere, notable the was that histories department know to the soundly written could get meant that a facts, as well as the legends, about its own past. In other words that history for myth, without could be substituted raising the question of what history. constituted

Another,

The editing documents era, as modern and publication of a relatively of distinct from the opening of archives to academic historians, in was an area The Foreign fell behind Continentals Americans. the which we and the Office had been engaged Books, Blue in the preparation containing of diplomatic selections since the end of the of recent correspondence, Napoleonic Wars. But it was not until the early years of this century that fuller its Office began in the to think the publication terms of sponsoring of States United lines Prussian by French, and the records on already adopted Governments.

1919 This process really got underway as part of the after Treaty, German Versailles in that the to challenge the claim campaign German The Great War. Germany for its the and allies were responsible Treasury initiative despite British predictable a required response and, historical inter-war be the age of a golden reluctance, years were to history became diplomacy in which diplomatic the writing closely of As in intertwined international a result, particularly problems. with current in history history became the the nineteen thirties, propaganda patriotic Axis countries.

50

decided to publish a the Second World War the British Government diplomatic documents, series of covering the years 1919-1939 as a means of in that ensuring any debate on the origins of the war the British case was first. heard Pre-emptive historiography, if you like.

In parallel the German for documents the period to 1945 was publication of captured Allied Germany form to to a entrusted an commission, effectively subjecting disarmament.

Germans joint Later the to this of archival were admitted be in two year's time. publishing programme completed which will form Meanwhile in the FCO the continues publishing programme of Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO) which, like its predecessor series, foreign is based British British that to policy on aims ensure about writing It is have thing to an open, official the nearest of record sources. we Britain's changing place in the world and, of course, it is neither propaganda During

nor even patriotic. beginning the of this paper raised the question of when at quotation known. become We have documents the contents of official publicly should is immediate it being further 30-year the prospect of no rule and there White Open have Paper however, We the on now also, reduced.

Records. its Public Government ninth chapter on and, more specifically, is lines Interestingly, the proposes very much along of what this chapter doing.

Unlike is FCO the mid-nineteen sixties, when now already what the feet its 50-year dragging FCO the the of rule, we over reduction the was have recently been among the leaders of the pack, rather than the laggards.

Secretary in May last year, the Foreign When, talked about opening how idea had to open a good about which windows and windows we already Records feet Department 2000 Library Every receives some and them. year Of judged be departments in London. from FCO those to of of records in PRO 31st interest over 95 per cent are transferred historical their to the for has, 5 however, is, It the remaining many years, per cent which year. found looked historians.

When fancy that we we tickled the of academic here Surely it feet 200 that was of retained material. there was over shelf found? be historical keys to to some puzzle were the

The

bulk the of this material was great clear was that quickly it information for the the sensitivity of substantive withheld not but for `technical' and people reasons such as clues about contained FCO been it had Previously which still needed protecting. operations file be hold files back to could such clues until the containing practice been have in its difficult To have paper would removed a entirety. released it have to with as tampering archival purists who would regarded anathema into Clearly if had the record. to change this we were to get more paper domain.

What we decided to do was to remove offending the public papers

What being

became

51

from

files or, more usually, block out still sensitive names and passages day its keeping the the original record against while, of course, when had lapsed PRO. it be sensitivity and passed to the could To date we have released over 1066 formerly PRO the to records withheld be Headline-grabbers have in to and will releasing more the months come. included the Farm Hall transcripts, dealing Hess's flight to the records with Cuba in formerly 194.1 this country missile crisis. and retained papers on the In parallel last SOE the first tranche month and records was opened of in GCHQ be PRO to the transferring the the more are pipeline. will soon decrypts by Churchill for during first the time, some the war and, seen intelligence History has PRO. to the nineteenth century material gone will be footnotes filled be not re-written, although and some some gaps will The benefit has FCO been demythologise changed. to main records policy.

Not only have we seen conspiracy have, I think, theories crumble we demonstrated have to historians a policy which makes and others that we All Information Freedom sense. serious governments, of even those with have keep be information if to they are to regimes, effective some secure internationally.

In other words we now have a credible policy trusted and both found it difficult believe insiders to that outsiders and where previously doing in defined.

In interest, however the what we were was public a debate in the House of Lords on 25 October 1993 on open government the FCO got a favourable from Opposition It mention peer. an was not always Open It has long Government but Open both thus. taken a time and Diplomacy better information by the record are now and underpinned done. before. be As have No doubt then ever policies we more still needs to bad it is thing to no we enter a whole new culture of electronic records have at least brought our records policy out of its previously dusty cupboard if little of our corridors even some still musty. remain a ...

52

NOTE

Richard

Bone

Sir

Alan

Campbell,

Dr

Keith

Hamilton

Richard

Langhorne,

ON CONTRIBUTORS

Records Head of FCO Library and HM Department 1989. since Diplomatic Service since 1966.

GCMG

Entered

Service 194.6, the Foreign Singapore, Rome, New Peking, served York; Head of Western Department, FO, 1965; Deputy Under-Secretary of State, FCO, 1974-76; Ambassador to Italy, in 1976-79. Articles and reviews International Affairs, author of Colleagues Friends (London, 1988). and

Joint Editor of Documents on British Policy Overseas and member Historical of Branch, Library Records and Department, FCO since 1990. Former Lecturer, Department International of Politics, College University Wales, of Aberystwyth, 1967-90. Author of Bertie of Thame: Ldwardian Ambassador (Royal Historical Society, 1990) and of the forthcoming Langhorne) (with Richard The Practice of Diplomacy (November 1994).

FRHS

Conference Director Wilton Park the of Centre Wiston House 1993. at since Centre for Former Director of the Studies, University International of Reviews Cambridge, 1987-93. and History in historical Journal, and articles Review of International Studies, author of The Collapse of the Concert of Europe 18901980).

1914 (London,

53

ON BRITISH

DOCUMENTS

POLICY

OVERSEAS

This

documents from Foreign the the collection of archives of Commonwealth Office is Her by and authorisation of published Majesty's Government. been The Editors have the accorded freedom in the customary arrangement of selection and documents.

SERIES Published Volume

I

The

Volume

V

Germany December

Volume

VI

Eastern

Volume

VII

The United Organisation,

I (1945-1950)

Conference

Europe,

I

The

Nations: 1946-7.

Schuman

Western December II

The London

Volume

III

German 1950.

Volume

IV

Korea,

In preparation V Volume

Germany

Volume

The Middle

Free lists Tides of Majesty's Stationery London SW8 5DR.

Plan,

the

Cold

1946.

War

and

1950-April

Council

of

Europe

World

January--June

and

1950-

May

Integration,

Conferences,

European and

(state Office,

1945-April

August--

II (1950-1955)

Rearmament,

June

Europe,

Iran,

European 1952.

Volume

VI

August

1945.

July-August

Western

and 1945.

SERIES Published Volume

Potsdam, at

1950.

September-December

1951.

Security,

1952-1954.

East, 1951-1953.

are subject/s) HMSO Books,

available 51 Nine

from Her Elms Lane,

OCCASIONAL

Changes in British

PAPERS

Russian and

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Records

Office

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