1. Introduction

THE RHODESIA SETTLEMENT

1. Introduction 1. The negotiating tactics adopted at Lancaster House were based on a study of the Kissinger initiative, the breakdown of the Geneva Conference and the subsequent failure of negotiations on the Anglo-American proposals. 2. By 1976 the situation for which the six principles (Annex A) had originally been designed—the granting of independence in advance of but with guarantees of unimpeded progress to majority rule—had long since been overtaken. The Pearce Commission had concluded that the last serious attempt to reach a settlement on that basis was not acceptable to the people of Rhodesia. The granting of independence to Mozambique, the closure of the border and the support given by the FRELIMO Government to the ZANLA (Mugabe) forces operating from its territory transformed the time-scale for Rhodesia’s prospects of survival. 3. The South African Government, conscious of the dangers of being drawn into increasingly direct support for a regime in Rhodesia which no longer had any long term prospects of survival—and of Mr Smith’s attempts to appeal over their heads to South African opinion—began at last actively seeking to promote a political settlement and had shown that they were prepared to put pressure on Mr Smith. By 1976 they had concluded that the best course was to work for the emergence of a moderate black Government. In June 1976 a meeting with Mr Vorster convinced Dr Kissinger that if the British and American Governments could produce a viable plan for a settlement, the South Africans would help to ‘deliver’ Mr Smith. There were consultations between the British and American Governments about proposals for the transition leading to independence (though the idea of a British Governor was rejected at this time by the Government, who saw dangers in Britain getting too directly involved). On 19 September Dr Kissinger persuaded Mr Smith to accept five points drafted by the Americans. Dr Kissinger gave Mr Smith the impression that he had obtained the agreement of Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere to the five points. Mr Smith announced his acceptance of them in Salisbury on 24 September. 4. Mr Smith emphasized that what he had agreed with Dr Kissinger constituted a package deal including the lifting of sanctions and an injection of development capital. The five points provided for majority rule within two years. The Rhodesian Government would meet with African leaders to organise an interim Government until majority rule was

achieved. This would consist of a Council of State, half of whose members would be black and half white, with a white chairman without a special vote; and a Council of Ministers with a majority of Africans and an African First Minister. The Ministers of Defence and Law and Order would be white. Decisions of the Council of Ministers would be taken by a twothirds majority. On the establishment of the interim Government, sanctions would be lifted and all acts of war, includingguerrilla warfare, would cease. 5. The five points were drafted in such categoric fashion that Mr Smith could and did take them as a firm agreement. They appeared to lay down clearly the form the interim Government was to take. Control over the armed forces and police would be in white hands during the transition. The white representatives would have a veto over decisions of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. Since these bodies would have the task of working out the majority rule constitution, there was no guarantee of early progress in doing so. But sanctions would have been lifted and, it was hoped, the war halted from the beginning of the process. The front line Presidents had not in fact agreed to these arrangements and they had never been discussed with the external nationalist leaders. Dr Kissinger had cut his corners in this respect. The inclusion of the provision that the Minister of Defence and Law and Order must be white had been Mr Smith’s price for his acceptance of the ‘package’. But, with South African help, Dr Kissinger had extracted for the first time from Mr Smith acceptance of majority rule. 6. The Geneva Conference probably never had a chance of success. The ‘package’ was not accepted by the front line Presidents or the external leaders. There was noagreed basis for negotiations. Mr Smith claimed that its sole purpose was to choose member for the Council State, which would be the supreme constitutional authority during the interim period. On the eve of the conference, under pressure from the front line Presidents, Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe agreed to negotiate together as joint leaders of the Patriotic Front. In all other respects ZANU and ZAPU remained separate entities. The early days were spent in procedural wrangles, with the Patriotic Front objecting that the conference should have been chaired by a British Cabinet Minister and demanding more generous accommodation allowances. With wide differences over the fundamental question of who was to exercise power during the interim, and with whose forces, the British delegation were reduced to trying to get agreement on the date for the achievement of majority rule. Within a few days it was apparent that there was no prospect of agreement to the Kissinger proposals. Mr Mugabe did not appear to believe in the possibility of a negotiated solution. The con-

ference dragged on until December, achieving nothing. The final breakdown came because of Mr Smith’s refusal to negotiate on anything except the package he had agreed with Dr Kissinger. With the change of administration in the United States Dr Kissinger himself was unable to do anything to help retrieve the situation. 7. By this stage the British Government had agreed that plans for the interim might include the participation of a British Commissioner with certain limited functions. Mr Smith rejected this proposal: the idea of surrendering power to a British representative was anathema to him. Bishop Muzorewa, finding himself rejected by the front line Presidents, was tempted to make his own agreement with Mr Smith. Mr Smith broke off the Geneva Conference and subsequent contacts because he thought he perceived a respectable escape route from the prospect of uncontrolled majority rule. He calculated that if he could get Bishop Muzorewa on his side he would be able to establish a form of Government with African support while leaving him and his followers in a position of considerable influence; and that while the Rhodesian security forces could not contain the guerrillas indefinitely, they could do so for long enough to enable him to work out an agreement with the internal parties. The South Africans were attracted by a solution of this kind. 8. At the end of 1978 the prospects for a negotiated settlement could hardly have looked less promising. The Anglo/American proposals put forward by Dr Owen and Mr Vance of 1 September 1977 had run into fundamental objections from the Patriotic Front and the internal parties. Those proposals envisaged the surrender of power by the Rhodesian regime; the return of Rhodesia to the legal status of a British dependent territory; the establishment by the British Government of a transitional administration under a British Commissioner with the task of conducting elections within six months to decide the independence Government; a United Nations presence, including a UN force; and a democratic independence constitution. The future Zimbabwe national army would be ‘based on the liberation forces’. This last proviso deprived the AngloAmerican proposals from the outset of any possibility of being accepted by the Salisbury administration and therefore of ever being implemented. President Carter was talked into a commitment to this effect by President Nyerere. 9. When these proposals were discussed with them in Malta between 30 January and 1 February 1978 and, subsequently, in Dar es Salaam in April, Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe insisted that the Patriotic Front must superintend the transitional process. Their counter-proposals for the transition envisaged a governing council which should consist of a British

Commissioner, a representative of the settler community and four members of the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front must have a ‘dominant role in the sovereign body’. The regime’s forces must be demobilised. They resisted any role for the internal parties and indeed the whole idea that there were other parties to the negotiation. It was up to the British and American Governments to deliver Mr Smith. 10. This they were not in a position to do. The Rhodesian authorities were not ready to surrender power or to accept a British Commissioner with ‘dictatorial’ powers. Nor were they prepared to accept a United Nations force. They regarded the proposition that the future army should be based on the liberation forces as in any event pre-judging that entire outcome in favour of the Patriotic Front. Mr Smith and his colleagues proceeded instead with the agreement with the internal parties signed in Salisbury 3 March 1978. That agreement included constitutional arrangements providing for majority rule based on universal adult suffrage; a 100 member legislative assembly with 72 black and 28 white seats; a declaration of rights and provision for the independence of the judiciary and the public services; and the establishment of a transitional Government with an Executive Council consisting of Mr Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, the Rev Sithole and Chief Chirau. The aim was to achieve independence on the basis of majority rule by 31 December 1978. 11. In August Mr Smith held a secret meeting with Mr Nkomo in Lusaka at which he offered him a leading place in the transitional administration. The meeting was encouraged by President Kaunda and the Nigerian Government. President Nyerere and Mr Mugabe were highly suspicious and, as soon as he found out about it, President Nyerere leaked news of the meeting. The possibility of further direct talks between Mr Smith and Mr Nkomo was destroyed by the reactions to the shooting down by ZIPRA of an Air Rhodesia Viscount at Kariba on 3 September. 12. At the end of the year Lord Cledwyn-Hughes concluded that an allparty conference would have no chance of success. The Patriotic Front believed that it could achieve its aims by continuing the war. The Salisbury parties would be prepared only to offer the Patriotic Front a place within the internal settlement. If the security situation worsened, as it probably would, the Salisbury parties might become less determined on their present course of action—but this in turn would lead the Patriotic Front to strengthen its demands. 13. The Rhodesians pressed ahead with the internal settlement. On 30 January 1979, out of a total European electorate of 94,700 57,269 voted in favour of the new constitution—representing a ‘yes’ vote of 85 per cent in a poll of 71.5 per cent.