3. The First Steps (May-June 1979

high level—approximately 14,000 whites were estimated to have left in 1978, over 2,700 in December alone. The burden of defence expenditure was heavy; there had been a decline since 1976 in industrial production; and employment was not expanding at a rate sufficient to absorb African school-leavers. The Patriotic Front had no capacity to confront the Rhodesian security forces, but believed that they could win a war of attrition. The tide had been running slowly in their favour. In the short term the war was likely to continue on its present course, with the Rhodesians using preemptive strikes as a primary means of defence; with guerrilla attacks on soft targets and the guerrillas, especially ZANLA, gradually extending their influence over the Tribal Trust Lands. The morale of the white community was crucial and would be affected by any outbreak of urban terrorism. 11. A note on British interests in Africa drew attention to the importance of our exports to Nigeria (£1133 million in 1978). 12. In view of the general belief that United Kingdom sanctions against Rhodesia depended entirely on Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, which fell to be renewed annually in November, a final paper explained that a considerable body of sanctions derived from legislation which did not depend on Section 2 and would remain in force unless the Government took positive steps to repeal it. There could be no question of going against the will of Parliament in relation to the lifting of sanctions— or of the Government relying on the votes of the opposition to secure their continuance. This note was, however, intended to indicate that the Government’s freedom of manoeuvre—and its ability, if necessary, to put pressure on the Salisbury parties—was somewhat greater than at the time was generally supposed.

3. The First Steps (May-June 1979) 1. After discussions with officials based on these papers Lord Carrington formed his views on the best way to proceed. It was already clear that Mr Ian Smith’s insistence on remaining in the Government after the elections, despite repeated promises to withdraw, would further reduce the prospects of recognition by any other African state. On 11 May Lord Carrington circulated a memorandum (OD(79)3) to his ministerial colleagues in the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of the Cabinet. This stated that the Government’s objectives were to bring Rhodesia back to legality and to do its utmost to ensure that Rhodesia gained widespread international recognition. Lord Boyd seemed likely to conclude that the election in Rhodesia had been fairly conducted and as free as was possible in the circumstances. It was open to the Government to grant legal independence

to Rhodesia and to lift sanctions. This would be widely popular in the Conservative party and in the country; but we could be of more assistance to Rhodesia by proceeding differently. To recognise immediately would risk considerable damage to British interests, both economic and political, throughout the world. The aim must be to return Rhodesia to legality in such a way and on such a time-scale that the country was launched into independence with the best start that was attainable, while at the same time limiting damage to British interests. 2. Immediate recognition would not bring the war to an end, nor achieve international acceptance. Few if any of our allies and partners would follow suit. It would be likely to harden attitudes in Africa, the Commonwealth and the third world. There was a need for consultations with friendly countries, starting with the Americans. 3. In view of the change of circumstances inside Rhodesia it was not possible to envisage asking Parliament in November to renew Section 2 of the 1965 Act. Although this would not remove all sanctions, it would put us in breach of our obligations under mandatory Security Council Resolutions if we had not by then secured a return to legality. Our objective should be to ensure that sanctions were lifted not only by us but by other members of the international community. 4. The first task must be to put ourselves in a position to influence the new Rhodesian Government. Lord Carrington had already arranged for Sir Antony Duff to visit Salisbury for discussions with Bishop Muzorewa. The Government should appoint a senior figure to advise on the steps to be taken to bring Rhodesia to a state of legality and international recognition, involving consultations with Commonwealth African leaders. A senior official should be established in Salisbury to act as a regular channel of communication with Bishop Muzorewa. In the debate on The Queen’s speech the Government should welcome the progress which had been achieved in Rhodesia and state that it wished to build on what had taken place to achieve the objective—a return to legality—with the best possible chance of securing wide international recognition. This involved consultation with our allies and the Commonwealth Governments concerned. 5. Lord Carrington had come to the conclusion that we must secure amendments to the Constitution. We should avoid any action which would disrupt the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in August; but it would be necessary to complete our efforts to achieve a settlement before the Sanctions Orders came up for renewal in November. 6. The Government’s first public pronouncement on Rhodesia was made in The Queen’s speech on 15 May in guarded terms: ‘Every effort will be made to end the conflict in Rhodesia and to bring about a lasting settlement based on the democratic wishes of the people of that country.’

In the debate on that day the Prime Minister said that it was the Government’s objective to build on the major change which had taken place in Rhodesia to achieve a return to legality in conditions that secured wide international recognition. There would be consultations with the Nine, the Commonwealth and with the United States. ‘We must and will take into account the wider international implications. I assure the House that we intend to proceed with vigour to resolve the issue’. 7. On 18 May the Lord Privy Seal said in the House of Commons that the Government had received Lord Boyd’s report and it would be published. Lord Boyd’s broad conclusion was that the election in Rhodesia was fair, in the sense that the electoral machinery was fairly conducted, that it was as free as was possible in the circumstances and that the result represented the wishes of the majority of the electorate. It was absurd that the British Government, which had special responsibilities in Rhodesia, had no way of informing itself directly or making its views felt in Salisbury. The Government would therefore be making permanent arrangements for continuing consultations with Bishop Muzorewa. Senior officials would visit Salisbury as often and for as long as was necessary for this purpose. There would also be consultation with the African Governments principally concerned. 8. Despite the terms in which this was phrased, the reference to permanent arrangements for consultations with Bishop Muzorewa produced the immediate reaction from the Nigerian Military Government, which imposed an embargo on tenders from British firms for major Nigerian Government contracts. The Government for its part was determined to take due account of British interests elsewhere in Africa, but not to permit its Rhodesia policy to be dictated from Lagos or elsewhere. 9. On 17 May Sir Antony Duff assured Bishop Muzorewa in Salisbury of the Government’s intention to work with him. He emphasised the need to bring the war to an end and to achieve maximum acceptance in Africa. Precipitate action by Britain would not help towards those objectives and would result in damage to British interests elsewhere. It might be that some damage was in the end inevitable; but it was clearly the British Government’s business to limit it as much as possible. Bishop Muzorewa welcomed the advent of a Conservative Government and agreed to the appointment of a senior official, Mr Derek Day, to maintain contact with him. On his return Sir Antony Duff recommended that Lord Carrington should seek to agree with Mr Vance on an approach designed to bring Rhodesia to legal independence by building on the new Rhodesian Government and Constitution, while seeking such changes as might be necessary to attract the support of other African countries and an end to the war either by negotiations or by undermining support for the Patriotic Front.

10. In talks with Mr Vance on 21 May Lord Carrington said that Lord Boyd clearly thought that the Rhodesian elections had fulfilled the fifth principle. The Government considered that it had to honour the undertakings in the Conservative manifesto. It was not committed on the time-scale but there were strong political pressures. There was no prospect of renewing sanctions in November. Mr Vance said that the Americans recognised the new reality created by the elections. But the lifting of sanctions would alienate black Africa and increase the leverage of the Russians and Cubans. Reflecting discussions earlier in the day between US and British officials Mr Vance speculated about the possibility of some revision of the Constitution; an attempt to move the Salisbury Government towards some form of all-party conference (but without a blocking power for the Patriotic Front); and an election after such a conference under some form of international supervision. 11. On 22 May Lord Carrington said in the House of Lords that a new approach was required. Lord Boyd had concluded that the election was as free as was possible in the circumstances. Lord Carrington did not however commit himself to the proposition that the fifth principle had been fulfilled. He said that the Government would be guided by Lord Boyd’s conclusions in seeking to build on the progress which had been made. It was our responsibility to try to bring Rhodesia to independence in conditions which would afford the country the prospect of a more peaceful future and the widest possible international recognition. There was a need to carry international opinion with us, just as much for Rhodesia’s sake as for our own. 12. On 7 June President Carter announced the decision he was required to make on sanctions under the terms of the Case-Javits amendment. The President stated that he was convinced that the best interests of the United States would not be served by lifting sanctions. The new Constitution had not been submitted to the African electorate. It preserved European control over the army, police, judiciary and civil service and gave the white minority a veto over significant constitutional change. Representatives of the external parties had not been able to participate in the political process. The Rhodesian authorities had expressed their willingness to attend an allparty meeting, but had not indicated that they were prepared to negotiate seriously on all the relevant issues. The United States recognised the progress that had been made and would keep the question of sanctions under review. The President acknowledged that he did not have majority support in the Senate; but he considered that to lift sanctions would be contrary to international law and damaging to United States interests in Africa. 13. The generally negative tone of President Carter’s statement contradicted Lord Boyd’s conclusions. The Senate sought to add an amendment