The Rhodesia Settlement
high level—approximately 14,000 whites were estimated to have left in 1978, over 2,700 in December alone. The burden of defence expenditure was heavy; there had been a decline since 1976 in industrial production; and employment was not expanding at a rate sufficient to absorb African school-leavers. The Patriotic Front had no capacity to confront the Rhodesian security forces, but believed that they could win a war of attrition. The tide had been running slowly in their favour. In the short term the war was likely to continue on its present course, with the Rhodesians using preemptive strikes as a primary means of defence; with guerrilla attacks on soft targets and the guerrillas, especially ZANLA, gradually extending their influence over the Tribal Trust Lands. The morale of the white community was crucial and would be affected by any outbreak of urban terrorism. 11. A note on British interests in Africa drew attention to the importance of our exports to Nigeria (£1133 million in 1978). 12. In view of the general belief that United Kingdom sanctions against Rhodesia depended entirely on Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, which fell to be renewed annually in November, a final paper explained that a considerable body of sanctions derived from legislation which did not depend on Section 2 and would remain in force unless the Government took positive steps to repeal it. There could be no question of going against the will of Parliament in relation to the lifting of sanctions— or of the Government relying on the votes of the opposition to secure their continuance. This note was, however, intended to indicate that the Government’s freedom of manoeuvre—and its ability, if necessary, to put pressure on the Salisbury parties—was somewhat greater than at the time was generally supposed. 3. The First Steps (May-June 1979) 1. After discussions with officials based on these papers Lord Carrington formed his views on the best way to proceed. It was already clear that Mr Ian Smith’s insistence on remaining in the Government after the elections, despite repeated promises to withdraw, would further reduce the prospects of recognition by any other African state. On 11 May Lord Carrington circulated a memorandum (OD(79)3) to his ministerial colleagues in the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of the Cabinet. This stated that the Government’s objectives were to bring Rhodesia back to legality and to do its utmost to ensure that Rhodesia gained widespread international recognition. Lord Boyd seemed likely to conclude that the election in Rhodesia had been fairly conducted and as free as was possible in the circumstances. It was open to the Government to grant legal independence
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