Organization Organization for for Statehood Statehood and and Freedom Freedom
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Human Rights Monitoring in the Western Sahara Introduction The UN Security Council’s last two meetings regarding the extension of the UN Mission for a Referendum in the Western Sahara [MINURSO] have been dominated by discussion over the inclusion of a human rights monitoring component in the mission’s mandate. Despite firm support from Mexico and the United Kingdom, the proposal has been defeated each time because of staunch French opposition. The most recent events in the occupied territories of the Western Sahara – including the construction and destruction of the Saharawi protest camp outside of the city of El Aaiun and the subsequent street battles in the capitol – have convinced many formerly neutral governments of the necessity of monitoring human rights in the Western Sahara. The following analysis offers general recommendations followed by three specific options for a human rights monitoring body, which must be implemented by the Security Council during its next meeting in April of 2011. General Provisions for Structuring the Body To meet the concerns of both parties, the body must be carefully structured. In general, it should:
ultimately be presented to the UNSC, so that parties are held accountable and the Security Council is kept up-to-date on the human rights situation in the Western Sahara; Operate equally: Human rights must be monitored in both the occupied territories of the Western Sahara and the Tindouf refugee camps run by the Polisario;2 and Be permanent: Temporary bodies or periodic fact-finding missions to the Western Sahara and the refugee camps would be ineffective and distrusted.3 The Polisario Front in particular would not consider temporary missions to be sufficient to protect the rights of Saharawis in the occupied territories. General Responsibilities of the Body The duties of the human rights monitoring body must also be well-defined, in order to avoid confusion and opposition to its activities. While the specifics of such responsibilities should be agreed upon by Morocco, the Polisario Front, and the Group of Friends of the Western Sahara,4 in order to take into account existing circumstances, they should at least include: A claims process that allows individuals to submit claims of alleged human rights violations to the body and provides a specific mechanism for investigating and responding to such claims; Periodic investigations of prisons both in the Tindouf camps and the occupied
Have a UN mandate: To avoid obstruction by either party, the body must be mandated by the UN Security Council, the Human Rights Council, or another UN body;1 Report to the Security Council: While there are several options for the structuring of the monitoring body, reports produced must
The Polisario Front has agreed to allow human rights monitoring in the camps, so long as similar monitoring occu rs in th e o ccupied Western Sahara. 3 For example, the UN Office of th e High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR] sent a fact-finding delegation to the Western Sahara in 2006. The subsequent repo rt was never made public, due to opposition to its findings, primarily from the Kingdom of Moro cco. 4 The Group of Friends consists of Fran ce, Russia, Spain, the U.S., and the UK. 2
While the office UN Secretary Gen eral’s Special Envoy to the Western Sahara should receive copies of the human rights reports produ ced by the monitoring body, so long as he is primarily responsible for mediating the n egotiations pro cess, he should not be tasked with monitoring human rights. Making the monitoring body directly responsible to Special Envoy Ross would erase the perceived neutrality that he cu rrently enjoys and further complicate his mission. 1
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territories. It is in these prisons that most alleged human rights violations occur, and so prisoners should be interviewed regularly; and Periodic, unannounced visits to Saharawi houses in both locations. These visits should be both frequent and random, to ensure that sources are not intimidated or prepared by officials in either location.
If human rights monitoring were to be included in MINURSO’s mandate, it should include two basic provisions. First, constant monitoring and periodic reporting should be conducted. This would require additional international civilian personnel, local civilian personnel, and/or UN Volunteers. 6 Second, MINURSO should work directly with local human rights organizations – both official and nongovernmental – to improve their capacity and competency for monitoring and protection. Examples of such organizations already in existence include the Saharawi Association of Human Rights Victims [ASVDH], the Moroccan Association of Human Rights [AMDH]7, the Advisory Council on Human Rights [CCDH], and the Association for Families of Saharawi Prisoners and the Disappeared [AFAPREDESA]. Duties for human rights monitoring could slowly be transferred to these organizations, which would report directly to MINURSO.
Specific Options for Structuring the Body A number of possible options for the a human rights monitoring body have been presented to the Group of Friends and are currently being reviewed. The three most appropriate options are analyzed and expanded upon below: 1) MINURSO’s mandate This is the option preferred by the Polisario Front and many of its international supporters. Arguments that suggest that including the duty in MINURSO’s mandate could damage the perceived impartiality and effectiveness of the mission are mute, as the Polisario and the Saharawi population consider the mission to be neither impartial nor effective. Further, as human rights responsibilities are included in the mandates of dozens of other UN peacekeeping missions – the UN Mission in Darfur [UNAMID], the UN Mission in Liberia [UNMIL], the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [MONUSCO], and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti [MINUSTAH], to name a few – it is difficult to suggest that MINURSO’s mission would be impeded by this additional responsibility.5 The Kingdom of Morocco considers granting additional responsibilities to MINURSO a threat to its sovereignty, although no foreign country or international body recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara.
MINURSO is currently only tasked with three responsibilities: monitoring the 1991 ceasefire, redu cing the threat posed by landmines and unexploded ordinan ces, and supporting confiden ce-building measures [CBMs]. 5
The difficulty in this option lies in monitoring human rights in the Tindouf refugee camps, as MINURSO does not currently have a presence there. This obstacle could be overcome by stationing a small MINURSO team in the camps, expanding the size of the MINURSO liaison office in Tindouf, or utilizing the services of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], which maintains a small contingency in the camps. MINURSO is the preferred institution for rights monitoring, for its inability to arrange the referendum in the Western Sahara has put Currently, MINURSO only employs 20 UN Volunteers, as opposed to the UN Mission in Sudan [UNMIS], which has 422. Supply greatly outpaces demand for UN Volunteer positions, and so this is one affo rdable means of in creasing MINURSO’s capacity to allow it to monitor human rights. 7 The AMDH o ffers a particularly attractive option, as it is the largest human rights organization in Morocco, (with over 10,000 members), has the support of the throne, and also has established a degree of credibility among Saharawis living under o ccup ation. 6
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it effectiveness into doubt among the Saharawi leaders and population. Effectively monitoring human rights would prove its usefulness to the Saharawis. While Morocco will continue to oppose this option, the Security Council – or, more likely, the Group of Friends – must be willing to pressure the Kingdom to agree to it. Most decisions by the UN on how to proceed in the Western Sahara have thus far been rooted in the desire to appease both parties, but particularly Morocco. Appeasement will not help break the status quo, and difficult, at times abrasive decisions will have to be made to move the peace process forward. 2) The OHCHR If agreement is not reached over the inclusion of monitoring in MINURSO’s mandate, the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights [OHCHR] is the most appropriate second option. There are two ways in which OHCHR could effectively become involved. First, a regional office could be opened in the Kingdom of Morocco. 8 This office could cover North and West Africa, and its presence would prove Morocco’s commitment to improving its human rights record. The regional office could then maintain satellite offices in both the occupied territories and the Tindouf refugee camps. Second, without opening a new regional office, the OHCHR could deploy teams to work alongside MINURSO in the occupied territories and the UNHCR in the refugee camps. These teams would be responsible for receiving claims, monitoring institutions, facilitating the work of local organizations, and providing human rights training for official institutions. The other tasks occasionally undertaken by the OHCHR – the appointment of a human rights advisor or the deployment of a rapid response team – are inappropriate for the Western Saharan case, as a permanent
Currently, the closest OHCHR regional offices are in Addis Ababa (East Africa) and Beirut (Middle East). 8
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presence is needed to truly address the concerns of the parties. 3) A bi-partisan commission The creation of a bi-partisan monitoring commission would serve the dual role of human rights monitoring mechanism and confidence-building measure [CBM]. Under this option, the OHCHR’s Human Rights Council could appoint a temporary Special Rapporteur or an Independent Expert who would, with the help of OHCHR staff, create and train a commission of Saharawi and Moroccan human rights monitors. The commission would consist of an even number of representatives from existing human rights organizations – ASVDH, AMDH, the CCDH, and AFAPREDESA – as well as Moroccan and Saharawi civilians, but would be chaired by the Special Rapporteur or Independent Expert. The commission would conduct constant investigations and provide periodic reports to the OHCHR, the Security Council, the Group of Friends, and Special Envoy Ross. Again, commissions must be established in both the occupied territories and the Tindouf refugee camps. Two Saharawi NGOs already operating in the camps – the Saharawi Red Crescent and AFAPREDESA – could represent the Saharawis there, while the Moroccan presence would have to be negotiated with both parties. Moroccan journalists have, in the past, been allowed to enter the camps, so it is possible that independent Moroccan observers would be allowed to participate in the commission. If the Kingdom of Morocco, Algeria, or the Polisario Front refuses to allow Moroccan citizens to permanently operate out of the camps, thirdparty individuals – from France, Switzerland, Argentina, or another country trusted by Morocco – may be appointed to take their place on the commission. Representatives from the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights could also fill this role.
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Funding for the commission could be required from Morocco and the Polisario (which already receives some support for human rights activities from foreign NGO), but would preferably be provided by the OHCHR or the Group of Friends.
Useful Internet Resources
While this option may appear unlikely, it should not be immediately dismissed. It would serve the important function of a CBM that brings together members of Moroccan and Saharawi civil society. Thus far, the only CBMs that have been implemented or seriously considered by the parties are ones that increase communication between Saharawi refugees and those living under Moroccan occupation, which do little to support the conflict resolution process. The utility of the human rights debate for fostering confidence between the parties should not be lost. Morocco can further use this opportunity to prove to the international community the sincerity of its efforts to improve human rights in the Kingdom by engaging directly with the Saharawis living under its de facto control.
3) Security Coun cil Report – April 2010 – Western Sahara
Conclusion While not ideal, if a periodic review of the human rights situation in the Western Sahara and the refugee camps in Algeria – through the appointment of a Special Rapporteur by the Human Rights Council or mandated periodic factfinding missions sent by the OHCHR – is the only option that can be agreed upon, then it is a necessary first step towards protecting the human rights of the victims of the Western Sahara conflict. This objective is imperative both to ensure the safety of the Saharawis and to improve the atmosphere surrounding the negotiations. Settling the issue of human rights monitoring will remove one point of contention from the negotiating table, forcing the parties to focus more seriously on political issues. Finally, if the UN cannot find a way to protect Saharawis living under occupation, the Polisario Front may soon become unable to resist the calls of its people to do so through the use of force.
UN Links 1) MINURSO minurso.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3949 2) OHCHR – In the World www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/Pages/WorkInField.aspx http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.5 888497/k.36C2/April_2010brWestern_Saraha.htm
4) UNHCR – Protection www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cc8.html 5) UN Mission in Darfur [UNAMID] – Human Rights unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2491 6) UN Mission in Lib eria [UNMI L] – Human Rights Protection unmil.org/1content.asp?ccat=humanrights&zdo c=1 7) UN Mission in Sudan [UNMIS] – Human Rights Fact Sheet unmis.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=jGNvKgH VdY8%3d&tabid=561 Moroccan/S aharawi Human Rights Organizations 8) Asso ciation fo r Families of Sah arawi Prisoners and the Disappeared [AFAPREDESA] www.afapredesa.org 9) Moro ccan Advisory Coun cil on Human Rights [CCDH] www.ccdh.org.ma 10) Moro ccan Asso ciation of Human Rights [AMDH] www.amdh.org.ma 11) Sah arawi Asso ciation of Human Rights Victims [ASVDH] asvdh.net/english/ In Support of Human Rights Monitoring 12) European Parliament http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDo c.do?pubRef= -//EP//NONSGML+MOTION+P7-RC-20100675+0+DOC+ PDF+V0//EN 13) Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/17/letter -unscurging-human-rights-monitoring-western-sahara 14) RFK Center for Justice and Human Rights www.rfkcenter.o rg/node/323
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