M MIITT PPoorrttuuggaall –– IISSTT TTrraannssppoorrtt PPoolliiccyy aanndd IInnssttiittuuttiioonnss
2009/04/10 Francisco Furtado
TGV and Portuguese Railways, Critical Analysis A Apppplliiccaattiioonn ooff TTrraannssppoorrtt PPoolliiccyy
Table of Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 2 Impacts and Stakeholders ....................................................................................................... 2 Base Scenario, Strategies and Realities .................................................................................... 3 Country...................................................................................................................................................... 3 Transportation .......................................................................................................................................... 4 Railways .................................................................................................................................................... 6
High Speed, the “triumph of the will” decision making paradigm? .......................................... 8 Freight and Logistics.................................................................................................................................. 9 Connection to Europe ............................................................................................................................... 9 Information Gaps and Disconnections .................................................................................................... 10 Oeste Station....................................................................................................................................... 10 Connection to Alcochete Airport ........................................................................................................ 10 Cost benefit Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 11 Business Model ....................................................................................................................................... 11 Triumph of the will? ................................................................................................................................ 11
Alternative Approach ............................................................................................................ 12 References............................................................................................................................. 13 Sites ......................................................................................................................................................... 13 Documents .............................................................................................................................................. 13
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Introduction The aim of this report is to assess the on going Portuguese high speed project (TGV), and to evaluate the decision making process led by the Portuguese Government. The impact of this project will be looked, not as a particular venture detached from the context, but as a part of a broader Transport policy measure1. Further more, as an even wider process, since this is a major public investment decision, that should be considered taking into account how it is integrated with the global objectives set for the country. We will start to identify what are the main stakeholders in the game, and the main features to assess the impacts of a program like this. After that we will make an overview of the country, transportation and railways strategy and realities. Than we will take the TGV project and evaluate it according to the impacts mentioned and taking into account the broader scenario we described and analysed. We will end by presenting an alternative approach to what is being done. Due to space and time constrains, some issues, like the pricing schemes, were not directly tackled, but overall the most determinant problems were addressed.
Impacts and Stakeholders Who are the stakeholders at stake here? First and foremost2, the Portuguese Citizenry. The State, the institution that expresses the collective will, manages the common goods and can also act as an arbitrator between particular disputes. Industry and Commerce are also stakeholders, like the citizenry they are not an homogeneous group, still like the citizenry, they will be the ones to pay and collect the benefits from the project3. The particular Operators and Suppliers4 of the infrastructure and service, they are part of the Industry/Commerce, but their interests are much more closely connected with the project. Trade Unions of the directly involved companies, and the wider Union Confederation, as representatives of the Workers. Finance (big banks) also plays a crucial part, they will provide (or better, manage and collect a fee for it) the capital necessary, and then receive a rent for their services. The Ports, Airports, Road concessionaires, are also players since they manage services/infrastructures that will be impacted by this. Last but not least the European Union and Spain are stakeholders to single 1
In a Program logic, not a project logic
2
From the author of the report point of view, this will be agreed by the general experts also, although there is always a huge gap between statements and reality. 3 At least it’s in their behalf, and for their good that the Project is being advocated. I don’t remember hearing “The TGV is good because it will provide the Banks with a steady and granted income for the next 40 years”. 4 By operators we mean the consortiums that will be selected for the PPP. The suppliers are providers of high value special equipments/technologies like Alstom or Siemens, they can also be part of the “Consortiums”.
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out, the EU finances a big share of the project and looks to it as a part of a broader European network, Spain is directly involved in the project, and is already building is share of it (the line to Vigo, and the one Badajoz-Madrid). And what Impacts should we consider, and what how to assess them? We will consider the fallowing: •
Supply(Industry) Efficiency/Productivity – increase the output/input ratio of the system, decrease overall costs of the system, denser use of equipment and infrastructure, improvement of the Operators balance sheet (subsidies and charge fees manipulation should not come to this equation5);
•
Demand(Users) Efficiency – decrease of travel time, increase in frequencies, adequate capacity, improved comfort and security.
•
Social and Economic leverage – the capacity this Project will have to leverage gains not just for the directly involved (users and operators) but for the Citizens at large and general Industrial and Commercial agents.
•
Sustainability – Are we delivering adequate goods/services while reducing the total amount of inputs and harmful wastes produced (from a social and environmental point of view, emission of CO2 is a good measure)
•
Connection to Europe and Atlantic – To what degree are connections to Europe and the Atlantic (threw the Ports) improved?
•
Integrated view – This is not quit an impact, but it is key that all the above are fully weighted, and more than that, every major project should be implemented fallowing a more broader strategy. Is this the case?
Base Scenario, Strategies and Realities Country For the last decades the country strategy as been closely aligned with the EU, the modernizing and development of the infrastructures as been largely funded and conditioned by the EU, and also the regulatory framework (from environmental to commercial) as been largely driven by the EU directives. The country aspires6 to become an open market economy directed to exports, with an increasing share of know how and industry in Information Technologies. Renewable Energy and Sustainable transportation also have become buzz words.
5
Even if they are justified under many circumstances, subsidies should not go in for this accountancy purpose. 6 It would be more correct to say that this is the ruling elite sermon to the populace. If it is the general public will, or even the ruling elite guide line for action is very questionable…
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Although this is not plain mythology, and some steps have been taken, the fact is that the country larger industry is Construction. The State (namely in transportation, especially in roads), first directly, than threw the Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), as heavily invested in the provision of infrastructures. Besides the benefits brought by the use of these new infrastructures this provided also7 financing to big Construction Companies/Banks8 and jobs for the population, giving fuel to the whole economy. Actually this has been the main driver of the Portuguese economy in the last 20 years (much more than exports or IT technologies…). This policy became known as “Política do Betão”. The PPPs are very appealing tools and its use is being spread not only to roads, but rail, logistic platforms, ports, airports, health care, and “whatever moves”… It provides the State an instrument to increase debt with no limits while presenting the populace some accomplishments. For the privates (especially finance) it delivers a steady secure income in the long term9. Portugal adopting the “good student” paradigm towards the European Union as actually been pushed by the EU in this direction too, this was the way the Portuguese State eagerly embraced the EU commandment to open the market for public obligation goods and services (PSOs), and European funds available were mostly to be applied according to this model and towards these infrastructure investments... In a way Portugal as become, more then an open market, a “rent economy” were private companies/banks provide and manage low competition goods and services, for fixed rents paid by the state. What more could big Finance ask? Needless is to say that besides distorting general Portuguese Economy10 and Society this “rentist model” also as deeply affected the way Transportation policy and public investment are decided.
Transportation
Picture 2 - Density of Road(Motorways) vs Rail: Source EU
New Motrorways and Hig ways done threw PPPs Km Million E uros Inves ted B efore this G overnment 2734 7675 Inves ted by this Government 2359 3872 Total 5093 11547 S ource: MOP TC and R AVE
Table 1 - Investments in new Roads threw PPPs
7
Mainly? Big construction companies are either owned by banks, or own big shares of banks. 9 Since most of this PPPs concern PSOs these arrangements leave the State completely captured, it contracts privates to provide natural monopoly goods, and services essential to the population. The way to make this politically acceptable both for the privates and the citizenry was on the one hand pay the privates for the “availability” and not the usage, this way caring the commercial risk. On the other hand most of the times the users of the services don’t pay the price that cover the cost, so the State takes the burden. 10 An important data to bear in mind is that the country is in an economic freeze/depression for the last 8 years. 8
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The 3 pictures shown now, illustrate the statements made above. They also make a good introduction to a more detailed analysis of the strategy for the transportation sector and reality of it. The
current
Transportation
Government policies
includes
under
the
“Mobility and Communications” umbrella, Table 3 - Rail network extension (km): Source EU
in the XVII Constitutional Government Plan, and in the Great Options for the Plan 2005-2009, Mobility and Communications are included in the “Sustainable Development” chapter (together with the energy, agriculture, sea/fishing and tourism sectors). Five key guidelines are provided on those documents: Increase quality of life (comfort, time travel, security…); Requalify Urban Mobility; Promote respect for the environment; Decrease total costs (intermodality, more efficiency…); Integrate the Iberian, European and Transatlantic networks. Than for each mode Rail, Road, Air, Sea, plus the Metropolitan Areas (Lisbon and Porto) subsection, specific priorities are set. The Great Options for the Plan gives more detail, and besides setting the guidelines it has a chapter listing the Public Investment Priorities. Intermodality, Sustainability, Security and an Integrated approach are all key words, in the great options of the plan it’s even stated that less pollutant modes should be promoted increasing supply and giving benefits for the users. High Speed Rail is given top priority, it is seen as an emblematic and modernizing endeavour that encompasses all the guidelines and priorities set by the government. It is like a project that single handed provides and fallows all the objectives that are set (intermodality, efficiency, connection with Europe, etc…). Fallowing the guidelines presented in these broad documents11 The Ministry of Public Works Transport and Communications(MOPTC), as developed specific strategic guidance for Railways, Airports, Ports and Roads(the National Road Plan). In addition it also developed the Portugal Logistic Plan, were the key are several hubs/platforms for freight that provide a friendly intermodal interface. Still between the general government strategy and each mode particular strategy there is no document, like a “Strategic Plan for Transports”12, which hinders the concrete implementation of a intermodal and integrated approach to the development of the sector…
11 Great Options and Government Plan 12 Or “Sustainable Mobility” if you like best…
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As for reality it should be mentioned that mobility issues in Metropolitan Areas/Cities have been addressed13 (both in the infrastructure/services and Institutional fronts). Information and Data are also shared and easy to assess14. But as can be seen in table 1 and 2, the allocation of resources doesn’t “exactly” fit the mentioned goals. In a nut shell, the broad goals and guidelines seam correctly placed15, but coherence is lacking since there is a gap between the Government strategy and each Mode strategy. The TGV seams to be a Program-Project that aims implementing all the government strategies in an integrated way. Still, inertia from previous established and ongoing projects is very strong, as can be seen from the investment made in Roads and mobility for the Metropolitan areas. The PPPs business model obsession16 heavily distorts the decision making and the actual implementation process. It focus attention and resources towards a particular mega projects logic, more than in a program approach that can, and should, integrate several small (and some big if necessary) different Modes projects. It also hinders a more flexible approach since for economy of scale reasons and due to the contractual complexity it ties down the State to large, rigid projects in a much stronger way then if the state would directly lunch and manage itself the program(s).
Railways Regarding Rail, the MOPTC as produced a document intituled Strategic Guidelines for the Rail Sector, still it’s very far from being a structural long term plan17 like the National Road Plan, a very detailed tool that is published and regularly updated in the Diário da República. This plan attempts to provide a comprehensive framework towards the recovery and development of the Portuguese rail network. It proposes such things as to define a hierarchy for the rail lines18 or to close the net to form a closed grid. But it’s more a list of things Picture 4 - Rail lines in Operation
to do (and are already being done) than an actual plan of action.
There are several plans to do or to conclude: The Director Plan for the National Rail Network; The Plan to migrate from Iberian to European Gauge; Strategic Plan for the Oeste Line and 13 Development of the Metro networks, improved interfaces, integrated ticketing, improvement of the commuter train lines… One should say there is some natural inertia that promotes continuous investment in these fields… 14 Just go to the MOPTC site, de SIMOPTC site (information system of the MOPTC) or the RAVE site… 15 Although some guidelines like, “increase quality of life”, seam over generalist and subjective. 16 The Logistic Plan current situation is a good example of what happens when the government tries to direct private investment towards investments with uncertain demand/return, that are not secured by State rents. Although it looks a good idea, it looks like it was set up in a rather voluntarist way. 17 That actually frames the investment in roads and is fallowed by governments even when the power exchange hands… 18 Like what already exists for roads in the Road Plan…
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Studies for the Tua, Tâmega, Vouga and Corgo lines, to develop with the Municipalities were those lines are. Freight seems like the poor relative… Connection to all main ports, airports and logistical platforms is mentioned, namely the dedicated freight19 line from Sines to Elvas, to be done in coordination with TGV. But the details of how this is going to be done are missing. At some months from the elections none of these plans has yet been disclosed… Inertia, as stated, plays a big role so what is rolling are interventions in the Metropolitan Areas, plus the ongoing modernizing of the North and Algarve line. Recently the link connecting the National “Siderurgia” to the rail network as been completed (also a part of the Strategic Guidelines…)20. In the meanwhile other lines keep closing: the Tua line, were several derailments21 occurred, as well as the more recent Tâmega line “blitzkrieg” shut down22. Cargo Movements (Road and Rail) 1000 Tons 350000
12000
300000
10000
250000 8000 200000 6000 150000 4000 100000 50000
Total
Even with this schizophrenia going on, the
0
good news is rail as been regaining users and
20 07
20 05
20 03
20 01
19 99
19 97
19 95
19 93
19 91
19 89
19 87
0
Graph 6 - Freight Modal Split: Source Portugal Logístico, MOPTC
2000
Rail
Graph 5 - Freight: Source Eurostat/INE
market both in passengers23 and freight traffic in the last years, even when road freight movements are falling, as can be seen in
Graph 6. Still, rail as a long way to go regarding freight, as seen in graph 5 the start point is depressing. Regardless all the above stated, at absolute center stage emerges a bold and revolutionary project, the Portuguese High Speed Network.
19
th
This is part of the Trans European transport network priority projects, placed in both 8th and 16 priority The beginning of operations of a second cargo operator as started to make an impact, very recently CP cargo as also started a new service with Renfe, Iberlink, which connects regularly Portugal and Spain. 21 Some with several deaths 22 Done on back of the Population in a inexcusable way 23 See the latest, 03-03-2009, INE report regarding Transport Activity. 20
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Graph 7 - Investment for the priority lines source MOPTC
Picture 8 - Portuguese High Speed Network Source RAVE
High Speed, the “triumph of the will” decision making paradigm? The Portuguese TGV project is not integrated in broader Strategy for the Portuguese Rail network, and that Strategy is not a part of a wider Transportation sector strategy, because these strategies simple do not exist yet. So the first question to raise is if it is wise to go forward with such a huge investment, 7.1 billion euros24, without a proper broader plan for rail and transport sector? Not only it’s a huge investment, but it’s in a fixed infrastructure with little flexibility, so the decisions taken now are to a great extent irreversible and will condition the Portuguese Rail and Transportation sector for the next decades. The second question is why weren’t much of the plans, namely the Director Plan for the National Rail Network, made before, or in parallel with the studies made for the TGV?? The public presentation of this project was made in December 2005, couldn’t Refer/Rave assemble a subcommittee to finish those broader Plans? Just the studies for the third Tagus crossing had a cost of 15 million euros25… Why weren’t some resources mobilized for such a basic thing? Portugal instead of having a comprehensive Strategy as a Mega-Project, somewhat disconnected from the rest of the sector26, that by itself is expected to connect us to Europe, be the back bone of our logistic system, improve sustainability, have a reproductive effect in our economy and deliver a more integrated system… Not having a program the government 24
Just for the Lisbon-Madrid and Lisbon-Porto not counting the Third Tagus Bridge Number given by RAVE financial director, at the presentation he gave to the MIT Portugal Transportation group. 26 This is not a line to “Freixo de Espada à Cinta”, Its the biggest investment ever made concerning Rail and Transportation… So we have, we must be demanding! 25
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chooses to have a Project that is a program by itself… But will this work? Some key questions must be addressed…
Freight and Logistics As stated by RAVE the Lisbon-Madrid line doesn’t have enough passenger demand to justify a dedicated line for passengers, so we will build a more expensive line (around 15% more… and we know how these things slide…) that can have mixed use27. But it as a limit of 17 tons per axis, will it be used for bulk28? Containers? The demand studies requested by RAVE include that, but they mention that high value, lighter goods, should be the target… And in the mean while there is the dedicated freight line Sines-Elvas that is also a priority project to be built, will we have than two parallel lines doing the same? For freight traffic the sines line will have more capacity and will take 25 tons per axis, couldn’t that line go to Poceirão, then from there to Elvas, and also serve the Lisbon and Setubal Ports? Or the other way around, couldn’t we have a nice connection from Poceirão to Sines and the freight from Lisbon and Setubal use the Sines-Elvas direct connection? Either way why do we need two parallel lines providing the same service? If the Sines-Elvas line is build then the TGV should definitely deal with “Postal like” freight, and in that case why build a mixed use more expensive and inefficient line? And if we don’t build Sines-Elvas, we will just have the mixed TGV, that in the end is not so mixed and won’t be able to serve all segments of freight and boost, as repeatedly stated in MOPTC power points, the Ports of Sines, Lisbon and Setubal movements…
Connection to Europe This is one of the biggest arguments given… But will we be connected to Madrid or to “Europe” will any passenger go by TGV to Paris? Or Berlin? Even in TGV this would be at least 9 hours trip and the ticket just to Madrid is 100 euros… Even the Promoters of the Project don’t raise this option, so what is the connection to “Europe” we are talking about29? Freight as much more potential… Having direct freight lines in the same gauge, with same signalling, from Portugal, to Spain and then France, that is being connected to Europe. If a Container that lives Lisbon can get to Paris in 2 days that will be highly competitive with a Truck, and that will surely take lots of Trucks off the roads and deliver a much more sustainable and efficient transportation service. Do we need the TGV to have that freight connection? The Sines-Elvas line is estimated to cost 250 million euros, since it shares the same platform with the TGV, not building the TGV would 27
And its not only more expensive to build, also to maintain, and its never as efficient as a dedicated line for passengers or freight… Key sector in rail freight 29 at least in the Atlas that the author of the report knows Madrid and Europe are not the same entity… 28
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increase the land movement costs of the Sines line, but it would be a marginal marginal increase and it would never come to close to double the 250 million number. Now compare to the 2,4 billion the TGV line costs (Lisbon-Madrid)… (Lisbon Madrid)… Imagine if we: built this freight line; implemented the (not yet presented but announced) Plan to migrate from from Iberian to European Gauge; Gauge; harmonized the working regulations plus signalling systems and reactivated/built more conventional links to the Spanish lines (that are also migrating to the European gauge). Wouldn’t these measures actually provided us with a more adequate and real connection to Europe? And with considerable lower costs?
Information Gaps and Disconnections isconnections Oeste Station This station is not presented in the RAVE site, but it was already announced30 as a compensatory measure negotiated with Oeste Region Mayors. The TGV will have a stop in Rio Maior, this known European Metropolis, half way31 between Santarém and Caldas das Rainhas… Why!?... Why! Why isn’t the money that will be spent on this stop used to improve the Oeste line32? What would serve the people of the t e region better? ? I don´t believe the Mayors are that narrow-minded, narrow minded, and if they are, why not to make a referendum in all those municipalities? You will see the People aren’t stupid. Connection to Alcochete Airport In 30-03 03-2009 2009 the tender for the Lisbon Lisbo -Poceirão Poceirão section of the Lisbon-Madrid Lisbon Madrid line was launched, it includes a branch from the main LisbonLisbon-Madrid Madrid line of the TGV departing from Poceirão to the new Alcochete airport33. This means that a train that leaves Madrid won’t be able to stop in the new airport, airport, and the other way around. So someone that arrives at the new airport that wants to go Madrid must take a shuttle to Lisbon and from there take the TGV, Picture 9 - Result for search "connection "con ection with Alcochete Airport" in RAVE web page
the same for someone in Madrid that wants to go to the new airport… Is this
an integrated approach? approach? Does this generate synergies?
30
See http://www.oesteonline.pt/noticias/noticia.asp?nid=18542, http://www.oesteonline.pt/noticias/noticia.asp?nid=18542, and MOPTC news on the website When one of the TGV biggest advantages is being able to go directly to the city centers… And again, didn’t RAVE have some leftovers that could be used to actually make the Strategic Plan for the Oeste Line? 33 According to a high profile consultant of one of the consortiums that is running for the new airport concession, present at the session RAVE finance director gave to the MIT Portugal transport group, ANA was unaware of this decision… 31 32
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Cost benefit Analysis The cost benefit analysis that were made compare this project with the base case scenario (current situation), but is the TGV and the current situation the only option we have? Shouldn’t alternatives be studied and then compared with this project? If this project was compared with a remodelling and upgrade of the conventional line system, including the dedicated sines-elvas freight line and remodelled Oeste line, among other projects, were then would we stand? Besides that some of the assumptions made are, at least, questionable. In all of the studies the value of time(VOT) saved is an essential parameter, but actually finding a VOT value is a very controversial subject among the experts, what confidence can we have on those values then? And is a 5% discount rate a reasonable value? When for a private project the minimum of minimum is 10%34? It´s a State initiative, but then aren´t the positive externalities already being counted, like the decrease in travel time, reduction of CO2 emissions and the general effects on economy?
Business Model Last but not least, we have the biggest PPP ever being launched (actually the project will be split in several but each one is huge)… The commercial risk of the private partners is 2%35, so if the real demand goes bellow the predicted demand studies guess who will pay? So the 38% financing provided by the cash flow generated by the project (in a 40 years term!) might be an illusion… We are faced with a SCUT on a Epic scale. So the Private operators of the network, the suppliers, the constructers and the Banks that will finance the project will surely gain. For the rest of the stakeholders mentioned the risks are Big...
Triumph of the will? Although the amount of studies available36 in the RAVE and MOPTC websites seams impressive, with rigour one is forced to say that this is a project presented, structured, studied and being implemented in a very voluntarist way, like if with shear will we could produce the desired results. Actually it looks like the result of a blinding pressure produced by the need to get the EU funds (22% of the project…) and third party interests, then a structuring project for the Transportation sector and a leveraged for the Portuguese economy and society. Sometimes we have to move even if the plan isn’t perfect. Even so, this investment requires such a huge amount of resources, besides delivering irreversible options, being a fixed/rigid infrastructure, that the least we must demand is a full explanation of the questions raised. And a reassessment 34
This can vary a bit from Project to Project and there are several contexts, but less than 10%, for a private project is in the absolute majority of the cases not applied. 35 PPPs IN THE ROAD AND RAIL SECTORS IN PORTUGAL, presentation made by the RAVE finance director 36 This is to be praised, it shouldn’t because this should be a standard procedure, unfortunately
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of the choices made, taking into account a national strategy for Transportation, and the rail sector.
Alternative Approach First, a committee made up by RAVE/REFER, Port authorities, government and the rest of the stakeholders37 mentioned should be assembled and deliver a comprehensive Transportation and Rail Strategy, that must include several alternative proposals38, within a pre-defined timetable. Universities and Students, from several fields, should be heavily involved to help explore the maximum amount possible of Alternatives39. These different approaches must be properly compared, the ones that deliver evident returns should go forward immediately to public discussion and the others should be further studied. A, as wide and participated40 as possible, public discussion should be done within a pre defined time table. The European Union isn’t the boogeyman, neither are “nuestros hermanos”. The European Directives and funding should be reassessed to maximize their intended effects. A critical, proactive and collaborative approach should replace our “good student”(to use an euphemism) attitude when addressing the EU. Some basic guidelines should be fallowed: before building mega infrastructures we should better manage what we already have. Remodelling should be a priority and new construction should be made with the goal of maximizing the output of existing assets. The third tagus crossing41, Sines-Elvas freight line, a modular airport with option to expand in Alcochete seam examples of new construction that give returns, but this should off course be the target of study and comparative analysis as above mentioned. If the, likely, conclusion that the TGV is not a priority is reached, we should nonetheless take full advantage of the studies and initiatives already made, like for instance reserve the TGV lines corridors for future eventual construction (for instance the platform for the Sines-Elvas line could be extra dimensioned to allow adding in the future extra tracks of conventional or TGV rail). Finally our “rentist” economic model and PPP fixation must be reassessed.
37 Representatives from the EU Commission and Spain should be a part of this. 38 Different phasing, different connections, different technologies… 39 Why not promote Master and Phd thesis that are actually useful instead of just working to warm up? 40 This implies not just providing information, but making an active effort to promote discussion 41 why just not Rail? Or built like the 25 of April Bridge with option to expand in the future?
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References Sites •
www.rave.pt
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www.moptc.pt
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si.moptc.pt
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www.ine.pt
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ec.europa.eu/eurostat
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www.refer.pt
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www.cp.pt
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ec.europa.eu/transport/index_en.htm
•
www.oesteonline.pt
Documents •
Programa do XVII Governo Constitucional, Presidência do Conselho de Ministros
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Grandes Opções do Plano, Principais Linhas de Acção e Medidas em 2005-2006, Conselho de Ministros
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Orientações Estratégicas Sector Ferroviário, MOPTC, Secretaria de Estado dos Transportes
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Novos Empreendimentos Rodoviários Lançados pelo Governo, MOPTC
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Plano Rodoviário Nacional 1998, Diário da República
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Actualização do Plano Rodoviário Nacional 2003, Diário da República
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O Projecto Português de Alta Velocidade, Eng. Luis Filipe Pardal, Presidente da RAVE/REFER
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El Plan Estratégico de Infraestructuras y Transporte de España, Ministerio de Fomento
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Liberalização do Transporte de Mercadorias - Impacto e Soluções, Eng. Armando Fonseca Mendes, Director CP Carga
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Cost-Benefit Analysis HSL Portugal, Bas Scholten, THR, Ecorys - requested by RAVE
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Análise Custo-Benefício Das Linhas De Alta Velocidade Lisboa-Porto E Lisboa-Madrid, TIS.pt - requested by RAVE
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Actividade dos Transportes, INE
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Estudo De Mercado E Avaliação Socioeconómica E Financeira Da Linha De Alta Velocidade Madrid-Lisboa /Porto, EPYPSA, EXACTO, TSI TECNINVEST
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Portugal Logístico, MOPTC, Gabinete da Secretaria de Estado dos Transportes
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The Trans-European Transport Network, new guidelines and financial rules, European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport
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