2020 FIU
CUBA POLL
HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Just, Peaceful and Prosperous Creating a
World
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 3 4 6 46 48
........................................................................................................ Foreword
............................................................................ About
the Pollsters
........................................................................... Executive
Summary
........................................................................................... Main
........................ Discussion
Findings
and Policy Implications
........................................................................................ Appendix
1:
Methodology
49
........................................................................................ Appendix
2:
Selected Trends
50
.......................................................................................... Appendix
3
How Were the Questions Asked?
Recommended Citation: Grenier, Guillermo and Qing Lai. 2020. 2020 FIU Cuba Poll: How Cuban Americans in Miami View U.S. Policies Toward Cuba. Miami, FL: Florida International University.
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
FOREWORD M
uch has changed in the narrative shaping U.S./Cuba
policy during the administration of President Donald J.
Trump. The policy shifts initiated by President Obama
in 2014 have all but disappeared. Old hostilities, dating to the Cold War period, now dominate relations between the two neighbors.
Two FIU Cuba Polls have been conducted since Trump’s inauguration. The trend measured in the 2018 Poll of a
Various units within Florida International University
contributed to funding the 2020 FIU Cuba poll. Along with the Steven J. Green School of International and Public
Affairs, these units include the Office of the President, the
Division of External Relations, Strategic Communications & Marketing, the Cuban Research Institute and the Kimberly
Green Latin American and Caribbean Center. We appreciate their generous support.
community hardening its isolationist views have continued
Finally, we would like to take this opportunity to once again
those of the administration. Relations between the two
Grenier and his new collaborator, Dr. Qing Lai. Dr. Grenier
in this 2020 FIU Cuba Poll. The community’s attitudes reflect countries since the last poll have not followed the path of
engagement. While the community still supports quite a few
engagement policies that it holds out as “carrots,” the overall tendency is to establish a stronger hold on the “stick” that promotes sanctions and isolation.
The findings of the poll suggest that there is a return to
recognize the co-principal investigators, Dr. Guillermo J.
has led the FIU Cuba Poll for almost three decades, keeping his finger on the pulse of the public opinions of the Cuban-
American community in South Florida. We would also like to acknowledge the collaboration of the staff members of the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, especially Pedro Botta and Amy Ellis.
traditional hard-line views toward U.S.- Cuban relations.
John F. Stack Jr., Ph.D
proponents, support for the wielding of the “stick” of the
Steven J. Green School of International & Public Affairs
While political and social engagement policies still have
embargo—the economic isolation of Cuba from the U.S. economy—has increased among Cuban Americans as a whole. The second and third generations of Cuban
Americans are driving the hope for engagement while more
established residents insist on a tougher stand. The return to hard-line views might be driven by the slow pace of change on the island, or the hostile national narrative that currently
surrounds U.S./Cuba relations in the United States. Whatever the reason, the demographics of the Cuban-American
community in South Florida continue to change while many of their attitudes directed at the state-to-state relations
between the U.S. and their homeland remain conflicted.
2 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
Founding Dean
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
THE POLLSTERS Guillermo J. Grenier is a professor of sociology and the chair of the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University. Born in Havana, Dr. Grenier is one of the founders of the Miami school of social analysis and has authored or coauthored seven books and dozens of articles on labor, migration, immigrant incorporation and Cuban-American ideological profiles. His books include A History of Little Havana, with Corinna J. Moebius (2015); This Land Is Our Land: Newcomers and Established Residents in Miami, with Alex Stepick, Max Castro and Marvin Dunn (2003); The Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States, with Lisandro Pérez (2002); Newcomers in the Workplace: Immigrants and the Restructuring of the U.S. Economy, with Louise Lamphere and Alex Stepick (1994); and Miami Now! Immigration, Ethnicity and Social Change, edited with Alex Stepick (1992). Dr. Grenier has been a Fulbright Fellow and a faculty fellow of the University of Notre Dame’s Institute of Latino Research and the director of the Florida Center for Labor Research and Studies. He lectures nationally and internationally on his research. He received his Ph.D. in sociology and his M.A. in Latin American studies from the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque.
Qing Lai is an associate professor of sociology at the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University. He earned his Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Michigan. Dr. Lai received graduate training at the Institute for Social Research’s Population Studies Center and Survey Research Center. His research interests include Chinese Muslims, development, demography and survey research. Dr. Lai has published peer-reviewed articles in Social Science Research, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Chinese Sociological Review, Chinese Journal of Sociology, Research in the Sociology of Work, Natural Hazards and Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. His current research focuses on the Muslim population in China. He analyzes census and survey data to examine the group’s heterogeneity and its relations with the majority Han society, the Chinese State and the Islamic world. He has participated in survey projects on various Asian Muslim communities, including the Xidaotang Islamic sect in Gansu and the Dungan people of Central Asia, and studied Chinese Muslim pilgrims to Mecca.
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
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2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The majority of the Cuban-American population in
6. Cuban Americans strongly support the resumption of
South Florida supports the way that President Donald
the issuing of visas at the Cuban Embassy in Havana
Trump has handled key issues of national importance.
(62%). All respondent categories are in support of this
He receives high marks in his handling of immigration
change in current U.S. policy. (Figure 14)
(64% support), race relations (55% support), national protests (55% support), healthcare (67% support),
7. Cuban Americans support the resumption of Family
Cuba policy (66% support), China policy (71%
Reunification Parole Program (60%). Only the oldest
economy (80% support). (Figures 26-33)
this policy by as much as 50%. (Figure 16)
support), the COVID-19 crisis (65% support) and the
2. While the Republican Party maintains a slight majority
among registered voters (53%), it is receiving new blood from the most recent arrivals. Seventy-six percent of
registered voters who arrived between 2010-2015 report
respondents and those migrating before 1995 oppose
8. The community is evenly split on the issue of reinstating the “Wet Foot/Dry Foot� policy. (51% oppose and 49%
support reinstating the policy.) This split is evident along all respondent categories. (Figure 15)
registering as Republicans. (Figure 36) 9. The economy and health care remain the two most 3. It is expected that President Trump will receive
approximately 59% of the Cuban-American vote in November. (Figures 38)
important national issues for Cuban Americans.
Respondents were asked to independently rank the importance of six policies related to the economy, health care, race relations, immigration, Cuba and China. The
4. Sixty percent of Cuban Americans in South Florida support the continuation of the embargo. (Figure 5)
economy and health care were considered to be the two most important issues facing the community across all age groups, migration cohorts and political party
5. The support for some policies promoting engagement
remains relatively high, such as the selling of food (69% support) and medicines to the island (74% support)
maintaining diplomatic relations (58% support) and the resumption of airline travel to all regions of the island (65% support). (Figures 8, 9, 13, 21)
4 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
registration. Cuba policy ranked last for all but the oldest cohort and the non-citizens in the sample. (Figure 23-25)
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
About Florida International University Florida International University, a public university located in Miami, has a passion for student success and community solutions. The university is classified by Carnegie as “R1.” FIU is among the top 100 public universities in U.S. News and World Report’s 2019 Best Colleges and 18 academic programs are individually ranked. FIU was recently ranked as the second best performing university in Florida and graduates are among the highest-paid in the state. FIU has multiple state-of-the-art research facilities including the Wall of Wind Research and Testing Facility and FIU’s Medina Aquarius Program. FIU has awarded more than 330,000 degrees since 1972 and enrolls more than 57,000 students in two campuses and centers including FIU Downtown on Brickell, FIU@I-75, the Miami Beach Urban Studios, and sites in Qingdao and Tianjin, China. FIU also supports artistic and cultural engagement through its three museums: Patricia & Phillip Frost Art Museum, the Wolfsonian-FIU, and the Jewish Museum of FloridaFIU. FIU is a member of Conference USA with more than 400 student-athletes participating in 18 sports. For more information about FIU, visit www.fiu.edu
About the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs Launched in 2008, the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs at FIU educates the leaders and changemakers of tomorrow through innovative teaching and research that advances global understanding, contributes to policy solutions and promotes international dialogue. One of the largest schools of its kind in the world, the Green School enrolls more than 5,700 students and employs 360 fulltime faculty. It offers 38 interdisciplinary degree programs at the bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral levels, as well as 54 undergraduate and graduate certificate programs. The Green School encompasses eight signature departments: Criminology and Criminal Justice, Economics, Global and Sociocultural Studies, History, Modern Languages, Politics and International Relations, Public Policy and Administration and Religious Studies. Home to 16 of the university’s most prominent international centers, institutes and programs, the Green School is an affiliate member of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA).
About the Cuban Research Institute FIU’s Cuban Research Institute (CRI) is dedicated to creating and disseminating knowledge about Cuba and Cuban Americans. The institute encourages original research and interdisciplinary teaching, organizes extracurricular activities, collaborates with other academic units working in Cuban and Cuban-American studies, and promotes the development of library holdings and collections on Cuba and its diaspora. Founded in 1991, CRI is the nation’s premier center for research and academic programs on Cuban and Cuban-American issues. No other U.S. university surpasses FIU in the number of professors and students of Cuban origin.
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
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MAIN FINDINGS This section presents the responses to key questions of the poll. The exact wording for selected questions, along with the Spanish version, is included in Appendix 3.
Cuban Americans and U.S./Cuba Relations: Old Wine in Old Bottles The Trump administration has altered all of the dynamics established by President Obama in U.S./Cuba relations. A dramatic shift in the tone of the relations between the two countries has established a new/old normal in the Cuban-American community. The hope of normalizing relationships—economic, familial, political, cultural—raised by the Obama policies has disappeared in the rearview mirror. The national narrative toward Cuba is one of hostility rather than engagement, confrontation rather than negotiation. While diplomatic relations have not been severed, diplomacy has all but disappeared. The reduction of consular activities at the United States Embassy in Havana has had a chilling effect on Cuban migration to the United States. The restrictions on direct flights to the island as well as the reduction in the categories available for legal travel by Americans has had a severe impact on the island economy, which had begun the slow process of diversification driven by the opening of the American market. The anticipated cessation of charter flights in October of 2020 combined with the impact of the COVID-19 crisis have added significant obstacles to the establishment of communications between the South Florida diaspora and Cubans on the island. It is in this climate that our respondents express their views in this 2020 edition of the FIU Cuba Poll. It is not the best of times. It is not the worst of times. It’s simply another poll measuring fluctuating attitudes toward policies that have changed little in 60 years. The main findings of the poll follow. We present the sample distributions of selected variables as well as their conditional distributions by age, migration/nativity and voter registration/party. All results are weighted to represent the current Cuban-American population aged 18 or older in Miami-Dade County. In the brief discussions associated with the charts, we will highlight the opinions of the entire sample and mention any category that diverges from the general opinion of the community as represented by the total sample. The Cuban-American community is not monolithic in its attitudes, even when certain tendencies might dominate.
Contextualizing the Cuban-American Population in South Florida Most of the Cuban Americans in the United States live in Florida and most of the Cuban-American Florida residents live in the South Florida region. As a result, Cuban Americans consist of a miniscule percentage of the national population but dominate the demographic landscape of Miami-Dade County. Their overwhelming presence in Florida makes their political involvement critically important, particularly in presidential election years.
Figure 1: Population Estimates: Cubans, Other Hispanics, Non-Hispanics CHART TITLE Cuban 0.0
25.0
National 0.7
Florida
Miam-Dade
Other Hispanic 50.0
17.1
7.2
Non-Hispanic 75.0
100.0
82.2
18.0
36.3
6 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
74.8
31.8
31.9
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Key Characteristics of the Cuban-American Population in Miami-Dade County As Table 1 shows, the methodology utilized in conducting the 2020 FIU Cuba Poll has resulted in a representative profile of the CubanAmerican population in South Florida along multiple dimensions. The weighted sample percentages reflect the estimates established by the Census Bureau in its 2014-2018 5-year sample of the American Community Survey. In our questionnaire we allow respondents greater flexibility in self-identifying racial categories. This accounts for the lower number of “white” respondents and a larger number of “others,” which would include the “mulato,” and “mestizo” categories. Overall, we achieve an excellent representation of the demographics of the Cuban-American population in Miami-Dade County.
Table 1: Cuban Americans in Miami Dade County: Migration/Nativity, Age, Gender, Race (ACS and Cuba Poll Sample Estimates)
ACS
Cuba Poll (2020 weighted)
Nativity & immigrant cohort Cuba
Migrated before 1980
19.2
19.6
Migrated in 1980-1994
15.2
15.5
Migrated in 1995-2009
29.8
30.4
Migrated in 2010-2020
15.0
13.6
United States
19.1
19.5
Other countries
1.6
1.5
Age group 18-39
29.5
30.0
40-59
36.2
36.9
60-75
20.2
19.1
14.1
14.0
75 or older
Gender Male
48.6
49.3
Female
51.4
50.7
Race 95.4
80.0
Black
White
1.9
3.6
Other
2.8
16.5
Years of education
12.5
14.3
Note: The Cuba Poll results are weighted toward ACS using a three-way weight based on nativity/immigrant cohort, age, and gender. Sources: 2020 Cuba Poll; American Community Survey 2014-2018 5-year sample.
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
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2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Voter Registration Estimates for Cuban Americans in Florida and Miami-Dade County Table 2 presents our estimate of the current number of registered Cuban Americans by party affiliation in Florida and MiamiDade County. These numbers become relevant when voting preferences are disclosed. The charts that follow the table visually highlight the dominance of the Republican Party in the Cuban-American political life at the state and the county levels.
Table 2: Estimated Number of Registered Cuban-American Voters by Party (Florida and M-D County)
All
FLORIDA Hispanic
Cuban
All
MIAMI-DADE Hispanic
Cuban
Republican
4,927,507 587,552 367,233
398,542 294,020 253,830
Democrat
5,167,930 920,324 180,227
622,818 272,397 124,572
Other
3,795,933 866,043 150,325
478,734 305,050 103,904
Total registered
13,891,370 2,373,919
697,785
1,500,094
871,467
482,306
Notes: Non-Cuban numbers are official voter registration data as of July 30, 2020. Cuban numbers are estimated based on American Community Survey 2014-2018 5-year sample, 2020 Cuba Poll, and official Florida voter registration data.
8 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Figure 2: Estimated Florida Voter Registration by Party (by Cuban/Hispanic/Non-Hispanic)
FLORIDA Republican 0.0
25.0
Cuban
ESTIMAT E Independent 50.0
21.5
13.1
Non-Hispanic
100.0
75.0
52.6
Other Hispanic
Democrat
25.8
42.7
37.7
44.2
25.4
36.9
Figure 3: Estimated Voter Registration by Party: Miami-Dade County (By Cuban/Hispanic/Non-Hispanic) MIAMI- D AD E ESTIMATE Republican 0.0
25.0
Cuban
Other Hispanic
Non-Hispanic
Democrat
50.0
52.6
10.3
16.6
Independent
75.0
21.5
25.8
51.7
27.6
100.0
38.0
55.7
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
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2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
The Embargo and Economic Relations Over 70% of Cuban Americans living in South Florida believe that the embargo has not worked. Since the beginning of the FIU Cuba Poll, a majority of Cuban Americans in South Florida have agreed: the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba has not worked. The question never interprets what could be considered a “successful embargo,� so each respondent is free to evaluate success/failure in her or his own terms. This year is no exception to the rule. Seventy-one percent of respondents recognize that the embargo has not worked. Respondents across all categories share this opinion although registered Republicans and the oldest members of the society tend to give the embargo the highest marks.
EMBWOR K
Figure 4 DK
Worked very well
0
25
Total (w/ DK)
7
Total
10
17
40-59
9
20
18-39
9
Mig. before 1995 Mig. since 1995 Not Cuba-born
Republican
Democrat Non-citizen
50
51
22
35
40
36
27
21
47
28 59
27
11 11
41
26
19
19
4
43
31
15 6
43
28
19
7
42
23
19
9
41
22
18
13
100
44
19
60-75
75
27
16
Not working at all
25
19
10
Worked not very well 50
17
9
76+
Independent
Worked well
23
10 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
23
44
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
A majority of the Cuban-American community supports the continuation of the embargo An increase in support for the embargo, first noted in the 2018 FIU Cuba Poll, has continued to gain strength in the current environment. Approximately 54% of the Cuban-American community supports, either strongly or mostly, the continuation of the U.S. embargo on the island when Don’t Know is considered a response. When an opinion is expressed, 60% of respondents support the continuation of the embargo. The youngest respondents, those born outside of the island and registered Democrats are the least supportive of the almost 60-year-old policy.
Figure 5
FAVCONE M B DK
Strongly favor
0 Total (w/ DK)
25 8
50
60-75 40-59 18-39
Republican
14
14 46
27
15
11 31
14
24
30
29
13
61
Independent
22
10
23
28
21
Not Cuba-born
28
15
13
43
24
14
13
55
Mig. since 1995
29
18
20
Mig. before 1995
25
10
16
33
26
16
16
46
24
15
11
45
100
14
17
49
Strongly oppose 75
15
43
76+
Non-citizen
Mostly oppose
39
Total
Democrat
Mostly favor
48
23 14
20
20
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
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2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Other Economic Relationships A majority of the community supports the temporary suspension of trade sanctions on Cuba during the COVID-19 crisis. Despite the reinforced support for the embargo, a strong majority of respondents support its temporary suspension in an effort to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. Sixty-one percent of respondents support a temporary halt to all economic sanctions. The hypothetical cessation of sanctions has broad support across all categories. The strongest desire to put the embargo on hold during the pandemic is expressed by registered Democrats and respondents not born in Cuba.
Figure 6
UCSANCTION DK
Strongly disagree 0
Total (w/ DK)
25 6
60-75
Mig. before 1995
Democrat Non-citizen
7
16 29
12 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
35
18 51
17
3
29
47 45
7
40
Independent
36
27
9
Republican
44
13
7
33 18
45
18
9
38
Mig. since 1995
32
20
20
9
27
49
17
9
29
18-39
43
4
45
40-59
40
11
10
30
100
18
8
Strongly agree
75
17
8
31
76+
Somewhat agree
50
29
Total
Not Cuba-born
Somewhat disagree
56
20 22
15
35
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
A minority of respondents support the continuation of cruise ship operations to Cuba. A minority of respondents (42%) support the resumption of cruise ship operations to the island. Several categories of respondents either support or are in a statistical split in their support for the resumption of cruise traffic. The youngest respondents (49%), the respondents not born on the island (54%) and registered Democrats (65%) are the groups most interested in resuming the operations of cruise ships to Cuba.
Figure 7
UCCRUIS E DK
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
0 Total (w/ DK)
25
50
5
57
60-75
56
40-59
30
6
35
11
28 41
24
8
19
8
20
10
43 27
30
16
66
Independent
20
9
24
11
Republican
Non-citizen
31
9 5
36
Not Cuba-born
26
18
9
49
19
15
6
61
Mig. since 1995
27 16
9
42
Mig. before 1995
27
8
9
52
18-39
25
15
8
76+
100
15
7
50
Strongly agree
75
48
Total
Democrat
Somewhat agree
27
27
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
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2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
A majority of Cuban Americans support the sale of food products to Cuba by U.S. companies. Figure 8
SELLFOOD DK
Strongly oppose
0 Total (w/ DK)
25 5 22
76+
21
60-75
50
40-59 18-39
Mig. before 1995 16
Not Cuba-born
16
12
Non-citizen
11
43 45
11 28
6
7
14 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
41
32
11
7
35 53
25
35
Democrat
48
22
10 6
15
42
28
9
Republican
44
27
8
34
Mig. since 1995
100 42
15
8
19
75
28
9
22
Strongly favor
25
8
28
Mostly favor
24
8
21
Total
Independent
Mostly oppose
30 28
35
20 51 50 53
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
The sale of medicine to the island is strongly supported. Figure 9
SELLMED DK
Strongly oppose
0 Total (w/ DK)
25 4
60-75
18-39
Mig. before 1995 Mig. since 1995
Democrat Non-citizen
9
5
46
30 52
31
5
12
42
23
9 10
15
38
33
12
26
Independent
60
24
17
38
26
9
5
Republican
47
30
26
Not Cuba-born
49
26
8
11
46
20
7
15
48
51
9
18
100
46
29
26
40-59
75
26
8
12
Strongly favor
25
8
18
Mostly favor
50
7
17
Total
76+
Mostly oppose
24
61
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2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
The Politics of the Carrot and the Policy of the Stick Does Cuba pose a threat to vital American interests? Most say, “no.” A majority of Cuban Americans do not consider Cuba a threat to vital American interests. The exception to this view is presented by the oldest group of respondents as well as those migrating before 1995 and registered Republicans. Cuban Americans born outside of Cuba, the youngest group and registered Democrats are most emphatic about the majority’s answer to the question.
Figure 10
THREAT DK
Strongly agree
0 Total (w/ DK)
25 5
40-59
41
18-39
39
27
13 46 47
19
9 8
4
16 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
27
13 45
10 54
22
10 27
14
14
4
38 14
39
44
51
Independent
13
8
17
16
35
11
17
36
Republican
Non-citizen
6
51
Mig. since 1995
Democrat
6
13
Mig. before 1995
40
7
26
38
14
47 42
16
100
14
8
60-75
Strongly disagree
75
8
37
76+
Somewhat disagree
50
35
Total
Not Cuba-born
Somewhat agree
53
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Wielding the stick: a majority of respondents support policies designed to put maximum pressure on the Cuban government to promote regime change. Since the beginning of the FIU Cuba Poll in the 1990s, the desire to wield a punishing stick on the Cuban government while simultaneously extending some kind of conciliatory carrot has been a constant in the community’s attitudes toward U.S./Cuba relations. This ambivalent carrot/stick attitude is clearly seen in the two questions asking respondents to express their general policy preference. Asked in a general and abstract manner, both questions received overwhelming support. Seventy-three percent of respondents approved, in general, of policies designed to put maximum pressure on the Cuban government in order to promote regime change. All categories of respondents expressed overwhelming support for hard-line policies, with only registered Democrats and the oldest respondents (76 years of age and above) opposing the proposition by as much as a third of respondents.
Figure 11
HARDPOL DK
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
0 Total (w/ DK)
25
50
7
Not Cuba-born
60
16
6
12
19
9
11 21
44
12
14
66 61
18
8
15 21
Republican Independent
22
4
9
53
15
12
19
59
14
8
15
64
Mig. since 1995
22
2
12
54
Mig. before 1995
Non-citizen
31
7
8
63
18-39
18
8
65
40-59
17
7
14
55
60-75
100
13
59
76+
Strongly disagree
75
55
Total
Democrat
Somewhat disagree
25
10 19
8
13
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2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Offering the carrot: a majority also support policies directed specifically at improving the economic well-being of the Cuban people. Respondents are equally in favor of policies directed at improving the well-being of the Cuban people living on the island. Overwhelming support is expressed for these “softer� political approaches. There is sizable opposition (over a third of respondents) by several categories of respondents, as can be seen in Figure 12. Over a third of older respondents, the earliest migrants as well as Republicans and independents oppose this softer approach to U.S./Cuba policies.
Figure 12
SOFTPOL DK
Strongly disagree
0 Total (w/ DK)
Somewhat disagree
25 6
Total
76+
31
60-75
31
18-39
Mig. before 1995
47
43
16
6
56
19
6
40
37
7
17
Not Cuba-born
49
31
5
18
47
21
34
Mig. since 1995
51 16
6 8
17
48
15
Republican
31
6
22
42
Independent
30
7
21
43
Democrat Non-citizen
7
15
60
28
5 5
21
18 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
59
Strongly agree 100
45
22
3
22
75
21
6
23
40-59
50 6
22
Somewhat agree
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
On the issue of maintaining diplomatic relations While there seems to be a retrenchment of attitudes toward the embargo as an economic pressure point to bring about change, Cuban Americans are also in favor of maintaining political connections to the island. The maintenance of the status quo in diplomatic relations is supported by a majority of all respondent categories except those migrating before 1995 and registered Republicans. The oldest respondent category (76+), is statistically evenly split on the issue. There has been a retrenching of support for the policy since 2018, however, when 67% expressed support for the maintenance of diplomatic relations, as contrasted with the 58% support this year within the general population.
Figure 13
FAVDIP DK
Strongly oppose
0 Total (w/ DK)
25 5
60-75
42
40-59 18-39
Democrat Non-citizen
28 9
11 26
26
18 41
21
7
44
32
8
49
Independent
40
7
10
Republican
36
27
31 14
35
22
49
Mig. since 1995
33
20
10 8
Mig. before 1995
36
16
3
25
35
22
8
33
100
21
8
42
Strongly favor 75
7
34
76+
Mostly favor
50
32
Total
Not Cuba-born
Mostly oppose
23
20 46
22
3
54
26 11
20
43
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
19
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Strong disagreement with the restriction on the issuing of visas at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. Sixty-two percent of respondents disagree with the policy of curtailing the consular services of the U.S. Embassy in Havana regarding the issuing of visas to Cuban nationals. Only registered Republicans and those migrating before 1995 are split on the issue. All other categories disagree with the cessation of visa distribution at the Havana-based embassy.
Figure 14
UCCONSULA TE DK
Strongly agree
0 Total (w/ DK)
25 5
60-75 40-59 18-39
Mig. before 1995 22
Not Cuba-born
21
Republican
Non-citizen
21
37
13 47
19
10
58
18
20 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
40
22
12
5
35
15 54
17
12
13
43
16
8
24
47
48
11
38
Independent
40
19
14
40
Mig. since 1995
45
18
10
20
42
10
11
29
100
19
6
32
75
17
11
35
Strongly disagree
16
10
28
76+
Somewhat disagree
50
26
Total
Democrat
Somewhat agree
25
49
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Should the United States reinstate the “wet foot/dry foot” policy? Maybe yes…maybe no. The community is evenly split on the “wet foot/dry foot” policy issue. Fifty-three percent would oppose the reinstatement of the preferential immigration policy while 47% would support it. Most respondent categories are similarly divided.
Figure 15
WETFOOD DK
Strongly oppose
Somewhat oppose
0 Total (w/ DK)
Somewhat support
25 3
50
Total
42
11
76+
43
8
60-75
18-39
Mig. before 1995 Mig. since 1995 Not Cuba-born
Independent Democrat Non-citizen
9
42
26
33 35
14
29
20
16
35
37
12
8
42
34
22
46
Republican
11
15
37
36
11
12
31
13
8
40
35
11
15
47
32
35
14
13
100
34
14
13
44 36
13
8
46
40-59
75
11
40
Strongly support
10
11
38
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
21
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Do you support the suspension of the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program? No! There is strong opposition to the suspension of the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program by respondents in almost all categories. Only the oldest and pre-1995 respondents support the suspension of the program while 70% of the post-1995, a population who can be assumed has the closest ties to those on the island, express support for the resumption of the program.
Figure 16
REUNION DK
Strongly support
Somewhat support
0 Total (w/ DK)
25 3
59
11
Not Cuba-born
58
Republican
14
44
Independent
20
5
22 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
54 69
13
4
32
10
12
7
27 14
47
18
13
22
33
11
11
6
24
45
12
45
Mig. since 1995
47
14
12 10
19
30
14
9
6
30
Mig. before 1995
Non-citizen
8
38
40-59
Democrat
47
48
60-75
19
100
46
13
9
Strongly oppose
75
12
9
31
76+
18-39
50
30
Total
Somewhat oppose
56
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Support for allowing all Americans unrestricted travel declines but younger Cuban-Americans and new arrivals beg to differ. For the first time in many years, support for unrestricted travel declined below the 50% mark, although staying within the margin of error. Only 47% of respondents expressed support for allowing all Americans to travel to the island. The younger populations, those born outside of Cuba and the new arrivals are the exception. Each of these categories log in at over 50% support for free travel as do Democrats and independent voters.
Figure 17
UNRTRAV DK
Strongly oppose
0 Total (w/ DK)
25 5
60-75
42
40-59
43
18-39
Mig. before 1995
Not Cuba-born
12
20 35
38 33
26
13 8
38
20
15 37
17 46
22 15
18
13
16
52
Independent
Non-citizen
32
13
14
Republican
28
21
13
27
33 18
12
11
28
15
10
36
30
11
56
Mig. since 1995
29
17
14
34
100
16
12
47
Strongly favor 75
12
41
76+
Mostly favor
50
39
Total
Democrat
Mostly oppose
20
30
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
23
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Ties that bind A large majority of Cuban Americans in South Florida have relatives or significant others living in Cuba. The South Florida Cuban-American community is developing into a true transnational diaspora. Despite the recent travel restrictions, many families have experienced the migration of one or more of their members. Approximately 70% of Cubans living in South Florida have relatives living in Cuba. Unsurprisingly, a higher percentage of those who migrated since 1995 (84%) have relatives left behind.
Figure 18
RELATIVE DK 0
25
Total (w/ DK) 1 Total
76+
No
Yes
50
75
30
70
30
70
68
32
60-75
27
73
40-59
27
73
18-39
34
66
Mig. before 1995
34
66
Mig. since 1995
84
16
Republican
69
31
Independent
66
34
63
37
Democrat Non-citizen
46
54
Not Cuba-born
8
24 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
92
100
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Some remaining relatives will eventually be our neighbors. Others will not. While a majority of Cuban-Americans have relatives on the island, a minority of community members plan to have these relatives travel to the United States to join them. The only group with a keen interest in reuniting with the relatives left behind are the post-1995 migrants and the noncitizen category, which is dominated by the most recent arrivals. A majority of both of these groups (57% and 69% respectively) hope to reunite with close relatives left in Cuba.
Figure 19
JOIN DK 0
Total (w/ DK)
25
Yes
50
5
75
44
56
76+
100 41
54
Total
32
68
60-75
35
65
40-59
50
50
18-39
46
54
Mig. before 1995
28
72
Mig. since 1995
57
43
Not Cuba-born
28
72
36
64
Republican Independent
38
62 46
54
Democrat Non-citizen
No
31
69
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
25
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Have you traveled to Cuba since leaving? Over half of the respondents report traveling to the island since their departure. Most recent migrants are the most frequent travelers. More than a quarter of Cuban Americans born outside of the island have made the journey to their parents’ homeland. Travel is similarly distributed across party lines.
Figure 20
TRAVCU B A DK 0
25
Total (w/ DK) 0
No
Yes
50
75
47
53
Total
47
53
76+
46
54
60-75
50
50
40-59
59
41
18-39
48
52
Mig. before 1995
40
60
Mig. since 1995
76
24
28
72
Not Cuba-born
Republican
52
48
Independent
52
48 45
55
Democrat Non-citizen
100
12
26 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
88
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Let the American airline companies resume previously established routes throughout the island, say a majority of Cuban Americans. A strong majority of respondents are of the opinion that U.S. airline companies should be able to establish services throughout the island, not just to Havana. Approximately 65% of the community shares this opinion. Seventy-two percent of post-1995 migrants support this expansion of services, 62% feeling “strongly� about it. All respondent categories express majority support for expanding airline services beyond the capital.
Figure 21
UCAIRLIN E DK
Strongly disagree
0 Total (w/ DK)
Somewhat disagree
25 5
50
27
76+
29
60-75
27
6
18-39
25
10
Mig. before 1995
Not Cuba-born
Republican
Democrat Non-citizen
9
14 8
3
62
14
44
22
43
13
7 9
28
41
15
10
37
Independent
47
18
13
21
54
7 4
23
50
14
36
Mig. since 1995
52
12
7
31
100
51
12
7
Strongly agree
48
14
7
40-59
75
14
7
26
Total
Somewhat agree
49
14 57
20 74
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
27
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Remittances matter. Almost half of Cuban Americans send them to family members on the island. Approximately half of all Cuban-American families send remittances to relatives in Cuba. The most recent arrivals are the most likely to send remittances while the older population group and the pre-1995 migrants are the least likely to send money to relatives on the island. It’s worth mentioning that the most recent arrivals have fewer resources to contribute to relatives on the island but, nevertheless, manage to share these resources with those left behind. The old saying comes to mind: “Cubans share what they have, not what is left over.”
Figure 22
SENDREMIT DK 0
25
Total (w/ DK) 1
50
75
100
47 48
52
76+
43
57
60-75
47
53
40-59
55
45
18-39
43
57
Mig. before 1995
40
60 66
34
23
77
Not Cuba-born
Republican
42
58
Independent
49
51
44
56
Democrat Non-citizen
Yes
51
Total
Mig. since 1995
No
33
28 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
67
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Cuban Americans are not one-issue ponies. The importance of national policies regarding the economy, health care, immigration, China and Cuba Importance of National Issues by Age Respondents were asked to rank the importance of each of these policies. Each policy was ranked independently. Respondents were not forced to prioritize the policies compared to each other, simply to rank the policy’s importance on a five-point scale. The results present a clear picture of the importance of each policy. Combining the answers allows us to evaluate how the Cuban-American community prioritizes them. Let us look at the importance of each policy to the respondents categorized by age. The economy ranks as the most important policy concern among all respondent categories EXCEPT the oldest. The over-76 category of respondents considers health care the most important policy. Cuba policy is ranked the sixth, that is to say, last in importance, by three of the four age groupings.
3.89 3.79
4.08
4.12 4.01 3.95 3.83
4.26
4.69 4.58
4.90 4.71
3.93 4.05 3.78 3.78
3.81 3.37
3.82 3.81
3.84
4.00
4.09 4.04
4.50
4.00
4.81 4.76
4.68 4.47
5.00
4.76 4.68
Figure 23
3.50
3.00 Total Economy
76+ Health care
Race
60-75 Immigration
40-59 China policies
18-39 Cuba policies
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
29
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Importance of National Issues by Migration Period Again, regardless of when the respondents left Cuba, the economy edges out health care as the most important issue for Cuban Americans in South Florida. The government’s handling of Cuba policy remains the least important policy concern for all groups except the post-1995 migrants, who consider its handling more important than U.S. policy toward China.
4.44
4.64
4.83 4.76
4.74 4.72
5.00
4.76 4.68
Figure 24
4.17 4.00 4.01 3.55
3.73
4.01
4.23 4.07 3.82 3.71
3.86
3.82 3.81
4.00
4.02
4.09 4.04
4.50
3.50
3.00 Total Economy
Mig. before 1995 Health care
Race
Mig. since 1995
Immigration
China policies
Not Cuba-born Cuba policies
Importance of National Issues by Voter Registration The economy remains the most important issue for registered voters and noncitizens alike, with the exception of registered Democrats, who consider health care the most important policy concern. Noncitizens, that is the most recent arrivals, consider Cuba policy more important than U.S./China policy but all registered voters put Cuba issues as the least important of the six policy concerns.
4.32 4.21 4.01
4.30
3.58
3.67 3.56
3.93
4.20 4.06 3.84 3.75
3.82 3.81
3.88 4.00 3.95 3.87
4.09 4.04
4.50
4.00
4.93 4.90
4.76 4.51
4.74 4.66
4.58
4.76 4.68
5.00
4.82
Figure 25
3.50
3.00 Total Economy
Republican Health care
30 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
Race
Independent
Immigration
Democrat
China policies
Non-citizen Cuba policies
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Approval for Trump’s Handling of Key Issues Trump receives support for his handling of the issue of immigration. An overwhelming majority of Cuban Americans (64%) strongly or somewhat support the way that President Trump has handled the issue of immigration. Respondents not born in Cuba and registered Democrats are the only two categories who express significant opposition to the President’s handling of immigration policy (50% and 78% opposition respectively.)
Figure 26
TIMMIG DK
Strongly support 0
Total (w/ DK)
Somewhat support 25
5
100
18-39
37
13
21
Republican
22
33 11
50
33
11 65
13
12
7
7
18
68
Independent
23
16
14
29
19
4
20
47
Not Cuba-born
28
15
56
Mig. since 1995
22
12
18 21
Mig. before 1995
28
3
18
37
19
12
11
48
25
11
18
51
40-59
23
11
58
60-75
Non-citizen
75 17
46
76+
Democrat
Strongly oppose
50
44
Total
Somewhat oppose
17
21
12
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
31
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump receives support for his handling of the issue of health care. The respondents express solid support for the President’s handling of health care policy as well. Approximately 67% of respondents express the opinion of “strongly” or “somewhat” supporting the President’s approach. A majority of all categories of respondents, except those not born in Cuba and registered Democrats, express support. Approximately 52% of the non-Cuba-born respondents oppose the President’s handling of health care as do 75% of registered Democrats.
Figure 27
THEALTH
DK
Total (w/ DK)
Strongly support
Somewhat support
0
25 7
40-59 18-39
Mig. before 1995
Republican
36
19
40 8
10
18 51
32 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
5
9
25
61
Independent
21
11
16
22
26
17
6
22
46
Not Cuba-born
22 28
25
51
Mig. since 1995
21
3
15
20
37
17
10
27
40
23
9 20
56
21
10
22
52
100
10
23
60-75
Non-citizen
75 21
44
76+
Strongly oppose
50
40
Total
Democrat
Somewhat oppose
29
12 65 33
7
9
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump gets mixed reviews for his handling of the issue of race relations. A majority of respondents (55%) support the way that President Trump has handled race relations issues during his term. The support is not unanimous across all of the categories of respondents. A majority (54%) of younger respondents (18-39) oppose the President’s handling of race issues as do a majority of the non-Cuba-born category (60%), independent voters (54%) and registered Democrats (84%). The opposition of the post-1995 migrants (47%) is within the margin of error of the poll as is the opposition expressed by the respondents included in the non-citizen category (48%).
Figure 28
TRACE DK
Strongly support
Somewhat support
0 Total (w/ DK)
25 5
40-59
Republican
Non-citizen
52
7
10
11
42
12 74
10 43
9
25 19
27
25
8
56
Independent
24
7 22
14 21
19
40
21
38
Not Cuba-born
26
18
47
Mig. since 1995
32
6
14
16
31
20
16
23 19
Mig. before 1995
31
15
37
18-39
29
14
18
39
100
13
50
60-75
Strongly oppose
75
17
37
76+
Democrat
50
35
Total
Somewhat oppose
10
33
15
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
33
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump gets mixed reviews for his handling of the recent national protests. The President’s handling of the wave of protests that have swept the country for weeks receives mixed reviews. While 55% of respondents support the President’s handling of the protests, the younger respondents and the non-Cubaborn respondents voice significant opposition (53% and 60% respectively) as do registered Democrats (76%) and independents (50%).
Figure 29
TPROTEST DK
Strongly support 0
Total (w/ DK)
5
50
Republican
49
14
10
65
11
35
34 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
37
13
18
32
17
12
16
56
Independent
29
11
15
26
24
12 18
15
38
Not Cuba-born
39
18
47
Mig. since 1995
30
16 14
14
Mig. before 1995
26
15
14
33
26
8
22
40
18-39
31
15
37
40-59
30
14
51
60-75
100
14
16
39
Strongly oppose
75
15
36
76+
Non-citizen
Somewhat oppose
25
Total
Democrat
Somewhat support
18
26
20
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump gets strong support for his handling of Cuba policy. Approximately 66% of Cuban-Americans in South Florida support the President’s handling of Cuba policy in general. The main opposition comes from the non-Cuba-born respondents (52%) and registered Democrats (74%).
Figure 30
TCUBA DK
Strongly support 0
Total (w/ DK)
25 7
50
60-75
Mig. before 1995
Not Cuba-born
31
11
15
16 66
7
7
21 21
36
24
21
65
Independent
18
6 10
15 19
Republican
28
22
29
21
16
18
51
22
9
18
55
Mig. since 1995
20
6
18
38
23
10
20
52
18-39
22
11
54
40-59
100
10
18
50
Strongly oppose
75 17
48
76+
Non-citizen
Somewhat oppose
45
Total
Democrat
Somewhat support
29
14 58 13
7
15
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
35
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump gets high marks for his handling of China policy. The President’s handling of China policy also receives strong support, with only the loyal opposition of registered Democrats raising a voice of dissent (68% oppose).
Figure 31
TCHINA DK
Strongly support
Somewhat support
0 Total (w/ DK)
25
50
11
60-75
Not Cuba-born
Non-citizen
29
19
69
Independent
16
47 16
15
16 58
36 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
15
11
17
16
18
7
20
38
Republican
22
19
55
16
11 15
19
57
Mig. since 1995
17
9
16
45
Mig. before 1995
26
18
58
18-39
19
6
26 56
40-59
17
11
19
43
100 10
17
52
76+
Strongly oppose
75
46
Total
Democrat
Somewhat oppose
5
7
21
17 53 29
8
4
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump receives support for his handling of the COVID-19 crisis. The President’s often criticized handling of the COVID-19 crisis receives high marks from Cuban Americans in general. Approximately 65% support Trump’s handling of the novel coronavirus crisis. Although over a third of respondents in several categories do not support his handling of the crisis, only non-Cuba-born respondents, registered Democrats and independents voice significant opposition (60%, 71% and 49% respectively).
Figure 32
TCOVID
DK
Strongly support
Somewhat support
0 Total (w/ DK)
25
3
23
40-59
Not Cuba-born
Republican
Non-citizen
49
36
13 60
11 56
9
8
24 24
19
20
11
11
27 10
18
7
59
Independent
23 35
24 20
20
20
8
23
45
19
11
51
Mig. since 1995
26
10
24
32
Mig. before 1995
10
8
21
45
18-39
25
22
50
100
9
26
47
60-75
Strongly oppose 75
22
42
76+
Democrat
50
41
Total
Somewhat oppose
22
8
14
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
37
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Trump gets high marks for handling the economy. Registered Democrats are the only category of respondents that express a muted if majority opposition to the President’s handling of the economy (54%). All other respondent groups overwhelmingly endorse the President’s work on the economy. Although the question did not guide respondents’ evaluation, it is clear that the present condition of the economy is not having an impact on the overall view of the President as doing a good job in steering economic policy.
Figure 33
TECON DK
Strongly support 0
Total (w/ DK)
Somewhat support 25
50
4
15
60-75
70
40-59
70
12
17
12
13
Republican
20
18
7 17
58 24
Non-citizen
38 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
22 74
10
6
85
Independent
20
9
6
16 15
10
7
13
47
10
6
18
68
Not Cuba-born
9
13
72
Mig. since 1995
11
14
57
Mig. before 1995
9
7
14
62
18-39
100
14
65
76+
Strongly oppose
75
62
Total
Democrat
Somewhat oppose
4
4
14
11 34 20
2 3
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Politics Writ Large Yes, Virginia, Cubans are still conservative. Most Cuban Americans consider themselves to be on the conservative side of political ideology. When asked to place their political views on scale where 1 is extremely conservative and 7 is extremely liberal, only Democrats cross into what might be called the “moderate� dimension of the ideological scale.
Figure 34
CONLIB 1.00
2.00
3.00
Total
7.00
3.05
40-59
3.26 3.37
18-39
Mig. before 1995
2.74 3.42
Mig. since 1995
3.65
Not Cuba-born
2.35 3.59
Democrat Non-citizen
6.00
3.10
60-75
Independent
5.00
3.23
76+
Republican
4.00
4.25 3.86
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
39
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
High citizenship participation is a characteristic of the Cuban-American population. The literature on Cuban Americans highlights their political engagement. Our sample lives up to expectations. Only the wave of migrants who arrived during the past decade, many of whom have not been in the country the necessary time to become citizens, lags behind in naturalization activity. All questions asking about voting preferences exclude respondents who are non-citizens and are not registered (or have no intention of registering) to vote.
Figure 35
CUBA POLL WGTED Non-US citizen 0
25
Total
US citizen
50
75 87
13
prior to 1959 0
100
1959-1964 0
100
1965-1979 1
99
1980-1994 1995-2009
Born in other countries
93
7
89
11
2010-2020
39
61
89
11
Born in U.S. 0
40 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
100
100
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
The Republican Party maintains a slight majority of registered voters and is replenishing itself with the energy of new arrivals. Figure 36
PARTY BY TYPE Republican 0
25
Total
Democrat
50
75 23
22
22
56
1965-1979
20
31
49
2010-2015
16
25
59
1995-2009
15
17
68
1980-1994
22
11
67
1959-1964
100
24
53
prior to 1959
20
76
Born in U.S.
Born in other countries
Independent
24
40
25
38
5
36
38
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
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2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Cuban Americans are politically engaged and politically motivated to vote in upcoming elections. Another measure of political engagement is the likelihood of registered voters to actually vote in the upcoming elections. Ninety percent of registered voters are committed to casting a ballot in November. Republicans are somewhat more motivated than Democrats or independents. The young voters are, as usual, the most ambivalent. Only 85 percent express certainty about casting their ballot.
Figure 37
VOTENOV DK 0
Definitely
Probably
25
50
Total (w/ DK) 1 Total
Probably not
Definitely not 75
100
90
8
11
90
8
11
76+
92
7
10
60-75
92
8
0
40-59 18-39
Mig. before 1995
5 02
94
21
11
85
6 01
93
Mig. since 1995
89
9
11
Not Cuba-born
89
8
21
Republican
5 10
94
Independent
88
10
11
Democrat
87
10
12
42 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
The Horserace If the election for President were held today with Joe Biden and Donald Trump as candidates, whom would you vote for? Cuban-American voters since the 1980s have expressed overwhelming support for Republican candidates. This year will be no exception. Approximately 59% of all registered voters intend to cast their vote for President Trump. Among registered Democrats, 71% intend to vote for Biden. Cuban-American independent voters usually vote like Republicans and they intend to do so in November. The support for Trump among non-Cuba-born respondents is a bit under 50%. Swaying the undecided might have an impact for the Biden campaign in a race where receiving the majority of the Cuban vote is not a reasonable expectation. Ten percent of all registered voters remain undecided and most of these are distributed among independent voters, post-1995 migrants and a couple of age cohorts.
Figure 38
GOVVOTE Biden 0
25
Total
23
60-75
24
40-59
23
18-39
50
No answer 75
100
59
4
59
55
Not Cuba-born
37
1
4
11
0
6
8
2
8
2
2 5 46
6
14 8
49 71
1
8
87 26
4 9
71 56
1
12 4
62
25
10
2 62
18
Mig. since 1995
Democrat
Undecided
29
Mig. before 1995
Independent
Neither
25
76+
Republican
Trump
2
1 5 1 10 15
14 6
0 8
0
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
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2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Lastly: On the Health and Economic Impact of Covid-19 on our Community The impact of Covid-19 on the health of the community: muted but significant. The COVID-19 crisis has had an impact on the physical health of the Cuban-American population in South Florida. Although the questionnaire does not explore the full impact of the virus in the community, nearly half (44%) of respondents report having been affected (slightly, somewhat, badly or very badly) by the pandemic. Approximately 56% of the younger respondents (18-39) report having been affected to some degree. This is roughly the same impact suffered by the nonCuba-born and Democrat categories of respondents.
Figure 39
CVHEALTH
Very badly affected
Badly affected
0 Total
76+
25
3 2
40-59
5
18-39
5
Mig. since 1995
5
Not Cuba-born
7
Republican
6
66
Democrat
7
3
Non-citizen
6
4
63
18
12
5 2
60
16
15
4
44
23
21
6
58
17
15
4
60
19
13
3
44
21
20
6
57
18
15
9
Mig. before 1995
60
17
13
44 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
43
22
25 21
56
Not at all affected 100
56
21
12 4
75
19
12
5 2
Slightly affected
50
16
4
6
60-75
Independent
Somewhat affected
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Economic impact due to COVID-19: broad and deep. The financial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is more widespread than its health impact. Sixty-five percent of all respondents report being financially affected by the pandemic. The most vulnerable population seems to be the noncitizens, who, presumably, are also the most recent arrivals. Democrats report being more affected than Republicans or independents. The personal finances of post-1995 arrivals and non-Cuba-born have been similarly jeopardized. The population most protected from financial calamity, ironically, seems to be the elderly, although 50% of that age cohort reports some financial impact from the consequences of the pandemic.
Figure 40
CVFIN
Very badly affected
Badly affected
0
25
Total
76+
8
40-59
10
18-39
9
Mig. since 1995
10
Not Cuba-born
9
Republican Independent Democrat Non-citizen
11 16
44
19
36
21
27
28
24
27 14
28
26
24
10
29
19
29
9
7
47
28
8
8
29
24
22
14
5
29
21
28
19
6
45
28
13
6
52 23
10
100 35
16 17
7
Not at all affected
75 22
23
6
3
Slightly affected
50 25
10
8
60-75
Mig. before 1995
Somewhat affected
29
21
20
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
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2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS The major conclusion drawn from this poll is that many
the Politics of the Stick and support for the Politics of the
Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade County are reevaluating the
Carrot. These cryptic categories are associated with policies
engagement attitudes that they supported during the brief period
of isolation and policies of engagement, respectively. It is
of glasnost under the Obama administration. It is likely that the
not surprising that the poll measures a certain amount of
reevaluation is influenced by the dramatic change in the narrative
ambivalence in the population. Most Cubans desire change,
toward Cuba adopted by the Trump administration. If this is the case, Cuban Americans are not so much shaping as reflecting U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba. Another social force potentially shaping the general shift in attitudes is the high expectations established by the Obama engagement policies and the unsteady handling by the Cuban government of economic reforms. Cubans here and on the island
in Cuba and in U.S. Cuba policy. They are unclear, even after 60 years of experience, whether isolation or engagement will bring about change so they are leaving the door open to more engagement while signaling that, perhaps due to the leadership provided by Trump and his administration, they are willing to give isolation policies their support. Still, both tendencies are evident in the community.
expected great changes and they never came. The revival of antagonism initiated by the Trump administration is building on the frustrations accumulated by the modest and nonsustainable changes brought about by engagement, and the result is a passionate response to the unambiguous policy initiatives emanating from Washington. Cubans in South Florida follow the lead of strong leadership from Washington, in engagement or in isolation. A strong status quo bias seems to govern the attitudes of the community, and the status quo is established by Washington policies. At least that is a hypothesis worth testing. The Cuban-American population is not immune to the national narratives. It is part of this society and, as much as Cuba remains a source of identity and pride, the members of the community are embedded in the sociopolitical structure of the United States and South Florida, where all Cuba news is magnified, and its importance often overblown in service of broader political agendas. The negative national narrative, plus the slow pace of changes taking place on the island, combine to create a less than hopeful view of the future and a more ambivalent attitude about the way forward. These are possible explanations for the shifting attitudes. More analysis is required to make more definitive statements. The tendencies evident in the results of the 2020 FIU Cuba poll can be categorized into two broad camps: support for 46 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
Policies of the Carrot
1. There is strong support for suspending the sanctions codified in the embargo to allow for humanitarian
assistance during the COVID-19 crisis. There is broad support across all respondent categories for this hypothetical, temporary interruption of the embargo. 2. The support for some policies promoting engagement
remains high, such as the selling of food and medicines.
3. While support for a policy of unrestricted travel for all Americans has diminished, the support for airlines to establish routes to all regions of Cuba is strong. 4. Policies designed specifically to improve the economic well-being of Cubans on the island are strongly
supported (as the counterbalance to the stick policies mentioned below). 5. Approximately half of Cuban Americans in South Florida send remittances to family members on the island.
Seventy percent have close relatives or significant others living in Cuba. The Cuban family remains a bond that transcends geography and ideology.
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
The Policies of the Stick
1. Support for isolationist policies has increased. Support has increased most dramatically for the economic
Pro-Trump Hispanics
1. The traditional support that Cubans have consistently
expressed toward the Republican Party (since the 1980s)
embargo. Younger Cuban Americans are more likely to
has transformed itself into support for the presidency of
oppose the embargo (46%). Cuban Americans not born
Donald Trump. He receives high marks on handling all of
in Cuba also support lifting the embargo (50%) as do
the measured key national issues as well as his handling
registered Democrats (72%).
of Cuba policy and will receive a majority of the Cuban-
2. There is a lack of support for resuming cruise ship
American vote on November 3.
operations to the island from U.S. ports. Younger respondents, the non-Cuba-born and registered
Democrats are the most supportive of the resumption of cruise traffic to the island. 3. While a majority of Cuban Americans do not believe
that Cuba is a threat to American vital interests, there is significant support for policies that exert maximum pressure on the government to promote regime change.
Views toward other existing polices
1. Cuban Americans support the resumption of the
issuing of visas at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. All respondent categories are in support of this change in current U.S. policy.
2. Cuban Americans support the resumption of the
Family Reunification Parole Program. Only the oldest respondents and those migrating before 1995 oppose this policy by as much as 50 percent.
3. The community is almost evenly split on the issue of reinstating the “wet foot/dry foot� policy. This split is evident along all respondent categories.
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
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2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
APPENDIX Appendix 1: Methodology Following the methodology used in previous polls, the 2020 FIU Cuba Poll is the latest telephone survey of Cuban-American residents in South Florida. The intended population includes all selfidentified Cuban adults (aged 18 or older) who currently live in Miami-Dade County (MDC). The sampling frame consists of all Telephone Consumer Protection Act compliant LAN and cell numbers operating in the area. A probability sample was constructed using Random Digit Dialing (RDD) procedure. FIU contracted the NORS Surveys, Inc. to conduct the interviews. The respondents who self-identified as Cuban were interviewed with our bilingual (English and Spanish) questionnaire and the Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system. Data collection took place from July 7 to August 17, 2020. We successfully reached a total of 4,355 telephone users (757 LAN and 3,598 cell phone users), among whom 1,117 (25.6%) identified themselves as Cuban. Most (89.7%) completed the interview, yielding a final sample of 1,002 respondents. A majority (81.1%) of those who completed interviews did so via cell phone. Approximately half (45.4%) of the interviews were conducted in Spanish. All results presented in this report are weighted to better represent the intended population. A three-way weight is constructed based on gender, age and nativity/migration cohort. Our population benchmark is the person-weighted American Community Survey (ACS) 2014-2018 5-year sample, which represents the 2018 U.S. population. Our weight variable adjusts our sample composition toward all MDC Cuban residents aged 16 or older in 2018. All figures in this report are graphed using precise values. However, in some figures the percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding error. In Table 2 we estimated the number of Cuban-American registered voters by party. Two assumptions were made. First, the registration rate is assumed to be the same (84.1%) for all Hispanic communities. Second, the state-level party distribution of Cuban-American registered voters is assumed to be the same as that in Miami-Dade County. Figures 2 and 3 are also built upon these assumptions. Figures 38 and 39 summarize the health and financial impacts of COVID-19. The results might involve a survival bias. For instance, Figure 38 shows that those aged 60 or older are less affected by the pandemic in terms of health. This needs to be interpreted with caution. It is known that COVID19-induced mortality is highly age-dependent, which means that many elderly Cubans did not survive to our window of observation. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that our results reflect the perceptions of the surviving Cuban adult population in MDC.   48 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Appendix 2: Selected Trends Support for the Embargo and Diplomatic Relations Over Time (2007-2020) T RE N D S O F % E N D O RSE M E N T
Figure 41
embargo
diplomatic
75
72
70
60 55
67
66
65 60
59 59
56 54
54
50 47
45
47
40 35 30 2006
34 2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
Party Affiliation Over time (2007-2020) P ART Y BY YE AR
Figure 42
Rep ublican 0
25
200 7
201 0
201 4
201 6
201 8 202 0
Independ ent
Democrat
50
75
27
24
49
29
25
49
51
53
17
15
68
45
100
23
29
30
24
20
23
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
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2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
Appendix 3: How Were The Questions Asked? Over the years, the United States government has often supported different policies toward Cuba. I am going to read you some of the policies that have been proposed and I would like you to tell me whether you favor or oppose these policies. 1.
2.
3.
4.
First, allow companies to sell medicine in an unrestricted way to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this? [Esta es una pregunta sobre Cuba actualmente.] Durante años el gobierno de los Estados Unidos ha apoyado a menudo diversas políticas hacia Cuba. Voy a leerle algunas de las políticas que se han propuesto, y me gustaría que usted me dijera si está a favor o en contra de ellas. Permitir que las compañías vendan medicinas a Cuba, ¿está decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra, o fuertemente en contra? Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba in an unrestricted way. [..Do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose this?] Permitir que las compañías norteamericanas vendan alimentos a Cuba... ¿Está decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra, o fuertemente en contra? Allowing unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba Do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose? Los viajes sin restricciones de todos los americanos a Cuba ¿deberían ser permitidos o no? Overall, do you think the U.S. embargo of Cuba has worked very well, well, not very well, or not at all? En términos generales, ¿cree usted que el embargo norteamericano a Cuba ha dado muy buen resultado, buen resultado, no muy buen resultado, o ningún resultado?
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
On the issue of the embargo, Do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba? ¿Está usted a favor o en contra de que continúe el embargo a Cuba? On the issue of maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba, do you Strongly Favor, Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or Strongly Oppose maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba? ¿Está usted a favor o en contra del restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas de los Estados Unidos con Cuba? The United States has stopped issuing visas to Cubans from the Havana embassy. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this policy? Estados Unidos ha dejado de emitir visas a los cubanos desde la embajada de La Habana. ¿Está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con esta política? Some people say that the U.S. should temporarily suspend the trade sanctions on Cuba to allow for humanitarian responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this policy suggestion? Algunas personas dicen que Estados Unidos debería suspender temporalmente las sanciones comerciales a Cuba para permitir respuestas humanitarias a la pandemia de Covid. ¿Estás totalmente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo? The U.S. government has suspended airline services to all cities in Cuba except Havana. Some say that U.S. airline companies should be able to establish services to any region of the island, not just Havana. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this policy? El gobierno de EE. UU. ha suspendido los servicios aéreos a todas las ciudades de Cuba, excepto La Habana.
50 Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
Algunos dicen que las compañías aéreas estadounidenses deberían poder establecer servicios en cualquier región de la isla, no solo en La Habana. ¿Está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con esta recomendación? 10. Allowing cruise ships to continue regular operations to Cuba. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this policy? Permitir que los cruceros continúen las operaciones regulares a Cuba. ¿Está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con esta política? 11. Do you or your family in Miami send money to relatives in Cuba? ¿Me podría decir si usted o algún miembro de su familia envía dinero a Cuba? 12. Some people say that the U.S. government should emphasize policies that put maximum pressure on the Cuban government to promote regime change. Other people say that the U.S. government should emphasize policies that directly help the Cuban people improve their economic well being. Thinking now about the policies that put maximum pressure on the Cuban Government, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this policy approach? Algunas personas dicen que el gobierno de los EE. UU. debe enfatizar las políticas que ejercen la máxima presión sobre el gobierno cubano para promover el cambio de régimen. Otras personas dicen que el gobierno de los Estados Unidos debe enfatizar las políticas que ayudan directamente al pueblo cubano a mejorar su bienestar económico. Pensando ahora en las políticas que ejercen la máxima presión sobre el gobierno cubano, ¿está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con este enfoque de política?
2020 FIU CUBA POLL: HOW CUBAN AMERICANS IN MIAMI VIEW U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA
13. Now thinking now about the policies that are directed specifically at improving the economic well being of the Cuban people, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with this policy approach? Pensando ahora en las políticas que se dirigen específicamente a mejorar el bienestar económico del pueblo cubano, ¿está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con este enfoque de política?
16. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly agree that Cuba poses a threat to the vital interests of the United States. ¿Está totalmente de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con que Cuba representa una amenaza para los intereses vitales de los Estados Unidos?
14. President Trump has suspended the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program, which allows Cuban Americans to sponsor their close family members in Cuba for immigration to the United States. Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose President Trump’s suspension of the Family Reunification Parole Program? El presidente Trump ha suspendido el Programa de Parole para la Reunificación Familiar Cubana, que permite a los cubanoamericanos patrocinar a sus familiares cercanos en Cuba para que puedan migrar a los Estados Unidos. ¿Apoya firmemente, apoya un poco, se opone algo o se opone firmemente a la suspensión del Presidente Trump del Programa de Parole de Reunificación Familiar de los cubanos?
18. Do you have close relatives or significant others living in Cuba now? ¿Tiene parientes cercanos u otras personas significativas que están viviendo en Cuba ahora?
15. Some people say that the U.S. should reinstate the “wet foot/dry foot” policy that allowed Cubans without a visa a guaranteed path to legal entry into the United States when they reached U.S. soil. Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the reinstatement of this policy? Algunas personas dicen que Estados Unidos debería restablecer la “política de pies secos/pies mojados” que permitió a los cubanos sin visa un camino garantizado para ingresar legalmente a los Estados Unidos cuando llegaran a territorio estadounidense. ¿Apoya firmemente, apoya un poco, se opone algo o se opone firmemente a la reinstauración de esta política?
17. Have you ever traveled to Cuba [ADD IF BORN IN CUBA:] since you left? ¿Ha viajado a Cuba alguna vez IF BORN IN CUBA: desde que salió?
19. How likely are you to vote in the general election in November? Are you definitely going to vote, probably will vote, probably will not vote or are definitely not going to vote? ¿Qué tan probable es que usted vote en las elecciones generales de noviembre? ¿Definitivamente va a votar, probablemente votará, probablemente no votará o definitivamente no votará? 20. If the election for President were held today with Joe Biden and Donald Trump as candidates, whom would you vote for? Si las elecciones para presidente se celebraran hoy con Joe Biden y Donald Trump como candidatos, ¿por quién votaría?
support or not support the way that President Trump has handled some important issues: Overall, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the way that he has handled … Independientemente de su elegibilidad o intención de votar en noviembre, me gustaría saber si apoya o no la forma en que el presidente Trump ha manejado algunos asuntos importantes: En general, ¿apoya firmemente, apoya un poco, se opone algo o se opone firmemente a la forma en que ha manejado la Política de …
23. Finally, we would like to get an idea of COVID-19’s impact on you and your family. First, in terms of health, would you say you or your family have been very badly, badly, somewhat, slightly, or not at all affected by the pandemic? Finalmente, nos gustaría tener una idea del impacto de COVID-19 en usted y su familia. Primero, en términos de salud, ¿diría que usted o su familia han sido gravemente, mucho, algo, un poco o nada afectados por la pandemia? 24. In terms of financial situation, would you say you or your family have been very badly, badly, somewhat, slightly, or not at all affected by the pandemic? En términos de su situación financiera ¿diría que usted o su familia han sido gravemente, mucho, algo, un poco o nada afectados por la pandemia?
21. Now let me list some important issues for the general election in November. Regardless of your eligibility or intention to vote, please tell me how important the following issues are to you. Ahora permítame enumerar cuestiones que pueden ser importantes en noviembre. Independientemente de su elegibilidad o intención de votar, dígame cuán importantes son los siguientes asuntos para usted. 22. Regardless of your eligibility or intention to vote in November, I would like to know whether you
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs
51
Florida International University 11200 SW 8th Street, SIPA 530 Miami, FL 33199 Phone: 305-348–7266 Email: international@fiu.edu https://sipa.fiu.edu/
54
CUBAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE
