Safety Accident Analysis
Who’s in control?
While we all love to share our joy of flying with friends and colleagues, Steve Ayres examines why it’s worth looking at some of the possible consequences of handing over those precious flight controls – and why it’s important to get the cockpit ‘relationships’ right
Accident 1
The Beechcraft B200 aircraft, equipped to perform medical evacuation flights, was conducting an instrument flight rules positioning flight, with two flight crew members and two flight nurses on board. While the aircraft was cruising at flight level 250, the flight crew declared an emergency due to a fuel issue, which the crew then realised meant they would not make it to the destination. It was at that moment that the First Officer (FO) remembered that he had forgotten to have the aircraft refuelled. The flight crew were ‘startled’ by the fuel exhaustion situation, and their management of the emergency subsequently deteriorated as they were faced with a higher and unexpected workload owing to the impending fuel
exhaustion and imminent power loss of one, and eventually, both engines. When the left engine lost power, the flight crew followed the procedure to shut down the engine. However, the left propeller continued to windmill at speeds between 1,300 and 2,000rpm. It is likely that the propeller control lever had not been moved completely into the feather position. The FO had earlier programmed the FMS to display a track to the diversion airfield on the captain’s FMS and he instructed the captain to turn right and fly the new track. However, only when the FO moved the heading bug on the FMS display did the captain turn the aircraft, some two minutes after his initial call. Still feeling the effects of the startled response to the fuel emergency, the captain quickly became task-saturated. The drag produced by the windmilling propeller explains the decaying airspeed and the difficulty the captain was experiencing controlling the aircraft. Although the captain was attempting to descend to intercept an acceptable approach angle, the windmilling propeller likely contributed to a rate of descent that was higher than expected, and at times approached 6,000fpm. Observing that the captain was encountering difficulty maintaining airspeed and controlling the descent rate, the FO took control. When the aircraft was at 2,800ft above sea level (asl), the left propeller stopped rotating, indicating that the blades had moved to the feather angle. The right engine then lost power due to fuel exhaustion when the
“It was at that moment that the FO recalled he had forgotten to have the aircraft refuelled” 46 | FLYER | October 2020
aircraft was one nm from the threshold. From that position, a successful forced landing on the intended runway was no longer possible and, as a result, the aircraft touched down on the ice surface of Stephens Lake, short of the runway. The aircraft was severely damaged but there were no injuries and the occupants exited the aircraft. The FO was a company line ‘indoctrination captain’, and on the occurrence flight he occupied the right-hand seat from where he was to perform the duties of a FO and provide line indoctrination training to the captain. The FO believed that the captain was the PIC, although in accordance with company policy it should have been the FO, as he was the one giving training to the captain.
Accident 2
The flight of the Cessna 172 was part of a three-plane, multi-day trip between Germany and France. The pilot (in the left seat) and the passenger, owner of the aircraft (in the right seat), took off from Dijon around noon for a flight to Tours. The accident pilot explained that he had met the owner of the aeroplane a few months before but that they had never flown together prior to this trip. As this three-day outing took place in several stages, they alternated in the role of captain. The day before the accident, the pilot flew one of the legs in Germany as a captain. On the day of the accident, he captained the Dijon-Tours leg from the left seat, while the owner provided radio communications in the right seat. On final for Runway 20 at Tours Aerodrome, the pilot said he had stabilised the speed at 70kt with the flaps configured in the landing position at 30°. After the flare and despite the reduced power, he had the impression that the aircraft was flying over the runway without touching the ground, as if it were floating on a
Mark Mitchell
F
or all pilots making a bit of a ‘thing’ about ensuring they always know who has control of the aircraft at any one time, it IS really important. It’s obviously crucial in the instructional environment, but then it is usually quite obvious who should be taking control if things start to go wrong. It is the instructor, of course! But, is it always? And what if the aircraft owner is in the ‘command’ seat but his passenger in the other seat is much more experienced, more familiar or just ‘clear as day’ more capable! Add to this the stress of a serious emergency and the scene is set for some tricky decision making – even before the need for some nifty aircraft handling by the one left ‘in control’.
