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NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS

Summary

Efficient release of land from the threat of CMR requires addressing a unique set of challenges that differ from a landmine context. IMAS is nevertheless a useful framework from which applicable methods can be conveyed. The more complex decision making process required when dealing with mines can be simplified when dealing with CMR. NPA believes that there is scope to improve the survey and clearance process by focusing more on information management, including thorough assessment of bombing data and other relevant information. Current CMR clearance techniques have inherited a thoroughness and slowness from mine clearance that may be redundant for CM treaty compliance and provision of reasonable levels of safety among people living in CM contaminated areas. Countries like Laos suffer from a combined CM and UXO problem. Targeting both of them the same way at the same time prevents effective and expedient resolving of the CM problem and distorts the greater picture of extensiveness of CMR. This paper is NPAs reflection on how operational resources can be streamlined for optimized efficiency and release of land while complying with the CM treaty.

Front page Š NPA

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Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................4 BROAD FEATURES OF DIFFERENT HAZARDS..........................................................................................5 HUMANITARIAN IMPACT.........................................................................................................................6 POLITICAL FRAMEWORK........................................................................................................................7 SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM.......................................................................................................................8 FEATURES OF A CLUSTER MUNITION STRIKE.........................................................................................9 ASSESSMENT OF FACTORS INFLUENCING SURVEY AND CLEARANCE.................................................. 10 BURIAL DEPTH OF CMR........................................................................................................................ 13 FOUR MAIN PHASES OF RESOLVING THE PROBLEM............................................................................. 14 IMAS PRINCIPLES OF LAND RELEASE................................................................................................... 15 GENERAL CM ASSESSMENT................................................................................................................. 16 NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY..................................................................................................................... 17 TECHNICAL SURVEY............................................................................................................................. 18 Releasing land from technical survey................................................................................................................ 18 Visual search...................................................................................................................................................... 19 Instrumentally aided surface search.................................................................................................................20 Shallow-sub-surface search.............................................................................................................................. 21 Full sub-surface search..................................................................................................................................... 21 CLEARANCE.........................................................................................................................................22 METHODS OF SUB-SURFACE CLEARANCE............................................................................................23 FADEOUT PRINCIPLES..........................................................................................................................24 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT..............................................................................................................25

Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

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Introduction

The term mine action embraces a series of activities that individually or combined aim to reduce or resolve the problem of ERW. Sub-groups of ERW include landmines, sub-munition remnants (CMR) and unexploded ordnance (UXO - mortars/rockets/ hand grenades etc). These three hazard groups claim unique operational methods of survey and clearance.

Methods of releasing land from a landmine threat have already been developed and are near universally accepted. These methods do not apply fully to releasing land from CMR and a degree of adaptation and refinement has been required.

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Norwegian People´s Aid has been one of the leading international NGOs in landmine related activities over the past two decades. Considerable experience has been gained from the global landmine survey and clearance process some of which has been used by NPA to address the contemporary problem of CMR. While IMAS is adequately addressing methods of survey and clearance of landmines it has not adequately addressed the same methods for CMR. This paper discusses how NPA approaches the challenge of developing more efficient methods of survey and clearance to release land from the threat of CMR. NPA will maintain a high focus on the problem of landmines while concurrently offering a systematic reflection on resolving the CMR problem from an operational point of view.

This focus is particularly important in the wake of the 1st Meeting of State Parties to the Convention of Cluster Munitions.

Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

Broad features of different hazards

Landmines; are, with some exceptions, laid in patterns or in clusters in areas of strategic importance during the past military conflict. These patterns may be difficult to recognise years after conflict.

This poses challenges during the survey and could potentially cause excess clearance of mine free land.

Despite difficulties in identifying patterns of mines during the survey it is nevertheless true that these patterns in most cases existed shortly after the mines were laid. An extensive assessment of the strategic reasoning for laying mines coupled with empirical experience can help to define the extension of mined areas. This will help determine which areas should be cleared in full or which areas the survey process can release. Many mines may contain limited amounts of metal and will thus be difficult to detect with metal detectors.

UXO; is a generic term that describes a range of different munition types that have failed to detonate as intended after launching or on impact. UXO typically integrate with CMR or landmines and are often fairly randomly distributed. There are, however, exceptions, cases where it would make sense to talk about footprints of UXO (areas around well defined targets). More often, however, is that any part of a typical battlefield could be contaminated with various UXO. Like CMR all UXO will have a high metal content, which make them easily detectable with metal detecting systems. That said, some UXO have penetrated deep into the ground on impact and may thus be buried too deep for metal detection at surface level.

Cluster Munition Remnants; are always found in cluster strikes and the number of CMR will depend on factors like the type and state of the used cluster munition, soil conditions, vegetation, terrain fluctuations and methods of delivery. The extension of the contamination from one CM bomb, rocket or mortar is defined as a footprint and there is typically overlap between footprints from multiple strikes, which will distort the pattern of the footprint. All CMR contain a high amount of metal, which will ease the detection process with metal detecting systems.

Most CMR will be located at surface, sometimes visible and other times hidden by undergrowth. Some CMR will be located sub-surface at various depths.

CM are not marked during the conflict and strikes are often difficult to mark after the conflict is over.

CMR will always have a footprint but local clearance (cherry picking) or emergency clear­ ance without careful recording of the individual CMR that were removed may have distorted it.

Moreover, multiple overlapping footprints may cause confusion and prevent a proper definition of each of the footprints.

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Humanitarian impact

Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia are considered three of the most CMR contaminated countries in the world. That said, the problem is 40 years old and a majority of CMR will fail to detonate even on severe impact. Accidents do, however, occur, mainly because of intentional tampering by scrap metal dealers or intentional burning of ground where CMR have been deposited. Very few accidents occur during regular farming despite CMR being present in the ground. No convincing studies have been undertaken to quantify the decay curve of various CMR but the prevailing opinion in Laos is that less than 10% of CMR will detonate on severe impact and regular farming may not impose a severe impact on CMR in the ground. This is emphasised by high local tolerance towards potential CMR by local farmers or villagers. The potential presence of CMR will in most cases not prevent farmers from taking new land into use and it would be wrong to suggest that this tolerance is a sole result of a lack of alternatives.

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This implies a high negative impact from visible CMR that are picked up by scrap metal dealers and the local population while buried CMR may pose a limited risk to the population. Systematic and time consuming full clearance of all suspected areas to a theoretical maximum depth will thus slow down expedient addressing of visible or surface placed CMR in all areas, which will have a prolonged negative humanitarian impact on the wider population.

In other countries, preferably where cluster munitions have been used recently, the picture is different and will require more thorough clearance of sub-surface CMR inn order to minimise the humanitarian risk and impact.

Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

Political framework

NPA considers the Convention of Cluster Munitions, to be the main political framework for CMR survey and clearance. The convention text (Article 4) calls for clearance and destruction of CMR located in CM contaminated areas. The proposed process in Article 4 contains some elements of particular relevance when developing an operational framework for survey and clearance of CMR: • Where CMR are located, clearance and destruction shall be completed as soon as possible but no later than ten years from the date of signing the treaty • Where cluster munition have become CMR, clearance and destruction must be completed as soon as possible and no later than ten years after the end of the active hostilities during which such cluster munitions became CMR • Affected State Parties need to survey, assess and record the threat posed by CMR, making every effort to identify all cluster munition contaminated areas • Affected State Parties need to prioritise needs in terms of marking, protection of civilians, clearance and destruction and take steps to develop a national plan to carry out these activities • Affected State Parties need to conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians • In conducting the activities above, IMAS should be taken into account

The CCM calls for a detailed survey of the problem in affected countries and a systematic process to release suspect land through a combination of non-technical survey, technical survey and clearance.

The treaty and the proposed action plan do, however, not provide detail on how the require­ ments in them should translate into practical operational solutions. There is an urgent need to assess the treaty from an operational point of view and agree on a set of operational principles and solutions that will ensure efficient resolving of the problem while maintaining full compliance with the treaty.

Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

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Scope of the problem

Cluster bombs have been used moderately in many countries and extensively in a few; the latter includes Lebanon, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iraq and the Balkans. There is great variation between the problems in these countries. Typically for most countries where cluster munitions have been used is a fairly high failure rate (ranging from 10 to 30%). This implies that there will always be submunitions remnants on the soil surface or in the ground shortly after a strike. All cluster munition strikes will thus need some form of assessment to establish the footprint and the likelihood of CMR in it.

In Lebanon, a country with a fairly recent problem, the challenges differ considerably from Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia where cluster munitions were dropped some 40 years back. It is thus not possible to develop detailed generic principles that will apply universally but broad operational principles can be assessed and standardised generically.

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CMR are often compared with landmines and this is in some cases fair while other times slightly misleading. Landmines have been designed to detonate on impact by people or vehicles or from triggering. CM are designed to detonate on impact and CMR is an undesired effect of old munitions, poor weapon design, faulty deployment or unfavourable ground conditions. Most mines have been buried in the ground while CMR may be found on the surface, buried or even hanging in threes and other obstacles. Some CMR are touch sensitive while others are less dangerous and will only detonate during tampering or forceful handling. While landmine contaminated areas can never be walked on before and during survey/ clearance, it is reasonably safe to walk carefully on CMR contaminated ground in most cases.

The ability to walk into potential cluster munition footprints during survey and clearance is a major advantage since it will enhance the information gathering process and allow more efficient deployment of survey and clearance teams. If the presence of mines is suspected in the same area, this problem will, however, need prior resolving before permitting walking into any CMR contaminated areas.

Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

Features of a cluster munition strike

A cluster bomb is a small explosive sub-munition that is delivered to its target in a large canister or shell.

Sub-munitions have anti-personnel fragmentation features, which can send hundreds of shards of steel at ballistic speeds over a wide area, or shaped charges which can penetrate heavy armour.

Many of the cluster bomb canisters carry hundreds of sub-munitions. A drop of several canisters can easily create vast zones contaminated with CMR. Systems used to deliver CM include artillery and air delivered systems. Artillery delivered systems include mortar systems, howitzers (mainly 155 mm calibre) and rocket systems (ranging from 122 to 300 mm calibre). Air delivered cluster munitions include aircraft dispensers that are launched from fixations attached on the bottom side of the wings or bomblets are ejected directly from dispensers that are fixed to the aircraft. The latter will give a higher degree of inaccuracy than the first. Other systems exist, including direct fire systems, but they are rare and not likely used in any of the countries where NPA operate.

Mortar systems deliver a limited amount of bomblets, typically ranging from a few to around 50. Ground rocket systems may carry from 39 to 950 bomblets while Howitzer delivered systems will contain between 15 and 120. Aircraft launched cluster bombs may contain several thousand bomblets per container. The default footprint will vary considerably depending on which system has been used. More research is required to determine more accurate footprints for each system.

The footprint of a cluster bomb is the area covered by the sub-munitions when they hit the ground. The size of the footprint is determined by a variety of factors, including weapon design, , altitude at which the dispenser opens, the dispenser spin rate, wind, and slope of the ground on which the bomblets fall.

Given the many variables that determine footprint size, cluster bomb footprints sizes also vary considerably.

The most prominent factor dictating the accuracy of the strike (proximity to target point) is the wind. Other factors will have a higher impact on dispersion and thus the size and shape of the created footprint. The number of bomblets will to some degree determine the size of the footprint but this is not always the case. Only rarely will a footprint exceed a length of 300 m and a width of 200 m.

Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

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Assessment of factors influencing survey and clearance

Methods of technical survey and clearance rely on careful assessment of a number of factors. The table below discusses some of them: FACTORS

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ISSUES

Type of CM reported

By studying bombing data and empirical evidence from past clearance it is normally possible to determine the potential type of CMR in a strike. This will give an indication of expected number of CMR. Some drops will likely contain a high number of CMR while others are likely to contain only a few in a similarly sized footprint. Some CM types will likely have more sub-surface CMR than others.

Anticipated size of footprint

A default footprint size may be established by using empirical experience from similar cleared footprints and information from manufacturers of submunitions. The default shape of a footprint is typically elliptical but the proportional size of the ellipse is influenced by factors discussed below.

Anticipated direction of foot print

The shape and direction of the ellipse (footprint) is primarily influenced by the direction from which CM was launched but is additionally influenced by height of separation from the carrier, wind strength and direction and ground fluctuations. Default elliptical sizes of footprints will, when applicable, be applied during the non-technical survey because it will give a fairly realistic picture (in the information management system) of what will later need clearance.

Factors affecting the size of the foot print

Faulty parachutes may cause a longer footprint while wind may cause a wider and more irregular footprint. Ground fluctuations may cause irregular footprints since CM will approach the ground from an angle.

Declining terrain if viewed from the launch direction will typically cause a longer footprint while raising terrain will cause a shorter footprint

Overlap between footprints

Multiple CM launches may cause considerable overlap between footprints and sometimes prevent detailed mapping of the individual footprints.

Soil properties

Hard soils will likely cause a lower failure rate and thus fewer CMR than soft soils. There are, however, other reasons for CM failing to detonate on impact, including faulty arming or disturbed fall direction of CM when impacting the ground. In hard soils these CMR will more likely remain on the surface than in soft soils. Bombing data may reveal information about the weather conditions during launching and thus help predict the soil properties at the time of impact. This can form a useful part of the survey process.

CMR burying profile

CMR may be found at varying depts. It is sometimes hard to isolate factors that influence the likelihood of deep buried CMR in an area. This could lead to a conclusion that the entire area needs deep clearance. Sample clearance of a part of a cluster strike, preferably an area where there is high certainty of CMR, may help determine the likely burial depth of CMR, which again may help determine the required clearance dept when clearing the entire footprint.

CM anticipated failure rate

Anticipated failure rate is a product of many factors. It will influence the likelihood of CMR within a given footprint and thus dictate the technical survey and clearance approach. A very low failure rate will cause greater distance between CMR and a more appropriate technical survey approach will thus be to detect evidence of detonated CM instead of CMR.

Distance between CMR

During survey and clearance a fade-out distance is typically applied, from which no more clearance is deemed necessary if no CMR are found in this buffer. Appropriate fade-out distance is difficult to determine and will be influenced by many factors, including the likely maximum distance between CMR in a strike, which is a product of failure rate, the number of CMR and the anticipated size of the foot print.

Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

Figure II illustrates two overlapping strikes that have created a bigger and more confusing footprint. Even if the Non-technical survey identifies a few spots where there is evidence of CM it may be more challenging to draw the correct footprint from the strike. Careful assessment of bombing data and rigorous recording and assessment of information collected by the survey may help clarifying likely foot prints.

Figure I

Figure I illustrate a footprint from one cluster strike.

Blue dots indicate detonation spots. Red dots indicate spots where CMR exists but in much lower densities than the detonation spots. The bomb case will, if found, indicate the direction of launching and thus the elliptical shape of the strike. The strike has a centre point and random errors of delivery will have dispersed bomblets, faded out towards the border of the annular area. Dispersion is in part caused by the spin of the carrier, which sometimes causes nonhomogeneous ground coverage with a high density of hits towards the centre and in gradually increasing circles or ellipses. Stray CMR will rarely and unpredictably occur outside the footprint. If the nontechnical survey e.g. identifies 3-5 spots where there is evidence of CM or CMR and perhaps the bomb casing, a fairly accurate footprint may be established.

Figure III

Figure III illustrates how terrain fluctuations will influence the size and shape of the footprint. Two of the footprints have been prolonged due to declining terrain while one has been shortened due to a slightly raised terrain.

The size of footprints that will occur under homo­ geneous conditions varies between different CM systems. Table I1 shows standard footprint sizes from some common CM systems and the density of hits from bomblets. The same bomblets may be delivered by different cluster bomb systems, which will give different numbers. Statistical data about failure rates can additionally be used to deduce an expected number of CMR from individual or multiple strikes in an area.

Figure II

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Source: FFI

Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

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WEAPON SYSTEM

BOMBLETS

FOOT­ PRINT (M 2)

NUMBER OF BOMBLETS

HITS PER 10,000 M 2

MLRS

M77

40,000

644

161

M483A1

M42 and M46

18,000

88

49

M396

M85

18,000

49

27

M449

M43

15,000

60

40

CBU-7/A

BLU-18

12,000

1,200

1,000

CBU-58

BLU-63

12,000

650

540

Mk20

Mk118

10,000

247

247

CBU-87

BLU-97

5,000

202

330

Figure IV

Table I

Figure IV is indicative to a default footprint for a small group of CM delivered by specific bomb systems. More efforts are required to determine realistic default footprints for all CM delivered by all potential bomb systems.

If we assume that the footprint will be an ellipse where the length (A) is 1,5 times the width (B) default footprints can be estimated for each of the weapon systems above. If we further assume a 10% failure rate, the likely number of CMR from one strike is low for many CM systems. If looking at the M77 and a 10% failure rate, the likely number of CMR from one strike is 64 while there will be 580 spots where sub-munitions will have detonated.

With the M42 and M46, the likely number of CMR is 8 or 9. These figures are essential when determining the likely maximum distance between CMR, an essential element of a fade out strategy.

Figure IV illustrates indicative size of footprints from the systems above:

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Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

Burial depth of CMR

CMR may appear as armed or unarmed. When armed they have failed to detonate on impact.

Alternatively they may have failed to arm prior to impact and will remain unarmed at or below surface level. Unarmed CMR are generally less sensitive than armed CMR and will likely require severe tampering or human arming in order to detonate.

The burial depth of CMR is a function of the type of CM and other external factors, including the soil properties, vegetation, fluctuations etc. Although some armed CMR are deep buried most of them are likely located at surface or at shallow depths. NPAs´ own records in Lebanon show that almost 50%2 of what NPA finds is surface placed while almost 75 % is found between zero and five cm below surface.

Approximately 10% have been found at depths between 11 and 16 cm and none have been found below 16 cm.

The depth of unarmed sub-munitions is different, mainly because a large number of them are bomblets that have not been dispersed and will remain inside their carriers upon impact and penetration of the ground at high speed. Unarmed sub-munitions that have been dispersed as intended but have failed to arm are likely to be found at surface levels in hard soils.

Mortars, rockets and CM bombs that have failed to disperse sub-munitions and have impacted the ground loaded with unarmed sub-munitions, should be dealt with like any other UXO and not as a cluster strike. It is unreasonable, slow and costly to search systematically down to depths beyond 15-25 cm and occasionally below 100 cm to ensure that all potential unarmed sub-munitions is cleared.

This potential threat should be considered residual and dealt with separately as with any other UXO. To better understand the potential burial depth of armed and unarmed sub-munitions, NPA will conduct pre-sampling of a small part of the footprint using full depth clearance. The results will form the basis of a likely burial depth profile under different conditions. Similar conditions and sub-munitions in other areas may warrant the use of the burial depth profile for several areas. The burial depth profile will be used to determine the most appropriate technical survey solution and the required clearance depth before release of land. NPA will additionally record the precise location and depth of each CMR identified during the follow-on clearance.

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The real number is probably much higher since visible CMR will have already been removed as part of a prior emergency clearance programme.

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Four main phases of resolving the problem

Four principle activities will apply when setting out to resolve a problem of potential CMR in a country.

• • • •

General CM Assessment Non-technical survey Technical survey Clearance

Each of these activities will have multiple subactivities and there may be operational overlap between them when they are applied in the field.

The following paragraphs discuss how NPA will address each of these principle activities.

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Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

IMAS principles of land release

The IMAS 08.20 series explains the principles of land release. These principles have been developed to enhance the survey and clearance process of landmines but they can be applied in the context of CM. There are differences between the detailed methods of non-technical survey in a mines and CM context that will need careful addressing. IMAS 09.10 describes the principles of Battle Area Clearance (BAC), where clearance of CMR is part but it does not provide detailed solutions for how to release land from suspicion of CMR. NPA believes that the broader principles can be conveyed from a landmine and general BAC to a CM context but will require unique practical solutions to maximize the efficiency of releasing land from this particular threat.

The essence of land release is that it follows an evidence-based assessment to determine the like­ lihood of an area being hazardous or non-hazardous and where the hazardous areas are cleared before land is released while the remaining land is released by the survey. Relevant IMAS terminology include: • Suspect Hazardous Area (SHA); An area where a limited or non-focused survey has been undertaken with a less than satisfactory survey protocol may be reported as a SHA. Such area does normally not represent the real picture of contamination and should be seen more as an area where there is reason to focus more targeted survey resources. SHAs are typically drawn during the General CM Assessment where accurate bombing data are absent.

• Confirmed Hazardous Area (CHA); The essence of NTS is that it is a thorough, evidence based process to determine the likelihood of hazards. This likelihood is measured in degrees of confidence that areas are either hazardous on non-hazardous.

Sufficient confidence in an area being hazard free will justify release while degrees of confidence that an area is hazardous will require technical survey and clearance. A CHA is typically drawn from a non-technical survey but can be drawn from a desk study if bombing data with a proven accuracy exist. If the latter, CHAs may be drawn using default footprints, which will vary between ammunition types.

• Defined Hazardous Area (DHA); Is the CM

footprint after a systematic technical survey has been completed. A DHA will require full clearance. However, a DHA will in some cases not easily be defined before well into the clearance process.

• Reasonable effort; IMAS calls for a nontechnical survey as the minimum reasonable effort to cancel land previously classified as SHA and to define CHAs. Exceptionally, SHA can be cancelled by a desk study if accurate bombing data occur after CHAs were created.

If there is any evidence of hazards, reasonable effort will imply degrees of technical survey.

If there is compelling evidence of hazards, a reasonable effort is full clearance of the area that contains these hazards.

• Land cancellation; Land previously classified as SHA will be cancelled if a follow-on nontechnical survey concludes that no hazards exist in these areas.

• Residual risk; Is the inherent risk of errors or weaknesses in the land release process. Hazards that remain in the ground after release may be dealt with on a case-by-case basis by specially trained response teams. The occurrence of hazards after release does not automatically imply unacceptable weaknesses in the land release concept and may not always vary re-clearance or survey.

IMAS explains that land is better released from one hazard group at the time. If multiple hazard groups exist, like landmine and CMR, they will need separate addressing where the threat of landmines is normally addressed first.

Figure V

Figure V illustrates the process of surveying and eventually releasing land from suspicion of CMR.

Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

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General CM assessment

The general CM assessment can be compared to the General Mine Action Assessment in IMAS. Its purpose is to broadly assess and identify areas that may be contaminated by CMR through a desk study of historical records, including bombing data if available, victim data and other central sources of information. Polygons may be drawn from a General CM assessment. However, following the analogy of IMAS these areas should be referred to as Suspect Hazardous Areas (SHA) since they may not fully represent the scope of the problem and are likely an exaggeration of the real problem. Even if bombing data exist, the accuracy of them has not yet been determined during this stage. Accurate bombing data could potentially change a SHA into a CHA following confirmation of the accuracy of information.

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An essential component of the General CM Assessment is to develop an appropriate information management system and methods of conducting the desk study and assessing information.

Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

Non-technical survey

While it is fairly well understood what constitutes a non-technical survey when dealing with landmines, it is more complex when dealing with CMR where the borderlines between non-technical survey are less clear. In the context of CMR NPA considers a non-technical survey to be a semi-intrusive on-theground activity conducted by specialised survey teams in order to verify information from the General CM Assessment and define more precise CHA polygons. If the General CM Assessment has created CHAs from accurate bombing data and the NTS determines that e.g. a cluster bomb did not disperse CM as intended, parts or the whole of the original CHA will be considered released.

NTS teams will in most cases enter into the original SHA in order to observe and find visual evidence of cluster munition strikes. The NTS should particularly focus on defining the centre point of the strike. A realistic extension of the strike may be found if bombing cases are found and it is known from which direction CM were delivered.

During the NTS it is more appropriate to draw realistic polygons of a perceived footprint than to safeguard by drawing larger all-inclusive exaggerated polygons. When drawing realistic poly­ gons, there is a risk of some parts of the footprint being outside the CHA. The follow-on technical survey will, however, identify these areas that will eventually be cleared. Exaggerating the problem by drawing conservative CHA polygons will only result in a poor set of data for planning of the wider technical survey and clearance process.

The non-technical survey is undertaken by welltrained survey teams, who will study and analyse data from the General CM Assessment before visiting all suspected sites. Part of the non-technical survey is liaison with local communities. The survey will particularly focus on visible evidence of CMR, bomb casings and other evidence that may help determine a realistic preliminary footprint of a strike. Non-technical survey will, when appropriate, walk randomly into suspected areas to look for evidence of CMR. Thus should not be confused with a systematic visual search, which may be part of the follow-on technical survey.

A light technical survey may be applied already during the non-technical survey stage. The two survey forms are then integrated and the aim of the technical component is to allow better targeting of follow-on technical survey efforts. Such light survey techniques may include limited random instrument-aided search with metal detectors with no systematic approach to cutting of vegetation etc.

Figure VI

The non-technical survey will typically draw bigger polygons than the real footprint. Figure VI illustrates two strikes that have created overlapping footprints and where the initial non-technical survey found evidence of three items (blue large spots). The location of these items suggested multiple strikes and polygon was drawn based on the assumption of at least two strikes. The real footprint and area to be cleared in this case was in one part actually outside the CHA. This is not considered a weakness with the NTS approach since the technical survey will ensure that the real footprint is eventually cleared.

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Technical survey

Releasing land from technical survey The technical survey is an intrusive technical investigation into the detailed footprint of the strike, the type of CM used, ground conditions that will influence the depth of where CMR may be found and other factors that could potentially influence the size and location of the footprint and requirements that should apply during subsequent clearance. It is important to remember that the technical survey, despite using virtually the same assets as used during clearance, is a survey process where the aim is to learn about the strike and the footprint as opposed to ensuring the removal of all CMR. A method that has a high likelihood of identifying CMR or other evidence, fragments from detonated CM, may be considered a good survey tool despite inherent weaknesses in terms of detecting all remaining CMR. The key to efficient technical survey is to focus more on when no evidence is found of CMR or fragments after a reasonable survey effort and release these areas.

If for example an area is suspected to contain CM strikes from the General CM assessment (SHA) and the NTS confirms this and defines a rather large CHA in response to multiple potential strikes, a full visual, or instrumentaided search may be applied during the subsequent technical survey. If no evidence of CMR or detonated CM is found in parts of the area, NPA may conclude that parts of the area is outside the real footprint and land may be directly released by the technical survey process.

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Following the analogy of IMAS 08.22 land will be released by the technical survey when a sufficiently detailed survey process determines that there is no evidence of CMR in parts or all of a CHA. Methods of technical survey may include: • • • •

Visual search Instrumentally aided surface search Shallow sub-surface search Full sub-surface search

These methods may be applied differently depending on circumstances on the ground. IMAS 08.20 calls for an evidence based assessment of the likelihood of CMR, which is a combination of qualitative and quantitative assessment.

Technical survey combines qualitative and quantitative assessment to form an overall assessment of where CMR are present and which areas can be released with no need for clearance. The quality of an asset is understood as the probability of the asset to find a CMR or other evidence of detonated CM. Using an asset with a high qualitative performance implies a reduced requirement for covering ground if compared with the use of an asset with a lower qualitative performance.

By quantifying the qualitative performance of each asset and method that NPA uses, there is an opportunity to balance methods with a ground coverage requirement. Slower and more costly methods may require less ground coverage to justify release while cheaper and faster methods may require greater ground coverage to achieve the same. Whatever will offer highest overall efficiency will be a preferred approach

by NPA.

Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

The layout of a visual search will depend on the following: • Risk of accidental detonation when walking the area • Topography of terrain • Vegetation and other obstacles • Potential risk of pressure sensitive devises, including landmines

Figure VII

Figure VII illustrates a technical survey approach that has identified more likely boundaries of the footprint. Given a degree of uncertainty with regard to these boundaries, spot sampling (orange spots) has been undertaken in the areas within the CHA that fall outside the perceived footprint when fade-out has been applied. If no evidence of CM is found during this process the land that falls outside the footprint but within the boundaries of the CHA polygon will be released by technical survey. The size of the spots will rely of the quality of the search method. Using methods with a lower qualitative performance will require increased ground coverage to ensure the same confidence that this land is actually free from CMR. Visual search A systematic visual search can help to confirm the presence of CMR and following visual search but the precise location of each CMR or evidence of detonation spots needs to be thoroughly recorded.

A visual search is in most instances inadequate as a stand-alone approach but may be sufficient for release in certain hard and rock soils. When combined with other methods, however, the importance of it normally increases, mainly because it can facilitate more accurate and efficient deployment of other TS asset. There are cases where “cherry picking” will have removed all potentially visible CMR and where visual search will have limited or no application.

In determining the risk of accidental detonation during walking into a potentially CMR contaminated area, NPA assesses the following parameters: • • • •

Type and sensitivity of CMR Visibility of CMR (high undergrowth etc) Time between strike and survey/clearance Empirical experience from past survey/clearance in the same area

Some CM types are more sensitive to accidental detonation than others. The presence of such CMR combined with poor visibility of surface located CMR (due to high undergrowth, leaves etc) or a risk of CMR being stuck in trees and other high vegetation may claim a degree of instrument support before walking into contaminated areas.

In sparsely vegetated areas or in areas where there has been a very long time gap since deployment of CM, physical entrance by foot into suspected areas is considered more appropriate.

NPA may prohibit regular walking into areas during the first stages of a programme until sufficient knowledge about the threat has been gathered and assessed to determine that the risk of careful walking is negligible. Provided that it has been deemed negligible, NPA will allow well-trained staff to enter into suspected areas and walk carefully on the ground while conducting the search.

While safety distances are applied during subsurface clearance, the risk of accidental detonation during visual search is considered negligible and surveyors are permitted to walk next to each other on a lane. This is done to ensure that the entire area is exposed to the search.

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Instrumentally aided surface search This process must not be confused with clearance. It is designed to help defining a more accurate foot­print. If no evidence is found of CMR on larger areas this may justify the release of all or parts of a CHA. There are two routes to apply instrument-aided visual search: • Calibrate detector to detect medium sized fragments from detonated CM; this will potentially give more detector readings and cause a slower search forward. That said, the likelihood of finding evidence from CM, either from detonated munition or complete CMR, is much higher since for every CMR there will typically be fragments from a ten-fold of detonated bomblets.

• Calibrate detector to ignore any metal fragment that is smaller than the CMR; this will potentially speed up the search process but will not detect evidence from the detonated bomblets that are likely in superior numbers.

CMR at surface level is often invisible because of leafs, vegetation growth and corrosion of CMR. NPA applies various methods of instrumentally aided surface search to strengthen the surface search progresses during technical survey. These methods are based on:

By applying a more sensitive detector and thus enable detection of at least a fair amount of fragments (regarded as evidence) from detonated bomblets,. Smaller areas will need to be searched in order to provide the same multitude of evidence that an area or parts of it is actually free from CMR than if compared to full discrimination of metal fragments from previous detonation of bomblets.

• Metal detectors with low sensitivity • Bomb locators with low sensitivity • Large loops

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Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

Shallow-sub-surface search Shallow sub-surface search is virtually the same as instrument-aided surface search but the sensitivity of metal detection has been increased to either detect shallow-buried CMR or smaller fragments from detonated bomblets. The same two routes in terms of adjusting sensitivity towards metal will apply as for instrument-aided visual search. Calibration towards entire CMR will detect all CMR to a given depth and some fragments near surface level. Calibrations towards greater sensitivity will additionally detect fragments at greater depths but the trade-off is a slower investigation process. Internal comparison between the two approaches will be undertaken by NPA when required in order to determine the most efficient approach.

Full sub-surface search Full sub-surface search is applied when clearing the narrowly defined strike and also during technical survey. The depth of clearance depends on many factors, including: • The results from assessing clearance over a small area and defining a CMR burial depth profile • Finds during clearance of past strikes or parts of the existing strike A theoretical probability of CMR being deep buried does not necessarily imply a need to clear to this depth. Careful assessment of the ground, depths where CMR have been found in the past and causes for why CMR have been found at these depths, can help determine the likelihood of CMR at various depths. If we look at landmines, it is common that the required clearance depth is given to e.g. 14 cm below surface. This does not rule out a theoretic probability of mines being found at greater depts.

Rather it implies that it is unlikely that mines are found below 14 cm and if they should occur later they will need dealing with by a stand-by residual capacity.

Full sub-surface search can vary from 5 to 50 cm depending on the circumstances. Any CMR below the agreed clearance depth may be missed and will form part of a wider residual risk. If at a later stage CMR occur, a residual clearance capacity should, similarly to a residual mine problem, be made available to deal with it. A logical consequence could mean a requirement for deeper clearance at a later stage. In areas where no such capacity exist, NPA will offer this service while concurrently assist the development of more permanent national mechanisms to deal with a longer term residual risk.

Every effort to identify all cluster-contaminated areas does not imply full depth clearance of all areas that potentially contain CMR. It implies a reasonable survey effort to find evidence of CMR and if no evidence is found, land can be cancelled or released through the nontechnical survey process or released through the technical survey process. Moreover, if there is compelling evidence to suggest an unlikeliness of CMR below a certain depth, clearance may not be required below this depth. CMR that should occur outside these surveyed areas or below a likely burial depth will form part of a wider residual risk that will need a long-term national stand-by attention similar to what is provided by many armed forces or the civilian police in many European countries in response to a residual UXO/mine problem from WW2.

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Clearance

Clearance is applied in all areas where the survey process has confirmed presence of CMR (DHAs).

The clearance process may follow several phases.

Immediately after conflict there may be an urgent need for rapid surface clearance since surface placed CMR are a much higher risk to people than buried CMR. The same would not apply with landmines and is unique to CM and UXO. During this so-called emergency phase vast areas may be semi-cleared rapidly by visual search or, more likely, instrument aided visual search. NPA is aware that this type of semi-clearance will rarely satisfy the requirements to full clearance but the impact is typically higher than the slower sub-surface search.

A parallel activity will be to carefully record the detailed location of any CMR or fragment that is cleared or removed during this process and plot evidence of CMR or footprints on appropriate maps that will form part of a shared information management system.

NPA might consider prolonging the rapid surface search approach well beyond the emergency phase if the impact from it shows considerably higher than applying sub-surface search on much smaller areas. Given that most accidents occur with surface found CMR and that CMR often has an inherent commercial value (as scrap metal or commercial value of explosives) causing people to tamper deliberately with them for profit, a better all-round approach in some places is to remove all surface CMR while later addressing sub-surface CMR.

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Surface clearance will in some cases be considered full clearance if there is no evidence suggesting that CMR will be present below surface. This will typically apply in hard soils. One footprint may contain spots of soft ground while other spots of hard ground. A mixture of surface and subsurface clearance may then be considered sufficient clearance for release of the entire area. Documented empirical experience from similar tasks and percentage sampling to generate a CMR soil burial profile will form basis for such decisions and will be part of any handover process that may apply.

Sub-surface clearance will be conducted to the depth where it is likely that CMR may occur and not to a depth where it could theoretically occur. The latter approach would slow down clearance beyond what would be considered a reasonable effort and will in most cases only leave a small negligible risk that is better dealt with by a rapid response residual standby capacity. In countries where no such capacity exist, NPA will establish one while operating in country and help national authorities to develop a national residual capacity to deal with the long term residual risk. Following this approach more land will be cleared and the risk to the wider society will in fact be reduced considerably if compared to always clearing at full depths.

Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

Methods of sub-surface clearance

Metal detection is the principle method of clearance for CMR. NPA has had good experience with the fairly inexpensive bomb locators and their ability to detect CMR at appropriate depths while discriminating ferrous soils. In addition to high sensitivity and good discrimination abilities, these stick shaped detectors are practical to use in vegetated areas. The large loop has also proven useful, especially on flat ground where vegetation is low and where there is limited metal debris.

The size of the large loop is an obstacle and will require swapping between the large loop and smaller detectors when vegetation is high. Regular metal detectors will in many cases be sufficient for clearance of CMR, especially if the sensitivity can be lowered to discriminate between CMR and other fragments.

A major problem when clearing CMR is that there will always be a high number of fragments from detonated sub-munitions. Careful adjustment of detector-sensitivity and appropriate training will partly address this problem while the speed of clearance is still slowed down by the many metal fragments. Target discriminating metal detectors may be available for technical survey and clearance of CMR soon and NPA will explore the true potential of these detectors when they arrive.

NPA will in the future consider using dogs to speed up survey and clearance of sub-munitions.

NPA has been successful in training dogs for the detection of landmines and the same principle can be conveyed to clearance of CMR. Internal NPA trials show that dogs may enhance efficiency while maintaining high quality of technical survey and clearance. There are cases were dogs will fail to offer increased efficiency but there are other cases where dogs are likely to enhance efficiency. The challenge is to establish a balanced use of dogs where they are most applicable.

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Fadeout principles

Fadeout is shortly described as the distance to which clearance will continue after finding what is perceived as the last target item in a footprint. If a fadeout distance has been agreed it is the radius in a circle from the last found item. The target item can be either a CMR or fragments from detonations.

Regardless, it should be considered as the perceived maximum distance between two items.

When a clearance task has been defined, clearance will normally be initiated from the perceived centre point of the footprint. Past principles of fading out have not been well enough assessed and this has resulted is excess clearance of CMR free areas.

Given the magnitude of the problem in many countries, NPA will promote methods that prevent excess clearance of CMR free areas while still offering sufficient degrees of certainty that all CMR within a footprint have been found and removed.

Clearly the perceived maximum distance between fragments from detonations is much smaller than the perceived maximum distance between CMR. This is explained by CMR normally amounting to between 5 and 20% of the total amount of detonation spots. Moreover, the number of fragments from one detonation is also high and the number of CMR will typically be much less than 1% of the number of fragments. The perceived maximum distance between fragments is thus much less than 1% of the maximum distance between CMR. By only targeting CMR much bigger areas will likely require clearance before release. That said, search for CMR may be faster than search for fragments and detonated CM may spread fragments to a wider area thus increasing the radius. When searching for fragments, smaller areas will nevertheless need clearance but the trade-off is a slower clearance process. Figure VIII illustrates how factor X in a fadeout will differ between CMR and fragments.

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Figure VIII

The radius in a fadeout can be fixed to ease operational decisions (typically between 30 and 50 m) but NPA believes that there is merit in applying a higher degree of flexibility when defining it. Factors that should be carefully assessed when defining appropriate fadeout distances include: • The perceived density of overall hits in a footprint • The fragment zone from CM detonations • The perceived density of CMR within the footprint • Speed of clearance when targeting CMR • Speed of clearance when targeting CMR and fragments Being able to reduce the fadeout distance will in some cases have a major impact on the efficiency of land release since the outer meters in an expanded circle are also the longest and most costly.

Cluster Munition Remnants The NPA Perspective. NPAs´ Operational Methods of Releasing Land

Information Management

Information Management is the discipline that analyses information as an organisational or sectorwide resource. It evaluates the kinds of data/ information that NPA requires in order to function and progress effectively and make appropriate decisions.

Information management primarily serves the functions of planning, controlling, and decision making at the management level. New means of processing information may be able to identify patterns/correlations and create unique decision making features that change the basis of differentiation when conducting technical survey and clearance and when giving priorities to work in certain areas.

Knowledge Management is a way of using techno­ logy to facilitate the process of collaboration across an organization. NPA has developed the Tech Base where sharing information between groups of employees and between countries by creating a best-practices database and designing an electronic directory indicating who holds what knowledge in which country. The Tech Base is not a substitute for IMSMA but will in some instances be a useful supplement. The Tech Base has been an improvement of NPAs overall information management and NPA has transmitted the Tech Base to several partner organisations on request.

An important component of transmitting the Tech Base is to offer adequate training. The Tech Base is smaller and simpler than IMSMA but will in some cases cover entire Information Management needs in a country. The system does, however, have storage limitations and a careful assessment of the information management requirements is needed before the Tech Base is transmitted to a partner.

Information management in mine action is often a one-way collection process where information is collected by operators and stored by mine action authorities. The ability to retrieve and share information and analyse it in order to eliminate redundant work and improve decisionmaking should be given highest priority when developing any information management system.

Essential components of information management in the context of CM can be summarised as follows: • The ability to obtain, assess and subtract vital bombing data • The ability to obtain and assess data from survey and clearance by other organisations • The ability to obtain and assess victims data • The ability to obtain data about population movement, people’s use of land and planned development activities Bombing data typically provide a variety of infor­ ma­­tion and is potentially the most useful source for priority setting and layout of survey and clearance.

The location and number of strikes, the accuracy of information and direction of delivery of CM is key information while information about the time of the year and weather conditions during CM deployment may provide useful information about the likely burial dept of CMR. Recent satellite photos, if available, can help determine the ground conditions and local people’s pattern of living/using land in areas where CM has been deployed. Satellite photos can further help identify the real target points during the conflict of war if this has not been recorded in the bombing data.

The accuracy of bombing data is disputed in many countries. Surprisingly, there are still ongoing debates in South East Asia about the accuracy of these data and whether they indicate the drop point or the target point. In NPAs experience the SEA bombing data are fairly accurate and there is an underexploited potential to make better use of them.

NPA will, as a matter of principle, pay highest attention to careful assessment of the bombing data and other relevant data and is prepared to assist national institutions to establish more efficient information management systems for this purpose. Careful assessment of bombing data has the potential to strengthen national mine action plans by better prediction of the scope of the problem and the resources needed to address it. It is also likely that an otherwise confusing picture of the real problem as it appears on the ground will be clarified and redundant access clearance of CM free land will be avoided.

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Mine Action Department POB 8844 Youngstorget N-0028 Oslo Norway Phone Fax E-mail Homepage

+47 22 03 77 00 +47 22 20 08 70 npaid@npaid.org www.npaid.org