FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
MILITARY SIGNALING AND EXERCISES In addition to deployments, NATO significantly increased its military exercises in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions since 2014. So did Moscow, which often timed its own drills to run at the same time as NATO’s and, despite the disparate nature of the activities, consistently described its exercises as a response to NATO’s drills.30 For instance, in 2018, the alliance announced plans for its Trident Juncture military exercise, to involve all NATO members along with Sweden and Finland.31 Just a few days before the exercise, Russia notified the Allies that it would launch simultaneous missile drills in international waters near the Norwegian coast.32
States and Ukraine in 2020. Three days before it began, Russia’s Black Sea fleet conducted snap exercises.39 Once Sea Breeze was underway, Russia commenced a series of snap exercises across its Southern (including Crimea) and Western Military borders, with the Defence Ministry insisting that it was doing so in preparation for its Kavkaz 2020 exercises.40 The 2021 itineration of Sea Breeze was also co-hosted by Ukraine and the United States. A few days in advance, the HMS Defender, a British destroyer (Type 45) en route to the exercise, made its way through Russianclaimed waters near the Crimean Peninsula, in part to demonstrate that the United Kingdom found Russia’s claim to Crimea unacceptable.41 Russian forces fired warning shots as a signal to the HMS Defender.42 Then, after Sea Breeze began, the Black Sea fleet and Southern Military District undertook a flurry of activity in Crimea and the Black Sea: a Russian navy submarine held comprehensive drills from its position, deck-based helicopters practiced daytime and night time flights, aircraft trained with the S-400 system, and Pantsir crews held missile drills.43
Russia also engaged in GPS spoofing and what NATO sees as highly provocative activities, such as buzzing ships and flying close to aircraft with NATO forces, often alongside the mirroring exercises. For instance, during the 2018 drills described above, NATO personnel participating in Trident Juncture accused the Russians of jamming their GPS signals.33 Russian responses to NATO’s annual BALTOPS exercises offer something of an illustrative chronology of how Moscow’s approach has shifted over time. Before 2014, Russian forces sometimes took part in BALTOPS.34 In 2014, at the height of the Crimean crisis, Moscow ran its own exercises parallel both to BALTOPS and NATO’s Saber Strike.35 In 2015, it shifted shadowing BALTOPS from a distance, albeit with proximate corvettes and close overflight from Su-24 fighters. In 2016, 2017, and 2018, it observed the exercises.36 In 2019, Russia’s Baltic fleet simulated a missile strike on an enemy ship in Kaliningrad as BALTOPS took place.37 In 2020, Russia’s Baltic fleet conducted air exercises close to NATO forces.38
Russia mirrored exercises in other parts of Europe, as well. For instance, in May 2021, Russia conducted exercises with Serbia alongside US-led training in neighboring Balkan states and NATO’s Defender 2021, which spanned the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Baltic Sea— showcasing the NATO’s military mobility across the continent.44
Some of the same patterns showed up in the Black Sea region. The annual Sea Breeze exercise, which brings together NATO and partner states, was co-hosted by the United
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