25 minute read
The Art of the Possible
For the time being, as rockets and artillery rain down upon Ukraine, deals on deployment and activity limits in Europe are unlikely. Currently, OSCE priorities are appropriately focused on dealing with the consequences of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.134 But as guns fall silent and a new status quo begins to evolve, limits may not only start to make sense, but may be crucial to making peace stick. Depending on the situation at war’s end, Russia may well seek time and space to rebuild its forces after the war, given that fighting to date has degraded capacity and suggested significant cracks in the edifice of Russia’s military power, including when it comes to control and command, planning and tactics, morale, targeting, and joint operations.135 Western states, Ukraine, and other regional countries may well want to make sure Russian forces cross no more borders uninvited, and thus prevent, or at least constrain, Russian rebuilding. Although these goals are at cross-purposes, in the aftermath of war, with the risks of escalation well-understood, countries may be more willing to accept constraints in order to limit adversaries, particularly if doing so brings cost savings. Conversely, even if war continues, the countries of Europe and Eurasia may want to mitigate escalation risks, increase transparency and visibility of adversary activities, and simply make aggression harder.
Although it is outdated and a poor fit for the post-February 24 world, any effort to move forward on European security would do well to begin by amending the Vienna Document through the Forum for Security Cooperation. For all its problems, the Vienna Document has the tremendous advantage of already existing, whereas negotiating a new transparency mechanism would take years. Even now, when inspections and evaluations seem difficult to fathom, Vienna Document data exchanges continue at the OSCE. Thus, while participants should surely explore new arrangements to replace it, in the meantime, amendments are likely the way to go.
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These amendments should focus on improving information flow and transparency, as the Vienna Document’s greatest asset is perhaps that it enables NATO members to inspect and observe Russian exercises, and vice versa, helping each better gauge the other’s capabilities. Parties could increase mandatory notification requirements for exercises not currently subject to the Vienna Document’s calendar year requirements. They could also develop a quiet notification mode for snap exercises and multinational forces on a short notice transit. This would allow either side to provide a highlevel military information notice to counterparts without warning troops participating in the drills.136
Thinking bigger, if NATO is in a position to do so when negotiations commence, it will surely push Russia to reduce any remaining force presence in Ukraine (including Crimea), Moldova, and Georgia (Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh may remain acceptable to NATO and its partners, depending on how that situation evolves). If Russia does maintain
forces in neighboring states, but the countries of Europe are willing to reassure one another, it might be worth considering monitoring missions, perhaps under OSCE auspices, to provide some transparency into what those forces are doing. Again, depending on how things evolve, Russia, for its part, might seek to establish multinational monitoring missions that have access to NATO forces and equipment in non-NATO member countries, should those be deployed.
When it comes to negotiated limits, arrangements do not need to involve all the countries of the OSCE region but can instead focus on affected parties. This is to say that constraints on exercises and deployments in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions, where build-ups and concentrations of forces have been highest and incidents most frequent, can be agreed upon separately.137 Usefully, many sub-regional limits on exercises, activities, and deployments do not require revision of past agreements. The Vienna Document’s Chapter 10 explicitly allows for bilateral and multilateral agreements at a sub-regional level.138
While critics argue that sub-regional deals can lead to tension between partners fearful that others will use them to increase their own security at a cost to others, a strategic approach by NATO can lead to a constellation of reinforcing deals across the continent. For instance, NATO members could agree to impose limits on troop numbers for specific countries (including the United States) forces in military exercises in the Baltic and the Black Sea regions in exchange for ceilings on Russian naval and air deployments (e.g., of systems such as the Kalibr) in and around Crimea and Kaliningrad. In time, this may facilitate a broader arrangement built on smaller feasible building blocks rather than efforts to cut several Gordian knots at once.
To reach sub-regional agreements, the countries affected could work through the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council, if that is ever revived. Indeed, because some affected states are neither Russia nor NATO members, the OSCE may be a better fit.139 They could also simply develop their own multilateral deals to, for instance, exchange reciprocal briefings on military exercises in addition to those required by the Vienna Document. To the extent all parties wish to, they might want to invite observers from outside their sub-region to take part in some, if not all such activities. Indeed, countries outside each sub-region, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, or France, could help facilitate discussions. Other arrangements could establish time limits for military drills and snap exercises in specific subregions.140 If so, they should specifically include joint air-ground-air exercises. They could also create time slots for simultaneous drills. All of this could be voluntary and unilateral/reciprocal at first, and perhaps codified over time.
In the Baltic Sea region, NATO members will surely seek limits on Russian forces and activities in Kaliningrad, and in the Black Sea region in Crimea, assuming Russia retains control of the Ukrainian peninsula. The question is whether it would offer anything in return? If the combination of war and sanctions leaves Russian capability degraded, the appetite in Europe to continue to spend money to deter might wane. If this is the case, better to trade any drawdown in forces for guaranteed limits on Russia than to simply give them away.
What could the trades look like? Limitations on NATO member states and Russian forces within certain geographic areas near borders (which for Russia could mean limitations on what can be placed by Russia in Crimea, Kaliningrad,
Polish soldiers engage in a sequence of tests with their short-range air defense anti-aircraft missile and artillery system during exercise Ramstein Legacy 22 (June 6-10, 2022). (NATO)
Transnistria, and/or Pskov) are an obvious target for negotiations. Reciprocal limits could be applied in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and/or Bulgaria.
In most plausible futures, NATO will not eschew military deployments on the territory of member states as Russia requested in late 2021. As a sort of corollary to the NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO has in the past pledged not to permanently deploy “substantial combat forces” on the territory of new members.141 Thus far, the alliance has not entirely walked away from this or the Act as a whole, although officials have pointed out that Russia’s war on Ukraine is a stark violation of the Act.142 The force buildups announced to date do not include large-scale permanent stationing of other countries’ troops on Baltic members’ territory, although they do include plans to permanently forward deploy the V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post, an Army garrison headquarters, and a field support battalion.143 Thus, if the Act and associated commitments survive this crisis, a first step would be to define “substantial,” perhaps as one brigade per country, a formulation Moscow has reportedly proposed in the past.144 This does not require a formal agreement and could be the product of a meeting, where limits on Russian activities are, perhaps, also negotiated. NATO members should also consider trading limits on deployments and activities by other states on the
territory of Sweden and Finland (where they may anyway not intend to introduce permanent or rotational deployments), if Russia accepts limits on forces in and near Kaliningrad, for example.
The United States and its allies can also consider taking up Russia’s proposed moratorium on intermediate-range missile deployments in Europe (including Russia’s 9M729/SSC-8 missile, which the United States has alleged violated the INF agreement), paired with verification measures that enable inspections, including both at Russian missile locations in Kaliningrad and elsewhere and, as the United States has offered, at Aegis Ashore missile defense locations on NATO member territory as a starting point for a future arrangement. Although this will not substantially degrade anyone’s capabilities (both sides’ air and sea-launched systems were never thus limited, and thus exist in these ranges), since it prevents, rather than reduces, deployments, it too, can offer transparency that would not otherwise be available. It can also help reduce worries about future force postures and perhaps even nuclear escalation by eliminating some systems from the European mix.
This constellation of arrangements and deals seems largely fanciful in the shadow of a continuing and brutal war. It may be years before any of them are plausible. But even now, escalation mitigation calls for risk reduction. Perhaps the easiest form of this is simply communication. Some channels are already in place. The United States and Russia established a deconfliction hotline between the US European Command and Russia’s Ministry of Defence on March 1, 2022.145 Such hotlines have proven valuable in the past for ensuring incidents do not become crises, as witness USRussian deconfliction in Syria.146 Since February 24, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin have spoken once. So have US Joint Staff Chief General Mark Milley and Russia’s General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov. States should keep these in place, and they should use them productively.
As the situation in Europe evolves, other mutual agreements to cap certain types and numbers of capabilities within certain areas, with verification and clear delineations of implications of violations, may become possible. Together, these may effectively form the building blocks of what will essentially be a new Conventional Armed Forces in Europe arrangement. While the war in Ukraine will yet define both what is possible and what is desirable, both analysts and policymakers can set the stage for a more secure future by thinking ahead, even as the war continues, to identify ways to make the continent safer from more major wars.
ENDNOTES
1 The authors would like to thank Dr. Alexander Graef, Daryl Kimball, Stephen Pomper, Dr. Chris Miller, Maia Otarashvili, an anonymous reviewer, and all of those who took the time to review this paper and/or helped with the research process. 2 Sergey Radchenko, “Nothing but humiliation for Russia’: Moscow and NATO’s eastern enlargement, 1993-1995,” Journal of Strategic Studies (2020), (https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/doi/ full/10.1080/01402390.2020.1820331). 3 “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” President of the Russian Federation, Published by the Federation of American Scientists, June 28, 2000, (https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept. htm#:~:text=The%20Russian%20Federation%20is%20pursueing,aimed%20at%20seeking%20joint%20 decisions). 4 E.G. Ponomareva and A.V. Frolov, “NATO Aggression Against Yugoslavia: International-Legal, Military Strategic and Geopolitical Consequences,” MGIMO Review of International Relations (2019) (In Russ.) (https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2019-2-65-32-56). 5 For a discussion of Russian exercises and activities as deterrence, see Samuel Charap, Andrew Stravers, John J. Drennan, Dara Massicot, Sean M. Zeigler, Gregory Weider Fauerbach, Mark Stalczynski, and Melissa Shostak, Understanding Russian Coercive Signaling, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2022. 6 NATO, “Prospects for NATO-Russia relations,” February 6, 2015, (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ opinions_117055.htm). 7 “Perceptions in the Euro-Atlantic Region,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (2020), p. 3, (https://www.ifsh.de/en/news-detail/perceptions-in-the-euro-atlantic-policy-brief). 8 Samuel Charap, Alice Lynch, John J. Drennan, Dara Massicot, and Giacomo Persi Paoli, A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st Century, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), p. 37, (https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4346.html). 9 Ibid.
10 Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge,” Survival, vol. 58, no. 2 (2016), DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2016.1161906; “Military Strategy and Force Structure in Kaliningrad,” FOI, May 2017, (https://www.foi.se/download/18.7fd35d7f166c56ebe0bbfe7/1542369070079/ RUFS-40_Military-strategy-and-force-structure-in-Kaliningrad_FOI-Memo-6060.pdf). 11 “Military Strategy and Force Structure in Kaliningrad,” FOI, May 2017, (https://www.foi.se/ download/18.7fd35d7f166c56ebe0bbfe7/1542369070079/RUFS-40_Military-strategy-and-force-structurein-Kaliningrad_FOI-Memo-6060.pdf). 12 “Boosting NATO’s presence in the east and southeast,” NATO, April 2020, (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/topics_136388.htm#). 13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Charap et al., p. 29. 16 Goble, 2020; “Military Strategy and Force Structure in Kaliningrad,” FOI, May 2017, (https://www.foi.se/ download/18.7fd35d7f166c56ebe0bbfe7/1542369070079/RUFS-40_Military-strategy-and-force-structure-
in-Kaliningrad_FOI-Memo-6060.pdf). 17 “Russia deploys Iskander nuclear-capable missiles to Kaliningrad,” Reuters, February 5, 2018, (https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-missiles-idUSKBN1FP21Y); “Russia’s Baltic Fleet missile units to hold drills in Kaliningrad region,” TASS, July 29, 2015, (https://tass.com/russia/811410). 18 “The Military Group in the Kaliningrad Region is Reinforced with New Tanks,” INTERFAX, October 7, 2021, (https://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=558391&lang=RU). 19 Konrad Muzyka, “Russian Forces in the Western Military District,” CNA, June 2021, p. 43, (https://www. cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/russian-forces-in-the-western-military-district.pdf). 20 Ibid., p. 44. 21 “Russia deploys additional air defences in Kaliningrad,” Lrt, October 31, 2019, (https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/ news-in-english/19/1112081/russia-deploys-additional-air-defences-in-kaliningrad). 22 Muzyka, “Russian Forces in the Western Military District,” CNA, June 2021, p. 42. 23 “Boosting NATO’s presence in the east and southeast,” NATO, April 2020, (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/topics_136388.htm#). 24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Petersen, Michael, “The Naval Power Shift in the Black Sea,” War on the Rocks, January 9, 2019, (https:// warontherocks.com/2019/01/the-naval-power-shift-in-the-black-sea/). 27 Ibid
28 Muzyka, Konrad, “Russian Forces in the Southern Military District,” CNA, August 2021, pp. 6–7, (https:// www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/Russian-Forces-in-the-Southern-Military-District.pdf). 29 Ibid.
30 See Saber Strike 2014, BALTOPS 2014, BALTOPS 2015, Saber Strike 2015, BALTOPS 2019, Trident Juncture 2018, BALTOPS 2020, Sea Breeze 2020, and Sea Breeze 2021.
31 “NATO’s Trident Juncture Exercise as a Deterrence Signal to Russia,” Russia Matters (2018), (https://www. russiamatters.org/analysis/natos-trident-juncture-exercise-deterrence-signal-russia). 32 “Russia to hold live missile drills outside Norway amid massive NATO drills,” RT, October 30, 2018, (https://www.rt.com/news/442665-norway-russia-missile-drills/). 33 Mark Episkopos, “Russia Jammed GPS Signals During a NATO Military Exercise. That's a Really Big Deal,” National Interest, December 1, 2018, (https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-jammed-gpssignals-during-nato-military-exercise-thats-really-big-deal-37682#:~:text=The%20North%20Atlantic%20 Treaty%20Organization,Peninsula%20during%20Exercise%20Trident%20Juncture). 34 Mehta, Aaron, “In the Baltic, shadowed by Russia, NATO allies focus on great power competition,” Defense News, June 12, 2018, (https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-priorities/2018/06/12/in-the-balticshadowed-by-russia-nato-allies-focus-on-great-power-competition/). 35 “Russia Responds to Annual NATO Maneuvers with Surprise Exercise of First Strike Forces,” RT, June 11, 2014, (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/russia-responds-to-annual-nato-maneuvers-withsurprise-exercise-of-first-strike-forces/). 36 Olevs Nikers, “Baltic Region Holds Multiple NATO Exercises in Anticipation of Russia’s Massive Zapad
2017 Drills,” Jamestown Foundation, June 14, 2017 (https://jamestown.org/program/baltic-region-holdsmultiple-nato-exercises-anticipation-russias-massive-zapad-2017-drills/); David Larter, “NATO runs massive Baltic exercise, with little Russian meddling,” Navy Times, June 15, 2016, (https://www.navytimes.com/news/ your-navy/2016/06/15/nato-runs-massive-baltic-exercise-with-little-russian-meddling/). 37 “NATO and Russia: Maneuvers and countermaneuvers in the Baltic Sea,” DW, (https://www.dw.com/en/ nato-and-russia-maneuvers-and-countermaneuvers-in-the-baltic-sea/a-49188875). 38 “Russian Baltic Fleet pilots crush enemy ships in drills as NATO holds Baltops exercise,” Tass, June 11, 2020, (https://tass.com/defense/1166817); “Three Russian warships to keep NATO Baltops-2019 exercise under observation,” TASS, June 7, 2019, (https://tass.com/defense/1062814). 39 “Russian Black Sea Fleet ships deploy to designated areas in snap combat readiness check,” TASS, July 17, 2020, (https://tass.com/defense/1179829) 40 Tom O’Connor, “U.S. Warship Holds Black Sea Drills Amid Surprise Russia Military Exercise,” Newsweek, July 20, 2020, (https://www.newsweek.com/us-warship-black-sea-russia-surprise-drills-1519207). 41 Dmitry Gorenburg, “The HMS Defender Incident: What happened and What Are the Political Ramifications?,” Russia Matters, July 1, 2021, (https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/hms-defenderincident-what-happened-and-what-are-political-ramifications). 42 Ibid.
43 “Pilots of the naval aviation of the Black Sea Fleet and aviation of the Southern Military District checked the air defense system of the Crimea,” Russian Ministry of Defence, June 20, 2021, (https://function.mil.ru/ news_page/country/more.htm?id=12369232@egNews); “Russian Navy sub holds drills off Crimea as NATO warships enter Black Sea,” TASS, June 20, 2021, (https://tass.com/defense/1308637). 44 “US, Russia hold parallel military drills in the Balkans,” Military Times, May 20, 2021, (https://www. militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2021/05/20/us-russia-hold-parallel-military-drills-in-thebalkans/). 45 Rob Lee, “Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy: Why did the Kremlin Mass Its Forces Near Ukraine This Spring,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 23, 2021, (https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/08/russias-coercivediplomacy-why-did-the-kremlin-mass-its-forces-near-ukraine-this-spring/). 46 Samuel Charap and Scott Boston, “U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine: A Silver Bullet?,” January 21, 2022, (https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/01/us-military-aid-to-ukraine-a-silver-bullet.html); Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage. “What If Russia Wins?,” Foreign Affairs, June 8, 2022, (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins); Jeff Hawn, “Russia’s Military Reshuffle Isn’t Preparation for Invading Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, November 17, 2021, (https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/17/russia-isntabout-to-attack-ukraine/); Michael Kofman and Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russia’s Shock and Awe,” Foreign Affairs, March 22, 2022, (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-21/russias-shock-andawe); Dara Massicot, “Ukraine Needs Help Surviving Airstrikes, Not Just Killing Tanks,” RAND, January 19, 2022, (https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/01/ukraine-needs-help-surviving-airstrikes-not-just-killing.html); Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried, “Putin’s Long Game in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, March 14, 2022, (https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-23/putins-long-game-ukraine). Maria Popova and Oxana Shevel, “Putin Cannot Erase Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, March 9, 2022, (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/ukraine/2022-02-17/putin-cannot-erase-ukraine). 47 Baker Sinead, “US says Russia has deployed 190,000 troops around Ukraine — almost doubling its strength in 2 weeks while claiming to withdraw,” Business Insider, February 18, 2022, (https://www. businessinsider.com/russia-up-to-190000-troops-near-ukraine-us-ambassador-osce-2022-2). 48 “War in Ukraine Driving NATO Revamp,” Arms Control Today, June 2022, (https://www.armscontrol.org/ act/2022-06/news/war-ukraine-driving-nato-revamp).
49 Interview with a NATO official, Brussels, September 2020. 50 “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence,” February 2022, (https://shape.nato.int/efp/efp/fact-sheet). 51 “Pre-Summit Press Conference,” NATO, June 27, 2022, (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ opinions_197080.htm). 52 “NATO Response Force,” NATO, July 11, 2022, (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm). 53 “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: NATO’s Response,” Congressional Research Service, March 21, 2022, (https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11866/4). 54 Ibid.; “NATO’s Military Presence in the East of the Alliance,” NATO, July 8, 2022, (https://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm#:~:text=An%20important%20component%20of%20NATO’s,%2C%20 Poland%2C%20Romania%20and%20Slovakia). 55 “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing,” Department of Defense, March 16, 2022, (https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2969068/senior-defense-official-holds-abackground-briefing-march-16-2022). 56 “Satellite Images Show Emptied Russian Military Base near Finnish Border,” Yle, 5 July, 2022. (https:// yle.fi/news/3-12523695). 57 Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, “Russia’s Stripped Its Western Borders to Feed the Fight in Ukraine.” Foreign Policy, September 28, 2022, (https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/28/russia-ukraine-war-natoeastern-flank-military-kaliningrad-baltic-finland/). 58 “Exclusive: Russia Moves Missiles from St Petersburg to Ukraine,” Yle, September 18, 2022, (https:// yle.fi/news/3-12626182). This is unlikely to have affected the air-defense of St. Petersburg given the fact that Russia removed the oldest armament from its bases. Most of the remaining anti-aircraft systems surrounding St. Petersburg are S-400s. 59 “Meeting with President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko,” President of Russia, June 25, 2022, (http:// en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68702). 60 “Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of Belarus,” Government of Belarus, December 27, 2022, (https://president.gov.by/bucket/assets/uploads/documents/konstituciya-na-27-dekabrya.pdf). 61 “Over 1,000 Russian Baltic Fleet Troops Practice Anti-Terror Measures in Drills,” TASS, April 29, 2022, (https://tass.com/defense/1445471); “Over 10 Russian Naval Ships to Hunt down Enemy Sub in Baltic Drills,” TASS, April 10, 2022, (https://tass.com/defense/1439235); “Russian Fighters, Bombers Practice Pinpoint Strikes in Baltic Drills,–” TASS, April 14, 2022, (https://tass.com/defense/1437951); “Russian Naval Ship Test-Fires Air Defense System in Shipbuilders’ Sea Trials,” TASS, April 20, 2022, (https://tass.com/ defense/1440517). 62 “Russian Navy Missile Ships Practice Artillery Fire in Baltic Drills,” TASS, May 12, 2022, (https://tass.com/ defense/1450151); “Russia Announces Hypersonic Zircon Missile Test,” Radio Free Europe, May 28, 2022, (https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-hypersonic-zircon-missile-test/31873072.html). 63 “Belarus Begins Snap Combat Readiness Drills,” Reuters, May 4, 2022, (https://www.reuters.com/world/ europe/belarus-says-surprise-army-drills-no-threat-neighbours-tass-2022-05-04/). “В Беларуси Началась Внезапная Проверка Сил Реагирования,” Sputnik, May 04, 2022, (https://uz.sputniknews.ru/20220504/ v-belarusi-nachalas-vnezapnaya-proverka-sil-reagirovaniya-24350956.html). 64 “Des exercices OTAN prévus de longue date débutent dans toute l’Europe,” NATO, May 13, 2022, (https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/news_195250.htm).
65 Luis Linares Petrov, “Russian Baltic fleet launches military maneuvers,” Prensa Latina, June 9, 2022, (https://www.plenglish.com/news/2022/06/09/russian-baltic-fleet-launches-military-maneuvers/). 66 Charap, et al. 67 Ralph Clem and Ray Finch, “Crowded Skies and Turbulent Seas: Assessing the Full Scope of NATORussian Military Incidents,” War on the Rocks, August 19, 2021, (https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/ crowded-skies-and-turbulent-seas-assessing-the-full-scope-of-nato-russian-military-incidents/); Email exchange with Ralph Clem, February 14, 2022. 68 Ibid.
69 Email exchange with Ralph Clem, February 14, 2022. 70 “NATO Jets Scramble in Response to Russian Aircraft over Baltic and Black Sea,” NATO, Accessed August 10, 2022, (https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/nato-jets-scramble-in-response-to-russian-aircraft-overbaltic-and-black-sea.aspx); “NATO Scrambling More Often in Response to Russian Jets Near Poland,” Air Force Magazine, April 29, 2022, (https://www.airforcemag.com/nato-intercepts-of-russian-aircraft-nearpolands-skies-increasing/). 71 “Sweden Says Russian Plane Violated Airspace as NATO Application Looms,” BNO News, April 30, 2022, (https://bnonews.com/index.php/2022/04/russian-military-plane-violates-swedish-airspace/). 72 “Denmark, Sweden Summon Russian Envoys Over Airspace Breaches,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, May 1, 2022, (https://www.rferl.org/a/denmark-sweden-russia-airspace-violation-spyplane/31829644.html). 73 “Estonia Summons Russian Ambassador Over ‘Very Serious’ Airspace Violation,” Overt Defense, June 22, 2022, (https://www.overtdefense.com/2022/06/22/estonia-summons-russian-ambassador-over-veryserious-airspace-violation/). 74 “Estonia Reports Airspace Violation by Russian Helicopter,” Anews, August 10, 2022, (https://www. anews.com.tr/world/2022/08/10/estonia-reports-airspace-violation-by-russian-helicopter). 75 Ralph Clem and Ray Finch, “Crowded Skies and Turbulent Seas: Assessing the Full Scope of NATORussian Military Incidents,” War on the Rocks, August 19, 2021, (https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/ crowded-skies-and-turbulent-seas-assessing-the-full-scope-of-nato-russian-military-incidents/). 76 Charap, et al. 77 See discussions in Thomas Frear, et al, “Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West in 2014,” European Leadership Network (ELN), November 2014, (https://www. europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Dangerous-Brinkmanship.pdf); “Lessons Learned? Success and Failure in Managing Russia-West Military Incidents 2014-2018,” ELN, April 12, 2018, (https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/policy-brief/lessons-learned-success-and-failure-in-managingrussia-west-military-incidents-2014-2018/); “Making Conventional Arms Control Fit for the 21st Century,” ELN, April 29, 2017, (https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/policy-brief/making-conventional-armscontrol-fit-for-the-21st-century/); “Modernising Conventional Arms Control: An Urgent Imperative,” ELN, March 9, 2020, (https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/policy-brief/modernising-conventional-armscontrol-an-urgent-imperative/); “Outlines for Future Conventional Arms Control in Europe: A Sub-Regional Regime in the Baltics,” ELN, September 3, 2019, (https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/policy-brief/ outlines-for-future-conventional-arms-control-in-europe-a-sub-regional-regime-in-the-baltics/). 78 A good overview of the treaty’s history is available at “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe” Nuclear Threat Initiative, updated August 31, 2020, (https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treatyconventional-armed-forces-europe-cfe/).
79 Chernenko, Elena, “Mission is reducible,” Kommersant, October 7, 2021, (https://www.kommersant.ru/ doc/5020100). 80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Jeremy Bender, “Russia Will No Longer Tell Lithuania About Its Weapons in The Russian Enclave Next Door,” Business Insider, May 7, 2014, (https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-suspends-agreement-withlithuania-2014-5?r=US&IR=T). 83 “The Finnish Defense Forces has an arrangement with Russian Federation concerning visits to naval bases. The arrangement is based on the Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. However, the arrangement has never been implemented in practice.” Russia and Norway also possess a bilateral hotline for coast guard and border control cooperation and their bilateral Incidents at Sea Agreement remains active. 84 Ian Anthony, “Reducing Military Risk in Europe,” SIPRI, June 2019, p. 22 (https://www.sipri.org/ publications/2019/sipri-policy-papers/reducing-military-risk-europe) 85 “Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Black Sea Naval Area,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2020, (https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/-/asset_ publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/1137546). 86 Other agreements such as INCSEA (Incidents at Sea) and the Montreux Convention do exist and remain active although compliance with the spirit of the latter agreements is questionable. See: “Russia Is Violating the Spirit of Montreux by Using Civilian Ships for War,” Middle East Institute, (https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-violating-spirit-montreux-using-civilian-ships-war); “Russia Slams ‘Unacceptable’ NATO’s Violations of Montreux Convention — Senior Diplomat,” TASS, accessed October 10, 2022, (https://tass.com/world/1373939). 87 Interview with German risk reduction expert, September 2, 2022. 88 “Speech by the Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Talks in Vienna on Military Security and Arms Control K.Yu.Gavrilov at the 1019th Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security CoOperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, July 27, 2022, (https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_ policy/news/1824147/). 89 “More security for everyone in Europe - for a restart of arms control,” German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 26, 2016, (https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/160826-bm-faz/282910). 90 Ibid
91 “From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Ministerial Council Hamburg, 2016, (https:// www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/e/289496.pdf). 92 “The OSCE at a Crossroads: Recognizing and Seizing Opportunities; Reflections and Recommendations” OSCE, 2018, p.10, (https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/ OSCE_FocusReport_2018_web.pdf). 93 Interview with an OSCE official, September 2, 2022; “Statement in Response to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Macedonia,” Norgesportalen, September 1, 2022, (https://www.norway.no/en/missions/ osce/norway-and-the-osce/statements/norwegian-statements-2022/statement-in-response-to-the-ministerof-foreign-affairs-of-north-macedonia/).
94 Wolfgang Richter, “A Framework for Arms Control. Current Status of and Requirements for Conventional Arms Control in Europe,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and Austria Institut für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik (AIES), p. 39-40, 2022, (https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/ fachpublikationen/A_Framework_for_Arms_Control_W_Richter.pdf). 95 Ibid.
96 “Alexander Grushko: Not Sure That NATO Will Refrain From Provocations During The Victory Parade,” TASS, 2020, (https://tass.ru/interviews/8665017). 97 Interview with an anonymous expert, August 2020; “Press Point by the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council,” Press Release, NATO, November 2, 2017,(https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_147976.htm). 98 Interview with a German expert, Brussels, November 2020; Interview with an anonymous expert, Virtual, November 2020.
99 Ibid. OSCE 695th Plennary Meeting FSC Journal No. 701, Agenda Item 3, October 17, 2012, (https://www. osce.org/files/f/documents/8/4/96492.pdf). 100 Alexander Graef, “Getting Deterrence Right on NATO’s Eastern Flank,” Berlin Policy Journal, 2020,(https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/getting-deterrence-right-on-natos-eastern-flank/); Dominik Jankowski, “With Russia, Transparency No Silver Bullet,” Berlin Policy Journal, 2019, (https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/ with-russia-transparency-no-silver-bullet/). 101 Interview with an anonymous expert, July 2020. 102 Interview with a German expert, August 2022. 103 “Meeting Requested by Ukraine under Vienna Document Chapter III Regarding Unusual Russian Military Activity,” US Mission to OSCE, April 10, 2021, (https://osce.usmission.gov/meeting-requested-byukraine-under-vienna-document-chapter-iii-regarding-unusual-russian-military-activity/; “US Statement for the meeting under the Vienna Document Chapter III 16.2,” US Embassy Ukraine, February 15, 2022, (https:// ua.usembassy.gov/u-s-statement-for-the-meeting-under-vienna-document-chapter-iii-16-2/). 104 Ibid; “Ukraine’s request for consultations under Vienna Document groundless-Russia,” TASS, February 15, 2022, (https://tass.com/defense/1403941). 105 “Swiss specialists to inspect specified area in Russia under 2011 Vienna document,” TASS, March 2021; (https://tass.com/politics/1291497); Interview with a German expert, January 2022. 106 Olivier Schmitt, “The Vienna Document and the Russian challenge to the European Security Architecture,” p. 278, (https://olivierschmitt.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/vd-chapter.pdf). 107 “Belarus-Russia military exercise named Allied Resolve 2022,” Belta, January 17, 2022, (https://eng. belta.by/president/view/belarus-russia-military-exercise-named-allied-resolve-2022-146980-2022/). 108 Ibid.
109 “Latvian Inspectors Will Inspect Russian Military Facilities,” RIA Novosti, January 24, 2022, https:// ria.ru/20220124/proverka-1769178050.html; Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Latvia, “Russia’s Defence Ministry declines Latvian OSCE inspection and publishes false statements about arrival of Latvian inspectors to its neighbouring country,” January 25, 2022, (https://www.mod.gov.lv/en/news/russiasdefence-ministry-declines-latvian-osce-inspection-and-publishes-false-statements-about) 110 Andrei Babinich, “Russian troops arrive in Belarus - how much, with what and why?” Reform, January 25, 2022, (https://reform.by/293046-rossijskie-vojska-pribyvajut-v-belarus-skolko-s-chem-i-zachem); “Allied exercises: the Republic of Polissya and the Northern Federation against the Western,” Sputnik, January 27,
2022, (https://sputnik.by/20220127/ucheniya-v-fevrale-respublika-polese-i-severnaya-federatsiya-protivzapadnykh-1059816303.html). 111 Sebastian Sprenger, “Ukraine Joins Baltic Nations in OSCE Query of Russian Troop Movements,” Defense News, February 11, 2022. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/02/11/ukraine-joinsbaltic-nations-in-osce-query-of-russian-troop-movements/. 112 “Grushko: Russia Will Not Participate in the Vienna Document Meeting,” Novaya Gazeta, February 15, 2022, (https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2022/02/15/grushko-rossiia-ne-budet-uchastvovat-vo-vstreche-povenskomu-dokumentu-news?utm_source=tw&utm_medium=novaya&utm_campaign=rossiya-otkazalas-otuchastiya-vo-vstreche). 113 “Baltic states call OSCE meeting over Belarus' military exercises,” ERR, February 16, 2022, (https://news. err.ee/1608501995/baltic-states-call-osce-meeting-over-belarus-military-exercises); “Ukraine joins Baltic nations in OSCE query of Russian troop movements,” Defense News, February 11, 2022, (https://www. defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/02/11/ukraine-joins-baltic-nations-in-osce-query-of-russian-troopmovements/). 114 Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, “Oleksii Reznikov held a phone conversation with Minister of Defence of Republic of Belarus Viktor Khrenin,” February 14, 2022, (https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2022/02/14/ oleksii-reznikov-held-a-phone-conversation-with-minister-of-defence-of-republic-of-belarus-viktor-khrenin/). 115 Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, “Speech of Minister of Defence of Ukraine Oleksii Reznikov during the hour of questions to the Government,” February 18, 2022, (https://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2022/02/18/ speech-of-minister-of-defence-of-ukraine-oleksii-reznikov-during-the-hour-of-questions-to-thegovernment/). 116 Ibid..
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid..
119 Among others, see “Towards a More Stable NATO-Russia Relationship,” ELN and RIAC, 2019, (https:// www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/31012019-Towards-a-more-stableRussia-NATO-relationship.pdf); “Conventional Arms Control: A Way Forward or Wishful Thinking,” FOI, 2018, (https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4586--SE); “Modernizing Conventional Arms Control in the Euro-Atlantic Region,” Clingendael, 2018, (https://www.clingendael.org/publication/modernizingconventional-arms-control-euro-atlantic-region); “Outlines for Future Conventional Arms Control in Europe: A Subregional Regime in the Baltics,” ELN, 2019, (https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/policy-brief/ outlines-for-future-conventional-arms-control-in-europe-a-sub-regional-regime-in-the-baltics/); “The Future of the Vienna Document,” PIR Center, 2019, (http://www.pircenter.org/en/security-index/190-6845103); “Sub-Regional Arms Control for the Baltics: What is Desirable? What is Feasible?” Deepcuts 2016, (https:// deepcuts.org/images/PDF/DeepCuts_WP8_Richter_UK.pdf); “Dilemmas of Arms Control,” ICDS, 2020, (https://www.nonproliferation.eu/dilemmas-of-arms-control-meeting-the-interests-of-natos-north-easternflank/); “Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Some Thoughts About an Uncertain Future,” Deepcuts, 2015, (https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/193067/Deep_Cuts_Issue_Brief5_Conventional_Arms_Control_in_ Europe(1).pdf); “Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Where Are We Going?” PIR Center, https://www. pircenter.org/media/content/files/11/13805715000.pdf. 120 “Latvia and Russia talk over military activities near border,” Latvian Public Broadcasting, 2016 (https:// eng.lsm.lv/article/society/defense/latvia-and-russia-talk-over-military-activities-near-border.a213764/); “Dilemmas of Arms Control,” ICDS, 2019, (https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ICDS_Report_ Dilemmas_of_Arms_Control_Kacprzyk_Kulesa_April_2020_cor.pdf). 121 “NATO is imposing a Cold War security scheme on us,” Kommersant, December 26, 2019, (https://www. kommersant.ru/doc/4207094).
122 “NATO is imposing a Cold War security scheme on us,” Kommersant, December 26, 2019, (https://www. kommersant.ru/doc/4207094). 123 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russian General Decries Provocative NATO Drill Near Its Borders,” Defense News, June 1, 2016, (https://www.defensenews.com/training-sim/2020/06/01/russian-general-decriesprovocative-nato-drills-near-its-border/); “Russia expects NATO’s constructive response to proposals on reducing risks,” TASS, June 7, 2017, (https://tass.com/politics/928173); “In the field, the strains rumbled,” Kommersant, April 25, 2020, (https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4331880?from=main). _ 124 Ibid.; “Shoigu Spoke About the Provocations of the United States and NATO in the Black Sea,” RIA Novosti, April 20, 2021, (https://ria.ru/20210420/donbass-1729124752.html). 125 Anthony, p. 21, 126 Ibid; I.V. Kasatonov, “Recalling the lessons of the past (on the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the Soviet-American negotiations on the prevention of incidents at sea,” Military Thought, Issue 11, 2021 p. 11–15, (not available online). 127 Anthony, pp. 21-23. 128 Interview with a NATO official, Brussels, September 2020; Virtual expert interview, August 2020. 129 Expert interview, August 2020 130 “Agreement on measures to ensure the security of The Russian Federation and member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 17, 2021, (https://mid.ru/ru/ foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=en). 131 “Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees,” Russia Ministry of Foreign Afffairs, December 17, 2021, (https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/ nato/1790818/?lang=en). 132 “Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg,” NATO, January 26, 2022, https:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_191254.htm. 133 Ibid.
134 “Belgium Announces Priorities as FSC Chair amidst Russia’s War against Ukraine,” OCSE, September 2022, (https://www.osce.org/forum-for-security-cooperation/525387); “North Macedonia’s 2023 OSCE Chairmanship to Focus on Safeguarding OSCE Principles and Commitments, in Times When They Are Seriously Challenged,” OSCE, September 2022, (https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/525003). 135 Robert Dalsjö, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg, “A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War,” Survival, vol. 64, no. 3 (2022); Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-fated Force Design”, War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022, (https:// warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/). 136 “Recommendations of the Participants of the Expert Dialogue on NATO-Russia Military Risk Reduction in Europe,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), December 20, 2022, (https://www. swp-berlin.org/publications/products/sonstiges/NATO_Russia_Military_Risk_Reduction_in_Europe_Expert_ Dialogue_Recommendations.pdf). 137 Neil John Melvin, “Rebuilding Collective Security in the Black Sea Region,” SIPRI, 2018, p. 3, (https:// www.sipri.org/publications/2018/sipri-policy-papers/rebuilding-collective-security-black-sea-region) 138 “Vienna Document,” OSCE, Chapter 10.
139 On venues for conventional arms control negotiations, see Zellner et al, “A Little of the Old, a Little of the New: A Fresh Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe,” September 2020. 140 Interview with experts, Brussels, September 2020–May 2021. 141 “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation Signed in Paris, France,” NATO, May 27, 1997, (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_25468.htm) 142 “NATO Strengthens Eastern Flank, Eyes Russia, China, Arms Control Today, July/August 2022, (https:// www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-07/news/nato-strengthens-eastern-flank-eyes-russia-china). 143 “FACT SHEET - U.S. Defense Contributions to Europe,” US Department of Defense, June 29, 2022, (https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3078056/fact-sheet-us-defense-contributions-toeurope/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defense.gov%2FNews%2FReleases%2FRelease%2FArticle%2F3078056%2 Ffact-sheet-us-defense-contributions-to-europe%2F). 144 Alexander Vershbow, “NATO and Russia: Why Transparency is Essential,” NATO, August 16, 2016, (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_134436.htm). 145 Nancy A. Youssef, “U.S., Russia Establish Hotline to Avoid Accidental Conflict,” Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2022, (https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-03/card/u-s-russiaestablish-hotline-to-avoid-accidental-conflict-hPUjy4NlEcA2SE6kCwHO). 146 “US, Russia Agree to Deconfliction Hotline as Putin’s Attack on Ukraine Escalates,” Defense One, March 3, 2022, (https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/03/us-russia-agree-deconfliction-hotline-putinsattack-ukraine-escalates/362750/).
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