THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE
WHY WORRY ABOUT EXERCISES AND ACTIVITIES? The military buildups in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions and simultaneous and proximate military activities of both Russia and NATO in Europe between 2014 and 2022 were largely driven by each side’s desire to project power and deter the other.66 An immediate result, though, was an uptick in “incidents,” that is, events in which NATO and Russian forces interact during proximate operations and activities.
to communications from Estonian flight control.73 The Estonian armed forces also reported a similar violation on August 9, 2022. The Estonian Foreign Ministry again summoned the Russian ambassador and handed him a note.74
Incidents were a feature of the NATO-Russia relationship even before 2014 but have increased since.
Incidents were a feature of the NATO-Russia relationship even before 2014 but have increased since. Ralph Clem and Ray Finch assembled a database of documented proximate encounters between NATO and Russian military forces. Between 2013 and 2020, inclusive, they identified some 2,900 cases, some of which were routine air intercepts. Others, however, involved dangerous and/or unprofessional behavior.67 About 40 percent of these incidents occurred in the Baltic Sea region, but the North Sea, Black Sea, and Northeast Pacific also had their share.68 Clem believes that the 2,900 number is a substantial undercount, because not all such events are reported.69
Clem and Finch’s data prior to February 24, 2022 indicates that incidents were growing more frequent over time.75 One likely reason is the higher rate of activity on both sides. This suggests that as forces build-up, and exercise and operational tempos increase, more incidents will likely follow. But another factor may be growing hostility, which may help drive the less professional actions such as the buzzing of ships. These may also, however, be intended to strengthen deterrence by sending a message of unpredictability. If so, they are now also likely to increase, particularly if Russia wants to overcome perceptions of its conventional weakness based on its performance in Ukraine. Sweden and Finland, as first prospective and then new NATO members, may also be in for additional harassment. This said, a statistical analysis of incidents between 2010 and 2018 by the RAND Corporation indicated that overall, Russian coercive signaling through incidents such as these was, in fact, fairly predictable.76
Like exercises, incidents have continued since February 24. NATO sources reported that member state planes had to scramble increasingly in response to Russian aircraft approaching alliance airspace in April, particularly near Poland and the Baltic and Black Sea regions. Russian pilots, they said, had failed to transmit transponder codes, file flight plans, or communicate with traffic controllers.70 Sweden also reported that a Russian reconnaissance plane had briefly violated its airspace late in the month.71 This led to a diplomatic exchange about the issue between Danish, Swedish, and Russian representatives in May.72 Fast forward to late June, the Estonian Foreign Ministry announced that it had summoned the Russian ambassador over a Russian Mi-8 which flew over southern Estonia for two minutes without a flight plan, with its radio transponder disabled, and unresponsive
In and of themselves, incidents are unlikely to spark a war between Russia and NATO, which
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