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A History of Russian Aggression in Ukraine

by DR. AMBER N. NICKELL - FHSU ASSISTANT PROFESSOR

In the late hours of the evening of February 24, 2022, news of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine appeared on American television sets and Twitter feeds. The Russian military build-up along Ukraine’s eastern and northern borders had dominated international news for well over a month, as pundits, politicians, and historians alike tried to make sense of Putin’s military peacocking.

Would he launch a full-scale invasion, or was this just another of the Kremlin’s military drills, meant to remind the West of Russia’s hard power?

On the evening of the 24th, I received an answer earlier than most. Friends and colleagues from throughout Ukraine sent me frantic messages about explosions and gunfire. First from Kharkiv, then steadily from almost every major city on Ukraine’s eastern and northern borders.

In the days that followed, messages, videos, and pictures from the south and west poured in. These messages continue today, as my Ukrainian colleagues and friends document atrocities and beg for help. Violent war crimes – bombings of schools, hospitals, and civilian structures; mass murder; rapes of women, girls, and young boys – have become the norm.

From a historical perspective, the Kremlin’s unprovoked full-scale invasion of an independent and sovereign Ukraine is neither a radically new nor an entirely unanticipated development.

After all, Putin started the current war in 2014, with the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea. He has backed extremely violent separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk since.

The Kremlin’s contemporary imperialism, which some attribute to the Soviet Union’s legacy, is actually rooted in centuries of Russian imperialism in Ukraine and a historical legacy of extremely violent Russian attempts at eradicating the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian culture.

This complex history has been the topic of several popular books, including the works of Serhii Plokhii, Timothy Snyder, Marci Shore, and Anne Applebaum (to name a few).

Thus, this short article cannot be exhaustive. Rather, it briefly addresses five key historical developments in 20th- and 21st-century Ukrainian- Russian relations, giving some context for Russia’s contemporary war of aggression in Ukraine.

Following the Russian Revolutions of 1917 and the accent of the Bolsheviks, the emerging Soviet Union signed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers (Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria).

Just prior, Ukraine – by then an independent state – signed its own peace treaty, the so-called “Bread Peace,” with Germany. As part of these treaties, the Bolsheviks ceded most of the territory that fell within Ukraine and the Baltics.

The international community simultaneously recognized Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state. In short, alongside the Russian Revolutions of 1917, the modern and independent state of Ukraine politically solidified. However, Ukraine as a cultural and social nation has roots dating back to the ninth century.

The Ukrainian War for Independence (1917-1921) raged alongside the so-called Russian Civil War (1917-1923). During this period, the Ukrainian state took several different forms. Initially, Ukraine allied quite closely with the Kerenskyled Russian government; ultimately, Ukraine stood in stark opposition to the Bolshevik regime.

The Ukrainian War for Independence was a profoundly violent anti-imperial war, one in which Ukrainians fought to break away from centuries of Russian imperialism to pursue their own cultural and political agendas. This moment proved formative for both Ukrainian national identity and Russian imperial policy.

Vladimir Lenin, the first leader of the Soviet Union, initially pursued a policy of ethnonationalism, intended to promote national identity as a route to spreading communist ideals. Ultimately, this policy failed to produce the Soviet’s desired outcome – a communized Ukraine.

Josef Stalin, who succeeded Lenin as the authoritarian leader of the Soviet Union in 1924, witnessed the Ukrainian War for Independence and the persistence of Ukrainian identity throughout the Soviet Union’s formative years.

During the 1930s, many Ukrainian peasants protested Stalin’s policies, pushing back against agricultural collectivization, anti-religious campaigns, and Russification attempts. As a result, Stalin perceived the Ukrainian people as a threat to the Soviet Union and his power.

In addition to mass arrests, deportations, disappearances, social and political ostracization, and anti- Ukrainian language policies, Stalin committed genocide against the Ukrainian people. He orchestrated a disastrous manmade famine, which Ukrainians call the Holodomor (1933- 1934).

During the Holodomor, Soviet officials violently requisitioned all foodstuffs from the Ukrainian people. They blacklisted entire villages and shot anyone caught hiding food or grain. At the same time, they exported copious amounts of grain overseas. Soviet officials prevented foreign aid from reaching the Ukrainian people, watching as they slowly languished from starvation. Around four million Ukrainians of various ethnicities died in Stalin’s orchestrated famine.

Memories of Soviet violence, including the Holodomor, remained with Ukrainians throughout the Soviet period. This, coupled with Ukraine’s very long history as a cultural nation, fueled calls for independence.

On August 24, 1991, as the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine officially declared its independence from the USSR and Russia. Ukrainians formalized this choice via a nationwide referendum.

Well over 90 percent of Ukrainians voted in favor of independence. However, the transition to an independent and democratic county was onerous.

After all, democracy is not a default. It takes effort, even more so after decades of communist rule. Independent Ukraine faced a series of obstacles, including the legacies of the Cold War and nuclear proliferation. Ukraine housed the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world. They had physical, not operational, control of these weapons.

The international community feared the repercussions of an unmonitored nuclear arsenal in the hands of a fledgling democracy. After a series of internal and international debates, Ukraine met with leaders of Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. This meeting resulted in the Budapest Memorandum (1994).

In exchange for transporting their entire nuclear arsenal to the Russian Federation, the United States, United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation assured Ukraine that they would never launch a military attack against them.

Initially, it seemed Russia would make good on this promise, as the Russian Federation went through a period of openness in the early 1990s.

However, the ascent of Putin, from a taxi driver to the director of the Federal Security Service to the “president” of Russia, signaled a shift in Russian domestic and international policy, particularly regarding Ukraine.

Russia and Ukraine had maintained a relatively close relationship following Ukrainian independence; however, Ukraine had already begun breaking away from the Russian stranglehold.

The 2004 Ukrainian presidential election revealed this shift. Two candidates emerged from the initial vote – Victor Yushchenko, a Ukrainian nationalist, and Viktor Yanukovych, an oligarch with Russian leanings. They both had strong followings; however, the Kremlin knew that Yushchenko would likely prevail.

Putin orchestrated an assassination attempt on Yuschenko, which failed, and then proceeded to tamper with the runoff election. Ukrainians, outraged by the falsified outcome and widespread voter intimidation, poured into the streets donning the color of Yushchenko’s campaign, orange.

During the Orange Revolution (2004), Ukrainians demanded fair and transparent elections. They peacefully protested for democracy, and they won. Ukraine held a new election and Yushchenko won. Yanukovych became the Prime Minister.

Due in large part to Russian interference, Yushchenko’s presidency was short and disappointing. Ukrainians opted for Yanukovych in the 2010 presidential election. During this entire period, Ukrainians had increasingly begun to look westward, expressing interest in joining the EU and NATO.

In 2013, Ukraine had the opportunity to sign an EU agreement, which would have initiated the very long process of joining the EU. Yanukovych refused to sign, opting for increased financial ties to Russia. Ukrainians, once again, took to the streets to protest.

They demanded closer ties to Europe and Yanukovych’s resignation. Yanukovych refused, instead siccing the Berkut police on the peaceful protestors. They beat thousands and murdered a little over one hundred Ukrainians in the streets, but Ukrainians refused to comply with Yanukovych’s demands to return home.

In February 2014, after months of fighting, Yanukovych fled to Russia, where he resides today. The Ukrainians held democratic elections for the pro-EU and pro-Ukrainian candidate, Petro Poroshenko. We call this protest Euromaidan, named for the Kyivan square where much of the protest occurred and the calls of Ukrainians to join Europe. However, Ukrainians call this The Revolution of Dignity (2014) because they reclaimed their dignity and demanded respect in the streets of Kyiv.

In 2019, presidential power in Ukraine peacefully transferred from Poroshenko to Volodymyr Zelensky. Zelensky ran on a decidedly pro- European platform that called for an end to the illegal Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbas.

Since 2014, during the presidencies of both Poroshenko and Zelensky, the Kremlin has orchestrated massive disinformation campaigns and waged war on Ukrainian soil. The timing of the recent escalation in violence, February 24, is profoundly symbolic for recent Ukrainian-Russian relations.

Yanukovych fled Ukraine for Russia on February 22, 2014, signaling an end to Russia’s weakening grip on the Ukrainian state and the beginning of the current war of Russian aggression.

Putin intended for this rapid escalation to immediately end the war and for Ukraine to capitulate within days.

He had Yanukovych primed to take the reigns and penned a manifesto to Russify Ukraine. Once again, Ukraine refused to acquiesce to Russian imperial aggression, as it has for centuries.

Fort Hays State University students will learn more about these topics and take up questions about Russian imperialism, past and present, in places like Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan in my Soviet history course this fall. Community members and alumni are welcome to audit the course as well.

We would like to hear what you think about the content in this issue of ROAR Magazine. Contact us at FHSUNews@fhsu.edu.

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