If we entertain the prospect that raising taxes on the wealthy to a sufficiently high level necessitates moving beyond the revenue-maximizing rate, the criteria for a just tax become more complex. Under a Rawlsian framework, such a tax would ideally increase equality without reducing the economic status of the worst-off in absolute terms. Such a system would satisfy the difference principle. However, it may be possible for a tax to violate the difference principle and still satisfy Rawlsian justice. Because, among Rawls’ two principles, the first is lexically prior—that is, it must be satisfied before any consideration of the second principle—and concentrated wealth may undermine our scheme of equal basic liberties in the political sphere, a tax designed primarily to disperse wealth can be justified on the basis of preserving liberal democracy, without appeal to economic performance. Essentially, Rawls’ principles of justice as fairness provide a broad justification for redistributive taxation, with several contingencies. If a tax that produces no tradeoffs is possible, it is the most just option. Yet, when unequal wealth jeopardizes the ability of citizens to participate in democracy on equal terms, a Rawlsian framework may deem a heavily redistributive tax necessary, even if it carries economic consequences.
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