Exploring new avenues to fight corruption

In May 2021, the Minister of Public Works and Infrastructure officially launched the Infrastructure Built Anti-Corruption Forum (IBACF) in partnership with the Special Investigating Unit, the National Prosecuting Authority and the Financial Intelligence Centre. It’s a potentially groundbreaking development, but can IBACF turn the tide against rampant corruption?

By Gundo Maswime*

Exploring new avenues to

fight corruption

The IBACF initiative emanates from the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure, which is indeed fitting. This is the department that gave South Africa the 10-point Plan, which laid the foundation for all government procurement in the late 1990s, plus the subsequent legislative enactments.

The public infrastructure sector is especially prone to corruption because the provision of capital goods is almost entirely outsourced within a segment that accounts for more than 8% of national expenditure. To correct the problem, and in the interest of evidence-based interventions, the state needs to tackle the underlying pathology. What’s obvious about the South African construction sector is that the quantum of corruption is significantly high, the incidents very frequent, with very few offenders imprisoned or sanctioned.

Within this context, it’s revealing to see how other countries in Africa have approached the issue. Both Rwanda and Tanzania, for example, have had a measure of success in shifting the

narrative by resorting to some very unusual measures to curb corruption.

When corruption is confirmed in Rwanda, all government employees who were close enough to the action to see what was happening are imprisoned until they disclose fully what they know. This extreme measure is unlikely in South Africa.

In Tanzania, the government has launched sting operations, colluding with thousands of public servants and residents to request and offer bribes respectively. Those that fall for the trick are imprisoned. This may also not pass the South African constitutional test.

Corrupt networks

In many instances in South Africa, corruption networks are structured so that the perpetrators know who the whistleblower is. Some government officials even participate in corrupt activities to avoid losing their jobs or lives. Public officials in certain strategic positions also find themselves having to enable corruption for fear of being targeted as ‘tap closers’.

There are various ways in which corruption occurs in government construction contracts. The prime one is the formal corruption network, which involves a syndicated approach. Here, the majority of the members on a bid evaluation and/or bid adjudication committee collude to ensure a particular bidder is selected. This may be via an instruction from a political principal to whom the officials are beholden, or purely the actions of administration. The evaluation committee is the natural platform for this kind of corruption.

Post-procurement corruption is especially pervasive. In this instance, the contractor claims for work not done and the public servant approves the claim for payment. An example in road construction would be where the contractor claims for damp rock that was not used or hard material excavation rates on soft material.

The approval may either be done knowingly or unknowingly. When it is done knowingly, the official is rewarded by the service provider once payment is made. Effectively combatting this crime requires a vigilant project manager who is closely involved in the activities of the contractor and the consultant.

False representation

There is yet another concerning corruption technique that is becoming more pervasive. Typically, a public sector employee presents a false sense of being close to those who hold sway over which company gets appointed. This complicit individual may be working with a junior official within the supply chain department.

The objective is to get hold of the attendance register, with the list of bidding companies and their contact details. The corrupt employee then calls and falsely promises to assist bidders in securing the work in return for a reward. They also maintain that they will not dictate the amount needed for securing the appointment of the service provider.

From this point onwards, the conniving person gets updates from their contact in supply chain on the progression of the tender process, which they pass on to their targeted service providers. The aim is to be the first to tell the service provider about their appointment before the genuine appointment letter gets to them. The drafting of the appointment letter, based on minutes of the bid adjudication committee, is done by very junior officials and is known internally before it reaches the service provider. This kind of corruption costs the unsuspecting service provider only.

The corruption that is most costly to the state is the appointment of incompetent service providers and those contractors who make false work claims to tap into the contingent fees set aside for unforeseen circumstances, like the road construction example mentioned earlier.

Pros and cons of whistleblowing

There are honest government employees who are not bold enough to be whistleblowers. Some know it will be immediately obvious that they are responsible for the leaking of information. Among these are those who also go as far as receiving money to ensure they are seen to be part of the syndicate for their own safety.

At the IBACF launch, the minister’s message included a proposal that whistleblowers should be financially incentivised to come forward where the information provided could lead to successful prosecution and the potential recovery of ‘stolen’ money.

Perhaps the minister should also consider availing a repository for them to declare and deposit money they took for fear of being targeted. The quantum of this ‘fear fund’ would surprise many. As part of the deposit, a form could be completed that gives the depositor the freedom to choose the level of disclosure they want to make about the sources of funds and the other ‘beneficiaries’. This idea recognises that public servants have discomfort in knowing that there are rogue elements in law enforcement agencies that operate in cahoots with corrupt officials.

Beyond this, the state must run operations where it monitors a group of public servants in corruption hotspots over set timeframes. This may have a downside, however, if it is used to deal with political opponents.

A slippery slope

Reports on the extent of corruption and the value of losses associated with it show that the country is on a slippery slope. Though other regions, including those within the EU, have been ranked as more corrupt than South Africa, there are certain vulnerabilities that South Africa has that make the impact of corruption more debilitating. Any intervention should be explored if it is premised on evidence and not in conflict with other interventions that are already under way.

*Gundo Maswime is a lecturer at the University of Cape Town and researcher in public infrastructure.