Issue 1 May 2005 Suggested Donation 5â‚Ź
Social Europe
the journal of the european left The European Constitution in Focus Contributions by Martin Schulz François Hollande Henri Emmanuelli and others
http://www.social-europe.com
Dear friends,
Social democrats are already taking positive actions within the Party of European Socialists and its Parliamentary group to shape the European Union. In December of last year, the leaders of the Party of European Socialists presented a common declaration on the EU policy agenda 2004-2009, outlining our principles and objectives for this new political term. We are now actively engaged in ensuring that EU policies correspond with our values and goals. Our latest effort to make the Lisbon Strategy, the EU’s only development plan, meet social and environmental, as well as economic, goals, was broadly successful in March of this year.
I have the pleasure of presenting our new E-journal ‘Social Europe: the journal of the European Left’. It forms part of a broad project of the Party of European Socialists to stimulate fresh ideas and debate about the present state and future direction of social democracy in Europe. Political renewal is essential to the durability and relevance of any political project, and particularly for social democracy which has fundamental responsibility for the political direction of the future Europe in the twenty first But action must be continuously informed by forwardcentury. looking reflection. I hope that the reflection that takes place in this new E-Journal, which should be free and We live in challenging times of constant change in soci- independent, will help inform our actions and inspire ety and the economy, within nations and across bor- our important process of long-term renewal within our ders. The pace and unpredictability of this change political family. leaves many citizens uncertain about the future and of our capacity as politicians to provide for it. It is essen- I want to express my gratitude to Detlev Albers and tial for European social democracy that the centre-left Stephen Haseler, who have initiated the project. I see it is capable of delivering real answers to the need to cre- as a strong new dimension of PES work. Detlev Albers ate new social security under conditions of permanent will be one of this project’s driving forces and Henning change. Meyer will be its Managing Editor. A final Editorial Board and a group of ‘Friends of Social Europe’ will Globalisation has brought a new pace of change, but be set up in the coming weeks and will be communicatalso a new public space, that presents new threats and ed in the next edition of the E-journal. opportunities. This places new demands on politics and politicians. How do we build European social democra- I look forward to your many contributions that will cy as a supplement and partner to social democracy help us together to build the future of European social within the nation state? Do we have the appropriate democracy institutions and policies to manage the powerful forces of globalisation? The European Union has given us an indispensable new layer of action and new cause for reflection. Europe’s social democrats support the new European constitutional treaty and are campaigning all over Enjoy your reading! Europe for its ratification. But at a time of deep questioning about the European Union, what do we, as social democrats, expect from the future EU? It is clear that we want Europe to be more than just an economic space. It is clear that we want Europe to serve the interests – social, environmental, economic – of all its citizens. How can we best achieve this Europe of social cohesion, security, prosperity and environmental sustainability? Poul Nyrup Rasmussen President of the Party of European Socialists
Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
Journal Supporters Detlev Albers Jean-Marc Ayrault Giuliano Amato Stefan Berger Anthony Beumer Matt Browne Harlem Désir Guglielmo Epifani Patrick Diamond Elisabeth Guigou Antonio Guterres Stephen Haseler David Held Jacques Reland Donald Sassoon Angelica Schwall-Düren Dominique Strauss-Kahn Livia Turco Giuseppe Vacca Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul Jan Marinus Wiersma Christoph Zöpel
(Bremen University, SPD Federal Executive Committee) (Leader French PS Group in the Assemblée Nationale) (Senator, Former Italian Prime Minister) (Manchester University) (European Parliament Socialist Group) (Director of Policy Network) (French MEP, National Europe Secretary PS) (Leader of CGIL) (10 Downing Street Policy Directorate) (French MP, Former French Europe and Justice Minister) (President Socialist International) (London Metropolitan University) (London School of Economics) (London Metropolitan University) (Queen Mary College, University of London) (German MP, Vice-Chair SPD group) (MP, Former French Minister for Economic Affairs) (Former Italian Social Minister) (President Gramsci Foundation) (Vice Chairwoman SPD, German Development Minister) (MEP, Vice Chairman Socialist Group) (German MP)
Henning Meyer
(Managing Editor)
Editorial Team Ian Gardiner Chris Cooper
(Design & Layout) (Illustrations – www.coopsey.com)
Please make sure that there will be more issues of ‘Social Europe. the journal of the european left’ by paying the suggested 5€ donation for this issue. Visit our website www.social-europe.com for payment options. Thank you very much!
‘Social Europe. the journal of the european left’ is published by the European Research Forum at London Metropolitan University.
Social Europe – the Mission Ahead
Editorial
‘S
ocial Europe’ is the title of this new journal, but it is much more than that. The name is adopted from the political vision of a united Europe with shared values of democratic participation, social justice, solidarity, and friendship. European social democracy in particular needs to be the driving force of this vision, fleshing out what politics, polity, and policies are needed to bring about the society these values describe. Willy Brandt’s words, in a book preface published 18 years ago, are still relevant today: ‘Whether this world becomes a peaceful one, whether our grandchildren will still be able to breathe its air and drink its water, whether there is a place on it for humankind or for meaningful work that is productive of individuality and history, this will depend not least on the degree of progress which international social democracy can and does make…’. The prerequisite for the progress Willy Brandt referred to is mutual understanding and debate. This is exactly what this journal is about. ‘Social Europe’ addresses European topics but also national issues that are relevant for the broader context. We aim at publishing our articles in as many languages as possible to widen the accessibility to the arguments of our authors.
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Additionally, our website www.social-europe.com provides an important discussion interface based on the contributions in the journal. With this open system, we aim at providing essential opportunities and means for a wider debate about the European dimension of social democracy. In this first issue of ‘Social Europe’ the focal point is maybe the most ambitious international political project ever: the European Constitution. Only a few days before the crucial French referendum, it is a pivotal time for the EU and its future. A ‘non’ in this plebiscite would certainly paralyse the Union’s development and be a major setback. Nonetheless, French critics of the Constitution have been offered their say in this journal too. Beyond all controversy, it is vital that Europe’s social democrats realise their international responsibility to be a progressive power for Europe. The new Clause IV of the British Labour Party constitution codifies that ‘by the strength of our common endeavour we achieve more than we achieve alone’. This belief must also apply to the social democratic family across Europe if it really wants to be a driving force for a new Europe – a ‘Social Europe’. You are all invited to participate.
Henning Meyer Managing Editor
Contents An Interview with Martin Schulz
1
François Hollande
‘My Ten Reasons To Say Yes’ (Link to French version)
3
Henri Emmanuelli
‘For the Sake of Europe, Vote No’ (Link to French version)
5
Detlev Albers
‘The Great Adventure of Europe’ (Link to Italian version) (Link to German version)
7
Peter Brandt / Dimitris Tsatsos
‘From the Constitutionalisation of Europe to a European Constitution’
13
Andrea Manzella
‘Constitution and Unification’ (Link to Italian version)
21
Stephen Haseler
‘The British General Election 2005 - An Interpretation’
25
Giuliano Amato
‘The Balkans - A Call for Courage’
27
Enrique Baron Crespo
‘One Year of Spanish Foreign Policy: Socialist Government returns to Europe’
30
Angelica Schwall-Düren
‘The End of Stability?’ (Link to German version)
34
Andrievs Janis Folkmanis
37 ‘The Changing Economy and Social Fabric – Challenges Faced by the New Member States of the European Union’
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An Interview with Martin Schulz Social Europe: Why is it so important that the Constitution is adopted? Martin Schulz: The EU has become bigger and many new candidates are knocking on its door. The EU is a great success story guaranteeing hitherto unknown prosperity, stability and peace in an area that has been riveted with disastrous wars for centuries. Now we need to consolidate this success and make the enlarged EU more workable and prepare it for the challenges of the future. The constitution offers a unique chance to end a long period of confusion about reforms and aims of the EU. It will make it more transparent, efficient, and democratic and will have a greater sense of solidarity. It offers the chance to do away with unnecessary red tape and streamline unnecessarily cumbersome procedures resulting in better legislation. It can help to enhance Europe’s role as a global player tackling issues such as globalisation and the economy, climate change, the fight against poverty and international terrorism and crime, social justice to name just a few. Apart from that it enshrines for the first time individual rights for every European citizen on European level such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights which will stand up in any European court. There are many good reasons why the constitution should be adopted even if it does not contain everything that we were striving for. It is the best possible result and a good and well balanced text which has been arrived at after long and intensive discussions and negotiations between members of national governments, national and European members of parliament. Members of civil society, trades unions, religious communities and NGOs from all walks of life were heard extensively. Nobody can criticise the outcome as being one-sided or elitist or out of touch.
Unfortunately it is not the first time that a referendum on European matters will be used by some as a scapegoat to vent general anger and frustration. I do not think that the European Union is an irreversible project. If the constitution is rejected in some countries for whatever particular (national) reasons, this will play into the hands of those who wish to destroy the Union. There is a serious danger that this might lead not just to a weakening of the EU but to its gradual disintegration. The constitution is the culmination of decades of European integration and of continuous updating and improving of how it works. A rejection would be a serious setback with unforeseeable consequences. I am afraid the enlarged EU might cease to function effectively if the Constitution is not adopted. Social Europe: As Leader of the PES Group in the European Parliament, what do you consider to be the strongest arguments in this debate?
Martin Schulz: Apart from the abovementioned points in favour of the constitution, for me, as a social democrat, one of the main positive elements is the enshrinement of constitutional rights (the Charter of Fundamental Rights). For the first time these rights are guaranteed and protected on European level. They will give additional protection with regard to action taken by the European institutions on top of those fundamental rights which remain valid at national level. Secondly, we will secure the enhancing of social rights. The constitution offers the opportunity to create a social Europe, thereby counterbalancing the completion of the internal market and monetary union. To name only a few: the right to education, protection against unjustified redundancies, the right to collective industrial action including the right to strike, the right to decent working conditions, the banning of child labour, the right to social security and welfare aid, the Social Europe: right to services of general interest. That is why I do Are you surprised to see such strong opposition to the not understand the arguments of the ‘No’-camp, claimconstitution in some countries? ing that the constitution is a purely neo-liberal project which will give the EU a one-sided bias. Martin Schulz: No, the opposite is the case. The principle of a social What worries me is the fact that we are seeing some market economy and the preservation of the unique dangerous tendencies of re-nationalisation by some European social model will be enshrined as a goal of political movements in some countries. These politi- the EU. We can be very proud of this achievement cians are mostly playing with different concerns, uncer- despite a conservative liberal majority in the tainties and fears of the population and are trying to Convention and a certain Zeitgeist which made bolder capitalise on them in a rapidly changing world. steps for European integration very difficult. Of 1 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
course one could always imagine even stronger provisions but a NO(N) to the constitution would mean no progress at all in the field of social policy. Thirdly, the constitution will enhance democracy, transparency and accountability regarding EU decisions. Parliament’s co-legislation rights will be greatly strengthened thereby increasing scrutiny of European legislative acts by elected representatives of the European people. And yes the constitution will strengthen Europe’s role vis à vis our global competitors. Only a strong Europe can counterbalance the predominance of the United States both in the economic field and in terms of global security issues and foreign affairs. The Iraq debacle has shown what happens if we do not act together and do not create the means to be able to act together effectively. The constitution will help to create the conditions for Europe to speak with one voice and act collectively with a maximum of impact and weight, while at the same time respecting national sensitivities and particularities. A ‘No’ to the constitution will leave Europe divided, weak and hesitant. That is exactly what some of our global competitors and the enemies of a united Europe want to see. Social Europe: Are you optimistic that the downward trend has stopped in France and do you expect problems in other countries? Martin Schulz: I was and I remain optimistic about a positive outcome. The more people learn about the constitution, the more it is the subject of public debate, the higher the approval rates will be. I have experienced this myself during several visits to France in the course of the referendum campaign. As more and more myths and downright lies are uncovered it will be increasingly difficult for demagogues and cheap populism to prevail. Regarding the second part of your question, of course there could be an adverse knock-on effect in other more euro-sceptical countries if one of the big founding members, which has always been a very proEuropean country, says no. But every country is different and reasons for saying yes or no vary greatly from one country to the other. France always has been and still is the ‘stem cell’ for European integration and progress, it has always been in the driving seat. I am sure that the French people, who can be proud of their country’s positive role in bringing peace and stability to our continent, realise the responsibility they carry not just for France but also for the whole of Europe. That is another reason which makes me optimistic for the vote on 29 May.
Martin Schulz: No I don’t think so. Ok, the decision to vote yes or no is a national matter for the French only, but the consequences of the vote will be Europe-wide. Therefore, I do not think we are interfering at all, I think on the contrary that we are entitled to speak out on what we, as European social democrats, have decided unanimously. Again we have always admired France and its proEuropean stance it has always taken as a role model for and engine of the EU. France has always acted responsibly and generously as a kind of ‘guardian angel’ of Europe. We appeal to this spirit, we appeal to the French people to continue to play this leading role. We need France. Its own prestige and European vocation are in the hands of the electorate on 29 May. I do not think it is untoward interference in national issues if we demonstrate our concern and highlight the European importance of the debate, particularly when this debate is predominantly about unrelated national issues, about infighting and personal campaigns and ambitions of some individuals including, unfortunately, some from our own French socialist sister party. We are all aware that there are some serious and genuine concerns, that there are uncertainties about the future where Europe is going and at what pace. We must address these concerns honestly and frankly and not shy away from some hard truths. But I think we have a right to remind the ‘No’ camp that they are endangering my kind of Europe and that of the overwhelming majority of European social democrats and indeed other proEuropeans. This is not about lecturing or patronising, this is a real concern over the survival of fundamental ideals. We cannot build Europe without France. Social Europe: What were the reactions of the French Socialists who themselves are split over the issue? Martin Schulz: When I examine the reactions of the overwhelming majority of our French comrades and when I look at the media reactions after our meeting in Paris of 3 May, I feel encouraged by what I see and hear and this will further encourage me to do all that is required to help the adoption of the constitution in France and elsewhere. You have mentioned the split within the French party, which is a fact also reflected within our own French delegation in the PES Group in the European Parliament. I must say that the French comrades who are against the constitution abstained during the Group vote, and have accepted the near-unanimous ‘Yes’ vote and are not campaigning against the constitution inside the Group or indeed the Parliament. While I disagree with them on the issue, I do respect and honour their fair and disciplined attitude very much and it further encourages me in my Group’s future endeavours.
Social Europe: Was it not inappropriate to interfere in the French debate like the PES Group did on 3rd May with a big Martin Schulz meeting in the Assemblé Nationale? is the leader of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament 2 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
My Ten Reasons To Say ‘Yes’ by François Hollande Leader of the French Parti Socialiste.
European Minister for Foreign Affairs, who will, finally be able to give Europe a face and authority in the world. On the economic and social level, the values established by the Constitutional Treaty are those of full employment, sustainable development, gender equality; public services are finally confirmed and protected. 2 A Parliament with enlarged powers The Constitutional Treaty increases the powers of the European Parliament: it is free to pass European legislation. It has extended powers to prepare the budget. It takes into account petitions from European citizens. Many national parliaments – including the French national assembly – do not hold such prerogatives. One cannot complain about the European technocracy and at the same time refuse to boost the place and role of the European Parliament, and therefore of the European citizens, who vote for it at European elections.
M
y ‘yes’ is in keeping with the longstanding proEuropean Socialist tradition. It is a sincere and determined ‘yes’, as other steps in European construction await us. It is a ‘yes’ of solidarity with the European left and progressives around the world, for whom Europe is an example. It is a coherent ‘yes’ in the face of a ‘no’, which would open a serious crisis. In short, a victorious ‘yes’ for all socialists. Europe was first built around a common market and then a single currency. It is undeniably an economic power; it is not a political power. The enlargement to twenty-five member states requires a clearer and simpler decision-making process, at a time when Bush’s reelection confirms the wish of the United States to decide alone on the fate of the world. Saying ‘no’ today would mean paralysing the European construction process on a long-term basis and breaking our bond with the European left. I want to speak the truth on this issue and remain credible and faithful to what we have done since 1981 regarding the European project.
3 Recognising secularity The treaty includes the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which provides 450 million people with the best protection in the world for their rights and freedoms (protection against unfair dismissal,
The Constitutional Treaty increases the Powers of the European Parliament
workers’ right to information, gender equality, right to strike…). This charter will give citizens means to submit their case to courts to ensure that these rights are respected. The treaty recognises Europe’s secular character. It allows each state to apply its own laws. The 1 There is no step backwards French bill on religious signs in schools is therefore valThe European Constitution only includes improve- idated. The way the European Parliament dealt with ments and does not introduce any step backwards. On Mr. Buttiglione illustrates Europe’s vigilance. the institutional level, Europe comes out strengthened with a President of the European Council elected for two and a half years, a European Commission which will originate entirely from the European Parliament, therefore from the citizens’ vote, the appointment of a
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4 Finally a social base Europe used to be rightly accused of only caring for the economy, markets and currency; the treaty finally gives it a social basis: - New objectives are imparted to Europe: social market economy, fight against exclusion and discriminations, social justice, territorial cohesion, cultural diversity, sustainable development… - It provides trade unions and employees with new tools to move forward on social issues: annual social summit for employment, social clause, recognition of social partners… - It enables the creation of an avant-garde for those who want to move faster and further in social and fiscal areas. It is on the basis of these improvements that the European confederation of trade unions approved almost unanimously the Constitutional Treaty! Let’s take the same approach. 5 Priority to employment For the first time, fullemployment is a clear and announced objective. The European Constitution creates an economic government, facing the European Central Bank (ECB); the first to complain about this evolution was JeanClaude Trichet, the ECB governor. This is a good sign. Countries outside the Euro, will not be able to block initiatives from the 12 members of the Eurozone.
8 The left will be able to act Europe never prevented the Jospin government from passing the 35 hour work week bill, the youth job schemes or the universal medical provision just as it does not prevent Mr. Zapatero today from implementing his social policy in Spain. It is not Europe which forces Mr. Raffarin to conduct an unfair and ineffective policy. He bares sole responsibility. A constitution or a constitutional treaty does not set any policy. 9 Progressives approve it This treaty has the support of all European socialist parties. For European trade unions, ‘the only pragmatic and realistic approach is to support it’. It would the last straw if French socialists had all European progressives turned against them.
10 Saying ‘no’ would spark off a crisis By choosing to vote ‘yes’, I am following the momentum of the European construction project, as French socialists have done each step of the way. None of these steps is sufficient for us. But if Europe works today, it is because each of us took responsibility in his time. A ‘no’ would create a European crisis and its supporters are not able to say how they would resolve it. Neither in France nor in Europe 6 Reinforced public there is any alternative to services the present text. The ‘sovereignists’ and ‘eurosceptics’ For the first time, a legal basis is recognised for public would capture a victory of the ‘no’ and influence a posservices. Member states will be able to finance their sible renegotiation. To negotiate a better treaty, socialpublic services in derogation of competition rules. ists cannot leave it up to a rightwing European Defending public services is a state policy in the first Parliament, a European Council dominated by eighteen place, a choice of territorial solidarity and a budget conservative governments, and a Commission led by commitment to ensure their existence. the very liberal and atlantist Mr. Barroso. In short, Europe would be stopped in its tracks and it would take a long time before it is able to have a Constitution. 7 Nothing is set The new treaty introduces more flexibility to decide on partial revisions without having to discuss everything My conclusion again. It gives a right of initiative to the European My ‘yes’ is faithful to the longstanding fight of socialParliament. Nothing is engraved in stone. From the ists for Europe. It is a sincere and determined ‘yes’, as Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Nice, the rule of una- other steps in the European construction project await nimity has always applied. It never prevented Europe us. It is a ‘yes’ of solidarity with the European left and from moving forward. If the constitutional treaty were progressives around the world, for whom Europe is an to be rejected, the Nice Treaty would apply and it example. It is a coherent ‘yes’ in the face of a ‘no’, would have to be renegotiated on the basis of unanim- which would open a serious crisis. In short, it is a vicity! torious ‘yes’ for all socialists. 4 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
For the Sake of Europe, Vote ‘No’ by Henri Emmanuelli French Member of Parliament and former President of the Assemblée Nationale.
F
or a socialist, Europe is not an end in itself, but a means of moving towards our ideal of peace, progress and social justice. We are all passionately pro-Europe, yet unlike the eurosceptics and those who fear for national sovereignty, we think that it is necessary to pursue the political development of the EU. We have argued tirelessly for a federal and social
Europe. The current European project, however, is clearly inspired by liberal ideology. Directive after directive points to the desire to undermine the achievements of social legislation, to dismantle public services, and to give priority to the market over the common good. The
The Proposed Treaty opens up the Door to Social and Fiscal Dumping proposed constitutional treaty is very much in line with this ideology. The positions described, particularly in Part III, allow of no ambiguity. You will be hard put to find in this text the values and principles which underpin our socialist ‘identity’. Socialists are in favour of a powerful Europe. Will the proposed treaty enable it to come about? Although we are all convinced that the European Union can and indeed must form a counterweight to (neo-)liberal globalisation and American domination in world affairs, we must introduce appropriate measures to achieve this. The treaty simply does not do so. The treaty does not propose the right economic measures, but prohibits the raising of any extra revenue thereby preventing any large-scale policy initiative. For instance, the European Council must come to a unanimous agreement on an EU law setting up the financial framework over several years. It is hard to imagine how the 25 member states might set up a policy of public investment on a voluntary basis. Nor does the treaty put forward appropriate diplomatic and defence policies (art. 1-41). NATO commitments take priority over the political objectives of the 5 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
European Union. More seriously still, the treaty restates that NATO ‘for those states which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.’ (art. 1-41.7). Is the treaty compatible with a socialist perspective? The principle of ‘free and undistorted competition’, which is a stated objective of the EU (Art. 1-3.2), makes safeguarding public services difficult. The primary objective of the European Central Bank, being independent of any political influence, is always to keep prices stable even at the expense of jobs and economic growth. More seriously still, the proposed treaty opens up the door to social and fiscal dumping, and thus to more and more relocations (of businesses). Fiscal matters require unanimous agreement. Even the prevention of tax fraud is subject to the agreement of the 25 member states! In matters of social policy, the harmonisation of national legislation is explicitly forbidden (art III-210). Those who wish to campaign for a ‘Europe-wide minimum salary’ can go on dreaming. Article III-210-6 stipulates that EU action in social matters ‘shall not apply to pay’. Finally, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is devoid of any real meaning. It only applies to European law and thus does not in any way constrain national policy (art II-111)! As regards laws which are the subject of provisions in other parts of the Constitution, it is these latter provisions which take precedence. (Art. II-112). In short, what this treaty proposes is a free-trade zone with no political framework. What will happen in the case of a ‘no’ vote? Those who forecast a ‘disaster’ if there is a ‘no’ vote, are playing on their own fears. Admittedly, a negative result in the French referendum would send out a strong signal which expresses the necessity of a change of approach to the project of European construction. Yet it would not call into question either France’s commitment to the EU or the day-to-day workings of its institutions. Existing treaties would apply, pending the renegotiation of a new constitution. In any event, the Treaty of Nice will continue to be implemented until 1st November 2009. If there is no constitutionally based assembly, member states will gather round the negotiating table to reach a new compromise. There are two possible scenarios: complete renegotiation, if possible by a constituent assembly; minimal renegotiation, retaining only the institutional parts of the project, which are consensual.
Would a ‘no’ from the French Socialist Party isolate it from other social democratic parties in Europe in the long term? The majority of leaders of social democratic parties in Europe are in favour of a ‘yes’ vote. We cannot be so certain about the members of our sister parties since up to now they have not been consulted. We are convinced that the debate that we have had amongst ourselves cuts across all social democratic parties in Europe. The French Socialist Party was the first to react negatively when the Blair-Schröder manifesto, proposing a so-called third way, was published. At the time the issue of ideological isolation did not even occur to us. Within the European socialist parties we have argued for a certain form of secularism (over which the proposed treaty rides roughshod). Should we cease to do so simply because many of our European colleagues do not share our vision of the separation of the churches and the state? We have consistently stood our ground on public services within the EU. Should we give up simply we are in a minority on this issue? Social-liberal governments are suffering defeat after defeat. More than ever, they appear isolated ... from their own peoples! That is the isolation we should fear.
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The ‘Great Adventure of Europe’ by Detlev Albers
often terrifying effects of the ‘cold war’ - four decades that accounted for two thirds of this period. There is more substance to the view that the predominantly ‘United in diversity’ peaceful nature of the radical changes that were triggered by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe henever constitu- from Berlin to Kyiv, was due in no small part to the tions set out to attraction of the ‘Project Europe’. establish their principles, there is usually no lack However, one should be quick to point out that our of grand ambitions involved European Maxim is only just beginning to prove its in this process. Accordingly, worth. After all, who could seriously claim to know the the preamble of the whole extent of the variety within today’s Europe, an European constitutional entity of 25 member states, faced with the task of unitreaty calls on the continent’s citizens to continue the fication? And who could be so presumptuous as to great adventure’ of their unification ‘with due regard make predictions about the diversity in what will possifor the rights of each individual and in awareness of bly become an even further enlarged European Union their responsibilities towards future generations and the in the next decade, with 28, 30 or even 35 member Earth’. Over eighty years ago, the German Social states? One thing, however, is certain: drawing attenDemocrats, in their Heidelberg programme, had tion to such questions does not mean to challenge the demanded, no less ambitiously, ‘the formation of the validity of the maxim; on the contrary, it is merely to United States of Europe’. This was supposed to be not highlight how much adventure, courage and incentive merely in the interests of the European nations, but are equally involved in this.
W
‘United in Diversity’- there has Rarely been a Slogan as Applicable and Crisp.
The ‘Monnet method’
When asking about the heart of European integration, its internal motor, there is no way around the ‘principal of communitisation’. It means the conscious and desired transfer of sovereignty from the national to the supranational, European level which has initially also ‘to achieve the common interest of all peoples in involved only sections of legislation and has focused all continents’. on economic matters. The systematic parcelling out of the seemingly indivisible nation-statehood and the sysBoth claims, the principle of sustainability with regard tematic use of this practice in favour of further transto future generations and the future of the Earth in fer of competencies towards the ‘upper level’; the so general, and the common interest of citizens every- called ‘spill-over effect’, is aptly described in Brussels as where are indeed no small objectives for Europe’s inte- the ‘Monnet method’, after its political inventor. gration process. In any case, one is completely justified in labelling these goals as social democratic. Against The history of the Schuman Plan, the coal and steel this backdrop, it should be all the more worthwhile to union, the EEC and Euratom has been cited often critically evaluate the results of this process sixty years enough. It remains an idly academic question to ask later. whether the Marshall Plan, as an initial trigger, or the Korean War, as a warning example, had more influence ‘United in diversity’- there has rarely been a slogan as on the willingness to initiate the process of integration applicable and crisp at the same time. If these words in the heart of (western) Europe. Without a doubt it were describing the present, the ‘great adventure of decisively shortened Germany’s path back to sovereignEurope’ would have already been accomplished. As it ty, albeit Germany now has to share this sovereignty is, however, it seems to remain our job to take it on as with its partners. In any case, both recent and previous an imperative of the constitution and try to assess its German history, from the old Reich, via the Deutscher popular appeal. The statement could firstly be con- Bund (German confederation) and the Zollverein (cusfirmed by the fact that there has rarely been a period in toms union) to the Bismarck-Reich, can serve as points European history where two generations experienced of reference about how to deal with the completely less times of war. It would be overestimating the new federal division of responsibilities within the impact of the European integration process though, if European communities. For the other players, especialwe claimed it was the sole reason for this. Such a ver- ly France, after all a victorious former allied power in sion of events would also too easily play down the two world wars, this step marked a turning point whose 7 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
consequences cannot be overestimated (Wilfried Loth). Union, association of states, the Europe of the regions and local authorities The advantages of the ‘Monnet Method’ were obvious to those in a devastated post-war Europe. It has proved ‘If it is the case that tariffs for international trade are its dynamism time and again since then, culminating in only the result of the political division of different the establishment of a common currency some states, then in turn it must also be the case that unificadecades later. Countries which pool their energy sector tion of these states to a free trade area will also lead to and arms industry (at the time in question coal and one and the same political system’ – we do not owe this steel) under a European ‘high authority’, effectively rule insight to a dedicated follower of Jean Monnet in the out the possibility of wars among them. If the scope of nineteen fifties, however. The phrase was in fact already the method is then widened to the extent that it com- used back in 1829, in the run-up to the German cusprises the member states’ whole economic systems, this toms union (‘Zollverein’), by the then liberal Prussian creates a vastly enlarged market. Naturally, such a finance minister Friedrich von Motz (quoted from process includes transitional periods and occasional Thomas Nipperdey, page 359). It was expressed then setbacks. The advantages of the ‘economies of scale’ with laconic words which would become, one and a for domestic producers, however, will grow even fur- half centuries later, the decisive theme of the ther, when the newly created internal market is protect- ‘European adventure’: which is the most adequate form ed with collective external tariffs. Then again, the result of statehood, of democracy and of a society based on is a high grade of attraction between the domestic mar- social justice that, in the truest sense of the word, will ket and the other European neighbours and even have to be invented, if one wants to continue to ride beyond that. It is because of this dichotomy that the the ‘tiger of integration’? community becomes over and over again confronted with the risky parallelism of In the era of globalisation, enlargement and integraold arguments from the tion. The Development of the Political early stages of the EEC such as the debate between In the face of the great System has almost caught up with the the advocates of a ‘confedadvantages of economic eration of states’ and those integration, some of the Development of the Economic System of one ‘federal state’, were more negative sides are already confined to history overlooked all too easily. a long time ago. Who would However, it is because of these downsides that the nowadays seriously advocate Charles de Gaulle’s conabove mentioned aims of the constitutional treaty have cept of the ‘Europe of the fatherlands’ or give more often become diluted to little more than empty rheto- than a brief nostalgic thought to Margaret Thatcher’s ric. Those whose predominant concern is the expan- ideas about confederation? The German constitutional sion of markets and unfettered competition should not court’s interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty, regardbe surprised when the European ‘market economy’ also ing it as an ‘association of states’ in the sense of a not spawns a ‘market society’. Whoever constantly comes yet defined blend somewhere between confederation up with new ways of removing (internal) national bor- and federation, was quite rightly perceived as a mere ders will suddenly come to the conclusion that ‘dereg- way of appeasing the group of Eurosceptics. In conulation’ might be the easiest - if not the only possible trast to this view, particularly Anglo-American authors form - of sovereignty transfer. Neither democracy nor such as Stephen Haseler and Jeremy Rifkin, who have public participation is automatically included in it. The been able to preserve their outside perspective on the ‘Monnet Method’ has no any inherent obligation to be EU, have been debating the question as to whether in the public interest. The EU-commission’s latest Europe has already developed into a superstate, or plans for the ‘services directive’ and its persistent more precisely, a second superstate along with the adherence to the principle of the country of origin, USA. leading to dumping-effects on the site of the supplier, have once again made this point clear. What, then, is the state of play regarding the EU’s path Communitisation in itself retains as small a guarantee to ‘one and the same political system’? The economic of internal diversity as it does an outward commitment sphere has been ahead of developments, this can hardto international solidarity, without even mentioning the ly come as a surprise. As a consequence, the monetary principle of sustainability. On the other hand, all this union has legitimately been criticised for the Euro does not contradict the method of integration. It being a ‘currency without a state’ and therefore not demonstrates, however, the sheer amount of political robust (Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa). Nevertheless, it action that is needed to endow this method with a must be admitted that the development of the political social dimension. system has almost caught up with the development of the economic system. This certainly applies to the additional and altered chapters of the Rome Treaty, from the Single European Act, up to Nice, the Constitutional Treaty and of course the Brussels ‘acquis communautaire’ collection of secondary European law. In the wake of 8 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
the recent accession negotiations, experts have attested The greater the number of states that are united withthe aquis a volume of more than 90,000 printed pages. in the union, the more important it will become to establish a bottom-up process of democracy which The European institutional structure, with its specific progresses from the bottom to the top and to rise balance of powers along with the growing influence of above a mere executive form of federalism. the parliament, as well as the principal of united dem- Indispensable condition for this process is a common ocratic and social basic rights have been widely form of action on all levels - including the European acknowledged. In addition to this, however, genuinely level - by all political and social stakeholders. This new concepts are needed in all those areas where the applies to political parties, trade unions and economic, continental design of the union demands new and environmental and consumer groups, as well as the rapinnovative solutions. As is demonstrated by the exam- idly rising number of other non-governmental organiples of multi-level democracy structures and the for- sations. It is the only way to create a vibrant European mulation of the subsidiary principle, such new public sphere which remains aware of the variety of all approaches regularly feature among the most contro- its parts. It is also the only path to create and maintain versial elements of the new European state. a general willingness to provide the funds necessary to reduce the massively increased regional disparities. The development of an effective and participatory Something that has become all the more urgent in the democracy that works on multiple levels is without wake of eastern enlargement. doubt one of the most important institutional components of the European experiment. Its successful implementation has become more important with each expansion of the union, necessary for the EU to counterbalance the centrifugal The European model of forces in today’s communisociety ty which already comprises more than 450 million Ironically, for decades, Europeans. For the numerEuropean social policy has ous smaller member states, been limited to playing a it is about emancipating mere bit-part role. The themselves from the domifounding fathers of the nating influence of their European Coal and Steel larger neighbours by using their over-proportional Community and the EEC explicitly deemed it secondshare in the Brussels decision making process. The larg- ary to economic integration. Nowadays, in the first er nations also need a balancing mechanism in order to decade of the new century, the European model of respond to their citizens’ increasing feeling of power- society is a talking point of central importance. This is lessness or even separatist tendencies which are trig- the case despite the indisputable fact that that there are gered by an ever more complex union. The results can considerable differences between the social security be observed in the increased importance of the systems in northern and southern Europe and even regions, autonomous area, woiwodships or Länder such more with regard to the eastern accession-countries. as in Germany and Austria. Simultaneously to the Nevertheless, the general congruence within Europe is growth of the EU itself, this development is taking striking when compared to the respective institutions in place in all of the larger member states. the USA or Japan and all the more so when compared to newly industrialised nations or even developing Only when the Brussels model of Europe is able to countries. present itself as the Europe of citizens – via the Europe of the regions and that of the self-assured local This can mainly be explained by the fact that the 15 communities - when it, moreover, manages to achieve a original member states of the EU experienced a ‘goldtransparent and conclusive system of power sharing en age’ (Eric Hobsbawm) in the decades following the that devises an adequate and independent scope for Second World War. It was an exceptionally long period action to every level, only then will the quantitative of economic prosperity marked by hitherto unprecegrowth of the union go hand in hand with an increased dented growth rates. Apart from the considerable internal cohesion. The principle of subsidiarity, i.e. to increases in salaries, this development led to reliable allocate as much power as possible to the lower institu- protection against the significant risks of life such as tional levels, is a fundamental manifestation of this poverty in old age, illness, accident, unemployment and belief and was firstly embodied in Maastricht and later the need for care. Although these achievements were reaffirmed by the constitutional treaty. Everyone not the result of coordinated efforts within the differknows, however, that this can only be a very general ent member states, they did however take place more or indicator of direction. And it would be dangerous to less simultaneously in each country (Hartmut Kaelble). hope for more precise indicators only from the existing Accordingly, the educational system experienced coninstitutions such as the Committee of the Regions siderable improvements. Its strategic importance has (COR) alone. become even more relevant in the course of the transition to the knowledge-based society, although one has
The European Model of Society is a Talking Point of Central Importance
9 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
to note that this development has also been strongly linked to economic interests. That said, the European model of society had never been limited to the welfare state. There had always been the additional goal, at least on the part of the trade unions as well as the political left, to achieve an effective taming and control of the ‘wolfish nature’ of capitalism by expanding people’s material security and rights of democratic participation.
of Francois Mitterand’s presidency, did not act any differently despite their promises in the ‘programme commun’. It was then, if not before, that all community members were faced with a choice: either to find a new scope for action in a European context that would compensate for the loss of national influence, or to look on helplessly as they were gradually forced back into doing nothing more than defending the welfare state system and to see the European social model Some countries such as France (traditionally) and Italy being gradually stripped of its democratic and partici(on a rudimentary level) placed an emphasis on a strong patory elements. state, dominated by the left, that was expected to provide the decisive economic and social directives in In March 2002, the European Council of Barcelona, cooperation with the social partners. This was the made a veiled attempt at an answer when it stated ‘The essence of the French concept of the ‘Tripartisme’. In European social model is based on good economic percontrast, Germany for a long time pursued a different formance, a high level of social security, high quality strategy. Already in the times of the Weimar Republic, education and professional training, and social dialogue’ there was an attempt to exert an influence on the direc- (italics added by Detlev Albers). Even in times when tion of economic decisions ‘from within’. First with the the economic situation was good, employment and the help of the workers’ councils and later by applying the standard of education were high, one had to wonder concept of economic democracy whether there was already too much expected from the (‘Wirtschafsdemokratie’). The basic idea was to control dialogue of the social partners or its French form, the economic decisions in such a way as to serve the pub- Tripartisme. That must certainly have been the case in lic interest. This explains the continuing strong position times of crisis, when there was scarcely any economic of the German industry councils today and the partic- growth, but instead, immense unemployment, insuffiular weight that is given to the equal representation of cient training, intensified competition for industrial workers on the boards of large companies. Incidentally, location and demographic problems had to be dealt some basic ideas had in fact much in common with the with, after waiting too long to get to grips with them. British concept of the ‘industrial democracy’. The ‘social dialogue’, even in its most obligatory form, must still remain within the limits of a persuasive exerIn Sweden, for many years the social democratic role cise. This is not to say, by all means, that the social diamodel country, the development took yet another turn. logue was not helpful in the resolution of social conHere, the goal of the Swedish Folke Hjem (home for all) flicts. In this context, the Brussels Economic and Social notion was approached from two sides. On the one Committee (WSA), including its ‘third bank’, which is hand, there was the exemplary and far-reaching devel- open to all other non-governmental organisations, has opment of social security measures, based on a con- built up a solid record of beneficial activities within the scious and universally accepted redistribution of last decades. It would, however, go far beyond the national income. On the other hand, it depended on a capacity of the ‘social dialogue’ to serve as the single particularly pronounced social presence of the trade steering instrument for the economy. unions, which actually considered themselves as the real Landsorganisationen (national organisations). For a time, The ‘great adventure of Europe’ has drawn its strength it seemed that this system could also be supplemented not least from the insight that the whole is greater than by the establishment of a comprehensive scheme of the sum of its parts. Finally, this verdict has also to be capital formation in the hands of the employees, the so taken seriously with regard to European social politics. called Meidner Plan. Finally, it should be noted that after An economic power, or even superpower, cannot be the enlargement, at least eight of the current member tamed by allocating it less power than has already been states enrich the EU’s socio-political wealth of experi- given to the national framework. Quite the opposite is ence with their practical knowledge about communistic true: only when we manage to combine the different state ruled economies (and also the abandonment of participatory elements as they had emerged within the this concept). In the same context, the former East different member states and, on the basis of this, develGermany and future accession countries also have to op a genuinely European central idea, only then can we be taken into account. hope to adequately offset economic integration with a democratic social model of equal status. During the last three decades of the previous century, it became more and more obvious that even the bigger This requires a combination of the French guidelines European states did not dispose of sufficient weight to regarding the primacy of politics, as expressed in the steer the economic process. This was, for instance, demand for a common European economic governexemplified by the German Social Democrats’ decision ment, the German principle of workers’ participation under the chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt to refrain in the industrial decision-making process and the from fully implementing their ‘Orientation Framework extensive socio-political presence of workers’ organisa1985’ programme, although it had only been adopted in tions as given by the Swedish example. Of course, these 1975. The French political Left, after the first two years elements cannot simply be added up. It is crucial that 10 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
the convictions that underline these concepts are going to cross-fertilise and supplement each other. Furthermore, they will only be able to exert their influence fully, if this process goes hand in hand with the coalescence of all the different social democratic and socialist parties, trade unions and their social partners, to real pan-European organisations. European Globalisation
including negotiation networks, the strengthening of the United Nations and its reform on the basis of the report to Kofi Annan (‘A safer world’) and not least the disapproval of strategies of pre-emptive strikes, as those currently advocated by the Bush administration. Without doubt, this would also demand European contributions to the fight against terrorism and against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
This is not enough though. The more the EU presents itself as a unified and jointly acting power on the interI wish for a Europe, which creates its own identity national stage, the more it must insist on realising far without feeling too much need to separate itself from reaching changes with regard to the fight against poverothers. Basically Europe, for me, is only tenable as a ty, sustainable development and the prevention of model for a liveable future world community’ – This potential global dangers, such as climate change. For it was recently expressed by Adolf Muschg, Swiss writer has long become apparent that taming capitalism in a and President of the Berlin Science Academy. In a nut- socially beneficial way will fail if limited to a European shell, the phrase specifies both the ambition and legiti- level only. Without constituting intercontinental macy of the European project. alliances, which on their part will have to depend on the support of their respective citizens and governments, Whether the member states like it or not, whether they no breakthrough will be achieved. are aware of it or not, with the Euro, the enlargement and the constitutional treaty, the EU has become one of Europe certainly does not have to worry about a lack of the key players on the global stage, politically and eco- attention or unwillingness to cooperate. The declaranomically. Whatever Europe is going to succeed in, be tion of principles of the Socialist International (SI) decidit further integration and the catching-up process of ed in Sao Paulo in 2003 (‘Governance in a global those new members who are yet lagging behind or be it world’) can be referred to as an example in this context. improving the quality of Europe’s leading national However, what resonance such alliances offered by economies, everything will have direct repercussions Europe will find outside and how attractive this offer outside Europe. It will provoke emulation, methodical- will be to others, will depend decisively on the extent to ly and as regards content, and will also promote non- which the EU is actually able to portray itself as ‘the hostile competition with others. However, at the same model for a liveable future world community.’ time, the logic of the international network, the core of all globalisation, demands that Europe cannot detach itself from the rest of the world. Whoever does outward business, must also accept the input from the out- Detlev Albers side under fair conditions – or else they will get caught is Professor of Politics at Bremen University and in an endless downward spiral of violence and thereby Director of the ‘Bremer Forum für Europäische ruin the central pledges of their own constitution. Regionalpolitik’ (BFER, http://www.bfer.unibremen.de). At the same time, he is Co-Director of the A simple and often uncomfortable rule of internation- European Research Forum at London Metropolitan al relations states that there is a direct relation between University (www.europeanresearchforum.com). He has a country’s size and its obligation towards others. Many published widely about social movements in Western of the smaller European nations, for long enough also Europe. Between 1995 and 2004, Detlev Albers was the Federal Republic of Germany, had tried to avoid chairman of the SPD Bremen and he has been a memtaking this responsibility by referring to their respective ber of the SPD federal executive committee since 1999. larger neighbours. Voices from the other side of the Being a member of the SPD basic value as well as proAtlantic claim with great vigour that, for decades, gramme commission, he is responsible for the Europe had been profiting from a sort of free rider European dimension in the new SPD basic value promentality (Robert Kagan). Impatiently, but by and large gramme. accurately, it is insisted that nowadays no member of the EU can claim not to want to get involved simply on grounds of lack of influence. In doing so, it is by the state of international affairs itself that Europe is called upon to articulate its interests - and this refers to the union as a whole rather than to the extended foreign policies of individual member states. Despite the national preferences that still exist, one will then quickly be able to establish a number of shared positions on particular issues. These include the decisive assertion of the belief in multilateral regimes, 11 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
References Haseler, Stephen
Super-State. The new Europe and its Challenge to America, London 2004
Hobsbawm, Eric
Das Zeitalter der Extreme. Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts Munich 1995
Kagan, Robert
Macht und Ohnmacht. Amerika und Europa in der Neuen Weltordnung, New York, Munich 2003
Kaelble, Hartmut
Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft. Eine Sozialgeschichte Westeuropas 1880-1980, Munich 1987
Loth, Wilfried
Der Weg nach Europa, Göttingen 1996
Muschg, Adolf
Ich beneide die Deutschen um ihre historische Lage. Handelsblatt vom 30/31. 12. 2004
Nipperdey, Thomas
Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866. Bürgerwelt und starker Staat, Munich 1983
Padoa-Schioppa, T
Der Euro und die Politik; in: Internationale Politik, Nr. 8, 2000, Page 29
Rifkin, Jeremy
Der europäische Traum. Die Vision einer leisen Supermacht, New York, Frankfurt 2004
Internationale, SI Vereinte Nationen
Governance in einer globalen Gesellschaft, Sao Paulo, Berlin 2003 edited by Christoph Zöpel Eine sicherere Welt: Unsere gemeinsame Verantwortung. Bericht der Hochrangigen Gruppe für Bedrohungen, Herausforderungen und Wandel, New York 2004
12 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
From the Constitutionalisation of Europe to a European Constitution by Peter Brandt and Dimitris Tsatsos From the constitutionalisation of Europe to a European constitution
T
he idea of a closer European Union, as a kind of league of princes and in sharp delineation from the Islamic Ottoman Empire and, to a lesser extent, also Russia and the orthodox Eastern church, began to find expression from as early as Peter Brandt the 15th century in plans for a confederation put forward by rulers such as Henry IV of France. Beyond that, and usually more vaguely, eminent thinkers such as Johann Amos Comenius, Jean Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant articulated the idea of European unity. Henri Saint-Simon, also one of the early utopian socialists, envisaged all of Europe as a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament. Conservatives like François RenÊ Chateaubriand developed their own visions as well as representatives of the liberal-democratic national movements, for example Giuseppe Mazzini indeed the differentiation of the large cultural and social space west of the Urals into modern nations is a typically European phenomenon - , the bourgeois peace movement and of course socialism in all its currents. The SPD, for instance, in its Heidelberg Programme of 1925 advanced the slogan of the 'United States of Europe'.
from the national-conservative to the social democratic-socialist wing but with the exception of the communists, formulated the programmatic demand for a European unity which appeared essential for security and economic reasons. Only by overcoming traditional power politics and unrestricted national sovereignty in favour of a supranational federal authority would Europe and the nations contained within such a European Union be able to assert themselves against the new world powers. The goal of establishing Europe as a 'third force', also in terms of its social order, between the USA and the Soviet Union which social democrats in particular saw as part of the unification perspective lost all chances of its realisation when the British Labour government, to which great hopes had been attached, refused to play the leadership role expected of it. In view of Stalin's brutal imposition of exploitation and conformity in the Soviet sphere of power on the one hand, and the determination of the US to uphold their economic and strategic interests on this side of the Atlantic on the other, a decidedly democratic-socialist policy of European independence was faced with enormous obstacles anyway. A 'Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe', founded in June 1947, could not expand this narrow room for manouevre.
From as early as the late 1940s onwards, efforts at European unification, inevitably confined to Western Europe, became an element in the East-West conflict and American hegemonialism, although this began to change in parts from the 1960s. To begin with, the USA clearly saw more advantages than risks in a closer union of Europe, with or without Great Britain, and unambiguously supported the early projects: from the coal and steel community via the (failed) European Defence Community with its concomitant unified political It was at this time, under the shadows of the First structures to the European Economic Community of World War, that the idea of European unification the Six agreed in 1957. began to play a larger role in realpolitik terms. In 1930 Aristide Briand, then France's left-liberal foreign mini- The latter's gradual expansion into a union which is ster, first presented other governments with his plan soon to incorporate almost the entire non-Russian for a European federation, inspired by the pan- Europe, and its institutional consolidation, has from European movement of Count Richard Coudenhove- the beginning, and always anew, posed the kind of funCalergi. Due to the beginning world economic crisis damental questions with which the unification process and the protectionist measures taken by nation states is still coming to grips and which inevitably stand at the on the one hand, and the unbroken traditions of natio- centre of a 'European Constitution'. As a matter of nal power politics and the corresponding thought pat- fact, the unification process has always contained both terns of all involved on the other, Briand's plan did not intergovernmental and supranational elements, with the progress beyond initial discussions. former usually dominant. Even De Gaulle however, with his attempt to bring the European communities A decisive turning was reached with the Second World under the control of a French-led confederation of War, when the larger part of the European continent states, could not and probably would not completely was occupied by Hitler's Germany which attempted to eliminate the supranational element. unite a fascist Europe under its own leadership. In all the occupied countries, the heads of the resistance, By contrast, attempts such as the one first undertaken 13 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
in 1962 in a draft written by an ad-hoc group for the governments, to give the constitution of Europe a predominantly federal character, have so far failed due to the resistance of the individual states. The constitutional treaty of 29 October 2004 is therefore above all characterised by the equal weight given to the two structural principles and its avoidance of any finality on the question while simultaneously keeping open the possibility of a further development of the Union, especially with regards to the powers of the parliament which have already been significantly expanded since the 1980s.
'absolute' monarchy - that is one limited only by divine and natural law - and in the most 'absolutist' states the intermediary powers of the estates remained much more important than has been commonly assumed. In their own understanding, the claims to autonomy and participation of the estates included, in certain conditions, the right of resistance to a law-breaking authority, perhaps even violent resistance. The modern declarations of human rights are grounded in the Europe-wide discourse of resistance in the early modern era.
One of the most fundamental historical preconditions of the constitutional state in Europe was the role of Historical preconditions of the constitutional state the Christian, especially the catholic, churches as a uniin Europe fying factor in the ancient European political culture. The church had absorbed the cultural heritage of antiThe gradual emergence of a 'European Constitutuion' quity, including that of Roman law, which served to is unthinkable without the specifically European tradi- legitimate the monarchical central power arising in the tions of the constitutional nation state late middle ages. There was no direct which in turn builds on much older historoad from a feudal society based on rical traditions. The basic principle of legal inequality and territorially fragEurope's historical develeopment since mented empires to a modern constituthe Middle Ages is pluralism: between the tional state which, while divided into variegated and relatively small-scale, and socio-economic classes, required a citimostly aristocratic, units as well as within zenship defined by legal liberty and the various communities where the emerequality. It was only the rise of the ging processes of politics favoured sovereign state in the form of absolute functionally differentiated systems over monarchy during the 17th and 18th cenautocracies. This characteristic 'pluralism' turies which pushed back the intermeusually expressed itself in violent terms, diary powers of the estates to such an in sometimes very bloody wars and civil extent that a politically more uniform wars which permeated European history society of subjects came into existence and were only exceptionally interrupted while on the opposite side the executive Dimitris Tsatsos by prolonged periods of peace. The milifunctions of the ruler became increasingtary, war and power expansion, moreover, ly differentiated and transferred to the constituted one of the major forces behind the techno- bureaucracy. The relationship between a society of sublogical-economic formation of Europe until the middle altern subjects and the monarchical state power became of the twentieth century. The social hegemony of the both more direct and more abstract, and against the nobility on the basis of the thousand years dominance background of a clearly accelerating social and econoof the feudal-agrarian mode of production, comple- mic dynamic since the mid-18th century demanded a mented by cooperative elements of various strengths in new set of administrative and juridical rules. peasant communities, limited the monarchies as the agents of pre-modern state formation as much as the Alongside the originally dominant medical and geograrelatively autonomous European towns and cities as phic uses of the word 'constitution' it was common to centres of trade and commerce. The social and occupa- consider fundamental treaties and laws such as the tional differentiation in the medieval and early-modern British Magna Carta of 1215 or the Roman-German city required a much higher level of regulation compa- 'Golden Bull' of 1356 as 'constitutional laws'. However, red with rural society, especially with regards to the law, none of these 'constitutional laws' of the early modern administration, and finance, and the necessity to invol- period was intended to provide a comprehensive politive a considerable number of people in political decisi- cal framework; they were always concerned with presons. sing individual issues even if their settlement implied broader commitments. It was only the modern concept The traditional autonomy rights of the nobility and the of a constitution, as for example in the 'constitutions' urban citizenry, combined with the early codification of of the USA (1787) - with its strong influence on property law, represented insuperable obstacles against Europe - and France (first 1791, in the same year also an arbitrary and violent appropriation of the surplus the Polish one which was frustrated by the second and product by the monarchs and required the participation third partition) made possible the part revolutionary, of the 'estates'. The political assemblies of the estates, part reformist transformation of the political systems dominated almost everywhere by the nobility, despite of Europe around 1800. The beginnings of this their social limitations established a tradition of repre- modern concept of constitutions reach back to Britain sentation against the rulers which was important for in the early 17th century and took shape during the the future constitutionalisation. Even in the epoch of 18th century in the debates among the enlightened 14 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
intellectual elites of the continent, acquiring an increasing normative and political charge: Individual freedom, equality before the law, division of powers, press freedom, political representation. Between the late 18th and the mid-20th centuries, in particular, one can identify broad, Europe-wide connections, certain waves and regions of constitutionalisation which strongly qualify the dominant image of this age as a long epoch of national fragmentation. The first republican-democratic constitution had come into being as early as the 1750s under the special conditions of the Corsican secession from Genoa; the project finally failed in 1769 with the French annexation of the island. The highly developed plan by Archduke Peter Leopold, the later emperor, for the constitutionalisation of Tuscany in the 1780s, too, did not come to fruition mainly because of the resistance of the conservative clergy. Yet it deserves study as a strong example of enlightened reform absolutism. The examples mentioned here show that the constitutional state was 'in the air' from the final quarter of the 18th century at the latest. They also point to the fact that the long road from the early, usually monarchical, constitutionalism to a fully-fledged democracy was certainly not smooth or without contradictions but rather marked by massive, even violent resistance and reactionary retrogressions, and in the inter-war period even by a complete, albeit temporary, change of direction. The constitutional state of the 19th century Important as the role of revolutionary France as part catalyst, part direct promoter - via the Napoleonic hegemonial system - was for the transformation of Europe around 1800, it could only play this role because there had been for some time - more in some places than in others - changes taking place in society and social consciousness which alone made it possible for the revolutionary impulses 'from the outside' to find fertile soil. Beginning with the Spanish war of independence, the idea of the self-determination of 'nations' made a dialectical turn against the Emperor, not least as a result of constitutionalisation. The extent to which there was a common and fundamental political transformation and paradigmatic change all over Europe around 1800 was shown when the so-called restoration after Napoleon's defeat not only left most of the important social and political reformations of the previous period untouched, at least in Western, Northern and Central Europe, but also permitted another wave of constitutionalisation following the Charte Constituionelle of 1814, especially in the South German states. It was the new bourgeois elites, the 'educated' in Germany, the 'notables' in France, and the 'middle classes' in England (of whom only the latter represented anything like a real bourgeoisie) who understood the constitutional state as a means of its own emancipation and also, simultaneously, as a means of integrating the post-revolutionary societies (if necessary, in league with the monarchy). Alongside this moderate liberal constitutionalism, and in part opposed 15 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
to it, could be found more radical, more plebeian currents which, usually in connection with social protests, demanded the unrestricted sovereignty of 'the people' as had been done in the French revolution after 1789. In decades of struggle in parliamentary bodies, in publishing, and not least on the street and often enough in armed struggle, the liberal 'party of movement' achieved the constitutionalisation of all of Europe's states, culminating in the revolutionary events of the early 1830s and late 1840s. The foundation of new nation states in Italy 1859-61 and Germany 186671 as a result of, on the one hand, the bourgeois national and constitutional movement and, on the other, the military dominance of the states of Piedmont and Prussia, concluded this process in the main - with the exception of the constitution which, following the revolution of the previous year, was imposed from above in Tsarist Russia as late as 1906 and which, although it left the monarchical executive in a particularly strong position, was none the less more than a mere pretence. The fact that the new nation states in Eastern and South-eastern Europe issuing from the dissolution of the Ottoman empire in the last third of the 19th century, and then at the end of the First World War from the destruction of Austria-Hungary and the eastward shift of Russia were constitutional states - at least on paper - from the start was already considered normal. It is well known that the constitutionalisation of England preceded that of continental Europe by at least a century. In 1688-89 (the 'Glorious Revolution'), following a decades-long conflict, including a civil war, between the lower house of parliament and the king, a de facto constitutional monarchy emerged, with the financial prerogatives of parliament, as they did elsewhere, becoming the main lever of successive further constitutional change. Although no comprehensive political framework law was ever adopted and no such law exists until the present day, a concept of 'the constitution' emerged which comprised the documents some going back to the Middle Ages - stating the personal rights of the Englishman or Briton, such as the 1689 Bill of Rights, as well as the Common Law and the unwritten rules of constitutional practice. The result is an evolutionary, customary law based understanding of constitution which has only recently begun to adopt elements of a more normative, systematic, and juridical concepts of the continental European countries (as well as the USA). Britain's constitutional monarchy with its tendency towards parliamentarianisation was an aristocratic form of rule and remained that to some extent until the House of Lords was effectively stripped of its powers in 1911. However, the English nobility had always been socially open to the commercial bourgeoisie as a result of the strict rules of primogeniture and had established close economic and political ties with it quite early. The political taming of the high nobility by the Crown and the economic de-feudalisation of aristocratic land
ownership in the early modern age provide the most important keys to understanding the pioneering role of England in both the constitutionalisation and the capitalist industrialisation of Europe. Until the First World War, the pan-European process of constitutionalisation proceeded largely within the limits of a constitutional monarchy in the narrower definition that is a monarchy limited by law but with the executive remaining with the ruler or a government appointed by him. Even in the Prussian-German, as well as the Austrian-Hungarian constitutionalism with its characteristic emphasis on the executive power it is possible to discern in the years around 1900 a creeping constitutional change which strengthened the government against the crown and, at the same time, the position of the national parliaments - elected through a general male franchise since 1867/71 in Germany, 1907 in Austria - against the executive and federal organs of the state. However, the breakthrough to parliamentarianisation had to await defeat in the First World War; it could then no longer prevent the revolutionary democratic rising of the people. All over 19th century Europe therefore, constitutional monarchies below the level of parliamentarianism still dominated. When in 1906 the traditional autocracy was replaced by a very modest version of constitutional monarchy even in Tsarist Russia, France had already had a parliamentary republic based on a general male franchise for over three decades. In Northern Europe, the introduction of women's right to vote was imminent. However, even France, for all its revolutionary traditions, remained a monarchy between 1804 and 1870, with only a brief interruption. Switzerland, the only constant republican country in Europe, only became a modern federal state in 1847-48 and it was not until 1874 that a combination of parliamentary and referendum democracy established itself. Otherwise it is possible to speak of the adoption of a parliamentary form of government (de facto, not necessarily de jure) at this time only in Italy (1861), the Netherlands (1868), Norway (1884) and Denmark (1905), with some reservations also Greece (1875) and Serbia (1903); only Great Britain and Belgium had done so much earlier in the 1830s and early 1840s if one ignores the special case of a temporary, quasi-parliamentary government by the French ultra-conservatives under the Bourbon monarchy restored in 1814.
Bonapartism of the two Napoleons, as well as to the specific lobbyism of sectoral interests in Imperial Germany. The Spanish 'Turno pacifico', in which governments were changed by arrangement between the conservatives and liberals and only subsequently legitimised through systematic electoral manipulation and falsification, was matched by the Italian 'Transformismo', a veritable system of oligarchic rule by a liberal government elite in which local clan chiefs and the leaders of provincial administrations took care of the desired results. In Italy as in Spain, where the Constitution of Cadiz (1812) had provided one of the early examples of relatively far-reaching constitutionalism, such practices led to a thorough discreditation of parliamentarianism; much the same can be said for the corruption and clientelism inherent in the constituional practices of the Balkan states. From the liberal constitutional state to social democracy The rising democracy movement in many European states around 1900 demanded, alongside the strengthening of parliaments, above all improvements in the franchise. Through a series of its extensions - 1832, 1868, 1884, 1918, 1928 in Britain - the general franchise for men and later also for women was gradually achieved. The demand for a democratic franchise, fought for bitterly including with mass demonstrations and strikes, was a key issue for the young socialist workers movement which considered parliamentary democracy, preferably in the form of a republic, as the most beneficial form of government in a bourgeois-capitalist society, but also at the same time as the form of its abolition. Alongside the labour movement, and sometimes in an alliance with it, were the radical liberal currents of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, but sometimes also the peasantry, which contributed to the achievement of democratisation against the traditional ruling elites of the aristocracy and big bourgeoisie. This phase of the democratisation of the franchise and, where it was still unachieved, the parliamentarianisation of government corresponded also with the era in which the legal regulation of social policy became a political issue, and here too with the involvement of bourgeois politicians who recognised the need to secure the working population against existential risks such as accidents, illness, old age, later also unemployment). The pioneering model was the social insurance system introduced in the 1880s for the German Empire by the conservative chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Even though Bismarck's motives were patriarchal and antisocialist and the material benefits quite modest in the beginning, social security and the improvement of employment law gradually became a constitutive element of the European constituional and democratic model. The difference between their financing through taxes or contributions is, in this context, secondary.
The European constitutional state of the 19th century and beyond, of course, organised a capitalist class society founded upon extreme inequality, which in addition was marked by a mixture of many pre-bourgeois and clientilist elements. The representative organs even of already parliamentary states such as Britain were elected on the basis of (initially very) restricted and unequal franchises. In addition, it is important to emphasise the fundamentally manipulative character of European constitutional development. This applies not only to the Southern and South-eastern periphery of The expansion of the social security systems with the continent but also for the plebiscitary-populist regards to their objects, their expenditures, perfor16 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
mances and the number of those insured to the concept of the 'social state' or 'welfare state' occurred after the Second World War and was made possible by the long phase of reconstruction and prosperity, the EastWest conflict and the temporary, and in some countries more long-term, dominance of social democracy and Keynesian economic policies. It would not be much of an oversimplification to say that - Great Britain apart democracy did not reach the degree of stability required for the process of European unification in Western Europe until the 1950s. The welfare state element in the political order must be considered the most important precondition alongside the defeat of fascism and its collaborators. After the First World War, during the Weimar Republic, political theorists and constitutional law experts from the ranks of German social democracy, especially Hermann Heller, had argued that the 'material' or 'social' law-based state, as it found expression in the articles of the Weimar constitution concerned with labour and social policy which themselves were a compromise between the republican bourgeoisie and the reformist labour movement, would expand the traditional legal and constitutional state by a qualitatively new dimension. The aim of social democracy and the trade unions was to gradually expand this dimension with their social policies and 'economic democracy' approach. It was thought that, in legal terms, it would even be possible to overcome capitalism and realise socialism without any change in the text of the constitution and without leaving the territory of representative democracy. The key argument was that without a minimum of 'social homogeneity' - which, under the conditions of market capitalism, included also the ability to achieve compromise between different interests on the basis of consensual notions of justice - the masses could not be enabled to complete the self-determination of the people in actual political practice and therefore could not become an integrated citizenry. These still very relevant deliberations on constitutional policy were directed not only against the old liberal idea that formal freedom and equality before the law were sufficient. They also entailed a clear demarcation against communist statism with its political dictatorship, abolition of the division of powers and fully nationalised command economy, as it had then taken shape in Russia and would later be exported to many regions of Europe and Asia. The theory and practice of a radical-democratic council system as the political form of socialism, which had emerged in several variants from the revolutionary upheavals of 1917-18, had in Russia been overlaid from the start by the educational dictatorship of the Bolshevik party elite which in turn then itself socially into the marasmus of the nomenklatura. The end of that system in the East European popular revolutions of 1989-91 can therefore also be understood as a constitutional revolution.
17 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
The historical background of the European constitution The afore-described historical procedure, i.e. the route of the constitutionalisation process in Europe, defines and renders the course towards a European Constitution. That is, the historical procedure of a lato sensu European constitutionalisation acquires now a concrete form through the creation of the European Communities in 1952 and reaches its first peak and a temporary 'integration' with the signing of the 'Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe' on October 29th, 2004. The history of the idea of the European Constitution, which commences with the concept of the Constitution of the nation-state, evolves adapted to the idea of a transnational and, finally, supranational and in the same time multi-national legal order of states, and is the one that led to the first steps of constitutionalisation of the process of European integration.The term 'Constitution' - irrespective of the accuracy of the term for describing the European Constitutional Treaty - refers, even symbolically, to the political will to create a unitary legal order or, in any case, a common legal framework of competencies, to ensure a space of liberty and finally this might be the problem of constitutionalisation of the integration process - to create for the European Union something like a state quality. These elements are at the starting point and constitute historical and logical conditions of the unification course from a beginning of international law nature (the point of view of international law) to an institutional condensation and, finally, to an outcome of constitutional law nature. The history of the concept and meaning of constitution in Europe explains finally a constitutional romanticism, which prevailed in the European Union and gave birth to the will and the dynamic of the respective evolutions. The international law nature of the starting point of the Communities rendered them inappropriate for a constitution. The legal-political content of unification though, its ratio, already incorporated all the elements of constitutional necessity. The development of the European integration into a political process The contemporary history of European integration has as a symbolic starting point: May 9th 1950, which is nowadays celebrated as 'Day of Europe'. At that time, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman proposed the establishment of a supranational organisation for the common administration of two principle sectors of economic policy, coal and steel. His final objective was to ensure peace and prosperity in post-war Europe through solid cooperation links between the European states, especially between Germany and France. In 1952, the European Coal and Steel Community was established (ECSC) with the participation of 6 European states: France, Germany, Italy, The
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. The undertaking of ECSC proved to be so successful that some years later the six states decided to extend their cooperation to even more sectors. In 1958, two additional communities were established through the Conventions of Rome, which were signed in 1957: the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community. The European Communities have been based since the beginning on a novel principle of transnational cooperation, which went beyond the concept of a traditional international organisation. The core of the unifying task was lying in the so called, 'community method' of cooperation which was based on the transfer of sovereign rights from the member states to the Communities, as well as on their joint administration at European level. Schematically: the Council, where representatives of member states participate, decides, the Commission proposes to the Council and implements its decisions, while the Assembly, which was composed at that time by representatives of the national parliaments, had an advisory role. The European Communities evolved soon into a pole of attraction for the remainder of the states of Western Europe: in 1972 Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined, in 1981 Greece and in 1986 Spain and Portugal. The last enlargement was accompanied by the first revision of the founding treaties, under the Single European Act in 1986. This historical moment marks the evident commencement of politicisation of the phenomenon of the Union. On the basis of the Single European Act, a decision to create a unified internal market was made and the first step was taken towards the political - apart from economic - unification of Europe, through the establishment of a mechanism of loose coordination of the external policy of member states, the European political cooperation. The European unification process undergoes a first institutional deepening At the end of the 1980s, while the existing socialist regimes were collapsing and the re-unification of Germany was becoming a reality, everybody realised the need for deepening not only the economic unification in view of the aim of its political unification of Europe. Moreover, the unified internal market in 1992 created the conditions - and according to many the need- for a single currency. In 1991, the Maastricht Treaty was signed, according to which the European Union was established as it principally operates to date. The European Union is based on three pillars. The first pillar refers to the European Communities, where the community method is implemented. An underlying evolution was the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which was completed on 1st January 2002 with the circulation of Euro. The second pillar refers to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), where cooperation in the field of external policy is implemented at intergovernmental level. 18 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
The third pillar, finally, refers to cooperation on issues of justice and home affairs (e.g. asylum and migration policy), where the member states cooperate also at intergovernmental level i.e. without the community method being implemented. Amsterdam Following the next enlargement of the European Union in 1995 (Sweden, Finland and Austria) a third revision of the treaties took place under the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. This treaty extended the implementation of the Community method of cooperation and enriched the institutional framework of CFSP; however the problem of preparing the Union and especially its institutions - for an already visible enlargement of the European Union towards Eastern Europe was not dealt with. This task was undertaken by the next intergovernmental conference for the revision of the treaties, which lead to the Treaty of Nice. Nice By means of the Treaty of Nice (2000) the Union attempted to solve the leftovers of the Amsterdam Treaty and to render the Union capable to receive the twelve member states, which were in the course of accession negotiations. Among the achievements of the Treaty of Nice were the promotion of the community method in new policy sectors, the reinforcement of the European Parliament, as well as the facilitation of enhanced forms of cooperation should be acknowledged. It remains to be proved though, since these forms of cooperation have not been used so far, whether they will serve the need for flexibility or whether they will endanger the unity of the European Union in the future. In parallel, a compromise in the institutional architecture of the enlarged Union has been achieved: the composition of the Commission and of the Parliament in a Union of 27 was regulated and the votes for decision making in the Council were allocated. On the contrary, the Charter of Fundamental Rights that was elaborated by a Convention established for this purpose, was not incorporated in the Treaty, despite the related endeavours of the European Parliament, but was only adopted as a political declaration. The Nice Treaty has been enforced on February 1st, 2003 paving the way for the enlargement of the EU. As of May 1st 2004 Estonia, Cyprus, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic became members of the Union. The Nice Treaty constituted a difficult compromise, which was not convincing as a basis for the future of the enlarged Union. In particular the solution of weighted votes has since the beginning been considered extremely complex, partly unfair, and convoluted for the citizens. The allocation of competencies between the member states and the Union, the role of national parliaments, the incorporation of the Charter in the treaty, as well as the overall rationalisation and simplification of the treaties could not be encountered in Nice.
The necessity of a Constitution becomes directly visible
a global, to a large extent novel, comprehensive 'Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe' which was adopted on June 13th, 2003 with consensus. The An extremely crucial point of the institutional evoluti- draft treaty was submitted to the Thessaloniki Summit on of the European Union comes on: Nice designated on June 20th, which adopted it, despite the objections expressis verbis, in a declaration annexed to the treaty, of several member states, as a solid basis for the works the limits of the intergovernmental conference as a of the intergovernmental conference. method for the revision of treaties: lack of transparency and publicity created intense alienation of the The European Constitution ante portas European citizens from the procedure of European integration. Thus, during the Nice Summit on The Intergovernmental conference was initiated on December 2000 the member states decided to embark October 2003 in Rome under the coordination of the on a new attempt for global dialogue on the future of Italian presidency. The objective of the presidency, supEurope. A year later, during the Laeken Summit ported mainly by Germany and France, was to decrea(December 2001) the European Council decided to se the spectrum of issues to be discussed anew. In that convene a new unofficial organ, the European way, two tendencies were formed: the first was the posiConvention for the Future of Europe, following the tion of the countries which supported the draft of the successful example of the convention that elaborated convention or pursued limited improvements and the Charter of Fundamental Rights; the objective of amendments; among them was also Greece. The the convention was to prepare the subsequent intergo- second tendency was expressed by countries which vernmental conference. adopted a critical stance towards the draft of the convention and maintained that it had proceeded extremeThe Convention ly with the unification endeavour (especially Great Britain) or that it was impairing their interests (especiThe mandate of the European Council to the conven- ally Spain and Poland). The effort to conclude the tion was to elaborate proposals in three directions, Conference in December 2003 failed, since it proved namely how to bring citizens closer to the endeavour of impossible to achieve unanimity among the 25. It European unification and to European institutions, should be highlighted that the consensus of the ten how to organise politically the enlarged European new member states was deemed necessary, although Union in order to operate efficiently, and how to ensu- they were not yet formally members of the European re a reinforced role of the Union in the world. At the Union. A key issue of disagreement was the refusal of same time, the convention had to examine whether the Spain and Poland to accept the convention's proposal need to simplify the treaties could be served by the regarding decision making at the Council and their peradoption of a constitutional text. sistence for the maintenance of the Nice system, which The convention was composed of 16 representatives of almost equated them with the four bigger member the European Parliament, a representative of the states. government of each member state and two representatives of each national parliament. The representatives The endeavour was further taken up by the Irish presiof the ten accession member states had equal status, dency, which valorised the new political conditions while the candidate countries (Romania, Bulgaria and created by the fall of the governments of Aznar and Turkey) were given observer status. Two members of Miller in Spain and Poland respectively, and convened the Commission and - under status of observer - repre- anew the intergovernmental conference on April 2004. sentatives of the Economic and Social Committee, of The Irish presidency was based on the acquis of the the Committee of the Regions, of the European first phase of the intergovernmental conference and Ombudsman and the Court of Justice of the European attempted to reduce the issues under negotiation, Communities participated. despite the effort of some member states (especially The works of the convention were initiated under the Great Britain's) to 're-open' several topics. Following a presidency of Valery Giscard d' Estaing on February complex compromise on the critical issues, the 'Treaty 2002 and were completed on June 2003. It operated establishing a Constitution for Europe' was finally under conditions of unprecedented publicity and trans- approved by the Intergovernmental conference, nameparency for European standards. Within the limits of ly, by all the member states, that convened in the framethe possible, the convention set the conditions for work of the European Council, held in Brussels on expression and participation of civil society and elabo- June 17th and 18th, 2004. The 'Treaty establishing a rated ideas for almost the total of the provisions of the Constitution for Europe' was signed by the governEuropean treaties. During its operation, the convention ments of the member states on October 29th 2004 in acquired a reinforced political dynamic, which led the Rome, following the necessary technical elaboration of governments of many member states to have represen- the final text and its translation into all the official tation at the level of ministers of foreign affairs. Under languages of the Union. the guidance of the presidium, the convention finally Should one fact be designated as the main starting managed to surpass the initial mandate of the point of the last phase of constitutionalisation of the European Council; instead of being restricted to the Union, this is beyond any doubt the enlargement, submission of different alternative proposals, it drafted which cannot be compared to the previous ones neit19 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
her quantitatively nor qualitatively. The leap of the Union from the 15 of the European West (and South) to the 27 of the reunified continent, was the catalyst, which accelerated evolutions and bended the existing objections. With respect to the method, the procedure of the Intergovernmental conference served the 6 founding members and reached its limits with 15 members. However, it was made clear, that it would not possibly continue to endure - as an exclusive procedure - with 27 members. With respect to the content, the form, structure and decision making procedures foreseen by the treaties were planned for the 6 member-states and operated in a relatively satisfactory way, with minor amendments for 15 members as well. However, it was certain that a Union with 27 member states would be condemned to paralysis. Schematically speaking: historical 1989 politically imposed the enlargement. The enlargement politically imposed the constitution. The next steps The next step until the enforcement of the European Constitution is the ratification by each member state. Once the Constitution is signed, the ratification procedure by each member state commences separately, according to domestic constitutional procedures. In that case, two options exist: ratification through the member state's parliament or through a referendum. Many member states have already announced referenda for the European Constitution. The procedure of approval of the European Constitution by the 25 member states will certainly be time-consuming. It might also prove to be extremely problematic according to historical experience. Denmark, in 1992 and Ireland in 2001 were obliged to hold second referendums following the first negative outcome regarding the Maastricht Treaty and the Nice Treaty, respectively. These facts of course delayed the enactment of the two treaties, the delay in the case of the Nice Treaty reached almost 2.5 years! In order to avoid extreme delays in enforcing the European Constitution, the Intergovernmental conference adopted a declaration, according to which, if during the two years following its signature by the governments of the member states, at least 4/5 of the member states have ratified the European Constitution and one or more have not done so, the issue will be referred to the European Council. Certainly, this provision is of mere political nature, since the obligation of ratification still remains for all member states. It is worth mentioning, that during both the convention and the intergovernmental conference it was maintained that the enforcement of the Constitution had to be facilitated. According to this viewpoint, even if one or more member states do not ratify the Constitution, the remaining states should have the possibility to proceed with its implementation. That is, the Union should not become a hostage of one member state. Finally, it has not been possible to conclude to overcome the binding 20 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
legal nature of the treaties in force, along the lines of which proceeds the enactment of the Constitution. Several procedural proposals have been presented for encountering the problem, such as the simultaneous (at the same day) approval of the Constitution in all member states either through referenda or by the parliaments, aiming at creating a dynamic which will facilitate both citizen's awareness and the approval of the Constitution.Commencement of implementation should the ratification procedures be promptly finalised, the European Constitution is expected to come into force on November 1st 2006. Should delay occur and should any other procedure be not decided - the Constitution will be put into effect following its ratification by the last member state. Constitution or Constitutional Treaty? The term 'constitution' has a specific history in continental Europe and therefore a specific content. Firstly, the constitution emanates from procedures based on increased legitimisation. Secondly, the constitution has acquired, through the evolution of European institutional culture, a specific content and includes regulations of specific nature. The first prerequisite - the constitution-making procedure - is not met, since the origin of its legitimisation is the international treaty concluded by the member states of the European Union. The fact that the convention was set up brings about a certain constitutionalisation of the procedure, which is however not sufficient. The content of the European 'Constitution' undoubtedly has elements of constitutional quality. For the afore-mentioned reasons the term 'European Constitutional Treaty' is more precise. Final remark The refusal of the constitutional treaty by a significant part of the European left is justified in terms of opposition to neo-liberal ideology and capitalist globalisation. What must be criticised here is not this basic political stance but the conclusion derived from it - that is, to consider the failure of the constitutional treaty and therefore the maintenance of the status quo as the lesser evil. The constitutional treaty is a step which can now be taken in order to progressively expand the ability of the European Union to act and therefore also to provide the institutional framework for a defence of the welfare state model and the re-regulation of the capitalist economy. Whether or not that can be achieved will be decided by political conflict. Peter Brandt is Professor of History at the University of Hagen. He is the son of former German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Dimitris Tsatsos is Professor Emeritus of the Universities of Hagen and Panteion, Athens and board member of the Institute for European Constitutional Sciences, Hagen. He is also Associate Professor of the Law School at the University of D端sseldorf.
Constitution and Unification by Andrea Manzella
sense defined?
A
a) The first and most emblematic factor of unification of the Union is represented by the specific procedure with which, in a unitary framework, it endeavours to govern the sum total of the existing diversities inside it. Collective diversities, and no longer – as we have seen diversities of individual member states. Voluntaristic, not identity, diversities. Here the process of integration actually aims, conceptually and practically, within the unity of the system, to embrace the action of groups of member states which decide to set up a closer and stronger cooperation ‘aimed at attaining the Union’s objectives’.
fter the Treaty of 29 October 2004 the form ‘constitution’ now describes both the legal material collected in the treaty and that gathered in the constitutional texts of the national states. However, owing to the significance of the existing legal order interdependences and those introduced by the Treaty, the form ‘constitution’ does not refer to separate legal orders but actually describes the composite set comprising the European constitutional system and the national constitutional systems. From this angle, one of mere qualification, the ‘Constitution for Europe’ already plays a unifying role.
In the constitutional view of these coalitions of the willing, their diversity is viewed as a resource for the Union and not as a difficulty or disuniting element. The main significance of the unification induced by the Their formation is actually ‘intended to reinforce its ‘Constitution for Europe’ is to be sought, however, in process of integration’. And indeed to ‘protect its interthe novelties it introduces into the existing system and ests’, with a projection towards external functions repin the renewal of institutions that, in the context of a resentative of the Union as a whole. different system, now have a legal significance that differs from the original one. We speak of ‘unification’ Politically and juridically, we have reached the point of here only in the sense which is possible in a suprastate greatest tension of the Union’s life experience. On one constitutional order, in which the degree of integration side, we have the abandonment of the concept itself of cannot reach so far as to eliminate the individual constitutional unity in favour of the option of a simple ‘national identity’ of the member states. The economic facilities zone. On the other, there is the scatConstitution confirms this counterlimit (to the limita- tering of State nuclei that choose their own path tions of sovereignty from which European public towards a different sub-European Union. power ‘originates’) inherent in the ‘fundamental, political and constitutional structure’ of the member states The maintenance of unity is entrusted in the and in the respect of their ‘essential functions’. Constitution to the teleological aspect, which plays a central role in all aspects of European constitutional Unity in diversity – a European Union motto – thus unification. It is indeed the ‘attainment of the Union’s cannot be pursued following the traditional state-based objectives’ that represents the key to the formation of techniques for imposing uniformity. These techniques special orders inside its own order. They are undeniably would be negated by the very concept of ‘diversity’. linked to the ‘respect of the Constitution and of Union The unification specific to suprastate constitutionalism law’. Their ‘authorisation’ stems from a European decishuns mechanisms of superimposition and command sion of the Council at the Commission’s recommendaand is implemented through principles of coordina- tion approved by the European Parliament. tion, homogeneity and consensus. It avoids compe- Furthermore, it is the Council and the Commission tence hierarchies and is instead organised in accordance that guarantee the ‘coherence’ of the action of with criteria of subsidiarity and mutual recognition. As enhanced cooperation with the Union’s policies. Rudolf Smend explains, it is not a ‘datum’ but the ‘result’ of a process dynamics in which the circular Nevertheless, the application of constitutional provinature of the positions is also the basic premise on sions inside enhanced cooperations allows bending and which the equilibrium of the whole rests. Unification, ‘slippage’ compared with the clumsier decision-making therefore, in the sense of homogeneity: the coexis- procedures applied in the general system. And each tence, on the basis of shared criteria, of different polit- safeguarding clause – in the first instance the costly ical autonomies in a legal order that undertakes to unanimity required for the European authorisation resolve the internal antinomies of organisation and decision – is observed to be a paper counterweight to functioning. the political will of a group of states to proceed together, a will that is in any case achievable outside the preWhat are the main points of this work of innovation scribed procedures. It is therefore only the constraint and renewal which translate into elements of intercon- of European purpose which truly counts in legitimatnection among legal systems, of unification, in the ing the enhanced cooperations, in order to turn them 21 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
into effective tools of progressive or deferred unity. Through them, in a sense, the Union is gambling on and investing in its future. And it also explains why it can administratively pick up the tabs not only for the cost of functioning of the common institutions, but also the actual ‘expenses deriving from the implementation’ of enhanced cooperation.
The correction is not just a face lift but is aimed at producing effects of homogeneity on the order. But what is of greater interest here is the fact that, since the ‘separate sectors’ are those having a definite intergovernmental vocation and reflecting a traditional reservation of state sovereignty (the sword, the scales), the toppling of the pillars affected not only the suprastate constitutional framework but also and specifically the degree of This actual realistic vision of ‘possible unity’ within the linkage and interrelatedness of the orders of the memcommon institutional framework (or of the inevitable ber states with that of the Union. differentiation in the plural system, currently numbering 25 but which already conceptually includes within c) The narrowest point in this interweaving of orders is its boundaries all the Balkans and Turkey) has led to a now somewhat paradoxically located precisely in the third way being envisaged between voluntarism and the part in which there should be the most definite separaprecariousness of the enhanced cooperations and the tion between Union and member states: the distribucomplicated stability of the common institutions: a tion of competences. In itself the interpretation of the ‘permanent structured cooperation’ as a special subsec- paradigm of the competences of the Union and the tion of the system which, once created, at the request member states seems to confirm the rigid principle of the states, no longer steps outside the institutional according to which ‘the limits of Union competences configuration. are governed by the principle of conferral’. And so, ‘under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act The outlook of this quite special ‘cooperation’ towards within the limits of the competences conferred upon it a priority objective of the Union - security and com- by the member states in the Constitution’. mon defence policy; its ‘reservation’ for the member states that satisfy higher criteria in terms of military However, this rigidity is softened when a teleological capacity, an equally permanent ‘opening up’ to the relationship between Union ‘competences’ and ‘objecother states: these are all elements that confirm the tives’ inside the Constitution itself is established. The leaning of the European Constitution towards results sumptuous identification of the Union’s objectives, involving unification around the Union’s objectives. their irreducibility to specific ends must therefore be This unification is meant to be achieved with the pres- viewed against the wide range of (exclusive, competing, ence of avant-garde states together with that of groups coordinating) competences of the Union. Having of States lagging behind, provided they are ‘kept ascertained this constraint, an all-comprehensive together’ by the fact of pursuing the same objectives. expansion of the ‘legal base’ that possibly supports the action of the Community institutions emerges. Of b) The unitary effort to contain ‘orders within the course the Union pursues its objectives in accordance order’, which is so visible in the great issue of enhanced with the competences attributed to it in the cooperations (even though they have a constraint of Constitution, although the general nature of the objecspeciality with respect to the general order of the tives and the flexibility of the competences make the Union), becomes both more subtle and more profound Union an organisation which has general aims just like when the Constitution sets up mechanisms of unifica- the member states. tion between the Union order and those of the member states. This ultimate sharing of aims between Union and states perfectly justifies three clauses: the clause of the A unification factor in this sense was the elimination of primacy of Union legislation over the law of the states the compartmentalisation of the Union order in three (originally jurisprudential, but now significantly constidifferent parts - the ‘pillars’: that of economic and tutionalised); the pre-emptive clause in favour of the monetary union; that of common foreign and security Union in competing matters (such that the member policy; that of cooperation in justice and home affairs. states exercise their competence to the extent to which The separation was intended to restrict application of the Union has not exercised its own or has decided to the suprastate community method – and therefore the cease exercising it); the flexibility clause establishing powers of the Commission and the European that if an action of the Union appears necessary to Parliament – exclusively to the first pillar (economic achieve one of the objectives of the Constitution withand monetary union). The removal of the pillars did out the latter providing the relative action powers, the not completely eliminate the diversity of the other two Council of Ministers, the Commission, the European fields (foreign and home policy). Nevertheless it now Parliament, acting in concert can adopt the ‘appropriate configures these procedural diversities as exceptions measures’. with respect to the general rules governing the entire complex Union order, no longer as general rules of two Clearly, these three clauses further ‘open up’ communispecific sectors – which among other things are deci- cation between state orders and the Union order. The sive for the very identity of the Union – to flank with primacy clause, by modifying the system of the sources equal status the general community rule which applies of law in each member state more than any other eleto all the rest. ment expresses the overall constitutional substance of 22 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
the new order. The preemptive clause acknowledges that in competing matters the Union’s action has the same nature as the regulatory action of the member states (plus the advantage of banning substitutive state action while that of the Union is in progress). Lastly, the flexibility clause allows powers that are the Union’s competences, to be extended precisely to achieve the objectives of the Constitution. The system of the Union’s competences, with its connection to its objectives, thus represents the area in which the connective tissue joining up the European orders is thickest.
with the national parliaments – albeit via the soft method of consultation – of the power of early warning regarding failure to observe the principle of subsidiarity and the obligation for Union institutions to take account of the assessment made of the financial and administrative impact on the government of the regional and local authorities of the Community legislation, represent the legislative elements that have symbolically broken through the state-level diaphragm between the Union and the sub-State level subjects. And also with regard to this aspect they have led to substantial unification: in a ‘Constitution with many States’ but also ‘with many regions and local authorid) This observation may be affirmed therefore even ties’. without reference to the principle of subsidiarity which continues to represent the Grundnorm of the European The same definition of the national identity of memconstitutional mechanism. The insertion point of this ber states changes significantly and now conforms to principle actually remains the evaluation of the objec- their fundamental political and constitutional structure, tives pursued (the teleological criterion therefore still including the local and regional autonomy system. occupies a central place in any coherent view of the Union order). They represent the parameter with which e) Performance value of legal-political unification is to compare the ‘scope’, ‘sufficiency’ and ‘effects’ of the also assumed by ‘simplification’ (with the reduction action to pursue them. from 15 to 6) and above all the change of denomination of the Union’s legal instruments, accompanied by The strategic difference between this principle and the a redefinition of their contents. clauses examined above, in relaxation of the principle of conferral, lies not so much in the fact the clauses are The Constitution performs five operations: the aboliall in favour of an arrogation while subsidiarity is a tion of the classification of sources linked to the origiprinciple of arrogation-devolution (and it is the latter nal specialist tradition specific to the Union; the simulthat prevails, at least in the declarations: ‘to guarantee taneous introduction for the legal instruments of that decisions are taken as close as possible to the denominations that generally correspond to the comUnion’s citizens’). The difference lies above all in the mon language of the national legal systems (law, framefact that with it infra-institutional communication work law, regulations, delegated legislation); the possiinside the Union is guaranteed to the point that all the bility to use the ‘new’ instruments for all matters (thus Community architecture (from the European providing further confirmation of the demolition of Parliament to the smallest municipal council, from the the ‘pillars’, with the exception of the sectoral specialiPresident of the European Commission to the presi- ties); the non proliferation clause referring to atypical dent of the regional community) is informed by the cri- acts (‘where the Constitution does not specify the type terion of functional interchangeability. Preventive con- of act to be adopted, the institutions shall select it on a trol of the national parliaments and, through them, of case-by-case basis, in compliance with the applicable the respective regional assemblies, the subsequent con- procedures’); the definition of a regulatory hierarchy trol of the Court of Justice, are directed not towards among the legislative acts of the Union (which contain conservative aims but actually to safeguard the objec- the ‘essential elements’ of the governance of a sector) tives-competences relationship in accordance with the and the implementing acts adopted by the member criteria of ‘scope’, ‘sufficiency’ and ‘effects’. The recent states (which contain ‘all measures of national law necdecision handed down by our Constitutional Court (no. essary to implement legally binding Union acts’). These 3 of 2004) which, on appeal from the regions, respond- are the operations by which the system of legal sources ed in a boomerang decision by shifting upwards, in the of the Union is innovated. They make it more comprestate attributions, not only administrative power but hensible to the citizens (thereby achieving a result of indeed the actual legislative power regarding ‘large-scale political unification of very great significance, by virtue works’, is a significant precedent for what may happen of the value, political that is, of the principle of legal (and, in view of the assumptions, probably will happen, certainty). But above all, these are operations that, by taking into account the great weight taken on by the means of a skilful use of defining techniques aimed at ‘dialogue between courts’). unifying a complex system, align and naturally combine, with no further semantic and exegetic imbalances, The legal value of the principle of subsidiarity there- the sources of the Union with those of the individual fore lies in the penetrating efficacy in unifying the national states to form a substantial unity. orders – which coexist in close interrelation - in the constitutional framework of the Union. The new f) As has been seen so far, the process of European Constitution takes this efficacy to its logical final con- constitutional unification is carried out as a function of sequences, linking to this unit order also regional and the Union’s objectives. The nodes that it embraces replocal subjects. The substantial co-ownership shared resent also the nodal points of the network linking the 23 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
legal systems that coexist inside the Union – united in their diversity, in order to achieve the ‘European’ goals. The attainment of the Union’s ‘legal personality’ appears to be the result of rather than the premise for this process. However, European constitutional unification is based also on a system of ‘founding’ values, ‘common to the member states’. These are values referring to institutional organization: ‘democracy’, ‘equality’, ‘state of law’ and the relationship between institutions and human rights. And they are values that refer to the organisation of a ‘society characterised by pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between men and women’. The value foundation of the European Union is thus projected beyond state-based conditions and seeks deeper rooting in the very ‘characteristics’ of European society.
citizenship a full and in many ways richer and more modern content than that of the national catalogues of rights. However, the most important aspect for constitutional unification is the inclusion in the Charter of rights of ‘constitutional subsidiarity’ clauses. By means of the latter open communication is set up that will allow the more favourable between the European constitutional formulation of rights and the national formulation to be chosen. Once again, as we saw for the general principle of subsidiarity, constitutionalisation leads to a unification of orders.
One observation concerning this point is that the fundamental rights, disregarding individual-jurisdictional and collective-political protection, to be illustrated in the following, ‘shall constitute’ according to the Constitution ‘general principles of Union’s law’. Also in this sense, therefore, they have a transversal function of The discourse on unification, however, must again be unity among orders in accordance with the specific virbased on closely linked structural nodes, this time tuality of the legal principles. because of the constitutional values, in order to give unitary form to the Union order. The first of these The guarantees. The aspect of the guarantees illustratnodes is European citizenship. ed here is not that of the protection of the individual sphere of rights, in accordance with the jurisprudence When first enunciated at Maastricht, the idea of of the Court of Justice, in constant interaction with European citizenship immediately appeared as that national jurisprudences. It is that of the protection of which better than anything else expressed the linking of the collective sphere of rights – of the collective citiorders (a meso-institution, as it were, between one and zenship, in other words. The ‘obvious risk of a serious the others). This citizenship did not replace national breach of European values by a member state’ or their citizenship but was added to and completed it. Even ‘serious and persistent breach’ can lead to the limitation the severe decision concerning Maastricht handed of the rights of the state in question in the Union: we down by the German constitutional court identified in would thus have a member with a diminished status. In this institution a breaking point in the theory of the other words, when the national soul of European citiseparation of orders: ‘with European citizenship, a zenship suffers compression during the enjoyment of legal democratic bond is formed among the citizens of common constitutional values, it is the entire Union the member states which confers a legally binding form that reacts as though this compression affected each of on the degree of homogeneity that actually exists’. its member s. In fact, in view of the long trek from Maastricht (1992) to the Constitution (2004), citizenship is an expression Besides, the political guarantee of the rights represents of a ‘homogeneity’ that is not only factual. It attains a a counter-limit to the limit of respecting the national legal fullness that gradually extends in two directions - identity of the member states, in the sense that the contents and guarantees. In both, the concept of citi- states may neither violate nor jeopardise the constituzenship shows its organising force, that extends across tional values of the Union even by advancing claims of the various orders. national specificity. Here, the indivisibility of rights and constitutional uniThe contents. The idea of citizenship is from the out- fication overlap. The connection between them, now set in excess with respect to the character-typing of the that the Charter of Rights subscribes to a ‘systematic five original rights (right of circulation and residence; overall political project’, has an obvious function of right to vote and stand as candidate in municipal elec- organising the European orders. It actually represents tions and for the European Parliament; right to diplo- the basic premise for a Union that is transformed from matic and consular protection; right of petition; right a legal organisation to a constitutional organisation. to good administration). It is immediately clear that it comprises also ‘the fundamental rights, as guaranteed Andrea Manzella, university professor of constituby the European Convention on the Protection of tional law, is Director of the Centre of Studies on Human Rights and the Fundamental Freedoms and as Parliament of the Luiss University of Rome. MEP durthey result from the constitutional traditions common ing the 1994-1999 parliament, he is currently member to the member states’. The Charter of Fundamental of the Senate of the Republic, Deputy Chairman of Freedoms, drawn up by the ‘first’ European the 14th Committee on European Union Policies, Convention and that the ‘second’ Convention incorpo- member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the rates into the constitutional treaty, will afford European Council of Europe. 24 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
The British General Election 2005 – An Interpretation by Stephen Haseler
B
ritain’s general election, held on May 5th, may have returned Tony Blair as Prime Minister with a solid majority in Parliament (a 67 seat majority over all other parties), but the result brought little comfort to any of the three major parties.
For Blair’s New Labour Party it was, in reality, an uninspiring result. Labour achieved only 35 per cent of the vote, representing a sizeable fall from the last election. This is a lower per cent vote than the party received when it lost the 1979 election to Margaret Thatcher (and secured only 268 seats); and is the worst vote for any winning party for over 30 years. And, interestingly, Labour is now the second party in England (behind the Conservatives in the English popular vote, and reliant upon its large majorities in Scotland and Wales). The Conservatives also did badly. Their vote - 32 per cent of the total - was only 1 per cent up on their disastrous showing in the 2001 general election and 2 per cent up on their worst ever post war result in 1997. The Conservative leader, Michael Howard, was well aware that in this election it was unlikely that he would win, but he had hoped to do well enough to build a sturdy platform for winning next time. In this strategy he was not successful. A cold-eyed look at the electoral statistics will show that in order to win the next election, by securing a majority over all other parties, the Conservatives still need to win over 140 seats next time, an almost impossible task. The blunt fact is that it will need a political earthquake to put a Conservative Prime Minister in Downing Street at the next election. So the Conservatives will now engage in a period of introspection and division. An internal debate can be expected that will incapacitate the party for some months, if not years. Already, only weeks after the election, battle lines between ‘modernisers’ and ‘traditionalists’ and between rural Tories and suburban 25 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
Conservatives have been drawn. And these divisions will be played out in an organisational conflict between the majority of Conservative MPs in the House of Commons (who will seek to make the Tories more upto-date and acceptable to what they see as a changing Britain) and grass-roots activists who want the party to remain true to what they see as its heritage (a socially conservative ‘British’ traditionalism which rejects multiculturalism and European integration, and stresses issues like law and order). But, if Labour and the Conservatives are unable to draw much comfort from the election, then Britain’s third party, the Liberal Democrats, is not much better off. They did relatively well in the popular vote as they increased their vote from 18.3 per cent to 22 per cent and their leader, Charles Kennedy, is right to claim that, with his party now possessing 62 seats, more than at any time since the war, Britain is now a genuine three-party polity.
The Conservatives will now Engage in a Period of Introspection and Division But the central problem for the Liberal Democrats remains: Their main objective in the 2005 campaign was to replace – or be seen as on the way to replacing - the Conservatives as the major opposition party. And this strategy failed. The Lib-Dems won only 8 extra seats, taking their total number to 62 (compared to 197 for the Tories.) Intriguingly, although the Liberal Democrat leadership expected to gain a large number of Conservative seats (because in these seats Labour voters were thought ready to switch to the Lib-Dems because of opposition to Blair’s policy on the war on Iraq) they, in fact, took none. This gives the Lib Dems a real strategic headache about how to progress from here on: do they try again to replace the Tories as the ‘real opposition’ or do they
go left, and undercut New Labour amongst some of its remains within and around the Conservative Party a core constituents? group of political activists (probably representing around 20-25 per cent of the wider electorate) who More importantly, though, than the narrow interests want to see Britain reverse existing integration by ‘reand hopes of the politicians, the British general elec- patriating functions back to London and, should this tion result shows, once again, how the country contin- de-integration become unattainable, they would argue ues to tolerate a very un-democratic and un-representa- for pulling the country out of the Union altogether. tive electoral system. The winning party formed the Should Britain’s relationship with Europe become the government (without the need for a coalition partner) dominant political issue then this grass-roots Toryism with 356 seats on only 35 per cent of the vote; the sec- can be expected to clash - probably irreconcilably- with ond party secured 197 seats with 32 per cent of the more centrist Tory MPs, and such a divide could cause vote; and the third party secured 62 seats with 22 per a fundamental re-alignment of the parties. cent of the vote. But as both Labour and the Conservatives support the existing electoral system the Conservatives may today lose by it, but know they can gain by it one day - the system is unlikely to be changed. Britain will therefore go into the next election (in four or five years time) with a three-party system that could produce unpredictable results. On the face of it the Conservatives cannot win outright next time (the mountain is too high to climb); but Labour could lose - in the sense that no party could hold a majority. Everything will depend on ‘external’ events. Should the British economy begin to slide into recession (and, as of writing, there were signs of such a development) then the Labour Party, whether under Tony Blair or Gordon Brown, could become very unpopular and very soon. The Conservative Party would normally be the natural recipient for disaffected voters, but if the Tories are still divided - and incoherent about their message and identity - then the anti-government sentiment could be swept up by the Liberal Democrats. Much too depends upon the great question that has divided and soured British politics for so much of the post-war period - the European issue. If in the next two or three years Britain has to face a referendum on the constitution - or any other big test of the country’s fundamental attitude towards Europe - then British politics could face a serious upheaval. For instance, should the public say ‘yes’ to the European constitution – or to any other serious act of integration - then the Conservative Party, no matter any new found discipline, could founder asunder on the issue. Should Europe become an over-riding issue then the party will continue to be divided, with a sizeable number of MPs continuing to flirt with the extreme position of withdrawal from the EU. The ideas and culture of the pro-withdrawal party, UKIP (the United Kingdom Independence Party), remains attractive to many Conservative activists in rural areas. And there 26 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
Stephen Haseler is Professor of Government at London Metropolitan University and Director of its European Research Forum (www.europeanresearchform.com). He is the author of many books including ‘Super-State. The New Europe and its Challenge to America’.
The Balkans A Call for Courage by Giuliano Amato have spent more than one year of my life working in the Western Balkans, as the chairman of an international commission that also had among its members Richard von Weizsäcker, Kiro Gligorov, Carl Bildt, Zlatko Lagumdzija, Ilir Meta, Kemal Dervis, Janez Potocnik, Goran Svilanovic, Mircea Geoana, Avis Bohlen: all of us with experience in government, some of us from Western Europe and the US and some others from the Balkans. Our final Report was released on 12 April, it is now on the web site of the commission (www.balkan-commission.org) and we are currently devoting ourselves to publicising it throughout the capitals. Our road show is aimed at convincing both the Balkans’ leaders and the international community that a courageous political endeavour is needed to move things forward (also facing the issues that are not easy to face) because the status quo is unsustainable. It does not lead to any desirable future. It might only lead to an endless confinement of the region in its past. As our report underlines, almost a century has passed since 1914, when a summer shot in Sarajevo triggered the first of the two world wars that indelibly marked the 20th century as the ‘century of madness and self destruction’.
I
Two world wars were enough for Western Europe to move towards integration, aiming at internal peace throughout the construction of the Union we have now. They were not enough for the Western Balkans to do the same. Their unsolved ethnic and religious conflicts, frozen for decades under the communist rule, exploded as soon as that rule was over in the early 1990s’, leading to new wars, new crimes and new victims. When the Dayton agreements were eventually signed, the entire European continent brought the century of madness and self destruction to its end.
tions are being held (more or less satisfactorily) in all the countries. Peace was badly needed and peace has been reached. However, the region lives a suspended present, more mindful of the past than of the future. The arrangements adopted on the basis of the Dayton agreements are not useful to pave the way to the future. Power sharing among ethnic groups, weaker states than their own enclaves and exceptional powers bestowed upon outsiders have stopped the bloodshed, but have greatly impeded steps forward such as the growth of responsible national leaderships and their own renewal. A preliminary conclusion, that can hardly be challenged, is that the status quo has outlived its former usefulness. Paradoxical as it might seem, this widely shared conclusion is not enough for the Balkan countries to move ahead nor is it enough for the international community, and mostly for the European Union, to promote the necessary change. Within the region, the stakes linked to the past are still highly rewarding and replacing them is politically costly. Within the European Union everybody understands that accession is the only sensible future for the countries of the region, but European public opinion is more and more reluctant to commit to further enlargements. We consequently risk a very dangerous stalemate, with the Western Balkans becom-
The Dayton Agreements are not Useful to Pave the way to the Future ing more and more a depressed (also economically) ghetto and we Europeans not just ignoring them (for we could not ignore them) but continuing in our heavy military and financial commitment, the only purpose of which would be to keep things as they are now.
Courage and farsighted vision are needed to put the future beyond the narrow horizons of this uncertain and long-lived present. And courage and vision are first of all needed in the countries of the region. Their leaders, and at least parts of their citizens, know that the standards for membership of the European Union are Ten years after Dayton, we can be satisfied of what has far from being reached. Ways and timing can certainly been achieved. The region is relatively stable, military be discussed, but there are demands that are conflicts and ethnic cleansing are over and free elec- inescapable for them and in their own interest. To 27 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
begin with, their preference lies on discussing status as the main topic, but they cannot ignore that the higher the number of the expected member states, the smaller their size will be and the lower their economic viability will also be. We can be as flexible as might be needed in recognising states in the region, but economic integration among them certainly is a prerequisite of their viability as member states of the European Union. This is why our report suggests completion of the free trade area in the region, leading to a custom union with the EU, regional infrastructures (both physical and institutional) that facilitate trade and capital flows, and labour market and travel policies within the region that support economic integration. Economic integration is the first and basic ingredient of the viability that the Balkans’ states should give themselves. But it is not the only one. They also should reshape their institutional machineries in order to make them oriented more towards delivering decisions and services than towards power sharing. Furthermore exceptional powers such as the Bonn powers of the High Representative in Bosnia should disappear on behalf of definite responsibilities of government, bestowed upon the officials elected by the citizens. Finally, all of the states of the region should comply with the rule of law. This means on the one hand to isolate and reduce corruption and organised crime and on the other hand to put an end to all forms of ethnic discrimination (which are milder than ethnic cleansing, but no less unacceptable) and replace it with equal treatment to which each individual citizen is entitled, independently of the ethnic group he/she belongs to. Is this too much? Is it too demanding for countries that were at war with each other until a few years ago? Certainly it is not, if we only think that the expected destination of these countries is the European Union, where the described principles are an essential part of the underpinnings upon which the Union itself is based. But it is certainly demanding in the context of the values and feelings that still prevail in the region and supply the political arena with the main and paramount resources that have cause in the competition for leadership. Let us take the case of Kosovo as an example. Every reasonable person in Serbia has already understood that leaving it to the local majority of Albanians is part of a solution rather than a problem for Serbia itself. Of course the rights of the Serbian minority there have to be effectively safeguarded (and currently they are not) and the area where this minority is mostly concentrated (Mitrovitza and its surroundings) could also have a special international status. But if someone in Belgrade seriously thinks about the future of his/her country, Serbia comes to his or her mind, not Kosovo, which for many years has already been somebody else’s problem. The only real doubt is whether Montenegro will be independent or still part of the same state. However, this is a politically sensitive and tricky issue. Should a political leader plead for separation, he/she would run quite a big political risk to be seen as an enemy of 28 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
national identity. There are political leaders who are aware that remaining prisoners of the past do not provide any help for building the future. But it is not easy for them to turn to new future ideas such as integration in the European Union with all its implications in terms of economic growth, students and business mobility, having voice in the wider world and not just within national borders. I am confident that public opinion could be (and in part already is) very open and more and more eager to follow along this new path. It entirely depends on courage, that kind of courage that always is necessary when sorting out of vicious circles becomes an urgency. We cannot ask the Balkans’ leaders to be the only ones taking the risk of being courageous. The European Union has to promote the change that is needed and consequently we, citizens of the existing Europe, should be supportive and courageous. Do we want to keep caring for the Balkans as if they were a sort of colony of ours? Do we want to keep our soldiers there to manage a form of stability that depends on public order, while it should depend on respect of human rights and the dynamics of economic growth as is the case in more deeply rooted democracies? Are we so wary of further diversities in our European family as not to formally accept others in it, ignoring the fact that they already have joined our societies as second or third class members? This is where politics, and political families, play their essential roles, for neither the Balkans nor our Union can wait for the other to make the first move. They have to move together, relying on each other and on their mutual influence. Let me indicate a crucial implication of the demand to go beyond the status quo as soon as possible (our report suggests that in 2006 all the countries of the region should have their own road maps and their fast tracks towards accession). Up to now, we have acted in the Balkans on the assumption that whenever there are standards to be complied with, complying with them always is a hundred per cent pre-requisite for whatever further step. And yet we have been forced to take note of the fact that in the suspended present of today there are standards that are not (and cannot be) satisfied. It does not make any sense to remain where we are, with the danger not to move forward and to have a fall back. Our report strongly recommends the opening of the process of accession, which would allow us to avail ourselves of the incentives and disincentives inherent to the process itself for lifting up the level of compliance with the standards. Against this backdrop, the EU institutions have done the right thing, on the one side in making the first (and preliminary) steps with Serbia and Montenegro, despite a good, but not yet ‘full’ cooperation with the The Hague Tribunal, and at the same in delaying the final steps with Croatia, which, at its stage, should demonstrate ‘full’ cooperation and
hand over the still missing General Gotinova to the Tribunal. This is the reasoning backing the proposal, that the report makes, of a European Conference to be held in the second half of 2006, aiming at identifying the interlocutors in the region (the expected member states with whom to open negotiations), solving therefore the Kosovo issue (upon the formula of independence without the prerogatives of sovereignty, that should be gradually handed over to Kosovar institutions as long as the process of accession proceeds) and giving each of the identified interlocutors its own road map to accession. There is a final point that perhaps is even more important than the previous ones: how to involve not just institutions and officials, but real people, ordinary citizens, in the process of ‘Europeanisation’. Amongst the most discouraging findings of our commission is that the youth, young men and women under 30 who share the values of Europe most keenly and who vote for pro-European parties most regularly, are those who experience the greatest difficulties in visiting the EU. More of 70 per cent of students in Serbia have never travelled abroad. Their difficulties are due to us, to the costly and lengthy procedures they have to undergo to get visas. Courage is needed here too! Security is a serious matter and filtering immigrants is no less serious. But a special programme could be envisaged for white listing special categories and facilitating their entrance into our countries. It is the best and most efficient way to lay the foundation upon which accession may be built as a solid priority on both sides. A new, fresh start in 2006 at the level of institutions and what we call ‘the smart visas’ programme at the level of civil society. These are the two tracks upon which we could move on towards the accession of all the Balkans countries by 2014. From Sarajevo to Sarajevo. It is very symbolic, but it is also realistic. It took fifteen years for the former communist countries to pass from their communist status to their formal entrance into our Union. It may equally take fifteen years for the countries of the Western Balkans to pass from the end of their wars to the same destination. Let us see it as a hope, as a common hope. And let us work for it to come true.
Giuliano Amato is a Senator and former Prime Minister of Italy. Furthermore, he is senior Vice President of the Party of European Socialists (PES) and chaired the ‘International Commission on the Balkans’. 29 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
One Year of Spanish Foreign Policy: Socialist Government Returns To Europe By Enrique Baron Crespo / MEP Chairman of International Trade Committee European Parliament
Over many years it supported all policies from the international community to make Hussein accountable for the military arsenal he was suspected of hiding. And the Socialist International supported the democratic n April 18th, a little more opposition in Iraq. Thereafter we stood by the than one month after the UNSCOM inspections and supported their search for sensational socialist party the caches of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) electoral victory of March 14th, supposedly in control of the Iraqis. Spain’s new Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero made a When the United States - ever since President Bush bold public announcement: chose Saddam Hussein as his nemesis - started to escaSpanish troops in Iraq should be late the conflict in order to invade Iraq regardless of withdrawn as soon as technically UN resolutions not allowing military force, the PSOE possible. The breaking news sent leadership opposed any unilateral action as a matter of shock-waves not only through his principle. Spain will support the fight against internacountry but also Europe and, tional terrorism in Iraq or elsewhere, but within the above all, the United States. For the Partido Popular, after framework of international multilateral institutions. its humiliating defeat at the polls, it was only adding insult to injury. For the US conservative administration, In the election programme, the PSOE doctrine was Zapatero’s challenge amounted to a cowardly retreat of clearly supporting a robust strategy both defensive and Spain as an ally and a crime of lese majeste. But it had to counter-offensive against international terrorist organibe done. sations, but did not support the American way of ‘war on terror’. During its campaign, Zapatero insisted time and again that not only the presence of Spanish troops was against international law but also that it had been justified on a flawed basis. We did not think that the existence of WMD was sufficiently proved. After the invasion, months of thorough inspections in Iraq failed to find evidence of those ‘secret arsenals’. And a series of independent and official reports, including the Enquiry Commissions of the US Congress and the CIA, stated unequivocally that it was ‘dead wrong’ intelOne has to look beyond this spectacular episode and ligence that established the existence of those WMD. the impassioned headlines it produced around the world and consider the rationale behind Prime Minister According to the Aznar government, our military was Rodriguez Zapatero’s decision: moral consequence and sent to Iraq on a peace keeping mission and to help in political coherence. The troops’ retreat from Iraq was humanitarian and reconstruction tasks. But Zapatero only the first decision that showed the change of found that in reality they were part of an occupying Spanish foreign policy compared to the previous gov- army and were perceived as such by the Iraqi populaernment. It was the beginning of a new mindset in tion. Above all, the Spanish army was also targeted as international affairs that marked a real comeback of enemy by the insurgent militias that fight the foreign traditional patterns in our relations and alliances within invasion. This explains why several Spanish intelligence Europe and the rest of the world. It was a return to our men had to pay the ultimate price in an ambush in historical and geographical roots after a parenthesis Baghdad. characterised by Aznar’s priority on transatlantic relations above Europe and against our allies in the Union. When it became clear that the White House and the Pentagon chose to bypass the United Nation’s Security From the new Madrid government’s perspective, the Council and attack Iraq, there was a spontaneous opporeturn of the army units from Iraq was only a question sition in Spanish public opinion evidently opposing the of political honesty. From the outset of the long con- unilateral US military intervention. Nevertheless, Aznar flict between the USA and Baghdad on, the Spanish was determined to support the Washington ‘neocon’ role, including the first socialist government of Felipe aggressive policy. Therefore he turned his back on the Gonzalez, was as a faithful ally in the UN coalition led major EU allies, France and Germany, and decided to by the US during the first Iraq war. After the Partido join the ‘coalition of the willing’ to go and attack Popular victory of 1996, when the socialist party went Saddam along the US. It was Aznar’s personal decision into opposition, the PSOE kept on being clearly to commit Spain to invading Iraq as he did not even opposed to the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein. consult the parliament.
O
Spanish Troops in Iraq should be Withdrawn as Soon as Technically Possible
30 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
Thus, it was hardly surprising that after winning the election, Rodriguez Zapatero was eager to be consistent with his party’s electoral programme. He explained his government’s rapid decision in straightforward words: ‘We cannot support a war that is illegal and therefore immoral’. This simple proposition entailed a more profound philosophy. The new socialist government will guarantee that Spain abides by international law, supports the UN and opposes any action based upon unilateralism. In the whole history of the conflict with Iraq, from the beginning on, the socialist party has supported the UN’s thorough inspection of Iraqi territory in order to establish whether or not it had WMD. From day one of his premiership, Zapatero clearly stated his position to reject any unilateral alliance solely based upon the military might of a superpower that will not respect the diplomatic rules of the international community. Shortly before the start of the US-led invasion of Iraq, Aznar ignored polls that showed that 85 per cent of the Spaniards were clearly against the military intervention. Nonetheless, he chose to join Bush and Blair in the Azores Pact. There was outrage in the vast majority of the Spanish population. The bombings and attacks in Iraq were immediately contested in the most important Spanish cities by means of peaceful demonstrations where the citizens shouted their own ‘shock and awe’. Millions of Spaniards took over the streets to show frontal opposition to the unilateral war of the US. This mobilisation, that lasted several weeks, was ignored and mocked by the Partido Popular government. But it was there in the streets of Madrid, Barcelona and other cities. The support for the socialist party began gaining momentum to establish the new majority that appeared at the general election a few months later. And it must also be remembered that, right after the Madrid terrorist attacks at the Atocha train station on March 11th 2004, even more Spaniards followed the call for massive demonstrations against terrorism.
Consistent with this priority, the socialist government has undertaken a drastic review of the past antiterrorist and security policies and has adopted an ambitious plan to implement a muscular strategy to prevent and fight terrorism in its first months in power. Army, police and security forces were fundamentally reorganised and their forces substantially enhanced and modernised to match the challenges of terrorist organisations operating in our territory. Furthermore, the human and technical security resources were also restructured to boost international cooperation with the EU, the USA and other continents. Our intelligence services were also updated to ‘state of the art’ technologies to match the challenges of international terror network operations worldwide. At the same time during its first year in power, the Spanish government saw the success of police and judicial investigations. These investigations lead to dozens of arrests and detentions, in Spain and elsewhere, of people suspected responsible for the March 11th massacre. The Spanish Parliament also set up an Enquiry Commission that independently investigated the Atocha attacks for one year. Its conclusions have been accepted by all parties except for the Partido Popular.
85 per cent of the Spaniards Were Clearly Against the
Stage two for the Zapatero government was a reshuffle of the diplomatic agenda in order to reinstate Spain’s foreign policy along our historical alliances. It amounted to a clear cut ‘return to Europe’. It was an energetic move to reverse Aznar’s outrageous U-turn that prioritised his allegiance to the policies of George Bush above the fidelity to the EU. The Partido Popular attitude contradicted a firm principle of the previous socialist government that Zapatero wished to restore: the conception of Spain’s integration into the heart of a Europe that is a political union (as well as an economic one). This implies the open support of a Common European Foreign and Security Policy, including defence and security matters. The new government thinks that CFSP is a basic pillar of our European and international commitments that cannot be ignored and abandoned but need to be developed, reinforced and implemented.
Military Intervention
Since Rodriguez Zapatero has assumed power, he has set the fight against international terror as one of the main priorities of his government. Given the tragic price Spain had to pay on March 11th 2004 to Islamic fanaticism, it could not be otherwise. Unfortunately, Spain has a long history of suffering terrorist attacks from the Basque separatist organisation ETA. But especially because of this long and painful experience, the new socialist authorities feel that this struggle should be tackled by other means and methods than those of the American ‘war on terror’. The Madrid trains bombings were the proof that one cannot succeed against international terror with bombs and tanks. Instead, intelligence sharing and exchange are the key weapons. 31 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
Zapatero decided that our relationship with the EU badly needed to be restored to regain our position of prestige and respect among our allies. The Partido Popular government period had a rather confrontational attitude towards the EU. From his debut at the European Councils, and especially at the Berlin summit in 1999, Aznar’s hype with his aggressive attitude challenged the rest of the European leaders in order to keep EU funds for Spain (that had been negotiated by the previous socialist government). On the surface, it yielded some benefits, but in the long run, Spain became the odd guest at the EU leaders’ table.
Idem ditto for the blocking capacity in the negotiation of the Nice Treaty, at the summit in the Riviera city in June 2001. As a result of his strenuous battle against the EU partners, Aznar indicated that he wanted to obtain an increased voting weight and some more blocking capacity in the Council. In fact the results were at best a pyrrhic victory against the backdrop of serious losses in the number of Spanish MEPs in the new European Parliament. Finally at the European Convention, the Aznar representatives systematically blocked progress and produced a stalemate. It was only after the March 14th elections that the new socialist government changed this blockade strategy and turned it into a positive attitude of cooperation. Within a few months, the EU reached a consensus to agree for a new text of the Constitutional Treaty. Spain was back in Europe.
tal, amigo’, more appropriate to salute one of his employees at his Crawford ranch. Better than a greeting en passant would have been serious political talk between the two leaders.
In my opinion, the results after one year of socialist foreign policy present a very positive balance. Over all these months, the socialist government has tried to explain to the White House and the State Department that Spain’s policy towards the US has not changed and that the disagreement with Washington is exclusively limted to its approach to the ‘war on terror’. As evidence for this attitude it should be remembered that the Spanish army has cooperated in its peace keeping missions in Afghanistan, and that the Zapatero government has recently accepted to increase the number of troops allocated to this crisis zone. Unfortunately, the The new positive attitude of the Spanish government readiness for normalisation of its bilateral relation to towards the EU was of course in the textbook of the the USA from the Spanish side did not seem to match socialist electoral programme. From the beginning on, the disposition for reconciliation from the other side of Rodriguez Zapatero has shown his intention of rap- the Atlantic. prochement to our European allies not only with words. He has also made it clear with deeds that he From the beginning of his mandate, Prime Minister wants to ‘put Spain back into the heart of Europe’, Zapatero has shown a considerable degree of stamina where it belongs. From the outset of his administra- to implement his main foreign policy engagement: the tion, this new atmosphere was clear. At the first sum- difficulty of the Iraq withdrawal. But he was also swift mit attended by the new Primer Minister, the main EU in getting his ‘Europe first’ priority on the way and leaders showed him their sympathy. Soon it became introduced a clear cut return to our Continental roots clear that Zapatero’s Spain was granted back a senior comprising full integration and active participation at status. This became evident in improved bilateral rela- the appropriate level in the EU institutions and also tionships with the major partners. There were soon improved bilateral relations with our fellow members. meetings between Chirac and Zapatero, reunions with Schröder and even trilateral gatherings of a renewed Aside from Europe, another main goal of the socialist Berlin-Madrid-Paris axis. Even Tony Blair (after all a government’s foreign policy was the restoration of a member of the socialist family) had to put up with the positive and constructive relationship with the USA, successor of his Iraq war allied Aznar. despite the rift on Iraq, in which Spain should be perceived and trusted as a dignified partner and not as a In its first year, this open pro-EU priority of the vassal. Here, it is relevant to recall the SpanishZapatero foreign policy has changed the atmosphere of American Transatlantic Declaration signed in Madrid in the Rumsfeldian ‘old and new Europe’ divide, eagerly 1995 by President Bill Clinton and socialist Prime promoted and embraced by Aznar. The Spanish turn- Minister Felipe González. This US-Spain relationship around was good for the current affairs of the should be reestablished on the basis of a reinforced Community and also positive for the reassessment of transatlantic link through both the EU and NATO as transatlantic relations through NATO. With its EU well as a good bilateral dialogue. After more than one comeback, Spain recovered its dignified role in the year, the Spanish disposition seems to be picking up Brussels and Strasburg scene. The atmosphere gave the momentum in the US administration. The April visit to impression of a ‘return to normality’ in international Madrid of the new US Undersecretary of State Robert relations after the rifts and traumas of the Iraq conflict. Zoellik sent a signal that Washington is also ready to mend fences with Madrid. In a newspaper interview, he The only exception of this positive atmosphere was the stated that US and Spain can be allies even with differnegative Madrid-Washington relationship. From the ences because good friends should tell each other day Zapatero announced his decision to withdraw the openly their disagreements. Spanish troops from Iraq, the conservative administration in Washington did not conceal its indignation. The objective of maintaining and enhancing Spain’s Their criticisms of the new Spanish government policy, traditionally privileged relations with Latin America is together with the contempt shown by their warlord also paramount for the socialist government. Donald Rumsfeld, sentenced the bilateral relations to a Therefore, Zapatero has taken advantage of the situavery problematic period of a mini cold war. This tion with many democratic and progressive governincluded various diplomatic snubs to Zapatero by Bush ments across Latin American to boost cooperation. whilst meeting frequently with Aznar. In his first visit This became especially evident in his joint initiatives to Brussels after his re-election, Bush reduced his con- with Brazilian President Lula, and his diplomatic versation to Zapatero to a dismissive greeting ‘Hola qué involvement in Venezuela and Colombia, which could 32 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
have important implications for peace in the guerrilla war and also in the fight against ‘narcotraffic’. For the new Spanish foreign policy, the Middle East is also an important priority. As it could not be otherwise, the government is trying to help to resolve the conflict as intermediary and within the international institutions. Spain has a long tradition in this mission. It has to be remembered that as early as 1991, the socialist Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez hosted the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference also attended by President George H. Bush; a meeting that opened hopes for a new negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians. Today, Spain is ready once again to try to help boost expectations for the peace process. As regards this endeavour, Spain’s Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos (a former EU envoy in the area for several years) could be instrumental with his knowledge of the problems and his acquaintance with the protagonists of the crisis zone. Finally on a wider, global perspective, Rodriguez Zapatero has offered a new formula for the fight against international terrorism and the struggle for peace and stability in today’s world. In his speech to the UN General Assembly, he proposed to the international community his concept of building an alliance of civilisations. He also repeated his ideas at the Arab League Summit in Cairo. Zapatero proposes to turn Samuel Huntigton’s more deterministic idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’ into a positive perspective by means of a worldwide dialogue to preserve peace and stability. Obviously, with the current challenges of international Islamic terrorism, this principle is not the instant panacea, but it is a noble and interesting idea worth to be explored in the immediate future for the sake of hope.
33 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
The End of Stability? by Angelica Schwall-Düren Deputy chairwoman of the SPD Parliamentary Group in the Bundestag
N
ow it has happened: the Stability Pact has been ‘watered down’, ‘overturned’, ‘torn up’, and many other formulations in the same vein. Ironically, the country which could not envisage a single European currency without a strict set of rules to keep a tight leash on those whose actions jeopardise stability, this country of all countries has been the strongest driving force behind the move away from the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The topic has dominated the headlines in recent days. The media is spreading an atmosphere of alarm. The Opposition, businessmen and bankers are all united in their belief
Our Currency is Surprisingly Strong, indeed, it Has Reached New Heights that the red-green government now intends to unabashedly continue building up ever more debt. Who is surprised? This country, the Federal Republic of Germany, has not only made no progress towards budget consolidation in recent years, but has also failed to meet the three per cent deficit criterion for the past three years. It hardly seems astonishing that the government should look for an easy way out, rather than trying to determine where it has gone wrong. But let’s set aside the rhetoric and focus on the substance. Critics of a single European currency were convinced that the euro would inevitably fail because it would not be sufficiently strong. Despite all the prophecies of doom, our currency is surprisingly strong, indeed, it has reached new heights. Monetary stability The rate of inflation in the eurozone is stable at under two per cent. While some EU countries have a higher domestic inflation rate, Germany has the lowest rate of all, and thus has made a crucial contribution to stability, indeed, is practically a stabilising force in and of itself! 34 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
Astonishingly, the strong euro has not yet hurt exports – a concern always loudly voiced whenever the European currency reached new heights. A country which is as export-oriented as Germany would be particularly hard hit by any negative effects of the exchange rate. However, savings on the import side should not be underestimated – the strong euro enables German companies and tourists to buy more cheaply abroad. Germany’s continuing exporting success must be attributed to the attractiveness of the products offered, companies’ productivity, and the success of the German economy. ‘German exporters’ trump card is their high level of competitiveness, which ... should improve further.’1 Nevertheless, one negative effect of the strong euro is making itself felt: real interest rates in Germany are higher than elsewhere (and Germany is thus making a greater contribution than other countries to the stability of the euro); this acts as a brake on our growth, since investment is an important motor for growth. Budget discipline Before joining the single currency, there was concern that many countries would (continue to) take a reckless approach to public finances and drive up debt. The Pact therefore set out the goal that each country should keep its debt below 60 per cent of GDP. This has not been achieved. Nonetheless, the Pact has had a stabilising influence.2 Debt largely stabilised in the eurozone at around 70 per cent of GDP between 2000 and 2006, although there are still very large differences between individual euro countries. Deficits have grown significantly smaller: between 1991 and 1995 they were still around 5.0 per cent of GDP, while in 2004 the average was around 2.9 per cent of GDP. As a result of the SGP, the eurozone is in a far better position than the USA and Japan in terms of fiscal policy. While the eurozone deficit was 2.9 per cent in 2004, the USA ran a deficit of 4.2 per cent, and Japan’s deficit was 7.1 per cent. If the long-awaited economic upturn occurs, the eurozone will be significantly less prone to inflation than the USA, which is running a double deficit (current account deficit, large government deficit), and Japan, which has been running a record deficit of over 7 per cent since 2000. Nevertheless, there is no denying that we have not made sufficient progress towards the aim of budget consolidation. In order to achieve sustainability, we must not waver in our efforts to meet this aim. The debate about which instruments are most suitable and promising, however, is still ongoing.
Three per cent deficit threshold The European Commission launched excessive-deficit procedures against Germany and France in November 2002 and April 2003 respectively, because both countries had breached the three per cent deficit threshold. Even Germany’s massive efforts at federal level, in terms of savings measures and social security reform, did not manage to reduce the deficit sufficiently. (Incidentally, it is important to note that the public budgets take into account not only the social security systems and the Federation, but also Germany’s Länder, or federal states, and local authorities). The cuts made have been painful for the citizens affected; moreover, scrapping popular programmes does not simply make life a little less comfortable, but instead often also involves job losses. Boosting growth However, budget consolidation was not the sole aim of the social security reforms. These reforms were also intended to boost growth through a reduction in non-wage labour costs and the introduction of greater labour market flexibility as a result of the Hartz reforms (one of the measures which the EU called for within the framework of the Lisbon Strategy and in its excessive-deficit procedure against Germany). Growth was also supposed to be boosted by tax reforms. Since 1998, businesses and individuals have benefited from more than 59 billion euros in tax relief. However, this has not generated sufficient growth; at the same time, public authorities have suffered huge drops in revenue while, on the expenditure side, high unemployment has meant that far more must be spent on benefits. Insufficient progress has been made on the issue which goes hand in hand with systematic tax relief, namely cutting subsidies, since the Opposition refuses to give its consent. A well-known example of this is the debate about scrapping the owner-occupied homes premium, or Eigenheimzulage. The leaders of the Opposition, Angela Merkel and Edmund Stoiber, show no movement on this issue in the ‘Pact for Germany’ proposed by the Opposition. On the other hand, the FDP and parts of the CDU are demanding cuts in subsidies to employees, in other words a group with a lower savings ratio. For example, they want premiums for working at nights and on public holidays to be taxed. Why has Germany not met the deficit threshold? Following 11 September 2001, the global economy suffered a sharp downturn; this was aggravated by the war in Iraq and the explosion in oil prices. Despite considerable success in terms of exports, these phenomena have had a dampening effect on Germany’s economic growth. The challenge of consolidating German unity means 35 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
that four per cent of GDP is transferred from western to eastern Germany, year after year, without this having thus far generated sufficient growth potential for self-supporting, lasting economic growth. The fact that the economy has been stagnating or, as was still the case in 2004, growing at too slow a rate, has meant that tax revenues have been too low and employment incentives have been inadequate. The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) rightly notes ‘that consolidation of public finances cannot succeed while the economy stagnates; from an economic perspective, such an aim should not even be pursued.’3 Consolidation should be pursued once the economic recovery has taken hold. Stability and Growth Pact There is one point on which all politicians and academics are agreed: growth in 2004 and the corresponding forecasts for 2005 give grounds for hope, but are far from sufficient to boost employment and thus make lasting progress towards consolidation of the public budgets. The only idea which the Opposition has to offer, however, is the motto ‘more of the same!’ In line with the ‘beer-mat tax’ proposed by Mr Merz – so called because it is designed to be so simple that tax returns can be worked out on the back of a beer mat – taxes are to be further reduced, even though the average tax burden in Germany is, at 21.5%, one of the lower rates in the EU. Further tax cuts, if not financed by cuts in other areas, would, however, only drive debt up further. At a high level cross-party meeting held on 17 March at the invitation of Federal Chancellor Schröder, a further cut in corporation tax was agreed. The Opposition now has a duty to prove that it is prepared to dismantle subsidies to prevent a new budget hole from opening up. How is growth boosted? The Stability and Growth Pact was drawn up during a period of strong economic growth, and phases of stagnation or even recession were insufficiently considered, or even wholly disregarded. Attention must therefore be paid to the causes of economic weakness, and we must examine to what extent the SGP deals with these causes. A similarly persistent phase of low macroeconomic growth was last observed in the early 80s. While exports are booming, domestic demand is weak. There has never been such a persistent divide of this kind in the past. The German Council of Economic Experts believes that this shows how fragile the economic recovery will remain unless shored up by significant domestic demand. The primary causes of the drop in consumption are the weakness of the labour market, the decline in the number of employees liable to social security contributions, and low increases in contractual and actual salaries and wages (+0.4%).4 Domestic demand has been far too weak in recent
years. The DIW believes that because pay rises continue to be low and job insecurity is declining only slightly, ‘private consumption will again be the Achilles’ heel of the German economy this year’.5 The level of public investment, particularly by local authorities, also continues to be much too low. ‘The main contributing factors to this have been declining employment and changes in disposable income. While private consumption recovered somewhat towards the end of the year, it did not expand strongly.’6 Further savings would, however, place a lasting brake on the recovery. The expansive effects of the tax cuts could be outweighed by this. Spending restraint aggravates stagnation. Procyclical policies are damaging! Proposals for reform Federal Chancellor Schröder drew severe criticism for his proposals, published in the Financial Times Deutschland, on how to deal with the SGP. He called – as have many other politicians and experts, incidentally – for a flexible interpretation of the SGP. This would mean that for each country, reforms and expenditure would both be examined to determine their positive impact on growth. In general, the macroeconomic situation would have to be considered; moreover, Member States’ payments promoting solidarity should be judged regarding the principle of sustainability. This was a reference both to horizontal transfers within the framework of European structural aid, and to investment for the future in education and research, or the years of transfers to Germany’s new federal states. It was not just the Opposition, parts of industry and the banking sector which reacted critically to these demands. Concerns were also expressed abroad. For example, Arnaud Leparmentier and Philippe Ricard asked in an article in Le Monde whether Germany was trying to pursue its interests at the expense of the other Member States. In their view, while Germany rejects the idea of gouvernement économique, it is asserting its economic interests in disputes with the European Commission (Volkswagen law, REACH, state banks), and on top of that now wants the SGP to be binding on other euro countries, but not apply to Germany. Flexible application Schröder is right to point out that a single policy is far from suitable for every Member State: ‘Twelve years after the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, however, it is clear that the EU economy is far too heterogeneous to be governed according to the principle of ‘one size fits all’.’7 For this reason, another new set of European rules, for example on how to define a ‘good period’ in economic terms, will not, by itself, achieve anything. Instead, it is dangerous to want to regulate different situations with supposedly objective criteria that apply to all – which would, in fact, be just as impossible as the mechanistic application of the 3% 36 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
and 60% thresholds. The basic rules of the Pact, namely that public debt may not be allowed to rise above 60 per cent and the budget deficit may not grow to more than three per cent, are to be maintained. This ensures that in future, budget consolidation and monetary stability will continue to be taken seriously and pursued. This primarily requires Member States to intensify their efforts to consolidate their budgets during phases of good growth. At the same time, it will in future be possible to avoid the Stability and Growth Pact acting as a procyclical brake on growth, and thus a period of stagnation or economic downturn being extended. In future, Member States’ net financial contributions to European integration will also be taken into consideration as an element of the overall evaluation, as will structural reforms promoting savings in the medium term. The consolidation process in the case of excessive deficits can be better tailored to the economic situation and the real options open to Member States, for example by allowing them a period of up to three years to meet the deficit threshold. Economic policy Taking into consideration the specific situation of the individual countries regarding stability and growth factors does not simplify the tasks of the Commission and the Council. Since the mechanistic application of the Pact is now to be scrapped, this requires an intensive dialogue and a time-consuming consensus-building process, since decision-making by the Commission and the Council weigh the principle of equal treatment against the need to make macroeconomic distinctions. In order to avoid the danger of consensusbuilding turning into a process of naming, blaming and shaming (the effectiveness of which has in any case thus far proven to be limited), this kind of ‘European coordination’ can only take place on the basis of cooperation on equal terms and in a spirit of partnership. 1 Wochenbericht DIW Berlin, No. 1 – 2/2005, ‘Grundlinien der Wirtschaftsentwicklung’ (basic outlines of economic development) 2005 / 2006, p. 16 2 Ognian N. Hishow, SWP-Zeitschriftenschau, ‘Stabilitätspakt, Lissabon-Ziele und Euro-Erweiterung’ (stability pact, Lisbon goals and euro-enlargement), January 2005, p. 2 3 DIW, ibid., p. 31 4 Annual report of the Council of Economic Experts for the Assessment of General Economic Trends of 18.11.2004, pp. 6-7 5 DIW, ibid., p. 14 6 DIW, ibid., p. 17 7 Hishow, ibid., p. 4
The Changing Economy and Social Fabric – Challenges Faced by the New Member States of the European Union by Andrievs Janis Folkmanis, Economic and European Affairs Adviser to the President of Latvia
O
ur economic age brings many phenomena with it, which we are only beginning to understand. If the industrial age saw the search for productivity, with all its demographic and social implications, we are now living in an era where industrial production is highly rationalised, so that about 60 per cent of our economic activity is now services to support our opulent lifestyle, to develop our personal
In a Broad Sense, this shift in Economic Balance does not differ a great deal between “Old” and “New” Member States.
tools for orientation, for coping with relationships and institutions at many different levels. Correspondingly, new basic skills are needed to master these situations. In a broad sense, this shift in economic balance does not differ a great deal between ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states. If western industrial production becomes obsolete and must be refreshed with new investments thanks to technological change, eastern European industry collapses to a large degree following the breakup of the Eastern Bloc and the national statistics show that most growth in these countries is now coming from the services sector. With different histories and conditions, the economic balance appears to be heading in the same direction. If these new basic skills are absent, difficulties experienced by the individual accumulate, leading to frustration and compounding the lack of ability to perform. Blockage eventually ensues, of the individual performance and very soon at the levels of groups or institutionalised movements, which take up the agenda of their members. The European population already senses this need in a general and intuitive way1 by placing education and training at the top of the list of needs to strengthen possibilities in the labour market.
This skills gap in our new economy will not be the only new need which can produce such blocking effects if it remains unresolved. If the Luddites of the 19tth century had a direct grievance with new technological ambitions as well as industrial production, which runs apparatus2 that directly reduced jobs in textile plant, as invisibly as possible in the background. the real agents and barriers to change today (such as lack of new basic skills) are much harder for policyThe impact of this new balance of economic activity makers and social partners to identify. on the social existence of the individual is multifaceted. The recent debate on the EU services directive3 was indicative of the current debate. While the European On the one hand, the social situation in Western Commission promotes the extension of the single marEurope is much better than in the past. Positioning in ket to services aggressively, the real difficulties lying at the corresponding labour markets is possible with ‘soft’ the root of this new labour market start to emerge and skills (communication, organisation, time-management, are rightly flagged by the social partners. languages) and less attention is paid to specialised skills in the large general services markets. The ratio of The debate over the services directive has taken us physically dangerous jobs is greatly reduced. The serv- some of the way, but a deeper understanding of the ices industry faces you at every move you make, provid- new labour markets is needed based on focused study ing you with information, orientation support and var- work on key issues. Such knowledge needs time to ious communications and mobility services – so that emerge and mature, so it cannot be hoped that by 2010 undertaking the operations you need to, for private or (the Lisbon target date) this work will have been comprofessional purposes, is easier and more efficient. pleted. Nevertheless, undertaking it in parallel with the Lisbon social agenda will surely enrich and sharpen On the other hand, as new efficiencies increase, the both. speed at which transactions and operations are undertaken, the pace and stress-levels for the engaged indi- The new Lisbon agenda, and the High Level Group on vidual are increased. The multiplication of people and Lisbon4 which gave a harsh critique of the original players, of institutions and rules, give a variety and Lisbon agenda, places education needs among its key complexity which need more and more sophisticated priorities. However, education does not take immediate 37 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
effect, it is a progressive process. If the new skills gap is really one of the most urgent of issues that the new Lisbon agenda needs to resolve, how must the remainder of the social agenda be designed, what is needed, so that the societies of Europe do not suffer too greatly until the skills gap is closed?
Public subsidies for utilities and transport were a standard feature of the Eastern Bloc and a key domestic selling point of the regimes. Today, with energy prices rising unremittingly and the progressive privatisation of transport sectors leading to reductions in public service and much more diversity in prices and service quality, the working population in new member states is faced Is the picture of social conditions and evolution equiv- with rapidly increasing prices and costs for these servalent in the new and old EU member states? Not ices, coupled with reduced service and quality. entirely. Accelerating industrial production was an Everything gets worse! achievement of the pre-war era in Russia, albeit at terrible human cost. The regimes in eastern European It is for this reason that in some states the political parstates did largely succeed in eliminating private partici- ties have found themselves compelled to retain some pation industry, but working conditions lagged behind level of subsidy, to retain state interests in enterprises partly due to a different tradition of expectancies of which they would otherwise most likely privatise. This the working population. The thresholds for working phenomenon of course has a negative influence on the conditions achieved in the west were higher through EU liberalisation agenda, sometimes leading to the union action, than the thresholds set and enforced (or state not fulfilling its promises to the EU in implementnot) by the communist governments in the east. ing EU legislation on the single market. If for the individual personal profits were greatly limited, the social welfare net in the Eastern Bloc was real The European Social Fund (ESF) could in principle and effective. The normal serve to cushion these soviet citizen occasionally effects, by providing the suffered through incompeDoes this extreme shift from social affairs ministries of tences in a large and the new member states with bureaucratised system, but maximal to minimal social much needed funds. This is where in these very diverse already happening, but to a territories the system services generate something new? limited degree. Fund allocaworked as it was designed, tion to priorities and the health care and other pubstyle of instruments used lic social services were readily available and of reason- will surely need to be tuned to real needs as experience ably good quality at very modest cost to the citizen. grows. Even at its best, ESF cannot be a durable solution, but will tend to create space for manoeuvre for As a result, the least well-off in the population had no policy-makers and raise hopes again. One likely posidifficulties when it came to obtaining social and health tive result will be that politics will find it difficult to services. If difficulty or even poverty existed, it was lower the bar of social standards later on. due to mismanaged planning5, corrupt bureaucracies which were excessively draining the system or failure of infrastructure or similar technical components of the In these arguments we find elements which can lead us system. The threshold of service achieved in the east- to reflect whether a new ‘social model’ has emerged in ern regimes, if not higher, had much less variation the east? Does this extreme shift from maximal to minacross earnings brackets compared to the west, so that imal social services generate something new? Probably for the lower earnings brackets the eastern system was not. The pragmatic force of circumstance which has better than in the west. For upper earnings brackets led to the choice of a sparse social net is not a deliberhigher quality could be achieved in the west thanks to ate or conceptually structured solution. Surely though, more readily available technology, but the cost was it can be converted into one and this is probably hapmuch higher. pening, also by force of circumstance and without plan or reflexion. The transition out of the legacy of the Eastern Bloc system has left a society in the new member states with By necessity, but not by choice, the Anglo-Saxon high expectations on the availability of social and approach to welfare as a system of last resort becomes health services. These expectancies cannot be fulfilled the model by default. It is objectively cheaper for the today, as the states have low national revenues and can- state, and politically easier to argue for. With the state not afford to pay for good quality public services for constraining its social responsibility, much responsibiliall. At the same time, the collapse and restructuring of ty for social protection falls onto the shoulders of the the economies results in large pressure on wages, while individual, who is neither ready nor equipped to deal the consumer prices of private social and health servic- with the situation properly. With this extreme swing of es grow inexorably. Dissatisfaction of the people is the pendulum from a maximalist to a minimalist social rife. Democratic institutions are not sufficiently model, the shock effect on the social sphere is unsurmature, the political playing field too rough, to lead eas- prising. ily to a new balance for social and health services. Without adequate democratic instruments in place, the 38 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
people cannot object, even if they were psychologically disposed to do so, which they probably are not, being conditioned from the past, that complaint only generates punishment. In such examples we are beginning to see the more profound and lasting effects of the earlier regime, not as spectacular as concentration camps, but in their own way just as disastrous for society. At the same time, new corporate players actively oppose a strong public social net, fearing increased taxes and hoping to benefit from the emergence of private social and health services.
with new players emerging, with old players dressing up differently and reappearing. Pensions increases are a very effective populist programme, as they immediately summon support not only from the aged, but also from their children, now professionally active, who are afraid that the burden of supporting their parents will fall to them and are relieved that the state is picking up some of the bill. This is the entire non-bourgeois population, and the nouveau-bourgeois in these states is rich but small and not very concerned about pensions. Political push, with no political counter-pressure is constrained only by budget discipline. This discipline is clearly fragile and at some stage could well collapse. The result would be exactly the heavy-spending problem for pensions with which the western European states already find themselves burdened.
This tendency is unequal through. The new member states and the political and social pressures in the states are by no means the same. Some have retained more social welfare than others. The difference between urban and rural populations is large, and much depends also on how extensively industrial production and farming have found new investors and markets. Putting these pressures together, there is pressure in the Nevertheless, common trends as described are visible. new member states for pensions to increase, but much less upward pressure for other social and health services. So, as national budgCan Corporate Social et becomes available for Responsibility (CSR) play a role social issues through in the new member states? If growth of the economy, EU efforts to strengthen the there will be a tendency CSR agenda since 2002 are to use it up for pensions laudable, there are many critics at the cost of other and by no means full acceptservices. This is exactly ance by employers. The typical the opposite of the corporation in the new member states has even less Lisbon strategy! For this reason, Lisbon is of the tendency to participate. Those companies which have utmost importance, to counteract this effect. survived the very robust competitive environment of the 1990’s in these countries will typically have little time for the social sphere. It can be asked, how much If a basic objection to the EU services directive, that it voluntary support is possible? If this turns out to be does not adequately take new labour markets into very low, legislation and incentives may be the only way account, is fully justified, there is a sad aspect of this forward to ensure minimal social standards. debate, which seeks to protect relatively rich western workers from their poorer colleagues in the east. This debate even goes so far, as to start back-pedalling on If social and health services are a burden on the state enlargement! budget, at least they are conditional upon the state of welfare of the population. If you succeed at improving The European Charter of Fundamental Rights has the people’s lot, the cost will go down. Not so for pen- been adopted as part of European policy and legislative sions. The cost of the social net becomes prohibitive, base6. The Charter has many features which make it a as pensions index upwards and our society ages. The natural candidate to be fully integrated into the challenge is well-known. It has been studied extensive- Constitutional Treaty, as the Draft Treaty proposes. ly and the sums are clear – there is no technocratic bar- One very important component is the solidarity chaprier to finding solutions. Of course, political resolution ter, a feature which is to be found nowhere else in of the pensions explosion is unsurprisingly proving European legislation. extremely difficult, as any measures to reduce pensions will be politically highly unpopular. The new protectionism of labour markets in the west, even if it is very understandable in the context of In the new member states we have the same phenome- increasing unemployment and slow growth, is at odds non as for other social services. There is no money, so with solidarity. The losers of such a process will be the the solutions for pensions are today minimalist by force workers of Eastern Europe. Where is solidarity across of circumstance, as low as local political conditions borders if we let this happen? The end effect for new allow. member states could be tragic, as the prevention of mobility east-west of workers will weaken the already But there is a trap. New political forces emerge contin- weak position of employee representatives, leading ually, the landscape of political players is very volatile, eventually to larger social imbalances and diminishing
The Losers of such a Process will be the Workers of Eastern Europe
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political capital.
1 See Eurobarometer 2004
It is clear that the west can help and can take seriously the principle of European solidarity as embodied in the Charter. It is not clear if the current tendency to selfishness will allow this. Clearly, there need to be transition measures and some restrictions to prevent or cushion shocks. But these should be agreed in the spirit of solidarity and not by creating a labour fortress of Western Europe.
2 power-driven weaving looms 3 COM (2004) 2 final 4 HLG Report, EU, November 2004 5 eg the Ukraine famine of 1932/33 6 at the Nice EU Summit in December 2000
The European social agenda7 as recently presented by the Commissioner for employment, social affairs and 7 COM (2005) 33 final equal opportunity, Vladimir Spidla, promises to develop solutions for EU 25. This is a major challenge for the Commission and the EU. A number of these policy elements have been on the social agenda before and in particular linked to the original Lisbon agenda, which has been harshly criticised recently by the member states and by the High Level Group report. Following the EU Summit of March 2005, and the presentation of the social agenda to the European Parliament which preceded this, it will be necessary to find new angles on these policies, to get a strong grip, in order to reach the new targets set by the Summit of March 2005. The new social agenda gives us all much homework to do. In the above, attention is focussed on those domains of social policy where there is a difference between the new and old member states. These differences exist, and can lead us to the conclusion that for these issues, the implementation of the social agenda must have special characteristics in these states to resolve these specific trends. This article has concentrated on the aspects of a social state which differ between old and new EU member states. There are of course serious social challenges which the states have in common, which are not addressed here, such as long-term unemployment, social inclusion, discrimination. This should not be interpreted as deeming them to be unimportant, on the contrary, they are central to the Commission’s new social agenda, but it is easier to identify them as being susceptible to the same or very similar solutions in all EU states, the intensity of measures differing regarding the intensity of the problem, but not according to the economic and social history of the member states. If the Lisbon agenda places increasing focus on the social agenda, this is surely correct. Entrepreneurship and technological change will drive our economies forward, but the citizen must not be allowed to be caught in the wheels of change and suffer from this. We must steer this progress, so that the citizen gains, wherever he or she is living in the European Union.
40 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005
Endnotes
We would like to express our special gratitude to ChloÊ Aublin, Stephen Barber and Bernd Spanier who helped a great deal in the development of this issue. All rights reserved Social Europe Forum Š 2005
41 Social Europe the journal of the european left May 2005