/Report-on-Living-in-a-Low-Carbon-Society-FIN by Global Utmaning

Living in a Low-Carbon Society What needs to be done to create an environment conducive to promoting a Low-Carbon Society and what does this imply for its citizens?

Scientific Coordinators: Lund University Universidad Aut贸noma de Madrid Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

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Living in a Low-Carbon Society What needs to be done to create an environment conducive to promoting a Low-Carbon Society and what does this imply for its citizens?

Preface One of the grand challenges that the world will have to face in the coming decades is the transition to a Low-Carbon Society. Although today the governance and economic issue of the debate have taken priority, the role of the individual citizens will play an important role in the transition to a Low-Carbon Society. In recognition of the complexities of this issue and the vastness of the subject the Permanent Platform of Atomium Culture organised the writing of this Report and the High-Level Workshop on Living in a Low-Carbon Society (HLW) to stimulate new insights and ideas from bringing together leading thinkers from university, industry, media and policy makers to discuss on the real issues and barriers of this debate. Atomium Culture brings together some of the most authoritative universities, newspapers and businesses in Europe in the first permanent platform for European excellence to promote the exchange and dissemination of the most forward looking new ideas: across borders, across sectors and to the public at large. A strong belief in the importance of sustainable collaborations, open communication and inclusion brings these actors together to create a nonpartisan setting where all stakeholders share their knowledge in order to create a whole picture that is bigger and clearer than the sum of the individual contributions. This report and the HLW want to create a comprehensive, intersectorial and interdisciplinary forum in order to create a credible and realistic medium for the public at large to access and understand the complexities of the debate; to outline the challenges, the possible solutions and innovative ways of implementing these. We want to thank all the people involved in the effort of writing this Report. Valuable contributions have been made by Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Lund University, the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU (Ministry for Climate and Energy), Bayer, Shell, Siemens, Zero Emissions Platform, CIUDEN and the European Climate Foundation. The writing of the report was coordinated by Hans Bruyninckx (KUL), Miguel Buñuel (UAM) and Erika Widegren (Atomium Culture) with written contributions from Global Utmaning, Johannes Stripple (Lund University), Matthew Paterson (University of Ottawa), Antonella Battaglini (Renewables-Grid Initiative), Ron van Erck (European Commission), Jan Coen van Elburg (RESHARE) and Sander van den Burg (Wageningen University). A special thanks goes to the workshop participants who invested their time and effort in completing this report.

Valéry Giscard d’Estaing

(Honorary President and President of Atomium Culture)

Michelangelo Baracchi Bonvicini

Index 8

Interview with European Commissioner Connie Hedegaard

An Economic Perspective: The Transition to a New Sustainable Energy Model

Introduction

An Economic Perspective on Energy Efficiency

An Economic Perspective on Renewables

An Economic Perspective on CCS

Market Based Policy

An Economic Perspective on Social Behaviour

A Sociological Perspective: Living in a Low-Carbon Society

Introduction

Current Trends: Future Images & Perceptions

Technologies: Energy Efficiency

Technologies: Renewables

Technologies: CCS

Public Acceptance

Changing Behaviour: Strategies and Tools

Key Issues for Making the Transition

Conclusions

Sharing Session

Recommendations

Outcomes

Interview with European Commissioner for Brussels, 15 November 2010 What are the expectations of the European Commission for Cancun? Will it be possible to achieve a legally binding framework? […I]f Europe could decide then we would get a legally binding deal, we were ready in Copenhagen and we are still ready. What we say is: we will not get that done by Mexico so let’s try to focus on substance. Can we get an agreement on forestry? Can we get a framework for adaptation? How to help developing countries be much more resilient to climate impacts? In the fields of adaptation, forestry and by the way also technology, there were substantial progresses in the formal negotiations in Copenhagen so the world ought to be able to agree and deliver these three things. Then we have said we must also deliver the ‘fast start’ pledges given by developed countries in Copenhagen. And then we say it’s also very important that whatever we agree on can be measured, recorded and verified; how to secure transparency. How can we then control they are actually delivering what they say, that’s what this is about. We also would like to see some modernisation of carbon market and, final point, we would very much like that all the submissions now under the Copenhagen accord, which has been done by 137 countries and 70 of them have submitted under the Copenhagen accord pledges to reduce somehow, we would like to see that sort of translated into the formal negotiation text so we at least have that in the formal negotiations to build upon to South Africa. The whole idea being if we can first agree in substance and everybody can see “what’s in it for me” then it might be easier afterwards to agree on a legal framework. That is what we hope to get out of Cancun in order to secure

momentum and in order to agree on things that can lead to immediate action after Cancun. I could also put it another way: if Cancun delivers nothing or not much then I would really fear that the international negotiations will wane; at this level things never stop formally but in reality people would start to lose their patience. Do you think that member states share this mood of urgency? Is the interest in the climate change issue waning? I can understand if people think maybe we can just set this aside, maybe we can wait. Now the irony is it’s actually not people doing so. We have to create more energy and resource efficient kind of growth. But many leaders realize that only the regions that would become the most energy efficient and most resource efficient will be best suited to take markets, to create jobs, to have sound economics in the future. I think that that is one thing that has changed quite a bit; if we go say 18 months back when the climate debate was very much on 2 degrees and 450 ppm and all these kind of statistical things, which are still important, but I think that now it has been communicated actually to people, to business, to politicians, to governments that what it’s basically about is how do we create the growth that we need. When my children will be my age, there will be 9 billion people on planet earth compared to 6.7 billions now; so even the worst climate sceptics will have to admit that no matter what, we have to get much more energy efficient growth. That’s why the Commission in our 2020 strategy said that intelligent climate policies will at the same time also increase our energy security and. if we do it intelligently, it can also benefit our growth and our innovation and it can be sort of push for innovations and by that also for jobs.

Climate Action Connie Hedegaard And, I know that some would say yes we know this but now we are focusing on the crisis, can we come back and talk about these when we have exited the crisis? My point is I actually do not actually subscribe to the views that it’s just the matter of few months and then we are out of the crisis. I think we are being challenged in a more structural way ; the way we have built societies in Europe, the welfare system that we have built up, the way we are financing them, the salaries, the level of salaries we have , the tax level we have, the number of holidays we have, retirement schemes, etc. I mean there are so many areas where, if you ask the man on the street, no matter if it’s in Belgium or it’s in Denmark or in Italy, they will say “we want to have this model” but that means we are being challenged a lot by China, by Korea, by Mexico, by Brazil by a lot of countries.

Will the EU go beyond 20% reductions?

As far as I can see one of the areas where we actually still have a lead that is in innovation and that is in energy efficient products, there are a few others but we should really take care to further develop the areas where we have a front runner position. Just to give one example that I think it’s a telling example as to how fast we are being challenged: I come from a country where it took 30 years to build a world brand in wind; ten years ago China did not have one wind manufacturer; today they have three in the global top 10. They say themselves that they will have two in the global top 5 within 5 years. In less than ten years they came from zero to 50% of the global market. That is just one example; you could make exactly the same example for solar except there their share of global market is even bigger.

Some people say that these state driven policies which are the “institutional incremental System of environmental regime creation” that they are functional but they are not sufficient because we are now globally at plus 37 % emission instead of a decrease and latest what OECD Report by 2030 predict plus 58% emissions as a “guesstimate”. First question: how are you perceiving this sort of context where you are working to get an accord that in the grand scheme of things, we all know, has limited impact to a certain extent or until now has a limited impact on the global emissions? Secondly, some people are saying that because of that inefficiency until now of that incremental statist system we should move more to societal instruments, how do you react to these points?

So I think that when we are thinking on how to exit the crisis, where to create the jobs, etc. we should be very very conscious to invest a lot in innovation, in research and development and cooperation in this field.

Our offer is still on the table provided others will come up with some targets; then we are ready to go to 30%. If you ask: is likely to happen? No it’s not. The Americans will not deliver anything more because they do not have the legislation. They even haven’t got the17 % through the Senate. They do not know how to live up to the 17 % that President Obama pledged in Copenhagen. So it’s not very likely. But the EU is only accounting for 14% of global emissions, soon coming down to 13%.We must have China and the US, the world’s biggest two emitters, they must be into the whole equation also so that is where the pressure should be.

First I want to say one thing: 1 year before Copenhagen Europe was more or less alone in setting targets; in the last six months up to Copenhagen, Russia came forward with their targets, so did Japan… significantly. A lot of countries which up to then they had never set targets

before suddenly set domestic targets: Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Singapore, India , South Africa, China in the end. Just to say some of the world’s biggest economies for the first time ever, because their leaders had to face world opinion in Copenhagen, set domestic targets. That’s at least a rather important step. I am sure up to a certain point it is true that a bottomup approach can be significant, but I must also say that based on Europe’s 30 or 40 year experience with environmental legislation we know that: yes business will do something and you will always have some kind of innovation but when you put up standards, regulations, requirements, targets then it pushes innovation forward faster than what else would be the case. When the time factor matters as it does according to the science then targets is a good way of getting things done faster. I still believe that this is important although I think that it’s not so much an either/or because we could internationally set all the targets we wanted but if people not mentally started to do things differently, did not sort of say “oh it makes sense that I retrofit my house or insulate my cellar or basement or whatever” then we would never live up to these targets. So it’s both; politicians should set the targets, business should come with the innovative solutions and citizens should say “oh why is all this lighting on or what about this air-conditioner and this product that I am going to buy: is it energy category A or is it F? and all these kind of things. You are also working in the field of connecting macro level policies to people’s choices. Some people talk about the concept of informational governance by providing basic information to citizens they make different choices. Think of the energy labelling where which as basically put out of production not that the badly performing appliances. Could we do the same through carbon labelling

on all products in European Union. We would have a carbon label which would give basically CO2 or greenhouse gas information to consumers? I am all for in a lot of contexts to make it much more visible and easy for people, citizens to make an informed choice. I am a bit sceptical with sort of carbon footprint because it can very easily grow into a very bureaucratic and complicated sort of procedure. So I think that it’s very important that these labelling systems are easy. If we have all these “E numbers” it grows to something that you just have to ignore because what can you do as a citizen? So I think car labelling it must be visible when I buy a car; what is the fuel consumption here? How much does it use per kilometre and things like that. As we already have the energy labelling for a lot of commodities .when I sell my house, it should be very visible, when I advertise it exactly what is the monthly cost: is it energy category A, B, C, D whatever. That kind of things where I can very easily as a consumer, as a citizen rate this is good this is bad; that kind of information should be very easily available to people. And that I think we could do things at European level.

An Economic Perspective: The Transition to a New Sustainable Energy Model

The writing of this section of the report was coordinated by Miguel Bu帽uel (Universidad Aut贸noma de Madrid) and Erika Widegren (Atomium Culture) with written contributions from Global Utmaning. Valuable contributions have been made by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Lund University, the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU (Ministry for Climate and Energy), Bayer, Shell, Siemens, Zero Emissions Platform, CIUDEN and the European Climate Foundation.

Introduction The Report on Governance for a Low-Carbon Society tried to anticipate and analyze the unprecedented challenges for political institutions and processes posed by the governance of transitions for a low-carbon society, and explore possible ways forward. The present report builds upon the Report on Governance for a Low-Carbon Society, taking its low-carbon future scenarios as a departing point, and providing an economic perspective on the three key mitigation options that it identifies: energy efficiency, renewable energy, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Our study also builds upon the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. The Stern Review’s main conclusion is that the benefits of strong, early action on climate change considerably outweigh the costs. It proposes that 1% of global gross domestic product (GDP) per annum is required to be invested in order to avoid the worst effects of climate change, and that failure to do so could risk global GDP being up to 20% lower than it otherwise might be. In June 2008 Stern increased the estimate to 2% of GDP to account for faster than expected climate change.

The overwhelming scientific consensus is that the cause of that accelerated climate change is the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) from human activity. These constantly increasing emissions pose a serious challenge for the energy sector. The global economy is set to grow four-fold between now and 2050 and growth could approach ten-fold in developing countries like China and India. This promises economic benefits and huge improvements in people’s standards of living, but also involves much more use of energy. Unsustainable pressure on natural resources and on the environment is inevitable if energy demand is not de-coupled from economic growth and fossil fuel demand reduced. According to the International Energy Agency’s Energy Technology Perspectives 2008, today’s best estimates under its “business-as-usual” baseline scenario foreshadow a 70% increase in oil demand by 2050 and a 130% rise in CO2 emissions. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a rise in CO2 emissions of such magnitude could raise global average temperatures by 6°C. The consequences would be significant change in all aspects of life and irreversible change in the natural environment. It is therefore clear that we need a global revolution in the ways that energy is supplied and used, resulting in a new sustainable energy model. This new model requires far greater energy efficiency, and that renewable energies and CCS be deployed on a massive scale. A dramatic shift is needed in government policies, notably creating a higher level of long-term policy certainty over future demand for low carbon technologies, upon which industry’s decision makers can rely. Unprecedented levels of co-operation among all major economies will be crucial, bearing in mind that less than one-third of “business-asusual” global emissions in 2050 are expected to stem from OECD countries.

Advancing in that co-operation, the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, held last December in Copenhagen, should have agreed on a framework for climate change mitigation beyond 2012. In lieu of this framework for the post-Kyoto world, the Copenhagen Accord is not legally binding and does not contain any legally binding commitments for reducing CO2 emissions. Nevertheless, the document recognizes that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of the present day and that actions should be taken to keep any temperature increases to below 2Â°C, which has always been the target of the EU. The EU and its Member States have confirmed their target to limit the global average temperature increase to 2Â°C compared with pre-industrial levels because this is the point beyond which the impact of climatic change is believed to increase dramatically. As a step towards reaching that target, the European Commission calls for the EU to set the target in international negotiations of reducing GHG emissions in developed countries by 30% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020. Until an international agreement is made, the EU has already made the resolute and independent commitment to reduce its own emissions by at least 20% by 2020. In particular, the EU officially adopted the so called 20-20-20 Directive over a year ago, setting climate change reduction goals for the next decade. The targets call for a 20% reduction in GHG emissions by 2020 compared with 1990 levels, a 20% cut in energy consumption through improved energy efficiency by 2020, and a 20% share of renewable energy on EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s total energy consumption by 2020. The commitment of Europe to move towards a low-carbon society shows the importance of following the path opened by the Report on Governance for a Low Carbon Society by focusing now on the economics of energy effi-

ciency, renewable energies, and CCS. For this reason, this report centers first on the benefits and costs of the main three technologies available to mitigate climate change. The particular benefits and costs of energy efficiency, renewable energies, and CCS will be studied in the following three sections. A summary of benefits and costs is also provided. The economic perspective offered in this report on the transition to a new sustainable energy model continues considering two other key issues in the last two sections: the use of market based policies, as an essential tool for the successful implementation of the technologies considered, and social behavior, which needs to change beyond what is possible just using market based instruments.

An international Climate Investment Community The idea of an International Climate Investment Community is to be seen as a complementary approach to the stalled UN negotiations. The EU is the global leader in clean tech export but other parts of the world, mainly Asian countries, are determined to win “the green race”. The EU has a comprehensive and ambitious climate strategy and should use its position to take the initiative and give new momentum to energy investments, thus turning climate mitigation policies into a strategy for growth.

There is a general agreement among leading global institutions that: - An energy revolution, based on widespread deployment of low-carbon technologies, is needed to tackle the climate change challenge; - A low carbon future is also a powerful tool for promoting economic development and enhancing energy security – it is within reach and will help modernise our economies.

To be successful, a low-carbon economy should be based on market principles in which energy technologies are spread primarily through commercial transactions. The report of Global Utmaning, published in October 2010, suggests that the EU should take the initiative to build an International Climate Investment Community together with partners around the world that share the same concerns about climate change. Such a community should have the double aim of tackling the political deadlock, and giving new momentum to climate mitigation investment. It should include four basic elements: 1- Focus on investments and business opportunities, rather than regulations of emissions to let member states benefit from being forerunners. 2- A technology neutral CO2-price as a driver of new technology and investments, rather than subsidies. 3- A step-by step approach in building a community of member states, rather than a global deal signed by every government and ratified by all parliaments, 4- Governance based on the open method of coordination, rather than a comprehensive global legal system.

The great strengths of establishing such a Community is that it can grow step by step – much like the European Community grew from six to 27 members, based on a set of jointly agreed rules and principles (acquis communautaire). A gradual approach based on established rules and an agreed organization could over the years grow into something that resembles a global framework, with considerable impact on investments and the development and diffusion of new, carbon-efficient technology. Global Utmaning (Global Challenge) is a nonprofit think tank that aims at spreading the knowledge of globalisation and its implications for democracy, sustainable development, and prosperity in the broadest sense.

An Economic Perspective on Energy Efficiency A new energy efficient technology for chlorine production Roughly 68 Million tons of chlorine can be produced every year in the existing global capacities, most of them could be much more energy efficient. Electrochemical chlorine production, for instance, consumes up to 3500 kWh per ton of chlorine produced. This is one of the most energy-intensive processes in the chemical industry. Large quantities of chlorine are used for the production of plastics and also for the manufacture of pharmaceuticals. Currently, chlorine is mainly produced using the so called â&#x20AC;&#x153;membraneâ&#x20AC;? process however current research is developing an innovative technology for chlorine production: the oxygendepolarized cathode technology. By feeding in gaseous oxygen, the new technology enables electrolysis to be performed at a lower voltage ultimately reducing by 30 percent the electricity required and, as a consequence, realizing an indirect reduction in CO2 emissions. The EU 27 capacity for chlorine production capacity amounts to roughly 11 million tons, requiring about 29 million MWh/a of electricity. Over 90% of this capacity is produced with NaCl electrolysis and using either membrane, diaphragm or mercury technologies. Roughly 3 million tons are still being produced with mercury cells for which the electricity savings potential even amounts up to 50%. This technology will have to be replaced by 2020. If all operating NaCl electrolysis plants in the EU 27 were converted to the new process, an estimated annual CO2 reduction potential of 4 million tons could be achieved.

Energy efficiency is not only a requirement for climate change mitigation policies, but for overall economic efficiency. In many occasions, improving energy efficiency is a win-win option that may help to simultaneously reduce GHG emissions and input costs in many economic processes. As assessed in the Report on Governance for a Low-Carbon Society, the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007) shows energy conservation and efficiency play the second largest role in attaining climate stabilization targets in most models up to 2030 (Figure 1). As the time frame increases to 2100 and the emission reduction targets get more ambitious, the importance of energy efficiency decreases in comparison to other options, but it still remains very important.

Figure 1: Cumulative emission reductions for different mitigation measures for 2000–2030 and for 2000–2100

Note: The figure shows illustrative scenarios from four models (AIM, IMAGE, IPAC and MESSAGE) aiming at stabilization at low (490–540 ppm CO2-eq) and intermediate levels (650 ppm CO2-eq) respectively. Dark bars denote reductions for a target of 650 ppm CO2-eq and light bars the additional reductions to achieve 490–540 ppm CO2-eq. Source: IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Fig. TS 10.

The importance of energy efficiency seems even larger according to the International Energy Agency (IEA)â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s World Energy Outlook 2009. As shown in Figure 2, the IEA estimates that energy efficiency will be responsible in 2020 for 65% of the energy-

related CO2 emissions abatement necessary for stabilizing the level of GHG at 450 ppmv, and for 57% in 2030. In the case of the EU, these percentages are 46% and 35%.

Figure 2: World energy-related CO2 emissions abatement

Source: IEA (2009): World Energy Outlook 2009, Paris: IEA

Figure 3: EU energy-related CO2 emissions abatement

Source: IEA (2009): World Energy Outlook 2009, Paris: IEA.

ready existing opportunities are yet to be incorporated fully into the capital stock. For instance, the substitution of old-vintage vehicles by new and more efficient ones keeps increasing the average efficiency of car fleets, and the replacement of incandescent lights by new diodebased ones will produce great reductions in the energy intensity of lighting.

Energy efficiency technologies can be found throughout the energy system, from power plants to end-use consumers, and involve everything that allows us to do more with less energy. Therefore, energy efficiency technologies save energy resources, which in turn means reducing CO2 emissions. They may also reduce overall spending for businesses, households, and public administrations, which makes sense from an economic perspective. This is because energy efficiency can sometimes be attained at negative costs, since there are plenty of hidden inefficiencies that firms, households and public administrations can root out, saving money in the process. In these cases, increasing energy efficiency provides just benefits at no cost. The Stern Review on the economics of climate change, for instance, provides some good examples of reducing business costs through tackling climate change by increasing efficiency. The technical potential for increasing energy efficiency to reduce emissions and costs is substantial. On the one hand, many energy-saving innovations will be developed in the future, and are much sought after, particularly by energy-intensive industries. On the other hand, many al-

Therefore, in the short term, energy efficiency plays a fundamental role in mitigating climate change because it can be increased at negative or low costs. This is clear when we look at the economic mitigation potential in 2030 in the different sectors of the economy. According to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, buildings have the largest low-cost potential, and the vast majority of this is due to measures towards improved energy efficiency. About 30% of the projected GHG emissions in the buildings sector can be avoided by 2030 with net economic benefits. Transport and industry also have sizable opportunities for low-cost efficiency improvements. Therefore, sectors where there is large energy efficiency potential contribute an important share to low-cost mitigation opportunities. The mitigation response will shift

from energy efficiency towards reduced carbon intensity in the longer term, as the costs of further efficiency improvements are projected to grow while those of lowcarbon energy sources are expected to decrease, making the latter more attractive. Given the importance of energy efficiency, the IEA recommends the adoption of specific energy efficiency policy measures covering twenty five fields of action across seven priority areas: cross-sectoral activity, buildings, appliances, lighting, transport, industry and power utilities. According to IEA estimates, if the proposed actions are implemented globally without delay, they could save around 8.2 Gt CO2/year by 2030, which is equivalent to twice the EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s current yearly emissions, and could reduce global CO2 emissions by 20% per year. Figure 4 shows the breakdown of these savings by sector. Coincidently, 20% is also the energy saving potential from energy efficiency improvement calculated by the European Commission for 2020, and set as the EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s target. This target should reduce CO2 emissions in the EU by 780 Mt with respect to the baseline scenario, more than twice the EU reductions needed under the Kyoto Protocol by 2012. According to the European Commission, additional investment expenditure in more efficient and innovative technologies will be more than compensated by the more than 100 billions euros of annual fuel savings. Even though energy efficiency has improved considerably in recent years, it is still technically and economically feasible to save at least 20% of total primary energy by 2020 on top of what would be achieved by price effects and structural changes in the economy, natural replacement of technology and measures already in place. The IEA reported in 2009 many positive examples of energy efficiency policy implementation in IEA member coun-

Figure 4: CO2 savings potential from energy efficiency recommendations

Source: IEA (2008): Energy Efficiency Policy Recommendations, Paris: IEA.

tries, such as minimum energy performance standards for appliances and equipment, as well as signs of energy efficiency policy innovations (for instance, active policies promoting energy efficiency in buildings, the extensive adoption of standby power policies and policies to phase out inefficient lighting, measures to promote proper inflation of tires, etc.). But the evidence in World Energy Outlook 2009 and Energy Technology Perspectives 2008 suggests that the rate of energy efficiency improvement must be increased significantly and urgently, even beyond what is achievable with current IEA recommendations. The IEA finds that even in the countries with the most active energy efficiency policies, more than 40% of the potential energy savings from the twenty five IEA recommendations remains to be captured. In particular, policies for transport stand out as having the least substantial implementation across all IEA member countries. Some co-benefits of mitigation through improved energy efficiency include: ď Ž for households, the increased value of the real estate and building stock, reduced vulnerability to weather extremes (in well insulated buildings), improved qual-

ity of life and comfort, reduced noise in transport;  in industry, co-benefits arise through reduced emissions of pollutants and waste production (which in turn reduce environmental compliance and waste disposal costs), increased production and product quality, reduced maintenance and operating costs, an improved working environment, and other benefits such as decreased liability, improved public image and worker morale, and delaying or reducing capital expenditures;  for business development, providing energy efficiency services through energy service companies (ESCOs) has also proven to be a lucrative business opportunity. Experts estimate a market of 5 to 10 billion euros in Europe (Butson, 1998). Experience also shows that energy efficiency investments can deliver as a significant co-benefit the creation of many jobs. Improvements in industrial energy efficiency help increase productivity and thus international competitiveness. Providing energy “supply” through improving end-use efficiency is often a more cost-effective way for “capacity expansion”, and often has a positive effect on employment, even if potential layoffs are considered in the energy supply industries. The employment benefits arise directly by creating new business activities in efficiency improvement and indirectly through the economic multiplier effects of spending the money saved on energy costs in other ways. The European Commission (2005) estimates that a 20% reduction in EU energy consumption by 2020 can potentially create (directly and indirectly) as many as one million new jobs in Europe, especially in the area of semi-skilled labor in the building sector (Jeeninga et al., 1999; European Commission, 2003). Finally, energy efficiency brings about a very important social co-benefit: It alleviates energy poverty, which oc-

curs not only in developing countries and economies in transition, but also in developed ones. Fuel poverty, or the inability to afford basic energy services to meet minimal needs or comfort standards, is found in even the wealthiest countries. In the UK in 1996, about 20% of all households were estimated to live in fuel poverty. The number of annual excess winter deaths, estimated by the UK Department of Health at around 30,000 annually between 1997 and 2005, can largely be attributed to inadequate heating (Boardman 1991; DoH 2000). Improving energy efficiency in these homes is a major component of strategies to eradicate fuel poverty. The main factors explaining the non-implementation of many cost-effective energy efficiency policies or equivalent measures are the following: Lack of access to capital for energy efficiency investments, insufficient information about the available options, principal-agent problems (behavioral and organizational factors affecting economic rationality in decision-making), and externality costs that are not reflected in energy prices. Therefore, it is urgent that EU countries contribute to remove these barriers and extend their efforts in energy efficiency policy.

An Economic Perspective on Renewables Renewable energy sources will be a necessary element of any future sustainable energy system. Not only do they provide a valuable alternative to fossil fuels, they are also much more climate friendly. In economic terms, the development of this sector does present many future benefits, but in order for these to flourish it will be necessary to put a price on the negative externalities of other energy sources, which should facilitate the required investments in R&D. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report indicates that renewable energies may be the most important tool for mitigating climate change during this century (see Figure 1). In a shorter time framework, the IEAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s World Energy Outlook 2009 estimates that, in the scenario leading to the stabilization of the level of GHG at 450 ppmv and for the whole World, renewable energies will be responsible for 19% of the energy-related CO2 emissions abatement in 2020, and for 23% in 2030 (see Figure 2). In the case of the EU, these percentages are 18% and 25% (see Figure 3). The main renewable energies currently available and amenable to significant further development for decarbonizing energy use in electricity generation, transport and industry are the following: 1. Expansion of bioenergy for use in the power, transport, buildings and industry sectors from afforestation, crops, and organic wastes. 2. Wind energy, both on and offshore. 3. Thermal and photovoltaic solar energy. 4. Hydroelectric power, although new sites are becoming increasingly scarce. 5. Wave and tidal energy. 6. Geothermal energy. Besides their contribution to limiting the damages of climate change, renewable energies are a source of many important economic benefits, and imply the creation of fast-growing new markets, which will be increasingly a source of economic growth and jobs, especially for the companies and countries that take the lead in their development. In fact, these markets are already important

Figure 5: Additional investment in the electricity sector in the ACT Mapa and BLUE Mapb scenarios of ETP 2008 (compared to the Baseline, 2005-2050)

Scenarios where global CO2 emissions are brought back to current levels by 2050. Scenarios that target a 50% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050. Source: IEA (2008): Energy Technology Perspectives 2008, Paris: IEA. b

and in permanent expansion. The Stern Report estimated in 2006 the size of the market for renewable energy generation products alone at $38 billion, providing employment opportunities for around 1.7 million people. One reliable estimate of the future market for renewable energy technologies can be derived from the IEAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Energy Technology Perspectives 2008 (ETP 2008). In the ETP 2008 scenarios that target a 50% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050, there is a massive switch to renewable energy for power generation, especially to wind, photovoltaics, concentrating solar power, and biomass. By 2050, 46% of global power in these scenarios comes from renewable, and the application of all renewable technologies combined accounts for 21% of CO2 savings against the baseline scenario. Figure 5 shows the annual rates at which new power generation capacity would need to be added in each scenario of ETP 2008. The massive shift towards renewable energy technologies also implies a deep shift in employment patterns.

The Stern Report estimates that over 25 million people could be working in this sector worldwide by 2050. The recent study The impact of renewable energy policy on economic growth and employment in the European Union (Employ-RES study, 2009), carried out for the European Commission, concludes that achieving the target of 20% of renewable energy in final energy consumption in 2020 will provide a net effect of about 410,000 additional jobs and 0.24% additional gross domestic product in the EU. In the USA, for instance, Hanemann et. al. (2006) analyzed the economic impact of California taking the lead in adopting policies to reduce GHG emissions, and concluded that by acting quickly California could become a leader in the new technologies and industries that will develop globally as international action to curb GHG emissions strengthens. They estimated that this could increase gross State product by $60 billion, and create 20,000 new jobs, by 2020. It is therefore clear that companies and countries should position themselves now to take advantage of the opportunities in the renewable energy market.

Renewable Energy and Employment In 2005, the EU’s renewable energy sector employed 1.4 million people, which was equal to 0.65% of the total EU’s workforce, and generated 58 billion euros of value added, which was equal to 0.58% of EU’s GDP. About 55% of value added and employment occurs directly in the renewable energy sector, and 45% in other sectors due to the purchase of goods and services. Increased use of renewable energies has both positive and negative effects on the economy, in terms of employment and economic growth. An important feature of the Employ-RES study is that it presents both gross and net effects. Gross effects include only the positive effects, while net effects are the sum of positive and negative effects. The net effects take into consideration all relevant economic mechanisms: 1. Increased investments, operation and maintenance costs, and biomass fuel supply for renewable energies. 2. Reduced investments, operation and maintenance costs in the conventional energy sector. 3. Fossil fuel imports and use avoided. 4. Increasing energy costs and their effects on the economy due to reduced industrial competitiveness or reduced budgets for consumption by consumers and governments. 5. Trade in renewable energy technology and fuels among EU countries and with the rest of the world. The Employ-RES study shows that, to meet the EU’s 2020 target for renewable energies, stronger support policies than those currently implemented are needed, which would lead to a share of renewable energies in final energy consumption of 30% by 2030. Current renewable energy support policies would lead to a share of renewable energies in final energy consumption of only 14% by 2020 and 17% by 2030. Achieving the 2020 renewable energies target leads to total gross value added in the renewable energy sector of about 1.1% of GDP or 129 billion euros by 2030 in a moderate export scenario. Compared to a situation with no renewable energy policies implemented, the additional gross value added due to renewable energy policies amounts to 52 billion euros or 0.44% of total GDP for that scenario. The total gross value added of the renewable energy sector may increase up to 197 billion euros by 2030 in the optimistic export scenario. Achieving the 2020 renewable energy target leads to a net increase in GDP of about 0.24% under the moderate export scenario in comparison with a hypothetical scenario in which all renewable energy support policies are abandoned. In an optimistic export scenario, net additional GDP compared to the no-policy scenario would amount to 0.44% of GDP in 2030. Achieving the 2020 renewable energy target would deliver 2.8 million jobs in the renewable energy sector in the EU-27 in 2020 under the moderate export scenario. This is 1.1 million workers more than in the hypothetical scenario in which all renewable energy support policies are abandoned. Total gross employment may increase by up to 3.4 million people by 2030 in an optimistic export scenario. The total net increase in employment in the renewable energy sector in the EU-27 in 2020 compared to the hypothetical scenario in which all renewable energies support policies are abandoned will amount to about 410,000 people under the moderate export scenario.

Besides their positive effects on economic growth and job creation, renewable energies are a source of other important co-benefits. One of them is their positive contribution towards energy security, since a more diverse energy mix is a very effective hedge against supply problems of any single fuel. In particular, the expansion of renewable energies can reduce the exposure of EU economies to fluctuations in fossil fuel prices, as well as their import dependence with its negative impact on the balance of payments. Another important co-benefit is an improvement of local air quality. Switching from fossil fuels to renewable energies can reduce significantly the levels of air pollution resulting from fossil fuel burning. For instance, the European Environment Agencyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s study on Air Quality and ancillary benefits of climate change (2006) shows that the additional benefits of an emissions scenario aimed at limiting global mean temperature increase to 2ÂşC would lead to savings on the implementation of existing air pollution control measures of 10 billion euros per year in Europe, and additional avoided health costs of between 16 and 46 billion euros per year. The

reduction in the use of fossil fuels will decrease tropospheric ozone concentrations, which may also increase agricultural production and lower pressure on natural ecosystems. With regard to the costs of renewable energies, the GHG abatement opportunities that they offer can be assessed in terms of their cost per ton of CO2-equivalent reduction, both at present and through time. Therefore, we can rank abatement opportunities along a continuum as illustrated in Figure 6. While measures like improving energy efficiency can be very cheap, and may even have negative costs, as discussed in the previous section, measures like introducing hydrogen vehicles may be very expensive in the near term, at least until experience brings costs down. In between these two extremes, renewable energies can be ranked by their marginal cost. It is important to note that the precise ranking will differ by country and sector. Even more important, marginal costs will also change over time (represented in Figure 6 by arrows going from up to down), as research and development and learning by doing progresses, which will bring costs down in the future.

Figure 6: Illustrative marginal GHG abatement cost curves

Source: Nicholas Stern (2007): The economics of climate change: The Stern review, Cambridge (UK) and New York: Cambridge University Press, Figure 9.1.

In the medium and long term, the uncertainties about the costs of renewable energies may be large. These costs vary with the stage of development of each particular technology, and on specific regional situations and resource endowments, including the availability of land for bioenergy or sites for wind. Other factors include climatic suitability in the case of solar insolation for incident solar energy. But what is very certain is that the costs of renewable energy technologies tend to fall over time, because of learning (costs decline with insights gained from investment and operating experience, which can be measured by cumulative investment) and economies of scale. Other factors that contribute to the declining costs of renewable energies are the development of new gen-

erations of materials and design concepts through R&D, such as thin-film and organic solar cells; and opportunities for batch production arising from the modularity of some emerging technologies, such as solar PV, which leads not only to scale economies in production, but to associated technical developments in manufacture, to the reduction of lead times for investments (often to a few months, as compared with three to six years or longer for conventional plants), and to the more rapid feedback of experience. For instance, Figure 7 shows how certain key energy technologies in use today have experienced cost reductions consistent with the theories of learning and scale economies.

Figure 7: Cost evolution and learning rates for selected technologies

Note: The number in brackets gives an indication of the speed of learning: 97%, for instance, means that unit costs are 97% of their previous level after each doubling of installed capacity (3% cheaper). Source: Nicholas Stern (2007): The economics of climate change: The Stern review, Cambridge (UK) and New York: Cambridge University Press, Box 9.4.

It is also necessary to consider that the usual cost comparisons between technologies are unfair to renewable energy technologies, since they do not consider the full costs associated with each technology. The usual (and unfair) way of calculating costs only considers the sum of capital costs over the life of the project plus fuels plus operation and maintenance costs. Under this kind of calculation, for instance, coal would be the cheapest energy in many countries. However, there are other human health and environmental costs as well for each energy source. With coal, for example, there are pollutants such as SO2, NOx, particulates, mercury and other heavy metals. There is significant land disruption, stream acidification, surface subsidence and decades long underground fires. None of the renewable energy technologies have these externalities or the costs associated with addressing them. Therefore, it is important to develop an agreed upon accounting system to make costs comparable among renewables, fossil fuels and efficiency. Another important aspect of the cost of electric power production is the transmission and distribution systems. According to the IEA, approximately 55% of the capital cost of electric power systems is in the “wires” and only 45% is invested in the generation technology. Hence if on-site, distributed generation is utilized (whether fossil fueled or building integrated solar or renewable technology), the transmission costs are generally zero, and the marginal cost of distribution if grid connected is much lower since most of the electricity is utilized where it is generated. This fact needs to be taken into account when comparing costs of alternatives. There are few studies to date that account for this sizable cost component. According to the Employ-RES study, recent strong growth in comparably low-cost biomass and onshore wind projects needs to be sustained, as these technologies are expected to generate most of the near-term future renew-

able energies production, employment and economic growth. More innovative technologies such as photovoltaic, offshore wind, solar thermal electricity and secondgeneration biofuels require more financial support in the short-term, but it is precisely these technologies that are key to achieving the EU’s 2020 renewable energies target and higher shares in the future, to maintain the EU’s current competitive position in the global market for renewable energies technologies and to increase employment and GDP in the midterm. Policies promoting technological innovation in renewable energies are therefore essential to strengthen the first-mover advantage of Europe’s renewable energy industries. If successful, these technologies can help the EU maintain a higher world market share of renewable energies.

An Economic Perspective on CCS Carbon capture and storage (CCS) has received increasing attention as an essential part of the portfolio of technologies needed to achieve a transition to a low-carbon society. Today the emissions from large stationary sources account for about half of the emissions from fossil fuel use ensuring a high potential use for CCS technologies. Its potential will increase if final energy use switches to electricity and, in the longer term, hydrogen. Differently from the previously considered technologies, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is the only technology whose only purpose for being deployed at large scale is dealing with reducing carbon emissions. The reason for the attention devoted to CCS is that no single technology or process alone will deliver the emission reductions needed to keep climate change within the 2ÂşC targeted limits. Hence, CCS could help reduce emissions from the flood of new coal-fired power stations planned over the next decades, especially in India and China.

We can capture at least 90% of emissions from fixed emitters

CCS is a three-step process that includes capture and compression of CO2 from power plants or industrial sources; transport of the captured CO2 (usually in pipelines); and storage of that CO2 in geologic formations, such as deep saline formations, oil and gas reservoirs, and unmineable coal seams. Technologies exist for all three components of CCS, but â&#x20AC;&#x153;scaling upâ&#x20AC;? these existing processes and integrating them with coal-based power generation poses technical, economic, and regulatory challenges. Research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) programs can help reduce project uncertainty and improve technology cost and performance. The focus of CCS RD&D is twofold: 1. to demonstrate the operation of current CCS technologies integrated at an appropriate scale to prove safe and reliable capture and storage; and 2. to develop improved CO2 capture component tech-

We have been transporting CO2 for decades

CO2 can be stored safely and permanently using natural trapping mechanisms Source: Zero Emissions Platform

The liquid CO2 is pumped deep underground into one of two types of CO2 storage reservoir (porous rock) cap rock

Deep saline acquifer

700m - 3,000m

cap rock up to 5,000m Depleted oil and gas fields

Source: Zero Emissions Platform

nologies and advanced power generation technologies to significantly reduce the cost of CCS, to facilitate widespread cost-effective deployment. The IPCC Special Report Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (2005) suggests that it could provide between 15% and 55% of the cumulative mitigation effort until 2100. The IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives 2008 (ETP 2008) studies a scenario that targets a 50% reduction in CO2 emissions from current levels by 2050, named BLUE Map scenario (Figure 8), as described also in the Report on Governance for a Low-Carbon Society. As shown in this figure, CCS provides 19% of the emission reductions from the baseline scenario in the ETP 2008’s BLUE Map scenario by 2050. The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2009 estimates that, in the scenario leading to the stabilization of the level of GHG at 450 ppmv, CCS will be responsible worldwide for 3% of the energy-related CO2

emissions abatement in 2020, and for 10% in 2030 (see Figure 2). In the case of the EU, these percentages are 4% and 20% (see Figure 3).

Figure 8: ETP 2008’s BLUE Map scenario technology contributions

Source: IEA (2008): Energy Technology Perspectives 2008, Paris: IEA.

The main benefit provided by CCS technologies is clear; their large-scale deployment could reconcile the continued use of fossil fuels over the medium to long term with the need for deep cuts in emissions. This is very important since, according to the IEAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s World Energy Outlook 2009, fossil fuels will remain the dominant sources of energy worldwide, accounting for 77% of the demand increase in 2007-2030. In this period, oil demand is expected to increase by 24%, demand for coal by 53%, and demand for natural gas by 42%. Hence, successfully stabilizing emissions without CCS technology would require dramatic growth in other low-carbon technologies, which would lead costs to grow also dramatically. Figure 9: World Total Primary Energy Supply 2007

Renewables 13%

Fossil Fuels

81%

Nuclear 5,9%

Source: IEA Key World Energy Statistics, 2009

IEA modeling shows that, without CCS, CO2 marginal abatement costs would rise from $25 to $43 per ton in Europe, and from $25 to $40 per ton in China, while global emissions are10% to 14% higher. This highlights the crucial role CCS is expected to play, which in most scenario studies increases over the course of the century. CCS can also be considered to contribute to energy security. This is because many major energy-using countries have abundant domestic coal supplies, and hence see coal as having an important role in enhancing energy security. Therefore, extensive deployment of CCS can reconcile the use of these coal supplies with the emission reductions necessary for stabilizing GHG in the atmosphere. Although it is technically possible to capture emissions from almost any source, the economics of CCS favors capturing emissions from large sources producing concentrated CO2 emissions to capture scale economies, and where it is possible to store the CO2 close to the emission and capture point, to reduce transportation costs. Therefore, the ideal sites for CCS would be close to sources such as power stations, and cement, steel and petrochemical plants. Letâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s recall that heavy industrial sectors such as steel, cement and refineries account for around 10-15% of Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s CO2 emissions. Employing CCS technology adds to the overall costs of power generation. But there is a wide range of estimates, partly reflecting the relatively untried nature of the technology and variety of possible methods and emission sources. The IPCC quotes a full range from zero to $270 per ton of CO2. A range of central estimates from the IPCC and other sources show the costs of coal-based CCS employment ranging from $19 to $49 per ton of CO2, with a range from $22 to $40 per ton if lower-carbon gas is used. The range of cost estimates will narrow

when CCS technologies have been demonstrated but, until this occurs, the estimates remain speculative.

between 60-90 US$/tCO2), due to their small scale and efficiency.

According to the IPCC Special Report on CCS, in most CCS systems, the cost of capture (including compression) is the largest cost component. Some of this cost could be offset by the use of CO2 for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) for which there is an existing market, but EOR options may not be available for many projects. Since the 1970s, engineered injection of CO2 into geologic reservoirs has taken place for purposes of EOR, resulting in the development of many aspects of reservoir management and operation needed for safe large-scale injection and geologic storage of CO2. Costs for the various components of a CCS system vary widely, depending on the reference plant and the wide range in CO2 source, transport and storage situations. Over the next decade, the cost of capture could be reduced by 20–30%, and more should be achievable by new technologies that are still in the research or demonstration phase. The costs of transport and storage of CO2 could decrease slowly as the technology matures further and the scale increases.

A demonstration program of commercial scale, integrated CCS projects would allow to prove the various CCS technologies at large scale, to identify risks and to achieve public and industry confidence in CCS. A sufficient number of such projects would be required to test different capture technologies and different storage geologies across a range of fuel applications and geographies. The first commercial projects would have to be started shortly after the demonstration phase. Otherwise, CCS could struggle to reach large scale in 2030. Regulatory issues, particularly around storage liability and the legality of storage will need to be resolved, and funding solutions found to support the demonstration project phase. A CCS framework and some form of co-

Energy and economic models indicate that the CCS system’s major contribution to climate change mitigation would come from deployment in the electricity sector. Most modeling as assessed in the IPCC Special Report on CCS suggests that CCS systems begin to deploy at a significant level when CO2 prices begin to reach approximately 25–30 US$/tCO2. This means that when the market price for CO2 emissions, such as the price of the EU Emissions Trading System, reaches this level, CCS will become an economically viable option to abate CO2 emissions. As prices increase further, CCS projects will become increasingly attractive. In the meantime, it is essential to gain experience with real projects that bring the costs down through the learning curve. Early demonstration projects are expected to be costly (probably

ordination should be established on a European level to ensure a ‘level playing field’ and share lessons learned. Finally, public awareness in and support for CCS must also be realized. Widespread cost-effective deployment of CCS will occur only if the technology is commercially available and a supportive national policy framework is in place.

CCS can be seen as a “bridging technology” between our current energy systems and tomorrow’s low-carbon society. As show in figure X, today CCS is one of the most expensive technologies from a CO2 abatement perspective, however, to address the enormous base of fossil fuel usage already implemented, CCS is the only alternative.

Figure 10: Development and Deployment of New Technologies

Different types of support that may be appropriate depending on the level of maturity of a technology. Less mature technologies like CCS and fuel cells need strong government support in the form of R&D funding and then financing of demonstration projects. Going up the curve in terms of competitiveness, a number of countries have successfully supported technologies like solar and offshore wind with targeted policies like feed-in tariffs or tax credits. Source: IEA (2010) Scenarios and Strategies for 2010

Market Based Policy The fundamental changes required in the energy sector for the transition to a low-carbon economy cannot be implemented if public policy does not create the proper incentives for this transition. And for public policy to be efficient it must be based on market based instruments, chiefly environmental taxes and tradable emission permits. These instruments are not only efficient, but effective in changing social behavior through higher prices on carbon fuels, which give signals and provide incentives for consumers and firms to change their energy use and reduce their carbon emissions. In the longer run, higher carbon prices will provide incentives for firms to develop new technologies to ease the transition to a low carbon economy. The key concept behind the use of market based instruments in climate change policy is the carbon price or the price that is attached to emissions of CO2 (and the rest of GHG). The carbon price can be regarded as the social cost of carbon, which is the present value of additional economic damages now and in the future caused by an additional ton of carbon emissions. The estimations of this cost vary greatly. For instance, Nordhaus (2008) estimated that the social cost of carbon with no emissions limitations is today and in today’s prices approximately $30 per ton of carbon, which is approximately equal to 6 euros per ton of CO2. This is probably a too low estimate, since just in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) the price per ton of CO2 in its current second phase has fluctuated approximately between 10-30 euros per ton of CO2. Other estimations of the social cost of carbon reach very high values, such as an estimate between 257583 euros per ton of CO2 by Azar and Sterner (1996). From an economic point of view, CO2 emissions are an “externality,” meaning that energy users are imposing the social cost of carbon on the rest of the world today and in the future without paying the costs of these

emissions. If market prices do not capture all the costs, they cannot provide right signals. In other words, these market prices are inefficient and lead to excessive emissions. The social cost of carbon must be “internalized” by market prices, correcting wrong market signals. The “right” market signal is the “carbon price.” This represents the market price or penalty that would be paid by those who use the fossil fuels and thereby generate the CO2 emissions. The carbon price might be imposed via a carbon tax, which is like any other tax levied on the purchase of particular goods and services, such as a gasoline tax or a cigarette tax, except that it is levied on the carbon content of purchases. Another option to create a market price of carbon is a cap-and-trade system, such as the EU ETS. In fact, cap-and-trade systems are the standard design for global-warming policies today, since they were foreseen as such by the Kyoto Protocol. Under this approach, total emissions are limited by governmental regulations (the cap), and emissions permits that sum to the total are allocated to firms and other entities or are auctioned. However, those who own the permits are allowed to sell them to others (the trade). Trading emission permits is one of the great innovations in environmental policy. The advantage of allowing trade is that some firms can reduce emissions more economically than others. If a firm has extremely high costs of reducing emissions, it is more efficient for that firm to purchase permits from firms whose emission reductions can be made more inexpensively. Both emission/carbon taxation and tradable carbon quotas are cost-effective policies. If it is decided that a global temperature increase of 2°C is the maximum that can be safely allowed, the economic approach is to find ways to achieve this objective with the lowest cost to the economy. As Nordhaus’ A Question of Balance: Weighing the

Options on Global Warming Policies (2008) points out, there are two requirements for cost minimization. The first one is that the marginal costs of emission reductions or marginal abatement cost be equalized across sectors and across countries (“where-efficiency”). The only realistic way to achieve this is by imposing harmonized carbon prices that apply everywhere, with no exempted or favored sectors or excluded countries. One approach to price harmonization is universal carbon taxes. The second requirement for efficiency is that the timing of emission reductions be efficiently designed (“when-efficiency”). When-efficiency is much more difficult to estimate than where-efficiency because when-efficiency depends upon the discount rate and the dynamics of the carbon cycle and the climate system, as well as the economic damages from climate change, all subject to a great deal of uncer-

tainty. Nevertheless, there are also estimates of when-efficiency. For instance, Nordhaus (2008) estimates that the when-efficiency carbon price should rise between 2-3% per year in real terms. Economics teaches us that it would be absolutely unrealistic to hope for major emission reductions based solely on responsible citizenship, environmental ethics, or any other voluntary approaches; it will be necessary to raise the market price of carbon. This will achieve four goals: 1. It will provide signals to consumers about what goods and services are carbon intensive and should therefore be used more sparingly. 2. It will provide signals to producers about which inputs use more carbon (such as coal and oil) and which use less (such as natural gas) or none (such as renewable energies), thereby inducing firms to substitute highby low-carbon inputs. 3. It will give market incentives for inventors and innovators to develop and introduce low-carbon products and processes that can replace the current generation of technologies. 4. A high carbon price will economize on the information that is required to do all three of these tasks. Because of the political unpopularity of raising prices, especially through taxes, it is tempting to use subsidies for “clean” or “green” technologies as a substitute for raising the price of carbon emissions. This is an economic and environmental risk because there are so many clean activities to subsidize, and hence resources are insufficient to subsidize all activities that are low emitters. Even if the resources were available, the calculation of an appropriate subsidy for a particular activity would be a very complicated task. Subsidies need to be used with care and differently depending on the different technology and the different stage they are on the technology curve.

Market Based Policy to Promote New Technologies The transition to a low-carbon society will require a major overhaul of the energy system by the middle of the century. Because of the scale of the energy system is so huge, it takes time to build the human and industrial capacity to achieve substantial deployment of low-carbon energy technologies. Gert Jan Kramer and Martin Haigh point out in their article “No quick switch to low-carbon energy” (Nature 462, 568-569 (3 December 2009)), there are”robust empirical laws” that limit the build rate of new technologies. These are: 1. When technologies are new, they go through a few decades of exponential growth. Exponential growth proceeds until the energy source becomes “material” i.e. to become widely available. 2. After “materiality” growth changes to linear as the technology settles at a market share

Thus the challenge is to overcome these laws by strong and aimed energy policies. Government needs to support R&D and pilot projects. As the technology moves up the deployment scale the support needs to change to market mechanisms reflecting the different scenarios of each technology. Different mechanisms will be effective for different purposes.

One advantage of a tax approach is that it raises revenues. Thus, taxes can be implemented for a so called “green, environmental or ecological tax reform.” This kind of reform implies substituting the taxation of “bads,” such as GHG emissions, for the usual taxation of “goods,” such as labor. The result is that we can attain not only the environmental target of reducing pollution by internalizing the externality created by emissions, but also an improvement of the tax system that will increase its overall efficiency. The systems of tradable permits has the same advantages if permits are auctioned. However a carbon tax approach does not guarantee reductions. Today delivering a target is a key part of domestic and international efforts to reduce carbon pollution. Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS), because of the quantity-based approach, gives certainty that targeted reductions will occur, whereas a carbon tax gives no guarantee over the quantity of reductions. Under a carbon tax it is necessary to estimate how emissions levels would respond to a carbon tax rate, introducing uncertainty about whether the target would be reached thus creating more uncertainty. Another key factor to take into account is the international dimension of the debate; because the creation of a tax is generally dictated by the tax jurisdiction of individual governments some argue that an ETS is better suited for international deployment. This connects to the three key issues that need to be examined on the economic effect of a carbon tax: 1. The first barrier is the concern that if only some countries implement carbon taxes, their carbon intensive industries will locate in countries without such taxes in place: thus that it affects the competitiveness of the country. However, the Stern Report (2007) refers

that the empirical evidence on trade and location decisions suggests that only a small number of the worst affected sectors have internationally mobile plants and processes. 2. The second barrier is the likely regressive effect on income distribution. In the study for the European Commission Analysis of the impact of Community Policies on Regional Cohesion, Buñuel (2003) finds that the international evidence about income distribution is scant, but some conclusions may be derived. Evidence in this direction can be found in Sweden, where doubling the tax on carbon dioxide would require a compensation to keep the same level of consumption for low income people of 1.24% of their consumption expenditure, while that compensation for high income people would be only of 0.78%. However, some empirical results show that while energy taxation affects negatively income distribution in Denmark, Ireland and UK, that impact is slightly positive in Italy and Spain. 3. The third issue concerns its possible effect on employment creation. In the same study mentioned above, Buñuel (2003) finds that there exists limited but increasing empirical evidence on the likely effects of revenue neutral ecological tax reforms. Both a carbon tax and ETS use economic incentives to drive emission reductions. It is argued that ETS has some important advantages. It’s more flexible allowing to link different ETS systems around the world. In today’s global economy, where companies operate in multiple countries at once, this kind of system has obvious advantages. ETS also allows the ‘’banking’’ of emission allowances reducing emissions early and using the saved emission allowances for later.

Sustainable Cities More than one-half of the world’s population now lives in urban areas. Although they cover only one percent of the planet’s surface, all urban centres worldwide account for 75% of global energy consumption and 80% of the greenhouse gas emission. It is clear that cities must be a driving actor if an urbanising world is to grapple successfully with ecological challenges such as development of urban infrastructures and climate change. Looking ahead: implementing sustainable cities: Cities have an array of options and levers at their disposal when it comes to the task of improving their overall environmental performance. If the urban planners rigorously rely on the latest environmental technologies, cities can substantially reduce their consumption of valuable resources. The fact that carbon dioxide-free cities are not a utopian dream is proven by Copenhagen’s plans or the plans for the Masdar eco-city in Abu-Dhabi. By improving building insulation, using energy-efficient lighting and appliances, and installing more advanced environmental controls in structures, e.g. London could move over one-quarter of the way towards its overall aspiration of reducing carbon emission by 60% by 2025. Over a 20-year lifecycle, the upfront investments required for these technologies would more than pay back in the form of reduced energy bills. There are already countless technologies available for reducing the energy appetite of major cities. But how do you know what cities have already achieved in terms of sustainability today? For the first time, Siemens, in cooperation with the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), has created a methodology to measure the current environmental performance of a city as well as its commitment to reducing its future environmental impact by way of ongoing initiatives and objectives. The resulting index, called the European Green City Index, is independently researched, which distinguishes it from other studies in this area. 30 individual indicators – some qualitative, some quantitative – across eight categories are taken into account per city. Cities are ranked using a transparent, consistent and replicable scoring process. The relative scores assigned to individual cities (for performance in specific categories, as well as overall) are unique to the index and allow for direct comparison between cities.

But the key difference between a carbon tax and ETS comes down to the issue of certainty. A tax provides for cost certainty whilst ETS provides for environmental certainty. The EU for instance decided to opt for the ETS System to reach the targets set by the Kyoto protocol. The EU ETS is the largest multi-national emissions trading scheme in the world and a major pillar of the EU Climate Policy. The system covers more than 10,000 sources and has spawned a robust emissions trading market with millions of transactions per month. The EU ETS has often been criticised for not having achieved the desired results but it has had some important successes and has been developing (and will con-

tinue to adjust) to reflect the market and the desired outcomes. It seems clear that it needs to be strengthened by taking measures such as: 1. A recalibration of the cap; 2. Setting reserve auction prices and increasing the auctioning; 3. Increasing the duration of quota allocations to over five years, as it is now. 4. Extending the scheme to other gases and sectors. 5. Aligning allocation procedures across Member States. 6. Linking the EU ETS to compatible mandatory schemes in other States, such as California and Australia.

A Sociological Perspective: Living in a Low-Carbon Society

The writing of this section of the report was coordinated by Hans Bruyninckx (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) and Erika Widegren (Atomium Culture) with written contributions from Johannes Stripple (Lund University), Matthew Paterson (University of Ottawa), Antonella Battaglini (Renewables-Grid Initiative), Ron van Erck (European Commission), Jan Coen van Elburg (RESHARE) and Sander van den Burg (Wageningen University). Valuable contributions have been made by Universidad Aut贸noma de Madrid, Lund University, the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU (Ministry for Climate and Energy), Bayer, Shell, Siemens, Zero Emissions Platform, CIUDEN and the European Climate Foundation.

Introduction In the next few decades we will change towards a low carbon society. What seemed like a vague proposition not so long ago is quickly becoming one of the major and unavoidable challenges at a global scale. The threat of global warming has prompted the rethinking of technologies, policies and economic realities at all levels of societal organization. In the previous parts, the emphasis has been on technological transition and economic aspects related to the low carbon energy model. Technological breakthroughs and the further spreading and mainstreaming of existing solutions on the production side will undeniably play a crucial role. Different types of renewable energy (solar, wind, bio-gas, tidal energy, etc.) and new possibilities (carbon capturing and sequestration) will largely form the new energy mix of a low carbon future, although fundamental uncertainties remain. On the consumption side â&#x20AC;&#x201C;which tends to receive less attention- technological innovation has the potential to increase the energy efficiency and thus decrease the energy demand with a factor 10 at least, provided we would consistently apply best available technological solutions. In addition, technological research in this area is relatively spoken still in its infancy, given the fact that societal transition to a low carbon energy system has only recently become a high politics concern and a profitable undertaking. Research into new materials (e.g. nanoscience and biomaterials), the closing of production cycles (e.g. cradle-to-cradle thinking) and energy technology is not only promising, but already showing its potential for system wide innovation and application. The economic aspect of the transition to a low carbon society is almost just as important as the technological side. Market mechanisms, property rights issues, comparative advantages and the issue of externalities are (co-) determining the viability or â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;realisticâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; potential of technologi-

cal breakthroughs. Energy systems require large capital investments, serious long-term infrastructures and stable market conditions. This makes the interaction between governments and economic and industrial actors crucial in the creation of the necessary conditions to allow for a transition of the energy system. The fact that most energy markets are in essence (quasi) monopolistic or oligopolistic forms an obstacle, also in the EU, which in principle has a free energy market. Another serious precondition is a correct pricing mechanism: one that takes externalities seriously. The lack of further internalisation of environmental (and also social) costs into the pricing mechanisms of traditional carbon based energies such as oil, gas and coal is a fundamental obstacle for more rapid market penetration of renewable energy or other low carbon technologies. In addition, it distorts production and consumption patterns far above market optimum. On the other hand, price incentives through tax systems or subsidies play a positive role in market creation for new technologies. If kept in balance with social concerns (subsidies or tax incentives going to the societal groups with the highest priority) economic instruments have proven their potential to change social behaviour in desired directions. Most technological and economic approaches to energy questions, and the transition to a low carbon system in particular, are based on macro-level reasoning. They are on actions by governments (policy) and economic actors (business decisions), today framed in new forms of governance. It is rather obvious that governments -and in the case of Europe, the EU- play a central role in decision making. The importance of the large economic actors (primarily producers and investors) is also supposed to be central. This emphasis on the macro-level (state or company) may suggest that the transition to a low carbon society has little impact on lower levels of decision making, or on individual citizens.

Yet, from a sociological and behavioural perspective, the role of citizens will be crucial in materializing a ‘lowcarbon society’. It is not by coincidence that we label it a ‘society’, referring to more than state institutions and economic actors. Citizens will play a role as consumers, as workers, as travellers, as members of organizations and networks, as communicators, etc. From a societal perspective it is crucial to distinguish between ‘the individual’ and ‘the citizen’. The former referring to a sort of notion of detached or atomized individual decisionmaker1, the latter referring to people as part of social reality in and for which they bear wider responsibility. Citizens’ choices on what they eat, how they go from place A to B, how and where they live (housing and location), what they do in their spare time, and countless other decisions in all spheres of personal life, have a large impact on individual and household carbon footprints. Their behaviour will be determined by a mix of several factors: cognitive elements (knowledge, information), perceptions (of problems, of possible solutions, of the (ir own) future, etc), economic incentives (market mechanisms; pricing), social incentives (quality of life; status; socialization; etc), consumptive practices and expectations (level, quality, choice options), peer group comparisons, their acceptance of technologies, economic instruments (for example taxes), etc. The impact of personal choices becomes clear when comparing the carbon footprint of two individuals of the same country and the same income level: the difference can be enormous, depending on everyday life choices! Moreover, citizens are also part of social groups, belong to organizations, go to school, have informal networks, and thus can and have to be approached as such: youth organizations, sports clubs as 1 Although this is suggested by rational choice approaches which see individuals literally as ‘individual’ preference orders and decision-makers. From a sociological perspective, this is a highly problematic notion, as individuals are regarded as belonging to groups (family, household, peer groups, work-related groups, class, etc.) which influences their value structure, consumptive habits, etc.

strong identifiers, socialization and the transfer of values and attitudes in the educational system are all social elements to take into account when approaching the low carbon transition as a societal transition and not just a technology shift supported by the correct mix of economic instruments. If we expect citizens to play a central role in the transition to a low carbon and sustainable society, all of these factors have to be taken seriously. This is complex, and the temptation exists to think that one or few factors will suffice (primarily market mechanisms and education), yet research (cf. Spaargaren; Nye and Hargreaves) demonstrates that simple mechanisms don’t lead to desired outcomes. The question is of course how we can accomplish strong citizen involvement in addition to the more obvious instruments of public and economic governance, technological innovation and economic incentives. In the following parts of this report the focus will be on a number of key issues related to citizen involvement. They provide a possible structure for further debate on the role of citizens in the transition to a low carbon society.  Images and perceptions about a future low carbon society  The role of citizens and behavioural change in strategies towards a low carbon society (with specific elements aimed at citizens)  A discussion of factors explaining public acceptance of policy interventions related to the low carbon society transition.  Societal change at the level of knowledge systems and decision-making

Do your bit! On the new role of individuals in climate mitigation Recent years has seen the explosion of projects designed to enable individuals to ‘do their bit’ in the struggle to limit climate change. Previously, the focus of action has been on states and industry, but in the early 2000s this started to be complemented by a focus on individual practice. For example, in 2006 the UK environment minister proposed a system of Personal Carbon Allowances and community groups have established voluntary carbon rationing system. Others have exhorted us to go on a low-carbon diet. There are now many organisations offering to help measure and manage your carbon footprint, or to go ‘carbon neutral’ through carbon offsetting. These personal practices are problematizations of individuals’ emissions of carbon dioxide where emissions are seen as a problem that needs to be rectified. These practices are interesting because they shape individual subjects through exhorting them to manage their climate-related practices themselves; they do not depend on state power or a particular international treaty, enforcing rules over states, companies and individuals, but rather acting through all such subjects, shaping not only their behaviour but their internal rationalities, identities, what they fundamentally regard as ‘normal’ behaviour. They articulate individuals as agents managing their own carbon practice in relation to an articulated global public goal of minimizing climate change. In spite of the fact that critics to individual practices usually respond, correctly, that climate change is necessarily a collective affair and requires collective decisions about fossil energy use, to reach the 2 degree target set for 2050 it will be necessary that individuals become engaged in managerial (and self-managerial) efforts in reducing personal emissions. This however should complement and support the stronger political actions that will be necessary. In the effort to reach a low-carbon society everybody has to do their bit! Contribution by Johannes Stripple (Lund University) and Matthew Paterson (University of Ottawa).

Scenario and vision building from below: Demos Helsinki Demos Helsinki is Finland’s only independent think tank. Its aim is to develop democracy to suit the needs and capabilities of the people of the 21st century. Demos operates based on a sense of urgency and a central assumption about the role of citizens: many of the central social issues and challenges for the next decades, such as climate crisis and wellbeing, among others, require wider participation of individuals than our democracies allow today. Demos Helsinki’s vision is in essence the belief that all change starts with an individual and emerges from our communities and social networks and contexts in which people operate. A second core belief is that ’action creates values’. Therefore it is important for politics to focus on creating everyday tools and structures for action, rather than only traditional political instruments, such as incentives and rules. Demos Helsinki produces scenarios, recommendations and experimentations, which give new insight into grasping the great challenges of the future. One of the central themes is the transition to a low carbon society, which is linked to the themes of well-being, democracy and citizen participation in future cities. Demos Helsinki works with companies, NGOs and Finnish ministries, the parliament, municipalities and other organisations of the public sector that are willing to widen their perspective and renew themselves. The starting point of the collaboration is acting, learning and creating together. This is done based on deliberative methods and debate and an essentialist position favouring bottomup creation of vision and agency.

Current Trends: Future Images & Perceptions Several large-scale attempts to set-up transition processes towards a low carbon society have emphasized the role of both images and perceptions (see the Japanese experiment with low carbon visions). Images of low carbon societies are generally based on scenario exercises. Studies on citizen perceptions aim to provide understanding on two important issues: (1) do citizens know what is at stake, or in other words do they understand the crucial issues? (2) can citizens imagine a low carbon society and a credible place for themselves in it? The core idea is that citizens need to understand the underlying issues and the necessity for long-term change if we expect them to change their own behaviour and to see an active role for themselves in the transition to a low carbon society. The challenge is to link macro-level scenario’s and trends to individual behaviour: from global industry and macroscenarios to citizen level practices such as Eco-teams, Climate neighbourhoods and Care sharing experiments.

Based on recent studies at the level of the EU and in several member states, we can make the following broad observations. The Eurobarometer of public attitudes (2009) demonstrates that 63% of European citizens consider climate change as a very serious problem and 24% a fairly serious problem. About half (47%) of respondents consider climate change to be one of the two most serious problems facing the world today; only poverty scores higher. Important is that most Europeans (62%) believe it is not unstoppable and that they understand that they can contribute to necessary changes. 63% of Europeans confirm that they have taken some kind of action against climate change themselves. In addition, 49% of citizens polled say they would be prepared to pay more for energy produced from sources that emit less greenhouse gases, while 27% would not. Among those ready to pay more, half would not be prepared to pay more than 5% extra.1 It is obvious that citizens understand the main driving force of climate change. Yet, that is not the same as being able to imagine what life in a low carbon society would mean. Many basic questions at the level of individual consumers are on the table: will I be able to drive a car? How expensive will electricity be? Will this have impact on my job situation? Much less research is available on that sort of topics. This is where an important role of communicating through images comes into play. Several imaging approaches have been constructed and tested. Going from large scale and well funded low carbon society imaging research such as Vattenfall’s One Tonne Future2 and the Japanese government’s Low Car1 A large majority believes climate change can boost economic growth in the EU. According to the survey, almost two-thirds of citizens think that fighting climate change can have a positive impact on the European economy. In total, 63% of respondents say it is the case, compared to 56% in March-April 2008. 66% also agree that “the protection of the environment can boost economic growth in the European Union” 2 Hyperlink to Vattenfall’s One Tonne Future: http://www.vattenfall.com/en/a-one-tonne-future.htm

bon Scenario’s 20503, to much smaller practice-oriented research by such groups as Demos Helsinki (see box X), which works on low carbon scenario’s very much from a bottom-up citizen’s perspective. The importance of building scenario’s and images together with citizens and civil society groups can certainly lead to better insights and acceptance (of individual responsibility). A great example is Calgary’s exercise regarding ‘charting Calgary’s low carbon future outcomes’ which is based on intense interaction with all relevant stakeholders.4 A fundamental element for citizen engagement in low carbon trajectories is participation in the early stages of the thought process. From the literature on ‘low carbon society’ images one thing is very clear: there is no such thing as a single, let alone a consensus vision! Several low carbon societies can be imagined; from the highly centralized high-tech variant to the low-tech local community based version to take just these two. Citizens contributions and roles in the different images of low carbon futures can be very different, engaging, stimulating or credible. Working with citizens and civil society actors is therefore a mandatory element in order to allow them to perceive their own role and responsibility both in the creation of the current problem and in possible solutions. And even then, things will be by definition unclear and uncertain. One reason is the existence of present day dilemma’s such as “what should I do as a European knowing that the planet cannot take the extra carbon emissions of 500 million extra cars on the road in China”. What we know from scenario and imaging exercises today is threefold: 3 Hyperlink Japan Low Carbon Scenario: http://2050.nies.go.jp/ 4 Hyperlink Calgary’s low carbon future outcomes: http://content. calgary.ca/CCA/City+Hall/Business+Units/Environmental+Management/ Reducing+Calgarys+Ecological+Footprint/LowCarbon/Charting+Calgary s+Low+Carbon+Future.htm

 First, low carbon futures fall realistically within the boundaries of energy-system transition scenarios. So we are not discussing an unrealistic future.  Second, several low carbon futures are possible, based on the same goal of drastic carbon emission reduction scenarios. This means that there are choices to be made, and that we should make sure that people/citizens and civil society actors are involved in the decisions that are made. This is part of the sociopolitical dimension of the necessary transition.  Third, based on a number of bottom-up, high participation exercises in scenario building we know that ordinary people –you and I- are capable of discussing the central issues and are able to define a role for themselves in the transition. This means that people see the link between the scenario exercise and their own ability to make (smaller) choices in their life.

Technologies: Energy Efficiency Low carbon building: strenghtening citizens through information

Whereas the technology for a fundamental system innovation in the building and housing system exists, it is not so obvious to expect citizens to make fundamental changes in this sphere. Oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s house is not just an element of consumption. It is the place where we live, where we raise children, invite friends and family; it reflects our personal aesthetic choices, cultural traditions, it is family history, and it is often a once in a lifetime investment. This means that system innovation in the built environment is challenging even without bringing in the low carbon story. Yet, scientists and also policy makers consider our house as a key component of a householdâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s carbon footprint. A purely technocratic approach would be to leave the system innovation to the producers of building materials and architects. Another approach puts equal weight on attempting to strengthen the house owner (or renter in a number of cases) through information, by networking, and thus creating agency at that level. The Flemish (Belgium) experiment with a provincial Centre for Sustainable Building is a nice example of how this goal can be facilitated. The Centre is a central point for information, debate, and exchange on low carbon building. It caters to professionals and owners alike by offering ready to use, or if desired more fundamental tailor made information. This happens through personal consults, workshops, virtual and real life provision of information, networking, etc. One of the original elements of the Centre for Sustainable Building is that it was a joint initiative of the environmental movement and the Province of Limburg. It was co-financed through different contributions of public institutions and also by other forms of sponsoring. It was thus a bottom up initiative, not to create new rules and regulations regarding the housing and building system (this is done by the EU and the Flemish government), but to provide individuals, households and professionals with actual information and a meeting point, thus recognizing the necessity to go beyond traditional regulatory action. The success of the Centre in creating a stimulating environment and practical dynamic has made it a model for other provinces in Flanders, thus creating more public support for the transition towards a low carbon housing stock in Belgium.

Environmentally Friendly Mobility Environmentally friendly mobility will be a major challenge in the future – on par with the growing trend toward urbanization, the steady rise in the world’s population, the increasing scarcity of natural resources, and global climate change. In the search for a sustainable solution to these challenges, electrical energy is the key to success, particularly when it comes to mobility. In an electric car the energy stored in the battery is converted into kinetic energy with a higher efficiency compared to a combustion engine driven car. Despite this important efficiency advantage, the actual penetration rates of e-cars are low. This is mainly due to the high battery cost and the still embryonic charging infrastructure. A significant advance in battery technology is essential to lower the cost and increase the performance of eCars in the next years. An electric car is simultaneously both a means of transport and a mobile energy-storage device that can also be used as a source of energy in public networks. It can therefore also be used as controllable load for the fluctuating feed of wind or solar energy into a power grid — provided that the layout of the network permits such a scenario. To this end, the energy and communications interfaces to the power grid need to be standardized, so that rapid charging processes can be coordinated with little effort across the whole grid. Charging poles will become a fixture in the contemporary urban landscape in the foreseeable future, making it possible to charge vehicles wherever they are parked – at home, at shopping centers, in front of restaurants or in parking garages. Governments can accelerate the transition towards more efficient modes of transport like e-cars creating economic incentives for consumers (e.g. tax breaks, exemption from congestion charges,...).

Technologies: Renewables Entering a New Age of Electricity Today at the beginning of the 21st century we face the question of how we can put our energy system on a sustainable foundation in the face of demographic change, declining fossil fuel resources, and climate change. The resulting challenge is to balance out what is known as the “energy triangle.” That means ensuring a reliable, cost-effective, yet also environmentally friendly energy supply. Paradoxically, the solution is to increase the consumption of electricity. The reason is simple: Electricity is the most flexible, most efficient energy source. There are three important steps to optimize the entire energy chain and enter the new age of electricity

An optimized energy mix

An optimized energy mix means tapping more renewables, highly efficient combined cycle power plants, and retrofitting fossil-fueled power plants with CCS technology. One example of an all-around approach to increasing the share of renewables used for the electricity supply is the Desertec Industrial Initiative (DII), which has the goal to provide 15 to 20 percent of Europe’s electricity needs by solar and wind power generated in North Africa. But for that, electricity first has to be conveyed for some 2,000 km into the European centers where it is consumed. This is technically feasible with high-voltage direct current transmission (HVDC). Thanks to 800 kV DC transmission, about 95% of the energy fed into the system will arrive at the centers where it is consumed.

Greater efficiency along the entire energy conversion chain

Technical improvements can help reduce losses in power generation, transport and consumption. In power grids for instance, the natural losses of electric power during transport can be reduced with power electronics components, meaning that significantly less electricity has to be produced. But increasing the energy efficiency in end-use application is equally important. Buildings are a good example – as they are responsible for 40% of the world’s energy consumption. This can be achieved by optimizing the building envelope, lighting, heating and cooling system, water and energy distribution and many more areas. Energy-efficient buildings with guaranteed lower energy costs can be operated at no cost for the customer, because the savings pay for the investment.

A systemic optimization of the energy system.

As a key factor for success, the new electricity age will require high-performance information, communication and sensor technology – a “Smart Grid.” And there emerges another central trend: Today’s generally passive consumers in the energy system will develop into interactive “prosumers” – who produce and consume electricity. Balancing many distributed generation units will require a flexible, intelligent and optimally controlled grid in a new bi-directional energy system and electricity storage solutions. This is needed because in the future, power consumption will follow generation, rather than vice-versa.

Renewables and power grids: thinking about public acceptance The potential electricity supply from renewable sources is essentially unlimited. The integration of large-scale renewables, which are geographically bound and most often located far away from consumption and storage sites, combined with the goal of market integration, requires grid infrastructure that is inclusive, long-distance and increasingly international. This means that the future electricity grid will not only be “small and decentralized” as the public might expect in some cases but also large-scale and cross-national. It will be a combination of Super (HVDC) and Smart technologies: a SuperSmart Grid (SSG). To realise a European SuperSmart Grid several thousands of kilometres of new lines needs to be upgraded and built. Building new grid infrastructure needs political backing as well as understanding and support from the public. It is crucial to develop a common communication strategy and a clear and assertive communication approach (actively endorsed at European and national level) to explain to the public and interested stakeholders the role of grids in the development of renewable energy sources and in the transition to a decarbonised power sector. This is particularly important in the case of cross-border infrastructure projects, which are often perceived to have little local benefit. Citizens and local policy makers are generally not informed about (i) the necessity of new HV-lines, (ii) the relationship between production of RES and building of new lines, (iii) properties, advantages and drawbacks of the various technologies (HVDC, cables, overhead lines). A communication strategy should be developed and clarify the role of the different actors involved in the process. Transparency on planning and permitting procedures should be enhanced and actively communicated to local authorities and citizens. Stakeholders need to be better informed about their rights to participate in the consultation process and the possibility of jointly developing solutions. Policy should deny the temptation of developing permitting regulations, which cut short the rights of the general public, rather it is necessary to develop communication strategies and consultations processes which create sustainable support among society for grid expansion. This can only be achieved in the presence of a clear vision for the future in which renewable energies pay a dominant role. Contribution by Antonella Battaglini, executive director Renewables-Grid Initiative

Producing biofuels on unused land Imperata is an invasive grass that thrives on land with poor quality soil. Such land has low biodiversity and carbon stocks. It cannot be used without investment first to clear it. Sustainable biofuels with a better greenhouse gas performance could be delivered by encouraging producers to invest in establishing oil palm plantations on unused land, such as Imperata grassland. This practice would help to direct oil palm expansion away from forested areas and peatlands to degraded land with no alternative use, reducing the risks of indirect land use change. This potential is explained in more detail in a report by Ecofys called Responsible Cultivation Areas (2010). Estimates vary but there are thought to be roughly 35 million hectares of land dominated by Imperata in Asia, (an area approximately equal to the combined area of France and Spain), compared to about 10 million hectares of globally harvested oil palm plantations today. Not all of this will be available and not all will be suitable for palm oil production but the potential for sustainable biofuels production is still expected to be very large. Planting oil palm on Imperata grassland could lead to a significant increase in carbon stocks as well. Alex Nevill, Shell’s Biofuels Agronomy Manager, says: “The greenhouse gas performance of biofuel from oil palm could be significantly improved if plantations were established on degraded lands, including those that are covered with Imperata. This sort of practice could be encouraged through policy mechanisms such as incentive schemes supplementing the existing sustainability requirements in the EU Renewables Directive.”

Technologies: CCS The useful side of CO2 “CO2RRECT”: Strategic alliance between the chemical and power generation industry Chemical industry and energy industry have joined forces to research the coupling of greenhouse gas utilization and renewable energy within the CO2RRECT initiative (CO2-Reaction using Regenerative Energies and Catalytic Technologies). In the project three main objectives will be addressed: • Effective utilization of temporary electricity excess from renewable sources; • Contribution to a sustainable raw material basis for the chemical industry; • Reduction of CO2 emissions by CO2-fixation in materials and by developing energy efficient processes. The project, financed by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and industrial partners, integrates chemical production using CO2 as feedstock with energy management and energy storage technologies to obtain new sustainable chemical processes. Energy from renewable resources, such as wind power, is today available only in an unbalanced way due to natural conditions, resulting in energy surpluses which are currently not used. In fact, there are still no effective storage strategies to manage these electricity peaks leading to large fluctuations in the electrical supply. Since the chemical industry depends on constant supply of electricity, chemical processes with the potential to flexibly react to fluctuations in the electricity supply are being investigated. CO2RRECT is using electrolysis to make this surplus energy technically and economically useful. The energy produced in this way is then employed for the second challenging research route of the CO2RRECT project which deals with the utilization of the greenhouse CO2 as building block for materials and chemicals. Although CO2 as end product of combustion is of low reactivity, catalytic technologies open up the way to its potential application in the production of polymeric materials such as foamed plastics, pieces for car interiors or CDs. This allows the replacement of fossil raw materials and hence gives a positive contribution to an integrated and sustainable strategy for carbon management.

CIUDEN: the importance of public support for CCS technologies development It has long been acknowledged that communication with public is essential when emerging technologies aim to be deployed, particularly if there is some perceived risk associated with the technology. As Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is moving towards large-scale demonstration projects worldwide, consultation and communication with stakeholder populations will be a crucial part of any project. In order to be successful in the implementation of a CCS project, international experts agree on the necessity to create a local value proposition for the project. This includes making all stakeholders understand what it is involved in the project, and more important, to be part of the project itself. Identification of local benefits, development of key messages, building of trust, establishment of strong outreach teams, frequent communication or creation of partnerships are different tools of utmost importance to reach stakeholder engagement and public acceptance. The Fundacion Ciudad de la Energia (CIUDEN) is a public organization created by the Spanish Government in 2006 with the objective of promoting CCS and CCT technologies in Europe. CIUDEN´s Clean Coal Technology Program involves the construction and operation of CCS Technology Development Plants (TDP) for CO2 capture, transport and storage. The selection of the sites was done according to technical, economical and environmental issues. Ongoing activities to engage the public and encourage public support include: • Identification of local benefits. The economy of the region has been traditionally connected to energy through coal mining and power generation. Keeping high qualification profile jobs, making own R&D in collaboration with local and national universities, research centers and energy companies, and specific programs such as the National Energy Museum or the Regional Development Projects, are some examples of activities central to gaining support for the project. Developing and using environmental recovery techniques in degraded lands due to mining activity is provided by the Regional Development Project. We have successfully approached in partnership with the main local actors some subprojects in order to create participation of the locals, which take eventually ownership of the particular sub-project, improving the environment of the area and creating employment. • Frequent communication: key messages and trust Representatives of CIUDEN interact personally with stakeholders by a set of different actions depending on the audience: face-to-face meetings, conferences, workshops, field visits. The information which is released about the technology and the Program is transparent and easy to understand. A document with simple, accurate and consistent key messages has been elaborated. CIUDEN, a public organization and part of the community itself due to the participation in local and regional activities, is actively contributing to create trust in the Program and in CCS technologies. Trust is one of the most important pillars for the establishment of real and constructive dialogue with general public. • Social research Research is conducted to identify if stakeholders receive sufficient and clear information about CCS and the project, and how is the evolution of the perception on the technology and activities carried out by CIUDEN. Face-to-face, group interviews and surveys with stakeholder leaders are currently ongoing in different degrees of development in the areas where the CCS activities are taking place. • Dissemination tools Dissemination materials such as dossiers, brochures, educational material and posters have been prepared together with a specific website of CIUDEN’s activities. Media is an important means to distribute information. Local, regional and national media are regularly contacted to be provided with information about our activities on CCS.

Public Acceptance The transition towards a low carbon society requires new technologies, economic incentives and changes in individual and collective behaviour. The public acceptance of policy interventions is a central element of concern. The following examples illustrate this: the siting of renewable energy installation (e.g. windmills or bio-mass centrals) suffers from Nimbyism protests1, the internalization of environmental costs in the price of energy (e.g. in the per litre price of gasoline, or in people’s heating bills) is met with great misunderstanding and concerns about the social consequences for the lowest income earners, and suggestions of changing people’s individual mobility choices (car use) or eating habits (lowering meat consumption) are met with strong debates about personal freedom. These examples point to possible difficulties of acceptance. The question is what can be done to increase acceptance and create public support. Yet, this question is not easily answered. Acceptance is a complex and multi-dimensional issue. This probably explains why scientific research on low carbon policy acceptance is scarce and mostly inconclusive. Citizens make distinctions between supporting technologies in general terms and their willingness to incur any costs for their implementation, as is the case with the location of wind energy for example. They may support the general goals of policies (e.g. becoming more carbon neutral); yet lack knowledge to form a clear opinion on more concrete forms of renewable energy. Yet, regardless of the uncertainties about the dynamics of public support and acceptance for policy measures, there are a number of factors and considerations to take into account.

1 NIMBY stands for ‘not in my backyard’ and refers to the attitude of people to object to the location of activities, constructions, economic activity in their own neighborhood. This often leads to organized citizen action against decisions about the location plans. If this NIMBY stance is widespread we speak of NIABY or not in any body’s back yard which suggests broad public objection against specific activities.

First, studies have illustrated how perceptions of fairness and levels of trust are important in the public acceptance of for example renewable energy developments. Procedural justice (i.e. the subjectively perceived fairness of a distribution or decision making process) is significant in explaining people’s potentially negative attitudes towards wind energy, particularly concerning zoning, planning and licensing decisions or their apprehension towards transport related policies such as kilometer pricing. Several studies indicate especially high levels of mistrust in political decisions makers, large companies and developers. Although these results are not unlike the general appreciation of citizens in most democracies towards state institutions and large companies, it remains problematic in light of the rather sweeping (policy) changes required for a fundamental system innovation in our energy system and our system of transport to name just those two. Suggested strategies for governments to overcome the general level of mistrust are in the sphere of communication and information, transparency, anticorruption measures, etc.; in other words not an easy battle. One concrete place to start is for governments to become prime examples of low carbon institutions. This can be done through public procurement and internal shifts. It certainly increases the legitimacy of government interventions. Second, public acceptance can be beneficially influenced by models of ownership and benefit sharing. Structures of ownership of low carbon technology -such as renewable energy production capacity- can vary widely; for example ownership by public sector institutions such as local authorities, private sector companies, private individuals or some mixture of each. Economic benefits can be distributed to large companies, state institutions, private individuals, institutional shareholders, or in the case of cooperatives or social enterprises, a community of interest (see Devine-Wright, 2007). The key to gaining

local community support may be to use compensation of a financial or other form to address the imbalances in the distribution of costs and benefits (see Dorshimer, 1996; Toke, 2002). In Denmark, it has been found that people who own shares in a turbine indicate significantly more positive attitudes towards wind energy than people with no economic interest. In Scotland, a study of public acceptance of wind farms in the Hebrides indicated that when income from land rental flowed to the community under local ownership of land, levels of acceptance rose from 28% to 39%, and levels of opposition fell from 55% to 44% (MORI Scotland for BBC Scotland, 2005 as discussed in Devine-Wright 2007)). Third, participatory elements of introducing new policies are often presented as increasing public acceptance. Many have advocated more participatory approaches to public engagement, to secure public acceptance. However, results from research on this issue are rather mixed. Depending on the legitimacy and the quality of the participatory approach (i.e. timing of participation, choice of participants, the communication, etc.) public acceptance

and support may increase or become even more problematic. This doesn’t signify a fundamental mistrust in participatory methods, but rather a call for much more seriousness and a strong sense of purpose when including citizens in participatory processes. Fourth, establishing an understanding of the link between individual choices in behaviour and the problems of the current high carbon system of production (and consumption) and potential benefits of the transition to a low carbon society can be a key motivator for individual citizen-consumers. It establishes a cognitive link between one’s actions and a specific problem, and thus to a feeling of individual responsibility and agency. One of the more innovative ways to do this is based on the idea of ‘governance through information’ (see box). By bringing relevant knowledge to consumers when they need it and in a form they can use and understand can help establish the necessary understanding and support and empower consumers to making low carbon choices. Examples include carbon labelling of products, energy labelling for houses and explicit information in carbon-related pricing of mobility. These previous elements are all positive and intrinsically optimistic approaches to the issue of acceptance and public support. A more cynical approach could be labelled the ‘Katrina effect.’ It is based on the fact that the support for climate change politics in the US was never higher than in the weeks and months after the deadly hurricane swept through Louisiana and hit the city of New Orleans. The idea is that major accidents or disasters will be necessary to make people understand, accept and support the necessity of drastic measures to curve carbon emissions and to see their own contribution in this shift. No matter how possible future disasters or calamities may be, this still remains the least desirable route to be on.

Changing Behaviour: Strategies and Tools INITIAL results of the RESHARE study “The EU has committed itself to a 20% renewable energy share by 2020. A lot of new projects will need to come online over the next decade in order to get us there. Local support is an important factor for the feasibility of many of these projects. In some cases, this local support for projects needs to be developed. The work of the RESHARE project aims to help increase local support by providing examples on how more direct benefits from renewable energy projects can be shared with local communities.” Ron van Erck, European Commission

The transition into a sustainable energy system will to a large extent depend on the ability of community based Renewable Energy Projects to evolve. From the political side it should be made explicit that these RES projects are indispensable for meeting sustainable energy objectives. When the legitimacy of the projects cannot be contested, developers can concentrate on the specific challenges of the project at stake. ‘Acceptance’ plays a crucial role in the feasibility of a RES project, both directly and indirectly (through legal, financial and technical issues). Acceptance can be addressed directly through application of so called ‘benefit sharing mechanism’ (BSM). Benefit Sharing Mechanism are methods which allow project developers to transfer benefits to local communities hosting the project. REshare has identified the following mechanism within 24 case studies throughout Europe: community funds, local ownership, compensation, benefits in kind, local employment/contracting, reduced energy prices, indirect social benefits. The REshare study shows that application of an adequate set of financial and non financial BSM can have a positive impact on acceptance issues related to environment, NIMBY as well as opportunism. Projects that include BSM can be realised faster. Financial mechanisms include possibilities to increase project scope and create local commitment. The mechanisms are applied as an instrument to develop an ‘enabling environment’ for RES projects at the local level. Benefit sharing should not be mixed up with ‘the right for compensation’. This would raise false expectations and create unfair competition (with existing sites/production capacity). Project developers are advised to choose mechanisms that address local needs rather than (individual) wishes; mechanisms with an identifiable and visible link with the project at stake. The REshare study includes recommendations that address the role of authorities as well as the role of project developers. Best practices are made available through a user friendly database. Publication of the final outcomes of REshare are expected in December 2010. For further information www.reshare.nu All rights reserved by RebelGroup/ European Commission.

Changing individual and collective behaviour will be necessary in nearly all aspects of our life if we want to live in or contribute to a global low carbon society. Individual cases demonstrate that this is possible even in today’s society, which has hardly started to move in the desired direction. Individual experiments such as the Low Impact Man show that individual choices actually work and are not unreasonable. What they certainly demonstrate is the fact that individuals have what sociologists call ‘agency’, or literally ‘the power of action’ or ‘action force’. It refers to the capacity and the responsibility which we have as individuals to change circumstances, institutions and behavioural practices. Agency as a responsibility is different depending on the position of someone. A minister or a CEO of a multinational company has more agency than a cashier in a supermarket. The basic idea is that you exert influence on your surroundings through all the choices you make and the positions you take in public debate. We argue that the hope that individual changes in behaviour will contribute to the low carbon society should ideally be based on people’s own recognition of their agency and their understanding of the necessity to transit into a low carbon society, to keep life on this planet sustainable.

Yet, we do not live in the ideal world, so a number of classic methods to influence citizens’ behaviour can be used to influence energy use and production:  Direct policies or classic regulation such as the EU Light Bulb directive which simply out-ruled classic light bulbs in favour of the energy saving type. Other examples of this type of direct policy interventions are the energy level legislation for new building (have to reach a certain K-value or other energy norm) or energy efficiency norms for new automobiles. If well designed and implemented they can indeed directly change the impact of individual consumers and citizens.  Market mechanisms usually shift the absolute or relative price of goods and services. Typical examples are taxes, cap-and-trade systems, subsidies and direct intervention on the price through the government. Eco-tax reforms are slowly being introduced and making environmentally harmful goods more expensive. Given price reflexes with consumers this type of instrument is shifting their behaviour. A good example is the increased tax on automobiles

with low energy efficiency. Subsidies also play an important role in the relative pricing of goods and services. The high subsidies for photovoltaic panels for individual households have caused a spectacular breakthrough of this individual electricity producing technology in Belgium. The same can be said regarding the subsidies for cars with low CO2 emissions. The attraction of these cars for consumers has increased significantly, thus changing the trend towards the choice for larger cars, with heavier engines, and higher energy use. ď Ž A classic third policy instrument is education. It is based on the belief that environmental or sustainability education can transfer values and practices that will lead to behavioural changes with individuals and groups. In line with international (UNESCO and other) standards and agreements all EU member states have developed environmental education and more recently also sustainable development education programmes. The target audience has long shifted from the traditional school age to life-long learning approaches. Yet, the causal link between education, shifting values and changing behaviour is not straightforward. Education is therefore seen as an additional measure by most policy scientists. More fundamental changes in educational programmes at all levels of professional or academic education are a next (and urgent) step that needs to be taken. Given the absolutely fundamental nature of the shift towards a low carbon society, knowledge about this transition ought to become a basic element of any study programme. The fact that economists, legal scholars, policy scientists and even engineers can still graduate from European institutions of higher education without any substantive knowledge on this topic is quickly becoming irresponsible.

ď Ž Information is a quickly growing instrument in reaching societal environmental and energy objectives. Labelling of household appliances such as refrigerator, television sets or cars allow consumers to make more conscious and informed choices. Other examples include energy certificates required in real estate transactions. Providing a coherent and effective set of policies aimed at changing citizensâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; behaviour or at supporting them in decision making is difficult. And even then, individual or household choices are more than rational decisions based on price impulses and information. The behavioural practices model (Spaargaren et al.) is based on linking so-called systems of provisions, through which products and services are provided, and life style choices of citizen-consumers. It links choices not to isolated decisions, but to patterns of consumption which are constitutive of more encompassing and identifying lifestyle choices: irrelevantly if a person is a handy man or

someone who always relies on professionals, we expect that he/she will make more carbon-conscious choices in home renewal projects, but it is clear that the decision making is very different in both cases. Consumers need to be approached as much more complex decision makers than generally thought of. They want to belong to a certain life style group through their consumption, are trend-setters or followers, etc. More consideration needs to go into this more sociological approach to individual choices. Examples of direct impacts of this approach are increased attention for design qualities of eco-products and ‘branding’ strategies. The focus in this part has been on the micro-level, meaning the individual citizen or consumer (or the household). Yet, citizens are also part of smaller social contexts that allow for low carbon agency. Neighbourhoods are one example. Several agency oriented models have been designed and tested with good results. One such example is the so-called Climate Neighbourhoods programme. A

group of neighbours work together with a basic toolkit that helps them to understand, discuss and grasp the climate challenge and come up with concrete steps which they can take to reach a certain target (for example the Kyoto norm of -8% reduction at the level of the EU). The system is based on information, measuring/monitoring, participation and mutual motivation. Citizens cut down on their carbon footprint based on usually small changes in their daily routines and practices, such as lighting and heating or local transport choices. Usually the project runs for a certain time, but evaluation of this method convincingly demonstrates the lasting effects on people’s behaviour. An additional social bonus is that social capital (network) is created around these processes. An equally impressive example is the so-called energy village Model or low-carbon communities. A bio-energy village is a regionally-oriented concept for the use of renewable energy sources in rural areas. The model has been developed in Germany and links local citizens to the production of energy. These villages tend to be selfpowered and independent from external grids, despite being connected to overland grids for feeding surplus energy. Examples of such villages are Jühnde near Göttingen and Mauenheim near Tuttlingen in Germany. Local farmers can choose to participate by providing bio-mass to the bio-energy plant of the village, as can local citizens who have a choice to become consumers of electricity or heat. Citizens participate for 70% in Jünhde. This type of project does more than cut carbon emissions. It is also an alternative form of (local) social organization as energy production becomes a community issue and decisions are made at that level. In this type of project urban planning becomes central. The change in behavior of the individual requires that low-carbon options are available and that the infrastructure and service development is highly-integrated. The low-carbon options have to be available for an individual to chose them.

Citizen behaviour and environmental information The function of environmental monitoring and information in governing the environment has changed considerably in recent times. Traditionally, environmental monitoring was geared towards governments and producers; it provided them with the information required to formulate environmental policies and environmental management strategies. More recently, environmental monitoring has come to serve an additional and different function. In line with the increasing popularity of notions such as accountability, transparency and availability of information, environmental monitoring is now also used as a tool to gather information for, and disseminate it to, ordinary citizen-consumers. This is illustrated by for example the upsurge of labelling schemes and various websites on which information about the environment and risks can be retrieved. This change in environmental monitoring affects the role of citizenconsumers in environmental governance. Monitoring can empower citizen-consumers and civil society organisation vis-à-vis large institutional actors. This is what we are witnessing in the domain of environmental governance. The following examples illustrate this point. • Monitoring arrangements which aim to provide citizen-consumers with information on domestic energy consumption levels: simple technology can be used to inform consumers on various aspects of domestic energy consumption. Examples include more visible and understandable information that allows a comparative follow-up of household energy use. This can be done over time (what was our energy use in a comparable period of time in the past; a continuous annual average use; or the same month over several years) or even based on a bench mark approach (how much energy does the household consume compared to the average household of the same size). • Other examples include the fairly wide use of web-based applications to calculate carbon footprints on individual or household level, based on choices concerning energy use (with differentiation of the energy source: for example renewable energy, carbon based energy sources, nuclear), transport and mobility choices, food consumption choices, etc. This information can be used to compare one’s own lifestyle impact, look for obvious or more difficult areas to improve carbon performance, and to follow up on evolutions. • A number of monitoring and information based methods are more social-network based. Examples include approaches which link up families or individuals in information based models of behavioural change with the goal to limit the carbon footprint of consumption. Climate Neighbourhoods or Energy Fighters are indeed based on close monitoring and comparing with peer groups. • Informational governance arrangements can also seek to influence consumption choices by providing information about the quality and/or performance of products. The case of fuel efficiency labelling is considered a typical case here. In the same category we find the labelling of household appliances. The effects of this can be major as badly scoring household appliances are leaving the market through the backdoor since consumers have turned away from them, purely based on the energy performance information. Individual monitoring at the level of the appliance is also possible in household contexts as simple monitoring devices can be placed between the plug and the appliance and provide energy consumption information aiding to make carbon conscious choices. • A further spreading of this type of informational governance is in the pipeline at the level of the EU, judging from the discussions on carbon labelling as a general requirement for consumer products. This would be based on a life cycle analysis approach (LCA) to provide the consumer with sophisticated information translated into one composite indicator. • A last element is obviously the shear endless number of websites which provide information on energy use for consumers. They allow for debate, provide comparative information not easily found in other places, and also have the potential to put pressure on producers. These examples demonstrate that citizen-consumers can nowadays more easily gather information on the environmental performance of companies and governments and on the environmental quality of products. Environmental monitoring arrangements and newly established flows of environmental information increasingly enable citizen-consumers to use agency and play their role in the transition towards a low carbon society. The large unused potential of this form of citizen involvement should be place more central in debates about creating interfaces between producers and consumers, and how they are mediated by public interests and the authority of the state. By simply strengthening the obligatory nature of the provision of information, the state can provide new opportunities for consumers to make conscious decisions (instead of having to regulate individual behavioural change in the traditional top down manner). Based on doctoral research by Sander van den Burg, Wageningen University, Netherlands

Key Issues for Making the Transition The transition to a Low Carbon Society will depend on technological innovation at the level of several key systems. Our transport system, the food system, the housing system and the energy system are probably the most important material systems that will require serious rethinking, eco-innovation and restructuring. This will require fundamental intervention from governments and economic actors. Yet, another dimension is just as central; it is the social dimension. Citizens will have to be willing, able and motivated to change personal and collective habits. Given the many uncertainties this will be difficult to achieve, yet no less necessary. In order to support the societal side of the energy transition a number of elements can be put forward: Essential institutional elements for changes in citizen behaviour  An absolutely indispensable element is the rapid move towards a system of internalizing the environmental externalities in the price of goods and services. Both academic experts and policy institutions agree on this point. If market mechanisms are an important instrument (think of the Emissions Trading System), then correct pricing is central to establishing a potential social and environmental optimum. We need to move faster and more fundamental in this direction.  The sort of energy discourse and energy policy that labels energy as an issue of national security needs to change in a discourse and policy of energy as a global threat, challenge and opportunity. Learning, information and knowledge system changes are essential for the transition to a Low Carbon Society.  Fundamental scientific and technological knowledge needs to be further developed  Knowledge about the economic shifts and consequences and also the workable economic instruments needs to be developed  The understanding that much creativity and knowledge comes from civil society and that we need to tap into this in policy circles often forgotten resource needs to grow.  The use of ICT systems in the transition needs to be better understood. Participatory elements of behavioural change:  The individual as part of civil society (organizations such as labour unions, youth organizations, cultural organizations, consumer organizations, etc), part of the political system (advisory boards, innovative forms of democratic input, etc), and as consumers (consumers as part of the decision making in production) needs to be recognized. This means that methodologies involving citizens directly or through civil society organizations must be developed and seen as equally important as strategies and methodologies aimed at large economic actors.  The traditional European system of social dialogue and participation in decision making at the level of the state, the sector and the company urgently needs to take the low carbon transition seriously as it will impact important issues such as competitiveness, job creation, and sectoral transitions.

Short term initiatives that can be taken at the level of the EU, member states, companies and civil society organizations A. EU level initiatives: - provide additional incentives for innovation in low carbon technologies - improve EU level coordination for further greening of the electricity grid - Speed up EU level legislation on energy efficiency in the housing and transport sector - include low carbon argumentation in external trade negotiations (e.g. in the WTO) - become carbon neutral as an institution - stimulate cost internalisation at the EU level so as to protect an internal level playing field B. Member states could take the following initiatives - speed up environmental tax reforms by reforming tax systems away from societal goods (such as work) to societal bads (energy inefficiency and pollution). - cost internalisation (e.g. smart road use pricing) - stimulate local experiments (e.g. eco villages) - stimulate the participation of civil society in debates about local transitions towards low carbon life styles - create â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;low carbon knowledgeableâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; citizens through mandatory educational components in all forms and at all levels of education- become carbon neutral as much as possible

Propositions that can be driving the High-Level Workshop on Living in a Low-Carbon Society 1. Civil society actors (NGOs, youth groups, labour unions, cultural organisations, etc) are central to involve citizens in the low carbon society transition; 2. Individual choices in transport and housing â&#x20AC;&#x201C;as two important examples- should be more strictly led in the direction of carbon neutrality through out ruling bad practices and behaviour and pricing mechanisms. Individual freedom of choice can thus be limited in favour of collective benefits; 3. More explicit information is an important element in guiding consumers to make better choices. Information has be adapted to the lifestyle of the target group; 4. Good practices of low carbon lifestyles at the level of the individual or just above (village, neighbourhood, organisation) have to be made more visible and be used as driving forces of policy formation. 5. All public funding (above a certain level) should be explicitly used to stimulate low carbon practices. Public funding should not be used to support high carbon practices any longer.

From left: Mr Allan Larsson, Professor Hans Schellnhuber, Mrs Barbara Kux, Mrs Connie Hedegaard, Ms Erika Widegren, Mrs Beatrice Delvaux, Mr Paul Magnette, Mr Tony Van Osselaer, Mr Graeme Sweeney

Conclusions The High-Level Workshop on Living in a Low-Carbon Society delivered a set of significant and ideas focused on concrete actions to be pursued to promote the successful transition to a Low-Carbon Society. The fruitful debates between representatives from university, industry, media and policy makers, inspired cross-cutting discussions. The debates and discussions of the High-Level Workshop on Living in a Low-Carbon Society are focused on a bottom-up approach on what has to be done to mobilize society in the right direction. Thus the conclusions and recommendations of this paper do not reflect the necessary policy and market mechanism tools that need to be in place to support a successful transition to a low-carbon society but addresses the question regarding the “societal aspects”. Remembering that from a sociological and behavioural perspective, the role of citizens will be crucial in materializing a ‘low-carbon society’ (it is not by coincidence that we label it a ‘society’), the High-Level Workshop on Living in a LowCarbon Society recommends the following actions: 1- Change the Narrative; 2- Invest in Research and Innovation; 3- Make it Easy to do the Right Thing; 4- Increase Intersectoral and Transversal Cooperation. The issues discussed during the High-Level Workshop and the debates that were raised are summarized below in the sections looking more in detail at the sociological, economic and governance aspects of the debate.

Sharing Session The outcomes and main arguments of the High-Level Workshop on Living in a Low-Carbon Society were discussed during the sharing session by key decision makers from politics, industry and university.

hange is Climate C

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lobal warm e physics: g th re o n ig rm t a o bal w “We cann opped. Glo st t o n s a ss h o systems acr ing certainly ange all the ch r e h it e our soill ing w to reinvent ve a h ill w e r we physics if w the world o the laws of to g e in th rd o 0 y 202 ciety. Acc emissions b k a e p t to u o spin are not able will simply m e st sy te .” clima rd for it Take my wo of control. huber, ans Schelln Professor H of the d Director Founder an limate stitute for C Potsdam In arch Impact Rese

Importance of Resear

ch and Innovation

“To reach the targe t of a so that is ca ciety rbon free o r nearly c bon free arwe will n eed new nologies b te choth those which are ready exis altent and w hich are u developm n d er ent and we will n maximize e e d to the energ y efficienc ing in inte y by invest lligent, re active, inte networks rconnecte and by en d electrica su ring that c that we w l olossal inv ill need w estments ill actually transition be made. / industria This energ l tradition y the citizen must also s; it must be fair fo be fast, it r one of the must be st ways is to rong and invest tod and develo a y hugely in pment in research a way tha tainable a t is system nd coordin a tic, susated.” Mr Paul M agnette, M inister for Climate and Energ y, Belgium

Changing Global Markets n a multibillio ated. This is e cr g in e b ets are “New mark ro industry.” ctor of dollar or Eu er and Dire d n u Fo r, e b hu ans Schelln Research ate Impact Professor H lim C r fo te u Instit the Potsdam “Europe is today leade r in environ tal technolo mengies but is u n der heavy a from China ttack and other countries. Ju continue as st to we have do ne in the pa ensure that st w ill not we will be th e leader in th e future.” Mrs Barbara Kux, Memb er of the M AG and Ch anaging Bo ief Sustaina ard of Siem bility Office ens r

“I believe that we wi ll not be exiting the current cri sis anytime soon because on e thing is the economic crisis –a n immediate financial crisis- bu t it is a much more difficult situ ation that the European countrie s are facing today with challenges fro m a lot of new areas” Mrs Connie Hedegaard , European Commission er for Climate Action

Recommendations

“The perfec t is often th e enemy of focusing on the good. So action now is critical; it is der the curv the area une that matte rs and reduci much more ng it now is cost effectiv a e process an for money th d higher valu an waiting fo e r things you are better to may think reduce it late r. It is time to what needs to get on with be done and it is time to do mum amount the maxithat we can w ithout waiting the global ag for all of reements to be in place.”

The reality of the current scenario and the scant prosDr Graeme Sw pects of seeing an international binding agreement eeney, Ex ecutive Vice Pr anytime soon, urges Europe to increase efforts and esident CO2, Shell Internatio Chairman of Ze nal, ro Emissions Pl mechanisms for a transition to a low-carbon sociatform ety. As Graeme Sweeney reminded “it takes about 40 years to change large chunks of energy system and the target we have leaves us about 40 years to make the change”. Europe needs to strengthen its current efforts as well as deploying new ways of engaging society in this “grand challenge”. For this reason this Report comes with four main recommendations that should be developed in the coming years: 1. Change the Narrative; The climate change debate has been closely followed by media for the past decade. However, although the majority of Europeans are aware of the issue, little change in behaviour has been seen. As highlighted by the representative of El País, it took 30 years for people to start changing their behaviour concerning smoking even though the media were strongly pushing the message; in the climate change debate we do not have 30 years. However the message for the climate change challenge is different in that there are as many positive sides to the story as negative. Whilst today the message to the public has focused around the catastrophic results that climate change could have this should change so as to highlight the opportunities and possible concrete solutions.

e box, think ink out of th th to e av h “We resent parato turn the p y tr d an d mething forwar aring into so sh en rd u b pportudigm of is sharing o at th ve ti more attrac nities.” rsson, of AC, Mr Allan La sory Board vi d A e th f an Member o sity, Chairm Lund Univer f o an ed rm ai Ch er Sw ish aning, Form tm U al b lo of G Finance Minister of

“Media is often used by politician s to communicate stract ideas about abthemselves or their parties. Media sh be used more by ou ld politicians to brin g to the citizen in tion regarding wha fo rm at has been decided and what this mea in practice.” ns Mrs Beatrice Delva ux, Editor-in-Chief of Le Soir ssible know what is po “People have to this ve ha t they do no today and often to ed ne businesses we information. As t ha is able and show w apply what is avail possible today.” laer, Mr Tony Van Osse Bayer ecutive Board of Member of the Ex Material Science

Mr Allan Larsson

From left: Mr Tony Van Osselaer, Mr Graeme Sweeney

From left: Professor Hans Schellnhuber, Mrs Barbara Kux, Mrs Connie Hedegaard

2. Invest in Research and Innovation; The Climate Change Challenge will be won by new technologies. When it comes to investing in research and innovation it is important to distinguish between investing in research and investing in demonstration projects; both investments need to happen for new technologies to emerge. hnology, one imand support in new tec st tru blic pu ed ne you “As y validate new ion projects is that the rat nst mo de of ect in asp or portant should be “Net investment is a crucial fact reduce cost and they They are designed to s. Eugie y olo toda hn and tec often not race n is is gree winning the trust too. Th public acceptance and ng ati cre ple at exam ted For ge tar this. place.” rope does not have which that activity takes inincluded in the way in Germany is just going down in net up vestments; China is going up and Dr Graeme Sweeney, al, are y man Ger t CO2, Shell Internation and n Japa and up whilst Executive Vice Presiden s not ons Platform at all-time lows. Today Europe doe Chairman of Zero Emissi ded nee s have the net investment rate of “The green race is on technology, Europe is leading but we are soon in order to bring about the type .” ded nee passed by the Chinese and they are determined to do it. We can do a lot transformation on this if we get the pricing right and if we build from the bottom up.” r, Professor Hans Schellnhube dam Mr Allan Larsson, Founder and Director of the Pots arch Rese act Imp ate Membe Clim r of the Advisory Board of AC, Institute for Chairman of Lund University, Chairman of Global Utmaning, Former Swedish Minister of Finance. 3. Make it Easy to do the Right Thing The general perspective is that a global binding agreement on these issues will come in due course but in order to achieve this we need to act now: Individuals, companies, institutions and cities need to mobilize. In a market perspective this means creating clear signals and increasing the carbon price to a level that makes new technologies competitive. From an individual perspective this means increasing the information about the solutions that are available now and making them easily accessible. Europe he “When Jean Monnet designed didn’t wait didn’t start with 27 countries. He started He y. read e until 27 countries wer coune mor ing with six and adding and add the in also tries and this is what we can do Investment climate strategy: creating Climate bottom up d buil to is Communities. The idea s to come ntrie instead of waiting for 192 cou to ratify to conclusions and their parliaments that.” Mr Allan Larsson, of AC, Member of the Advisory Board irman of Chairman of Lund University, Cha Minister Global Utmaning, Former Swedish of Finance

“Make it easy to the right thing; make it expensive to do the wrong thing. Generally speaking in our societies we would be going more in the direction of tax more what you burn, tax less what you earn.” Mrs Connie Hedegaard, European Commissioner for Climate Action

“What do we ne ed? We need financial models that are transparent and that ca n help people start to implemen t these technologies. We sh ould be more creative in this ar ea as in principle it is a win-win situation.” Mr Tony Van Osse laer, Member of the Ex ecutive Board of Bayer Material Science

4. Increase Intersectoral and Transversal Cooperation Climate change and the transition to a low-carbon society is a challenge that we all face. It cannot and should not be addressed by individual sectors and actors alone. Including society at large in these debates is a fundamental step towards a sustainable solution.

eate more need to cr e w , ay d ehold“As here to the key stak l al e er h w s out the big opportunitie to discuss ab er h et g to e industry, re ers com politicians, : es g n le al societal ch d media.” searchers an Osselaer, d of Bayer Mr Tony Van ecutive Boar Ex e th f o Member nce Material Scie

“For Europe it is absolute ly key here to the right fram have eworks, to h ave the righ cies in place t polito have the right cooper between th ation e political, environmen businesses t and in order to ensure that keeps its nu Eu rope mber one p osition in th ising and at is p ro mtractive new market of en mental tech vironnologies.” Mrs Barbara Kux, Member of the Managin g Board of Si AG and Chie emens f Sustainabilili ty Officer

“As Energy M inisters we will commit to a ve notion of tran ry important no sversality. Our tion; the ex pertise and th that we will se e European ener t should also gy policy be reflected in al this context th l other EU po e European st lic ie ra s. In tegy for smart, growth in Eu sustainable an rope 2020 is d in cl a very good to usive transversality.” ol to apply in the area of Mr Paul Magne tte, Minister for C limate and En ergy, Belgium

Outcomes: The Economic Perspective A low carbon society demands massive investment in low carbon technologies. These become a positive step, with improved energy services at greater affordability, through innovation. Innovation comes about through several forces: from direct investment in RD&D by governments, universities and the private sector, and also through learning in the context of actual technology deployment. It disseminates through effective technology transfer, which includes issues of intellectual property rights. Policies therefore need to address all of these issues: generating innovation in the laboratory and the market scale, mobilizing investment in human and physical capital in the right direction, and diffusing innovation. Investment responds to policy and regulatory coherence and certainty. The degree to which different policies can provide this is still a matter of uncertainty, and hence it is imperative to experiment with different policy options and instruments, observe their effectiveness, and learn from observation. These policies include the market mechanisms described in greater detail below, but also direct support mechanisms such as feed-in tariffs and quota systems. Clear market mechanisms must be key instruments to foster RD&D and innovation and mobilize investment. Carbon price must be predictable and sufficiently high for the private sector to perform that RD&D and do that investment. Therefore, the EU and the Member States should move forward towards clear market mechanisms. At a European level steps should be taken to strengthen the EU ETS in order to push the price of carbon up. From an investment perspective a clear view of how the EU ETS will develop and how this will affect the carbon price will be imperative in order to send the correct signals. Member states could also take further steps to implement environmental tax reforms, where carbon taxation would be a key element. This reform should avoid negative social impacts, especially for lower income groups, to increase its political acceptance. It is also imperative to remove environmental harmful subsidies. In particular, public funding should not be used to support high carbon practices any longer. Similarly, tax exemptions that are environmentally damaging should also be eliminated, such as those affecting aviation fossil fuels.

Outcomes: The Sociological Perspective The debate centered around the issue of linking societal concerns about fairness, transparency, trust, etc. which are necessary preconditions for positive behavioral change, to the actions, responsibilities and technological capacities of companies and public institutions. The debate was broad and open, but boiled down to the following main points. How to communicate about the Low Carbon Society to citizens? The general feeling was that there is a serious lack of a communication plan on the part of governments and international organizations alike. One of the challenges is to sell the ‘Low Carbon’ story in a convincing way. According to most participants this should be a positive story, about a better future; not a story about less consumption or threats to our lifestyle. Governments and public institutions have to demonstrate their positive engagement and the possibilities they have. They should include citizens in positive projects. For companies, the same fundamental principle of selling a positive story holds. ‘Selling’ obviously has a different meaning in this case, yet the participants recognize that profitable and innovative companies are crucial in the transition towards a Low Carbon Society. Representatives from the side of the industries affirm that much technology is available today, but that it is difficult to illustrate all the possibilities and their contribution. Universities and research institutes should also contribute to selling the positive story, through communicating much more about the possibilities of research and development for system innovation. Science should be much more promoted and communicated in a public, accessible and engaging fashion. The general idea of a positive image of the Low Carbon Society that can be used by public and private actors is supported by all. This could be a serious task and opportunity for the EU. Fairness and trust as prerequisites for behavioral change Here the idea is that in order to motivate social actors (individuals or groups) to change their behavior, they must believe in the fairness of the suggested changes and have to trust the ‘guiding’ institutions. Yet, we know from extensive research that citizens’ trust in public state institutions and especially in large companies is low. In the climate debate, even scientists suffer from mistrust, therein not helped by such incidents as ‘climate gate’. A first suggestion emerging from the debate is to increase the public character of available information and data. For example, carbon footprints of companies or public institutions can easily be made public. This would allow the public to follow in an immediate and transparent way, what actors are doing and how they are changing their own behavior and practices. This could instill more trust in the system. Citizens and different actors can potentially also be convinced of the fairness of the demands made on them. Governments who ask citizens or companies to limit their carbon footprints should also set the example. One way to do this is through transparent, coherent and comprehensive choices in public procurement. This would demonstrate to the public that they can trust that their public institutions are in the same boat and it would provide a serious boost for

those companies who live up to new and higher standards of low carbon production. A more critical approach was also discussed regarding the role of companies. Extra-territorial responsibility for their footprint in developing countries (or more broadly, countries with lower regulatory requirements) would contribute to public trust. The general conclusion of this discussion was that if we want to place demands and expectations on citizens and civil society organizations, trust in public institutions and companies is a prerequisite and fair measures are mandatory. Ownership and participation An important issue is related to the question of ownership and participation. Ownership has two meaning here. First, literally ‘to be the owner’, and second ownership as an attribute of ‘feeling fundamentally involved’ in the process of change. An interesting point of discussion was brought forward by the representative of the industries. The reality of ownership is shifting dramatically. A good example are energy systems. We come from a system of consumers and producers and are moving towards a system of prosumers. Citizens and organizations and consumers of energy, but are also increasingly producers, through decentralized systems of energy production such as photovoltaïcs or small scale wind or hydro energy. This not only requires different technologies (smart meters and smart grids for example) but also potentially changes the feeling of ownership of the transition towards a Low Carbon Society. The question of participation (in the decision-making) remains here though. Also in transport and mobility, new technologies and new systems of ownership can meet each other. For example electrifying cars and driving can go hand in hand with more far reaching systems of car sharing through ownership platforms (e.g. Cambio in Belgium). The role of public elements of ownership is also crucial: the government (central or local) can or should provide for stimulating infrastructural, fiscal and other policies to stimulate these new forms of ownership and participation.

Outcomes: The Governance Perspective In cyclical political and economic systems, governments at times need to respond to short term demands and give less attention to long term policy objectives. Reconciling long term goals with short term priorities requires new governance approaches. But these are highly contextual. Viable approaches need be adapted to, for example, political culture or administrative structures. This said, one approach that government should consistently pursue across contexts is to mobilise and empower civil society to act according to long term goals. Higher capacity in civil society may counter instability caused by political election cycles and instead foster virtuous cycles in the governing of transitions to a low carbon society. Leadership is needed to foster mobilisation, and policy-makers could take on such leadership. Trust in policy-makers is here a keyword, augmented by transparent policy processes, dynamically consistent policy delivering on the goal of carbon lock-out, and not least, effective and legitimate mechanisms to safeguard policy implementation. We conclude on steps that could be considered by governments to promote civil society awareness and willingness to assume responsibility for long term climate policy goals and capacity to act according to these – what we will denote top-down initiatives for bottom-up governance. Mitigation of climate change has long been framed negatively as a matter of sharing costs, efforts and burdens. Research indicates that alarmist messages can backfire, making people less amenable to reducing their carbon footprint. Hence, to mobilise civil society there is an urgent need to reframe the sustainability transition to include also the sharing of realistic future new business opportunities and better quality of life. Storylines for the future including these opportunities should be created by the civil society, displaying different mitigation and adaptation options, and their consequences. A broad range of civil society organisations can be engaged in creating storylines recognisable and relevant for their members: cultural organisations, local community organisations, trade unions, business federations, educational institutions. Timely stakeholder engagement helps build consensus and ensures broad buy-in to future policy goals and implementation strategies Governments could take leadership in initialising and incentivising the start-up of storyline making, utilising capacities already in place in such collective action oriented organisations, exemplified by the step taken by the European Environmental Agency to engage civil society in discussing options in the field of low-carbon transport. The government can also take steps to ensure that end-points of storylines are trustworthy: act as guarantors through establishing long term goals and legal rights to environmental qualities. Leadership can also be taken elsewhere, by environmental NGOs or industry, exemplified by the work done by the European federation of electricity companies (Eurelectric) leading to the report ‘Power Choices – Pathways to carbon-neutral electricity in Europe by 2050.” The participatory storyline approach to empower people and businesses can also create a better legitimacy base for top-down climate policies such as creating acceptance for binding policy measures. An engaged and well-informed society will more readily accept transition and its dynamic nature; efforts to make scientific methods and results attractive and accessible to the public are therefore important parts of such a governance model. When engaged in the process, people and businesses may assume greater commitments toward the solutions and object less to the transition.

Norms and values of the society may accordingly change and diffuse gradually also among those less engaged, creating the societal base for stricter political measures. Such gradualism, a step-wise governance strategy, would first exploit voluntary and simple measures and options that are less controversial, proceeding to more coercive measures in later stages of knowledge diffusion concerning cause-effect relations and understanding of alternative options. While civil society engagement would constitute a needed force for transformation to a low-carbon society, governments must also acknowledge that bottom-up governance alone would not necessarily do the job of creating legitimacy for specific low-carbon solutions. The appropriate design of policy packages will vary across geographical and sectoral boundaries, as well as technical solutions chosen. To illustrate this point, energy efficiency in buildings, wind power, and CCS are three low-carbon energy solutions with very different characteristics in terms of, for example, technologies, stakeholders, markets, and institutions (e.g., rules, norms and cognitions). Experience shows that regulation can be uncontroversial and effective in some areas (e.g., building codes), benefit sharing schemes are often important to ensure buy-in (e.g., for local acceptance for wind power) and public-private partnerships can be important for risk sharing and to leverage funding and capacity (e.g., for CCS). A transversal approach for policy integration, to ensure that all relevant concerns are taken into account, is recommended for the delivery of coherent clean energy and transport policy packages. Although the case for â&#x20AC;&#x153;first-bestâ&#x20AC;? policies such as carbon pricing can be argued, it is often that flanking policies are needed, for example to mitigate unintended distributional or in other ways adverse effects. Planning and permit procedures, as well as combinations of regulation, economic incentives, information, and R&D efforts are important elements of coherent policy packages, in addition to carbon pricing. Furthermore, voluntary (e.g., voluntary offsets) and experimental (e.g., climate labelling) approaches can be a testing ground for policy learning and a mechanism for empowerment and increasing awareness. This, in turn, can increase acceptance for future more binding policy. Governments must acknowledge that civil society mobilisation and engagement could be undermined by failure to deliver trust that policies adopted to achieve the long term low-carbon society will not create negative effects, that policies will actually be implemented, and that frameworks for investments in needed solutions will remain stable and predictable. It is often easy to get agreement on general goals whereas specific goal conflicts and distributional effects can hinder agreement on implementation. A possible approach to safeguarding implementation is the set-up of independent civil society commissions or citizen panels engaged in ex-post evaluation, assisting and watching that policies evolve with dynamic consistency to reach the long-term goals. Such elements of dynamic consistency and implementation safeguards are found in e.g. the UK Climate Change Act and in more specific instruments such as the EU ETS and different types of government loan guarantees. Safeguard mechanisms can facilitate policy learning and evidence based policy development, in addition to ensuring that actors stand by commitments.

Thanks to the contribution of: Ms Carmen Avellaner de Santos CIUDEN Professor Dario Braga UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA Professor Hans Bruyninckx KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN Professor Miguel Buñuel UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRID Mr Massimo Busuoli ENEA - EU LIAISON OFFICE Mr Luciano Corbetta UNI - ITALIAN ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION Ms Elisabeth Cramaussel U.S. MISSION Mr Emilio De Benito EL PAÍS Ms Beatrice Delvaux LE SOIR Professor Gemma Durán Romero UNIVERSIDAD ÁUTONOMA DE MADRID Professor Mark Dyer TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN Ms Christine Elvers THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND Dr Fabiana Fini UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA Ms Karen Geens BELGIAN PRESIDENCY Dr Navraj Ghaleigh UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH Ms Bernard Gonze SYNERGRID Professor Andy Gouldson UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS Dr Henrik Gudmundsson TECH UNIVERSITY OF DENMARK

Mr Bernd Halling BAYER Professor Patrick Hostert HUMBOLDT-UNIVERSITAT ZU BERLIN Commissioner Connie Hedegaard EUROPEAN COMMISSION Mr Mark Johnston WWF Professor Katarzyna Juda-Rezler WARSAW UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY Professor Andy Kerr EDINBURGH CENTRE ON CLIMATE CHANGE (ECCC) Ms Tone Knudsen BELLONA EUROPA Ms Karsten Krause EUROPEAN COMMISSION Ms Barbara Kux SIEMENS AG Ms Jennifer Lacroix FGTB-ABVV FÉDÉRAL Dr John Larsen CLIMATE AND ENERGY PROGRAM WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE Mr Allan Larsson CHAIRMAN, LUND UNIVERSITY Professor Jean Lebrun UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES Minister Paul Magnette MINISTRY FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY, BELGIUM Mr Ivan Martin ROYAL DUTCH SHELL Mr Joachim Mueller-Jung FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG Dr Sara Munro Bryan Pasquier INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY

Professor Lars J Nilsson LUND UNIVERSITY Ms Catharina Nystedt-Ringborg GLOBAL UTMANING Dr Per Ove Eikeland FRIDTJOF NANSEN INSTITUTE Dr Anthony Patt INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS (IIASA) Mr Bruno Pedrotti BAYER EU LIAISON OFFICE Mr Jean-Paul Peers SIEMENS AG Mr Eric Ponthieu EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE Mr Ignasi Puig Ventosa ENT ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT Professor Pierre Regnier UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES Professor Hans Joachim Schellnhuber POTSDAM INSTITUTE FOR CLIMATE IMPACT RESEARCH Dr Graeme Sweeney ROYAL DUTCH SHELL Mr Renato Tagliaferro ATOMIUM CULTURE Mr Massimo Tavoni PRINCETON ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTE AND FEEM Dr Tony Van Osselaer BAYER Ms Diana Van Oudenhoven ACLVB-CGSLB Ms Erika Widegren ATOMIUM CULTURE

This Report is excellent as it does not discuss whether we should do things, whether we should be ambitious, but it very specifically sets the point of “let’s get things done” and addresses the issue of how to do this. Mrs Connie Hedegaard, European Commissioner for Climate Action

The Report “Living in a Low-Carbon Society” is concise, to the point, giving a clear cut idea of the situation and most importantly it gives a very clear idea of possible solutions identified to issues, to challenges, to objectives and how we need the concrete solutions and how we can reach them. It proposes actions, ones we need to take on several levels and I am sure will it will prove very relevant for today’s policy discussions in the energy and climate field.

www.atomiumculture.eu

Mr Paul Magnette, Minister for Climate and Energy, Belgium