IDEA-Model-Framework-article-summarizes-model-for-emergency-managers-Sellnow&Sellnow

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The IDEA model for effective instructional risk and crisis communication by emergency managers and other key spokespersons Deanna D. Sellnow, PhD Timothy L. Sellnow, PhD

ABSTRACT

Emergency managers are very often the key spokespersons charged with instructing people to take appropriate self-protective actions during natural disasters and other extreme events. Doing so successfully poses unique challenges including, for instance, convincing people to pay attention, translating complex information intelligibly to non-scientific publics, and motivating people to actually take appropriate actions for self-protection. These challenges are complicated further by the uncertainty surrounding many crisis events and the short response time demanded of emergency managers to offer such information and instructions. This manuscript describes the IDEA model for designing efficient and effective instructional risk and crisis communication messages and some of the research that has been conducted to validate its utility. Ultimately, emergency managers can use the IDEA model to design effective instructional messages in short order and educators can use the model in the classroom to teach new professionals to communicate effectively when they face crisis circumstances in the future.

Key words: IDEA model, instructional communication, risk communication, crisis communication, emergency preparedness INTRODUCTION

Emergency managers play a critical role in protecting disparate publics when acute crises hit (eg, hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, fires, blizzards), as well as in helping prepare for such events prior to their onset. Effective communication is central to their

success in doing so. Perhaps one of the most difficult tasks of emergency managers in such situations is instructing various stakeholder groups in ways that prompt them to take appropriate self-protective actions. One key challenge stems from message (in)accessibility based on the channel(s) through which it is being distributed. Another daunting task is to translate scientific, technical, and complex information in ways that make it intelligible to non-scientific, general publics. Still another is motivating people and groups to attend to the messages and then take the recommended self-protective actions seriously when time is of the essence.

This essay summarizes a line of research focused on the IDEA model for effective instructional risk and crisis communication that emergency managers can use to achieve the self-protective results they seek among disparate publics. Research informing the development of the IDEA model has been funded by the International Food Information Council (IFIC), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), United States Geological Survey, Department of Homeland Security, and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). This research has focused on a range of topics including food contamination and safety, agricultural biotechnology, natural disasters, animal diseases and biosecurity, health epidemics, and terrorism. In essence, the IDEA model provides a theoretically grounded and empirically tested framework for crafting successful risk preparedness and crisis response messages that can effectively instruct disparate publics both prior to and during crisis events when time for taking action is limited.

DOI:10.5055/jem.2019.0399 Journal of Emergency Management Vol. 17, No. 1, January/February 2019

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Figure 1. The IDEA Model.

EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING THEORY

The IDEA model—which is an acronym for internalization, distribution, explanation, and action—is grounded in experiential learning theory as first conceptualized by John Dewey. Experiential learning may be defined simply as learning from experience.1 More specifically, Dewey explains that authentic learning is achieved when learners not only understand information, but also retain and apply it by engaging in appropriate actions.2 In other words, learning is an ongoing interactive process of knowing plus doing plus reflecting. Kolb further refined Dewey's notions by conceptualizing experiential learning as a four-stage process consisting of concrete experience, reflective observation, abstract conceptualization, and active experimentation.3,4 Thus, the IDEA model was derived from multiple research studies grounded in experiential learning theory and then tested across risk and crisis types ranging from health pandemics to natural disasters to food contamination crises, as well as with disparate stakeholder groups both within and beyond the United States.5 Through additional message design and message testing research, the model is also informed by both convergence theory and exemplification theory, as well as the risk and crisis

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communication best practices concepts published in the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Manual.6-9 Essentially, the IDEA model is an effective and easy-toemploy framework that emergency managers can use to design messages for instructing people and groups to take appropriate self-protective actions before and during emergency and crisis events, particularly when those crises create a sense of urgency.

THE IDEA MODEL

The IDEA model for effective instructional risk and crisis communication is comprised of four key components. As depicted in Figure 1, these components are internalization (I), distribution (D), explanation (E), and action (A). The graphic illustration of the model as represented in the figure is cyclic in nature to acknowledge that it extends Kolb's theoretical conceptualization of learning as a fluid process.3,4 Each of the following paragraphs describes a component of the IDEA model and links it to representative empirical research studies that both inform it and serve as evidence to support its utility.

INTERNALIZATION

Motivating people to pay attention to risk preparedness messages and crisis warnings can be particularly

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challenging. To do so, spokespersons must first break through apathy barriers among receivers.10 According to the IDEA model, they can do so by offering content that prompts receivers to internalize the message. In other words, receivers need to be provided with an answer to the personal relevance question: “Am I or those I care about affected and how?” Emergency managers may cultivate internalization in a number of ways depending on the nature of the crisis event. For example, they can (a) express care and compassion, (b) highlight personal impact, (c) clarify proximity, (d) indicate timeliness, and (e) use exemplars.

Motivational speaker and leadership expert, John Maxwell, is credited with saying people don't care how much you know until they know how much you care.

In other words, expressing empathy and compassion for victims and their loved ones during times of crisis “demonstrates that you value them.”11 For example, Coombs conducted an experimental study based on stimulus scenarios modeled after a real industrial explosion that released chlorine gas into a neighborhood. He tested this principle of compassion with a pool of 114 emergency managers and discovered significant effects in support of spokespersons demonstrating compassion in crisis events.12 Moreover, the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Manual published by the US CDC explains that only when the spokesperson shares their genuine “care and concern for what others are going through” will people be willing to both listen and act according to the instructions provided.9 In fact, when President Trump failed to first express compassion for victims and their loved ones on his first visit to Houston, Texas, in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, he was criticized for showing “an empathy gap” regarding “concern for those in harm's way” and providing “the emotional connection that many Americans would like to see.”13 Another internalization strategy is to highlight personal impact regarding what is likely to happen if people heed (or fail to heed) the self-protective action advice being recommended.14 In the case of a health pandemic like Zika or Ebola, for example, people need to know what will happen to them if they contract the virus before they will be ready to attend to the message.15,16 In the case of natural disasters such as

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the 2017 catastrophic hurricanes in Texas (Harvey), Florida (Irma), Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands (Maria), people need to know what is likely to happen to those that do not to evacuate. Two key obstacles to overcome in conveying personal impact deal with numeracy (ie, numerical literacy levels) and disaster subcultures.

Regarding numeracy, people cannot be compelled by the level of personal impact the event may have on them or their loved ones if they do not grasp the meaning being conveyed through numbers. In the event of an earthquake, for instance, people need to know what effects a level 4, 6, or 8 intensity earthquake will have on them and their homes before they will be motivated to pay attention and subsequently take appropriate action. Scientists typically describe earthquake intensity levels using numbers, which emergency managers and media broadcasters then share with their audiences. Although using numbers to indicate intensity level may be scientifically precise, numeracy issues among non-scientific publics suggest a failure to understand what the numbers mean in terms of actual personal impact on them and their property.17 In fact, based on a series of IDEA model message testing experiments focused on what content to include in an earthquake early warning (EEW) message on a smart phone app, Sellnow and colleagues discovered that, although many receivers could recall the intensity level number “7”, few could articulate what that would mean regarding personal impact on them and their homes.18 Thus, using words (extremely strong shaking) and visual images to illustrate personal impact may serve spokespersons better in getting general publics to internalize the message.

Conveying personal impact as a motivator to attend to risk and crisis messages can also be a difficult challenge for emergency managers working in “disaster subculture” communities that repeatedly experience certain types of disasters.19 People living in these communities may become so familiar with a certain risk (eg, earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, tornadoes) that they become less concerned about the severity of the threat even when a warning is issued.20,21 Results can be devastating, however, as was the case with hurricane Katrina.22 In a study examining survey responses from 964 Katrina evacuees, for instance, failure to prepare

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was a significant issue even though the respondents lived in this hurricane-prone area. In fact, more than half of those participating in the study “had neither prepared for the storm nor devised an evacuation plan.”22 Recently, some have even argued that live reporting during events such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria tend to overdramatize the event in ways that contribute to the nonchalant attitudes of those living in these disaster-prone areas.23 Thus, spokespersons ought to rely on other internalization strategies in combination with personal impact to motivate people living in disaster subculture communities if they are to succeed in getting them to pay attention.

Regarding proximity, interest will be piqued when the situation is close to their homes or the homes of their loved ones.24-26 For example, Spence et al. examined 1329 survey responses from people living in three different cities regarding the effect of proximity on information seeking after the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center. They discovered that emotional responses increased significantly as proximity to the crisis event narrowed and that the types of information sought differed based on geographic location.24 Similarly, Sellnow, et al. conducted an IDEA model message testing experiment based on a food contamination crisis event in Sweden. They collected data from 1488 participants and discovered that those living closer to the location of the outbreak (Stockholm area) were significantly more likely to attend to and internalize the message than those residing in other geographic locations.26 In the case of Hurricane Irma, this task was particularly daunting as the storm changed course repeatedly and ultimately impacted residents throughout the state of Florida.

Regarding timeliness, people are more likely to pay attention to the risk or crisis message when they realize how much (or little) time they have to respond.27-29 For example, in a message-testing study based on a sample of 525 participants, Sellnow et al. discovered that participants were significantly more likely to attend to the IDEA model message that contained elements of both proximity and timeliness than those receiving the status quo message which did not include these elements.29 More specifically, people were more likely to pay attention to and

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internalize the message when they learned that people were sickened from meat purchased in local stores and restaurants, when they knew the effects of the poisoning, and when they knew how much time they had to take action should they show symptoms of being poisoned. Unlike active shootings that occur unexpectedly with little or no warning (eg, at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida (June 2016), at the music concert in Las Vegas, Nevada (October 2017), and at the church in Sutherland Springs, Texas (November 2017), there is often a few days of warning before a hurricane makes landfall. This was, in fact, the case with Hurricane Irma and officials rightly closed schools and businesses for several days prior to the event. Doing so provided people with time needed to evacuate or to prepare for sheltering in place.

Unfortunately, however, preparing even earlier would have been better since the demands placed on suppliers still could not keep up with the needs created during the week preceding the event.

Finally, another internalization strategy for enticing people to attend to an emergency message is to use exemplars. Exemplars are essentially highly evocative words and memorable phrases, visual images, or sounds that serve as “cognitive shortcuts,” which simplify complex risk conditions “that motivate risk avoidance and related protective behavior.”30 Exemplars effectively arouse the attention of receivers because they are both simple and evocative.31,32 Moreover, they can be positive or negative and can be expressed verbally (eg, pink slime as a negative exemplar for lean finely textured beef (LFTB)), visual (eg, see Illustration 1 as a positive exemplar and Illustration 2

Illustration (Positive).

1. Visual

Internalization

Exemplar

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self-protective action at all.34-36 For example, in their examination of New Orleans residents that did not take steps to prepare for hurricane Katrina despite having several days to do so, Roberto, Goodall, and Witte illustrate how high-threat/low-efficacy messages result in fatalistic consequences because victims believed the threat of a major hurricane would strike but not that being prepared would actually help them or that they had the time or means to evacuate.34 Thus, fear-arousing exemplars used to get receivers to pay attention to and internalize crisis messages must also employ specific achievable actionable instructions (ie, high-threat/high efficacy).

DISTRIBUTION

Illustration (Negative).

2. Visual

Internalization

Exemplar

as a negative exemplar) or aural (eg, the emergency alert sound that precedes warning messages).

Overuse of exemplars as an internalization strategy can backfire, however, when negative exemplars mislead publics about the nature of the risk. For example, consumers were misled about the safety of LFTB in 2012 when ABC News used the verbal exemplar “pink slime” accompanied by repugnant visual exemplars (see Illustration 2) to describe the healthy product commonly used for decades in the ground beef industry.33 Consequences of this attention-getting negative exemplification in television news reports caused a crisis of public perception among viewers that resulted in hundreds of layoffs at Beef Products Incorporated (BPI) and skyrocketing prices for ground beef as a result of eliminating LFTB production which was equivalent to “throwing away 5,700 full beef carcasses per day.”33 Fortunately, research results of a message-testing experiment focused on the “pink slime” case revealed that a public perception crisis based on negative exemplification can be successfully refuted when credible sources respond quickly with an accurate counter-argument.32 Finally, overuse of negative exemplars as fear appeals without a means of reassuring efficacious action steps can also result in a sense of fatalism that actually demotivates receivers from attending to the message or taking

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Unlike the other three components of the IDEA model, distribution is not about message content but, rather, about the channels through which risk and crisis messages are sent.5 In other words, crisis communication spokespersons need to answer the question: Which channel(s) will best reach my target audiences? Challenges spokespersons face when attempting to distribute emergency messages focus primarily on two key areas. The first has to do with reaching multiple and disparate publics that may or may not have access to the channel(s) selected. The second has to do with message coordination among the various agencies, groups, and media outlets delivering the messages.35 Until recently, the distribution channels from which to choose for delivering emergency messages were limited. We relied primarily on traditional broadcast media (newspapers, newsletters, radio, TV), warning sirens, and interpersonal word-of-mouth (face-to-face, telephone) communication channels.35,37 Today, however, message distribution options also include text messages, smart phone apps, as well as Internet Web sites and social media (eg, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and even Snapchat).38-41 This plethora of choices brings with it both opportunities and challenges for risk and crisis communicators and emergency practitioners. One opportunity, for example, is that risk and crisis communicators can reach more people by sending emergency messages through multiple channels since not all people seek information

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via the same channels. Relatedly, new channels of communication create unprecedented opportunities for tailoring messages to unique audiences. Moreover, these technologies afford spokespersons the opportunity to provide constant updates regarding crisis events and what to do for self-protection.35 Two key challenges that also must be considered are channel accessibility and message alignment.

One important challenge is channel accessibility.

If an impacted person or group does not have access to the channel being used, they obviously cannot receive the message. During the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, for instance, available cell phone towers became overburdened and locked up as friends and families attempted to make contact with loved ones that lived and worked in the ground zero area or were traveling by plane.37,42 Based on data provided by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press immediately following the event, people turned to the Internet as another means by which to communicate with loved ones.37 Moreover, television was the most important source of information for most Americans.43 During Hurricane Katrina, however, many underrepresented populations did not get messages being sent because they did not own or have access to cellphone or Internet computer technologies.44,45 More recently, the widespread power outages affecting all 3.5 million people across the island of Puerto Rico made message distribution over multiple channels to reach disparate groups extremely difficult both during and after the event.46 Lessons learned regarding channel accessibility generally and social media use more specifically derived from active shooter events beginning with the Virginia Tech Incident have inspired schools to not only come up with crisis plans but also their own warning systems.47,48 Despite these challenges, social media remains a message distribution channel of choice for many people and groups during crisis and emergency events.

However, according to data collected by the Pew Research Center, 13 percent of Americans do not use the Internet at all, let alone use social media.49 Thus, to ensure the risk and crisis messages reach as many disparate people and groups as possible, spokespersons must distribute their messages through multiple

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channels ranging from face-to-face interpersonal communication to traditional broadcast media to smart phone texts and apps to social media.

Another key challenge with regard to risk and crisis message distribution focuses on alignment among the messages sent by emergency managers, public officials, and media outlets. In fact, Sellnow and Seeger contend that such coordination among crisis response organizations and spokespersons “at the local, state and federal level remains the most significant emergency management and response challenge.”35 To clarify, when faced with an extreme event, people tend to seek corroborating information from multiple sources before taking action.50 They do so to reduce uncertainty regarding the chaotic nature of the event and what they should or should not do to regain control of their safety.27,29 When messages from various entities conflict, people continue to seek information until they discover a convergent theme among them.51-54 Message convergence occurs when people perceive that “several distinct arguments lead to a single conclusion.”6 In an examination of interviews conducted with 28 physicians, for example, Anthony and Sellnow discovered that “message convergence plays a notable role” in their decision making, particularly when faced with competing messages or unclear evidence.51 In another study based on eight focus groups representing diverse co-cultural groups, the authors concluded that participants both “recognize and actively seek out points of convergence” among multiple arguments made by different sources regarding food contamination outbreaks.55 Thus, emergency managers may be most effective when they coordinate their communication efforts among a variety of entities to ensure that a convergent best practice message is being sent to disparate publics regarding the crisis event and the actions they ought to take (or avoid) to mitigate harm.

To complicate the issues of message distribution and convergence in times of risk and crisis, perceived credibility of message sources is also an important factor.53,55 That is, different people and populations do not necessarily consider the same sources as more or less credible.25,53,56,57 Mileti and Sorensen rightly argue that, unless target audiences are motivated to

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trust the message spokesperson, they are unlikely to heed their advice.58 Sellnow and Sellnow clarify that ongoing audience analysis and message tailoring from multiple sources perceived as most credible to different publics is critical for effective instructional risk and crisis communication.59 Based on a series of 25 in-depth interviews conducted with Gulf Coast residents after Hurricane Katrina, for instance, Anthony and Sellnow discovered that residents not only perceived local media sources as most credible, but also perceived national media reports as inaccurate and offensive.53 Because some cultural groups perceive local emergency managers and other local opinion leaders to be most trustworthy whereas others may be most convinced by government officials or news media broadcasters, coordination among agencies and spokespersons in delivering convergent messages is key.60,61 EXPLANATION

Explanation focuses on answering questions about what is happening and why, as well as what is being done to mitigate the risk situation and protect communities during a crisis event.5 With regard to risk and crisis explanations and information sharing, the US CDC are known for touting the mantra: Be first, be right, and be credible.9 Few would argue with this assertion; however, accomplishing this task can be extremely challenging when uncertainty is high, safety is at risk, and diverse publics have dramatically different literacy levels regarding the topic. The explanation component of the IDEA model includes several strategies for doing so.

To clarify, emergency managers and other key spokespersons should seek regular and ongoing opportunities to share what they know to date about the situation, as well as what they do not yet know and what they are doing to learn more.9,35,42,61 Moreover, they should do so during pre-crisis and early onset emergency stages in order to raise awareness about potential risks, to provide risk preparedness instructions, and to foster perceived credibility among stakeholders and groups.61 Moreover, since different publics perceive different spokespersons and agencies as more and less credible, consistent explanations should be

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offered from a variety of expert sources.53 Motivating receivers to actually take appropriate risk preparedness measures is perhaps one of the most challenging objectives to achieve. However, engaging in such participatory communication can achieve positive results.59,62 For example, based on survey results and a series of in-depth interviews with employees at a food processing plant, Novak and Sellnow reported that participatory communication achieved positive collective mindfulness regarding biosecurity and, in fact, explained 71 percent of the variance.62 During the Las Vegas mass shooting at the Route 91 Harvest Festival in 2017, the Las Vegas police department was lauded for their effective use of Twitter to engage in ongoing communication with reporters and citizens throughout the event.63 Thus, engaging in ongoing participatory communication is critical before and during extreme risk and crisis events. Failing to do so results in losing control of the narrative as others fill that space with misleading and erroneous information.64 A key challenge to overcome when explaining the situation stems from the fact that various constituent groups may have dramatically different literacy levels not just in a general sense, but also in terms of the complex nature of the scientific details surrounding the risk. In the case of earthquake warnings, for instance, spokespersons must overcome the challenges of explaining the difference between magnitude and intensity, prediction and probability, as well as foreshocks, aftershocks, and swarms.18 Moreover, doing so with numbers gives rise to misunderstandings based on numeracy comprehension.17 In fact, misunderstandings regarding these very issues actually resulted in the arrest of six seismologists and one public official after the 2009 earthquake in L'Aquila, Italy.65 Based on participant observations during a meeting of operational earthquake forecasting professionals in the summer of 2014 and a textual analysis of the report generated from that workshop, Sellnow, Iverson, and Sellnow illustrate how the L’Aquila earthquake actually served as a triggering event that transformed by expanding the community of earthquake experts to include risk communication professionals and practitioners as key to translating science in ways that will be intelligible to non-scientific publics.65

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Thus, to overcome the challenges of scientific translation, emergency managers, scientists, communication experts, and media professionals ought to work together to shape and translate complex scientific information in ways that are not only accurate but also comprehensible to non-scientific publics.

If, in fact, a picture is worth a thousand words, then exemplification can also enhance intelligibility when used strategically.7,8,33,66 To clarify, when a risk message or warning is conveyed in a language in which a given receiver is not fluent, a picture can serve as a cognitive shortcut to increase understanding. Moreover, if similar graphic visuals are adopted in multiple countries, more people may be able to understand them even when traveling across national borders.26,61 The graphic depicted in Illustration 3 clarifies this argument. The circle with a line through it serves as a cognitive shortcut for “do not enter” or “not allowed” across regions in the United States and in many other countries, as well.

In sum, spokespersons should be first, be right, and be credible by taking regular opportunities to explain what they know, do not know, and are doing to find out all through the stages of pre-crisis, acute crisis, and post crisis. Moreover, they should do so based on ongoing and coordinated interactions among scientists, emergency managers, and media professionals as they translate complex information in ways

Illustration 3. Visual Explanation Exemplar.

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that are intelligible to non-scientific publics. Finally, spokespersons should cite the expert sources with whom they consulted in obtaining the information.

Doing so enhances the spokespersons’ perceived credibility and trustworthiness.

ACTION

The action component of the IDEA model focuses specifically on what people should/can do or not do for their own safety and well-being, as well as those they care about.5 Important to note here is the need to provide specific actionable instructions regarding what to do (and not to do) (a) before, during, and after an acute crisis event, (b) across geographical boundaries, and (c) by using exemplars.

Prior to the onset of an extreme event, there is typically the luxury of time to engage in meaningful dialogue with disparate publics about risks and how to prepare for the potential threat, as well as what to do should an acute crisis event occur.35,42,61 This is also the time when education and training campaigns ought to occur. The Southern California Earthquake Council's Great ShakeOut Earthquake Drills campaign is a prime example. These drills, which occur annually in October, attract over five million participants worldwide.67 In the case of food safety, the action step campaign would consist of four simple steps to clean (wash hands and surfaces often, as well as fruits and vegetables), separate (don't cross-contaminate), cook (to at least 160 degrees Fahrenheit), and chill (refrigerate perishable foods within two hours).27,28,29,56 If education and training campaigns are successful, the short response time challenge during an acute crisis can be met successfully. In fact, in their message testing experiments regarding EEW messages delivered on a phone app, Sellnow et al. discovered that such messages can be effective even when time allotted to warn receivers of the impending threat—in this case a high intensity earthquake—is 10 seconds or less.18 Moreover, action steps need to be offered for those living in the crisis-impacted areas, as well as for those living beyond them. For many, it is human nature to want to do something to help those in need. When it comes to crisis response, however, the most appropriate action steps for those living far away are not to

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come to the inflicted area. Thus, offering other action steps is critical. During and after Hurricane Harvey, Irma, and Maria, for example, popular musicians hosted benefits asking listeners to donate money.

Similarly, communities across the United States set up locations where residents could pack food and other supplies to be sent to residents of the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico as they worked to recover from Hurricane Maria. Colleges and universities offered free or in-state tuition to University of Puerto Rico students choosing to come to Florida to finish their degrees.68 Finally, if sufficient training has occurred in advance of the event, visuals can also serve as action step cognitive shortcuts.7,8,18 For instance, the “drop, cover, hold on” graphic serves as a quick, clear, and specific reminder of what to do for self-protection from the strong shaking that may occur during an earthquake (see Illustration 4).

Unfortunately, a good deal of research conducted when developing and then testing the IDEA model revealed that risk and crisis messages broadcast via television news reports often fail to provide clear and specific action steps. For example, results from a content analysis of 566 television news stories broadcast during the height of the 2010 egg recall in the United States revealed that only 3 percent instructed viewers to wash hands and cooking surfaces, 17 percent to cook eggs thoroughly, 9 percent to check plant numbers and Julian dates on egg cartons, and a mere 2 percent on what to do if you or a loved one ate the tainted eggs.69 Their follow-up pretest/posttest experiment revealed that failing to include such actionable instructions resulted in significantly reduced efficacy about the

ability to protect oneself from becoming sickened and including such actionable instructions produced a significant increase in confidence about self-protection.69 More recently, Sellnow-Richmond, George, and Sellnow conducted an IDEA-model thematic content analysis of local, national, and international stories regarding the Ebola outbreak during the weeks after the first case was reported in Dallas, Texas, in 2014.

They discovered that only 6 percent of the local Dallas news stories and 19 percent of the national CDC twitter exchanges offered specific action steps. On a more encouraging note, however, their analysis did reveal that 66 percent of the international organization Web site articles proposed them.70 An even more recent study based on in-depth interviews with producers and veterinarians working in the swine industry during the acute phase the Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea virus (PEDv) crisis revealed that the most effective messages in motivating receivers to take appropriate biosecurity actions followed the recommendations of the IDEA model.

Moreover, when such action steps were recommended without also providing elements of explanation and internalization, receivers were less likely to follow them or sustain the practices over time, providing additional evidence to support the inclusion of all elements in the IDEA model in a risk or crisis message.71 In sum, the key regarding the action element of the IDEA model is to conduct educational training campaigns during the pre-crisis phase when the luxury of time allows emergency managers to do so. Then, when the acute crisis manifests, recognizable alert sounds, short messages, and visual exemplars can be effective cognitive shortcuts to spur appropriate

Illustration 4. Visual Action Exemplar.

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self-protective actions among disparate publics.72 If, however, such preparation and planning campaigns are not done or are impossible to complete in advance of the emergency event, spokespersons should clearly articulate whatever steps are most relevant for selfprotection. Having created a sense of urgency via message internalization and explanation, audiences are likely to welcome advice from credible sources such as emergency managers regarding self-protective actions they ought to take.

DISCUSSION

The communication challenges for emergency managers prior, during, and after emergency and crisis events are formidable. Prior to an extreme event, they must break through the apathy of those living in disaster areas to motivate them to engage in appropriate risk preparedness actions. During an event, they must motivate people and groups to pay attention and take self-protective actions when time is of the essence. And after the event, they need to provide both assurance and action steps for recovering from it.

The IDEA model for effective instructional risk and crisis communication provides a framework for designing messages that will motivate receivers to attend, to understand, and to convince them to take the actions needed for self-protection of themselves and their loved ones. Although no model can serve to inspire all people and groups to take appropriate action, the IDEA model, grounded in experiential learning theory and informed by both convergence theory and exemplification theory, has been tested empirically as one option emergency managers can use for reaching disparate publics effectively across risk and crisis types. More specifically, the model was developed and tested empirically using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, across a variety of risk and crisis types, as well as among disparate groups. These studies consistently affirm the utility of the IDEA model for designing effective risk preparedness and crisis warning messages. If the right messages (aural, verbal, visual) can save lives, then the IDEA model may be an important framework to follow for designing and delivering them.

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In addition, the IDEA model is validated, easy to remember and employ, and flexible. First, the model is based on a broad body of empirical research that confirms the essential nature of each component for effective instructional risk and crisis messages. Moreover, the model is easy to remember and employ. Each step is summarized into an easily recalled word and, when combined, form an acronym that spokespersons can call on when designing messages before and during extreme events. Finally, the IDEA model is flexible in that it has demonstrated its utility across a wide array of disasters, risk situations, and crisis types.

In essence, regardless of the threat, audiences must internalize the message that is sent through a channel to which they have access, comprehend what is happening based on that message, and engage in the recommended self-protective actions. Thus, the elements of the IDEA model can be effective across a variety of extreme events and situations.

The IDEA model can serve as a useful framework for professionals communicating at the federal, state, and local levels. For example, the model can aid firefighters in planning how to communicate about casualties after a severe car accident to helping meteorologists and local police convince people not to drive on the highway during an upcoming winter storm. The model can help EMTs and homeland security professionals plan how to distribute information about triage in a terrorist event and guide local municipalities in communicating about power loss and subsequent actions to take during extreme events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, and wildfires.

Emergency managers face considerable challenges in effectively communicating with their diverse and complex audiences. Fortunately, substantial research has been done to better understand these challenges and to generate strategies for overcoming them. The IDEA model is a practical and teachable approach for meeting the demands of risk and crisis communication in a variety of risk, crisis, and disaster contexts. The IDEA model is offered as an effective tool for emergency managers and other key spokespersons to use as they design and distribute instructional messages to mitigate harm and, ultimately, to save lives.

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Deanna D. Sellnow, PhD, Professor of Strategic Communication, Nicholson School of Communication, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL. Timothy L. Sellnow, PhD, Professor of Strategic Communication, Nicholson School of Communication, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL.

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