EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Energy

EU 2013 Policy Priorities Energy Policy

This report outlines the main policy proposals the EU institutions will be putting forward in the field of energy policy throughout 2013. The report offers a brief overview of the stand points of the European Greens on these specific policies, and points to the national contexts where these policies are likely to stir most discussions.

This report was researched and drafted by Benjamin Tannahill.

Overview Relevant Commissioners: Günther Oettinger, Germany, DG Energy; Janez Potočnik, Slovenia, DG Environment; Connie Hedegaard, DG Climate Action.

Relevant Committees: Industry, Research and Energy; Environment, Public Health and Food Safety.

Main Green actors in the European Parliament: Claude Turmes (Luxembourg; Greens/EFA Coordinator), Rebecca Harms (Germany, Co-president Greens/EFA), Bas Eickhout (Netherlands, Treasurer Greens/EFA), Michele Rivasi (France, Vice-Chair Greens/EFA), Reinhard Bütikofer (Germany, Greens/EFA), Yannick Jadot (France, Greens/EFA).

Main lobbies: Main (inter)national energy companies— e.g. Shell, GDF Suez, Statoil, BP, EDF, RWE, EO.N, GE Energy, OMV); grid operators—e.g. The European Network of Transmission System Operators for

Electricity (ENTSO-E); main renewable energy umbrella lobby group—European Renewable Energy Council (EREC); main umbrella nuclear lobby organisation— European Atomic Forum (FORATOM); NGOs— Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth (FoE), Climate Action Network (CAN), WWF. Propelled by the imperative of tackling climate change and problems of energy security and scarcity, energy policy has risen swiftly up the political agenda and currently represents one of the most complex and contentious topics in the EU. Whilst traditionally it has been largely the preserve of the Member States themselves, with the EU exerting very little influence, there is growing awareness amongst both national and European policy makers that some energy challenges can be better faced at the European level. An integrated EU energy market, for example, could lead to better prices due to increased competition and reduce the Union’s energy import dependency (it currently imports 54% of its energy1).

In the past and still today, however, differences in energy mixes, transport routes, questions of funding and the structure of national or regional energy markets have caused Member States to oppose the development of more integrated energy policies. For example, some Member States rely heavily on nuclear, whilst others do not have a single reactor; some are sitting on huge deposits of coal, while others have few natural resources and rely heavily on imports from abroad—these differences make the development (and then agreement!) of cohesive and effective energy policy at the EU level extremely challenging, as Member States seek to defend their own interests.

Despite slow increases in collaboration over the decades—catalysed, for example, by events such as the 1973 oil crisis and the Rio Earth Summit in 1992—it was not until March 2007 that the Commission developed a proposal for the first EU-wide energy strategy (An Energy Policy for Europe) which marked the beginning of a genuinely pan-European energy policy. Many of the Commission’s proposals were adopted by the Council two months later, including the famous 20/20/20 target (20% savings in energy consumption compared to projections, a 20% share of the energy mix by renewables and a 20% decrease in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 levels—all by 2020), a deal which was brokered by Greens/EFA rapporteur Claude Turmes. The Lisbon Treaty, signed by the Member States in December 2007, 1

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php /Energy_production_and_imports

EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Energy Policy

included the addition of a section on energy which officially added the following to the EU’s legislative remit: Ensuring the functioning of the energy market; Ensuring security of the energy supply in the Union; Promoting energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; Promoting networks2.

the

interconnection

of

energy

These represent a significant step towards policy integration at the European level as much of these areas, especially energy security, were previously very much under national control. Some policy areas are still made at the national level; however, most importantly decisions about the energy mix, energy foreign policy and the conditions under which national energy resources can be exploited.

Currently, the imperative of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, decreasing dependence on nondomestic sources of energy, improving energy efficiency and establishing secure, reliable and low-carbon energy infrastructure across the Union are the driving forces behind EU energy policy—which is expressed most broadly in the Union’s 2050 Roadmap, which was published at the end of 2011. The Roadmap investigated the technical and economic feasibility of achieving an 8095% reduction in GHG emissions (from 1990 levels) by 2050, featuring three different potential pathways to a decarbonised energy system. Whilst generally lauded for providing such a (theoretically) ambitious target, and therefore (in principle) long-term certainty, the Greens have criticised the plans for over-representing energy industry positions and for not including a scenario for a transition towards a system based on 100% renewable energy. This is a long-term policy goal of the Greens and NGOs, which several studies have demonstrated to be possible. The Roadmap, however, provides only a strategy; the legislation which will enforce action on the ground remains to be written. Thus, the actual specifics of where, how and when these energy goals will be realised (i.e. the political, as opposed to technical/economic, dimension) are being hammered out decade by decade as the mid-century deadline approaches. In this respect, the European energy policy agenda for 2013 continues the expansion and development of current initiatives for the 2020 targets (embodied in the Energy 2020 framework) whilst, on the

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Lisbon Treaty, 2007, Article 194

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other, looks to the future by starting to develop a framework for energy policy for 2030—which is crucial for achieving Green energy goals.

Whilst there are of course a wide range of initiatives relating to energy in this year’s Commission Work Programme the most relevant from a Green perspective are those surrounding the establishment of a 2030 Energy and Climate Framework; nuclear energy, particularly the stress tests and amendments to the nuclear safety directive; unconventional hydrocarbons, principally shale gas; and eco-design initiatives. The Greens envision a low-carbon, nuclear-free society, powered by 100% renewable energy by 2050 and supported by high levels of energy efficiency. They see the ambitious implementation of these policies as crucial in achieving this goal. This paper will introduce the aforementioned policies, outline the relevant legislative initiatives to be taken this year and then explore the Green response to those initiatives, before assessing what is currently missing from the EU’s work programme for 2013 in this field.

Important current circumstances which will influence the development of such legislation include the pressures put on Member States by the ongoing economic and Eurozone crises as well as the hangover from Fukushima and the progress of Germany’s nuclear-free Energiewende (energy transition to 100% renewables).

Key measures 1. 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework

Of greatest significance in 2013 is the development of a framework for climate and energy policies for 2030. The EU’s current 20-20-20 targets will reach their deadline by 2020. To continue the upward trend in renewables and energy efficiency it is essential to provide clarity early on regarding a policy framework for 2020-30. This will provide for investor certainty, stimulate innovation and encourage demand for renewable technologies—all of which will also allow the EU to engage effectively in international negotiations for a new climate agreement, anticipated in 2015. The first step in this direction has been taken with the adoption of a Green Paper on the matter by the European Commission in March 2013. The purpose of this paper was to explore and learn lessons from the current energy framework and to raise a set of key questions regarding future energy and climate policy, namely:

EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Energy Policy

What type (e.g. binding or non-binding) of climate and energy targets should be set for 2030 and at what level?

How can coherence between different policy instruments be achieved?

How can the energy system best contribute to the competitiveness of the EU? How can the differing capacities of the Member States’ be taken into account?

Based on the scenarios in the Energy Roadmap 2050, the Green Paper suggests building a framework along the following lines: Reducing GHG emissions by 40% by 2030, in order to be on track to reach the 80-95% reduction target by 2050.

Achieving a higher energy market share for renewable energy, energy efficiency and improved energy infrastructure as “no regrets” options.

A 30% market share for renewables by 2030.

Acknowledging the necessity of significant investments to modernise the energy system, with or without decarbonisation, and the impact of this on energy prices towards 2030.

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further promoting its demonstration and deployment, which will feed into the work on the 2030 policy framework. CCS is the process of capturing waste CO 2 produced by fossil fuel plants and burying it underground, to prevent it from entering the atmosphere.

Green Response The previous targets outlined in the Energy 2020 framework were already judged by the Greens to generally be lacking in ambition: Dutch Green MEP Bas Eickhout states that they have “undermined the effectiveness of overall climate policy [and] the emissions trading scheme”5. Overall, the EU is not on track to achieve all of its 20-20-20 targets, although the renewable energy target is seen as having been successful, with the fact that it was legally binding playing a large role. In this context, preparations for the new 2030 framework, specifically the establishment of ambitious, legally-binding targets for energy efficiency, renewables and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, are at the core of the Green vision for Europe’s energy policy.

Alongside the green paper the Commission also published a Consultative Communication on Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in order to identify the barriers to its development and to discuss options for

The European Renewable Energy Council published a report in April 2013 (Hat-trick 2030: An integrated climate and energy framework) which sets out a number of reasons why an integrated triple-goal system—based on renewables, energy efficiency and greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions—with an ambitious and binding renewable energy target is superior to the “one-legged policy based on a supposedly ‘technology neutral’ GHG-only approach” which is favoured by the energy industry (as it allows them more flexibility in how the target is achieved).

Despite this, Euractiv reports that moves towards a single GHG emissions-reduction target of 40%, in accordance with the wishes of the Member States, seem to be “gaining traction”6. The Greens support the tripletarget system, and are unequivocal that the targets should be ambitious as well as legally binding. To move towards the goal of 100% renewable energy by 2050, the renewable energy target, for example, should represent a 45% share of the energy mix. Combined with the right policies on the internal energy market, well-designed individual support schemes and the necessary infrastructure, such a move would provide the muchneeded investor certainty to support the energy transition. In this respect they see the potential targets

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However, the Commission is still uncertain if there will be one overarching GHG emissions reduction target, or several individual targets relating to renewables, energy efficiency and emissions reduction, as was the case with the 2020 targets. In this regard there are disagreements between Member States in the European Council, particularly between those who are enthusiastically pursuing renewables and those who still have access to large fossil fuel deposits3.

The publication of the green paper also marks the start of a public consultation covering the above questions. As early agreement on legislation is required to tie into the long investment cycles found in the energy sector there is hope that a legislative proposal will emerge by the end of the year, with binding legal decisions coming into effect in the year 2015 at the latest4.

http://www.ewea.org/blog/2013/04/a-hat-trick-is-the-goal-in-thfootball-and-energy-fields/ 4 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-eu-energyidUSBRE93N0RQ20130424

http://www.greens-efa.eu/eu-climate-and-energy-policy9517.html 6 http://www.euractiv.com/energy-efficiency/debate-ragesbrussels-fires-star-news-518688

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set out in the Green Paper above to be inadequate.

The crisis is seen by the Greens as an opportunity to transform the development model of society into a highly efficient, renewables-based and climate-resilient economy; accordingly, they have called on the Commission to come forward with concrete policy suggestions (such as the triple target approach, see above) for the 2030 energy and climate package to facilitate this. Claude Turmes, vice-chair of the European Greens/European Free Alliance, has called for the whole package to be agreed as soon as possible—ideally before summer 20147.

Regarding the Consultative Communication on CCS it should be noted that the Greens oppose this technology on the basis of the risks posed by storing CO2 underground, e.g. gas leakage; its unproven effectiveness (there are currently no functional CCS plants in operation); and the fact that it would prolong dependence on fossil fuels, hindering a shift to renewables.

National Considerations The largest obstacle to the development of a common pan-European energy policy is simply the divergent national interests of the Member States, which vary greatly in terms of domestic natural resources, energy mix, economic strength and energy requirements.

Germany, for example, has chosen to phase out nuclear energy, whilst France relies on it for 77% of its electricity generation. This is exacerbated by the fact that the EU energy market is dominated by a powerful oligopoly of (majority) state-owned energy companies, which seek to protect the strategic energy assets of their respective countries. Examples include Electricité de France, Eon in Germany, Iberdrola in Spain, Enel in Italy or the Central European Energy Partners (CEEP) in Poland, which unites the biggest, domestic energy companies. A good example of how these can influence policy making is the CEEP, a coal lobby who claim that the EU needs to develop a separate (coal-heavy) energy policy for Central and Eastern European countries as their interests are in “contradiction” with those in Western Europe8. This despite the fact that several such states, e.g. Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia use comparatively little coal9.

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http://www.euractiv.com/energy/eu-energy-chief-calls-newtaxes-news-518794 8 http://www.ceep.be/www/Energy_Summit_%EF%BF%BD_%EF %BF%BD_Conference/80/news.html 9 http://www.euractiv.com/climate-environment/brussels-coallobby-sponsored-po-news-515851

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The current economic crisis is also having substantial knock-on effects at national level. In the Commission’s 2013 Renewable energy progress report it was noted that current economic conditions have generally increased the cost of capital, causing Member States to cut their renewable energy support schemes and subsidies and thereby dampening investor enthusiasm— for example, the slashing of feed-in tariffs in the UK in 2011 as part of the Government’s austerity measures. According to the report, “addressing these barriers will contribute significantly to the cost-effective deployment of renewable energy and the achievement of the EU’s targets”; failure to do so will hinder the necessary ‘Europeanisation’ of energy markets. In this context, some states fear that pushing renewable energy will prove too expensive in the long run and are considering turning instead to natural gas (which is comparatively cleaner than coal), as a method for reducing carbon emissions, as is the case in the US. Furthermore, in many of the austerity-stricken states, such as Greece or some Eastern states, where social and economic issues are dominant, environmental measures barely feature on the political agenda.

Key positions among Member States: Most renewable energy: In 2010, according to Eurostat, the following countries had the highest shares of renewable energy – Sweden (47.9%), Latvia (32.6%), Finland (32.2%), Austria (30.1%) and Portugal (24.6%)10.

Least renewable energy: In 2010, according to Eurostat, the following countries had the lowest shares of renewable energy – Malta (0.4%), Luxembourg (2.8%), the UK (3.2%) and the Netherlands (3.8%).

Most nuclear-friendly - Joint Ministerial Communiqué on Nuclear Energy in Europe: In London on the 12th of March, 2013, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Spain signed a communiqué expressing support for nuclear energy in Europe. Business Green notes that this statement suggests that the signatories could oppose plans for a binding 2030 renewables target in favour of a single emissions-reduction target so as to allow for greater national autonomy and flexibility11.

Germany:

currently at the forefront of energy infrastructure decarbonisation efforts as a result of its Energiewende (transition to renewables), the country’s 10

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT- 12- 94_en.htm http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2254407/ministersbolster-nuclear-confidence-with-eu-agreement 11

EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Energy Policy

share of renewables has increased from around 5% in 1999 to 17% in 201012. They have also committed to phasing out all nuclear plants by 2022. Accordingly, they support a triple target for 2030. Germany is not entirely alone in this, however: Belgium has followed suit by pledging to phase-out its nuclear reactors by 2025.

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the table for 2013 legislation. They feature, for example, a legislative proposal on nuclear insurance and liability 17 which seeks to improve the compensation received by victims of nuclear accidents, as well as to level the market-internal playing field for investors. The Commission will put forward a proposal for new legislation in this area during the third quarter of 201318.

France: Despite France’s reliance on nuclear energy, Delphine Batho, Minister for Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy confirmed in April 2013 that France supports a triple target for 203013.

Poland: widely seen as the Member State showing the most reluctance to commit to energy and climate targets, partly as a result of its large remaining coal deposits (90% of Poland’s electricity generation comes from coal)14. A further barrier is that reducing its reliance on coal would force it to import more energy, most likely natural gas from Russia (which supplies most of Europe’s natural gas), a country it “historically distrusts”15 and simultaneously a move which would reduce its energy security. The country has also demonstrated a willingness to exploit its shale gas reserves—although uncertainties over the extent to which they are technically and economically recoverable have thus far discouraged investors.

2. Nuclear Energy Recent developments have brought the so-called nuclear renaissance into question, in the political sphere as well as in the eyes of the public. The repercussions of the accident at Fukushima, the difficulties in finding willing investors due to the risks, uncertainties and rising insurance prices in the market which followed Fukushima and the German Atomausstieg (nuclear phase-out) are prominent examples. The repercussions can be seen in the development of nuclear power across the world over the past few years. Since 2000 EU nuclear capacity decreased by 14GW, while 142GW of renewable energy capacity was installed, 18% more than natural gas, which increased by 116GW16. Nuclear energy, however, remains a key pillar of the EU’s 2050 Energy Roadmap. Such events have, however, placed pro-atomic energy actors under pressure—especially from the Greens. These stresses are reflected in the initiatives on

Also very important is the Commission’s intention to revise the nuclear safety directive19 on the basis of the nuclear stress tests carried out on reactors across the EU in 2012. Provoked by the earthquake and tsunamis disasters at Fukushima in 2011, these tests were designed to assess the safety and robustness of nuclear power plants in cases of extreme natural events, especially floods and earthquakes. The tests concluded that the standards of plants in Europe are “generally high” but recommended further improvements in the safety features of almost all the plants in Europe20. The nuclear safety directive will therefore be revised to include “ambitious but reasonable” minimum standards21. In this capacity, initiatives are planned to review the role and powers of nuclear regulatory authorities and to deal with transparency, as well as communications on the monitoring of environmental radioactivity and off-site emergency preparedness and response. A draft text for the new directive was put together at the end of 2012 and is currently being reviewed by the Group of Experts which, under Article 31 of the Euratom treaty, have advisory status in the EC. The European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group have also set up an ad hoc working group to examine the new safety proposals. Publication of the revised Safety Directive Proposal by the EC is expected in May 2013. The Commission intends to report on the implementation of the stress test recommendations by member states in June 2014, in partnership with national regulators 22.

Nuclear programmes are being expanded in other areas as well, for example, with the Council’s proposal on new cooperation agreements between EURATOM and the Republic of China, Russia and South Korea23. These aim at agreeing financing measures to support a higher level of nuclear safety, radiation protection and the application of efficiency and effective safeguards of nuclear 17

2013/ENER/027 – CWP 2013 FORATOM (2013) EU Policy Developments 2013 19 2013/ENER/021 – CWP 2013 20 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-121051_en.htm?locale=en 21 http://arc.eppgroup.eu/press/showpr.asp?prcontroldoctypeid= 1&prcontrolid=11435&prcontentid=19044&prcontentlg=en 22 http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RSResolution_on_EU_stress_test_lessons-2501134.html 23 2011/ENER/024; 2009/ENER/036; 2012/ENER/006 – CWP 2013 18

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http://www.economist.com/node/21559667 http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2263541/francebacks-plan-for-eu-2030-renewables-targets 14 http://www.iiea.com/blogosphere/a-tale-of-three-targets-the2030-climate-and-energy-debate 15 http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/poland-stands-inthe-way-of-european-global-warming-efforts-a-874344.html 16 World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2012 13

EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Energy Policy

materials in third countries. It is expected that the programme should be adopted by the end of this year.

Such measures suggest some long-term enthusiasm for the technology both in the EU and abroad.

Green Response The Greens maintain their position of absolute opposition to nuclear energy on the grounds that it is expensive, dangerous and obstructs the path to a Union powered entirely by renewables. They furthermore highlight the imperative of ensuring the highest safety standards during the period of nuclear phase- out and insist that the phase-out begin with the most dangerous nuclear power plants. Accordingly, the Greens have paid close attention to the 2012 stress tests and in 2013 will follow closely the planned revisions of the current nuclear safety directive which will be drawn up based in part on the results of these stress tests. The Greens have sharply criticised the tests themselves, for example, on the basis that, inter alia, only 54 of 145 EU reactors were visited, that the tests were carried out by the operators themselves, and that they failed to assess the risk of events such as terrorist attacks, aircraft crashes or material degradation. In a 2013 debate on the matter, Claude Turmes, a Green MEP, dubbed them “stress tests light”.

He also condemned the paucity of proper insurance schemes regarding nuclear, highlighting the 100 billion euro debt which the Japanese population are currently carrying as a result of the Fukushima accident.

Rebecca Harms, co-president of the Greens/EFA parliamentary group, has also criticised the safety plans, pointing out, for example, that the €300 million which has been made available for the enhancement of the safety of reactors in the Ukraine is effectively being used to extend the life of outdated, risky, Soviet-era reactors24. The Greens have called on EU commissioners Günter Oettinger (Energy Commissioner) and Stefan Füle (Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy) to halt the allocation of these funds.

National Considerations EU Member States have very different approaches to nuclear policy, which will probably play out in different positions in the EU Council on the nuclear legislative initiatives:

Member States with the most nuclear energy in the 24

http://www.greens-efa.eu/chernobyleu-nuclear-funds9729.html

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electricity mix: France (77.7% - see above), Slovakia (54%), Belgium (54%), Hungary (43.3%), Slovenia (41.7%), Sweden (39.6% - has started replacing old reactors with new ones), Czech Republic (33% - two more reactors planned), Bulgaria (32.6% - two new reactors planned), Finland (31.6% - one reactor under construction, two more planned)25.

Member States with no nuclear energy: Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Italy (in a 2011 referendum on nuclear power, 94% of the voters were against the proposed construction of reactors), Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta.

Germany: Following the March 2011 Fukushima accident, Germany permanently shut down eight of its 17 reactors and pledged to close the rest by 2022.

France: Due to a long-standing policy on nuclear-based energy security, France generates over 75% of its electricity from nuclear sources, the most of any country26. Nuclear power is not especially popular with the public, however27, and current President Francois Hollande has pledged to reduce nuclear power’s share in the energy mix to 50% by 202528.

Vienna Declaration: In Vienna, on May 25, 2011 in Vienna, Ministers and Heads of Delegations from Austria, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal formed an anti-nuclear bloc within the EU by signing a declaration declaring nuclear power to be incompatible with sustainable development and the mitigation of climate change.

Joint Ministerial Communiqué on Nuclear Energy in Europe: In London on March 12, 2013, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and the UK signed a communiqué expressing support for a new generation of low-carbon nuclear power plants stating that “Member States committed to press[ing] ahead with their decarbonisation objectives [be able to] deploy the fullest possible range of low carbon technologies, particular to their nation’s needs and wishes ... includ[ing] renewables, CCS, and nuclear power. Such neutrality of technology complements the common 25

http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/nuclear_statistics/worl dstatistics 26 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/CountryProfiles/Countries-A-F/France/#.UX6J26LfDh4 27 http://www.energypolicyblog.com/2011/08/02/eu-memberstates-and-nuclear-power/ 28 http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NPHollande_wins_French_presidential_election-0805124.html

EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Energy Policy

European goal of a decarbonised economy given that determination of the energy mix is a national competence”.

3. Unconventional hydrocarbons – the shale gas debate A crucial factor in determining the future energy mix in Europe will be the role played by unconventional hydrocarbons. These principally refer to shale gas—the extraction of which through the high pressure fracturing of layers of rock has been dubbed ‘fracking’—but also other fuels such as coal bed methane or shale oil. The above-mentioned green paper on the 2030 energy framework takes a favourable position on shale gas and in April 2013 the EU’s chief scientific advisor gave the green light to its extraction as part of EU energy policy.

The Commission sees such fuel sources as possessing economic and energy security benefits, lowering European gas prices in the face of rock bottom US rates as well as decreasing the need for energy imports29.

However, the EU wishes to ensure that their exploitation is carried out with proper health, climate and environmental safeguards in place. In order to ensure the environmental integrity of unconventional hydrocarbon extraction in 2012 three studies were published by the Commission in which several risks were identified and questions were raised pertaining to appropriate legislation and regulation of the extraction of these fuels. Continuing in this vein, the principal EU policy initiative for 2013 in this area is ‘environmental, climate and energy assessment framework to enable safe and secure unconventional hydrocarbon extraction’30. This aims at “delivering a framework to manage risks, address regulatory shortcomings and provide maximum legal clarity and predictability to both market operators and citizens across the EU”31. An online stakeholder consultation has been held. The results are expected to be available by the end of June.

Green response Due to a multitude of environmental, economic, climate, health, and geographical reasons, the Greens reject all shale gas extraction in Europe. They note the potentially damaging use of toxic chemicals during the process, particularly on the water table and call into question

whether fracking infringes EU legislation on both water quality and the use of chemicals. Furthermore, they note that the intensive extraction process and subsequent combustion of the gas has demonstrably negative impacts on the climate, through fugitive methane emissions, as well as dampening the prospects for growth in the renewable energy sector by deterring much-needed investment. Finally, the costs of production of shale gas are very high and the production rate decreases rapidly over just a couple of years leading to boom and bust cycles in local economies, meaning that little effect will be had on high gas prices in Europe.

Given the current momentum behind shale gas in Europe, however, attention must be paid to the process, as Carl Schlyter, a Swedish Green MEP, puts it: “[w]hile the Greens believe there is already sufficient evidence to ban this risky technology, existing EU legislation must clearly be vigorously enforced at the very least”32. They have called for an explicit ban in sensitive areas, which was adopted in a Parliamentary own-initiative report, and for EU liability rules to be revised to ensure that those involved in shale gas extraction are fully liable for all damages and are required to provide financial guarantees to cover the potential risks.

National Considerations According to an EIA study conducted in 2011, the EU countries with the greatest potential for shale gas are Poland, France, Norway, Sweden, Ukraine, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany. However, governments and publics across Europe have very different attitudes to the technology33.

States who have banned shale gas extraction: France (although industry pressure is starting to mount for a withdrawal of the moratorium, President Hollande has promised that the ban will last his entire five-year term34), Bulgaria, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Luxembourg.

States who allow fracking: Belgium, Croatia, Latvia, Norway.

States who allow fracking and have issued permits: Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania (a moratorium was lifted at the beginning of 2013), Slovenia, the UK35.

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http://www.greens-efa.eu/shale-gas-and-fracking-8596.html http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/ 34 http://www.economist.com/news/business/21571171extracting-europes-shale-gas-and-oil-will-be-slow-and-difficultbusiness-frack-future 35 http://www.economist.com/news/business/2157117133

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http://ec.europa.eu/environment/consultations/uff_en.htm 2013/ENV/004 – CWP 2013 31 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/energy/unconvent ional_en.htm 30

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EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Energy Policy

4. Ecodesign Whilst not as prominent in the discourse surrounding energy affairs and debates in Europe, 2013 does feature a number of initiatives under the auspices of the 2009 Ecodesign Directive. The idea of this directive is to provide consistent EU-wide rules for improving the environmental performance of energy-related products, principally through reducing their energy consumption, but also through reducing material use, water use, pollution, waste, and enhancing recyclability. This should also prevent disparate national legislations on environmental performance from hindering trade within the EU, benefiting both businesses and consumers by enhancing product quality and environmental protection.

Currently more than 40 different product groups are covered (such as lightbulbs, TVs, fridges, windows, insulation material etc.), which together are responsible for around 40% of all EU greenhouse gas emissions. A study by Ecofys found that effective implementation of the Ecodesign directive would save 400 million tonnes of CO2 emissions per year36.

In 2013 there are numerous initiatives on the table which chiefly address regulatory measures for ecodesign requirements for products such as computers, servers and various boiler and heating systems; plus various regulatory measures on online and offline labelling of energy-related products such as vacuum cleaners. For example, in March the Ecodesign directive’s regulatory committee set minimum standards for boilers and water heaters, also forcing their energy savings potential to be labelled37. Energy savings legislation for computers across the EU was also strengthened after a closed-door vote on 7 March, 201338.

would have a “massive” effect on greenhouse gas emissions reductions39.

What’s missing?

Coordinated Nuclear Phase-out: The Greens/EFA have always opposed the use of nuclear within Europe, and the EU’s subsidy and promotion of it.

The nuclear disaster at Fukushima and the subsequent German announcement of a national phase out should lead to an EU wide coordination of a withdrawal from nuclear they contend. Instead nuclear power remains as an integral part of the energy mix in the 2050 roadmap.

Heating and cooling savings: Heating and cooling are responsible for 43% of the EU’s energy consumption. As, for example, 81% of heating today is produced through the combustion of fossil fuels (cooling also largely relies on coal and gas) making emissions savings in these areas is crucial. There is potential for turning waste heat into energy that could be used to produce electricity or to feed district heating networks, for example40. In the 2030 Green Paper, however, it was briefly mentioned only three times. The Greens will be pushing for further action in this domain.

For more information >

EU Energy Roadmap 2050: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy2020/roadma p/index_en.htm

>

Green Paper: “A 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies”

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The Greens/EFA website: http://www.greensefa.eu/

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The Green New Deal website, developed and promoted by GEF for the Greens/EFA group, and uniting materials from GEF, the Greens/EFA and the EGP, focuses heavily on energy policy, e.g. decarbonising Europe & developing renewables: http://greennewdeal.eu/energy.html

Green Response Ecodesign-related initiatives are being closely followed by the Greens for their energy efficiency potential. They could have a very profound influence on the Greens’ energy objectives. Also other actors, such as Stéphane Arditi, a senior policy officer for the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), stated that such measures

extracting-europes-shale-gas-and-oil-will-be-slow-and-difficultbusiness-frack-future 36 http://www.ecofys.com/en/publication/economic-benefits-ofthe-eu-ecodesign-directive/ 37 http://www.euractiv.com/energy-efficiency/low-key-dodgyboilers-vote-seals-news-518925 38 http://www.euractiv.com/energy-efficiency/expert-votetightens-green-compu-news-518370

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http://www.euractiv.com/energy-efficiency/low-key-dodgyboilers-vote-seals-news-518925 40 http://www.geothermie.de/fileadmin/useruploads/Service/Pub likationen/EGEC-Policy-Paper-on-the-Energy-Roadmap2050_April-2012-1.pdf

EU 2013 Policy Priorities: Energy Policy

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Webpage of the Industry, Research and Energy Committee of the EP: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/I TRE/home.html

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Stop Climate Change campaign (Greens/EFA)

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Greens/EFA independent study of “The European “Stress Test” for Nuclear Power Plants”

This text is the result of an original research carried out by Benjamin Tannahill for the Green European Foundation. Special thanks go to Heike Leberle and Grace Murray for their advice on this briefing. © Green European Foundation The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Green European Foundation.

With support of the European Parliament.

Green European Foundation asbl 1, rue du Fort Elisabeth 1463 Luxembourg Brussels Office: 15 rue d’Arlon, 1050 Brussels, Belgium Phone: +32 2 234 65 70 - Fax: +32 2 234 65 79 E - mail: info@gef.eu - Web: www.gef.eu

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