Decreus

Thomas Decreus: The Left must commit itself to Europe In a series of six lectures, Bureau de Helling goes “deeper into Europe”, together with the Europe working group of GroenLinks and the Green European Foundation. The sixth and final lecture was delivered by Thomas Decreus, a philosopher at the University of Leuven.

Decreus took his doctorate in early 2014 with a thesis on representation, hegemony and power. In his lecture, he spoke about the state of democracy in Belgium and Europe, and in particular he addressed the question “Does a European project need a European nation?”

National Liberalism Political debate in Europe is dominated by national liberalism, which Decreus defines as follows: “National liberalism is a movement in political theory that holds that our democracy does not work unless it is rooted in a cultural identity. The basis of a well-functioning democracy is a solid cultural community. It helps prevent the conflicts between political parties and between people of differing outlooks from getting out of hand.”

Without everyone realising it, a consensus on liberal values such as freedom of expression exists across the whole political landscape, from left to right. Democracy depends on a liberal constitution which defines fundamental rights and freedoms. These ideas originated in the Enlightenment. The mutual recognition that emerges from them prevents disintegration. These ideas data back to the Romantic Era. How does this apply to Belgium? The people who declared Belgian independence in 1830 were inspired by national liberalism. In this outlook, the native country notion is held to embody liberal truths. A distinct Belgian history was written with a distinct Belgian identity. This mentality is still widespread and deep-rooted; the Belgian political system has a pronounced culture-based dimension. Cultural identity is considered a precursor to the political system. The Flemish region has a strongly nationalist movement which uses rational-sounding arguments. Their discourse runs as follows: “The

Flemish have a distinct common character which differs from that of the Walloons. There are therefore differences in political outlook. The Flemish are rightwing and the Walloons are left-wing. Belgium is broken, because it consists of two distinct cultural communities.

Belgium should therefore split apart.”

But the national liberal mentality also appears in the debate on the multicultural society. Right-wing critics of multiculturalism hold that we have lost our identity. In their view this leads to a relativism of values, and they consider the loss of identity to be the source of all social ills. They see integration and assimilation as the remedies; the recovery of identity here goes hand in hand with the restoration of unity. Only then will the country run smoothly.

Another example is Europe. The idea that Europe cannot function because there is no such thing as a European identity is widespread: there is no European nation and therefore no European democracy. This gives rise to such lines of reasoning as “the Scots are far too different from the Germans.” This rationale reappears in relation to the debt crisis, which is blamed on “lazy Greeks and southern European, Latin countries where people are too fond of their siesta.” Cultural differences are here seen as the cause of different economic behaviours.

National liberalism, in the view of Decreus, believes in the prior existence of a cultural identity. It assumes a static conception of culture and identity, of a native character that has always prevailed. A properly functioning government must be rooted, in this theory, in cultural identity, in a pre-existing demos. This is a very dominant discourse. It is generally seen in opposition to a cosmopolitanism which does not care about cultural identity, and which promotes a “naïve” concept of world citizenship. The public debate often divides along these two lines. But this is a false dichotomy, for a middle road is possible. That middle road calls, however, for a different idea of how political communities function.

Authority creates identity Decreus derives his middle road idea from Niccolò Machiavelli, a philosopher of Renaissance Florence.

Machiavelli, who wrote in the North Italian context of wealthy, independent trading city states, is widely regarded as the first modern political thinker. “The question he addressed,” Decreus explains, “was about the source of authority. His book The Prince presents a quest for the foundations of a political community.

Machiavelli has long been miscast as an unscrupulous politician for whom the ends always justify the means.

But this reputation is baseless, for he was a lucid, profound thinker. The Prince is an analysis of the essence of politics, of how to maintain a society. It’s a kind of physics of power.” Power, in Machiavelli’s view, must derive from the populace. The ruler obtains his legitimacy from his subjects. He cannot remain a ruler

Thomas Decreus: The Left must commit itself to Europe

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without the support of his people. Every city-state had two groups: the populi (the people) and the grandi (the aristocracy). They were always at loggerheads because their interests clashed. The people do not want to be oppressed, but the aristocracy desires power. Therefore there is always conflict. A well-ordered society is impossible because conflict is inevitable. The ruler can unify society. He must seek support from the people and must place himself above both the people and the aristocracy. From this, a notion of common interest emerges. Machiavelli’s prince must represent the common interest. We have the idea that we are a community only thanks to him. Authority creates unity.

declines into totalitarianism.

The reasoning adopted by national liberals is, according to Decreus, precisely the opposite. “There is no such thing as a pre-existing cultural unity. It’s politics itself that creates the unity. The idea that there is such a thing as a common interest is also created by the prince. The situation is thus reversed. Politics is not an expression of a political community, but the community is shaped by politics. Culture is a political product. A society is always divided. What is needed is a political authority that brings structure into the disunity. That is the integration that we need in a multicultural society. This integration is in the first place a political one. Cultural homogeneity is not necessary. In the public discourse on the multicultural society, political problems tend to be treated as problems of cultural difference. In essence it is a problem of systematic disadvantaging: the lack of opportunity is a precarious situation. Poverty is regarded as cultural maladaptation.”

We lack something like a political ceiling. Europe operates in a de-democratising and depoliticising fashion. The European Union tends towards cooperation with institutions that do not play the democratic game: the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank are not compelled to justify their decisions democratically. The “Troika” of the European Commission, the IMF and the ECB is wholly undemocratic: voters have no say and no influence over this Troika. That leads to disempowerment and rage.

Power is invisible: it hides behind institutions. The citizen has no access.

The democratic deficit So what about Europe? According to Decreus, the same story applies. “Cultural differences are not the greatest problem facing Europe. The main problem is that political problems are packaged as cultural problems.”

We must find political solutions for political problems. A political unity must be shaped first, and only then can cultural problems be tackled. The fact that the European project is an economic project is Europe’s most crucial problem. Only secondarily is it a political project.

Neoliberal ideology is clearly reflected in the European Union. Neoliberalism is an ideology that arose in the 1950s and 1960s through the ideas of Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek and kindred figures. They argued that we should diminish the role of the state and make more room for the free market. This approach has indeed fostered growth, but it has been unevenly distributed.

Inequality has visibly become even more acute since the crisis.

Neoliberalism is a political ideal as well as an economic one. In the context of the Cold War, the free market was regarded as an absolute precondition for a free, democratic society. The reason for the collapse of the Eastern Bloc was its centrally planned economy, for the more one intervenes in the market, the quicker a society

Europe has a consensus about the free market which tends towards liberalisation and privatisation. Priority is given to a free trade zone, but without too many social restrictions. This produces a situation in which countries compete with one another. It places a strain on the welfare state. Neoliberal thinking is not a successful basis for creating unity. The competition between European member states is thus organised. The result is economic racism, such as the myth of the lazy Greeks. It does not foster solidarity, which is precisely what Europe needs.

The institutions are shedding their ideologies. The European Commission bears some resemblance to a government, but a real majority government has an ideological profile. The European Commission does not have that and consequently it has much less democratic legitimacy. Another element is the presence of lobby groups. They aim to exert an influence on the design of legislation. The relation between lobbyists and democracy remains a rather strange one. Well-organised interests have more influence on a democratic process than arbitrary lobby groups. When it comes down to it, the European Parliament is the most democratic of Europe’s institutions. But all in all, the Parliament does not have all that much power.

From this account it will be clear that power in Europe is practically invisible. It is unclear who decides what and where. The most crucial elements of power must be visible. The consequence is that debate is constricted into one between pro and anti Europeans. It is a debate that lacks almost any shade of gray, but knows only black and white. Through disinformation, the citizens are against Europe on account of “wrong” legislation. The only option for protest is hence to be anti-European.

Decreus made several observations on the European debate. “The European debate is always organised nationally. An overarching European debate is needed.

The lack of debate leads to a lack of unity. There is little media attention because journalists do not find the European Union interesting. You never see a European debate. The media simply do not report on it, with the

Thomas Decreus: The Left must commit itself to Europe

result that there is a constant lack of information about Europe in the media. The debate about what kind of Europe we want is systematically avoided.”

The Left must commit itself to Europe Thomas Decreus has a word of advice for left-wing politicians. “The Left must take it as gospel that Europe is vital. We need more Europe, because our economy is organised globally. Small nation states no longer have any influence on it. There are certain left-wing groups that say ‘we must go back to the nation state because then we will get a hold on globalisation.’ That is nonsense. It is only by scaling-up that we can come to grips with globalisation. Only then can we redistribute welfare. We must move towards more social legislation in the European sphere. Nationalism will not lead to leftwing redistribution policies. The Left must commit itself wholeheartedly to Europe.”

“We need a political and a social Europe, not a cultural one. The point is that we share a common interest. We need a European discussion that makes it clear to us that we share things – that there is a common interest that rises above cultural differences. Therefore we need, in the first place, an ideologisation of the European institutions. The European Commission must develop an unmistakable political mien. We must set a discourse going in which Europeans recognise themselves as participants. We also need a pan-European, federal, constituency. European policy stretches across national borders, so we need a political space that does the same.

We in the Netherlands ought to be able to vote for Germany’s Angela Merkel. She has an enormous influence on our lives. Politicians of that kind should explain why they have made certain decisions in our TV

studios. They ought to justify themselves to the whole of Europe. Political debate divides people while at the same time drawing them together. Once you discuss matters with one another, you realise that you have common aspirations. It then becomes much more interesting for journalists, because there is a frank debate, and the media love that.”

“Furthermore, we must move away from a competitive Europe, which embroils member states in a continuous slugging match. It only leads to more and deeper divisions. People are set up as rivals towards one another. We will also have to develop Europe-wide redistribution. That necessity is unavoidable.”

“We should not expect too much of politics. A different Europe will have to be built from the bottom up, in confrontation with the existing Europe. The crisis contributes to this: people from all over Europe are organising themselves, as Europeans, in opposition to the present European construction. They want a kind of counter-Europe. I saw that myself in the actions of the Occupy movement. In May 2011, there were demonstrations in Spain. A group of Spanish protestors set off from these rallies towards Brussels. The size of the group grew continually along the way, and by 15 October they were able to put on a 15 thousand strong rally. It was a European protest by people from all over Europe. It was resistance to Europe as it is now. We need a European civil society – a collaboration of trade unions, political parties and social movements. A common enemy creates good friends.”

This text written by Simon Otjes, based on a lecture by Thomas Decreus (held in Utrecht, on February 10th). © Green European Foundation, March 2 014 The views expressed in this article are those of the authors’ alone.

They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Green European Foundation.

With support of the European Parliament.

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