Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
AFRICAN SWINE FEVER MANAGEMENT: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOLLOWING THE INTRODUCTION IN WILD BOAR IN BELGIUM Application of the EU approach on ASF control and eradication
Lleida, 3 March 2020 Patrocinado por:
Philippe Houdart, DVM Director crisis prevention and management philippe.houdart@afsca.be - www.afsca.be
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain 29/08/2011
Inspection Visit Bovine Semen
CONTENT 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Introduction Eradication strategy Approach in domestic pigs Approach in wild boar Sensibilisation and information Conclusions
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INTRODUCTION
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Belgium, Federal State Competences Federal -
Safety Food chain Sanitary aspect of agriculture (animal/plant health) Exports (sanitary aspects - SPS) EU and third country relations CVO - OIE delegate
Regions -
Management of wild life, including animal health Hunting, nature and forest management, tourism Agriculture other than sanitary (economy, subventions)
-
Animal welfare
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
ASF preparedness: at 3 levels Overall aim = early detection and rapid response 1. Introduction in wild boar (Regions) -
Passive surveillance (increased mortality) ASF included in testing protocols Informing hunters and forestry workers Training of staff and hunting managers
2. Introduction in pigs (FASFC) - Mandatory notification of clinical suspicion - Laboratory preparedness - Incentives to increase notification
© Edvīns Oļševskis
3. Strong network between ASF partners - Collaboration initiatives since 2017 - Exercises on operational preparedness - Information initiatives Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Chronology of events • 9-10 Sep 2018 •
5 WB found dead in Etalle, South-BE
Collected & sampled by Wild Life Sanitary Surveillance network (Univ. Liège) = passive surveillance
• 12 Sep 2018 • •
ASF confirmation by PCR in NRL Sciensano Informal information Minister, SANTE, neighbouring countries
• 13 Sep 2018 • •
Crisis meeting Delimitation of provisional infected zone (630 km2)
•
Re-confirmation of analysis result by NRL Sciensano
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Chronology of events (2) • 26 Sep – 03 Oct 2018 • •
Slaughter of all pigs in delimited zone Restocking prohibited
Unknown situation: exclude all risk of introduction into pigs
• 12 Oct 2018 • •
Delimitation of 3 operational regional zones by Walloon Region Objective: better management of WB
• 23 Nov 2018 • • •
Adaptation of zoning according to EU standards Zone I = buffer area Zone II = infected area
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Origin of the virus unknown • Eastern European lineage type II • Jump of > 1,000 km • Potential introduction routes • • • • •
Contaminated left overs on parking areas: truckers, tourists, seasonal workers Contaminated equipment/clothing (vehicles, shoes, …): hunters, tourists, seasonal workers Through nearby military training facility Illegal introduction of contaminated wild boar Intentional introduction
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Current zoning (since 20 Jan 2020) EU zones Management in domestic pigs
zone I = buffer area zone II = infected area Zoning extended 4 times to W and N due to spread of ASF in WB
Operational zones Management in wild boar
zone infectée = infected area zone d’observation renforcée = enhanced surveillance area zone de vigilance = vigilance area
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Situation in wild boar (11 Feb 2020) All analysis results
4,822 WB collected and analyzed of which o 4,588 in zones I and II o 831 ASF virus positive
Positives of last 6 months
Same evolution in different parts o first active circulation o then transition into endemic situation
Little activity in last 8 months – last ASF positive WB dates of half Aug 2019 !!! Disease seems to have stopped circulating at end of summer of 2019 !!! Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Evolution of number of cases of ASF
© Alain Licoppe, SPW
© Céline Malengreaux, SPW (GF-TADs Handbook on ASF in wild boar and biosecurity during hunting - Version 25.09.2018)
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Situation in domestic pigs
No outbreaks so far
>10,000 blood samples of domestic pigs coming from ca. 1,900 holdings analyzed with PCR in framework of enhanced surveillance
EU
Third countries
Regionalization and zoning Measures and restrictions for intracommunity trade for the zones but no restrictions for the rest of the country â‚Ź20 > : e ipl princ e losses e t i Desp llion trad nth mi y mo ever
OIE status Belgium remains free from ASF in domestic pigs and captive wild pigs, in line with article 15.1.3 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code but has lost its ASF free status for all swine (domestic pigs + WB)
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ERADICATION STRATEGY
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Overall strategy • Short term • •
Prevent introduction of ASF in domestic pigs Prevent spread of disease among WB
• Long term • • •
Eradication of disease Eradication of WB in affected areas Significant reduction of WB population elsewhere in BE
ASF management Strategy is in line with § Chapters 4.3 (Zoning) and 15.1 (ASF) of the OIE terrestrial code § Council Directive 2002/60/EC of 27 June 2002 laying down specific provisions for the control of ASF § Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU concerning animal health control measures relating to ASF in certain Member States Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Overall strategy (2) • Operational means domestic pigs • • • • •
Zoning Preventive measures Enhanced biosecurity Increased surveillance Pre-emptive culling in risk areas or on risk holdings
• Operational means WB • • • • •
Zoning Standstill of activities in forests Active search and removal of dead WB Containment of virus by fencing Depopulation of WB with • •
risk adapted hunting tactics trapping Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
APPROACH IN DOMESTIC PIGS
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Background information • Some figures about pig production in BE • • • •
•
7,200 pig farms (registration is compulsory for even 1 pig!) 6.2 million pigs (94% in Flanders) 11 million pigs slaughtered per year €1.3 billion turnover from exports o 90% to EU member states o 10% to third countries Direct jobs: 15,000
• Some figures about the affected area •
•
Initial zone of Sep 2018 o 67 holdings with about 5,000 pigs o mainly backyard owners raising <10 pigs for private use o all pigs culled Current zoning (after extension to W and N) o 11 backyard holdings with in total <100 pigs Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Preventive measures in the whole country • Already applicable prior to detection of ASF = applicable at all times o Mandatory notification of suspicion o Pig holdings •
general biosecurity measures (limited access, disinfection baths at the entry of the stables, dedicated clothing, carcass hut, etc.)
•
strict cleaning and disinfection
•
quarantine following the introduction of new pigs into a holding
•
no feeding of kitchen waste
•
specific WB measures o no outdoor keeping of pigs without effective double fencing not allowing direct contact with WB o no access for 72h after contact with WB o no introduction of WB carcasses Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Preventive measures in the whole country (2) o Pig transport •
mandatory cleaning and disinfection of vehicles after each transport
•
mandatory additional cleaning and disinfection of vehicles entering BE and originating from third countries / ASF risk areas
• Additional measures since detection of ASF o Assembly of pigs prohibited o Mandatory 1 on 1 movement of pigs (1 origin to 1 destination) o Access to holdings limited to those persons that are really indispensable for the good management of the holding o Enhanced passive surveillance in case of any illness in a group of pigs: mandatory sampling/analysis of 3 diseased pigs to exclude ASF o Farmers have been asked to perform risk assessment regarding WB Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Preventive measures in the affected zones • Initial measures prior to pre-emptive culling •
Inventory
•
Control by vet
•
Biosecurity check with regard to “WB proof” o o o o
double fencing when outdoors rearing equipment, feed, straw, … out of reach of WB disinfection facilities precautionary measures when using equipment on the fields
•
Entry and exit of pigs prohibited (except with FASFC authorization)
•
Examination of all illness and dead animals
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Preventive measures in the affected zones (2) • Pre-emptive culling on 27 Sep 2018 •
All domestic pigs o > 10 pigs: electrocution on central killing site o 1-9 pigs: euthanasia on farm
•
Restocking prohibited for duration of ASF problems
•
Compensation scheme o animals and feed: Sanitary fund (federal) o loss of economic activity: Walloon region
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Preventive measures in the affected zones (3) • On the farms in the zones added since due to spread of ASF in WB •
Movement restrictions according to EU rules as defined in Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU: = measures to prevent the infection of domestic pigs and to assure safe trade of pigs and pig products
•
No outdoors keeping allowed
•
Strict biosecurity
•
No systematic culling of pigs but o regular biosecurity checks o compulsory euthanasia when risk of introduction of ASF
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APPROACH IN WILD BOAR
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Background information • No precise data known on WB densities •
Constantly been increasing over last decades
•
Estimates based on hunting bag: 28,000 in 2017-2018 season in Wallonia
•
No 1 on 1 link between hunting bag and density
•
Complex population dynamics
• Need for better data gathering and processing
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Tool 1 Adaptive zoning • ASF zones adapted 4 times following virus spread • Criteria •
presence of ASF virus
•
WB habitat and forested areas
•
natural and artificial barriers
• Example: zone with infected WB 12 Oct 2018 11 19 19 18
Jan 2019 Feb 2019 Mar 2019 Dec 2019
© Alain Licoppe, SPW
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Tool 2 Standstill in the forests
© Alain Licoppe, SPW
• Initial epidemic phase •
Total ban of activities in entire infected area o no disturbance of WB o avoid movement of WB o includes hunting, forestry works, hiking
•
No feeding of WB to limit contacts between groups
• Current situation (endemic phase) •
Limited activities allowed again in certain lower risk areas
•
Targeted hunting and depopulation in all subzones
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Tool 3 Search and removal of dead WB • Joint effort •
Active search by groups of 4 to 8 people (wild life staff, army, hunters)
•
Collection and transport of carcasses by Civil Protection to 3 collection centers (1 for infected area, 2 for non infected areas)
•
ASF sampling by veterinarians of Surveillance Network (Univ. of Liège)
•
Analysis by NRL Sciensano
•
Rendering of all carcasses by rendering company
• Enormous effort •
On average 130 FTE / week only for searching
•
One person covers 20 to 40 ha/day
•
Maintained without break since Sep 2018
© Alain Licoppe, SPW
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Collection of dead wild boar
Virton collection and sampling centre © Annick Linden (RSSFS, University Liège) © Service Public de Wallonie
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Collection of dead wild boar
© Annick Linden (RSSFS, University Liège) © Service Public de Wallonie © Civil protection
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Collection of dead wild boar
© Annick Linden (RSSFS, University Liège) © Service Public de Wallonie © Civil protection
Virton collection and sampling centre © Annick Linden Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Tool 4 WB containment by fencing • Triple aim • • •
Avoid spread of disease by keeping WB fenced in Facilitate hunting Avoid surrounding WB to enter ASF zones
• Means • • • •
Simple metallic fencing (type ursus) >300 km put into place Locally reinforced with repellents (scent-based) In practice mainly developed along roads
• Challenges • • • •
Suitable landscape necessary Connect to similar fencing in FR and LUX Demand daily surveillance and mending Very effective to isolate WB except where interrupted by villages Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
nov 2018 dec 2018
okt 2018 feb 2019
jan 2019 Š Alain Licoppe, SPW
Tool 5 Depopulating of WB in ASF zones • Double aim • •
Eliminate infected WB Reduce potential new hosts for ASF virus
• Means • • •
Hunting by regular hunters Shooting by wild life staff Trapping
• Evolution in time •
•
Initial phase: o hunting ban in core area o increased hunting in outer areas Since summer shooting also started in core area
Objective: zero WB in whole zone of 1,110 km2 (520 km2 forest) Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Hunting methods and hunters are established according to risk profile of the area In vigilance area by hunters All hunting methods allowed In ZOR by hunters supported by authorities No hunting with dogs allowed In infected area only by authorities No driven hunts allowed Night hunts with specialized weapons
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Traps put into place throughout the zones to capture and kill WB
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Traps are very effective in summer when foliage makes hunting ineffective
2 m²
15 m²
300 m²
© Alain Licoppe, SPW
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
SENSIBILISATION AND INFORMATION
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Information effort • Towards all stakeholders (hunters, forestry workers, farmers, …) •
Information meetings
•
Mailing
•
Websites
•
Flyers
• Towards neighboring countries •
FR, LU, DE (2 bordering Länder)
•
Weekly basis
• Towards general public •
Websites
•
EU Warning posters (highways, airports, …)
•
Mailing and information via municipalities in the affected areas Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
CONCLUSIONS
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Conclusions • Domestic pigs = no outbreaks so far •
Enhanced biosecurity, spec. regarding contacts with WB
•
Enhanced surveillance
•
Information and sensibilization of stakeholders
•
Where necessary culling of animals
•
Preparing for worst case scenario
• WB = currently stable situation with perspective of eradication •
Continuous monitoring to follow up situation
•
Continuous effort to collect dead WB to eliminate infection
•
Extensive network of fences to stop ASF spread
•
Reduction of WB by trapping and risk based hunting
•
Information and sensibilization of stakeholders and public
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Information – Links to websites
•
AFSCA/FASFC FR – ENG http://www.afsca.be/ppa/ http://www.afsca.be/businesssectors/animalproduction/animalhealth/africanswinefever/
•
Walloon Region http://www.wallonie.be/fr/actualites/mesures-de-lutte-contre-la-peste-porcine-africaine
•
EU Commission & OIE https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/animal-diseases/control-measures/asf_en http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/animal-diseases/african-swine-fever/
•
EU Commission educational film https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eyQ4t1wHl2M&feature=youtu.be
•
FASFC’s Scientific Committee's opinions http://www.favv-afsca.fgov.be/ppa/publications/avis/
•
EFSA http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/search/site/african%20swine%20fever
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Thank you for your attention !
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain 29/08/2011
Inspection Visit Bovine Semen