Truro College: Cold War Booklet 2 by Guy Hopkinson

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: Growing tension

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: Growing tension

17/09/2015

Introduction • End of 1945 two new superpowers technically allies but relations strained: – GB fears losing world influence to USSR so attempted to create Anglo-US Pact, pulling together capitalist powers (GB/USA) in opposition to USSR – Truman under increasing pressure from Congress to stand up to Stalin (outraged no democratic elections in Eastern Europe) … accused of “appeasing Stalin” … why a damaging accusation? – Vagueness of earlier agreements, e.g. Dec. on Liberated Europe – Issues between occupying powers in Germany, Japan and Korea

• Relationship increasingly strained during 1946 • Two telegrams – sent by Kennan and Novikov – revealed attitudes of senior officials on both sides

The Kennan telegram, February 1946 • George Kennan US diplomat based in USSR since 1933 • February 1946 sent telegram to US government alerting them to fears that USSR preparing for world domination • Kennan predicted: – Life-and-death struggle between democracy and communism

• Kennan advised: – “The main element of United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be of firm and vigilant containment”.

• Containment – stopping spread of Communism – became defining feature of US policy in early years of Cold War TASK: • Complete Long Telegram activity (read handout in Stretch and Challenge folder on Moodle for further analysis)

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: Growing tension

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: Growing tension

17/09/2015

The Novikov telegram, September 1946 • N.V. Novikov, Soviet ambassador to USA (1946-47), sent telegram to Moscow summing up his views • Stalin studied document very closely • Novikov expressed: – – – –

After death of Roosevelt USA turned its back on co-operation Concern about USA using its wealth to gain world influence USA beginning to act like an imperialist power Expansion of US military bases sign US government planning ‘global domination’

• TASK: • Find evidence that can be used to support Novikov’s point of view

Churchill, Stalin and the ‘Iron Curtain’ • March 1946, Churchill spoke at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri • Emphasised bitter divisions between rival power blocs in Europe • Likened divisions to an ‘iron curtain’ • Stalin responded by branding Churchill a warmonger TASK: • Read extract of Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech at Fulton, Missouri 5 March 1946 and Stalin’s response in his interview in Pravda, 13 March 1946

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: Growing tension

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: Growing tension

17/09/2015

Conclusion • • • •

End of 1946 trust broken down between USA and USSR Both convinced the other plotting world domination So, by end of 1946 Grand Alliance at an end However, senior diplomats still engaged in regular bilateral negotiations (Council of Foreign Ministers and Allied Control Commission in Germany) so superpowers not yet in state of Cold War …

TASK: • Read pp.25-26 of your textbook • Watch CNN/BBC documentary on The Cold War 1945-1947 Iron Curtain and complete question sheet

Key Interpretation: mutual misconceptions • Cold War came about due to mutual misconceptions and different perspectives of the two superpowers • Both superpowers motivated by desire to protect own interests • However, these actions misinterpreted as aggressive policies designed to expand global influence • E.g., – Soviet leaders saw Stalinisation of Eastern Europe as legitimate actions to safeguard Soviet security; but US leaders interpreted these actions as desire to dominate – Similarly, Western initiatives, e.g. introduction of DM into Western zone of Germany, viewed as provocative by Soviet leaders

• Therefore, Cold War developed due to series of misunderstandings and overreactions

Kennan’s Long Telegram Truman’s hard-line approach to the Soviet Union found its justification in George Kennan’s Long Telegram of February 1946. George Kennan was the USA’s Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Moscow. His Long Telegram provided an analysis of Soviet foreign policy which emphasised the role of communist ideology. He saw the Soviet leadership as suspicious and aggressive; insecurities that stemmed from their view of the outside world. Given the outlook, there could be no compromise with the USSR. The Long Telegram formed the firm basis behind the belief that only a hard-line approach towards Stalin and the Soviet Union would work in containing communism and therefore safeguarding the USA’s interests. From this point the US government dropped the prospect of compromise in favour of a policy of containment. Kennan later returned to the Soviet Union as US Ambassador.

TASK: 

Read the extract from the telegram on the next page.



Identify Kennan’s view of: a. The effect Russia’s past has had on Russia b. The effect Marxism has on the Soviet Union Thenote actions the Soviet with reference to their Findc.and downofevidence thatleaders could be used to support Kennan's pointpolicy. of view foreign

The â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;long telegramâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; of 22 February 1946 One of the key documents of the Cold War, written by Kennan in the US embassy in Moscow, and forwarded to Washington. Only a part of the telegram is reproduced here. At the bottom of the Kremlinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighbourhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more, powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison for contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between the Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned the truth about the world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smouldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive, which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices 2

they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced their country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security for their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate the importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven by necessities of their own past and present position to put forward a dogma which pictures the outside world as evil, hostile:, and menacing,,, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power in Russia state, for that isolation of Russian population from the outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries-old movement in which conceptions of offence and defence are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before. George F. Kennan

Churchillâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Iron Curtainâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; speech (5 March 1946) Winston Churchill, now leader of the opposition, was alarmed at the course of the Cold War and, in the presence of President Truman, called for a partnership between Great Britain and the United States to halt the Soviet colossus. Churchill was ahead of his time however. Only a year later did his ideas become acceptable.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone, with its immortal glories, is free to decide its future at an election under British, American, and French observation.... However, in a great number of countries-, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist centre. Except in the British Commonwealth, and in the United States, where communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization.... On the other hand, I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable; still more that it is imminent. It is because I am so sure that our fortunes are in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have an occasion to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines.... From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength. If the western democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering these principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If, however, they become divided or falter in their duty, and if these all important years are allowed to slip away, then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, A 1146- 7

Stalin's reply to Churchill's speech of 5 March 1946 Stalinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s trenchant response to Churchill revealed his belief in Anglo-American collusion against the Soviet Union, his fear of Germany, and his conviction that eastern and southeastern Europe was so vital to Soviet security that Soviet influence there should be seen as natural. Question: What is your opinion of Mr Churchill's latest speech in the United States of America? Answer: I regard it as a dangerous move, calculated to sow the seeds of dissension among the Allied states and impede their collaboration. Question: Can it be considered that Mr Churchill's speech is prejudicial to the cause of peace and security? Answer: Yes, unquestionably. As a matter of fact, Mr Churchill now takes the stand of the warmongers, and in this Mr Churchill is not alone. He has friends not only in Britain but in the United States of America as well. A point to be noted is that in this respect Mr Churchill and his friends bear a striking resemblance to Hitler and his friends. Hitler began his work of unleashing war by proclaiming a race theory, declaring that only German-speaking people constituted a superior nation. Mr Churchill sets out to unleash war with a race theory, asserting that only English-speaking nations are superior nations, who are called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world. The German race theory led Hitler and his friends to the conclusion that the Germans, as the only superior nation, should rule over other nations. The English race theory leads Mr Churchill and his friends to the conclusion that the Englishspeaking nations, as the only superior nations, should rule over the rest of the nations of the world.... The following circumstances should not be forgotten. The Germans made their invasion of the USSR through Finland, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The Germans were able to make their invasion through these countries because, at the time, governments hostile to the Soviet Union existed in these countries. As a result of the German invasion the Soviet Union has lost irretrievably in the fighting against the Germans, and also through the German occupation and the deportation of Soviet citizens to German servitude, a total of about seven million people. In other words, the Soviet Union's loss of life has been several times greater than that of Britain and the United States of America put together. Possibly in some quarters an inclination is felt to forget about these colossal sacrifices of the Soviet people which secured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget about them. And so what can there be surprising about the fact that the Soviet Union, anxious for its future safety, is trying to see to it that governments loyal in their attitude to the Soviet Union should exist in these countries? How can anyone, who has not taken leave of his senses, describe these peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as expansionist tendencies on the part of our state?

Pravda, 13 March 1946

The 'Long Telegram' The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 pm [Received February 22-3: 52 pm] 511. Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] The Question, Soviet Ideology, Historical Fear of the West, Kennan's Prophecies: 1 Soviet Foreign Policy, 2 'Reds under the Bed', 3 Conflict is inevitable, 4 Cold War, 5 The USSR is weaker, 6 Containment, 7 Marshall Plan

In February 1946, the State Department cabled the US Moscow Embassy, and asked for an analysis of the Soviet position, viz,:

Links Text of the actual telegram Interview with George Kennan Article on Keenan

The Question

(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook. (2) Background of this outlook (3) Its projection in practical policy on official level. (4) Its projection on unofficial level. (5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.

They received back an 8,000-word telegram from George Kennan, an Embassy official. This has become known as 'the Long Telegram', and it said exactly what the American government wanted it to. Kennan hated Communism and the Soviet government. However, he had lived in Moscow since 1933 and knew what he was talking about. His telegram was rewritten as a paper entitled: The Sources of Soviet Conduct, and read by many Americans. It formed the basis of American policy towards Russia for the next quarter of a century. Kennan’s telegram has been criticised by some historians for not giving enough Soviet ideology weight to Soviet belief in Communism. This is not strictly true. Kennan wrote: Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs.

However, he saw Soviet ideology as being layered over the top of more ancient Russian values - the desire to exclude the foreign world and destroy it: At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity … they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

Communism, said Kennan, had just strengthened Russian fear of the West, and given Russia ’s rulers the excuse to wipe out all opposition: In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. Historical fear of the West The USSR, said Kennan, was essentially afraid of the effect that Western capitalism and freedom would have on its people. Because of this fear, he argued, Russia ’s leaders represented the West as evil and corrupt – as Russia ’s enemies: The USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence… Soviet leaders are driven [by?] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is finally killed by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers.

The result was, Kennan argued, a Russia which was determined ‘to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society’, to weaken and the capitalist powers, and to wage a ‘relentless battle’ against western leaders, even if this meant an "imperialist" war. Kennan's Prophecies: Therefore, Kennan prophecies (with remarkable accuracy) the Soviet Union 1 Soviet Foreign Policy could be expected to pursue the following kinds of policies: (a) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark. (b) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. … (c) Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. … (d) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of Western nations, … (e) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense Strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc. (f) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. …

In fact, ALL these policies were pursued by the Soviet Union long into the 1980s. Kennan also prophesied, less accurately, that the Soviet Union would conspire with pro-Soviet elements in capitalist countries to undermine their governments:

2 'Reds under the Bed'

(a) Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity.… (e) Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers against each other. … (f) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. …

Although America in particular, and Britain to a degree, both feared Communist infiltration, and there were regular spy-scares, in fact, Communism never managed to undermine Western governments in the way that Kennan feared. 3 Conflict is inevitable Part 5: [Practical Deductions From Standpoint of US Policy] The most important part of Kennan’s document is his conclusion, in which he outlined beliefs which were to become the basis of American policy for the next twenty years. Firstly, he started by stating that the Communist threat was huge and that there could be no accommodation with the Soviets – the US could never work with a Soviet government, because the Soviet government was intractably determined to destroy America: In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi [way of living together] that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. … Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face….

4 Cold War However, Kennan believed that the Soviet threat could be defeated, and also defeated without a world war. In this way, Kennan can be considered the prophet of the Cold War: But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve -- and that without recourse to any general military conflict.

Kennan considered that, despite the danger, ‘Gauged against Western World as a 5 The USSR is weaker whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force.’ Also, in a remarkable prophecy, he suggested that the Soviet system of government would eventually collapse: Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive … internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured. 6 Containment Above all, Kennan stated that the Soviets – although they might take every possible opportunity to extend Soviet power where allowed, and to test Western resolve where they were opposed – WOULD back down against a show of force. This idea, developed by the American government, eventually turned into the Truman Doctrine, and the policy of containment: Soviet power … does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, it is highly sensitive to logic of force. ….

Kennan therefore stated his belief that, if the US had the ‘courage and selfconfidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society’, and if ‘our public is educated to realities of Russian situation’, the menace of Soviet Communism could be resisted. This would best happen, he said, by making sure that people were wealthy, happy and secure, and waging a propaganda war to make sure that they were aware of the benefits of Western Freedoms. This became the basis of the Marshall Plan: Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue… Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow … We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.

7 Marshall Plan

The Cold War 1945- 47 Iron Curtain

1. What was the initial reaction to the Iron Curtain speech? 2. Economist Galbraith stated what about war production? 3. How many civilian and military lives were lost in the USSR? 4. Why was Britain concerned to maintain good relations with Greece? 5. What was Stalinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s response to the Greek Civil War and why? 6. In East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria although the governments were not in Soviet hands as such, what did remain in Soviet hands? 7. What did Stalin say in his speech in 1946 that caused international outrage? 8. What justification could Stalin have given for his comments? 9. What key document came to light in February 1946? 10. What was the key argument put forward and on what basis was this made? 11. Who did Stalin compare Churchill to after his Fulton, Missouri speech of March 1946? 12. Where did Stalin want to maintain troops despite having no legal right to do so?

The Cold War 1945- 47 Iron Curtain 13. What did the USA do in July 1946 to threaten the USSR and physically show the ‘Iron Fist’ approach Truman had adopted? 14. What different approach was taken towards Germany by the USA from 1947? 15. What was the essence of Byrnes’ Stuttgart speech? 16. Why did the USA decide to try and stabilize the German economy? 17. Who was the US General in Germany? 18. In which two countries was communism making gains? 19. What conditions prevailed in Britain during the winter of 1946-47? 20. What decision did this lead to and what was the US reaction to it?

Topic: Containment

Truman Doctrine 1947

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: Containment

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

• Truman Doctrine, is it: – –

A move away from traditional isolationist policy? A turning point in American Foreign Policy?

• Truman’s speech, is it: – –

A declaration of ‘Cold War’ on Russia? The foundations of the ‘containment of communism’?

Introduction • 1946 and early 1947 American policy changes towards the Soviet Union • Why? – Effect of the Long Telegram and the – Emergence of the policy of containment – Soviet intransigence, especially over Iran (November 1945December 1946) – Problems over Germany (e.g. Paris Peace Conference and Byrnes’ Stuttgart Speech) – Failure of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (December 1945)

• However, need for toughness had to be proved to the American public for them to support a new hard-line policy

Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Origins of the Truman Doctrine • USA assumed Britain would continue to play a major role in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean • Why? – Traditionally an area of British influence, e.g. during the 19th Century Britain had propped up the Ottoman Empire – ‘Sick Man of Europe’ – Post-WW1 Britain gained territory in the region, e.g. Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, Cyprus and Egypt – GB controlled region’s oil fields either directly as part of the Empire or indirectly through British oil companies

The Problem … • However, Britain in midst of crippling economic crisis – Effect of WW2 and bad weather

• Britain also faced serious problems in Empire – India in state of unrest and on the verge of civil war – Palestine rife with Zionist terrorism – Egypt demanding removal of British troops

• Failure to sign peace treaties also left Britain with huge economic ($1m/day) and military commitments in Germany • Post-war US loan to GB of £3.75 billion already used up • Effect of bad weather in 1946/47 winter – Blizzards and cold weather had effectively shut down Britain's industry

• So, PM Attlee informed Truman that British financial and military aid to Greece and Turkey would end on 31st March 1947

Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War

The Greek Dimension • TASK: Read Be Careful What You Wish For (Rodger Hudson, History Today, October 2012) • Greece had been in a state of civil war since 1944 after German forces had been forced out of the country • Greek Communists v Government forces (backed by Britain) • In September 1946 Stalin asked Tito to aid Greek Communists – In contrary to an earlier policy of non-intervention

• Britain’s decision to stop aid was a concern to Truman – Feared communist victory would lead to similar events in rest of Europe, e.g. Italy and France

• Decided the non-communist forces had to be strengthened

TASK: Watch/listen to Truman’s speech Read the extract Then answer the following questions:

1. 2. 3. 4.

In what different ways might the speech be interpreted? What is the tone of the speech? How might Congress react to the speech? How might the US public react to the speech?

Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War Topic: Containment

The Doctrine TASK: Read pp.26-28 of your textbook then answer the following questions: 1. What events led to the creation of the Truman Doctrine? 2. What were the main points of the Truman Doctrine? 3. What was the most important principle enshrined within the Truman Doctrine?

1. What events led to the creation of the Truman Doctrine? – Kennan’s Long Telegram and Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech 1946; Greek Civil War 1944-9 (Yugoslav and Albanian aid to ELAS/DSE; GB unable to help Greek govt. due to debt/economic crisis/winter)

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

2. What were the main points of the Truman Doctrine? – Support free peoples resisting subjugation by armed minorities and/or outside pressure with economic/financial aid and military advisers

3. What was the most important principle enshrined within the Truman Doctrine? – Prevent spread of communism; …

Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War Topic: Containment

President Truman’s Speech 12th March 1947 Truman’s aim: • To provide economic, political (and military) assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces to stop the spread of communism (i.e. containment)

Immediate causes of the speech: • Britain’s announcement it can no longer support Greece and Turkey • So Truman needed to ask Congress to support Greece and Turkey

Key Features of the Doctrine • Truman argued that a stark choice faced every nation – One way of life was:

‘…based upon the will of the majority and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections…’ – Whereas another is:

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

‘…the will of a minority, forcibly imposed upon the majority…’

• Truman added: ‘I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting…subjugation [conquest] by armed minorities or by outside pressure.’

Topic: Containment

• Defenders of Truman Doctrine saw it as the beginning of the end of American isolationism • Critics saw it as the beginning of America as the world’s policeman

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: Containment

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

– Columnist Walter Lippmann called it a ‘strategic monstrosity’

• Dean Acheson suggested that the Truman doctrine was only for Greece and Turkey, other countries would be assessed on ‘individual merits’

in American Foreign policy?

J. L. Gaddis: • US concern for European balance of power dates back to much earlier, e.g. 1917 and 1940 – what is Gaddis referring to with these dates? • The Truman Administration had neither the intention nor the capability of policing the rest of the world • The Turning Point grew out of events in the Korean War, not Greece and Turkey

Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Did the Truman Doctrine mark the first step in the containment of the Soviet Union?

• No! Feb 1946: Kennan ‘Long Telegram’ • Evidence of a tougher policy at once: – Approval of Churchill’s Fulton, Missouri Address March 1946 – Secretary of State Byrnes stance at the Paris Peace Conference (July-October 1946) and Stuttgart Speech (September 1946) – Henry Wallace fired from the Cabinet in September 1946. (In 1947 he criticised the Doctrine as marking the beginning of "a century of fear”.)

Did the Truman Doctrine mark the first step in the containment of the Soviet Union? • No! Clark Clifford Memorandum (Clifford-Elsey Report) September 1946 had already advocated a global policy of containing the Soviet Union: – Using propaganda, economic aid and even military force – To convince the Russians, ‘that we are too strong to be beaten and too determined to be frightened’

Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War

What was the Russian reaction to the Truman Doctrine? • Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) • Consolidate control over Soviet satellites • Unanimity to Eastern bloc strategy • Andrei Zhdanov proclaimed that there were two rival camps in the world: – ‘socialism and democracy’ – the other dedicated to ‘reaction and war’ – Which camp was he referring to with each quote?

• Zhdanov denounced Truman Doctrine as aggressive, and played on East European fears of resurgent Nazism

Stalinisation of Eastern Europe • 1947-49 Cominform successful in Stalinising Eastern Europe through: – Rigged elections and – Sponsorship of coups

• Created one-party dictatorships copying Stalin’s model of government: Country

Date of Stalinisation

Method used

Hungary

1947

Rigged elections

Czechoslovakia

1948

Coup overthrew elected government Jan Masaryk murdered

• By 1949 the majority of Eastern European states were reduced to Soviet satellite states

Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Conclusion • US Congress gave Greece $300 million and Turkey $100 million • Democratic Greek forces won the Civil War • Turkey remained in the western camp • Paved way for the Marshall Plan • Implications – A direct line can be drawn from the Doctrine to the Vietnam War – why?

• Fitted into the American ideas of universalism and selfconfidence • Its anti-communist message touched a chord with the American public • Containment becomes a national crusade

The Truman Doctrine

President Truman deliberately set out in this speech before Congress on 12 March 1947 to dramatise the Soviet threat so as to ensure that the aid requested for Greece and Turkey should be voted. He divided the world into two camps and called on the American people to take up their world mission.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.... The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world - and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation. Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely. Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1947.

Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: Containment

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

The Marshall Plan

Introduction • Continued acceptance of containment during 1947 – Announcement of Truman Doctrine – Containment becomes official – Announcement of aid for any country facing communist threat

• Assist rebuilding of European economy after WW2 • Increase trade and sustain US economic growth • ‘Tie’ Europe to USA – Free trade agreement part of aid

• So extension of containment policy or act of goodwill?

Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Origins of the Plan • Since end of WW2 US pumping money into European economies to prevent famine and economic collapse • Many prominent Americans pushing for European integration

– believed would open up markets by making Europe prosperous – Act as barrier to spread of communism – Pull eastern European states from Soviet bloc – Act as means to integrate West Germany and possibly East Germany too

• Effect ‘A Report on Germany’

The Speech, 5 June 1947 • Marshall outlined US government's preparedness to contribute to European recovery: “It is logical, that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health to the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is not directed against any country, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Any government that is willing to assist in recovery will find full co-operation on the part of the U.S.A.” • Marshall convinced economic stability would provide political stability in Europe “…there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give a proper effect to whatever actions might be undertaken by this Government.” • Most important element of speech was the call for Europeans to meet and create their own plan for rebuilding Europe, and that the United States would then fund this plan

Topic: Containment

Expenditure

Topic: Containment

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

â&#x20AC;˘ Map of Cold-War era Europe and the Near East showing countries that received Marshall Plan aid â&#x20AC;˘ Red columns show relative amount of total aid per nation

Expenditure Total Aid supllied through the Marshal Plan 14000 12000 10000

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8000 6000 4000 2000 0 Aid ($ Millions)

France

Germany

Italy

Britain

Total

2296

1448

1204

3297

12721

Topic: Containment

Criticisms • Marshall Plan described as “most unselfish act in history” Accurate? – Plan dictated a country’s market be opened up to US businesses – Pravda accused Marshall Plan of being motivated by desire to prolong economic boom in USA

• Liberal economists argued:

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: Containment

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

– Plan merely hid failings of the European socialist governments

• Revisionist historians argue: – Plan an example of economic imperialism, i.e. an attempt to control Western Europe

• Economist Tyler Cowen stated: – Nations receiving most aid from Marshall Plan saw least returns and grew least between 1947 and 1955 – Nations who received little, grew most

Conclusion •

Key questions arising from the Marshall Plan – Was the Plan a case of American goodwill? – Why does USSR not accept aid and what effect does this have upon the international scene? – What effect does the Plan have upon Europe?

• • • • •

1948-51 saw fastest economic growth in European history Marshall Plan aid allowed nations of Western Europe to relax austerity measures and rationing, reducing discontent and bringing political stability Communist influence on Western Europe was greatly reduced Played an important role in Western European integration Aided eventual creation of West Germany and NATO as bulwark against communist aggression

Topic: Containment A2 Unit 3: Cold War Topic: Containment

Key interpretation: US dollar diplomacy • US economic interests main reason for development of Cold War – Superpower conflict due to US desire to have political and economic dominance in Western Europe and Japan. So Marshall Plan a form of ‘dollar imperialism’ as US economic aid dependent on political compliance – Cold War developed due to concerns of US politicians to avoid repeat of Great Depression. So Truman’s desire to promote trade with Western Europe and Japan really an attempt to stimulate US economy through trade – Truman encouraged superpower tensions to justify massive government spending on armaments to stimulate US economy

TASK: • Watch CNN/BBC documentary Marshall Plan, 1947-8 • As you watch the documentary, identify and note-down evidence to support and criticise the key interpretation that the Cold War was a product of US dollar diplomacy: Criticise Interpretation

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Support Interpretation

Key events 1946 • • • • •

King Zog of Albania deposed by Communists (Jan) Stalin’s Bolshoi Theatre Speech (Feb) Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ (Feb ) Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech (March) General Clay halts reparation payments to the Soviet Zone (May)

• Byrnes’ Speech at Stuttgart (Sept ) • Novikov Telegram (Sept) • Communists win rigged elections in Romania (Nov)

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: 1945-7

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: 1945-7

17/09/2015

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: 1945-7

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: 1945-7

17/09/2015

Key Events 1947 • Communists win rigged elections in Poland (Jan) • Anglo-US Bizonia formed (Jan) • Britain informs US that their financial and military aid to Greece and Turkey would cease (Feb) • Truman doctrine announced (March) • Marshall Aid (June) • Communists win rigged elections in Hungary (Aug) • Cominform established (Sept)

Why did the doctrine of containment exert such influence? • The belief that appeasement had paved the way for Hitler • The increase in American power had not been accompanied by a feeling of security • Insecurity was increased due to fears of another recession • War time mobilisation was successful in expanding output – what was needed was a peacetime equivalent • World War Two had given rise to a powerful industrial/military complex

Name: ________________________________

THE COLD WAR 1945-47 Please complete the crossword puzzle below using the clues to help you.

Across: 1. PHRASE COINED BY SCIENTIST WILLIAM T.R. FOX 5. US GENERAL WHO STOPPED REPARATIONS 7. AREA OF BRITISH INFLUENCE HELPED THROUGH THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE 8. LEADING COLD WAR HISTORIAN 4. NEW US UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE 1947 (4,7) 12. DEMOCRATIC POLITICS CONTINUED ALTHOUGH THIS COUNTRY IS IN THE EAST OF EUROPE 13. FREE ELECTIONS TOOK PLACE IN THIS COUNTRY IN 1946 17. NEW US SECRETARY OF STATE IN JAN 1947 19. USSR EXPANSIONISM

Down: 2. ACT PASSED BY CONGRESS TO PROHIBIT ATOMIC ENERGY INFORMATION 3. DESCRIPTION OF THE NEW POST-WAR ORDER 4. TYPE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY USING FINANCE TO INFLUENCE 6. REPORT ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS MADE FOR TRUMAN IN JULY 1946 (8,5) 9. DEFENCE SECRETARY HENRY STIMSON SAID THE USA COULD NO LONGER BE THIS 10. STALIN FAILED TO IMPLEMENT THE YALTA ACCORDS REGARDING THIS COUNTRY 11. STOPPED BY THE USA TO SECURE FOOD TO THE SOVIET ZONE 14. UN REPORT TO INSPECT ATOMIC ENERGY INSTALLATIONS (6,4) 15. SOVIET FORCES WERE MOVED 40 MILES TOWARDS THIS IRANIAN CITY IN MARCH 1946 16. ANNOUNCED RELAXATION REGARDING IMPORT-EXPORTS AT STUTTGART 18. SOVIET TROOPS MOVED INTO MANCHURIA AND -----AGAINST JAPAN AT THE END OF WW2

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: Growing tension

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: Origins

17/09/2015

Key Interpretation: ideological confrontation • Ideological confrontation one of eight explanations for origins of Cold War –Cold War inevitable conflict as capitalism and communism fundamentally antagonistic –Marxism-Leninism, official ideology of USSR, committed Communist Party to world revolution to overthrow capitalism –US economic success depended on free trade; Soviet economic system rejected free markets and free trade

• Useful interpretation as explains East-West conflict before Cold War

• Therefore, Cold War developed due to series of misunderstandings and overreactions

A2 Unit 3: Cold War

Topic: Containment

17/09/2015

Key Interpretation: US dollar diplomacy • US economic interests main reason for development of Cold War – Superpower conflict due to US desire to have political and economic dominance in Western Europe and Japan. So Marshall Plan a form of ‘dollar imperialism’ as US economic aid dependent on political compliance – Cold War developed due to concerns of US politicians to avoid repeat of Great Depression. So Truman’s desire to promote trade with Western Europe and Japan really an attempt to stimulate US economy through trade – Truman encouraged superpower tensions to justify massive government spending on armaments to stimulate US economy