The Globe: Spring 2010 2nd Edition

Page 1

The
Clash
of
Gender
Systems
 By
Kirsten
Ortega
 Nationalism
in
Japan:
Issues
for

 Education,
Youth,
and
Politics
in
the
 Modern
Era
 By
Daniel
Boehmer
 Dialectical
Materialism
and
the
 Green
Revolution
 By
Andrew
Detsch
 Food
Scarcity
and
its
Effects
on

 Health
 By
Alison
Salisbury
 Islamism
v.
Nationalism
 By
Behnam
Ben
Taleblu

World News from all Sides Spring 2010—Issue Two

The Globe: World News From All Sides

TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
 
 Letter
from
the
Editor……………………………………………………………………………………3
 The
Clash
of
Gender
System…………..…………………………………………………………….4‐9
 French
and
Muslims
Views
on
the
Display
of
Sexuality
and
their
Implications
 By
Kirsten
Ortega
 
 Nationalism
in
Japan…………………………………...……………………………………………12‐17
 Issues
for
Education,
Youth,
and
Politics
in
the
Modern
Era
 By
Daniel
Boehmer
 
 Dialectical
Materialism
and
the
 Green
Revolution……………………………………………………………………………………..18‐23
 By
Andrew
Detsch
 
 Food
Scarcity
and
its
Effects
on
Health………………………………………………………23‐33
 By
Alison
Salisbury
 
 Islamism
v.
Nationalism……………………………………………………………………………33‐40
 By
Behnam
Ben
Taleblu

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2010
©

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2

The Globe: World News From All Sides

Dear
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3

The Globe: World News From All Sides

The
Clash
Of
Gender
Systems
 French
and
Muslim
Views
on
the
Display
of
Sexuality
and
their
 Implications
 By
Kirsten
Ortega

Since
the
days
of
women’s
suffrage
movements
and
the
burning
bras
of

activists
in
the
1960s,
feminists
of
the
Western
world
have
fought
not
only
to
attain
 equal
rights
before
the
law,
but
define
themselves
as
free
individuals
in
society
as
 well.
One
vehicle
through
which
these
women
have
asserted
their
newfound
 “freedom”
is
through
public
display
of
their
sexuality.
In
the
last
half
of
the
 twentieth
century,
women
began
to
dress
with
less
modesty,
their
exposed
skin
 seen
as
rebellion
against
the
discrimination
they
faced
in
the
past,
requiring
them
to
 hide
their
sexuality.
Wearing
as
little
as
they
pleased
and
acting
as
they
wanted
was
 a
public
declaration
of
their
“freedom”
from
the
social
constraints
that
had
once
 bound
them.
The
open
attitude
towards
publicly
displaying
female
sexuality
 challenged
the
long‐held
double
standard
that
men
could
publicly
indulge
in
the
 play
of
sex
and
seduction
while
women
who
fell
to
their
carnal
instincts
outside
of
 the
private
sphere
were
considered
social
infidels.
Now,
at
least
from
the
Western
 perspective,
women
could
publically
embrace,
instead
of
hide,
their
sexuality
and
 the
West
rejoiced
as
they
achieved
“full
equality”
between
the
sexes
and
“freedom”
 from
gender‐based
discrimination.
But
did
they
really?
Was
the
right,
nay
the
 obligation,
to
publically
display
one’s
sexuality
an
indication
of
true
“freedom”?

Let
us
turn
to
France,
a
nation
that
prides
itself
as
being
the
epitome
of

Western
civilization.
In
France,
women
(and
men)
are
completely
“free”
to
 publically
express
their
sexuality;
it
is
seen
as
a
fundamental
and
a
natural
right.
For
 women,
this
expression
usually
takes
the
form
of
fashion
designed
to
display
and
 reveal,
instead
of
hide,
the
female
figure.
French
culture
celebrates
sex,
and
goes
as
 far
as
claiming
sexuality
as
being
free
of
social
and
political
risk.
This
“open”
system
 of
sexuality,
in
which
exposure
of
the
body
and
free
accessibility
to
the
other
sex
are
 considered
positive
influences
on
society,
is
seen
as
the
only
system
in
which

4

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 women
can
be
totally
“free”
and
“equal”
to
their
male
counterparts.
Any
woman
who
 denies
the
right
to
expose
her
body
as
she
pleases—and
any
women
who
does
not
 take
advantage
of
that
right—is
seen
as
oppressed,
and,
therefore,
not
fully
free.

In
Politics
of
the
Veil,
Joan
Scott
analyzes
France’s
perspective
that
the
public

display
of
sexuality
in
the
public
sphere
is
an
expression
of
“freedom”
and
an
 indication
of
“equality”
in
the
context
of
French‐Muslim
relations
during
the
 headscarf
ban
controversy
in
the
latter
half
of
the
twentieth
century.
According
to
 Scott’s
analysis,
French
society
sees
the
Islamic
veil
as
an
instrument
of
oppression,
 a
way
to
subjugate
women
as
lesser
beings,
a
device
used
to
deem
them
unequal,
 and,
among
other
things,
a
denial
of
their
natural
right
to
exhibit
their
sexual
 “freedom.”

During
the
headscarf
debates,
pro‐ban
legislators
emphasized
public
 “sexual
self‐expression
as
the
primary
test
of
equality.
”1
Scott
explains
that
from
the
 French
perspective,
“the
visibility
of
the
bodies
of
women
and
men,
their
easy
 accessibility
to
one
another,
[and]
the
free
play
of
seduction,
were
taken
to
be
 hallmarks
of
liberty
and
equality,
the
expression
on
the
personal
level
of
what
it
 means
to
live
in
a
politically
free
society.2
In
other
words,
sexual
display
was
not
 seen
as
dangerous
to
political
and
social
intercourse,
but
rather
the
defining
 characteristic
of
a
“modern”
society
that
is
fundamentally
“free.”
As
Scott
states,
 “equality
[in
France]
became
synonymous
with
sexual
emancipation,
which
in
turn
 was
equated
with
the
visibility
of
the
female
body.
”3
Therefore,
those
women
who
 do
not
make
visible
their
bodies,
indicative
of
their
“sexual
emancipation,”
are,
in
 this
logic,
obviously
suffering
from
inequality,
and
not
“free”
individuals,
in
the
 French
sense
of
the
word.
However,
as
Scott
points
out
in
her
essay,
many
Muslims
 in
France
regarded
the
veil
as
a
personal
choice,
a
defining
characteristic
of
their
 individuality,
or
an
affirmation
of
their
spiritual
dedication.
From
their
point
of
 view,
their
modesty
was
not
a
sign
of
oppression
or
inequality,
but
a
symbol
of
 respect
for
themselves,
and
a
respect
for
God.
These
two
opposing
interpretations
of
 the
veil,
and
their
heavy
implications
regarding
freedom
and
equality,
not
only
 























































 1

Joan Scott, Politics of the Veil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 168. Ibid. 3 Ibid, 156. 2

5

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 amplified
tensions
between
French
and
Muslim
groups,
but
exposed
the
French
fear
 of
ideas
about
displaying
sexuality
different
than
their
own.

To
describe
these
two
different
approaches
to
addressing
the
display
of

sexuality
in
the
public
and
private
realms,
Scott
coins
two
terms:
“psychology
of
 denial”
and
“psychology
of
recognition,”
referring
to
the
French
attitude
toward
 sexual
exhibition
and
that
of
Islam’s,
respectively.4
The
“psychology
of
denial”
refers
 to
the
inherent
contradiction
in
France’s
republican
theory
in
which
individuals
are
 reduced
to
abstract
beings
and
yet,
men
and
women
are
held
as
inherently
different
 due
to
their
biological
make‐up.

“Citizenship
in
France,”
Scott
states,
“is
based
on
an
 abstract
individualism”
in
which
individuals
are
stripped
of
all
communal,
ethnic,
 religious,
or
social
distinctions
in
an
effort
to
make
everyone
equal.5
This
 overzealous
emphasis
on
individuality,
independent
of
all
identifications
(other
than
 dedication
to
the
French
state)
diminishes
the
identity
of
individuals
to
the
lowest
 common
denominator:
an
abstract
being,
nothing
more
and
nothing
less.
According
 to
France’s
political
theory
as
presented
by
Scott,
French
citizens
are
completely
 “equal”
as
abstract
individuals,
with
no
inherent
advantages,
disadvantages,
 symbols
of
superiority,
or
inferiority.
In
other
words,
as
abstract
individuals,
we
are
 all
fundamentally
the
same.
While
this
way
of
conceptualizing
equality
appears
 philosophically
straightforward,
there
is
a
key
problem
in
its
practicality.

Although
 French
society
claims
all
individuals
are
the
same
and
equal,
the
difference
in
the
 anatomy
of
men
and
women
is
still
recognized
on
both
social
and
legal
levels.
 Women
are
biologically
defined
by
their
sexual
difference
and
their
unique
 anatomic
make‐up,
which
is
a
difference
that
French
“sameness”
cannot
correct.
 Scott
identifies
this
contradiction
in
French
republicanism:
the
idea
that
equality
(or
 sameness)
is
possible
while
still
elevating
the
differences
between
the
sexes
as
 distinctive
traits.
According
to
Scott,
the
French
see
women
only
through
their
 sexuality,
a
logic
that
implies
that
women
cannot
be
abstracted
from
their
gender.
In
 different
terms—women
cannot
be
reduced
beyond
their
anatomy;
their
sexual
 























































 4 5

Ibid, 186. Ibid.

6

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 difference
is
a
fundamental,
defining
characteristic
and
their
individual
identity
 cannot
be
reduced
any
further.
Therefore,
they
are
inherently
different.
To
illustrate
 this
difference,
there
is
great
emphasis
in
France
on
the
visibility
and
display
of
 women’s
bodies
and
the
sexual
interaction
that
goes
along
with
the
openness
of
 seductive
play.
This
line
of
thought
both
seeks
to
prove
women’s
difference
and
 overzealously
expose
it,
while
at
the
same
time
denying
the
problem
of
reconciling
 sexual
difference
and
sameness
under
French
republican
theory.
While
women
may
 be
formally
equal,
the
difference
of
their
sex
belies
that
equality
and
reveals
the
 deep‐rooted
uneasiness
in
French
politics
about
actually
sharing
power
with
the
 opposite
sex,
and
these
are
the
difficulties
French
society
stubbornly
denies.
In
the
 words
of
Scott,
“the
objectification
of
women’s
sexuality
serves
to
veil
a
constitutive
 contradiction
of
French
republicanism,”
a
mask
to
cover
the
limits
of
a
system
 France
claims
to
be
universal.6
Therefore,
this
“psychology
of
denial”
Scott
refers
to
 is
the
denial
of
the
existence
of
this
contradiction
within
French
political
theory
and
 of
the
problem
of
reconciliation
in
the
relationship
between
sexual
differences
and
 abstract
individualism
in
French
society.

While
the
French
possesses
a
psychology
(or
more
appropriately,
a
politics)

of
denial
when
approaching
sexuality,
Islam
takes
a
different
perspective.
In
Islamic
 society,
sexual
difference
is
recognized
as
a
potential
threat
to
political
and
social
 order,
and
the
placement
of
sexual
display
under
the
private,
instead
of
public,
 sphere
is
a
way
of
addressing
it.
According
to
Scott,
“Islamic
jurists
deal
with
sexual
 difference
in
a
way
that
avoids
the
contradiction
of
French
republicanism
by
 acknowledging
directly
that
sex
and
sexuality
[may]
pose
problems
(for
society,
for
 politics)
that
must
be
addressed
and
managed”
(170‐171).
While
sexuality
and
sex
 may
not
necessarily
create
problems,
they
have
the
potential
and
must
be
dealt
with
 accordingly
to
maintain
societal
order.
Unlike
France,
Islam
honestly
and
openly
 acknowledges
the
problems
that
sexual
differences
can
provoke
in
society,
and
 through
this
recognition
as
implied
by
Scott,
it
is
able
to
more
effectively
meet
and
 deal
with
such
issues.
According
to
her
analysis,
Muslims
realize
that
the
rejection
of
 























































 6

Ibid, 170.

7

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 such
fundamental
differences
and
the
denial
of
a
problem
with
such
weighty
 implications
only
feed
the
fire
of
social
tension.
For
Muslims,
“modest
dress…is
a
 way
of
recognizing
the
potentially
volatile
and
disruptive
effects
of
sexual
relations
 between
women
and
men,
driven
by
impulses.”7

Coverings
such
as
the
headscarf
or
 the
veil
are
open
declarations
that
sexual
relations
are
not
meant
for
public
places.
 While
the
French
theory
denies
the
problem
of
reconciling
the
abstract
 individualism
of
French
republicanism
and
the
sexual
differences
inherent
in
 nature,
the
Islamic
interpretation
of
sexuality
suggests
a
different
perspective.
The
 veil
signals
the
acceptance
of
sexuality
and
even
its
celebration
as
something
special
 and
something
to
be
preserved,
but
only
under
the
proper,
private,
circumstances.
 This
system
of
sexuality
is,
therefore,
a
“psychology
not
of
denial,
but
recognition.”8

Although
Scott
appears
on
the
surface
to
espouse
the
Islamic
approach
to

sexuality
over
that
of
the
French,
she
makes
it
clear
that
both
systems
are
essentially
 patriarchal.
Scott
points
out
that
in
both
systems,
“women
are
objectified…although
 in
different
ways.”9
Despite
France’s
insistence
on
equality,
their
system
is
still
 patriarchal
as
seen
in
the
contradiction
previously
discussed
in
their
political
 theory.
Islam,
on
the
other
hand,
is
patriarchal
not
because
it
denies
the
problems
 sex
can
pose
for
a
society,
but
because
they
cite
women
as
the
primary
instigators
 and
the
source
of
social
disruption
caused
by
sexuality.
While
Islamic
theory
uses
a
 conspicuous
covering
of
the
body
to
expose
sex
as
a
potential
problem,
France
calls
 for
a
conspicuous
display
of
the
body
in
order
to
deny
the
problem
that
sex
poses
for
 French
republicanism;
either
way,
women
are
conspicuously
objectified.
The
 ultimate
aim
of
Scott’s
analysis
is,
therefore,
not
to
cite
one
approach
as
being
 superior
to
the
other,
but
to
show
that
sex
and
sexuality
are
differently
represented
 and
differently
managed
by
these
two
different,
yet
patriarchal,
systems.

These
differing
views
on
sexuality
and
France’s
rejection
of
any
system

contrary
to
their
own
only
increased
tension
in
French‐Muslim
relations.
Not
only
 























































 7

Joan Scott, Politics of the Veil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 171. Ibid. 9 Ibid. 8

8

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 were
these
Muslim
“immigrants”
flooding
France’s
cities,
but
they
were
bringing
 with
them
a
different
perspective,
a
point
of
view
that
challenged
France’s
own,
 superior,
Western
way
of
life.
France
felt
threatened
and
“Islam’s
insistence
on
 recognizing
the
difficulties
posed
by
sexuality
revealed
more
than
republicans
 wanted
to
see
about
the
limits
of
their
own
system.”10
Such
dissension
from
 traditional
French
values,
was
intolerable
and
yet
another
indication
of
the
 inadmissibility
of
Islam
into
French
society.
From
France’s
point
of
view,
their
way
 is
the
right
way,
the
natural
way,
and
the
only
way
to
structure
their
gender
system,
 and
those
who
cannot
conform
to
the
French
way,
are
not
welcome.

Nationalism
in
Japan

Issues
for
Education,
Youth,
and
Politics
in
the
Modern
Era
 By
Daniel
Boehmer
 

 Since
1945
Japan’s
national
psyche
has
experienced
great
change,
the
 Japanese
nation
having
morphed
from
a
constitutional
monarchy
and
later
de
facto
 military
dictatorship
into
a
more
representative
constitutional
monarchy,
grounded
 in
democratic
principles.
The
Japanese
citizen
was
transformed
from
a
subject
of
the
 emperor
with
a
primary
duty
to
protect
and
serve
the
motherland
to
a
subject‐ citizen
with
personal
rights
and
liberties
that
could
never
be
legally
ignored.
With
 these
changes
in
the
status
of
the
Japanese
citizen
came
a
change
in
the
way
that
the
 citizen
viewed
himself
and
his
relationship
with
the
Japanese
state.
Many
of
the
 controversies
that
have
plagued
the
Japanese
state
since
the
end
of
the
Second
 World
War
remain
salient
today
from
issues
of
constitutional
reform
to
the
battles
 waged
over
the
historical
depiction
of
Japan’s
past.
Fundamentally
there
seems
to
 exist
a
difficulty
for
the
Japanese
in
deciding
the
ways
in
which
there
have
been
 continuities
from
Japan’s
Meiji‐era
past
into
modern
times
in
the
face
of
many
 changes
in
Japanese
life
in
the
political,
economic,
and
socio‐historical
realms.
Thus,
 to
a
large
extent
the
legacy
of
Japanese
involvement
in
World
War
II
has
caused
the
 























































 10

Ibid, 154.

9

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 relationship
between
the
Japanese
and
the
Japanese
state
to
change.
Japanese
 nationalism
today
is
largely
characterized
by
a
set
of
relatively
distinctly
constituted
 factions,
from
those
who
have
reacted
toward
the
legacies
of
the
past
with
shame,
 discomfort,
and
a
desire
to
move
beyond
them
to
those
who
believe
that
too
much
of
 Japan’s
past
has
been
rejected
in
this
process.
Resulting
from
this
discourse
have
 been
disagreements
between
the
Japanese
people
over
how
to
view
their
national
 history,
the
state
of
Japanese
youth,
and
their
modern
politics
in
the
post
war
 period.
It
is
the
modern
manifestations
of
these
competing
factions
of
Japanese
 society
that
will
be
the
subject
of
this
study.
 The
depiction
of
the
history
of
Japan
by
the
Japanese
has
been
an
issue
of
 literally
epic
importance
since
the
dawn
of
history
of
the
Japanese
islands.
Japan’s
 origins
are
documented
in
Japan’s
national
myths,
which
have
been
instrumental
in
 the
formation
of
a
national
consciousness
in
Japan.
This
process
was
only
 accelerated
after
the
Meiji
Restoration,
Japan’s
military
victories
being
described
in
 positive
terms
as
indications
of
Japan’s
emergence
as
a
modern
nation,
equivalent
in
 power
to
the
West.
As
military
dictatorship
took
Japan
in
the
1930s,
the
Ministry
of
 Education
took
action
to
suppress
student
rioting
and
communist‐affiliated
political
 activities
in
reaction
to
student
protests.11
Meiji
Japan
textbooks
tended
to
 emphasize
the
positive
contributions
of
Japan
to
the
provinces
of
its
growing
Pacific
 Empire.
Efforts
were
also
made
during
the
Second
World
War
to
highlight
the
 importance
of
service
to
the
nation
by
comparing
the
samurai
to
the
modern
 Japanese
soldier;
service
to
the
emperor
is
an
essential
continuity
in
Japanese
 political
culture
even
in
post‐War
Japan.

After
the
War,
General
MacArthur
and
his
office
of
the
Supreme
Commander

for
the
Allied
Powers
(SCAP)
ordered
the
Ministry
of
Education
to
change
the
 rhetoric
contained
in
Japanese
textbooks,
exchanging
“lessons
for
war
and
loyalty
to
 the
state
with
teachings
of
peace
and
democracy.”12
The
ideological
climate
of
Japan
 began
to
change
rapidly,
as
many
Japanese
began
to
embrace
a
“fever
of
 























































 11

A. Gordon. (2009). A modern history of Japan: From Tokugawa times to the present. (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press., p. 184-5. 12 Gordon, p. 229.

10

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 ‘democratization’
[that]
swept
Japan.”13
More
rights
being
devolved
to
the
people
on
 the
basis
of
a
constitution
(at
least
officially)
written
by
their
own
government
(it
 was
actually
prepared
by
SCAP)
in
contrast
to
the
former
constitution—one
of
 rights
bestowed
generously
by
a
divine
emperor—had
a
profound
effect
on
the
 Japanese
consciousness.
After
the
war,
education
continued
to
be
an
activist
forum
 for
enacting
social
policy,
where
students,
especially
in
the
public
schools,
were
 shuffled
and
sorted
into
different
categories
based
on
exams
and
a
job‐based
 mentality
of
a
standardized
labor
force.14
Educational
changes
were
transforming
 Japan’s
sense
of
self
or
its
kotukai
from
a
basis
in
the
imperial
institution
to
one
 based
on
Japan’s
way
of
life
in
the
economic,
political,
and
cultural
spheres
of
all
the
 different
classes
in
Japanese
society.15

After
the
end
of
the
occupation,
the
rhetoric
contained
in
Japanese
history

textbooks
became
even
more
condemnatory
of
wartime
policies,
denouncing
the
 war
as
imperialistic
and
describing
the
cruelty
of
Japan’s
colonial
policies
in
great
 detail.16
Efforts
by
Japan
to
improve
its
relationships
with
its
neighbors,
such
as
 China
in
the
late
1970s,
required
it
to
be
even
more
conscious
of
the
ways
its
 described
its
wars
in
the
pacific,
with
the
result
that
textbooks
began
to
even
 describe
in
graphic
detail
atrocities
committed
by
the
Japanese
military
during
the
 war,
such
as
the
Rape
of
Nanjing.17
This
exemplified
an
issue
where
the
Japanese
 people
wished
to
find
a
way
to
distance
themselves
from
the
actions
of
their
family
 members
during
the
war.
 By
the
time
of
the
formation
of
the
Society
for
the
Creation
of
a
New
History
 in
1996,
the
frustrations
of
members
of
the
right
wing,
which
decried
the
way
that
a
 pacifist,
foreign
constitution
had
been
used
to
redefine
Japan’s
identity
and
form
an
 apologetic
and
vacillating
system
of
diplomacy,
had
reached
their
apex.
The
Society
 for
the
Creation
of
a
New
History
sought
to
find
a
different
path
and
create
a
middle‐ school
textbook
that
would
not
instill
in
Japanese
schoolchildren
feelings
of
shame
 























































 13

Gordon, p. 230. Gordon, p. 260. 15 Gordon, p. 229. 16 Nathan, p. 140. 17 Nathan, p. 143. 14

11

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 and
disgust
at
Japan’s
past,
especially
during
World
War
II.18
Of
secondary
but
equal
 importance
was
the
desire
to
create
a
textbook
that
would
not
obstruct
the
 formation
of
a
national
identity,
as
they
claimed
current
editions
of
textbooks
did
 rather
it
would
serve
in
the
drawing
of
a
continuity
in
history
that
bridged
the
 heretofore
unbridgeable
1945
gap.
The
society
submitted
its
draft,
New
History
 Textbook
to
the
Education
Ministry
in
2001
in
order
have
the
textbook
included
on
a
 list
of
approved
textbooks
that
could
be
used
in
the
teaching
of
eighth‐grade
social
 studies.
The
textbook
provided
controversially
heterodox
interpretations
of
many
 points
of
the
War
in
the
Pacific,
including
the
occupation
of
China,
and
neglected
to
 mention
anything
regarding
‘comfort
women,’
the
local
women
in
Korea
and
China
 used
as
prostitutes
for
the
Japanese
military.19
On
April
3,
2001,
the
educational
 review
board
responsible
for
vetting
textbooks
approved
the
New
History
for
use
in
 schools,
although
it
was
the
responsibility
of
each
district
to
specifically
choose
to
 whether
to
use
this
textbook
or
one
of
the
many
others
also
approved
for
use.
The
 outcome
of
the
debates
surrounding
usage
of
the
New
History
has
served
to
affect
 significantly
the
countrywide
discussion
of
nationalism.
Although
the
New
History
 failed
to
gain
much
usage
in
Japanese
schools,
with
the
Fuso
edition
of
the
text
 accounting
for
only
0.039%
percent
of
the
total
orders
of
textbooks20,
its
tangential
 effects
were
notable.
Japan’s
depiction
of
itself
in
the
form
of
textbooks,
especially
 those
addressed
to
the
younger
generation’s
of
Japanese
society,
continues
to
 remain
intricately
tied
up
in
issues
of
nationalism
as
Japan
seeks
to
find
a
moderate
 way
to
depict
its
society
to
its
newest
members.
 The
state
of
Japanese
youth
in
general,
in
addition
to
society’s
official
 educational
dialogue
with
them,
has
also
had
much
to
do
with
Japan’s
historical
 legacy
and
lack
of
nationalism
in
comparison
to
neighboring
countries,
which
many
 in
Japan
attribute
to
its
lack
of
continuity
in
history
and
its
lack
of
a
national
 message.
Japan’s
demographic
shift
to
an
older
population
has
also
precipitated
 problems
in
the
educational
sector,
with
many
Japanese
elementary
and
secondary
 























































 18

Nathan, p. 139. Nathan, p. 143-4. 20 Nathan, p. 152. 19

12

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 schools
closing
and
less
competition
to
get
in
higher
education.21
Additionally,
 reports
of
abusive
bullying
have
increased,
and
crimes
such
as
the
decapitation
of
an
 eleven‐year‐old
student
by
a
fourteen‐year‐old
have
highlighted
the
social
 breakdown
occurring
among
Japanese
youth,
such
things
being
previously
unheard
 of.22
Prostitution
among
Japanese
school
girls,23
cases
of
students
dropping
out
of
 school
for
fear
of
sexual
abuse,24
and
increased
rates
of
juvenile
suicide25
all
 highlighted
the
need
for
reform
in
education
to
improve
the
national
sense
of
self
 and
country
instilled
in
Japanese
youth.
In
2006,
the
first
reform
of
the
Fundamental
 Law
of
education
of
1947
was
enacted.
It
added
to
the
list
of
the
goals
of
a
Japanese
 education
1)
the
maintenance
of
tradition
and
2)
the
nurturing
of
love
of
the
 nation—in
addition
to
the
American
inspired
goals
of
realizing
the
ideals
of
peace
 and
democracy.26
In
this
case,
the
social
order
and
continued
modernization
and
 stability
in
society
required
the
educational
system
to
instill
tradition
and
 nationalism
in
Japanese
students.

 The
consumerism
of
Japanese
youth
and
young
professionals
has
been
a
hotbed
 issue
that
has
been
associated
with
Japan
losing
touch
with
its
traditional
values,
 and
these
groups
have
been
seen
as
particularly
susceptible
to
its
vices.
As
the
 average
Japanese
family
saw
its
income
increase
during
the
post‐war
period
there
 became
more
opportunities
to
spend.27
People
became
liberated
as
the
percentage
 of
household
budget
reserved
for
purchases
of
foods
fell
from
50%
in
the
early
 1950s
to
25%
by
the
late
1970s.28
The
typical
Japanese
person
at
that
time
(the
 parents
of
today’s
youth
in
Japan)
became
far
more
obsessed
with
owning
the
“three
 Cs”:
car,
(air)
conditioner,
and
color
TV29
than
they
were
interested
in
serving
the
 Japanese
nation,
the
obsession
of
their
own
parents.
These
luxuries
fostered
the
 























































 21

Gordon, p. 312. Gordon, p. 312. 23 Gordon, p. 313. 24 Nathan, p. 68. 25 Nathan, p. 32. 26 Gordon, p. 313. 27 Gordon, p. 347. 28 Gordon, p. 264. 29 Gordon, p. 264. 22

13

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 development
of
a
middle‐class
consciousness
distinct
from
that
of
the
rest
of
Japan.
 In
later
decades,
their
chidlren
were
becoming
just
as
excited
as
their
parents
about
 acquiring
new
status
symbols,
whether
it
was
the
latest
edition
of
their
manga
 magazines
or
the
newest
video
and
computer
games.30
It
was
the
early
stages
of
this
 process
that
so
distressed
right‐wing
political
leaders
like
Mishima
Yukio,
who
 directed
his
veneration
for
the
Japanese
throne
into
an
effort
of
critique
Japan’s
 “modernizing,
materialistic
postwar
culture.”31
Mishima’s
effort
to
convince
 Japanese
youth
of
the
need
for
a
return
to
traditional
Japanese
aesthetic
values,
 including
militarism
and
devotion
to
the
emperor
and
nation,
proved
a
failure;
 however,
his
critique
is
still
commonly
heard
in
Japanese
society
today,
though
in
 less
militaristic
terms.
By
the
1980s
the
middle
age
generation
clearly
thought
of
its
 children
as
less
prepared
than
itself
to
take
up
the
mantel
of
individual
 responsibility
in
the
areas
of
career
and
personal
relationships,
labeling
their
 children’s’
generation
‘shinjinrui’
or
‘new
species’.32
Ironically,
it
was
their
influence
 that
had
precipitated
their
children’s
becoming
what
they
later
came
to
criticize.
 Modern
Japanese
political
debates
on
the
whole
have
been
characterized
by
 larger
debates
on
nationalism
for
decades.
The
politicians
on
the
left
assert
that
 Japan’s
nationalism
should
derive
from
its
unique
status
as
a
pacifist,
democratic
 nation
which
can
serve
as
a
model
for
improvement
to
other
nations,
in
light
of
its
 great
economic
successes.
Politicians
on
the
right
believe
that
Japan’s
constitution
 should
be
reevaluated
and
reexamined,
including
the
controversial
Article
9.
It
is
 also
significant
that
the
economic
woes
that
Japan
has
experienced
in
recent
years,
 including
the
recession
that
has
plagued
Japan
since
the
early
1990s,
has
acted
as
 proof
that
Japan’s
economic
system
cannot
be
made
the
source
of
Japan’s
pride
as
 was
once
thought.
Limited
economic
successes,
they
maintain,
cannot
supplant
 genuine
investedness
in
the
political
process
and
the
thought,
history,
and
culture
of
 Japan.
Right
leaning
politicians
view
attempts
to
brand
economic
success
as
such
as
 illegitimate
and
far
from
a
legitimate
continuity.
Political
activists
and
politicians
 























































 30

Nathan, p. 124-5. Gordon, p. 266. 32 Gordon, p. 303. 31

14

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 such
as
Shintaro
Ishihara,
his
late
friend
Yukio
Mishima,
conservative
Prime
 Minister
Junichiro
Koizumi,
and
manga
author
Yoshinori
Kobayashi
have
shaped
the
 debate
in
recent
years
to
a
great
degree,
focusing
on
the
relationship
between
Japan
 and
its
neighbors,
official
visits
to
the
Yasukuni
Shrine,
Constitutional
reform,
and
 Japanese
nationalism
in
the
public
sphere.
The
ability
of
these
individuals
to
shape
 and
focus
national
debate
has
been
a
testament
to
their
strength
and
vitality
as
 political
actors.
 Ishihara’s
influence
on
the
national
debate
has
been
immense
in
his
own
 right.
He
has
continually
sought
to
increase
the
pride
of
Japanese
youth
for
their
 country
by
highlighting
facts
that
evince
Japan’s
greatness:
Japan’s
sole
status
as
the
 only
fully
modernized,
powerful
non‐Caucasian
society,
for
instance.33
Ishihara
 blames
many
of
Japan’s
modern
problems
on
historical
and
continuing
U.S.
influence
 and
meddling.
His
opinions
on
Japan’s
neighbors
are
equally
as
stinging,
he
already
 having
condemned
China
on
many
occasions
for
its
development
of
nuclear
and
 ballistic
weapons.34
He
has
also
taken
the
opportunity
to
speak
on
behalf
of
Taiwan
 against
China
in
defiance
of
the
One
China
policy.35
His
blatant
disregard
for
 international
opinion
is
unnecessarily
exaggerated
and
hawkish,
but
it
speaks
to
his
 desire
to
see
Japan
no
longer
cow‐tail
to
the
United
States’
interests
instead
of
its
 own.
Mishima’s
ideas
reflected
similar
sentiments
and
he
was
an
early
proponent
of
 Ishihara.36
Though
Mishima
died
decades
before
the
debates
over
nationalism
of
the
 1990s,
when
Ishihara
was
arguably
at
his
peak,
Mishima’s
ultranationalist
political
 ideas
have
influenced
many
on
the
right.
Ishihara’s
arguments
disturbed
many
 Americans
who
saw
his
efforts
as
damaging
to
the
strategic
U.S.‐Japan
security
 relationship,
such
as
his
remark
that
the
Soviet
Union
could
have
been
made
to
win
 the
Cold
War
with
help
from
Japanese
microchips
for
guided
missiles.37
Ishihara
 even
called
up
the
Self
Defense
Forces
to
be
especially
ready
to
play
a
greater
role
in
 























































 33

Nathan, p. 170. Nathan, p. 172. 35 Nathan, p. 172. 36 Nathan, p. 178. 37 Nathan, p. 181. 34

15

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 maintaining
law
in
order
because
of
the
greater
numbers
of
immigrants
in
Japan.38
 Overall,
Ishihara
has
historically
been
disappointed
with
the
current
political
 system’s
inability
to
reflect
what
he
thinks
it
should:
pride
for
one’s
country,
the
 serving
of
national
interests
first,
and
defense.
 Prime
Minister
Koizumi,
a
member
of
the
LDP,
emerged
in
the
early
2000s
as
 the
next
standard‐bearer
of
the
conservative
side
of
the
nationalism
debate.
Elected
 by
a
wide
margin
as
party
president
and
prime
minister
and
pledging
great
 economic
changes,
he
used
his
role
to
give
Japan
a
more
assertive
role
in
the
world
 with
the
first
overseas
deployment
of
the
Japanese
Self
Defense
Force
and
repeated
 annual
visits
to
the
Yasukuni
Shrine
while
in
office.39
Koizumi
developed
a
closer
 bilateral
relationship
with
the
United
States
under
President
George
W.
Bush
in
the
 face
of
increasing
importance
of
the
Sino‐American
partnership
in
recent
years.40
By
 prioritizing
Japanese
politics
differently,
Koizumi
faced
down
large
amounts
of
 pressure
to
do
what
was
popular
in
the
eyes
of
large
numbers
of
the
Japanese
 population,
the
visiting
of
a
shrine
dedicated
to
war
veterans,
even
while
protestors
 in
Seoul
and
Beijing
burned
Japanese
flags
and
hung
Koizumi
in
effigy.41
In
the
face
 of
calls
to
apologies
for
past
Japanese
atrocities,
Koizumi,
like
some
of
his
 predecessors
repeated
verbatim
the
words
of
the
Hosokawa
apology,42
raising
up
 Japanese
feelings
of
self‐worth
even
as
he
was
repeating
expressions
of
regret.
 Ultimately,
Koizumi’s
political
success
and
popularity
derived
from
his
ability
to
 connect
Japanese
with
feelings
for
their
historical
national
greatness.
By
not
 drumming
up
negative
rhetoric
but
at
the
same
time
not
focusing
on
the
issues
that
 are
not
beneficial
for
Japan
to
focus
on,
he
was
successfully
able
to
find
a
middle
 ground
that
may
serve
as
a
guide
to
future
prime
ministers
of
Japan.
 The
legacy
of
Japanese
involvement
in
World
War
and
Japan’s
subsequent
 history
has
been
a
cause
of
great
controversy
in
Japan
since
the
onset
of
the
 American
occupation
in
1945.
With
the
imposition
of
rule
directed
by
SCAP
and
the
 























































 38

Gordon, p. 311. Nathan, p. 155. 40 Gordon, p. 329. 41 Nathan, p. 155. 42 Nathan, p. 154. 39

16

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 United
States
government,
American
priorities
began
to
influence
Japan
and
the
 relationship
between
the
Japanese
their
country
began
to
change.
In
modern
 Japanese
political
culture,
Japanese
nationalism
is
characterized
by
two
main
 competing
factions
within
Japanese
society,
those
who
have
reacted
toward
the
 legacies
of
the
past
with
shame,
discomfort,
and
a
desire
to
move
beyond
them
and
 those
who
believe
that
too
much
of
Japan’s
past
has
been
rejected
in
this
process.
 This
discourse
has
affected
how
the
Japanese
view
their
national
history,
the
state
of
 Japanese
youth,
and
their
modern
politics
in
the
post
war
period.
While
liberalism
 has
dominated
Japan’s
political
scene
since
the
end
of
world
war
two,
as
right‐ leaning
politicians
and
activists
such
as
Ishihara,
Koizumi,
and
Kobayashi
continue
 to
use
their
influence
to
determine
what
is
discussed
in
Japanese
national
discourse,
 the
future
of
Japanese
politics
remains
uncertain.

 Although
it
is
unlikely
that
Japan
will
move
dramatically
to
the
right
and
 embrace
the
ultranationalist
political
views
of
the
likes
of
Mishima
or
Ishihara,
the
 influence
of
these
political
leaders
and
thinkers
is
indirect.
As
the
example
of
the
 textbook
controversy
showed
clearly,
although
the
right‐wing
textbook,
New
 History,
was
not
able
to
gain
a
significant
amount
of
circulation
in
schools
(its
stated
 intent),
it
still
was
able
to
become
a
bestseller
in
its
own
right
in
Japan.
In
addition,
it
 influenced
other
textbooks
to
tone
down
their
descriptions
of
Japanese
atrocities
 during
World
War
II
and
thereby
decrease
the
feelings
of
guilt
in
Japanese
school
 children,
as
far
as
the
right
wing
publishers
of
the
New
History
were
concerned.
In
 that
way
it
did
serve
as
a
victory,
and
it
is
likely
that
if
the
political
discourse
in
 Japan
continues
to
move
in
the
direction
it
has
been
in
recent
years,
the
indirect
 influence
of
the
right
will
precipitate
an
increase
in
moderation
and
reexamination
 of
many
of
the
heretofore
unexamined
issues
of
World
War
II
and
of
Japanese
 society
as
a
whole,
and
thereby
reshape
Japanese
nationalism
in
the
modern
era.
In
 the
process,
Japanese
may
find
that
there
is
more
continuity
with
the
past
in
the
 Japanese
society
of
today
to
celebrate
than
they
previously
thought
ever
existed

17

The Globe: World News From All Sides

Dialectical
Materialism
and
the

 Green
Revolution
 
By
Andrew
Detsch

Can
a
convincing
theoretical
explanation
of
Iran’s
Green
Revolution
be
found
 in
the
writings
of
Karl
Marx?
Marx
argued
that
capitalist
systems,
incompatible
with
 popular
realities,
would
encourage
an
ongoing
political
struggle
between
the
 bourgeoisie
elite
and
proletariat
working
class
that
would
inevitably
bring
about
 communism.
This
framework,
dubbed
dialectical
materialism,
is
the
strongest
model
 we
have
to
depict
social
change
in
Iran
in
the
context
of
the
Green
Revolution
 movement,
with
disgruntled
young
voters
battling
oppressive
clerical
elites
for
 systemic
control
and
democratic
freedoms.
On
June
10th,
2009,
When
Mahmoud
 Ahmadinejad,
favored
by
Supreme
Leader
Ayatollah
Khameini,
defeated
his
rival
by
 a
two‐to‐one
margin
in
a
presidential
race
considered
to
be
a
dead
heat,
fraud
was
 popularly
suspected,
and
throngs
of
young
citizens
took
to
the
streets
in
protest
of
 perceived
disenfranchisement.
Nine
months
later,
with
Green
Revolution
protests
 ongoing,
theorists
struggle
to
explain
the
protestors’
success
in
persisting
where
 others
have
been
suppressed.

 How
then
are
we
to
adequately
understand
the
rapid
progression
of
social
 change
in
Iran?
There
is
no
doubt
that
Mir‐Hossein
Moussavi,
Iran’s
former
Prime
 Minister
and
Ahmadinejad’s
only
serious
electoral
rival,
used
technological
 capabilities
to
great
effect,
by
building
and
energizing
a
massive
grassroots
base
of
 young,
urban
voters
that
brought
the
election
to
a
dead
heat
and
enabled
the
 movement
to
survive
the
instruments
of
authoritarian
power.
The
movement
was
 particularly
successful
in
evading
the
use
of
brute
force
by
governmental
proxies
 such
as
the
Iranian
National
Guard
and
the
Basij
Militia.
In
this
manner,
the
Green
 Revolution
can
be
considered
a
historical
affirmation
of
Marx’s
theory
of
dialectical
 materialism,
a
harsh
reminder
to
the
establishment
that
Iran’s
current
political
 system
is
fundamentally
incompatible
with
the
changing
demographic
realities
of

18

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 the
Iranian
state,
which
have
altered
the
nation’s
sociopolitical
landscape
beyond
 recognition.

 Marx’s
metric
of
dialectical
materialism,
derived
from
the
assumption
that
 the
proletariat,
stripped
of
the
ownership
of
society’s
‘means
of
production’
would
 push
the
illegitimate
establishment
to
reform.
History
has
proven,
however,
that
 authoritarian
regimes
can
have
staying
power
without
popular
legitimacy,
as
 Saddam
Hussein
reigned
for
nearly
thirty
years
by
suppressing
his
opposition
with
 brute
force.
So
what
makes
this
case
so
different?
Adverse
demographic
conditions
 challenge
the
political
fabric
of
the
Islamic
Republic
to
this
day.
From
the
inception
 of
the
state
in
1979
until
just
before
Ayatollah
Khomeini’s
death
in
1989,
Iran
 experienced
an
Islam‐inspired
baby
boom
that
peaked
3.8
percent
in
1983,43
 intended
to
account
for
the
transformative
and
destructive
war
with
neighboring
 Iraq,
and
derailing
a
system
of
fertility
control
that
had
been
in
place
since
1967.44
 While
the
high
birth
rate
drove
consumption
of
material
resources
skyward
and
 drastically
underscored
domestic
economic
growth
in
the
short
term,
it
was
a
taxing
 burden
upon
developing,
under‐resourced
state
and
government
institutions,
 already
flagging
under
the
weight
of
war.

 To
make
matters
worse,
Khomeini
had
no
choice
but
to
send
teenage
soldiers
 into
the
fray
to
stabilize
Iran’s
war
effort,
killing
off
much
of
a
generation
of
staunch
 political
supporters.
These
demographic
trends
have
fueled
the
Green
Revolution
as
 today,
70
percent
of
Iran’s
population
is
under
thirty.
What
does
this
mean
 politically?
As
aforementioned,
the
teenage
martyrs
who
were
killed
in
the
Islamic
 Republic
were
largely
supportive
of
Khomeini,
and
had
been
instrumental
in
 providing
the
momentum
that
decapitated
the
Shah’s
regime.
Though
Khomeini
was
 eventually
able
to
slow
population
growth
to
a
crawl,
as
government
promulgation
 of
contraceptives
increased
their
use
to
56
percent
among
married
couples
and
 slowed
the
growth
rate
to
1.5
percent
by
1996,
with
the
teenage
martyrs
now
lost,
 























































 43

F.S. Ghorbani, “Iran: The Family-Planning Challenge,” The Lancet, Dec 5, 1992. Research Library Core, pg. 1401. 44 Farzaneh Roudi, “Iran's revolutionary approach to family planning,” Population Today 27, no. 7 (Jul/Aug 1999).

19

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 activist
sentiment
to
turn
against
the
Islamic
Republic
establishment
during
the
 1990s.45

 As
a
result
of
these
demographic
shifts,
in
1997
reformist
candidate
 Mohammed
Khatami
was
elected
to
the
presidency
by
a
landslide,
with
decidedly
 mixed
results:
eight
years
at
the
helm
tempered
his
idealism
with
reality.
By
the
 time
the
2009
elections
rolled
around,
many
of
the
baby
boomers
from
the
Iran‐Iraq
 period
became
eligible
to
vote.
This
only
drove
the
progress
of
dialectical
 materialism
forward,
especially
considering
that
many
of
these
people
were
not
 politically
conscious
during
Khomeini’s
rule
and
believed
many
aspects
of
the
 current
system
to
be
completely
illegitimate.

 Iran’s
dialectical
history
does
not
solely
owe
itself
to
population
growth:
it
 also
spawned
from
a
deteriorating
social
relationship
between
the
clerics
and
 minority
religious
and
intellectual
communities
who
initially
helped
usher
in
the
 1979
downfall
of
the
Shah.
When
Iran’s
sociopolitical
situation
is
scaled
to
fit
Marx’s
 system,
dissident
minorities,
students
and
intellectuals,
the
most
vociferous
 opponents
of
the
bourgeois
Islamic
Republic,
wholly
embody
the
proletariat.
In
the
 dialectical
process,
Marx
believed
establishment
powers
would
survive
by
 promoting
a
systemic
and
doctrinally
ingrained
understanding
of
the
“suffering”
of
 the
citizenry.46
Khomeini’s
Islamic
Republic
is
designed
to
do
just
that,
playing
into
 Shia
devotion
by
promising
salvation
in
exchange
for
political
loyalty.
Enabling
 these
mechanisms,
Ayatollah
Khomeini
developed
a
far‐reaching
system
of
social
 control
over
the
Iranian
populace.
But
from
the
inception
of
the
Republic
there
were
 signs
that
its
political
hardware
was
incompatible
with
reality,
as
its
constitution
 refused
to
recognize
religious
minorities
and
condemned
democracy
as
“western,”
 while
promoting
Sharia
law.47
Such
a
perversion
of
intent
was
a
slap
in
the
face
to
 the
disparate
coalition
factions
that
brought
it
to
power.

 























































 45

Ibid.

46

Bradley L Herling, A Beginner’s Guide to the Study of Religion (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007), 77. 47 Hussein D. Hassan, “Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities” (paper presented before U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, May 25, 2007).

20

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 Khomeini
further
stoked
the
flames
of
intolerance
with
constant
 authoritarian
crackdowns
on
his
political,
religious
and
ethnic
opponents.
Khomeini
 accused
intellectuals
of
supporting
liberal
values
that
would
“corrupt
[the]
 youth…pave
the
way
for
the
oppressor…[and]
drag
[Iran]
to
the
bottom.”48
While
 this
inflamed
rhetoric
and
authoritarian
posturing
temporarily
bolstered
the
 Republic’s
power,
it
ultimately
hurt
the
legitimacy
of
the
regime,
alienating
these
 strategically
important
populations.
As
Saul
Newman
rightly
notes
about
the
 Marxist
argument,
that
religion
and
ethnicity
“…[can]
be
used
by
the
dominant
 classes
to
legitimize
their
rule…and
foster
political
passivity
among
the
 economically
weaker
classes.”49
Khomeini
intended
the
Islamic
Republic
system
to
 foster
this
dialectic,
and
Ahmadinejad
and
his
allies
in
the
clergy
have
continued
it,
 as
doctrinal,
authoritarian
and
social
persecution
of
religious
minorities
have
 become
mainstay
in
Iranian
culture,
particularly
the
vilified
Baha’i.50

 In
the
1990s,
government
discouragement
of
population
growth,
as
detailed
 beforehand,
bolstered
the
political
power
of
the
student
movement
in
Iran,
as
 students,
no
longer
saddled
with
the
burden
of
raising
a
family,
had
time
for
political
 organization
and
networking.
As
the
average
marriage
age
for
young
Iranians
 increased
to
25.6
in
the
1996
census
from
23.6
a
decade
earlier,
a
mass
of
political
 organizations
for
voting
age
dissidents
began
to
take
hold,
in
urban
centers
and
on
 college
campuses
across
the
country.51
This
culminated
in
a
transformative
 mobilization
of
students
between
July
8‐13
in
fourteen
cities
to
protest
a
bloody
 authoritarian
suppression
of
political
expression
at
Tehran
University
in
the
 proceeding
weeks
the
first
of
many
blemishes
the
Islamic
Republic
would
receive
to
 its
legitimacy.52

48

Judith Colp Rubin, Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East Saul Newman et al., “Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political Conflict?” World Politics 43, no. 3 (Apr., 1991), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010402. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid, 401. 52 Mehrdad Mashayekhi et al., “The Revival of the Student Movement in Post-Revolutionary Iran,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 15, no. 2 (Winter, 2001), http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020116. 49

21

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 Population
growth
alone,
however,
is
not
a
sufficient
explanation
the
 progress
of
dialectical
materialism,
but
Iran’s
inability
to
economically
cope
with
it.
 Marx
posited
that
a
primary
objective
of
modern
political
regimes
was
to
provide
a
 nurturing
political
environment
for
a
free
market
economy,
and
necessarily
were
to
 abide
by
“material
conditions”
of
governance
or
risk
popular
revolt.53
At
its
essence,
 the
Islamic
Republic,
which
subscribes
itself
legitimacy
through
God
and
maintains
 power
through
devotional
constructs
and
authoritarian
rule,
is
not
an
unhealthy
 backdrop
for
capitalism,
as
similar
systems,
such
as
the
Kingdom
of
Saudi
Arabia,
 enjoy
flourishing
free
market
domestic
economies.

 The
clerical
mismanagement
of
population
challenges
has
also
become
a
 significant
economic
problem
in
the
thirty
years
of
theocratic
rule.
Though
 population
growth
has
finally
been
reigned
in,
since
the
founding
of
the
Republic
in
 1979,
economic
growth
has
fallen
by
33
per
cent,
inflation
has
doubled,
 unemployment
is
three
times
higher,
and
per
capita
income
has
declined
by
nearly
 30
percent.54
Khomeini’s
successors
were
also
forced
to
deal
with
the
economic
 fallout
from
the
Iran‐Iraq
war,
which
contributed
to
an
already
bleak
outlook.55
This
 has
brought
the
legitimacy
of
the
Islamic
Republic
further
into
question
in
the
eyes
 of
a
dubious
public
and
encouraged
political
activism
among
the
economic
 unfortunate
and
disenfranchised,
who,
like
students,
are
unshackled
from
domestic
 obligations
and
have
the
time
to
network
and
organize.
Even
the
Interior
Ministry’s
 own
internal
polling
shows
that
90
per
cent
of
the
public
is
dissatisfied
with
the
 current
regime.56
Iran’s
under‐resourced
physical
institutions
have
also
been
 adverse
to
population
growth,
leading
to
food
shortages
and
high
levels
of
 malnutrition
among
the
nation’s
poor,
overcrowded
primary
schools,
and
housing
 shortages,
particularly
in
rural
areas.57
The
current
“material
conditions”
of
the
 























































 53

Ibid, 76.

54

Jahangir Amuzegar, et al., “Iran's Crumbling Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2003), http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?. 55 David Waines. An Introduction to Islam (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 252. 56 57

Ibid Ibid, 1401.

22

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 Islamic
Republic
are
inadequate
to
the
needs
of
the
populace,
and
have
exacerbated
 the
dialectical
process.

 While
the
dialectical
damage
to
the
clerical
establishment
has
paved
the
way
 for
Moussavi’s
“Green
Revolution,”
it
does
not
at
all
ensure
the
ongoing
vitality
of
 the
movement
or
the
eventual
demise
of
the
regime.
Marx
envisioned
the
socialist
 construct
of
dialectical
materialism
would
define
history:
the
collision
of
systemic
 and
popular
realities
and
the
ultimate,
but
progressive,
victory
of
the
latter,
 culminating
in
a
fully
socialist
political
system
in
which
citizens
controlled
the
 “means
of
production.”
After
all,
the
Islamic
Republic’s
powers
of
authoritarian
 suppression
are
vast,
including
use
of
the
Revolutionary
Guard
and
Basij
Militia
to
 squelch
future
uprisings,
nearly
limitless
abilities
to
censor
free
speech
and
powers
 of
oversight
that
stretch
into
most
facets
of
Iranian
civil
society.58
Thus,
the
future
 for
the
Islamic
Republic
is
shrouded
in
mystery.

 Can
the
Green
Revolution
truly
endure?
While
the
population
trends
that
 have
given
it
life
will
likely
continue
to
calm,
the
social
dialectic
between
clerical
 elites
and
the
rest
of
the
populace
seem
to
be
on
a
continually
downward
trajectory.
 As
Jahangir
Amuzegar
bluntly
states:
“After
nearly
a
quarter‐century
of
theocratic
 rule,
Iran
is
now
by
all
accounts
politically
repressed,
economically
troubled,
and
 socially
restless.
And
the
ruling
clerical
oligarchy
lacks
any
effective
solutions
for
 these
ills.”59
Authoritarian
action
cannot
long
suppress
such
systemic
devastation.
 The
Islamic
Republic
will
not
long
be
able
to
survive
without
the
popular
legitimacy
 of
the
Iranian
people.

Food
Scarcity
and
its
Effects
on
Health:

 A
Case
Study
 By
Alison
Salisbury

In June 2008, the price of basic food staples reached their highest prices on the international market in over 30 years. While food prices have since declined, the dramatic 























































 58 59

Gabriel A. Almond et al., Comparative Politics Today: A World View (New York: Longman, 2010), 578. Ibid, 401.

23

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 increase of food prices in 2007 and 2008 has left an additional 115 million people battling chronic hunger.60 According to 2009 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) estimates, with this new addition of 115 million people, 1.02 billion people around the world are undernourished.61 It is with these dramatic figures in mind that I plan to research food scarcity and its impact on health in Africa in this case study report. In this report, I examine the factors that cause food scarcity through the dimensions of food availability and food accessibility, and how this has contributed to major health threats in Africa, specifically in Ethiopia and Kenya. After identifying the main factors that cause food insecurity and its impact in these countries, I will examine what can be done to help limit food insecurity by mitigating the factors that contribute to this major world problem. What is Food Scarcity? Food scarcity is a complex issue that has the potential to affect even the most affluent countries. In order to establish what food scarcity is, it is best to define what constitutes food security. The UNFAO defines food security as existing “when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” It is with this definition in mind that the UNFAO defines food insecurity as a lack of “adequate physical, social or economic access to food” in relation to the standards put forth in the definition of food security. 62 Food insecurity is an issue in all regions of the world, especially in developing countries. In many cases, it is not just one single factor that contributes to food scarcity in a country, but rather a multitude of issues that could range from environmental factors such as drought, stability barriers such as political unrest, or economic factors such as increases in the world price of food and fuel, which occurred from 2006-08. 























































 60

United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets (Rome, Communication Division, FAO, 2009), under Key Messages. 61 United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, The State of Food Insecurity in the World (Rome, Communication Division, FAO, 2009, under Key Messages. 62 Ibid., 8. 24

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 For developed countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, greater food prices were felt by their citizens in the case of the 2006-08 food and fuel crisis, however their developed status prevented their citizens from experiencing food scarcity like that which occurred throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It is in these regions where even marginal differences in the price of staple food goods can be the difference between paying for a family to eat and sending their children to school. In the case of developing countries, among the poorest members of society food can account from anywhere between 50 to upwards of 70 or 80 percent of their budget.63 As food scarcity becomes greater, so too does the risk of families having to make difficult budgetary decisions that could come to affect their health and well-being. The questions remain: how has food scarcity become so prevalent in the world, and what will it take to mitigate this situation. Breaking Down Food Scarcity Driving forces are key to understanding where food scarcity comes from and more importantly how to avoid it from happening. Kenya and Ethiopia are prime examples of countries that are experiencing dramatic food scarcity. According to recent figures, one in ten Kenyans suffer from food scarcity and 4.6 million Ethiopians are in need of food assistance.64 Through the examples of Kenya and Ethiopia, one can get a good sense of the multitude of driving forces that characterize food scarcity. In both Kenya and Ethiopia, the agricultural sector plays an important role in the livelihoods of many of its citizens. In the case of Ethiopia alone, the agricultural sector provides the livelihood for 75 percent of the population, and accounts for 48 percent of the nation’s GDP.65 Statistics in Kenya are similar, as farming regions compose approximately 18 percent of Kenyan territory, despite low levels of agricultural

63

UNFAO, The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets, 26. “Newspapers Examine Drought, Famine in Africa.” http://globalhealth.kff.org/DailyReports/2009/September/09/GH-090909-East-Africa-Drought-Famine.aspx. Accessed 14 October 2009. 65 UNFAO. Nutrition Country Profile: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 11. 64

25

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 productivity.66 The strong agricultural connections in these countries make food scarcity an even more pressing issue because if this sector fails, the impact on large portions of the population will be devastating. Through driving forces like environmental change in the form of drought and land degradation, food scarcity is on the rise in both Kenya and Ethiopia. Changes in the environment have lead to massive rain shortages both in Kenya and Ethiopia. As consecutive growing seasons pass with limited amounts of rain, crop yields and animal productivity continue to decrease.67 Rain shortages combined with drought are taking a toll on the populations of Kenya and Ethiopia. As poor communities lack the ability to make up for losses in crop yields, the prevalence of food scarcity is becoming more apparent. Many farmers live year-to-year based on the crops they produce. As rain shortages and drought expand from just one growing season to yearly repeated incidences, the communities of Ethiopia and Kenya lack the resources to recover from one bad growing season, let alone consecutive bad seasons. In the course of efforts to limit the affects of rain shortages, land degradation often occurs as agricultural rich soils become depleted of nutrients and growing capabilities from years of use with varying degrees of agricultural techniques. It is important to note that despite these drops in food production in Kenya and Ethiopia as a result of environmental factors, since the 1970s the world has had enough (and still has enough) food to not only feed the people of the world at the bare minimum level for survival, but to eliminate hunger completely. Food scarcity cannot be contributed to a problem in the supply of food, but rather it is the distribution of food, specifically in the form of unequal distribution of economic power that results in global increases in food prices.68 Failure to manage the driving forces of food scarcity- namely in the form of environmental issues or economic distribution-that results in soaring food 























































 66

“Rural Poverty in Kenya,” IFAD. http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/home/tags/kenya. Accessed 14 November 2009. 67 “KENYA: Tens of Thousands Facing Acute Food Shortage.” http://wow.gm/africa/kenya/baringo/article/2008/8/12/kenya-tens-of-thousands-facingacute-food-shortage. Accessed 29 October 2009. 68 Michael T. Clare and Daniel C. Thomas, World Security, Challenges for a New Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 357-358. 26

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 prices is a considerable world failure that subsequently affects one-sixth of the world’s population. The Role of the Food Crisis of 2006-2008 as a Driving Factor The food crisis that began in 2006 as a result of increases in food prices is a key example as to why food scarcity is a particularly devastating the problem facing the world today. It is hard to pinpoint one specific cause that led to food price increases in 2006, but many experts including the UNFAO contribute these rises to policies undertaken in global economic markets and their respective global economic organizations. Depreciation of the United States dollar combined with existing tariffs imposed on the trading of agricultural products caused the prices of food to increase exponentially, especially for developing countries that rely greatly on imports of food to offset their own agricultural production.69 While food prices are traditionally known as goods that experience dramatic rises in prices, the 2006 crisis was different in the fact that rather than a few key agricultural goods like coffee or cocoa rising in price, key basic foods that are of international importance such as cereals, oilseeds, and dairy products were the goods that rose exponentially in price. It is these goods rather than goods such as coffee or cocoa that populations in all countries-especially less developed countries require to feed their citizens.70 The shock of rising food prices among these essential food items are key to contributing to the food scarcity Kenya and Ethiopia are currently experiencing. Due to their reliance on agricultural productivity as high portions of their GDP, both Kenya and Ethiopia were dramatically affected by rising food prices as a result of the 2006 food crisis. Although food prices have declined slightly since the 2006 crisis, prices still remain high in many African nations. It is hard to pinpoint a single cause that contributed to rises in food prices, but decreases in cereal production, combined with a depreciating US dollar, high fuel prices, and a large demand for biofuels proves that the problem of volatile food prices will remain a persistent issue among African nations and even highly 























































 69 70

UNFAO, The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets, 9-10. Ibid., 10. 27

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 developed countries for years to come.71 High food prices are an essential driving factor that creates food scarcity, and it is a driving factor that can be addressed with adjustments in both the world economic market and additional efforts in countries like Kenya and Ethiopia to increase their own agricultural outputs. However, until these issues are addressed, food scarcity continues to create dramatic problems in all sectors of society that must be addressed. What are the Hazards Presented by Food Scarcity? As the 2006-08 food and fuel crisis demonstrated, it is necessary to examine the different components that contribute to food scarcity. Food scarcity can be examined through measures of food availability and food accessibility. Food availability is the ability to have sufficient quantities of food for a population to exist on, while food accessibility is the ability to gain food for use through having sufficient income to purchase food, transportation to get to available food, and other similar categories. 72 If food availability or food accessibility fails to be maintained for populations, food scarcity is imminent, causing regional, national, and even global food problems. The following sections will provide a picture of the hazards that are presented by food scarcity. Economic Hazards Food scarcity presents a great economic hazard in aspects related to both food availability and food accessibility. In both Ethiopia and Kenya, the role agriculture plays as a main source of income for many of its citizens creates a great risk if food scarcity becomes prevalent. In the case of Ethiopia, 48 percent of GDP is a result of the agricultural sector.73 In Kenya, 74 percent of the active working population works in agriculture. This data shows the important role agriculture plays in the dynamics of Ethiopian and Kenyan society, and the devastating impact agriculture can have when food scarcity strikes. Failures in agriculture contribute to both food availability and food accessibility. For those who produce food, bad crop years prevent high yields from reaching markets. 























































 71

Ibid., 14. Brix, Laura. “The Food Challenge” Power Point Presentation. 20 November 2008, page 7. 73 UNFAO. Nutrition Country Profile: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 13. 72

28

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 This means that farmers loose profit, providing them with less money to buy food that other farmers produce, or forcing them to limit the amount of seeds and other agricultural material needed for next year’s crop. Financial failure from a bad harvest forces families to have to make tough decisions that may require children to drop out of school, or suspend trips to healthcare providers as families lack the income to pay for these endeavors. This initial failure gets transferred to those in society who are not responsible for producing food. Limited food amounts mean that people may have to travel farther and pay more to get what limited amounts of food exist. This creates a great strain on families as they may have to pay more to get to food supplies, leave their jobs for longer amounts of time to go get food, or pay higher prices that take away income from other important things families need. Economic hazards in this regard affect both food accessibility and availability. What may appear to be food scarcity on an individual family or town level can very quickly turn into a country wide problem if food scarcity and the economic risks associated with it are not managed and mitigated. Health Hazards Food scarcity has a dramatic role on health in countries like Ethiopia and Kenya whose populations are already greatly at risk for health issues. In Kenya, infant mortality and under-5 mortality are on the rise, as these rates were 73 percent and 105 percent respectively in the period from 1989 to 1993, and 77 percent and 115 percent respectively in 2003.74 While these high rates are attributed to many factors including communicable diseases like malaria or diarrheal disease, with a proper, more balanced diet, these rates can be cut down immensely. Food scarcity breeds malnutrition and vitamin deficiencies that could otherwise help protect infants and children under-5 from diseases that can be cured or avoided. Children becoming sick as a result of malnutrition means less time spent in school, which eventually turns into a population that is not well educated and limits future capabilities for progress. Adults are also greatly at risk of the health consequences of food scarcity. Malnutrition in adults as a result of a lack of food availability creates devastating 























































 74

UNFAO. Nutrition Country Profile: Republic of Kenya, 11. 29

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 problems for their health, especially in pregnant women. Vitamins and nutrients that are essential to pregnant women are found directly in many of the foods people eat. Food scarcity and malnutrition limits the intake of these important vitamins and nutrients, having a devastating effect on both mother and child. Infants can be born underweight and lower cognitive abilities among other side effects. Lack of good food supplies lengthen a women’s recovery time, which can impact her child rearing abilities, or her ability to go back to work. In other adults, food scarcity can lead to health problems as a result of not having enough food, which can hurt their economic productivity and limit the amount of income they can earn, which can lead to food shortages for their family if they do not have enough income to buy food. Stability Hazards Food scarcity can prove to be a source of immense political conflict and hazards in countries. Lack of food resources among a hungry population can insight food riots, government coups, and contribute to corruption in society. According to the Kaiser Daily Global Health Policy Report, in Kenya alone, some government officials were recently “implicated in a scandal to illegally sell off thousands of tons of the nation’s grain reserves” in spite of a looming famine.75 Government endeavors of this nature only seek to worsen food scarcity in their respective countries. While political unrest of any sort is never particularly good for a ruling government, loss of credibility as a result of withholding food from its citizens will breed political discontent that can push a country into violence. In the case of Kenya, the elections of 2008 were a perfect example to show how food scarcity combined with an unhappy political climate led to violence and political uprisings throughout Kenya. Ethiopia also experienced similar issues during their war against Eritrea and in the years following as they attempted to rebuild their country and government. Spanning from political problems, wars in other countries can contribute to food stability issues. Both Kenya and Ethiopia have become home to thousands of refugees attempting to escape the crisis in the Somalia and as a result of the Ethiopian-Eritrean 























































 75

“Newspapers Examine Drought, Famine in Africa.” http://globalhealth.kff.org/DailyReports/2009/September/09/GH-090909-East-Africa-Drought-Famine.aspx. Accessed 14 October 2009. 30

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 war.76 These refugees prove to be an added burden to governments as they work to feed these new inhabitants in addition to their own citizens. These added mouths to feed contribute to drops in food accessibility and availability, as food that is already in high demand must continue to be spread amongst even more people. Social Hazards Food scarcity represents a great divide between those who have and those who have not. For many who are experience food scarcity and poverty, the small number of elites and wealthy in society who can afford to pay high prices for food, or have food in abundance create a great rift in societies. Cases of this rift have been reported in Kenya as corrupted officials gain from the spoils of wealth and access to food as a result of their positions in government.77 For many governments including Kenya and Ethiopia that have GDPs made up by a larger percentage of agriculture, food scarcity means that capital improvements such as public health clinics, better roads, and education systems cannot be achieved. These failures create problems on the whole for society as basic necessities for improving life cannot be completed. Overall, food scarcity represents a dramatic problem that affects all aspects of society. How Can we Eliminate Food Scarcity? Food scarcity is a far-reaching problem that cannot be fixed by examining one single issue, and the impacts of food scarcity on society are deep and far reaching. There are some global measures that have been discussed that can help to reduce and even possible end food scarcity, but a solution cannot be reached overnight and must be made a concerted international effort. Education is one means to eliminating food scarcity. Educating populations through international organizations such as UNFAO and NGOs can help farmers establish better agriculture methods. Some of these methods include soil management, which helps farmers learn how to extract the most from soils year to year and help replenish nutrients after each crop season, and switching to seed varieties that can withstand particularly harsh growing seasons. Education can also lead to a rise in urban agriculture programs which help urban homes adapt their food situation and help account 























































 76 77

Ibid. Ibid. 31

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 for providing food accessibility and availability. These urban programs have low start up costs when used as a community garden or in other group settings. These urban programs can also help provide larger yields than would otherwise be capable in an individual setting as people pool their resources together to contribute to the gardens.78 Other endeavors than can be used to help combat food scarcity is a state adapted safety net approach to food scarcity. A safety net approach is a way of instituting social programs to address food crises. For many years a food crisis appeared year after year in Ethiopia, and the country would then have to appeal for international help to supply them with enough food to feed its people. Ethiopia has now adopted a safety net program that works to combat food crises before they appear. This effort decreases relief assistance while enhancing risk management of a food crisis. Countries can do many things that qualify as a safety net program, including monthly cash assistance programs, food at work and school programs, cash for work or food programs, and other various programs. In places like Ethiopia and Brazil, these programs have been very successful in mitigating food crises and preventing them from reoccurring. 79 Safety net programs have been very successful; however they require a focused government that can adopt its policies to accommodate a safety net program, in addition to a secure government that is not ridden by corruption. Safety net programs also require an increase in public spending on agriculture, which in least developed countries can be as low as 4 percent of GDP.80 The international community can also make a concerted effort to reducing food scarcity. By working with food insecure countries, the international community in forums such as the WTO can work to reduce the price of food and tariffs, greatly assisting developing countries battling food scarcity. As seen in the last rounds of the WTO, agriculture is often a sticking point for country regarding the success or failures of these trade negotiations. With the severity of the last food crisis in 2006-08, now is the perfect time for the international community to begin preparing for what will soon be another food crisis unless trade agreements and tariffs change. The difficulty of changing WTO 























































 78

Marcel Rutten and others, eds. Inside Poverty and Development in Africa, (Boston: Brill, 2008), 226-227. 79 UNFAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World, 42-45. 80 Ibid., 39. 32

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 agreements is notorious in the international community and will take a great deal of diplomacy and negotiation. However, with time and compromise tariff barriers can be reduced, gradually freeing up more food for the world, and helping to limit food scarcity. Conclusions Food scarcity is a very diverse issue that occurs from varying development needs and driving forces to create a multitude of hazards that men, women, and children must face, especially related to health. While these hazards are diverse, the status of food scarcity in terms of food availability and food accessibility in Kenya and Ethiopia provide a unique study of exactly what food scarcity can do to a population. Both of these countries are unique in the fact that despite agriculture making up such large percentages of their GDPs, millions of people still go hungry each year in these countries. As seen from the food crisis of 2006-08, food scarcity will not go away, and in many ways the problem will continue to get worse unless changes are made both at a community, state, national, and international levels. Through small changes and assistance of the international community, countries like Ethiopia and Kenya can limit the outbreak of food crises and the health problems that follow these crises for years to come.

Islamism
v.
Nationalism

Iran’s
Foreign
Policy
Towards
its
Neighbors,
the
Middle
East,
and
the
West
 By
Behnam
Ben
Taleblu
 
 Executive
Summary:
For
too
long
a
clash
of
civilizations
rhetoric
has
precluded
policy
 makers
in
both
Washington
DC
and
Tehran
from
understanding
the
internal
dynamics
 and
regional
politics
that
go
into
each
other’s
foreign
policy
formula.
The
point
of
this
 paper
is
to
attempt
to
understand
how
Iran
measures
its
foreign
policy
in
three
 contexts;
in
relation
to
that
of
its
neighbors,
its
region
and
America.
By
many
 standards,
its
seems
as
if
Iran’s
foreign
policy
is
formulated
by
a
group
of
radical
 clerics
who
have
some
of
the
most
anti­western
rhetoric
the
world
has
ever
seen.
What
 I
have
discovered
are
some
more
tangible
reasons
for
Iran’s
strategic
posture
as
a
 realist
state,
not
as
an
ideological
rogue.
Moreover,
their
perception
of
themselves
as
a
 regional
power
and
natural
hegemon
are
founded
in
policy,
not
ideology.

 
 
 For
three
decades
now,
Iran
and
the
formulation
of
its
foreign
policy
have
 baffled
policy
makers
and
academics
alike.
Everything
in
Iran’s
political
system,
 from
its
leadership,
to
its
internal
dynamics
as
a
theocracy,
is
often
misunderstood
 33

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 as
evidence
that
it
is
an
irrational
and
ideologically
driven
state
actor.
In
my
humble
 opinion,
nothing
could
be
further
from
the
truth.
Iran’s
foreign
policy
has
at
its
heart
 a
contradiction
found
across
the
greater
Middle
East;
and
that
is
of
competing
 strands
of
Islamism
and
nationalism.
While
one
utilizes
history
and
the
other
 religions,
both
are
effectively
galvanized,
interchangeably
I
might
add,
to
create
a
 specific
posture
in
the
Middle
East
in
relation
to
its
neighbors
and
especially
 towards
the
West.

Looking
at
a
map
from
Iran’s
eyes
one
thing
becomes
extremely
evident

really
fast;
Iran’s
territory
is
smaller
now
than
it
has
been
in
the
past
2,500
years.
 From
its
inception
into
history,
whether
we
like
the
idea
or
not,
Iran
has
been
a
 significant
player
in
the
Middle
East,
Caucuses,
and
Central
Asia.
Today,
the
lack
of
 physical
territory
under
Iranian
jurisdiction
prevents
it
from
having
direct
rule
of
 these
areas.
Therefore
in
the
realm
of
foreign
policy,
Iran
looks
to
instill
a
sort
of
 nostalgia
of
what
Persian
influence
and
culture
was
like
in
the
respective
areas.
 Here
Iran
uses
nationalism
to
stir
emotions
and
replace
unfavorable
policies
with
 favorable
ones
by
drawing
upon
nationalistic
and
historic
rhetoric
of
cooperation
 between
cultures.
There
is
no
better
modern
day
example
of
this
than
Tajikistan,
the
 only
Central
Asian
Republic
without
a
Turkic
or
Russian
ethnic
bias
that
is
fiercely
 nationalistic,
protective
of
its
gas
reserves
and
at
the
whim
of
Iranian
nationalistic
 rhetoric.

But
sometimes
nationalism
can
only
get
you
so
far.
Thus,
Iran,
as
a
theocratic

republic
of
the
21st
century
seeks
to
promote
a
favorable
brand
of
Pan‐Islamism
 around
the
globe
and
especially
in
the
Middle
East.
The
idea
of
‘exporting
the
Islamic
 Revolution’
is
one
that
still
carries
weight
with
many
civilian
pro‐regime
loyalists
in
 Iran
but
is
one
that
is
founded
in
the
pillars
of
the
regime
constructed
in
the
70’s.
 The
Islamic
Republic
of
Iran
was
built
by
Ayatollah
Khomeini
and
modeled
off
of
his
 Islamic
thesis
of
government
styled
after
a
“Guardianship
of
the
Jurist”
(Vilayat­e­ Faqih.)
It
is
a
contentious
system
that
required
Bid’ah,
or
Islamic
innovation
to
form
 and
does
not
carry
weight
with
many
of
Iran’s
Sunni‐Arab
neighbors.
Thus
Iran
uses
 rhetoric
to
apply
pressure
to
Sunni‐Arab
states.
It
is
more
vocal
than
any
other
 member
of
the
Organization
of
Islamic
Conference
in
its
opposition
to
Israeli
 34

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 domination
and
hegemony.
So
much
so
that
its
rhetoric
as
of
recent
leaves
people
 baffled
and
offended
as
to
why
a
country
that
only
spends
3%
of
its
GDP
on
their
 military
can
threaten
to
wipe
another
nation
with
nuclear
weapons
off
of
the
map.

The
two
cases
mentioned
above
were
brief
summaries
of
how
Iran
uses
or

has
attempted
to
use
two
conflicting
strands
of
ideology
to
formulate
foreign
policy.
 Or
so
the
smoke
screen
says.
In
reality,
Islamism
and
Nationalism
are
mere
 rhetorical
vehicles
for
Iran’s
foreign
policy
goal,
a
goal
that
has
been
on
the
minds
of
 dynasties
in
the
Iranian
plateau
for
more
than
millennia.
Iran
wants
to
be
a
regional
 power,
a
leader
and
interestingly
enough
a
hegemon.
It
feels
its
culture,
history
and
 version
of
Islam
are
better
than
that
of
its
neighbors
and
it
can
rise
to
prominence
 above
them.
Whether
wearing
a
crown
or
turban,
Iranian
leaders
and
policy
makers
 realized
the
importance
of
creating
legitimacy,
not
inside
Iran,
but
outside,
in
order
 to
maintain
an
aggressive
and
expansionist
view
and
negotiate
on
an
about
what
 they
feel
is
their
territory.

Here,
it’s
best
to
dissect
each
context
and
point
of
conflict
in
order
to
shed

light
on
Iran’s
behavior.
Iran’s
main
foreign
policy
initiative
is
to
become
this
 hegemon,
this
regional
leader
of
sorts
which
it
feels
it
was
destined
to
be.
Firstly,
 there
is
the
case
of
Iran
and
its
neighbors.
Iraq
and
Afghanistan
have
been
great
 impediments
to
the
hegemonic
posture
of
Shiite
Iran
for
ages,
but
nothing
 exacerbated
this
conflict
like
the
Islamic
Republic
of
Iran
first
going
to
war
for
eight
 years
with
Saddam’s
Iraq
and
then
having
its
diplomats
executed
in
the
late
90’s
by
 the
rise
of
a
Pashtun
group
in
Afghanistan
called
the
Taliban.
While
both
these
 challenges
to
Iran’s
posture
come
in
an
ethnic
and
ideological
form,
they
also
 present
political
challenges.
After
Nasser’s
death
in
Egypt,
Iraq
picked
up
the
mantle
 of
Pan‐Arabism
and
became
the
exemplary
Ba’athist
state.
It
was
the
vanguard
for
 Arab
nationalism
and
became
a
nepotistic
nation
to
the
Hussein
family
and
city
of
 Tikrit
(Saddam’s
home
town.)
In
fact,
during
the
Iran‐Iraq
war,
Saddam
frequently
 called
the
invasion
of
Khuzestan
in
South‐western
Iran
“the
Second
Qadiyssa,”
 Qadiyssa
being
the
battle
that
devastated
the
Sassanid
Persian
Empire
in
the
 seventh
century
AD.
To
counter
this,
Iran
sought
to
support
its
Shiite
brethren
in
 southern
Iraq
by
empowering
its
clergy.
Moreover,
it
sought
to
instill
a
form
of
 35

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 passion
in
its
own
soldiers
and
claimed
they
were
martyrs,
like
Imam
Hussein,
 fighting
for
the
true
Islam
and
would
recapture
the
sacred
shrine
cities
of
Karbala
 and
Najaf.

The
impact
of
the
Iran‐Iraq
war
went
beyond
the
one
million
lives
lost.
It

rationalized
two
major
fears
for
Iran.
One
was
that
the
international
community
did
 not
care
about
the
defense
and
well
being
of
Iran,
as
was
evident
during
the
war
 when
the
UN
was
silent
on
Iraq’s
use
of
chemical
and
biological
weapons
on
Iranian
 soldiers
and
civilians.
The
second
fear/threat
for
Iran
was
the
proof
that
Iraq
was
 not
just
an
ideological
enemy,
but
a
potent
military
threat
capable
of
bogging
the
 whole
country
down
with
war.
In
my
opinion,
this
created
a
sense
of
paranoia,
and
 created
the
current
mindset
of
the
Revolutionary
Guards
in
Iran.
It
is
a
very
cowboy,
 go‐at‐it
alone
approach
to
Iranian
politics,
and
it
is
one
of
the
reasons
cited
by
some
 policy
circles
outside
Iran
as
to
why
it
needs
the
bomb.
It
is
a
security
guarantee
that
 it
can
use
to
deter
powers
in
the
region
while
asserting
legitimacy
and
military
 supremacy.
This
view
would
only
come
to
be
entrenched
after
Saddam’s
deposition
 and
the
presence
of
the
US
military
alongside
the
Iran‐Iraq
boarder.
Obviously,
 Iranian
and
American
security
interests
for
a
stable
Iraq
converged,
but
the
people
 they
chose
to
support
did
not.
Iran
utilizes
its
strategic
link
to
mobilize
the
Shiite
 majority
in
favor
of
American
democracy
attempts,
showing
that
they
can
be
 productive
in
nation
building
and
civic
participation
in
government.

This
is
one
of
the
key
aspects
of
Iranian
foreign
policy
not
just
in
Iraq,
but
in

the
entirety
of
the
region.
To
broaden
the
scope
of
the
context,
Iran
seeks
to
pursue
 a
bottom‐up
approach
to
Middle
Eastern
societies.
It
hijacks
American
pursuits
and
 goals
in
the
region
and
transforms
it
into
theirs.
The
prime
example
of
this
is
the
 American
wish
for
security
and
democracy
in
the
Middle
East.
Whenever
autocratic
 Arab
or
Islamic
governments
have
a
referendum,
or
attempt
to
broaden
the
political
 spectrum
and
flirt
with
the
idea
of
‘slightly
free‐er
elections’
Iran’s
friends
and
allies
 rise
to
prominence.
This
is
proven
by
the
Northern
Alliance
stepping
aside
for
 Karzai
after
the
US‐Coalition
led
invasion
of
Afghanistan,
the
pro‐Shiite
turn
out
and
 the
rise
of
the
Da’wa
party
in
all
Iraqi
elections
thus
far,
Lebanon
and
the
rise
of
 Hezbollah
(especially
after
the
2006
war
and
their
45%
dominance
in
parliament)
 36

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 and
the
election
of
Hamas
in
Gaza
as
an
anti‐Israel
entity.
While
all
of
these
are
not
 proxies
for
the
Islamic
Republic,
they
are
great
friends
and
allies,
and
in
the
case
of
 Hezbollah
and
Hamas,
are
non‐state
actors
funded
by
Iran
and
labeled
as
terrorist
 organizations
by
the
United
States
that
have
inflicted
casualties
on
what
Iran
calls
 ‘The
Zionist
Entity.’

What
it
boils
down
to
for
Iran
is
a
projection
of
power.
Iran,
until
the

elections
of
Hezbollah
and
Hamas
to
power,
has
not
had
a
hand
in
the
politics
of
the
 Mediterranean
for
exactly
one
and
a
half
millennia.
Now
they
are
back,
and
to
add
 insult
to
injury,
they
feel
the
need
to
set
the
agenda
in
the
region.
Sad
but
true,
Syria,
 Lebanon
and
the
Gaza
strip
have
become
reactionary
Arab
forces
to
the
instigation
 of
Iranian
hegemony,
and
the
Gulf
countries,
both
economically
invested
in
Iran
and
 the
Untied
States
via
their
free‐market
principles
are
afraid
of
Iran’s
exercises
of
 influence
in
what
they
feel
is
a
Sunni‐Arab
zone,
not
a
Persian‐Shiite
playground.

 These
countries
have
become
vital
extensions
of
the
Iranian
rhetorical
arm
and
are
 glad
to
receive
the
pan‐Islamist
spin
Iran
puts
on
their
realist
objectives.

Iran
also
has
strategic
and
specific
goals
for
the
Arab
populace.
As
the
new

champion
of
the
third
world
and
lost
Islamist
causes,
Iran
seeks
to
use
the
 Palestinian
issue
as
a
wedge
for
Arab
governments
like
Saudi
Arabia,
Egypt
and
to
a
 lesser
extent
Jordan.
Iran
looks
to
isolate
the
Arab
street
from
the
Arab
 governments,
which
are
all
cognizant
of
this
fact.
Iran’s
most
controversial
President
 yet,
Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad
is
the
most
rhetorically
skilled
diplomat
in
this
area.
He
 touts
his
populist
credentials;
he
points
more
than
just
a
finger
at
the
UN
by
wearing
 a
zip‐up
windbreaker
to
the
General
Assembly,
takes
the
Israeli‐Palestinian
issue
to
 a
new
height
and
manages
to
promote
Iranian
interest
abroad
in
places
like
 Venezuela,
Belarus,
Nicaragua,
Armenia,
Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan
and
Sri
Lanka.

But
the
Arab
populace
is
just
a
gateway,
a
wildcard
if
you
will
in
Iran’s

foreign
policy
arsenal
when
it
comes
to
relations
with
the
US
or
lack
thereof.
For
 three
decades
now,
failed
policies
of
containment
and
isolation
out
of
Washington
 have
spurred
Iran
to
go
unchecked
and
unbalanced
in
the
dark.
It
allowed
Iran
to
 accelerate
its
weapons
program
and
civilian
nuclear
energy
program
for
18
years
 without
the
attention
of
the
world.
If
anything,
Iran
prefers
this
attitude
out
of
 37

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 Washington,
because
it
can
galvanize
liberal
democracies
to
look
at
the
US’s
 belligerence
and
obstinacy
as
Iran
has
reached
out,
both
directly
and
indirectly
to
 many
US
administrations
and
both
sides
have
squandered
successive
chances
for
 rapprochement.

Anti‐Americanism
is
a
founding
pillar
of
this
Islamic
regime.
Additionally
it
is

anti‐western,
anti‐colonial/imperial
hubris
and
anti‐capitalism.
Ironically
enough,
 this
is
a
country
that
has
a
youth
bulge
with
70%
of
the
population
aged
35
and
 under
and
80%
of
that
population
being
pro‐American.
Hence,
the
status
quo
cannot
 remain.
Iran’s
graying
population
of
clerics
knows
this
too
well
and
often
employs
 the
very
same
‘clash
of
civilizations’
rhetoric
(America
is
the
great
Satan,
the
 Holocaust
never
happened…)
to
keep
America
from
discovering
its
realist
motives
 and
power
ambitions.
Iran
claims
to
be
an
Islamic
Republic,
yet
it
only
advocates
on
 behalf
of
Islam
when
necessary.
It
is
a
collective
anti‐Americanism
that
unites
Iran
 with
Russia
and
China,
two
countries
which
have
significantly
oppressed
Muslim
 communities
but
consistently
watered
down
any
sanctions
from
the
United
Nations
 Security
Council
on
Iran’s
behalf.
Iran
responds
with
lucrative
gas
and
oil
deals
at
a
 special
price
for
such
special
friends.
Recent
news
point
to
the
$7.2
billion
deal
in
 place
until
2012
with
Iran
and
Lukoil
in
the
southeast
with
Sinopec
looking
to
do
the
 same
in
the
near
future.

Iran
knows
America
has
devastated
its
potential
to
be
a
natural
gas
super‐

power
by
blocking
the
technology
needed
to
access
Natural
Gas
on
the
Caspian
Sea
 and
Persian
Gulf.
Iran
needs
to
balance
itself
fiscally
as
a
nation
and
remove
the
 70%
grip
of
the
state
on
the
economy.
Only
full
engagement
with
the
west
can
 provide
the
middle
class
and
Bazaari’s
in
Iran
with
this
chance.
Tehran
foreign
 policy
makers
know
this
too
well,
and
instead
seek
to
prevent
engagement
by
not
 only
being
rhetorically
bold
but
deterring
American
progress
in
Iraq
and
attempting
 to
make
sure
the
government
in
Baghdad
and
Kabul
are
not
only
friendly
with
Iran
 but
also
Shiite.

Thus
Iran
has
formed
a
foreign
policy
of
counter‐containment,
to
reach
out
to

3rd
party
actors
and
nations,
like
Armenia
for
instance,
which
is
fiercely
pro‐Iran,
 pro‐US,
but
anti‐Israel.
Iran
and
Armenia
have
enjoyed
a
strategic
relationship
when
 38

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 Iran
mediated
the
Ngoro‐Karabagh
war
of
the
80’s
between
Armenia
and
Azerbaijan
 in
favor
of
Armenia
when
one
out
of
four
Iranians
are
of
ethnic
Azeri
decent.
Iran’s
 ability
to
move
past
ethnic
issues,
when
the
Supreme
Leader
himself
is
half
Azeri
is
 proof
that
Iran
wanted
to
rebuff
pro‐American
Azerbaijan
which
would
sell
gas
to
 pro‐American
Turkey.
Instead
Iran
and
Armenia
have
created
a
competing
pipeline
 for
Liquefied
Natural
Gas
and
are
looking
for
a
second
one
in
2011.

Iran
and
the
US
have
definitely
had
a
falling
out,
but
that
does
not
mean
they

cannot
realize
they
have
some
overlap
of
policy
in
the
region.
For
years
now,
Iran
 sought
to
promote
American
failure
in
the
Middle
East
with
democracy
movements.
 But
now,
when
Iranian
security
is
challenged
by
the
lack
of
a
pluralistic
democracy
 in
both
Iraq
and
Afghanistan,
it
has
reached
out
to
the
US
for
collaboration.
Firstly,
 Iran
needs
security
assurances,
not
civilizing
rhetoric.
In
my
opinion,
only
when
 fears
of
regime
change
from
Washington
have
been
put
to
rest
is
when
a
series
of
 cultural,
religious
and
more
importantly
economic
incentives,
exchanges
and
 programs
can
occur
within
each
nation
about
the
other.

However,
Iran’s
strategic
posture
remains
hostile
to
the
US
and
the
June
12th

elections
have
exposed
the
militancy
of
the
regime
against
clerics
and
pragmatists.
It
 remains
unclear
as
to
how
Iran
will
fare
with
Obama’s
policy
of
engagement
and
 negotiations
without
preconditions,
but
one
thing
is
definitely
for
certain.
Iran
 realizes
that
it
is
surrounded
by
American
troops,
pro‐American
governments
and
 economic
powerhouses.
Until
Washington
understands
that
Iran
is
facing
a
basic
 security
dilemma
and
is
merely
looking
to
become
the
regional
and
natural
 hegemon
that
it
historically
was,
engagement
and
negations
will
remain
aloof.

All
in
all,
as
the
saying
goes,
there
is
a
reason
behind
the
madness.
Tehran

looks
to
rhetoric
to
project
power
where
it
lacks.
This
will
ring
true
when
it
comes
 to
the
nuclear
issue,
to
sanctions
and
human
rights.
Iran
will
not
cease
and
desist
on
 what
is
believes
is
its
inalienable
right
to
exercise
its
sovereignty.
We
simply
need
to
 be
able
to
dissociate
religious
rhetoric
from
political
rhetoric
and
realize
that
 Iranian
foreign
policy
is
a
creative
formulation
of
realist
policies
set
to
allow
Iran

39

The Globe: World News From All Sides 
 become
a
major
player
and
rise
to
a
position
that
it
historically
had,
and
now
 desperately
feels
it
deserves.

www.gwias.com

40

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