The shrinking peninsula

Sia (Lower Sixth)

South Korea is shrinking. Not in physical size, but in the size of its society. From 2020, the Republic of Korea passed the point of no return and was officially declared to be a declining population.

South Korea’s population decreases due to the combined effects of a multitude of factors, however the following are amongst the most significant. In recent decades, the country has experienced a dramatic rise in affluence, for instance GDP levels increased by more than £1,000 billion from 2000 to 2020, reducing the need for children as a means of financial support, decreasing the size of families. Improved family planning measures, access to contraception, and legalised abortion have decreased birth rates further in addition to the changing attitudes towards females and gender roles. In South Korea, women are becoming increasingly integrated into the workforce, whilst their desire for marriage and motherhood on average has declined. For example, a government survey in 2018 found that only 20% of women considered marriage as a necessity, compared to the 47% obtained 20 years prior, and this growing independence of women financially and socially has contributed to a declining birth rate, whilst improved healthcare provisions have created an increased life expectancy. South Korea now has an extremely low fertility rate of 0.92 - the lowest in the world- and an extremely high life expectancy of 84 - one of the highest in the world. Hence, its population is in decline.

The implications of the Republic’s declining population will be wide ranging, severe and long lasting. It is significant to note that an aging and declining population will reduce the labour potential of South Korea, whilst inflating the number of older dependants and pensioners. As the Republic becomes less productive, its economic output is likely to diminish, limiting income and increasing the strain on local and national governments. Reducing Korea’s financial capabilities would adversely impact its global bargaining power in political and economic systems, and could cut military might by over 200,000 men, something that would weaken Korea, particularly in the face of China, North Korea, and other potential power houses in the region.

As the population is expected to continue to decrease in future years, it is likely that we will see many new procedures and policies put in place by the government. Already, there have been a number of policies implemented to mitigate the impacts of its declining population. For instance,

in 2020 the Korean government provided £675 to pregnant women and prolonged payments to mothers of children under 12 months old to increase child support, in the hope of encouraging more couples to have children.

In addition to financial incentives, campaigning and other soft measures have been used to raise awareness of the importance of fertility, for instance the ‘One is Not Enough’ advertisement campaign. However, where such campaigns and financial incentives are successful in improving child support for already existing families or entertaining the idea of starting a family, they fall short of growing seeds into trees. In addition to a lessened necessity and desire for children, starting a family is considered unattainable for many South Koreans: the average cost of raising a child in South Korea in the first six years is £41,000; the GDP per capita is £24,000 annually. Such expenses are unlikely to be overcome by any government support, which is particularly true if Korea’s economic power lessens in the future. Due to this, any successes in South Korea’s government-led fertility-promoting policies are likely to be offset by the harsh realities of raising children.

An alternative response to South Korea’s declining population could be a concentrated government effort to maximise economic output from the existing working population. Although the issue of a declining population would not be solved, the short term economic benefits could help to relieve pressure on the government and allow for a better response in the long term. For example, in 2013 the government launched a ‘Creative Economy’ initiative to develop higher earning tertiary and quaternary sectors, in order to diversify the economy and increase profits in both the short and long term. This initiative- in addition to similar schemes, such as those aimed at youth unemployment- aims to engage the younger proportion of Korea’s economically active population, with the intention of enhancing and future-proofing the economy as a result. However, the structure of the South Korean economy may not be conducive to an approach focussed on younger workers, as there is currently a greater proportion of economically active people over 60 than those in their twenties- a trend that will only become more extreme as Korea’s population continues to decline. Although this does not mean that the government will terminate investment into the younger workforce, it does mean that cost-benefit analyses will have to be carefully calculated, as any attempts to rejuvenate the workforce would potentially be short lived.

Perhaps the most impactful solution to South Korea’s declining population is to increase immigration. Immigration has the potential to be extremely advantageous to the Republic as migrant populations tend to have higher birth rates, easing the effects of an ageing population, and the abundance of foreign workers would help to fill existing or impending labour shortages whilst enlarging the market size, making Korea a more attractive location for FDI. Immigration could help to alleviate the population crisis whilst simultaneously strengthening Korea as an economic and political power. However, as of yet, South Korea has experienced relatively low levels of immigration. For example, in 2018, migrants made up only 2% of Korea’s population- in contrast over 14% of the USA’s population was comprised of migrants. Although Korean schemes such as the ‘New Southern Policy’ and memberships to trade blocs such as ASEAN do facilitate immigration to an extent, rates have the potential to be much higher. However, one of the main challenges to immigration currently is South Korea’s strong sense of ethnic nationalism (called danil minjok). Such pride in ethnic homogeneity has translated into complex legal frameworks that make it hard for immigrants to gain citizenship, discouraging immigration. This also raises the important point that the retention of migrants, not only the influx of migrants, is crucial to South Korea’s long term economic success; therefore, creating migrant-friendly systems and environments would be vital for South Korea’s long-term security.

In the end, given the uncharted territory of population decline, there are many uncertainties that South Korea will face when addressing this issue, and it is not only Korea treading this precarious path.

Major nations such as Japan and Portugal are also experiencing the difficulties caused by a declining population, as will many more in the future.

However, perhaps the only certain is this: when considering the issue of a declining population, no single solution on its own will suffice.

To mitigate the impacts of its population crisis, the Republic of Korea will have to consider a holistic approach to a multifaceted problem, and perhaps the only actions that can be taken are ones that mitigate, rather than treat.

References Oh Seok Kim, Kee Whan Kim (2020) Super Aging in South Korea Unstoppable but Mitigatable: A Sub-National Scale Population Projection for Best Policy Planning Moni Nag (1980) How Modernization Can Also Increase Fertility, Current Anthropology Miriam Quick (2019) South Korea’s population paradox, BBC Generation Project (2021) South Korea’s fertility rate falls to the lowest in the world, Reuters.com Republic of Korea Population Statistics, World Bank Aaron O’Neill (2021) Distribution of gross domestic product across economic sectors South Korea Hye-Kyung Lee (2015) An Overview of International Migration to South Korea (2020) Startups offer a different future for South Korea’s economy, The Economist Justin McCurry (2021) ‘Luxuries I can’t afford’: why fewer women in South Korea are having children, The Guardian Song Jung-a (2019) South Korea’s birth rate falls to new developed world low, The Financial Times Erin Aeran Chung (2021) How South Korean Demographics Are Affecting Immigration and Social Change, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Insoo Jeong The Status of Youth Unemployment in Korea and Policy Tasks, Korea Labor Institute Adam Hur (2021) South Korea’s Demographic Crisis is Challenging its National Story, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Gi-Wook Shin (2006) Korea’s ethnic nationalism is a source of both pride and prejudice, Stanford Asia-Pacific Research Centre Chung Min Lee (2021) South Korea’s Military Needs Bold reforms to Overcome a Shrinking Population Woo-Young Lee, Hayeon Lee (2019) The Perception of the Integration of North and South Korea, Historical Social Research, Vol 44. All other statistics from: WHO Statista KOSIS -Korean Statistical Information Service