Skilled Human – Designers' Skills

Eero Kallio

Introduction

In dividing the world we live in into a natural one and one created by humans, we are inevitably facing the human connection between the natural world, which is operating by the laws of nature, and the artificial world, which is using these laws to satisfy human needs. This artificial world is created by human technology.

Technology has a connection to the natural world, as it obeys natural laws. At the same time, it has a connection to the artificial world, as the creation of technology originates from human needs. This dual connection makes technology interesting. In this article, I discuss the ways in which human action connects the natural and artificial worlds within the realms of craftmanship and design.

Human skill – designing – is a connector of these two worlds. Human skills are the interface over which we interact with these two worlds. In our everyday lives, we do not designate a difference between the natural and artificial worlds. Human skill constantly operates in the interface of nature, technology and culture. This article discusses craftmanship, the designing skill and its meaning for creating artefacts. What are the many roles of human skill as a connection between the realms of nature, human action and technology?

Designer’s Skill

Having expertise and knowledge are common words used to describe someone who is highly skilled in performing certain difficult tasks. When acting intentionally to create something, we are experiencing this kind of skillfulness. When creating new things, artefacts, we are working between natural laws and human needs. This work combines knowledge of human needs to the knowledge of causal connections of the natural world. This article is about skill and its role as a connector between natural laws and human needs. It is about the design and creation of something new. In the end, we should be able have an insight of the aspect of skillfulness behind the design and the designer.

Craftmanship is considered a basic manifestation of skillfulness. In the beginning, I will discuss the nature of a craftsman’s knowledge. The aim is to clarify the essence of the maker’s knowledge and its connection to practical problem solving. This kind of knowledge is connected to its possessor – it is the craftsman’s knowledge.

My second topic is the artefact and its dual connection – the connection to the world of natural laws and to the world of human intentions. This chapter clarifies the processing of artefacts to meet human needs. It is about the connection between natural laws and human needs. This discussion aims to clarify the fascinating connections between the natural world, the artificial world, and the human who works between these two worlds.

The third section of this article is about design. In it, I will discuss the nature and the aim of design: about gaining an acceptable alternative – since in the real world we rarely have the methods foractually finding the optimum (Simon 1996, 120). Compared to craftmanship, design is about making the connection between natural laws and human intentions visible. By contrast to craftmanship, design is something that also makes the experience explicit.

The aim of my article is to discuss the connective role of human skills. I will begin by examining the connection between knowledge and skill. The notion of the maker´s knowledge is the key to studying the connection. Understanding the dual connection of the artefact and especially the role of the human actor as a connector between these two worlds emphasises the meaning of the skills and experience: Understanding causal connections and being able to utilise them in creating artefacts. By describing the essence of the craftsman´s skills and skill acquisition, we are ready to examine the gestalt of the designer and the designer´s skills.

Craftsman´s Knowledge

According to Aristotle, practical and theoretical reasoning are parallel processes. Theoretical knowledge and practical action have an inalienable connection. Knowledge has not only a connection to the character of the action but also to the reasons behind the action – to the intentionality of the action. A single event produces a single experience which is not yet exploitable. Several combined events are creating a picture about the effects of the causes, but they are not yet enough to tell why the effects are following the causes. Only causal knowledge explains why certain effects come about and how they are connected to the causes. The awareness about causes and effects makes experiences evolve into knowledge. (Mutanen, 2016)

Richard Sennett (2009, 9–12) describes traditional craftsman’s skill as an ongoing dialogue between head and arm: the synthesis of practice and deliberation. On one hand, it is the capability to use tools and on the other it is knowledge about achieving the objective.

Knowledge about skill is often divided into knowing that and knowing how. The first one refers to theoretical knowledge and the latter to practical knowledge. According to Ryle (2009, 18) one always uses a bit of both when one does something. The basic challenge is that theoretical knowledge does not provide a full perspective on how to do something. Vice versa, it is not fully possible to describe “know-how” in a descriptive way – how could one, for example, describe the difference between a good and a bad joke? (Ryle, 2009, 18–19)

This division is complex because of the connection between knowing that and knowing how. In the recent discussions concerning “knowing how” there is a clear disagreement about the grounds of knowing how: is the idea of “knowing how” based on propositional attitudes or on other abilities (Breivik, 2014). Is knowing how simply a form of knowing that?

The so-called “intellectualist explanation” of knowing how suggests that there is always theoretical knowledge behind the intentional action. Practical and ethical implications of theoretical knowledge are diverse. What if an agent has false knowledge but is still able to carry out the desired action? Anti-intellectualism explains “knowing how” as an ability. This means that propositional knowledge alone is not sufficient for knowing how – one must be able. There could also be an important difference between knowing how to do something and being able to do it. Becoming paralyzed may affect being able to walk, but one still knows how to walk. (Breivik, 2014; Boesch, 2019)

The idea of tacit knowledge gives an important vantage point to the discussion concerning knowing how. The idea about knowledge that one cannot express points out one important aspect of knowledge. There is a kind of knowledge that is connected to the person who carries it and is not able to make it explicit. The origin of this kind of knowledge is intrinsic. It is based on experience and bound to its subject. One important feature is that it is connected to expectations regarding the feeling of experiencing something: “Knowing how to execute involves knowing how it should feel, the bodily feeling and maybe also what the emotional involvement should be” (Breivik, 2014).

The idea of the maker´s knowledge covers both the theoretical and the practical knowledge. The main idea can be summarised as an idea that one can possess the kind of theoretical knowledge that one can bring forth (Hintikka 1974, 80). Maker’s knowledge includes knowing that and

knowing how: theoretical (knowing that) and practical (knowing how) knowledge are inalienable (Hintikka, 1974, 86–88).

Instead of building a wall between the natural science and the human sciences, they can both be approached through theories of a manmade, artificial world through the concept of a maker´s knowledge. Maker´s knowledge has an important connection with practical reasoning. Hintikka (1974, 84) elaborates on the concept of maker´s knowledge regarding practical or intentional knowledge, which are often understood as practical reasoning.

Maker´s knowledge has a close connection to intentionality. By contrast to speculative knowledge, which is derived from known objects, maker´s knowledge is connected to the reason of actual processing or doing. When the artisan is creating his or her artefact, we can observe all the phases of the work process, but we cannot tell why he or she is working that way. There is still a certain goal toward which he or she is aiming. There is a long causal chain and a true intention behind it. The craftsman is an expert in his or her own area. The craftsman’s focus is directed towards a personal aim. The knowledge and experience a craftsman possesses are bound to the artefact. He gains more experience every time he creates a new artefact, but the experience is limited to this certain subject (cf. Martini, 2019, 17–118). The craftsman’s competence is focused on solving a certain, known problem.

A craftsman´s skill or ability can be analysed from the viewpoint of habitual action (Pollard, 2006). When reaching the level of a highly experienced and skilful actor, the manufacturing of an artefact does not need ongoing attention. Repetition has then developed one´s skills to the self-acting level (Pollard, 2006). The cycle of habituation and repetition improves the action to something that the agent does not have to think about. In a social setting, the apprentice is not only imitating his master but also improving and exercising his own skills. By intentional exercising and monitoring his own performance, one learns – or habituates – their action.

Breivik (2014) describes the skill acquisition of expert athletes in a broader way – it is not just habitual behaviour: “At high skill levels, the execution of know how is thus an all-embracing activeness involving a person´s cognitive, emotional and motor abilities and resources”. A craftsman would in this framework be called an expert when he achieves a high skill level in his area of expertise. This expertise should be evaluated in two different ways: as backward-looking experience and as forward-looking competence. Experts then should have experience in their field of expertise and be competent in using their experience in solving new problems (Martini, 2019, 117).

Craftsmanship is about developed expertise in a specific area of proficiency. It is acquired by experience. The knowledge concerning this expertise is refined intrinsically. The background of knowing may have connection with propositional knowledge. Nevertheless, the central part of the capability is attached to its carrier – it is knowledge attained by its maker. Gaining this kind of experience or knowledge is a process where the creator makes expertise (knowledge) by exercise. In the beginning, it may demand some examples or theoretical knowledge. When getting more sophisticated, one begins to adjust their performance by internal guidance.

Internal guidance does not mean anything supernatural. It is about a gut feeling. It is something you already know, or you can do. An experienced professional is able to perform complex operations without specific attention. Being skilled is closely connected to this – being skilled in something enables one to focus attention on something more important: a craftsman doesn´t have to think about how to use tools and may focus on the fragile material he is working with; and the football player is able to concentrate on the situation on the field because his ball control works like automation (Breivik, 2014).

When discussing the maker’s knowledge or practical knowledge, we must remember the inseparable connection between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge on an individual level. While an individual’s understanding about causal dependency evolves, his capabilities regarding practical knowledge improve (Hintikka, 1974, 86). Theoretical reason, then, is free from the real world. Experienced world has a restraining essence when one is operating from his practical reasoning. Theoretical reasoning expands possibilities to exercise practical actions by reasoning the upcoming actions and their possible effects. The conceptual structure of cause and effect creates awareness of the possibilities to reach the intentionality behind the maker’s knowledge.

Artefact and Dual Connection

We all live in the world of technical artefacts. Artefacts are objects made by craft/skill by human beings, supporting them in fulfilling their practical needs and ends (Kroes, 2012). Technical artefacts have a dual nature. They are man-made physical constructions and objects carrying a designated function; something which connects them to the intentional human action (Kroes, 2002). An artefact is something that is created because of a human need. The reason for the existence of the artefact rises from its functionality and especially from the goals it is made for. Still, it is an artefact with a structure created by the man. From the outer environment, it presents itself as something that fulfils its goal and from an inner environment it is described as a physical system.

Functional explanation means that we are giving an explanation of something by reference to its purpose or function. This kind of explanation differs from the methods of natural sciences, which explain how things are without dividing them into the inner and outer environments. Birds and planes being able to fly can be explained by natural laws. There is no reason for a division between an inner and an outer environment. For example, why do animals in the Arctic have white fur? When explaining this we are shifting to an explanation by functionality: their white colour helps them to survive in that kind of environment. This is only a statement but when we support it with the notion of natural selection, we turn it into an explanation. (Simon, 1996, 7)

The dual nature of the artefact means that it has a connection to the world of causal connection where it works as a physical object and to the world of human beings where it works through intentional acts of human agents (Kroes, 2002). We are used to working with the former physical conceptualisation employed and developed by the physical sciences. The latter intentional conceptualisation of the world underlies most of the social sciences. The problem appears when these two give competing explanations for the same kind of phenomena.

The technological explanation bundles artefacts, physical structure, and functional explanation. Functionality, which is explained in an intentional language, must be translated to the terminology of structure. The functionality of the artefact exploits natural laws, but the operating principles are bound to the use of the artefact. Natural science is not able to explain the functionality of the artefact before it exists. Technological objects’ physical essence and their functionality can be explained with causal connections. For example, a piston moving up and down in a cylinder and the energy it produces can be described as a phenomenon with several features. This description is not enough for deductive reasoning to investigate the functionality of the artefact. This phenomenon can produce several outcomes in different uses. On the other hand, it is also impossible to derive the structure of the artefact just by knowing the functionality. (Kroes, 1998)

A technological explanation, therefore, is not a deductive explanation; it connects structure and function on the basis of causal relations and pragmatic rules of actions based on these causal relations. (Kroes, 1998)

The relation between cause and effect has been discussed through the ages without reaching consensus. In this context, it is sufficient to state: When an effect is caused by another effect, the first one must always be followed by the second, which is consequently caused by the first one. Understanding cause-effect relations enables predictions – after the first phenomenon, the effect it causes is predictable. Experiments in natural sciences are a

process of intentionally causing cause-effect conditions. With the notion of technology, we are signifying the knowledge we possess about applying cause and effect in practice. (von Wright, 1961, 177–178)

We consider a phenomenon explained when its causes have been discovered. Natural sciences constitute a system of causal laws. These laws explain how the universe works – all things that happen have some cause. When we turn our focus to the human and society, the notion of causation becomes much more difficult. Individual intentional and social action does not form a deterministic system like the natural sciences do. (von Wright, 1961, 178–179)

G. H. von Wright´s concept of technical norm defines factual statements about the relations between means and ends. When we have a causal law that ‘X causes A in situation B’ we can predict that if X happens in situation B, it may cause A. If the X may be chosen by us (not by nature), the causal law can be converted to a technical norm: “if we want to achieve aim A, and the situation is type B, then we should bring about cause X”. (Niiniluoto ,1993)

In the context of human sciences, causality is used to represent the causeeffect relationship with respect to human action. When focusing on human behaviour, the role of experience and the context where the agent is operating must be emphasised. In comparison to computer software, humans are likely to act against the rules (Hughes, Kroes & Zwart, 2005). Human beings have the ability to reason, which makes their cause-effect relationship differ from the relationship between the physical objects. Human reasoning creates a possibility to make several different choices in similar situations. Human cause-effect relationships can tell us why someone has done something, but it is never a guarantee that this will happen again. Interaction between physical objects is purely causational, whereas human behaviour bears in itself a significant amount of intentional deliberation (Kroes, 2002).

According to Aristotle, the deliberation related to practical knowledge – practical reasoning – focuses on the means, not on the ends. Because acting or crafting are both focused on reaching an objective, deliberating on the objective itself is not the issue in this context. The objective is based on a presumption like healing the patient or creating the desirable legislation. Deliberation thereby focuses on the ways to reach the objective. Practical reasoning is about choosing the best alternative via deliberation. This process is a linear way to achieve understanding about reaching the objective. (Hintikka, 1974, 89–90)

Designing and the Designer´s Skill

Designing is about devising a course of action which is aimed at changeing existing conditions to something desirable (Simon, 1996, 111). Designing is an intellectual activity aimed at creating a road map or several possibilities to achieve this goal. Unlike craftmanship, designing is about making the path of creating the artefact visible.

On the other hand, design science is the activity of generating instrumental knowledge for production and manipulation of natural and artificial systems. Design science produces knowledge which may then be applied within scientific design. (Niiniluoto, 1993)

Simon (1996, 118) divides designing science into two main topics: 1. Utility theory and statistical decision theory – the logical framework for rational choice among given alternatives and 2. Deducing the optimum alternative.

The computation of the optimum alternative works only in simple cases. When applying utility theory to real-world cases, we must have the tools for actual computations. Even with the traditional rational chess playing case we will encounter the limitations of the computational capacities: In a simple game, winning is about keeping the gearing ratio positive. The process of playing is aimed at exploiting every move in an optimal manner. This kind of computation is not possible within an existing computer’s capacities – even the latest chess computers work by evaluating situations within their limited computing capacity. The problem with computation of the optimum alternative is that real-life problems should be solved in the current situation and by real humans or computers. (Simon, 1996, 118–119.)

The latter topic refers to challenges concerning available computation techniques. This perspective concentrates on usage of available counting techniques in comparing possible courses of action. In the real world, the pursuit of an optimal solution is not a realistic objective. In practice, we are forced to choose between good and tolerable alternatives – and we choose the one that seems to be suitable in our current situation. The optimal alternative is more like a theoretical ideal than a practical possibility. Therefore, the comparison between the possible alternatives turns out to be even more important than pursuing the optimal one. The key point is then, how the possible alternatives meet the given criteria of a design task. (Simon, 1996, 119–121)

In a situation where we are searching for an optimal solution to a problem, it is necessary to understand the connection between the observation and the action. Simon (1996, 122) suggests that behind the intentional action, there should be a double connection to the external environment. A system must have the receiving, afferent, connection and the efferent,

which is the operant connection. In addition, the system must have a kind of memory system which records information about changes in environment and about the actions that the systems itself has done. According to Simon, achieving objectives is about how the system can build connections between the actions and changes in the external environment. A system can accumulate knowledge about the changes in environment caused by the intentional actions. This kind of systemic design process is useful in all kinds of planning, where the aim is to create courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones (Simon, 1996, 111).

Designers’ skills are measured by how structure and functionality are combined. In the designing context, the focus is on the structure: What must be created to gain the preferred functionality. The preferred functionality is described by the known cause-effect relationship. In the utilization context the focus is on how to achieve the preferred objective – the reason why the designing task is performed. Designing is about creating possible courses of action for how to achieve the objective. The reason for designing is to create suitable alternatives to gain the preferred outcome –it must connect the structure, the theory, to the real world, to functionality (Kroes, 2002).

Along with designing the alternatives, it is essential to evaluate the suitability of the possible courses of action. According to Simon (1996, 118), it is possible to apply utility theory, statistical decision theory and different kinds of deduction techniques for choosing the best (most applicable) alternative. Mathematical theories have very limited applicability to complex real-life situations. When the problems get more difficult and the deduction becomes harder, the significance of human skills and experience grows even more crucial (Mutanen, 2016).

Conclusion

This brief study on human skill and experience brings us back to the maker’s knowledge. Development of the skills is bound to a certain individual – it is impossible to experience something on behalf of someone else. If I want to gain more theoretical knowledge, I have to study. If I want to become a more skillful football player, I must practice. And probably part of becoming a better player also entails some theoretical knowledge. Nevertheless, the essential is the agent – all the skill and knowledge one can utilize is bound to oneself.

When taking steps from craftmanship to designing, we must look back to the essence of the artefact. The artefact is about natural and human causalities. It is a manifestation of the intention-driven functionality and a nature-driven structure. It is something that gets its meaning through human needs. The artefact connects its maker to the theoretical knowledge

of natural worlds’ causalities and to the intentional knowledge of human needs. This is something which cannot be explained by just one of the pieces.

An artefact can be explained by designing, which is a process that makes the connection between the structure and the function visible. Designing is an attempt to connect the structure and the function. The major difference between design and craftmanship is that the designing process cannot be tacit. Designing could be simultaneously seen as a process that makes something visible and a process where the designer gathers more experience about designing. The outcome of the process is a plan, the designing of something, and during the process, the designer develops their personal knowledge about designing.

There are also some similarities – the designer is also a kind of craftsman. When performing design, he is making some planning visible. At the same, he is becoming more skilled as a designer. In the end designing is a process bound to intentionality and causal connection. To become more skillful as a designer is to better understand the process that connects these two.

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