Lee 2018 Near

2017-18 JOHN NEAR GRANT Recipient “There Are No Neutrals There”: Radicalism, Progressivism, and Class Struggle in 1930s Harlan Kentucky Matthew Lee, Class of 2018

"There Are No Neutrals There": Radicalism, Progressivism, and Class Struggle in 1930s Harlan Kentucky

Matthew Lee 2018 John Near Scholar Mentors: Mr. Byron Stevens, Mrs. Lauri Vaughan April 11th, 2018

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The coal wars that raged throughout 1930s Harlan, Kentucky were as politically variegated as they were contentious. Though the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) would make the first union forays into Harlan in 1931, by 1933, their organizing efforts had failed in the face of strong owner resistance.1 Next came the National Miners Union (NMU), an openly communist labor organization, which staked a organizing claim from 1932 to 1934—their foray proved similarly fruitless.2 In fact, Harlan would not prove hospitable to unionization until 1938, nearly a decade after the first organizers descended upon the southeastern Kentucky county. Labor’s long period of infertility was attributable to county’s political situation: one of complete domination of local politics—from district attorneys on coal company retainer to ballot-stuffing on election day—by the forces of mine ownership.3 Beyond the sticky web of a corrupt local polity, however, labor in Harlan found solace from federal entities, such as Senator Robert La Follette Jr. of Wisconsin and his senate subcommittee.4 The La Follette Civil Rights Committee was dedicated to safeguarding the civil rights of labor, from organizing to demonstrating or striking.5 La Follette’s Civil Liberties Committee breached the impasse between labor and its foes, paving the way for complete organization of Harlan county by exposing coal company injustice to a federal and public audience alike.6 Nevertheless, the role of

1

John W. Hevener, Which Side Are You On?: The Harlan County Coal Miners, 1931-1939 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 84.

Maier B. Fox, United We Stand: The United Mine Workers of America, 1890-1990 (Washington D.C.: United Mine Workers of America, 1990), 293.

2

3

Hevener, Which Side, 88.

4

Jerold S. Auerbach, Labor and Liberty: The La Follette Committee and the New Deal (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966), 72.

5

Ibid.

6

Hevener, Which Side, 88.

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the unions themselves in organizing Harlan cannot be understated. Between 1931 and 1938, Harlan’s labor unions created the conditions necessary for their own success through ceaseless organization and persistence.

The 1931 UMW Strike In 1930, Harlan county, Kentucky had a population of 64,557; by 1940, Harlan’s residents had swelled in number to 75,275.7 Throughout the turbulent thirties, a time period wracked with depression and nationwide instability, Harlan’s economy was inseparably tied to coal. Mining was, in turn, inseparably tied to the large conglomerate: some, such as HarlanWallins Coal Company, produced for direct sale; others, such as Ford Motor Company, dug to fuel larger vertically-oriented supply chains.8 Yet company influence spread far further than the mines. Politically, company operators and mine owners controlled nearly every aspect of Harlan’s society. Economically speaking, mine workers were largely residents of company towns—communities administered directly by the coal companies. For residents of Harlan’s towns, the coal company was not merely employer, but landlord, shopkeeper, even schoolteacher—nearly every aspect of a miner’s life was contingent on the conglomerate they worked for. Thus, the reach of capital extended beyond the workplace and into the home: coal operators strictly regulated who entered and left their towns; set rents; and evicted problematic— as in union-sympathizing—workers at will.9 The influence of business consumed polling booth, courthouse, and town hall alike. In 1931, for example, Harlan’s votes in a Kentucky gubernatorial election were thrown out after voting irregularities were discovered; voter

7

Richard Forstall, ed., "Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990," U.S. Bureau of the Census, last modified March 27, 1995 8

Hevener, Which Side, 4.

9

Ibid.

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intimidation and ballot stuffing were the modus operandi of Harlan politics.10 Outside the polling place, mine operators controlled the masses with violence and intimidation, exemplified by Sheriff J.H. Blair, who reigned over the county’s police forces from 1930 to 1933.11 Wielding a sizeable force of deputies as a cudgel, Blair crushed worker organization on the behalf of coal companies with bomb, nightstick, and rifle. By his own admission, the sheriff “did all in [his] power to aid the coal operators.”12 Yet it was the coal operators’ domination of the courts that bought Blair’s thuggery a thin veneer of legitimacy: several district judges were paid multithousand-dollar retainers by coal companies. When graft failed, coal operators returned to the tried-and-true methods of perjury and witness intimidation. It was clear to Harlan’s miners that, in the fight against injustice, local government was more foe than friend.

Harlan’s poverty and working-class desperation created a workforce open to unionization, a condition exploited throughout the 1930s.13 Triggered by poor working conditions and brought to a head by Depression-era pay cuts, the United Mine Workers, then America’s premier coal union, launched a 1931 organizing effort that advanced rapidly through Harlan. What began as anger over a mid-February pay cut had, by March, escalated to solidarity marches twenty-seven hundred strong. By May, Harlan’s UMW local had banded eight to nine thousand workers together.14 Yet the county’s coal operators fiercely resisted unionization: thousands of miners were fired; laborers that lost their employment not only missed desperatelyneeded paychecks but, more insidiously, had their families forcibly evicted from company towns 10

Hevener, Which Side, 15.

11

Ibid, 16.

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid, 17.

14

Ibid, 36.

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and often faced the prospect of an employment blacklist. In doing so, Harlan coal firms effectively stripped demonstrating workers of the ability to feed themselves. Literally out in the cold, the increasingly desperate unemployed found little solace in traditional avenues of aid.

Ostensibly neutral charities like the Red Cross refused to provide aid to starving families, pointing towards a policy to never take part in industrial conflicts no matter how malnourished or vulnerable evicted union families became.15 The United Mine Workers, struggling financially themselves, could not furnish strike aid for their own members.16 Likewise, government, controlled by mining companies, provided more billyclubs than bread for Harlan’s famished.

Indeed, Harlan’s county government emphasized instead their support for “scabs,” laborers who crossed picket lines to work during strike days, safeguarding their passage to worksite.17 Though the 1931 strike’s desperation and destitution would lead to several bloody conflagrations, without bread to feed miners’ families, company victory was assured. By the end of July 1931, 88% of Harlan’s miners had returned to work. Chronically underfunded, the United Mine Workers’ first foray into Harlan county had unequivocally failed.18 The UMW would not receive a second chance until six years later, in 1937.

The National Miner’s Union The wake of the United Mine Workers’ disastrous 1931 strike left many Harlan miners, blacklisted, destitute, and unemployed. These harsh conditions, combined with feelings of betrayal stemming from the UMW’s lack of aid and anger at company oppression created

15

Hevener, Which Side, 49.

16

Fox, The United, 293.

17

Fred Greenbaum, "A 'New Deal' for the United Mine Workers of America," Social Science 33, no. 3 (June 1958): 155, JSTOR. 18

Hevener, Which Side, 49.

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conditions ripe for radical organization. In Harlan, this radicalism took the form of the National Miners’ Union (NMU). Founded at the behest of the American Communist Party in September 1928, the NMU’s hard-left slant was born of a Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) belief that widespread organization of the working class would hasten the demise of American capitalism.19 This ideology informed the National Miners Union’s organizing philosophy. Indeed, the NMU was less concerned with brokering exclusive open-shop deals as they were the immediate alleviation of the plight of the nation’s coal miners; spreading revolutionary propaganda was both an organizing tactic and an end goal in and of itself. Thus informed by socialist dogma, the National Miners’ Union garnered no allies within the United Mine Workers. For the UMW, the NMU represented not only a rival union but an incompatible ideology: the latter’s dreams of revolution and communist ideals were diametrically opposed with the pragmatic organization of the former.20 Unsurprisingly, the NMU found themselves unpopular among anti-radical state and local governments and certainly not liked among mine owners already unwilling to negotiate with even more moderate unions.21 In starved Harlan, however, the NMU found attentive ears.

The first National Miners Union organizers arrived in Harlan in late June 1931, immediately after the failure of United Mine Workers’ efforts in the county. Approximately onethousand miners remained blacklisted and without hope for employment. Though many stillemployed workers had returned underground, discontent and suffering still abounded in

19

Fox, The United, 293.

20

Ibid.

21

Ibid.

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Harlan.22 Typically socialist, the NMU’s first step was to develop inroads with Harlan’s community and transform discontent into radicalism. To achieve the former, NMU organizers set up seven soup kitchens to feed the county’s hungry; the latter was achieved with a deluge of Communist publications.23 Within weeks, ten National Miners Union locals dotted Harlan.

Large-scale organization was soon to follow: by the end of July, NMU rallies drew crowds of 2,000.24 At first glance, the NMU’s prolific rise seems improbable. The United Mine Workers had just attempted and lost a long and hard-fought organization campaign earlier in the year, meanwhile, coal operators and their government cronies maintained their stranglehold on Harlan politics. The National Miners Union found opportunity in misery: among their ranks were blacklisted miners, large auxiliary corps of women, and still-employed mine workers allured by the promise of better working conditions.25 Though ostensibly run by idealists, the National Miners Union’s success in Harlan was their ability to galvanize the otherwise hopeless.

Despite their initial momentum, the National Miners Union faced overbearing suppression by the coal operators and their institutions. One prime tactic was covert violence, specifically targeted at the organization’s wildly popular soup kitchens. A union soup kitchen in Evarts, one of seven in the county, was destroyed with dynamite on August 11th, 1931. Another in Clovertown was the site of a sheriff-initiated shootout that claimed the lives of two NMU organizers.26 Government harassment of union organizers also proved integral to the coal

22

Hevener, Which Side, 50.

23

Peter Gottlieb, "The Complicated Equation: Worker Rebellion and Unionization," Appalachian Journal 6, no. 3 (Summer 1979): 325, JSTOR. 24

National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, Harlan Miners Speak (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932; Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 46 25

Gottlieb, "The Complicated," 325.

26

Hevener, Which Side, 60.

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operators’ union-busting strategy. Branding the National Miners Union as an organized crime entity, Sheriff J.H. Blair employed anti-criminal syndicalism laws against many of the union’s top leadership. Under these dubious auspices, Blair arranged the arrests of NMU delegates Bill Duncan and Jim Grace to the late-August arrest of Debs Moreland, overseer of the soup kitchen in Pansy, Kentucky.27 Thus deprived of both guidance and their primary means of recruiting, the National Miners Union struggled to stay afloat in Harlan.

In addition to overt violence, the twin forces of local government and business conspired to combat the National Miners Union’s proliferation of socialist literature with a media blitz of their own design. Labor-friendly publications faced censorship and scrutiny: the Knoxville DailySentinel, a Harlan newspaper with a pro-union slant, was outright banned by no less than seven companies. As for radical publications, circulation was also a target for violence. A reporter for the radical Federated Press, for example, was kidnapped, driven to the top of a hill, then nonfatally shot by unknown assailants. By controlling the media, Harlan operators sought to reign in all pro-union discourse and, by extension, limit the National Miners Union altogether.28 As they employed suppression of all kinds, coal operators nearly destroyed the union’s ability to organize. By the end of the summer of 1931, union locals no longer met; relief from the NMU’s remaining soup kitchens dwindled and scarcely any central organization remained among the National Miners Union’s Harlan outposts.29 What the coal operators’ suppression was unable to destroy, however, was the resolve of Harlan’s miners. Even after a summer of bloody suppression that left the organization proper on

27

Hevener, Which Side, 59.

28

Ibid.

29

Fox, The United, 293.

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its last legs, between seventy to eighty percent of Harlan’s NMU members favored an immediate strike in September.30 In the face of violence and brutality, Harlan’s miners remained zealous in their desire to organize. Ironically, it was the so-called firebrand socialists who now hesitated in the face of radical action.31 Fearing a dearth of national funds and a lack of central structure within Harlan would immediately doom any efforts, the NMU procrastinated throughout the fall of 1931. Indeed, it was not until mid-December that union delegates began to lay the groundwork for a strike to come on January 1st, 1932.32 Yet, after a winter of waiting, the longawaited strike proved feckless and plagued by catastrophe. Out of the thousands employed in Harlan, only eighty-three miners walked off the job on New Year’s Day. With such a weak showing, demonstrators were easily dispersed by Sheriff Blair, his deputies, and private mine guards. The strike would officially continue in some capacity for months, but the National Miners Union was doomed.33 Membership dwindled, and in October 1933, the union itself was disbanded. To characterize the National Miners Union as an utter failure, however, would be to discount their remarkable achievement. They managed to unionize much of Harlan immediately after a grueling and violent strike and in the midst of a depression, proving that recruitment through aid and worker-centric messaging is a potent organizational tool.34 Furthermore, the suppression the NMU faced was clearly documented in contemporaneous publications like the National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoner’s Harlan Miners Speak. Similarly, the

30

National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, Harlan Miners, 46.

31

Gottlieb, "The Complicated," 325.

32

Hevener, Which Side, 76.

33

Ibid, 73.

34

Fox, The United, 293.

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atrocities the NMU weathered became integral to the cases of later muckrakers like Robert La Follette and his Senate investigation.35 Most importantly, the National Miners Union was a beacon of hope during dark times in Harlan county: their activism, driven through altruism and relentless perseverance, kept alive the dream of an organized Harlan in the absence of all other support.36 Though perhaps overwhelmed by the unbreakable power of the local alliance of business and government and perhaps hindered by their own caution, the National Miners Union made significant advances towards the unionization of Harlan county in 1931 and 1932.

1937: Turning Point In 1937, three years after the demise of the National Miners Union, Harlan still lacked officially recognized labor representation for the county’s coal miners. By then, Harlan was the only major mining county yet unorganized by the United Mine Workers, though the UMW did make continued attempts to organize the county between 1934 and 1937.37 Harlan’s imperviousness to union organization was again directly attributable to the stranglehold mining corporations had on the county’s political and economic life. The notorious Sheriff J.H. Blair had been replaced by Sheriff Thomas Middleton, who proved just as hostile to organization efforts as his predecessor.38 Open intimidation—ranging from sheriff deputies tailing union organizers in hotels to shootings of union officials by unknown assailants—continued to be standard operating procedure within Harlan’s contentious politics.39 The climax of this violence was the February

35

National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, Harlan Miners.

36

Gottlieb, "The Complicated," 325.

37

Jerold S. Auerbach, "The La Follette Committee: Labor and Civil Liberties in the New Deal," The Journal of American History 51, no. 3 (December 1964): 445, JSTOR. 38

Hevener, Which Side, 111.

39

Ibid, 105.

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1937 murder of Bennett Musick, the 17-year old son of a United Mine Workers organizer killed in his own home during a drive-by shooting.40 The death of an innocent young man sparked outrage and scrutiny nationwide. By 1937, such garish examples of violence stood in stark contrast to New Deal idealism. The nation, in the midst of the Roosevelt revolution, could no longer tolerate such business committing such blatant injustices. The Musick murder, especially hideous in the eyes of the general public, exposed Harlan’s operators to unprecedented scrutiny.41 The La Follette Committee Such scrutiny was to take the form of Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette Jr.’s Civil Liberties Committee, organized in June 1936 with the singular goal of exposing various incidents of labor suppression.42 Using the National Labor Relations Act’s definition of collective bargaining as a “civil liberty,” Senator La Follette sought to expose the labor suppression that plagued many of America’s industries, thus bolstering the power of both labor and the NLRA.43 In 1937, fresh off a successful investigation into the labor practices of the American auto industry, La Follette found his next target in Harlan, by now long infamous as a place of unending labor strife and operator domination.44 On April 14, 1937, La Follette began his inquiry into Harlan, calling forth all manner of witnesses to the committee stand in D.C.—from UMW organizers to Sheriff Middleton’s deputies and the owners of Harlan’s mines themselves—to

40

Patrick J. Maney, Young Bob: A Biography of Robert M. La Follette, Jr., 2nd ed. (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 2003), 181.

41

Maney, Young Bob, 181.

42

Auerbach, Labor and Liberty, 73.

43

Ibid, 102.

44

Ibid, 115.

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fully reveal the extent of the county’s brutality for the first time.45 Mine operator George Ward admitted to chairing Harlan’s Republican party since 1932, which, when combined with the fact that miner’s association president S.J. Dickenson headed the county’s Democratic party since 1936, pointed towards clear political domination.46 Sheriff Thomas Middleton divulged the fact that, since taking office, his holdings had grown by $92,000 in liquid assets, two coal mines, and a spot on the mine owner’s association. Given that his salary is limited to $5,000 yearly, Middleton’s fiduciary stroke of luck raised more than a few eyebrows at Committee—and served as a clear link towards graft.47 As La Follette’s grilling continued, Middleton soon admitted that “there has been a lot of violence and crime committed by my deputies,” cementing the link between Harlan’s operators and brutal labor suppression.48 As the hearings wore onwards, one atrocity after another was revealed for the world to see. It soon became very clear that mine operators and their cronies were not only deliberately suppressed the rights of labor to organize but employed garish violence while doing so.49 Clear links between Harlan’s operators and county judges and lawmakers displayed the extent of the county’s corruption. Most damning was the revelation that, through the auspices of the Harlan County Coal Operators Association, the county’s firms had colluded to deliberately create an atmosphere of brutal oppression.50 La Follette’s revelations horrified the nation. On

45

Hevener, Which Side, 136.

46

Hevener, Which Side, 147.

47

Ibid.

48

Ibid.

49

Ibid, 138.

50

Ibid, 140.

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May 2nd, 1937, the Washington Post described the violence in Harlan as “murder and mutilation,” directly citing Senator La Follette’s questioning of county sheriff deputies. 51 By the end of that month, the Los Angeles Times openly referred to Harlan operators’ union-busting as “terrorism” to “deprive Harlan county coal miners of their rights to organize.”52 Outrage over Harlan’s atrocities were not limited to the public.

In May, 1937, not even a month before La Follette’s hearings began, United States Attorney General Homer Cummings dispatched twenty FBI agents to Harlan to investigate the extent of operator collusion; by the end of September, that investigation had resulted in a full-on federal indictment.53 Sensing a political turning of the tide, many local politicians soon rediscovered their pro-union sentiments. On April 23, 1937, Kentucky Governor Happy Chandler sent state police to protect United Mine Workers organizers. In late June 1937, Morris Saylor, the formerly vehemently anti-union county judge, issued warrants for the arrest of several notoriously corrupt sheriff’s deputies.54 Their power collapsing beneath them, Harlan operators were soon left to fend for themselves. Fearful of being drawn further into a political maelstrom, coal companies soon left the Harlan County Coal Operators Association in droves.

Indeed, the Association’s increasingly toxic reputation drove many operators to quickly dissociate from the embattled organization, instead choosing to negotiate union contracts with the UMW independently.55 Though La Follette’s probe was over by April 1937, the effects of his

51

"Harlan County: Murder and Mutilation," The Washington Post (Washington D.C.), May 2, 1937, ProQuest Newspapers.

52

"Kentucky Terrorism Plots Linked to Mine Arsenal," The Los Angeles Times, May 26, 1938, ProQuest Newspapers.

53

Hevener, Which Side, 146.

54

Ibid, 141.

55

Hevener, Which Side, 144.

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inquiry were only beginning to manifest themselves.56 In Harlan, the operators’ collusion was in full retreat whereas solidarity amongst the county’s workers was nascent.

Though the contributions of the La Follette Committee were invaluable—indeed, Harlan’s organization would have been impossible without their exposés—to characterize the union’s success in the county as the inevitable consequence of the investigations would be a mistake. Indeed, it was the union which prompted La Follette’s inquiry: United Mine Workers organizers had been waging an ongoing initiative since January 11, 1937, preceding La Follette’s inquiry by four months.57 Following the February murder of the 17-year old Bennett Musick, union officials hurriedly pressed the La Follette Committee to investigate, practically delivering the commission’s most sensational case to their doorstep.58 Having secured an investigation, the United Mine Workers similarly utilized La Follette’s exposés to quickly organize the county.

Beginning on April 25th, the UMW held weekly rallies, hoping to promote their cause to the county’s miners.59 Beyond merely spreading grassroots support, however, the United Mine Workers also learned to utilize their significant political clout to their electoral advantage. In 1937, County Judge Morris Saylor, infamously pro-business, was voted out in favor of his prounion Democratic challenger, Cam E. Ball, in large part due to union backing.60 So powerful was

56

Auerbach, Labor and Liberty, 120.

57

Hevener, Which Side, 134.

58

Ibid, 136.

59

Ibid, 143.

60

Ibid, 142.

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union political influence that, the next year, Harlan county, for the first time in its history, had a Democratic majority amongst county offices.61 Electorally or otherwise, union efforts were demonstrably successful: on May 2nd, 1937, UMW district president William Turnblazer claimed to have organized 31.25% of Harlan County.62 Eight days later, on April 10th, that figure had jumped to around half.63 Last-ditch operator attempts to slow down the United Mine Worker’s advance proved fruitless. In July 1937, coal operators conspired to derail the UMW with a myriad of methods. First, they created a number of company unions, or labor organizations wholesale controlled by a business owner and without any real bargaining power, to deter workers from joining the United Mine Workers.

Then, sticking to the tried and true, they attempted a mass firing of already-organized employees.

In response, the UMW filed suit with the National Labor Relations Board— claiming an abrogation of their rights to organize—and won.64 On August 27th, the Harlan County Coal Operators Association, once organized as a means to collude and defeat labor, signed a closedshop agreement with the UMW.65 As such, joining the UMW became a necessary condition of working in Association mines. At the end of 1938, excess of 86% of the county was unionized.66 Under the watchful eye of La Follette, labor had triumphed. Indeed, the La Follette Commission was initially spurred to action at labor’s opportunistic behest. Similarly, it was the UMW’s

61

Ibid.

62

"Harlan Coal Men Sign Up With Union," New York Times, August 28, 1938, ProQuest Newspapers.

63

Hevener, Which Side, 143.

64

Ibid.

65

Ibid, 151.

66

Ibid, 153.

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skillful political navigation and tireless grassroots organization of Harlan itself that allowed them to make the most of the senator’s inquiry.

The Historiography of Harlan’s 1930s Labor Struggles Nestled at the intersection of America’s labor movement and the New Deal, the history of Harlan’s unionization efforts was sharply split along ideological grounds. While established fact was rarely contested, authors have grappled over how details are interpreted and narratives are emphasized. In 1978, John W. Hevener published a decade-long review of Harlan’s labor movement in Which Side Are You On?: The Harlan County Coal Miners, 1931-39, postulating that the La Follette Committee played a critical, central role in ending the cycle of oppression in Harlan and bringing about the union.67 In doing so, Hevener took on a relatively liberal view of the county’s unionization: the impetus of Roosevelt’s New Deal was, according to the historian, not only capable but uniquely qualified in solving Harlan’s decade-long quandary.68 At the core of Hevener’s argument is his lauding of New Deal polities and organizations such as the La Follette Committee and the Department of Justice. In his view, without the auspices of an activist government, Harlan would be doomed to continued owner domination. Conversely, Peter Gottlieb’s 1979 article “The Complicated Equation: Worker Rebellion and Unionization,” published in the pages of the Appalachian Journal in response to Hevener’s claims, urges further historical emphasis on the role of union workers themselves in their 1937 organizing victory.

Unionization, Gottlieb postulates, was not merely won through the alliance of federal government and the union but through the rebellion of Harlan’s workers. To Gottlieb, “labor

67

Peter Gottlieb, "The Complicated Equation: Worker Rebellion and Unionization," Appalachian Journal 6, no. 3 (Summer 1979): 320, JSTOR. 68

Hevener, Which Side, 152.

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historians [overlook] the workers’ revolt as [an independent event] in the 1930’s” with their focus on top-level governance.69 Thus, while the narratives of both Gottlieb and Hevener are driven by common recognition of various historical events, they clash heavily in interpretation.

John W. Hevener dedicated much space in Which Side Are You On? to covering the communistic National Miners Union’s activities in Harlan from 1931 onwards, mainly focusing on the campaigns of terror waged against the union’s leadership by mine operators. Despite his emphasis on the atrocities committed against them, Hevener’s characterization of the National Miners Union as an organizing entity is altogether unflattering. In his description of the National Miners Union, Hevener paints the organization as a union of last resort, claiming they were an organization who “in more prosperous times had few followers and who were concerned themselves less with winning strikes and improving conditions than with radicalizing workers.”70 Similarly dim is the author’s view on the union’s actions within Harlan itself: Hevener characterizes the NMU as an organization that understood how to “start but not end a strike, ultimately [resulting] in even greater unemployment and destitution among the miners.”71 Hevener’s dim outlook on the National Miners Union seems, initially, to be directly corroborated by the facts at hand: the NMU was indeed unsuccessful in its organizing campaign, so much so that Harlan proved to be the National Miners Union’s last strike. Their leadership decimated by the county’s law enforcement and their legacy devastated by the utter failure of their 1932 strike, the NMU disbanded in the summer of the same year.72 As such, the fact that the National Miners

69

Gottlieb, “The Complicated,” 321.

70

Hevener, Which Side, 55.

71

Ibid, 70.

72

Fox, The United, 293.

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Union could not succeed in organizing Harlan an obvious one—that would not come until the United Mine Workers’ initiative in 1938. 73 Hevener’s pessimistic outlook on the National Miners Union is directly contrasted by views of Peter Gottlieb in his 1979 journal article, “The Complicated Equation.” Poignantly, Gottlieb notes that Which Side Are You On? discounts the fact that the NMU’s Harlan countywide network of soup kitchens “sustained the unemployed and blacklisted miners and their families,” an altogether impressive logistical feat that was as much a desperately-needed humanitarian intervention as it was an organizing tactic.74 As previously noted, the NMU’s charity-based techniques drew crowds of 2,000 in mere weeks; all this was accomplished in Southeastern Kentucky, which, with its conservative heritage, was hardly friendly territory for a socialist organization.75 Beyond organizational success, Gottlieb also noted that the National Miners Union “worked diligently to publicize the operators’ brutality and the widespread violation of civil rights in Harlan County.”76 Indeed, thanks to the NMU’s efforts, the infamy of Harlan’s operators was spread far and wide. One such endeavor was the 1932 publication of Harlan Miners Speak by the National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, a branch organization of the Communist Party of the United States of America—of which the National Miners Union was a component.77 Comprised of testimony by miners and organizers, the work itself was the culmination of a Communist Party-commissioned committee of writers headed by

73

Fox, The United, 293.

74

Gottlieb, “The Complicated,” 321.

75

Hevener, Which Side, 72.

76

Gottlieb, “The Complicated,” 323.

77

National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, Harlan Miners.

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the novelist Theodore Drieser. Its publication brought national attention to Harlan’s plight. So extensive was the mythos of Bloody Harlan that, on March 23rd, 1932, two-hundred university students from Yale, Harvard, Princeton, and Columbia descended upon Harlan to observe the NMU’s organization drive firsthand.78 Gottlieb finalizes his defense of the National Miners Union’s competence by examining an inconsistency within Hevener’s argument. According to Which Side Are You On?, the NMU was simultaneously an organization full of opportunistic radicals with little organizing strategy as well as an overly-cautious labor committee that squandered its political capital by delaying calls for a strike within Harlan itself. This, Gottlieb notes, is impossible: the fact that the National Miners Union, recognizing its weakness, chose to delay strike action as long as possible proves that NMU’s organizers planned strategically. 79 As such, in “The Complicated Equation,” the author postulates that National Miners Union’s topdown dilatory actions reflect a capable restraint on the part of NMU leadership.80 In Gottlieb’s view, the National Miners Union was a capable and experienced organization that accomplished much against all odds in Harlan: as such, their legacy deserves more merit than Hevener affords them.

Gottlieb and Hevener’s ideas ultimately stem from differing scholarly, political, and ideological perspectives. Hevener’s Which Side Are You On?, in its dismissal of the radical labor efforts of the National Miners Union, is consistent with a political viewpoint that emphasizes the success of New Deal liberalism in reshaping America’s labor politics.81 By emphasizing the role

“Students to survey Kentucky coal strike, 200 from eight universities leave today for Study in Harlan and Bell Counties," The New York Times, March 23, 1932, ProQuest National Newspapers Core (1985 - current).

78

79

Gottlieb, “The Complicated,” 323.

80

Ibid.

81

Hevener, Which Side, 154.

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of federal government, be it through the La Follette Committee or the National Labor Relations Board, Hevener characterizes labor’s victory in Harlan as a byproduct of the federal government’s campaign in support for unionism. In his own words, Hevener’s central argument that “the Roosevelt administration’s support of the Harlan strike accounted in large part for the difference between union defeat in 1931 and union victory in 1939.”82 Absent, of course, from this thesis is the National Miners Union’s struggle in 1932, indicative of Hevener’s dismissal of the struggles of the United Mine Workers in the larger context of Harlan’s unionization.

Conversely, Gottlieb, in “The Complicated Equation,” advances a labor-centric historical perspective of Harlan’s organization. Gottlieb notes that “radicals led successful strikes in San Francisco and Minneapolis in 1934,” in stark contrast to Hevener’s brusque dismissal of the organizing potential of radicals.83 Furthermore, regardless of actual success, Gottlieb notes that, following the crushing defeat of the United Mine Workers in 1931, the National Miners Union were the sole organization capable of sustaining Harlan’s labor movement from 1932 to 1933.84 Ultimately, Gottlieb urges his readers to look past the National Miners Union’s ultimate failure in Harlan and give credence to their hard-won accomplishments. At least in Harlan, his perspective is compelling: no matter the ultimate fate of the county’s beleaguered communists and their organizing campaign, they, seemingly against all odds, brought hope to a Harlan’s desperate and beleaguered.

Beyond his dismissal of the National Miners Union, Hevener also manifests his pro-New Deal inclinations through his coverage of the United Mine Workers’ post-La Follette

82

Hevener, Which Side, 166.

83

Gottlieb, “The Complicated,” 325

84

Ibid.

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organization drive in 1938. For Hevener, “the Roosevelt administration’s action and its effect in 1937 and 1938 revealed the meaning of the New Deal for Harlan county.” 85 The triumph of labor in Harlan was not so much a product of the UMW’s independent initiative as it was the direct result of sweeping governmental interference by federal polities like the La Follette Committee. This point itself is perhaps not a point of controversy: that the La Follette Committee’s exposés. The National Labor Relations Board’s bargaining and the watchful eye of the Justice Department allowed United Mine Workers organizers to maximize their potential within Harlan is commonly accepted historical perspective.86 Yet Hevener’s claim that “the New Deal extended a new dimension of liberty to the Harlan miner” by directly abolishing the ability of sheriff deputies to terrorize organized workers, reducing violence, and giving union officials leeway to operate freely within Harlan is a position that lowers historical emphasis on the longstanding efforts of the Harlan miners and unions to do the same.87 By framing his thesis in this manner, Hevener asserts that New Deal politics was not merely a facilitator of Harlan’s unionization, it was the main stimulus.

Nevertheless, Hevener’s perspective has merit. The New Deal did indeed enflame prounion passions, in Harlan, Washington D.C., and the nation at large. The threat of imminent Justice Department litigation pushed mine operators to sign closed-shop contracts, mandating that all their workers also be union members. Making union membership compulsory bolstered the size, coherence, and dues of the United Mine Workers, thereby increasing their ability to

85

Hevener, Which Side, 153

86

Gottlieb, “The Complicated Equation,” 322.

87

Hevener, Which Side, 153.

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collectively bargain.88 And the work of Senator La Follette and his committee in exposing the gruesome violence of the Harlan’s corrupt sheriff’s deputies and crooked private mine guards eventually prevent mine operators from using violence to suppress organization.89 Yet to replace labor’s ongoing role in organization with the federal government’s intervention in Harlan’s 1937 victory is to gloss over the deliberate struggle of contemporary organizers in the United Mine Workers and miners within the county. As Hevener asserts, without the impetus of the Musick murder, the issue of Harlan may have never reached the La Follette committee.90 The Senate and Justice Department may have made Harlan safe for organizers, the UMW had to put together massive and well-organized campaign for which they are solely responsible.91 While due credit must be afforded to the federal government, the contributions and achievements of workers and union in the organizing victory of 1937 cannot be overlooked.

Peter Gottlieb’s critique of Which Side Are You On? frames Hevener’s thesis simply: “given the operators’ domination in the heyday of the New Deal, and given the miners' unrest, then the violence, the operators' initial victories over unionism, the federal government's intervention, and the UMW's ultimate triumph all appear to follow in logical procession.”92 Unlike Hevener, Gottlieb is unsatisfied with a simplistic, chronological view of Harlan’s labor movement. Instead, Gottlieb urges a holistic review of the labor movement—both through the lens of organizers within Harlan and in a national context. The former point is especially potent.

88

Hevener, Which Side, 153.

89

Ibid, 134.

90

Ibid, 136.

91

Maier B. Fox, The United Mine Workers of America, 1890-1990 (Washington, D.C..: United Mine Workers of America, 1990), 293.

92

Gottlieb, “The Complicated,” 324.

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As previously noted, the United Mine Workers’ organizing drive preceded La Follette’s inquiry by four months; during those four months, the union publicized the brutality and violence they faced in Harlan.93 In fact, perhaps recognizing the fecund political ground the New Deal offered, United Mine Workers temporarily halted organizing activities in Harlan to push La Follette to investigate.94 Such a display points towards a historical narrative in which union and government worked hand-in-hand to unionize Harlan as opposed the government-led narrative of Hevener.

Furthermore, the United Mine Workers’ drive in Harlan in the wake of La Follette’s inquiry is a superb testament to the might and organizational ability of the UMWA in 1938. After the beginning of La Follette’s inquiry, enormous weekly rallies and a robust mine-to-mine organizing initiative organized 65% of Harlan’s miners within three months.95 Facing delays in their organization, the UMW themselves filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). It was ultimately the pressure brought about from that filing that led UMW representatives, the coal companies, and NLRB mediators to reach an agreement that brought complete unionization to Harlan.96 Gottlieb’s critique of Hevener’s perspective is thus compelling, for the La Follette Committee may never have investigated Harlan if not for the repeated entreaties of the United Mine Workers. Even after intervention, skillful organization and union-government cooperation was required to organize Harlan. Far from being idle participants, labor and government worked hand in hand to organize the county’s coal fields.

93

Hevener, Which Side, 136.

94

Ibid, 136.

95

Ibid, 143.

96

Ibid.

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Though the facts at hand are consistent, Gottlieb and Hevener’s interpretations of Harlan’s unionization differ radically. Through his lauding of La Follette, the Justice Department, and Roosevelt’s New Deal as a whole, Hevener creates a narrative where unionization is the logical conclusion of federal intervention, thereby minimizing the role of organizers and miners in shaping their own history. In Hevener’s view, it was “federal and state officials who were laying a further basis for enduring local labor-management peace.” Achieving that enduring local peace was thus the climax of 1937 and the crux of a decade of organization.97 Harlan had at long last been organized, and for Hevener, that marked the end of the New Deal conflict that raged there, one of the many battlegrounds where Roosevelt’s activist government would intervene on behalf of the beleaguered worker. Gottlieb, by contrast, viewed Harlan’s unionization not as a natural effect of the policies of New Deal government but instead the end result of a decade of working class struggle. Gottlieb thus emphasized the power of “the rebellion of unorganized workers against unemployment conditions in the open shop regime.”98 For Gottlieb, the true impetus of the 1937 victory was not federal intervention, but rather a decade of protest and discontent by the humble miner. In the light of Harlan’s long and bloody history, Gottlieb’s people-centric narrative is compelling, for without the determination of the picketing worker, the bravery of the union organizer, and the persistence of Harlan’s working class, Hevener’s vaunted New Deal government may have never had the opportunity to intervene.

From dismissing the efforts of the National Miners Union to insisting paramount importance of Roosevelt’s New Deal government, Hevener championed a narrative where the

97

Hevener, Which Side, 171.

98

Gottlieb, “The Complicated,” 322.

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government’s actions paved the way for union organization.99 Hevener’s ideals, so interwoven into his work, did not escape the viewpoint of his contemporary critics. As historian Steven Rosswurm notes in his review of Which Side Are You On?, Hevener’s text “[revealed] little awareness of the “new labor history.”100 Indeed, Hevener seemed to gloss over the subtleties of the Harlan miner’s condition. Which Side Are You On? gives little mention of Harlan’s residents, their distinct culture, their religious beliefs, especially not their feelings and emotions throughout unionization period. Rosswurm continues: in Hevener’s work, “the potential benefits of oral history remain unexplored.”101 Instead, as previously noted, Hevener devotes his text to careful explication of the state’s mediations, going so far as to name the federal government the main agent of change in 1930s Harlan.102 As such, Hevener’s ideological underpinnings clearly reflected those of New Deal liberalism. As the political scientist Eldon Eisenach explains, New Deal ideology is characterized by the “thought that political discourse would henceforth be dominated by talk about the best, most effective, policies to achieve substantive ends agreed upon, not about pre-political rights and constitutional jurisdictions.”103 Hevener’s focus on government and its policies allowed him to craft a fine explanation of the macro-level political forces that moved and shook Harlan, yet obscures the individual stories of the men and women truly responsible for the county’s liberation.

99

Hevener, Which Side, 172.

100

Steven Rosswurm, review of Which Side Are You On? The Harlan County Coal Miners, 1931-1939, by John W. Hevener, The History Teacher 13, no. 2 (February 1980): 298, JSTOR. 101

Rosswurm, review, 299.

102

Hevener, Which Side, 173.

103

Eldon Eisenach, "Second Thoughts on Progressivism and Rights," Social Philosophy and Policy 29, no. 2 (July 2012): 197.

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In “The Complicated Equation,” Gottlieb called for attention to be drawn to Harlan’s oftforgotten masses.104 In pages of scathing critique, Gottlieb criticizes Hevener for resorting to repeating hackneyed stereotypes of Harlan’s residents—prone to violence, unsophisticated, desperately poor—and, on a larger scale, failing to analyze the experiences of the men and women behind the movement.105 Gottlieb instead argued for a people-driven history, a school of thought that emphasized the role of everyday Harlanites through narrative history. Gottlieb thus sought to analyze Harlan’s revolt through the lens of labor conflict as a whole and considered the “vantage point of the rank of file” as well as labor and government leadership.106 In a way, Gottlieb’s rejection of classic New Deal historicism and emphasis on the narrative perspectives of everyday Americans thus mirrors the thoughts of the popular leftist historian Howard Zinn, who cynically claimed that the New Deal “had to meet two pressing needs: to reorganize capitalism in such a way to overcome the crisis and stabilize the system; also, to head off the alarming growth of spontaneous rebellion.”107 More recent scholarship follows Gottlieb’s lead entirely. Historian Jessica Legnini’s 2009 “Harlan County and the Constraints of History” attempts to answer Gottlieb’s call for historians to tell the stories of Harlan’s proletarians with a foray into modern-day Harlan County itself. After first-hand research, Legnini concludes that “the local history is concerned with family, community, and nostalgia.” As Gottlieb predicted, a stark contrast to the New Deal saviorhood that Hevener postulates.108

104

Gottlieb, “The Complicated,” 322

105

Ibid, 323.

106

Ibid, 322.

107

Howard Zinn, A People's History of the United States (2003; repr., New York: HarperCollins, 1980), 392.

108

Jessica Legnini, "Radicals, Reunion, and Repatriation: Harlan County and the Constraints of History," The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 107, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 501, JSTOR.

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Despite their ideological differences, both Gottlieb and Hevener can find common ground in their view of Harlan’s unionization as a net positive, in addition, neither disagree on the brutality of the coal companies. As elucidated through their disagreements on the National Miners Union’s drive of 1932 and the United Mine Workers’ push in 1938, both advance competing historiographies that reflect broader historical and political tradition. Hevener’s lauding of government reflects a propensity towards New Deal liberalism; Gottlieb’s workercentric narrative urges a more radical view. Ultimately, Harlan’s story—one of continual suppression tempered by constant rebellion—lends itself towards the latter.

Harlan’s Legacy The closed-shop contract signed by the United Mine Workers and the Harlan County Coal Operators association on August 27th, 1938 brought closure to a decade of struggle that began in earnest with the United Mine Workers’ doomed organizational drive in 1931. At least initially, it seemed as Harlan’s miners had, at long last, defeated the legacy of Bloody Harlan.

Private mine guards no longer prowled company towns; sheriff deputies could no longer assault, kidnap, or murder union men; the provisions of the United Mine Workers afforded the average miner economic and political security. Yet Harlan’s troubles were far from over: another wave of United Mine Workers strikes, predicated by the rise of the rival Progressive Mine Workers of America and the need to renew the United Mine Workers national contract, would grip Harlan on March 14th, 1939: less than a year following the strikes of 1938.109 Perhaps demonstrative of the power of the United Mine Workers, the strike of 1939 ended in a rousing labor victory. Indeed, the decades following Harlan’s turbulent thirties were, as described by John Hevener, a “golden age” for Harlan county. In the two decades between 1939 and 1959, not a single life was lost due

109

Hevener, Which Side, 159.

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to labor struggle; it appeared the legacy of “Bloody Harlan,” so named for the violence that marred much of the county’s turbulent history, was over at long last.110 Yet the two-decade anniversary of Harlan’s unionization also marked a turning point for the county: with the 1959 decline of the profitability of coal nationwide, coal operators resumed their siege of labor institutions.111 The conflict descended into violence, replete with dynamiting, sniper attacks, and beatings. For all their struggle, however, by 1965, the United Mine Workers, exhausted and defeated, remained in control of only around 49% of the county’s miners.112 Today’s nationwide recession of coal has made the union’s situation in Harlan grimmer. No union-led coal mines exist in Kentucky and fewer than 1,000 of Harlan’s 27,703 residents still work in the coal fields.113 The decline in demand for coal means that mine owners, no longer able to operate profitably, go out of business, depriving miners of a job and the union their dues. Despite their violent struggles and virulent animosity, Harlan’s miners, the United Mine Workers, and the nation’s coal operators today find themselves stranded in the same boat, the tide rapidly rising.

The cause of labor itself is in similarly dire straits: when organizers, after years of bullets and bombs, finally succeeded in organizing Harlan in 1938, 18.2% of all American workers were organized.114 Just over three-quarters of a century later, the national union membership rate is a mere 10.7 percent.115 The American unions that weathered bombs, bullets, and nightsticks

110

Hevener, Which Side, 150.

111

Ibid, 160.

112

Ibid.

113

Jeff Kelly Lowenstein, "Life After Coal in Harlan County, U.S.A.," In These Times, May 23, 2016

114

Gerald Mayer, Union Membership Trends in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2004), 23.

115

Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Union Membership Rate 10.7 Percent in 2016," The Economics Daily, last modified February 9, 2017, accessed March 26, 2018.

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throughout the early 20th century have proved no match for globalization and anti-labor governments.116 Today, a century after Harlan, labor once again faces existential crises at the mouth of a new millennium. Driven by the dual forces of anti-labor government edicts and a rapidly globalizing economy, fewer and fewer Americans are unionized.117 At this unique point in history, then, labor scholarship provides both a window into a radically different past and a glimpse into a theoretical future. The activism of a militant working class may be alien now, but, as the National Miners Union proved eight decades ago, radicalism has clear American precedent. A New Deal government willing to open Senate investigations and go to court in defense of labor’s rights serves as both heady contrast to contemporary anti-unionism and an enduring legacy of Progressivism. If nothing else, exploring the New Deal from a labor history perspective provides a window into a unique period in American industrial relations.

116

Bob Bryan, "The decline of US labor unions over the last 30 years," Business Insider, February 26, 2016.

117

Ibid.

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Bibliography Auerbach, Jerold S. Labor and Liberty: The La Follette Committee and the New Deal.

Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966.

A development of the author’s doctoral thesis, J. S. Auerbach’s book provides a thorough review of the La Follette Committee’s origins, tenure, and legacy. Auerbach displays the perspectives of both labor and government, creating a unique take on the La Follette Committee that examines each of the Senator’s sensational cases thoroughly and individually. In doing so, Auerbach frames the Committee as a stalwart force for civil rights.

Bryan, Bob. "The decline of US labor unions over the last 30 years." Business Insider, February 26, 2016.

The above article analyzes federally-provided data in search of trends in American union membership. An American news website with a focus on business and technology, Business Insider has published articles since February 2009. This early 2016 piece, by policy writer Bob Bryan, reviews Bureau of Labor Statistics data from 1985 to 2015 to draw conclusions about the influence unions possess over the American workforce. In this paper, Bob Bryan’s findings are used to provide statistical evidence for a claimed decrease in union prominence.

Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Union Membership Rate 10.7 Percent in 2016." The Economics Daily. Last modified February 9, 2017. Accessed March 26, 2018.

The above article provides the percentage of American workers who are part of a union.

The data was found via the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ own data collection methods. A government agency tasked with collecting data on the American workforce, the Bureau of Labor Statistics occasionally publishes its findings on a self-hosted blog named The Economics Daily. There, recently calculated statistics of note are released to the general public. This particular factoid is used to provide statistical background for a discussion of unions in modern America.

Forstall, Richard, ed. "Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990." U.S. Bureau of the Census. Last modified March 27, 1995.

This useful compilation by a U.S. Census employee splices through microfilms and negatives to provide a definitive list of the populations of each of Kentucky’s counties as reported in the Census Bureau’s decennial censuses, which are collected every ten years.

The author has assembled records from ten censuses in total (1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990). The Census Bureau, a branch of the U.S. Federal Statistical System, collects demographics data from the United States via comprehensive censuses every ten years. Forstall’s findings are used to paint a picture of Harlan’s demographical background.

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Fox, Maier B. The United Mine Workers of America, 1890-1990. Washington D.C.: United Mine Workers of America, 1990.

Complied by then-chief historian of the United Mine Workers of America (UMW), Maier B. Fox, this large volume provides a surface-level history of the UMW from an insider’s perspective, ranging from motivations behind union’s birth on January 25, 1890 to the turn of the 1990s. Though written by a union employee and published by the union itself, Fox’s tome provides remarkably even-handed—if cursory—summaries of union history, from the development of rival unions to periods of lean and strike. Fox’s book is used to provide an overview of the various crusades of the United Mine Workers and other unions within Harlan county in support of analysis efforts.

Gottlieb, Peter. "The Complicated Equation: Worker Rebellion and Unionization." Appalachian Journal 6, no. 3 (Summer 1979): 321-25. JSTOR. Published on the pages of the Appalachian Journal as a critique of an increasingly government-centric view of labor history, Gottlieb’s article calls into question the idea that a progressive federal government “rescued” Harlan county, instead urging a focus on efforts by individual workers in self-liberating. Of particular concern to Gottlieb are the studies of John Hevener, who he believes brushed aside the stories of ordinary working people, instead embracing the top-down commandeering of La Follette and the Justice Department. Gottlieb provides several arguments of his own and urges further scholarship to focus on the perspective of the working man. Peter Gottlieb himself is an American archivist with a specialty in the early 20th century. Here, Gottlieb’s text is thoroughly analyzed for ideological perspective.

Hevener, John W. Which Side Are You On?: The Harlan County Coal Miners, 1931-1939.

Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002.

John Hevener’s book is perhaps one of the most thorough reviews of Harlan’s decade of labor strife, belaboring even the most minute details pertaining to coal operators, union organizers, and everyone in between. Despite its title, the work actually covers the history of Harlan before 1931 and after 1939, beginning at the start of the twentieth century and ending in the forties, allowing the author to both provide context to a casual audience and expound on the legacy of the thirties. Throughout the book, Hevener embarks on a rather macro-level examination of Harlan politics: the experiences of individuals serve to reinforce broad themes or provide emotional impact; policy and large events, such as a series of strikes or an organizing drive, guides the narrative, not anecdote. A professor of history at the Ohio State University, Lima, Hevener’s text received strong reviews from within the academic community. For the purposes of this paper, Which Side Are You On? serves as a seminal text on Harlan’s history and baseline for discussion of various historiographical ideologies.

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Legnini, Jessica. "Radicals, Reunion, and Repatriation: Harlan County and the Constraints of History." The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 107, no. 4 (Fall 2009). JSTOR. Focusing on Harlan’s history as seen by its residents, Legnini’s article functions as both a critique of traditional historical discourse on Harlan county and an independent narrative.

The author prefaces her findings with a thorough discussion of the way Harlan miners are typically portrayed in history and culture alike: as unintelligent, violent, impulsive—to put it succinctly, as “rednecks and hicks.” Lengini notes that the majority of Harlancentric historical study emphasizes the region’s violence—yet, on a personal journey to Harlan itself, she noted that its residents and resident historians portray their past in a more positive light, focusing on community and companionship through hard times. In doing so, Legnini promotes valuable discourse for anyone who seeks to portray Harlan in an authentic lens, away from the “ivory tower” that permeates much of academia. Jessica Legnini holds a PhD in Cultural History from the University of Warwick and serves on the faculty of the George Mason University. Her commentary is analyzed as a critique to the historical tradition of other cited authors.

The Los Angeles Times. "Kentucky Terrorism Plots Linked to Mine Arsenal." May 26, 1938.

ProQuest Newspapers.

Published in the wake of the La Follette Committee, the above newspaper piece brings to light the links between mine ownership and violence in Harlan. A national paper of the record, the Los Angeles Times publishes news it deems to be of importance for its readership throughout the United States. As an urban paper, as well as one headquartered many miles away from Harlan, the Los Angeles Times speaks of the crisis in Harlan in a matter-of-fact, birds-eye manner, seeking to summarize and briefly explain the area’s labor conflict to a diverse audience perhaps not very well versed in Harlan’s ongoing conflicts. This article is used to demonstrate that, by spring 1938, public opinion had swung solidly against mine owners.

Lowenstein, Jeff Kelly. "Life After Coal in Harlan County, U.S.A." In These Times, May 23, 2016.

This is a feature piece in which the journalist attempts to frame the stories of several residents of 2016 Harlan, Kentucky. To set the tone for his piece, Jeff Kelly Lowenstein also provides some economic and historical data on Harlan itself, specifically employment statistics of various kinds. A political magazine with a markedly left-wing slant, In These Times publishes news and opinion pieces on national and international affairs that might interest their progressive readership. This article is used to create a solid background for a discussion of modern-day Harlan.

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Maney, Patrick J. Young Bob: A Biography of Robert M. La Follette, Jr. 2nd ed. Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 2003.

This complete biography of the progressive lawmaker Robert La Follette Jr. provides a thorough overview of the Wisconsin senator’s life and accomplishments, from the influence he drew from his father—Senator Robert “Fighting Bob” La Follette Sr.—to his tragic suicide in the mid-20th century. The author, Boston University history professor Patrick Maney, chooses to bestow particular focus to La Follette’s political activities, belaboring on his motivations and methods. In doing so, this book combines a compelling personal narrative with the nuts and bolts of early-20th century politics. Maney’s work is used to highlight events of importance within the La Follette Committee’s investigation into Harlan.

Mayer, Gerald. Union Membership Trends in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2004.

The above study, by economic analyst Gerald Mayer of the Domestic and Social Policy Division, reviews data on union membership rates from the year 1930 to 2004. The Congressional Research Service is the non-partisan, in-house think tank of the United States Congress. As such, it produces original research in the fields public policy, law, and economics in support of Congressional lawmaking efforts. This data is used to preface a discussion of union decline.

National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners. Harlan Miners Speak. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2008. First published 1932 by Harcourt, Brace and Company.

The above compilation, written by the journalist and novelist Theodore Dreiser, is a collection of first-person accounts on the various atrocities that occurred within Harlan.

The National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners (NCDPP) was an arm of the Communist Party of America that sought to clearly document and publish the various forms of anti-labor violence prevalent during the United Mine Workers’ foray into Harlan County in 1933. This source is used to establish the National Miners Union’s own efforts to bring attention to the atrocities they faced in Harlan.

New York Times. "Harlan Coal Men Sign Up With Union." August 28, 1938, 18. ProQuest Newspapers.

This above article, published close to the end of the UMWA’s victorious 1937-1938 organizing drive, characterizes the UMWA’s success in relatively neutral terms, merely noting the details and lead-up behind the massive shop contract to be signed between labor and company. The New York Times, being a newspaper for the urban, often portrayed Harlan unionization efforts in a less-than-sympathetic light, choosing to focus on tales of violence and unrest rather than the motivations of labor. As a large paper, smaller news pieces often went to print without a direct author citation, as was the case here. This article is used to finalize the narrative of Harlan’s 1937 organization.

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The New York Times. "Harlan Union Men Rally: Four Meetings, Protected by State Police, Press Organizing of Miners." May 3, 1937. ProQuest Newspapers.

The above article, published without a credited author, notes massive union rallies were to be held in a quickly-organizing Harlan under the watchful protection of state police, a night-and-day difference to the violence strikers faced in earlier eras, indicative of the burgeoning success of the UMW. Though no friend of the union, the New York Times, as a paper of the record, still published impartial reports on the day-to-day happenings of Harlan’s labor conflict, which by 1937 was headline news—particularly after Senator La Follette Jr.’s sensational exposés. As a piece of historical record, this article is used to establish a narrative for Harlan’s 1937 unionization.

The New York Times. "Students to survey Kentucky coal strike, 200 from eight universities leave today for Study in Harlan and Bell Counties." March 23, 1932, 3. ProQuest National Newspapers Core (1985 - current).

The above article is a piece of feature journalism examining the failure of the United Mine Workers unionization initiative and the subsequent violence that gripped Harlan; the author approaches his topic objectively and in a matter-of-fact manner. As was typical for many newspapers of the day, this article was written by newspaper staff and printed without a readily identifiable author. As a national paper of the record, the New York Times publishes news of significance from across the world. This piece of historical record demonstrates national interest in the labor strife in Harlan, even as early as the National Miners Union’s 1932 organizing drive.

Rosswurm, Steven. Review of Which Side Are You On? The Harlan County Coal Miners, 19311939, by John W. Hevener. The History Teacher 13, no. 2 (February 1980): 297-98.

JSTOR. Academics frequently publish reviews of recent books released in their area of expertise.

Here, a historian criticizes John Hevener’s Which Side Are You On? for the author’s decision to focus on big-picture level industrial relations rather than exploring the narrative experiences of average Harlanites. The above review was written by Professor Steven Rosswurm, today a professor of history with a specialization in U.S. History at Lake Forest College. Rosswurm’s review is used to draw parallels to the viewpoint of Peter Gottlieb, whose own “The Complicated Equation” raised many of the same concerns with Hevener’s work.

The Washington Post (Washington D.C.). "Harlan County: Murder and Mutilation." May 2, 1937. ProQuest Newspapers.

The above article provides a brief summary of the La Follette Committee’s findings on labor relations in Harlan county, namely the violence and terrorism that characterized the area’s labor drives. As a national paper of the record, The Washington Post publishes news it deems noteworthy enough to receive national attention. As such, its reporting is matter-of-fact, attempting to summarize and simplify large events such that they may fit on a newspaper page and be readily absorbed by a casually interested layman. This article, especially given its attention-grabbing, nearly sensationalized title, demonstrates how, thanks to the La Follette Committee, Harlan’s plight captured the hearts and minds of Americans nationwide.

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Zinn, Howard. A People's History of the United States. 2003. Reprint, New York: HarperCollins, 1980.

Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States is perhaps one of the most storied books of American history, known for its leftist slant and attempt to portray the past from the eyes of everyday people through narrative. One of Zinn’s many sections revolve around the New Deal, an event that Zinn takes a dim view of. Within, he criticizes the New Deal as corrupted by business and ultimately unable to truly liberate the American worker. As an unabashed leftist, Zinn imbues his narrative with clear evidence of his political slant, from the selection of events he chooses to portray in A People’s History to the politicizing commentary he intersperses the work with. In this paper, Zinn’s narrativedriven, leftist view of history is compared to that of Peter Gottlieb. Similarities are also drawn between the disdain both scholars held for the New Deal.

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