The Philosophical Groundings of Equality

Joshua Yen, Year 12, Shaftsbury

One of mankind’s greatest developments in the past century has been the growing awareness of human rights and equality of treatment. Regardless of one’s background, people from all around the world have been rallying under one flag — the flag of equality.

While emotions and respect may point to the need for equality, as a philosopher, I am also worried about its groundings. Just that a lot of people believe in x doesn’t make x right! If belief in equality is unjustified, how can we possibly live an intellectually satisfied life, knowing full well that our key belief is unwarranted?

Hence, I have decided to set off on this journey to provide you with an insightful article to delve deeper into the possible groundings for equality, to provide you with an intellectually cogent and satisfying worldview upon which you can ground and develop your belief in equality. I would like to make it clear that I am turning towards the metaethical groundings of equality of treatment, not the practical reasons for the equality of treatment.

Before I put forth my argument, I would like to define what exactly do I mean when I am referring to “equality” or “equality of treatment”. Equality of treatment, as the name suggests, is the idea that we should treat everyone equally and with respect. This does not mean that we cannot disagree with others, only that we should not impose our beliefs on those who hold different beliefs or oppress those who are different from us.

Furthermore, I would like to make a distinction between the roles of equality of treatment, equality of outcome and equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is the idea that everyone should be given the same opportunities regardless of their backgrounds. From this definition, we can see that it is a subcategory within the category of equality of treatment (which is not restricted to solely equality of opportunity). Equality of outcome, on the other hand, is not included within the equality of treatment and is independent of the equality of opportunity. This is the idea that all people regardless of their background and work ethic/contribution should be given the equal outcome, in most situations wages or benefits. I believe that this is a mistaken view and it is clear that such a system would end in disaster1 .

Now that I have discussed what exactly I will be attempting to ground and defend in this article, I will lay out my argument:

Premise 1: Either “Equality of treatment is grounded if and only if intrinsic value of human life is grounded” or “equality of treatment is grounded if and only if extrinsic value of human life is grounded” Premise 2:¬ 2 “equality of treatment is grounded if and only if extrinsic value of human life is grounded” Therefore, Conclusion 1: Equality of treatment is grounded if and only if intrinsic value of human life is grounded

Premise 3: Groundings of intrinsic value are either atheistic or theistic or both fail Premise 4: Atheistic groundings of intrinsic value fail Premise 5: Theistic groundings of intrinsic value succeed (therefore, they don’t both fail) Therefore, Conclusion 2: Theism is the only grounds for the intrinsic value of human life

Premise 6: Equality of treatment is grounded if and only if intrinsic value of human life is grounded (see C1) Premise 7: Intrinsic value of human life is grounded in theism (see C2) Therefore, Conclusion 3: Theism (x) grounds the equality of treatment.

Since the three stages of this argument are deductive, if the premises are true then the conclusion must follow from them.

Therefore, in this article, I will defend each premise one by one to show why theism is the sole grounding for the equality of treatment.

P1: “Equality of treatment is grounded if and only if intrinsic value of human life is grounded” or “equality of treatment is grounded if and only if extrinsic value of human life is grounded”

The sole reason why our propositions “equality of treatment is metaphysically grounded if and only if intrinsic value of human life is grounded” or “equality of treatment is metaphysically grounded if and only if extrinsic value of human life is grounded” are possible is due to the fact that equality of treatment has to presuppose a certain value in human life. Due to this dependency, the proposition can be written as a biconditional and is logically sound.

When we turn to the content of this premise, it too appears non-controversial. Properties can be classified into either intrinsic or extrinsic. This is the idea that the property is contained within the subject (intrinsic) or is attributed to or externally attached to the subject (extrinsic). This is the same for the value of human life, it can be either an intrinsic property or an extrinsic property.

A possible rejection at this point could be the suggestion that the grounding of equality does not lie within the value of human life, but with the utility of equality of treatment. This objection would most likely come from a consequentialist or instrumentalist standpoint (I will refer to them as consequentialist from now on), this is the idea that equality of opportunity is a beneficial trait and should be supported, a good example of this would be economic benefits.

While this argument definitely has its merits, it is subject to three insuperable rebuttals: 1. The consequentialist standpoint does not successfully ground equality of treatment; it just pushes the explanatory requirement one step further. Even if we do show that equality of treatment can be explained by “beneficial” consequences, we can then ask why those consequences are “beneficial”. Let us take economic development as an example– even if one could show that equality of treatment leads to economic development, one is justified to ask why economic development is good. The answer to this, in most situations, will be “because it is beneficial to the development of humankind”. The loop returns back to the importance of humankind. If human life has no value, intrinsic or extrinsic, then why should we seek the development of the economy?

2. The consequentialist reasoning treats humans as means to obtain a certain end.

This is a common and effective rebuttal of consequentialist moral reasoning. By looking at the consequence, economic development for example, anything done in order to achieve that goal becomes a means to achieve a particular end. This devalues human dignity and can be used against the notion of equality of treatment. While a consequentialist can salvage the situation by suggesting that human dignity should be the end, it fails as a meta-ethical grounding. This preference is arbitrary and there is nothing, on consequentialism, which dictates that someone must value human dignity as an ultimate end.

3. This is realised through a good analogy-the city of Omelas presented by Ursula Le Guin. In this story, we are presented with a perfect city. However, there is one caveat, the perfection of this city is dependent on the torture of one young and innocent boy. Now let us make this scale a bit bigger: what if the perfection of the world was achievable, with the caveat that we must enslave and torture one race of people. In response to this, the consequentialist can raise the suggestion that slavery or the imprisonment of one may be inefficient. That may be true, the proponent of this argument can accept this. As seen previously, efficiency is not the sole indicator of moral obligation on consequentialism, other factors or ends can come into play. The Nazis thought the furtherance of the Aryan race was one of these ends. On consequentialism, there is nothing objectively “wrong” about this goal; one can only raise another end to compete with it, at the end of the day it is arbitrary.

From these three rebuttals, we can safely conclude that consequentialism fails to provide a suitable solution to the equality of treatment. Therefore, it follows that the first premise of my argument stands.

P2: ¬ “equality of treatment is grounded if and only if extrinsic value of human life is grounded”

Since this is a disjunctive syllogism, by showing that one of the two categories are wrong, we can see that the other disjunct is correct3. In this case, I would aim to show why the second disjunct doesn’t work. I would do so from the perspective that equality of treatment is not dependent on extrinsic value.

1. All humans are biologically different from one another. While there are substantially more similarities than differences between individuals, there are small differences in the DNA which separate every human being. Due to these differences in DNA, it is inexplicable why we should treat each other equally. Our current understanding of evolution makes it clear that natural selection occurs on a genetic level and the organisms with the best genetic traits are those which survive. 36 I

For the improvement of the species, it is beneficial that those who thrive are able to pass on their genes to the next generation. Unless, there is something intrinsically valuable in human life, it is inexplicable why we should hinder this important biological process.

2. Extrinsic value of human life allows for change. Since extrinsic value is a factor which is attached to human life and is not found within human life, it follows that it can be changed depending on social norms. For example, let us take into account a counterfactual, if the Nazis won the war and had control over the world, they may choose another value to attach to human life, perhaps the furtherance of the Aryan race. From this reductio 4, we can see that on extrinsic value, the value and meaning of life is very much malleable, making it impossible to sustain a case for the equality of opportunity.

3. Extrinsic value of human life is subjective. This third objection follows a similar path as the previous one about change. Since extrinsic value of human life is dependent on an extrinsic value synthesised or determined by humans, it is very much subjective, making this an issue of “I think”, not “it is” or “it ought”5. From this subjectivity, it makes us powerless to enforce the equality of treatment on anyone who disagrees. If we went back to the past and approached the slave owners and criticised their behaviour of abusing African Americans, on subjective moral standards, all they need to say is “I don’t think”, and one’s persuasion is thoroughly refuted.

From these three powerful objections to the extrinsic value of human life and its ability to support the equality of treatment, we can conclude that this extrinsic value of grounding fails, leading us logically to the conclusion.

Therefore, C1: Equality of treatment is grounded if and only if intrinsic value of human life is grounded

This is the logical conclusion of the disjunctive syllogism found in the first two premises, therefore, in order to deny this conclusion, one must defeat either one of the first two premises.

P3: Groundings of intrinsic value are either atheistic or theistic or both fail

Once again this premise of the argument should be relatively uncontroversial. Explanations either reference or depend on the existence of a God (theistic) or do not have reference or dependence on the existence of a God (atheistic)6. The third disjunct “or both fail” is also uncontroversial as it is logically possible that both atheistic and theistic explanations are insufficient and hence there is no grounding for equality of treatment.

P4: Atheistic groundings of intrinsic value fail

The reason why atheistic groundings of intrinsic value fail can be explained from two perspectives. One can approach it from the subjective/ objective moral difference or one can approach it via its failure to provide intrinsic meaning in life. These perspectives are both sufficient in providing strong reasons for the failure of atheistic explanations.

When approaching the subjective/ objective moral difference, the weaknesses of an atheistic moral worldview soon become apparent. As we have seen in the discussion of P2, subjective moral reasoning would fail to ground the intrinsic value of human life. Since the term subjective implies that it is down to one’s interpretation and opinion, discussions about the value of human life can only be on an extrinsic basis, not an intrinsic one.

Therefore, we must turn towards the atheistic attempts at postulating an objective moral standard which can successfully ground the intrinsic value of human life. While this view has been mostly in the minority, it has grown in popularity with the rise of New Atheist writer Sam Harris in his book The Moral Landscape, where he suggests a hedonistic approach to objective morality. The idea that what is objectively good is to do that which maximizes human pleasure.

While this sounds correct at face value, you will soon realise that there are actually a lot of problems with Harris’ argument. The arguments raised in objection to consequentialism can once again be raised here. While it is true that if human pleasure is objectively desirable, then benefiting it would be objectively good, we can just ask why human pleasure is objectively desirable. Therefore, we see that his moral outlook presupposes the intrinsic value of human life instead of grounding it. Furthermore, even if atheistic explanations worked, there would be no way of making any moral decision based upon a knowledge of intrinsic value. This is best presented by David Hume in his book A Treatise of Human Nature, where he describes the is-ought fallacy. Even if someone proved that intrinsic value of human life exists, he cannot then say, we ought to act upon this intrinsic value. While the former implies a fact, the latter implies moral value, something which is not found within a naturalistic world of matter and motion, rightfully named “the mystical” and “transcendental” by Wittgenstein. This notion would be developed in the second half of this argument where I would be developing the meaningless of the atheistic universe.

With the clear failure of atheistic moral groundings of the equality of treatment, I would now make a case against the intrinsic value of human life on atheism. In order to do so, I would be referencing major existentialist/ nihilist philosophers, Nietzsche, Kierkegard, Dostoyevsky7 , showing how their work points towards the ultimate meaningless and futility of life under an atheistic worldview.

Let us first turn to Nietzsche, one of the main philosophers associated with nihilism. Nihilism comes in many forms, but in this article, I would be discussing existential nihilism, the belief that life has no meaning.

This is embodied in Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God. In his book The Gay Science, he famously remarks:

God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? 8 9

This extract is constantly misrepresented by atheists who postulate that Nietzsche was using this as a celebration of the end of religion. However, this could not be further from the truth. He knew the implications of the fall of religion. He was afraid that along with the metaphorical death of God, the will to live and the will to meaning would crumble into ashes, an age of nihilism emerging in His place.

3 P1: p or q P2: ¬p C1: q 4 Reductio ad absurdum: by showing that something is absurd, we can postulate that the suggestion is wrong. (the earth cannot be flat; otherwise people would fall off the edges) 5 Here lies the important “is/ought” distinction raised by Hume. While I would be discussing this issue in later premises (P4), this distinction/ fallacy is insignificant here, the illustration is to show the problem of subjective morals instead of how we are to approach objective morals. 6 While there is significant debate as two what these two terms actually mean, I will define these two terms as described in the article 7 I believe that these three philosophers best present the case against atheistic intrinsic value, later on in the article, I would compare their ideas to Sartre and Camus, two other philosophers who searched for meaning in a godless universe. 8 This idea of becoming gods is further emphasised by Dostoyevsky in the character of Kirilov who commits suicide to become god (an idea which is expounded on by Camus in The Myth of Sisiyphus) 9 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882, 1887) para. 125; Walter Kaufmann ed. (New York: Vintage, 1974), pp.181-82.]

While some can object and say that this is only applicable to the theist, the atheist is also subject to this lack of meaning. This idea is emphasised in the idea of “[becoming] gods simply to appear worthy of it”. In order to replace the void created by the death of God, Nietzsche suggests that we should, ourselves, become a metaphorical god, the ultimate arbiter of all meaning.

If Nietzsche is right, do we really need God in order to support the intrinsic value of human beings?

To answer this, we must turn to the father of existentialism, Kierkegaard. Growing up surrounded by death, Kierkegraad recognised the stark futility of life. He saw “angst” as the thorn in the side for pleasure and contentment. To him, the lack of knowledge regarding the future, the fear of death, and other vices all increased the suffering and the intolerable nature of life.

This inescapable suffering led him to only one conclusion — Christianity. Not institutionalised Christianity, but the basic principles of Christianity, the self-sacrificial nature of the atonement, love for one’s neighbors, the dominating theme of forgiveness. He suggested that a “leap of faith”10 was necessary for one to escape the meaninglessness of life.

Yet is this really necessary? Is God really needed for the meaning of life or was Kierkegaard too pessimistic about the atheistic explanations?

This leads us to Dostoyevsky, one of the most profound Russian writers of the nineteenth century. Throughout his works, Dostoyevsky wrestles with issues of nihilism and irrationality.

This is perhaps best presented, as Camus notes, by the character Kirilov in Dostoyevsky’s book ‘Demons’. He understands that God is necessary for meaning; however, he simultaneously knows, with confidence, that God does not exist and cannot exist.

Consequence?

He kills himself.

He kills himself to become god, the god of himself 11 . This is the ultimate irony of atheistic groundings for the intrinsic value of life. No matter how far we try to run from God, no matter how hard we try to search for meaning in a world without a creator, Dostoyevsky makes it clear: A god must exist. If it doesn’t exist in reality, then one must kill oneself to become it.

Now that we have toured these three masters of philosophy, we arrive at the sole conclusion that life at its core, without God, has no intrinsic value and meaning.

In response to this, one may turn to the works of Camus (absurdist) and Sartre (existentialist/ humanist)12, two philosophers who tried to find the meaning of life.

The absurdist, like Camus, would agree that on atheism, there is no intrinsic meaning in life. In fact, he would rejoice in the face of the absurd. To Camus, it is the embracement of the absurd which appreciates the joy in life. While it is ironic, the absurd becomes the meaning of life.

The existentialist, on the other hand, may disagree. While an existentialist would agree that life doesn’t have any innate intrinsic meaning, they may suggest that the intrinsic meaning lies within the free will of man that allows him to choose his meaning.

Unfortunately, I disagree with the existentialist and the absurdist alike. The absurdist fails to ground any intrinsic value to life and the existentialist struggles with finding meaning out of non-meaning. After all, if you start off with a meaningless universe, it is hard to picture how any meaning could come from it.

Hence, we can conclude that the atheistic approach fails to warrant a belief in the intrinsic value of human life.

P5: Theistic groundings of intrinsic value succeed (therefore, they don’t both fail)

Now that we have established the first disjunct of the syllogism fails, we must look at the second disjunct. This is the suggestion that theistic groundings of intrinsic value succeed. If it does, the third disjunct (they both fail) would be false and we can conclude that theism is the only solution to this premise.

When we take into account the Judeo-Christian narrative, we immediately find ourselves with a sufficient grounding for the intrinsic value of human life. Regardless of the historical veracity of the first few chapters of Genesis, a different debate which I loath to enter, we learn that mankind is made in the image of God.

From this simple yet profound proclamation, it follows that human life has intrinsic value and purpose. The fact that God Himself stepped down to earth in the personification of Jesus Christ of Nazareth and gave His life for all of humanity further emphasises this point.

Hence, where atheism fails, theism succeeds, not only in providing us with what the intrinsic value of human life is- that we are all made in the image of God- but also provides us with a sufficient grounding for the existence of this intrinsic value. With this in mind, we can conclude that theism provides a strong philosophical grounding and justification for belief in equality.

Therefore, C2: Theism is the only grounds for the intrinsic value of human life

Due to theism’s success in grounding the intrinsic value of human life, we can see that the third disjunct of the disjunctive syllogism is wrong. Therefore, it follows logically that theism grounds the intrinsic value of human life.

P6: Equality of treatment is grounded if and only if intrinsic value of human life is grounded (see C1)

This premise is a biconditional which postulates that equality of treatment is grounded if intrinsic value is grounded and intrinsic value is grounded if equality of treatment is grounded. Due to its biconditional nature, this would suggest that if we could successfully ground one of these conditions, the other would be grounded as well, therefore, if x grounds one of them, x would provide sufficient grounds for the other one.

P7: Intrinsic value of human life is grounded in theism (see C2)

This premise is remarkably non-controversial, on the assumption that C2 of my argument stands, this premise is true as well. Since theism is the sole grounding for the intrinsic value of human life, we can conclude that theism is required to justify the equality of

10 He wasn’t too persuaded by the academic literature which pointed towards the existence of a God. However, if you are interested in such arguments, feel free to turn to William Lane Craig, Richard Swinburne or Alvin Plantinga, philosophers of religion who make a good case for the existence of God. 11 This is what Nietzsche meant when he said “Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?” 12 Existentialism and absurdism are very similar beliefs, however the small difference is that the absurdist rejoices in the absurd and the existentialist is meant to find meaning from the meaningless

treatment. In order to refute this premise, one must refute P3, P4, or P5 of the argument to show that C2 of the argument is false.

At this point, the critic may suggest that theistic solutions are also subject to David Hume’s “is-ought” distinction. Even if theism successfully supports the claim that there is an intrinsic value of human life and that there is an equality of opportunity, there is no moral obligation for us to act upon it. This view is further presented by Dr. Wielenberg, a philosopher at DePauw University, who postulates that even if God commands or explains x there is no reason for x to be good.

While this argument is certainly very strong, I feel that there are two ways a theist can refute it.

Firstly, one can turn to the concept of an explanatory ultimate (or properly basic beliefs); this is a concept in philosophy where you can only get to a certain point before you are unable to explain such a phenomenon even further; therefore, the explanation you have at hand is the best possible explanation. Examples of this could be belief in other minds13, the belief in the past14, belief that the world is logical15. These categories cannot be “proven”, yet are accepted by all but the most extreme skeptics and solipsists. In the same way, we too can say that belief in God, as a grounding for morality16, is a properly basic belief/ the explanatory ultimate which explains our experience of the world around us, in this case our experience of moral knowledge (equality of treatment).17

Secondly, God being good can be approached as an analytic proposition. The question “is God good?” is meaningless. If “God is (as an a priori truth/ tautology) good”, this means that it is impossible for God to be not good. Being God necessarily entails being good and not evil. If a being was evil, then he wouldn’t be God. Since God is good and is the greatest conceivable being, His commandments are morally and analytically perfect. Unlike the arbitrary nature of secular moral theories, under this concept of God, morals have objective roots stemming from the immutable nature of an analytically perfect being. Therefore, they provide not only moral fact, but also moral obligation.

In response to this, a critic can raise the hypothesis that God could “technically” command genocide (or any other morally objectable action). Unfortunately, this is where the flaws of an atheistic worldview are exposed. While it is undeniable for a proponent of divine command that “if God commanded (insert morally objectionable action), we would be morally obliged to do so and that action will be good”, it doesn’t follow that God will command such an action. Since the theist normally adheres to the principle that God is intrinsically immutable18 and God has already laid out commands19 against morally questionable actions, it only follows that He would not change these commands.

Furthermore, God is the sole standard of good and all forms of non-theistic explanations of morality fail (as demonstrated above). The only reason that we can say that any act is objectively wrong is due to a sense of the divine. Hence, it would be demonstrably fallacious to hold a moral charge against God when God is the sole grounding of such objective moral values.20

Therefore, we can see that these two rebuttals successfully refute the “is-ought” dilemma from which it follows that P7 of the argument is well defended.

C3: Theism (x) grounds the equality of treatment.

Since both P6 and P7 of this argument stands, C3 logically follows. Therefore, we reach the conclusion that theism is the sole grounding for the equality of treatment.

In order to believe in the equality of treatment, one must also believe in a theistic explanation. In order to refute this deductive argument, one must find a fault in the previous premises of my argument, otherwise, due to its deductive nature, these three conclusions must follow from their premises.

To conclude:

I would like to make it very clear that this is not an argument for the existence of God nor is this an argument against atheism. It is an argument for the grounding of the equality of treatment that is logically coherent and satisfying.

From this deductive argument, we can reach two profound insights into the groundings of equality:

1. On atheism, intrinsic value for human life cannot be grounded. Since belief in equality requires the intrinsic value of human life, it only follows that if God does not exist, belief in equality is unjustified.

2. On theism, intrinsic value of human life can be grounded. Since belief in equality requires the intrinsic value of human life, it only follows that if God does exist, belief in equality is justified.

In other words, theism is required for belief in the equality of treatment. A simple application of this logic would be the society we see around us today. While some argue black lives matter and others claim all lives matter, logically, if this argument stands, the atheist is making a more extreme claim: No lives matter! This is a very controversial conclusion and is bound to be a thorn in the side for many activists, so if you disagree with anything in the article, feel free to let me know and I will be happy to discuss or debate these issues with you.

However, if this argument stands, it logically follows that everytime you say no to discrimination or proclaim “Black Lives Matter!” you are implicitly asserting the existence of God.

13 It is possible that you are a brain in a vat and everything around you are merely illusions 14 You can’t necessarily disprove or prove whether the world was created five minutes ago with the image of it being millions of years old. 15 You can’t argue that the world is illogical without presupposing that the world is logical 16 Via a theistic grounding of morality like Divine Command Theory 17 This belief is commonly referred to as Reformed Epistemology, a theory of knowledge developed predominantly by Alvin Plantiga, however its historical traces can go all the way back to the Greeks. 18 This is the idea that God remains unchanged throughout time, the use of “intrinsically” just sheds clarity to the fact that God can change extrinsically in relationship to the world. His own nature, on the other hand, does not change. 19 While not important for this discussion, it is good to differentiate between practical laws and moral laws that are set out in the Old Testament. Don’t eat pork would be an example of a practical law whereas do not murder is quite clearly a moral law. 20 This can be demonstrated by a simple syllogism: P1: Objective moral values exist if and only if God exists P2: Moral objections are dependent on objective moral values. P3: One arguing from moral objections against God (P2) would affirm the existence of God (P1) C1: Since any moral argument depends on the existence of God, one cannot use the moral argument to argue against God without proving the existence of God in the process.

Alexandra Joseph Hui, Year 9, Gellhorn

Civil rights, by law, are defined as an expansive and significant set of rights designed to protect individuals from unfair treatment. They guarantee equal protection under the law and are an essential part of democracy. One of the civil rights outlined is the right to a fair trial. This story looks at a case in which a single man defied civil rights laws and changed how the world of law viewed protection, self-defence, and gun ownership. However, this story is unique- the victims of civil injustice are the criminals, and the city’s hero is a lawbreaker.

Bernhard Goetz was a white man who defied legal principle and managed to get away with charges of four counts of attempted murder, four of assault, four of reckless endangerment, and one of criminal possession of a weapon, because the jury refused to charge him. He is a man both regarded as a hero and villain by history. Having inspired creative works such as two episodes of ‘Law and Order’, Billy Joel’s ‘We didn’t start the Fire’, the 1993 film ‘Falling Down’, and most prominently, the popular film ‘Joker’ amongst many others, he is deeply embedded into pop culture and his name alone can spark passionate debates in across the U.S.

In the early afternoon of Saturday, December 22, 1984, in New York City, four black teenagers: Barry Allen, Troy Canty, and Darrell Cabey, all 19; and James Ramseur, 18—boarded a downtown train. The teens, each of whom previously had been arrested and convicted at least once, stated they were on their way to an arcade in Manhattan. At the 14th Street station, Goetz entered the car through the rearmost door, crossed the aisle and took a seat on the long bench across from the door. Canty was across the aisle from him, lying on the long bench just to the right of the door. Allen was seated to Canty’s left, on the short seat on the other side of the door. Ramseur and Cabey were seated across from the door and to Goetz’s right. According to Goetz’s statement to the police, approximately ten seconds later, Canty asked him, “How are you doing?” to which Goetz responded, “Fine.” The four youths then allegedly gave signals to each other, and shortly after Canty and Allen rose from their seats and moved over to the left of Goetz, blocking him off from the other passengers in the car. Canty then said, “Give me five dollars”.

Goetz responded by standing up, pulling out his handgun, and firing four shots in rapid succession. When asked what his intentions were when he drew his revolver, he said, “My intention was to murder them, to hurt them, to make them suffer as much as possible.”. Although there is debate about who was shot in which order, it was ruled that the first shot hit Canty in the chest; the second struck Allen in the back; the third went through Ramseur’s arm and into his left side; the fourth was fired at Cabey, who was then standing in the corner of the car, but missed, deflecting instead off a wall of the conductor’s cab. After Goetz briefly surveyed the train scene around him, he fired another shot at Cabey, who was sitting on the end bench of the car. The bullet entered the rear of Cabey’s side and severed his spinal cord. From then on, Cabey was paralyzed from the waist down. There was dispute as to whether Goetz said to Cabey “You don’t look so bad, here’s another ‘’ before firing the final devastating shot. “If I had more bullets, I would have shot ‘em all again and again.” Goetz said in a police tape. “My problem was I ran out of bullets.” He added, “I was gonna, I was gonna gouge one of the guys’ eyes out with my keys afterwards”.

Goetz then fled the city before finally returning and surrendering himself to the police, saying “I’m the man you’re looking for in New York”.

He exercised his right to have an attorney present, and shortly afterwards attended trial alongside his two lawyers. At the criminal trial, Goetz’s defence attorneys, Barry Slotnick and Mark M. Baker, argued that the extreme statements made by Goetz were the product of emotion and an overactive imagination. Finally, the jury refused to indict Goetz on the more serious charges, voting indictments only for unlawful gun possession – in the 3rd degree, for carrying in public the loaded unlicensed gun used in the subway shooting, and two counts of possession in the 4th degree, for keeping two other unlicensed handguns in his home. Goetz only ended up serving 8 months of jail time.

“The Subway Vigilante,” as Goetz was labelled by NYC media, was front-page news for months. Afterwards, Goetz embraced celebrity status. He appeared in small films, pushed for the legalisation of marijuana, made a run for mayor’s office, and even opened a store called ‘Vigilante Electronics’. Public opinion was divided into three camps: those who believed Goetz’s version of the incident, that he was aggressively surrounded by four teenagers and feared he was about to be beaten and robbed; those who believed the version told by the four teenagers, that they were merely panhandling to get some money to play video games; and the others who believed that The prior criminal convictions of three of the four teenagers prevented them from gaining sympathy from many people. A special hotline set up by police to seek information about the case was swamped by calls supporting the shooter and calling him a hero, for standing up to his attackers and defending himself in an environment where the police were increasingly viewed as ineffective in combating crime.

Though majority of the public in New York City voiced their support for Goetz, many questions were raised about the fairness of the jury and the legal system. Organized demonstrators accused Goetz of genocide. The question was raised: Was it right that someone who had said his intention was to murder the teenagers had been acquitted of attempted murder?

Some people saw the incident as racial, and the jury verdict as a blow to race relations. Benjamin Hooks, director of the NAACP (The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People- a civil rights organisation), said, “The jury verdict was inexcusable. ... It was proven – according to his own statements – that Goetz did the shooting and went far beyond the realm of self-defence. There was no provocation for what he did.”. Another representative agreed, saying, “I think that if a black had shot four whites, the cry for the death penalty would have been almost automatic.”. Furthermore, Goetz used derogatory racial language about criminal activity on 14th Street, saying, “The only way we’re going to clean up this street is to get rid of the spics and n*ggers”. This became clear evidence for racial motivation behind the shooting, and black political and religious leaders twice called for Federal civil rights investigations, but were ultimately dismissed. It was determined that the shooting had come solely from a place of fear although Goetz later admitted that his fear was enhanced because the alleged muggers were black.

A month after the shooting, Darrell Cabey filed a civil suit against Goetz, with race as the dominant theme, and the jurors (mostly nonwhite) awarded him $43 million- $18 million for pain and suffering and $25 million for punitive damages. However, Goetz subsequently filed for bankruptcy, claiming that legal expenses had made him penniless, and when later asked about whether he compensated Cabey in 2004, said “ I don’t think I’ve paid a penny on that”. Cabey wasn’t the only one whose life was greatly affected by the shooting- On December 22nd, 2011, exactly 27 years after the subway incident happened, James Ramseur committed suicide. Did Goetz’s actions ruin his life?

What Goetz did goes far beyond what is considered legal self-defense. He paralysed a man, yet he was not convicted of assault. He said he was trying to kill four teenagers, yet he was not convicted of attempted murder. What he did was inexcusable according to current law, but in the 1980’s, an overwhelming majority praised him for being the hero that combated New York crime. So was Bernhard Goetz really a hero? Was he in the wrong, or was he acting quickly under an adrenaline rush? Were the teenagers the wrongdoers, or did they fall victim to unnecessary violence? Were their civil rights infringed for not getting a fair trial and facing discrimination for their race? Did the jurors who refused to convict Bernhard Goetz play a major role in a huge step back for the civil rights movement?