The Philosophical Groundings of Equality Joshua Yen, Year 12, Shaftsbury One of mankind’s greatest developments in the past century has been the growing awareness of human rights and equality of treatment. Regardless of one’s background, people from all around the world have been rallying under one flag — the flag of equality. While emotions and respect may point to the need for equality, as a philosopher, I am also worried about its groundings. Just that a lot of people believe in x doesn’t make x right! If belief in equality is unjustified, how can we possibly live an intellectually satisfied life, knowing full well that our key belief is unwarranted? Hence, I have decided to set off on this journey to provide you with an insightful article to delve deeper into the possible groundings for equality, to provide you with an intellectually cogent and satisfying worldview upon which you can ground and develop your belief in equality. I would like to make it clear that I am turning towards the metaethical groundings of equality of treatment, not the practical reasons for the equality of treatment. Before I put forth my argument, I would like to define what exactly do I mean when I am referring to “equality” or “equality of treatment”. Equality of treatment, as the name suggests, is the idea that we should treat everyone equally and with respect. This does not mean that we cannot disagree with others, only that we should not impose our beliefs on those who hold different beliefs or oppress those who are different from us. Furthermore, I would like to make a distinction between the roles of equality of treatment, equality of outcome and equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is the idea that everyone should be given the same opportunities regardless of their backgrounds. From this definition, we can see that it is a subcategory within the category of equality of treatment (which is not restricted to solely equality of opportunity). Equality of outcome, on the other hand, is not included within the equality of treatment and is independent of the equality of opportunity. This is the idea that all people regardless of their background and work ethic/contribution should be given the equal outcome, in most situations wages 1 2
or benefits. I believe that this is a mistaken view and it is clear that such a system would end in disaster . 1
Now that I have discussed what exactly I will be attempting to ground and defend in this article, I will lay out my argument: Premise 1: Either “Equality of treatment is grounded if and only if intrinsic value of human life is grounded” or “equality of treatment is grounded if and only if extrinsic value of human life is grounded” Premise 2:¬ “equality of treatment is grounded if and only if extrinsic value of human life is grounded” Therefore, Conclusion 1: Equality of treatment is grounded if and only if intrinsic value of human life is grounded 2
Premise 3: Groundings of intrinsic value are either atheistic or theistic or both fail Premise 4: Atheistic groundings of intrinsic value fail Premise 5: Theistic groundings of intrinsic value succeed (therefore, they don’t both fail) Therefore, Conclusion 2: Theism is the only grounds for the intrinsic value of human life Premise 6: Equality of treatment is grounded if and only if intrinsic value of human life is grounded (see C1) Premise 7: Intrinsic value of human life is grounded in theism (see C2) Therefore, Conclusion 3: Theism (x) grounds the equality of treatment. Since the three stages of this argument are deductive, if the premises are true then the conclusion must follow from them. Therefore, in this article, I will defend each premise one by one to show why theism is the sole grounding for the equality of treatment. P1: “Equality of treatment is grounded if and only if intrinsic value of human life is grounded” or “equality of treatment is grounded if and only if extrinsic value of human life is grounded” The sole reason why our propositions “equality of treatment is metaphysically grounded if and
only if intrinsic value of human life is grounded” or “equality of treatment is metaphysically grounded if and only if extrinsic value of human life is grounded” are possible is due to the fact that equality of treatment has to presuppose a certain value in human life. Due to this dependency, the proposition can be written as a biconditional and is logically sound. When we turn to the content of this premise, it too appears non-controversial. Properties can be classified into either intrinsic or extrinsic. This is the idea that the property is contained within the subject (intrinsic) or is attributed to or externally attached to the subject (extrinsic). This is the same for the value of human life, it can be either an intrinsic property or an extrinsic property. A possible rejection at this point could be the suggestion that the grounding of equality does not lie within the value of human life, but with the utility of equality of treatment. This objection would most likely come from a consequentialist or instrumentalist standpoint (I will refer to them as consequentialist from now on), this is the idea that equality of opportunity is a beneficial trait and should be supported, a good example of this would be economic benefits. While this argument definitely has its merits, it is subject to three insuperable rebuttals: 1. The consequentialist standpoint does not successfully ground equality of treatment; it just pushes the explanatory requirement one step further. Even if we do show that equality of treatment can be explained by “beneficial” consequences, we can then ask why those consequences are “beneficial”. Let us take economic development as an example– even if one could show that equality of treatment leads to economic development, one is justified to ask why economic development is good. The answer to this, in most situations, will be “because it is beneficial to the development of humankind”. The loop returns back to the importance of humankind. If human life has no value, intrinsic or extrinsic, then why should we seek the development of the economy? 2. The consequentialist reasoning treats humans as means to obtain a certain end.
It is inexplicable why the man who works hard to feed his family should be paid the same as the man who plays mobile apps during work time. This the negation sign which means (not-) and is followed by a proposition The Philosophical Groundings of Equality
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