[Re]Territorializing Infrastructures: Enfilades through Landscapes of War at Stützpunkt Vigsö by Heather L LaHood

(RE)TERRITORIALIZING INFRASTRUCTURES Enﬁlades through Landscapes of War at Stützpunkt Vigsö Heather Lynne LaHood

(RE)TERRITORIALIZING INFRASTRUCTURES (RE)TERRITORIALIZING INFRASTRUCTURES Enfiladesthrough throughLandscapes LandscapesofofWar War at at Stützpunkt Enfilades StützpunktVigsö Vigsö

Heather Lynne LaHood

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Architecture University of Washington 2011

Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Department of Architecture

University of Washington Graduate School

This is to certify that I have examined this copy of a masterâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s thesis by

Heather Lynne LaHood

and have found that it is complete and satisfactory in all respects, and that any and all revisions required by the final examining committee have been made.

Committee Members:

_____________________________________________________ Rob Corser

_____________________________________________________ Thaisa Way

Date:__________________________

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a master’s degree at the University of Washington, I agree that the Library shall make its copies freely available for inspection. I further agree that extensive copying of this thesis is allowable only for scholarly purposes, consistent with “fair use” as prescribed in the U.S. Copyright Law. Any other reproduction for any purposes or by any means shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Signature_________________________________________

Date:_____________________________

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ii......................................................................................................List of Figures iv........................................................................................................List of Plates v...............................................................Glossary of Danish and German Terms CHAPTER ONE Introduction: 2.........................................................................................Crumbling Permanence CHAPTER TWO Literature Review: 11.................................................................................................I. Fortify/Destroy 22..................................................................................II. Inside the Third Reich 27.........................................................................................III. Bunker Archeology CHAPTER THREE Macro/Micro Site History & Related Methodologies: 33.................................................................................................Nature 37..............................................................................................Culture/War CHAPTER FOUR Theoretical Underpinning: 46..........................................................................................Landscape as Archive CHAPTER FIVE Reconnaissance: 66........................................................................................................Wanderlust 83...................................................................................................Bunker Registry 90..................................................................................Cartographic Morphology CHAPTER SIX Design Proposal: 94.....................................................................(Re)Territorializing Infrastructures CHAPTER SEVEN 120.....................................................................................................Conclusion 124.....................................................................................BIBLIOGRAPHY

LIST OF FIGURES PAGE figure 1.1: Stützpunkt Vigsö, approach from the west.........................................2 figure 1.2: Along the Atlantic Wall in France, 1...................................................5 figure 1.3: Along the Atlantic Wall in France, 2...................................................5 figure 1.4: Along the Atlantic Wall in France, 3...................................................5 figure 1.5: Along the Atlantic Wall in France, 4...................................................5 figure 1.6: Atlantic Wall macro-micro site collage...............................................6 figure 1.7: Failure sequence of the retaining wall at Stützpunkt Vigsö.................9 figure 1.8: Erosion from 1954-2005......................................................................9 figure 2.1: Original drawing for Regelbau #667..................................................10 figure 2.2: Gates with left-hand approaches exposing right flank of the intruder....14 figure 2.3: Enfilade tactics....................................................................................17 figure 2.4: German prisoners on Juno Beach figure 2.5: German map of Hanstholm, March 12, 1944.................................... 19 figure 2.6: Skaggerak mine field.........................................................................19 figure 2.7: Tourist photograph of Stützpunkt Vigsö, 1981..................................21 figure 2.8: Hitler and Speer examining drawings for Berlin................................23 figure 2.9: Drawing of a bunker by Hitler............................................................23 figure 2.10: Dutch propaganda poster for the Atlantic Wall fortifications............23 figure 2.11: Monthly concrete output for Organisation Todt.................................26 figure 2.12: Regelbau types..................................................................................29 figure 2.13: Atlantic Wall, 1995, installation by Magdalena Jetelová...................30 figure 2.14: Boundaries of terra firma at Stützpunkt Vigsö..................................31 figure 3.1: Aerial photo sequence of coastal change near Hanstholm, DK..........32 figure 3.2: Map of the JCC..................................................................................33 figure 3.3: Jetty Study near Hanstholm, DK........................................................34 figure 3.4: Alabama Point Jetty at Perdido Pass..................................................35 figure 3.5: Spiral Jetty, Robert Smithson.............................................................35 figure 3.6: Jetty Spurs at Suislaw River Inlet, OR................................................35 figure 3.7: Ponce Inlet, FL...................................................................................35 figure 3.8: Atlantic Wall strongpoints..................................................................38 figure 3.9: Defense of the Skagerrak...................................................................39 figure 3.10: World ocean currents.......................................................................39 figure 3.11: Hanstholm Fortress collage.............................................................42 figure 3.12: Map of Stützpunkt Vigsö, January, 1943........................................43 figure 3.13: Weaponry at Hanstholm and topography map.................................43 figure 3.14: Aerial photograph of Stützpunkt Vigsö, 1991................................44 figure 3.15: Retaining wall at Stützpunkt Vigsö, 1943.....................................44 figure 3.16: Aerial photograph of erosion at Stützpunkt Vigsö, 1974................44 figure 3.17: Map of bunkers and retaining wall, Stützpunkt Vigsö, 1945..........44 figure 3.18: German map of Stützpunkt Vigsö, December 28, 1943..................45

ii.

LIST OF FIGURES (CONTINUED) figure 3.19: Bunker interior.................................................................................46 figure 3.20: Bunker construction.........................................................................47 figure 3.21: 38 cm battery...................................................................................47 figure 4.1: Aerial over Stützpunkt Vigsö, 1975....................................................48 figure 4.2: Cyclical and linear time......................................................................55 figure 4.3: Position diagram.................................................................................55 figure 4.4: “Cathedral of Light” at Zeppelin Field, by Albert Speer in 1938........60 figure 4.5: Dune formation over Stützpunkt Vigsö..............................................62 figure 4.6: Dune formation near Battery at Hanstholm.......................................63 figure 4.7: Surface texture detail..........................................................................63 figure 5.1: Map of Hanstholm and author’s visit...................................................64 figure 5.2: Passage 1.............................................................................................64 figure 5.3: Passage 3.............................................................................................70 figure 5.4: 58c: Ringstand für M.G. und Leichten Granatwerfer...........................84 figure 5.5: 69: Ringstand für Schweren Granatwerfer 34......................................84 figure 5.6: 120: Artillerie-Beobachtungsstand mit Panzerturm............................84 figure 5.7: 134: Munitionsunterstand I.................................................................84 figure 5.8: F1 277: Scheinwerferstand 150 cm.....................................................85 figure 5.9: L 409A: Unterstand mit Aufgesetztem Geschützstand.........................85 figure 5.10: 501: Einfacher Gruppenunterstand..................................................86 figure 5.11: 607: Munitionsunterstand II............................................................86 figure 5.12: 622: Doppelgruppenunterstand........................................................86 figure 5.13: 636: Befehlsstand für Heeresküstenbatterie.....................................87 figure 5.14: 645: Unterstand für eine Küche.......................................................88 figure 5.15: 671: Schartenstand für Geschütze auf mittlere Sockellafette..........88 figure 5.16: 681: M.G. - Schartenstand ohne Nebenräume.................................88 figure 6.1: Aftermath studies in photography and model......................................94 figure 6.2: Notch derivation................................................................................106 figure 6.3: Site plan (West).................................................................................108 figure 6.4: Site plan (East)..................................................................................109 figure 6.5: Rendering: Sunbathing near the jetty.................................................114 figure 6.6: Rendering: War voyeurism................................................................114 figure 6.7: Site plan............................................................................................115 figure 6.8: Conceptual Image: A datum for recording marks of culture...............115 figure 6.9: Conceptual image of the excavation spiral........................................119 figure 7.1: Final board montage (site analysis)..................................................122 figure 7.2: Final board montage (design proposal).............................................123

iii.

LIST OF PLATES PAGE plate 1.1: Stützpunkt Vigsö, aerial approach from the west..................................1 plate 5.1: Approach to the site from northwest....................................................66 plate 5.2: Along the beach, in between the bluffs and the fortifications..............67 plate 5.3: Weaving through the remains...............................................................68 plate 5.4: On to the bluff......................................................................................69 plate 5.5: Gravel road from Hanstholm, walking up on the bluff towards Vigsø...71 plate 5.6: Topography and vegetation..................................................................72 plate 5.7: Edge of the terra firma, footpaths to the strongpoint...........................73 plate 5.8: Unearthing............................................................................................74 plate 5.9: Details of graffiti and board form concrete texture..............................75 plate 5.10: Wandering through the formation.......................................................76 plate 5.11: Up on the bluffs, existing tourist infrastructure..................................77 plate 5.12: Paths over the site, views from the top of the bluff...............................78 plate 5.13: Views of the edge of the bluffs and the site..........................................79 plate 5.14: Topography study................................................................................80 plate 5.15: Views of the site from a distance..........................................................81 plate 5.16: Evidence of erosion.............................................................................82 plate 5.17: Bunker registry....................................................................................83 plate 5.18: Original construction drawings and sketches......................................89 plate 5.19: Cartographic morphology 1.................................................................90 plate 5.20: Cartographic morphology 2.................................................................91 plate 5.21: Mapping game study of coastal erosion 1..........................................92 plate 5.22: Mapping game study of coastal erosion 2..........................................93 plate 6.1: WWII pilgrimage sites near Hanstholm...............................................97 plate 6.2: Site analysis and conceptual development 1........................................98 plate 6.3: Site analysis and conceptual development 2........................................99 plate 6.4: Topography model.............................................................................100 plate 6.5: Earth-shaping forces of nature and war..............................................101 plate 6.6: Topography.........................................................................................103 plate 6.7: Vanishing coastline............................................................................105 plate 6.8: Site planning process drawings..........................................................107 plate 6.9: Intervention timeline 1954-2100........................................................110 plate 6.10: Site history story board.....................................................................111 plate 6.11: Jetty section diagrams 1...................................................................112 plate 6.12: Jetty section diagrams 2....................................................................113 plate 6.13: Excavation spiral and reburial sequence...........................................117 plate 6.14: Excavation spiral model and drawing...............................................118

iv.

plate 1.1: StĂźtzpunkt VigsĂś, aerial approach from the west [Drawing and editing by author, original photograph from Museumscenter Hanstholm]

{I N T R O D U C T I O N} NØTERØY

“Phenomena of a dramatic moment in contemporary history, ten thousand monuments disappear. Stripped of their functions, removed from topical contexts, these works bespeak of an unknown meaning.” -Paul Virilio, 1958

NORWAY

VARA

SWEDEN

HANSTED (HANSTHOLM)

NAVAL RADAR Aircraft reporting Artillery radar Naval tactics Reporting center Workshop Heat direction finder Radar passive

LUFTWAFFE NIGHT FIGHTER CONTROL AIRFIELDS

figure 1.1: Stützpunkt Vigsö, approach from the west [Original photograph and drawing]

1 INTRODUCTION

CRUMBLING PERMANENCE On December 14, 1941, as Fortress Europe faced imminent threats of western attack, Adolf Hitler commanded the construction of an Atlantic Wall. The impenetrable (or so he would have it) barrier of massive concrete bunkers along the western European coast from Spain to Norway was designed to defend the entire German-conquered territory and communicate an image of menacing power to the rest of the world. Today these structures are relics of the Nazi Empire that maintain a presence under the open sky and before an open sea.

The gradual

disappearance of the massive bunkers reveals an ironic truth; that the architectural interventions meant to fortify the coast against all interventions have been slowly conquered by the landscapeâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the very landscape of which they are built. Preserved in form and placement, however, is a frozen maneuverâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;one in which surface and subsurface operations served the Nazi objective of absolute resistance. The architectural form of the bunkers themselves can be analyzed as an expression of a defensive posture and understood as a manifestation of not only specific war directives, but also of broader implications that defined the character of warfare, military technology, urban infrastructure, and architecture during World War II. These elements are intertwined with a complex and jaded history that has regarded the current treatment of the architectural remnants of war and related landscapes as a controversial endeavor. This thesis was initially inspired by the decommissioned and derelict Atlantic Wall of World War II. Emblematic of a barbaric power long extinguished, they are crumbling in surrender to the dynamic nature of the landscape, and the advancement of military technology, which has rendered their original function futile.

Simultaneously, however, the

bunkers are camouflaged in nature with the passage of time. They can

neither be removed from the earth that increasingly engulfs them, nor separated as independent objects in the setting of the landscape. The visible result is an aesthetic of disappearance—the aging and partial erasure of a long line of epic ruins in nature.

Consequently, their

physicality today is approachable and even beautiful to those who did not experience the terror they were built to represent. The fortifications are merely shells, for they cannot in themselves preserve the memories of battle they were designed to facilitate. As the cruel connotation of their previous use fades, the structures embody new purposes and associations—playground, museum, promenade, lookout, pilgrimage, art, etc.—that have been embraced by users of all ages and kinds. The richness of these post-war sites is a kind of collage, in which historical networks and prescribed operations have been superimposed with spontaneous interactions.

Additionally, less traceable layers of

memory, pain, death, and human psychology tied to the former function of fortify/destroy are tangled with more recent fascinations connected to the phenomenological experience of these places.

Thus, the once

“impassible” barrier is no longer a boundary, but a series of spaces for lived experience.1

The thesis is an investigation that addresses

theoretical and practical concepts of intervening in such a ruin. More significant than any solution is the process that is engaged—a thorough investigation of a physical and historical palimpsest that determines the designer’s engagement.

SITE This study focuses on strategic site locale within the former German defense sector at Hanstholm, Denmark.

Also referred to as the

“Hanstholm Fortress” during WWII, this particular area of the Jutland coast was strategic for the defense of the Skagerrak (the strait between the northern coast of the Jutland peninsula, the southern tip of Norway, and the southwest coast of Sweden). At the onset of WWII, Germany forced an occupation of Denmark to close off the barrage to the Baltic Sea and began establishing batteries and strongpoints along the coastal

Leach, Neil. 1997. Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory. New York: Routledge.

1 INTRODUCTION

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figure 1.6: Atlantic Wall macro-micro site collage [Author’s composition, original images from: http://www.atlanticwall.polimi.it/museum/]

1 INTRODUCTION edge. A sporadic and inefficient development of temporary structures caused anxiety amongst the German High Command who feared an Allied invasion of the Skagerrak (among other strategic points). To avoid defeat at all costs, Hitler issued “Führer Order No. 40” (March 23, 1942)—a manifesto for the construction and operation of the New West Wall. Once linked with the original West Wall fortifications, which spanned the German-French border opposite the Maginot Line, the extensive line of defense became infamously known as the Atlantikwal (Atlantic Wall).

DISTURBANCE The Führer’s order propagated a dramatic shift in logistical operations for the German war effort.

Hitler’s emphasis on the permanent

entrenchment of troops and artillery along the entire Atlantic Coast was a reversal of the previously embraced “blitzkrieg” (“lightning war”) concept of rapid mobile attack and infiltration. Characteristic of a much more defensive posture—fueled by chronic megalomania—Hitler’s obsession with the development of the Atlantic Wall fortifications propagated an outrageous consumption of resources and energy. The Organization Todt (OT), headed by Albert Speer by this time, was mobilized to generate standardized bunker designs. As relics of the Atlantic Wall, the bunkers are also architectural artifacts that speak not only of the character of battle and the delineation of military space in the WWII stage, but also of the passing of global warfare on the development of construction technology, earthworks, and contemporary aesthetic expression. The Atlantic Wall maintains its presence along the northwest coast of Jutland. The concrete shells punctuate the long strip of sandy beach.

Subterranean networks are exhumed as the harsh winds and

coastal currents carve away at the dunes and rapidly erode the shoreline. Seeking a site that exhibits such dramatic natural forces juxtaposed with remnants of the Atlantic Wall, the thesis targets STÜTZPUNKT VIGSÖ (Strongpoint Vigsö), which was established in November of 1941. Cartographic documentation, aerial photography, and geological survey indicate that the coastal edge of this particular site

has receded nearly 400 meters since the mid 1800s due to erosion. The dynamic nature impeded the construction of the strongpoint so much so that the Germans resorted to building a retaining wall in attempt to contain the land.

However, the strategy was not successful and the

structure failed as the land was literally swept out from beneath. Today nearly the entire strongpoint is exposed and in danger of being completely lost at sea. The formation of bunkers, like small islands just off the shoreline, will most likely be entirely submerged in the next 100 years. Stripped of its former camouflage in the natural topography, the excavated bunkers are alien elements in the coastal landscape. The site itself is an embodiment of several battles.

Its designed intent of

preventing landing operations is exposed, allowing for the study and commemoration of the Nazi defensive strategy as a battle against enemy forces. The battle of the built and natural environments is also evident as a result of the coastal erosion in this region. Furthermore, the continued submersion of this portion of the Atlantic Wall aligns with the battle to acknowledge the German occupation and the catastrophe of WWII as part of Denmark’s collective identity/memory.

OBJECTIVES The ambition of the project is two-fold.

The first objective is to

construct a reading of the extended site context that is informed by an abstracted understanding of military strategies, tactics, and maneuvers. This is employed as a response to both the type and the historical relevancy of the structures that are objectified in this study, for the purpose of exposing and/or re-embedding a logistical intervention in the final solution. After thorough reconnaissance, the process is activated by a series of ‘games’ that emphasize dynamic and static components of the macro- and micro-context. Both calculated and arbitrary mash-ups of information sets simulate designed and natural transformations in attempt to illustrate a more comprehensive history and begin to predict the future of this site. The second objective is to mobilize the processes of architecture and landscape design to inscribe an experiential history of place—an

1 INTRODUCTION

figure 1.8: Erosion from 1954-2005 [Author’s composition, original images from: http://nordjylland. flyfotoarkivet.dk/]

archive in the built environment of war.

The main thesis title

(Re)Territorializing Infrastructures was designated, like the project itself, to highlight contesting elements of site—namely nature, culture, and time within a built environment of war—and the provocation of related forces. The delineation of territory as it is being exercised on this contested site is read in the thesis as a series of battles and alliances amongst various players.

In order to delineate my own stance as a

designer in this field, it was important to begin the thesis by acknowledging time as both a cyclical and linear element at play. The proposed intervention interrupts and redirects both movements towards renewal and ruin of the natural landscape and architectural relics on the site.

VISION In light of recent discussion over the merging disciplines of architecture and landscape architecture within the University of Washington College of Built Environments, this project seeks to demonstrate an inspired outcome of combined practice.

As the future of CBE design is re-

imagined, I hope that this thesis can contribute to forward-thinking efforts.

figure 1.7: Failure sequence of the retaining wall at Stützpunkt Vigsö, 1943-1944 [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

2 {2

L I T E R AT U R E R E V I E W

{L I T E R A T U R E

}

R E V I E W}

The Literature Review is presented a series of essays that summarize the thematic exploration prior to the design phase of the thesis work. Most of the writing was completed during the thesis preparatory course in the spring and fall quarters of 2010. The essays examine three principal research trajectories that informed the design response: 1. The evolution of military architecture and technology; 2. Albert Speerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Theory of Ruin Value; 3. The architectonics of the bunker typology. These analyses led to the development of the theoretical convictions for the proposed intervention, which are outlined in Chapter Four, and reinforce the project as a design exercise rooted in a kind of historical and theoretical excavation.

figure 2.1: Original drawing for Regelbau #667, an enfilade bunker Weapon location and ballistics of the structure are shown. [http://www.atlanticwall.polimi.it/museum/]

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

“Attacking has been diverse according to thetotime the invention of machines of “Attacking has been diverse according theoftime of the invention of machines ruination.” of ruination.” -J. Errard -J. Errard

I. FORTIFY/DESTROY The history of military architecture and the art of war as it has influenced the development of man-made fortifications is an extensive subject. For the purpose of this study, a general understanding of the evolution of defensive structures and warfare are necessary to extract relevant contingencies that give a historical context to the conception of the bunker typology and coastal fortifications during the First and Second World Wars. Additionally, the pattern of adaptive reuse in obsolete constructions and landforms is telling of how the selected sites may be reactivated or retrofitted for future military and/or civilian purposes. Most important, however, is the advancement of weaponry and communicative technologies, which often outruns the creation of resistant models for defense. This is a telltale failure of the man-made fortress, evident throughout world history. Technology runs the game, so to speak, by determining both the character of the line that divides two opposing forces and the distance from which each side can attack the other. The fortress typology has evolved based on two scales: the space of the soldier’s body and the force/range of the attacker’s weapon. This is evident in Vitruvius’ descriptions of the construction of city walls in Book 1, Chapter 5, of his Ten Books on Architecture, written and published between c. 30 and 20 B.C. Vitruvius’ writings on military architecture are ancient standardizations based on the work of the engineer Philo of Byzantium (second century B.C.) and the general practice of Hellenistic fortifications. As one of the allocations of public works, “the architecture of defense is the set of principles devised so that

walls, towers, and gates will be permanently effective in warding off enemy attacks.”1 …the thickness of the wall should be made in this manner: walking along its top, two armed men coming toward each other should be able to pass each other without difficulty…”2 The intervals between towers should be made so that the distance between them is never more than the length of a bow shot; thus, if an attack is mounted at any particular point, the enemy will be thrown back by bolts from the catapults and other missiles that have been launched from the towers on either side.”3 Towers should be made either round or polygonal, as war machines break apart square towers more swiftly…Likewise, the fortification of walls and towers is far more secure if these are joined to earthen ramparts, because neither rams, nor mining, nor any of the other war machines succeed in inflicting any damage on the latter.4 Additionally, Vitruvius emphasized that the execution of fortified structures should “exhibit the principles of soundness, utility, and attractiveness” (firmitas, utilitas, venustas), which were attributed to the highest quality of architectural work.5

The apparent soundness of

construction, utility of organization, and attractiveness in design were believed to communicate an image of sophistication and readiness that was in itself a type of defensive mechanism. The location of the fortress delineated the threshold of battle—a point or line that, if conquered by an external foe, determined a transfer of power. Most simply stated, this is the object of warfare. Power is exercised through the capture of the enemy and thus the enemy’s territory—land being the currency of war. Capturing, or dominating, in this sense does not necessarily imply death or destruction (although the ruins of ancient battles and more recent conflicts surely testify that this

Vitruvius Pollio, Ingrid D. Rowland, Thomas Noble Howe, and Michael Dewar. Vitruvius: Ten Books on Architecture. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 26 (Book 1, Chapter 3, Section 1). 2 Ibid., 28 (Book 1, Chapter 5, Section 3). 3 Ibid. (Book 1, Chapter 5, Section 4). 4 Ibid. (Book 1, Chapter 5, Section 5). 5 Ibid., 26 (Book 1, Chapter 3, Section 2).

2 LITERATURE REVIEW has always been a threat.) The taking of hostages, for instance, has proved to be an effective tool for this purpose. In theory, the capture of a few bodies could potentially provoke the compromise of an entire nation. A forced occupation of the enemy’s psyche has also been effective in yielding surrender.

Convincing him of his imminent demise often

segued a more civil transfer of authority without the necessity for loss of face, life, or the desecration of cities and/or national monuments.6 (The Roman Empire capitalized on this strategy by utilizing less destructive forms of combat and promising a peaceful occupation as long as the native population submitted to its rule.) Preventative measures have manifested an architecture of walls, which were first and foremost designed to protect the lifeblood of the defense—the army—and to thus facilitate counterattack. Therefore a dual function, fortify/destroy, was integral to the effectiveness of the stronghold and dependent on the occupation of a skilled commander and army. With the defense at the perimeter, the central networks comprised the active operation base, which maintained a consistent program throughout history, though its organization has morphed over time. The common elements are as follows:     

A dwelling for the master and a safeguard for national treasures. A judicial chamber for the trial and punishment of transgressors. Accommodation for the master’s bodyguard to live and train. Adequate space for the preparation and storage of armament and provisions. A refuge for civilians (privileged members of the community) until the army is unleashed for counterattack.7

The significance of the internal operations placed high demands on the architecture of the walls not only to outfit the resistance, but also to impress and intimidate the intruder (as part of the aforementioned

Brice, Martin Hubert. Stronghold: A History of Military Architecture. London: Batsford, 1984. 27-28. 7 Ibid., 11.

Xanthos

Zarax Mantineia

Zarax

Xanthos

Mantineia

Pleuron

Aigosthena

Kasarmi Pleuron

Aigosthena

Kasarmi

Zarax

Xanthos Mantineia

Mantineia

Aigosthena

Pleuron

AigosthenaPleuron

Kasarmi

Xanthos

Zarax Mantineia Zarax

Mantineia

Aigosthena

Pleuron Kasarmi

Aigosthena

figure 2.2: Gates with left-hand approaches exposing right flank of the intruder [Vitruvius, 1999.]

2 LITERATURE REVIEW practice of psychological domination).

Thus the architectural

expression—the illusion of impenetrability—was nearly as important as the actual hardness of the wall itself. The impermeable character was extended to the configuration of outworks, observation towers, and the position of weaponry and spies along the boundary to convey the message that once seen, the enemy would be destroyed. If this threshold was breeched, a labyrinthine entrance filtered the density of the intrusion to weaken the opponent.

An illustration of this can be seen in the

entrance of the Great Tower of Rochester Castle (constructed in 1087): The entrance to [Archbishop of Canterbury, William de Corbeil’s] tower was by means of a forebuilding, approached via a stone staircase which ended at the edge of a pit just short of the main doorway. Further access could only be made over a drawbridge and, once in, the attacker had to turn right towards the portcullised entrance to the keep proper. He thus exposed his right, unshielded side to the next series of defenders. It is worth noting that many passageways in castles were deliberately narrow, so that one man could hold it against many. He would not have to stay there indefinitely…the Norman only had to hold it long enough to kill or disable just one opponent. The casualty himself would remain jammed there and could only be removed by being dragged all the way back to the nearest wide part. (Presumable the defender’s death would achieve the same object of delaying the enemy.)”8 The approach, therefore, was crucial. Vitruvius also noted the importance of designing entries that compromised the intruder’s effectiveness: Special care should be taken to ensure that there will be no easy approach to the wall for an attacker; rather the rampart should encircle precipitous heights and be so planned that the approaches to the gates are not straight but on the left. For if the wall is made in this manner, then the right flank of those entering the gates, the side which will not be covered by a shield, will be closest to the wall.9

8 9

Ibid., 80-81. Vitruvius, 28 (Book 1, Chapter 5, Section 2).

Impenetrability was to be carried out in the spatial configuration of strategic points in addition to the overall impressiveness of the rampart.

ENFILADE The notion of enfilade as it pertains to military architecture and tactics is described in Vitruvius and applied to fortification design throughout history. Enfilade fire implies an engagement with the target, occurring when the “long axis of the beaten zone coincides or nearly coincides with the long axis of the target. This type of fire is either frontal or flanking. It is the most desirable type of fire with respect to a target, because it makes maximum use of the beaten zone.”10 The design portion will expand on the concept of enfilade, which is also used to describe architectural conditions (typically, a suite of rooms in alignment). Military applications of this principle were utilized in the close combat defense space of the Atlantic Wall bunker. Similar to Vitruvius’s prescription, the approach is designed to disarm the intruder by exposing his vulnerable side to the defender’s fire. The spatial arrangement forces the defender and intruder into a position where the defender may attack through oblique enfilade fire. Inversely, the defender is protected by an architectural feature, which is called the “enfilade.” This was a kind of double ziggurat impressed in the concrete wall of the bunker. From the interior, the defender would wait for the enemy to approach the threshold and fire through the opening in the “enfilade” window. The ziggurat, lined with steel, would cause any return fire to ricochet from the small opening, protecting the defender from enemy bullets. For the thesis this is a significant architectonic, because it embodies the historical tactics of combat and a relevant architectural expression, accommodating both the intimate space of the soldier’s body and the implications of modern weaponry. Just as the architectural details reveal methods of man-to-man combat from WWII, the bunker formation delineates the larger-scale operation of defending the strongpoint.

Territorial networks were

"FM23-22.68 Chapter 5 Combat Techniques of Fire." GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information. Web. 25 May 2011. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-22-68/c05.htm>.

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figure 2.3: Enfilade strategies Oblique (left), frontal (top right), and flanking (bottom right) enfilade fire [http://www.globalsecurity.org]

figure 2.4: German prisoners on Juno Beach, BerniĂ¨res-sur-Mer, France, 6 June 1944 [http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca]

established based on the relationships of the individual bunkers to each other and to the landscape. Enfilade bunkers were positioned at the coastal front of each strongpoint grouping. This type of enfilade implied a sweeping, radial fire out into the open sea to prevent an enemy landing. The Atlantic Wall, although commonly represented as a long line along the Atlantic coast of Europe, can be read as a series of defensive zones, determined by the physical character of the wall itself and the ranges of weaponry, sight, sound, and perception embedded in the complex groupings of bunkers and forts. In this thesis for example, the radii of the enfilade are read as extensions of the physical boundaries—invisible layers of fortification and destruction that were imperative to the defense of the strongpoint.

PAUL VIRILIO AND THE LOGISTICS OF PERCEPTION It is important to account for the factors of perception and speed (dromology), which have determined the boundaries of military space— the arena for battle extending beyond the physical markers of territory. Perception, in this case, implies an optical range at which the target can be visualized and hit with accuracy. The ability to see, therefore, is essential to the success of militaristic ambitions. To take aim is “a geometrification of looking, a way of technically aligning ocular perception along an imaginary axis”—a “faith line” (ligne de foi).11 Throughout the evolution of weaponry and defensive strongholds, the visual conquest of territory can be understood as a race for technology that would eliminate the element of faith. In 1610, Galileo was the first to succeed with his invention of the passive optic lens, which he implemented in the celatone (a brass gas mask with a telescope through one eyehole) in order to view the Medicean stars.12 As a result the astronomical telescope was developed, offering stargazers a closer view of the heavens than ever before. Consequently, the way in which the world could be perceived and navigated was revolutionized, and by 1650

Virilio, Paul. War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception. London: Verso, 1989. 3. Sobel, Dava. Longitude: The True Story of a Lone Genius Who Solved the Greatest Scientific Problem of His Time. New York: Walker, 1995. 26.

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figure 2.5: German map of Hanstholm, March 12, 1944 Colors: Red = Army Green = Air Force Blue = Navy The figures at VigsĂ¸: 12 = range of guns in km 10,5 = calibre of guns in cm f = French 4 = number of guns [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

figure 2.6: Skaggerak mine field [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

surveyors and cartographers were employing Galileo’s techniques to focus on the ground—in essence, to redraw the world. The

innovation

military

photography

and

aerial

reconnaissance during the American Civil War initiated an extension of the battle stage that soon would become global. The primary catalyst being the indirect sighting device (the peephole of the camera) that when attached to weapons of mass destruction allowed the soldier to engage in combat from much greater distances. “It thus prefigured a symptomatic shift in target-location and a growing derealization of military engagement.”13 Indirect sight also implies the photographic image itself, which, when the content is not experienced firsthand, is a simulation. From the photograph to cinema, video, computer graphics, and the synthetic imagery of active optics, the ligne de foi has been replaced by the security offered through virtual reality. “Thus, alongside the ‘war machine’, there has always existed an ocular (and later optical and electro-optical) ‘watching machine’ capable of providing soldiers, and particularly commanders, with a visual perspective on the military action under way.”14 Dromology, a concept developed by French philosopher Paul Virilio—whose writings are referenced several times throughout the structuring of the theoretical framework for this thesis—is essentially the “science of speed.”

The speed at which weapons are developed,

solidified, and implemented, for example, determines the character of warfare and the transfer of power—depending on which side possesses the dominant technology. This concept is known as arms race, which resulted in the inevitable breakout of World War I in June of 1914. In terms

communication

capabilities,

which

underwent

rapid

advancements during the 20th century, the instantaneous transfer of information via radio and satellite permitted the direction of battle maneuvers from off-site locale. Speed has always been the advantage and the privilege of the hunter and the warrior. Racing and pursuit are the heart of all

13 14

Virilio, 1989. 1. Ibid., 4.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW combat. There is thus a hierarchy of speeds to be found in the history of societies, for to possess the earth, to hold terrain, is also to posses the best means to scan it in order to protect and to defend it…The superior speed of various means of communication and destruction is, in the hands of the military, the privileged means for a secret and permanent social transformation, a projectile for the destruction of the social continuum, a weapon, an implosive.15 The theory of dromology is addressed, but not explored thoroughly in the thesis.

Virilio’s analysis provides a lens for understanding the epic

failure of the Atlantic Wall—the speed of military technological advancement outran the construction and effective occupation of the physical boundary.

The architectural remains represent a pivotal

moment in the history of global warfare when virtual/perceived space perpetuated total war, in which actual space and time became subservient. The Atlantic Wall is a giant cemetery: a massive line of tombs that mark a dead strategy of defense, a world to which there is no return. “Space was at last homogenized, absolute war had become a reality, and the monolith was its monument.”16

figure 2.7: Tourist photograph of Stützpunkt Vigsö, 1981 [http://www.flickr.com/photos/m-joedicke/3614911538/in/photostream/]

Virilio, Paul, and George Collins. 1994. Bunker Archeology: Texts and Photos. New York, N.Y.: Princeton Architectural Press. 19. 16 Ibid., 40.

“Not yet thirty, I saw before me the most exciting prospects an architect can dream of.” “Not yet thirty, I saw before me the most exciting prospects an architect can dream of.” -Albert Speer, -Albert Speer, 19691969

II. INSIDE THE THIRD REICH Albert Speer’s memoirs give an intimate perspective from within the confidence of Hitler’s entourage. His personal narrative is extremely valuable in understanding the cultural convictions that spawned the ideals of the Nazi regime. Architecture—one of Adolf Hitler’s profound passions—was, above all, an exercise of power in the Third Reich. Hitler’s obsession with urban grandeur at an inhumane scale was embodied in the state architecture, Speer’s plan for Berlin (which was never realized), and ultimately the Atlantikwal (Atlantic Wall) fortifications.

This facet of twentieth-century architectural history is

rarely exposed in the traditional canonic presentation. To weave the architecture of the Nazi Empire, so to speak, into the fulcrum of European Modernism requires an explanation of the personal and political ambitions that generated Hitler’s architectural fantasies.17 For the purpose of this thesis, however, it is necessary to understand the networks of tension that resulted from the Führer’s megalomania. To the detriment of his own reign, Hitler refused to accept the conditions of real time and real space—a supposed symptom of the technological surge that breached the confines of pre-virtual warfare. As previously discussed, the weapons of the virtual stage projected a vast (to Hitler, an

Speer writes of a dialogue with Hitler regarding the roots of this obsession: “Hitler declared again and again: ‘How I wish I had been an architect.’ And when I responded: ‘But then I would have no client,’ he would say: ‘Oh, you would have made your way in any case!’ I sometimes ask myself whether Hitler would have forsaken his political career if in the early twenties he had met a wealthy client willing to employ him as architect. But at bottom, I think, his sense of political mission and his passion for architecture were always inseparable. It seems to me that this theory is borne out by the two sketches he made around 1925, when at the age of thirty-six his political career had been virtually wrecked—for certainly it must have seemed a wild absurdity that he would ever be a political leader who could crown his success with a triumphal arch and a domed hall.” (Speer, Albert. 1970. Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs. [New York]: Macmillan. 80.)

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figure 2.9: Drawing of a bunker by Hitler [Speer, 1970]

figure 2.8: Hitler and Speer examining drawings for Berlin [Speer, 1970.]

figure 2.10: Dutch propaganda poster for the Atlantic Wall fortifications [http://www.war44.com]

intoxicating) realm of probable conquest.18 Never mind the high stakes of defeat—to Hitler, Fate had predetermined the Nazi victory.

His

unrelenting failure to acknowledge the actual conditions and processes behind his grandiose schemes was a fatal pattern. The tension between impression and function, therefore, characterized the relationship between the dictator and his architect and prioritized architecture as a lasting tribute to the Nazi era above its ability to serve.

Speer admitted several times in his memoirs that he was

skeptical of Hitler’s psychotic attachment to monumental form. Despite his reservations, Speer entered into a collaboration that became disillusioned by power. An excerpt from his memoirs gives context to this struggle: Early in 1939 Hitler, in a speech to construction workers, undertook to justify the dimensions of his style: ‘Why always the biggest? I do this to restore to each individual German his self-respect. In a hundred areas I want to say to the individual: We are not inferior; on the contrary, we are the complete equals of every other nation.’ This love for vast proportions was not only tied up with the totalitarian cast of Hitler’s regime. Such tendencies, and the urge to demonstrate one’s strength on all occasions, are characteristic of quickly acquired wealth. Thus we find the largest buildings in Greek antiquity in Sicily and Asia Minor…Moreover, most of the Seven Wonders of the World won their repute by their excessive size… Hitler’s demand for huge dimensions, however, involved more than he was willing to admit to the workers. He wanted the biggest of everything to glorify his works and magnify his pride. These monuments were an assertion of his claim to the world dominion long before he dared to voice any such intention even to his closest associates. I, too, was intoxicated by the idea of using drawings, money, and construction firms to create stone witnesses to history, and thus affirm our claim that our works would survive

Speer’s testimony at the Nuremberg Trial was not a plea for innocence, but a statement of guilty standing on the premise that he was only an instrument in Hitler’s crimes. Technological advances in the field of communications had escalated the ensued devastation. His final statement follows: “Hitler’s dictatorship was the first of an industrial state, a dictatorship that, to dominate its own people, used to perfection all technical means at its disposal…thus the criminal events of these past years were not due only to the personality of Hitler. The excessiveness of these crimes could at the same time be explained by the fact that Hitler was the first who knew how to commit them thanks to the means offered him by technology.” (Virilio, 1994. 60-61.)

2 LITERATURE REVIEW for a thousand years. But I found Hitler’s excitement rising whenever I could show him that at least in size we had ‘beaten’ the other great buildings of history. To be sure, he never gave vent to those heady feelings. He was sparing in his use of highsounding words to me. Possibly at such moments he actually felt a certain awe; but it was directed toward himself and toward his own greatness, which he himself had willed and projected into eternity.19 Speer’s Theory of Ruin Value manifested from this mentality.20 The idea that new buildings should be designed for their eventual decomposition as aesthetically pleasing monuments to the Third Reich further justified the outlandish scale of their architectural design. The urban landscape of Berlin, in particular, would have been drastically overhauled had the plans of Hitler and Speer been executed. It is ironic, however, that the architectural remnants of the Third Reich are manifested at a grand scale in the derelict but stubborn relics of the Atlantic Wall. The principle of Ruin Value (as conceived by Speer and Hitler) has failed in this case, as the artifacts speak to epic failure. The grandeur of the Nazi Empire and Hitler’s megalomaniacal building campaign are read in their context—subject to the same natural and

Speer, Albert. 1970. Inside the Third Reich: memoirs. [New York]: Macmillan. 69. “Hitler liked to say that the purpose of his building was to transmit his time and its spirit to posterity. Ultimately, all that remained to remind men of the great epochs of history was their monumental architecture, he would philosophize. What had remained of the emperors of Rome? What would still bear witness to them today, if their buildings had not survived? Periods of weakness are bound to occur in the history of nations, he argued; but at their lowest ebb, their architecture will speak to them of former power...Our architectural works should also speak to the conscience of a future Germany centuries from now. In advancing this argument Hitler also stressed the value of a permanent type of construction...The building on the Zeppelin Field was begun at once, in order to have at least the platform ready for the coming Party Rally. To clear the ground for it, the Nuremberg streetcar depot had to be removed. I passed by its remains after it had been blown up. The iron reinforcements protruded from concrete debris and had already begun to decay. This dreary sight led me to some thoughts, which I later propounded to Hitler under the pretentious heading of ‘A Theory of Ruin Value.’ The idea was the buildings of modern construction were poorly suited to form that ‘bridge of tradition’ to future generations, which Hitler was calling for. It was hard to imagine that rusting heaps of rubble could communicate these heroic inspirations, which Hitler admired in the monuments of the past. My ‘theory’ was intended to deal with the dilemma. By using special materials and by applying certain principles of statics, we should be able to build structures which even in a state of decay, after hundreds or (such were our reckonings) thousands of years would more or less resemble Roman models...He himself accepted my ideas as logical and illuminating. He gave orders that in the future the important buildings of his Reich were to be erected in keeping with the principles of this ‘law of ruins.’” (Ibid., 55-56.)

cultural forces that resisted their initial installation.

This notion

represents a point of departure for the design process, which seeks to emphasize

the

forces

nature,

principally,

active

the

deterritorialization of the targeted site.

figure 2.11: Monthly concrete output for Organisation Todt [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

War is beautiful because it establishes man’s dominion over the subjugated machinery by means of gas masks, terrifying megaphones, flame throwers, and small tanks. War is beautiful because it initiates the dreamt-of metallization of the human body. War is beautiful “War is beautiful because it establishes man’s dominion over the subjugated machinery because it enriches the flowering meadow with the fiery orchids of by means of gas masks, terrifying megaphones, flame throwers, and small tanks. War machine guns. War is beautiful because it combines the gunfire, the is beautiful because it initiates the dreamt-of metallization of the human body. War is cannonades, cease-fire, the scents, thefiery stench ofofputrefaction beautiful becausethe it enriches the flowering meadowand with the orchits machine into a symphony. War is beautiful because it creates new architecture, guns. War is beautiful because it combines the gunfire, the cannonades, the cease-fire, the the stench of putrefaction into a symphony. War is beautiful it likescents, that and of the big tanks, the geometrical formation flights,because the smoke creates architecture, that of the bigmany tanks, the geometrical formation fights, the spiralsnew from burninglike villages, and others…” smoke spirals burning villages, -F.from T. Marinetti, 1924and many others...”

-F. T. Marinetti, 1924

“Thebeautiful beautiful is the justfirst thedegree first of degree of the “The is just the terrible.” -R. Rilke -R. Rilke

terrible.”

III. BUNKER ARCHEOLOGY The architectonic development of the bunker is most evidently read in the thickness of the concrete enclosure—a quality that Virilio connects to an “almost botanical sign of a constantly increasing pressure, of a constantly more ‘rigorous’ climate,” and monumentality “witnessing not so much the power of the Third Reich as its obsession with disappearance.”21

Criptic Architecture.

Measuring upwards of 3.5

meters thick, the walls and roofs attest to Hitler’s desire for permanence and fear of defeat. The extensive construction process was carried out by the Organization Todt (also known as the Bautruppen or construction troops); an extension of the Army devoted to the engineering and building of armaments principally for the Atlantic Wall. After Fritz Todt’s accidental death on February 8, 1942, Albert Speer succeeded as head of these operations. Preoccupied with the state of war economy, Speer passed over the opportunity to reconceive the Atlantic Wall strategy. Whether or not his position as head of the OT was granted due to Hitler’s trust in the architect or a desire to directly oversee design and

Virilio, 1994.

planning of the fortifications is uncertain. However, Speer recounted in his memoirs:

“Hitler planned these defensive installations down to the smallest details. He even designed the various types of bunkers and pillboxes, usually in the hours of the night. The designs were only sketches, but they were executed with precision. Never sparing in self-praise, he often remarked that his designs ideally met all the requirements of a frontline soldier. They were adopted most without revision by the general Corps. of Engineers.”22 Carrying out the Führer’s plans consumed two years, 17.3 million cubic yards of concrete valued at 3.7 billion DM, and 1.2 million metric tons of iron.23

The construction process was complicated,

involving several phases of earth moving, foundation work, framing, roofing, and pouring.

Once the concrete shell was complete, the

construction pit (the hole that was dug for the bunker) was filled in with dirt and covered as a form of camouflage. The remains of these sites, exposed on the beach as independent units, are deceiving—they have been unearthed from their original positions, which were connected by a series of trenches and underground tunnels. The interior spaces also needed finishing to make them more livable. Plaster was applied to flatten the surfaces of the walls and floor, doorframes were installed, insulation was applied, and the walls and various metal parts were whitewashed and painted. Typically, the work force for this construction came from the occupied nation, and German specialists were assigned to install the ventilation, telephone, and weapon systems. The timing for this completion work ranged from six weeks to six months depending on the urgency to inhabit the site.24 Virilio writes extensively about these structures in Bunker Archeology, as well as several of his other writings. Drawing parallels

Speer, 352. Ibid., 352-353. 24 Andersen, Jens. 1999. The Atlantic Wall from Agger to Bulbjerg. [Nørre Nebel]: Blåvandshuk Egnsmuseum. 72-78. 23

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figure 2.12: Regelbau types (bunkers that comprise Strongpoint Vigsรถ are framed in black) [http://www.atlanticwall.polimi.it/museum/]

figure 2.13: Atlantic Wall, 1995, installation by Magdalena Jetelovรก in Jutland [http://www.jetelova.de/]

2 LITERATURE REVIEW with cryptic architecture, he muses about their meaning—why do structures designed to protect the life of its inhabitants resemble funerary monuments? The irony of this question is perpetuated by a contested history, which enshrouds the Atlantic Wall fortifications and creates controversy regarding the contemporary maintenance and intervention of the sites. “This architecture results from the variations of a selfsame energy, cryptic energy, itself indissociable from the survival of all living species. It is the energy of everything that hides itself.”25 The notion of the crypt is a violation of Ruin Value—Hitler’s monuments were to perpetuate the glory of his empire. Bunker archeology, for the purpose of this thesis, exposes the fragility of the empire and thus the infrastructure. This is mirrored in interactions with natural forces, which through the process of erosion have both un-camouflaged the bunkers from their original subterranean conditions. A kind of re-camouflage is also occurring, as the concrete shells are eroded and broken down by sandy wind and water—appearing as part of the natural landscape from a distance, like islands off the coast or massive boulders in the bluffs.

figure 2.14: Boundaries of terra firma at Stützpunkt Vigsö

Virilio, Paul, and Claude Parent. 1997. Architecture Principe 1966 and 1996. Santa Monica, Calif: Form Editions. XVIII.

A C R O / M I C R O S I T E H I S T O RY & { M R E L AT E D M E T H O D O L O G I E S} â&#x20AC;&#x153;We wait for the enemy in vain unceasingly.â&#x20AC;? -Graffiti in a guard hut near Stenbjerg, 1943

figure 3.1: Aerial photo sequence of coastal change near Hanstholm, DK (from top to bottom: 1954, 1981, 1986, 1992) [http://nordjylland.flyfotoarkivet.dk/]

3 MACRO/MICRO SITE HISTORY AND RELATED METHODOLOGIES

180˚

150˚

120˚

90˚

-60˚

-30˚

0˚

30˚

Natural processes have sculpted the terrain of the site at Vigsö— regardless of human interventions that have attempted to overcome the dominant forces of ocean and wind currents. This chapter addresses the natural history first, recognizing the military (cultural) territorialization as a series of events that have confronted and redirected (but not halted) the natural cycles that prevail. In both cases, the historical analysis informed methodologies for the conceptual development of an intervention on the site. These are described in the conclusions of each section, and processed in the artifacts documented in Chapter Five.

I. NATURE JUTLAND COASTAL CURRENT An excerpt from a study conducted by Flemming Jackson of the Danish Hydraulic Institute, in 2000, gives a succinct definition of the Jutland Coastal Current—the primary cause of coastal erosion in the targeted site. The North Sea has a residual cyclonic circulation1 driven by tides, buoyancy and wind (Lee 1970; Otto et al. 1990). The Jutland Coastal Current (JCC) is a freshwater-influenced coastal current localized in the south-eastern part of the North Sea and contributes to the cyclonic circulation (Figure 3.2). Its main freshwater sources are the Elbe, the Weser and the Ems, which run into the German Bight, as well as smaller rivers along the Danish west coast. The Seine and the Rhine are, by definition, not contributors to the JCC. The Ekman Transport in the North Sea far away from land feeds the coastal current along the Jutland coastline within approximately one Rossby radius of the coastline…The wind determines the spatial extend of the current and only during

A definition from the American Meteorological Society Glossary of Meteorology Online defines “cyclonic circulation” as “Fluid motion in the same sense as that of the earth, that is, counterclockwise in the Northern Hemisphere, clockwise in the Southern Hemisphere, undefined at the equator.” (http://amsglossary.allenpress.com)

figure 3.2: Map of the JCC [Jakobsen, 128.]

60˚

south-southwesterly winds does the JCC flow into the Skagerrak.2 For the purpose of this study, only a basic understanding of site hydrology is needed. The general direction of the forces from the global to the local scale of the Skagerrak and the stretch of beach at Vigsö is important for predicting the future of the site. In addition to technical scientific studies, which typically analyze the phenomenon over several centuries or millennia, a survey of aerial photography gives insight to the more recent history.

SEDIMENT TRANSPORT ANALYSIS & PLANNING An analysis of sediment transport measuring the volumetric changes at the micro-scale of the Vigsö beach was conducted via a series of aerial photographs.3 Figure 3.1 shows the progression of erosion from 19542010, illustrating erosion of 50-100 meters along the coastal edge of the land. This is a conceptual exercise of coastal inventory, which was sufficient for the purpose of this thesis. Following this data collection, two questions are addressed in order to proceed with the design: (1.) What is the nature of the amounts of sediment being moved and the directions of movement? (2.) What is the relationship among the features, processes, and trends of the coast?4 Regarding the first question, the nature of the system is understood through viewing the aerial photographs in the chronological sequence. It has been identified as cyclonic circulation, which moves counter-clockwise in the Northern Hemisphere. This further explains the direction of the movement, which is evidence of longshore current

figure 3.3: Jetty Study near Hanstholm, DK, [Author’s composition, original images/map from: http://kmswww3. kms.dk/kortpaanettet/]

Jakobsen, F. 2000. "The Wind Influence on the Jutland Coastal Current Interpreted on the Basis of some Observations". NORDIC HYDROLOGY. 31: 127-148. 127-8. 3 From a description of sediment transport analysis methods in Marsh, William M. 1983. Landscape Planning: Environmental Applications. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley. 278. 4 Ibid.

3 MACRO/MICRO SITE HISTORY AND RELATED METHODOLOGIES

figure 3.4: Alabama Point Jetty at Perdido Pass [http://www.orangebeach.ws/2009/News/2009-05-21-Snorkeling_and_Diving_the_Alabama_Point_Jetties.html]

figure 3.5: Spiral Jetty, Robert Smithson [http://nthiteration.blogspot. com/2005/01/robert-smithson.html]

figure 3.6: Jetty Spurs at Suislaw River Inlet, OR [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/waterfront-waves.htm]

figure 3.7: Ponce Inlet, FL [http://www.larrygrimm.com/ponceinletpics/ponceinlet-aerial-terrafly2.jpg]

flowing from east to west, causing a crescent-shaped erosion pattern.5 The site at Vigsö is located near the midpoint of the crescent, where the highest rate of erosion is observed. The second question addresses the relationships evident on the site, which are also understood through the aerial photography sequence. This question is more generally answered by drawing on information that can be gathered from map and photograph databases. As the photographs only represent a little more than 50 years, the erosion trend is consistent—causing the coast to recede at an angle. By observing other points along the coast where harbor jetties and groins have been constructed, the reverse process of deposition can also be measured. (Figure 3.3) The relationship of nature to the man-made coastal elements is the most significant concept grasped from the brief survey of natural history represented in this chapter. For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that these relationships may be isolated from a multitude of other processes that influence a subtler shaping of the site.

II. CULTURE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF DENMARK Dr. Jens Andersen, curator of the Museumscenter Hanstholm, has published two books addressing the German fortifications in Denmark. Both are significant sources for the historical information presented in this thesis. In The Atlantic Wall – From Agger to Bulbjerg, Andersen provides a detailed historical narrative of the Nazi occupation of Denmark as the fortifications were constructed and occupied.

His

research and documentation was extremely valuable for understanding the targeted site at Vigsö in the global and local contexts of WWII. The

An excerpt from Marsh’s book further explains this phenomenon: “Two factors account for the parallel, or longshore transport of sediment. One is that most waves approach and intercept the coast at an angle; therefore, the direction of wave force is oblique to the shoreline. Although waves refract into a more direct approach angle near shore, most retain a distinct angle as they cross the shallow-water zone. Thus a large component of the energy for sediment transport is set up parallel to the shoreline. The second factor takes the form of a current that flows along the coast. This current, called a longshore current, moves parallel to the shoreline in the direction of wave movement at rates as great as 2 to 3 feet per second. Longshore currents are driven by wave energy, increasing in velocity and size (volume) with wave size and duration. When sediment is churned up by waves, the longshore currents transport it downshore before it settles back toward the bottom where it is churned up and transported again.” (Marsh, 270-271.)

3 MACRO/MICRO SITE HISTORY AND RELATED METHODOLOGIES second publication German Bunkers in Denmark, which Andersen produced in collaboration with Rudi Rolf, provided technical information about the bunkers that were constructed in Denmark. This survey was integral for reconstructing the site as part of the site analysis. The onset of World War II increased the German Navy’s anxiety regarding its coverage along the Atlantic Coast of Europe.

Grand

Admiral Raeder, Commander of the German Navy, alerted Hitler that the Navy needed new bases as far north as Norway. The outbreak of the Finnish-Russian Winter War on November 30, 1939, increased the pressure to solidify the Norwegian border and prevent the Allies from intervening for Finland. If the Allies seized the opportunity to invade, it would have been possible to intercept German supplies of iron ore from Lapland (North Sweden) and halt the production of ammunition for the war. As a measure of precaution, Hitler summoned Norwegian Nazi Party member, Vidkun Quisling, to Berlin in mid-December of 1939 and ordered an investigation of prospective tactics to occupy Norway. Planning for the invasion ensued for two months. On February 21, 1940, General von Falkenhorst was appointed commander of “Weserübung”— the code name for the operation.

At this time, Denmark was not

considered a strategic position. The threat of British surface vessels in the Baltic Sea was minimal due to this region being sufficiently guarded by the German Luftwaffe. As planning developed, the German High Command deemed it necessary to fortify the northern edge of Jutland (mainland Denmark) to protect supply routes to Norway.

The harbors at Skagen and

Frederikshavn were targeted and secured by exerting political pressure on the Danish government. The Danes complied with this arrangement until the end of February of 1940, when the Germans invaded to take the whole country by force. The Luftwaffe was undoubtedly behind this decision; gaining control of the Ålborg airfields was essential for launching airborne attacks into southern Norway. Control of the region of Thy was integral to the success of Operation “Weserübung.” The Germany Navy commenced the planting of a vast minefield in entrance to the Skagerrak (a strategic point of access to the Baltic Sea and the strait between Kristiansand, Norway, and

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figure 3.8: Atlantic Wall strongpoints [Author’s composition, original image from: http://www.atlanticwall.polimi.it/museum/]

3 MACRO/MICRO SITE HISTORY AND RELATED METHODOLOGIES

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Hanstholm, Denmark) to prevent an Allied invasion.6 During the night between April 8 and 9, 1940, the first mines were laid in preparation for the execution of “Weserübung.” At the end of that month, 1,642 mines divided into five separate fields blocked nearly the entire barrage, save 10 nautical miles at the coastline of each end. These openings provided passage for German ships and were guarded by gun emplacements on shore and guard vessels at sea. For added defense of the Skagerrak, the German Navy established two coastal batteries at Thyborøn and Hanstholm. Each was equipped with four 17-cm guns, which dated from 1902 and could cover a range of twenty kilometers.

APRIL 9, 1940 At 04:15 on April 9, 1940, German troops breeched the Danish German border in South Jutland. Simultaneous landings in Gedser, Korsør, and Copenhagan initiated a struggle that was very short-lived.

German

bombers flew over Copenhagan as a threat of wrath pending the Danish government’s decision to respond. At 06:00 the Danish conceded, giving the German troops ample time to move to the more strategic points in Jutland. The region of Thy was taken in the mid-afternoon, by midnight the Germans had established a full occupation of Denmark, and in the following morning Hanstholm was given over. From this point until the end of the war in 1945, the Germans built temporary and permanent batteries to secure the Skagerrak and eventually link up with Hitler’s Atlantic Wall.

PERMANENT BATTERY AT HANSTHOLM On April 10, 1940, a special reconnaissance unit was dispatched from Keil to locate appropriate sites for the permanent batteries at Hanstholm and Thyborøn. The “Schill” battery was established near Hanstholm on April 11, and the engineering corps was ushered in to begin working on

Over the course of WWII, the German Navy laid a total of 8,810 mines and 4,298 protective buoys in the Skagerrak. The fear of an Allied attack grew as the war progressed, justifying the continued upkeep of the barrage. New mines were needed to replace old mines as the tides and currents caused shifts in their positioning. After the end of WWII, the barrage was immediately cleared and free of mines by 1946. (www.museumscenterhanstholm.dk)

3 MACRO/MICRO SITE HISTORY AND RELATED METHODOLOGIES the site. On April 14 the artillery was shipped from the German naval arsenal at Tollerort to Denmark, and the troops who would man the new positions in Jutland were relocated.

The construction of permanent

foundations for the gun emplacements began on April 19, “Schill” was declared conditionally ready for action on April 27, and test shots were fired on May 4.

ATLANTIKWAL: JUTLAND COAST Hitler’s issue of “Führer Order No. 40” on March 23, 1942, marked the official commencement of the furious building campaign for the “New West Wall.”7

Although a similar notion had been dictated by the

German Supreme Command a few months prior to the Führer’s directive, the construction of the fortifications had been disorganized and fragmented. This was unnerving to Hitler, who feared that England would attack while his troops were preoccupied with the campaign against the Soviet Union.

The ports between Gironde and Brest

(Norway), the ports between Seine and Schelde (Channel Islands), and the open coast of Normandy and Bretagne (France) were considered the most vulnerable positions along the Atlantic. Hitler’s order indicated the extent of his megalomania: “Behind the formal military language—yet in terms comprehensible to any layman—it enshrined a breath-taking concept. It was a design for the defense of almost the entire continental landmass of Germanheld Europe.”8 At this point an Allied invasion of Denmark was still believed a relatively unlikely occurrence. However, the German High Command recognized the Skagerrak as a strategic point of entry for an Allied infiltration of the Baltic Sea. If an attack was carried out successfully in this area, Norway would be isolated and the Allies could invade on several fronts.

The possibility was not overlooked.

Grand Admiral

Raeder, Supreme Commander of the German Navy, toured North Jutland from May 19-20, 1942, to inspect the condition and potential

The old “West Wall” was built along the German-French border in 1938-39. (Andersen, Jens. 1999. The Atlantic Wall from Agger to Bulbjerg. [Nørre Nebel]: Blåvandshuk Egnsmuseum. 39.) 8 Majdalany

figure 3.11: Hanstholm Fortress collage [Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s composition, images from: Museumscenter Hanstholm]

3 MACRO/MICRO SITE HISTORY AND RELATED METHODOLOGIES

figure 3.12: Map of Stützpunkt Vigsö, January, 1943 [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

figure 3.13: Weaponry at Hanstholm and topography map [Author’s composition, images from: Museumscenter Hanstholm]

figure 3.14: Aerial photograph of Stützpunkt Vigsö, 1991 [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

figure 3.15: Retaining wall at Stützpunkt Vigsö, 1943 [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

figure 3.16: Aerial photograph of erosion at Stützpunkt Vigsö, 1974 [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

figure 3.17: Map of bunkers and retaining wall, Stützpunkt Vigsö, 1945 [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

3 MACRO/MICRO SITE HISTORY AND RELATED METHODOLOGIES effectiveness of the emplacements.

Hanstholm was found to be

extremely insufficient—the 38 cm battery would not hold under enemy attack, and the army troops that had been deployed to man the port were too few to form a successful defense. As a result, Raeder issued orders for increased security measures. In response, a new plan for hardening the northern and western Jutland coasts was conceived. The strategy was designed to fortify the most vulnerable and valuable nodes along the coastline by extending defensive networks and establishing strongpoints. Reconnaissance units began surveying the land in April of 1942 for the immense project. A kind of military urbanism developed out of this intention—the physicality of the landscape and the ranges of weaponry, communication, and visuality provided the necessary information to determine the location of the strongpoints as well as the subordinate components. Fear of attack guided the formation of stricter criteria for defense fortifications.

The nature of construction practice up until Raeder’s

survey was inefficient, resulting in the sparse production of mostly temporary bunkers (usually three would be built to service one gun emplacement). Built of earth and wood or of thin concrete, the shelters could support the retaliation of small commando units, but undoubtedly would have caved under a massive landing operation.

The Supreme

Commander’s orders ensued a drastic manipulation of the architectonic quality of the bunker typology—it was necessary for the structures to evolve with the changes in warfare.

The German military officials

stationed in Denmark prepared for the worst-case scenario; an Allied landing would have been precluded by a bombardment of heavy rounds from the sea and air.

STÜTZPUNKT VIGSÖ The strongpoint at Vigsö (HKB 539) was established in November of 1941 with the emplacement of an Army coastal battery. The battery, which occupied a coastal front of 0.7 kilometers, was comprised of

figure 3.18: German map of Stützpunkt Vigsö, December 28, 1943 [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

twenty-four permanent bunkers poured between the summer of 1942 and January of 1945.9 Although the German Army was in command of the strongpoints, the Navy provided strategic influence in their placement along the coast. The role of HKB 539, along with the other Army coastal batteries, was to attack enemy ships in the Skagerrak and prevent enemy landings on the shoreline territories. Vigsö in particular was established to protect the heavy Naval battery at Hanstholm against attack via invasion of Vigsø Bugt. The natural landscape served as a form of camouflage for this objective—the four 10.5 cm field guns were hidden in the first row of sand dunes for targeting opposition from the open sea. German sappers carried out the initial construction of the military infrastructure in Denmark, but private Danish contracting companies built the bulk of the Atlantic Wall in Jutland. The extensive need for labor provided wartime employment for Danes. The Danish government supported this labor for economic and political reasons— sending their own contracting firms to work on the fortifications meant that German companies and workers were kept out.10 Artillery was captured from the French Navy (a 1913 model recycled from World War I), and the four guns were set approximately 30 meters apart. These guns had a range of 11.5 kilometers and a firing figure 3.19: Bunker interior [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

rate of four shots per minute.

The strongpoint also contained three

machine guns for retaliation during aerial attack. Typically, the battery crews were comprised of three officers, 18 N.C.O.s (Non-Commissioned Officers), and 48 privates. Training for counterattack was difficult due to the outdated weaponry and the crews’ general lack of experience firing at battleships—the Army soldiers manning the strongpoints were not well versed in naval tactics. This was not a matter of urgency at Vigsö, which never saw attack, but the overall inefficiency of the

Andersen, Jens, and Rudi Rolf. 2006. German Bunkers in Denmark. Middelburg: PRAK Publishing. 136. 10 However, the Germans also expected the Danish government to fund the labor and did not comply with requests to minimize the costs. On the contrary, German authorities required that higher fees and wages be paid in order to make the jobs more attractive to the Danish work force. The only pressing order was that projects were finished on time. Economic tensions continued to rise, ultimately contributing to the resignation of the Danish government on August 29, 1943. (Andersen, 1999, 71.)

3 MACRO/MICRO SITE HISTORY AND RELATED METHODOLOGIES strongpoint

engendered

frustration

and

anxiety

amongst

the

crewmembers. Permanent bunkers, outbuildings, and barracks were constructed directly on the beach, set on concrete foundations encompassed by protective embankments of earth and sandbags. The guns were mounted on emplacements and were pivoted on wheeled carriages or makeshift turntables. The battery was also protected by a fire control point and two direction-finding stations, which were typically constructed out of thin walls of brick and concrete. Living quarters were located behind the gun emplacements and were comprised of wooden barracks shielded by earthen anti-blast walls. A single row of barbed wire encompassed the entire battery complex. This information was essential for reading the remains of the site and interpreting the historic documentation. The design builds on this physical

history

territorial

networking

process

reterritorialization, which will be further theorized and elaborated in the following chapter.

figure 3.21: 38 cm battery [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

figure 3.20: Bunker construction [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

{T H E O R E T I C A L U N D E R P I N N I N G} “A long history was curled up here. These concrete blocks were in fact the final throwoffs of the history of frontiers, from the Roman lines to the Great Wall of China; the bunkers, as ultimate military surface architecture had shipwrecked at lands’ limits, at the precise moment of the sky’s arrival in war; they marked off the horizontal littoral, the continental limit. History had changed course one final time before jumping into the immensity of aerial space.” -Paul Virilio, 1975

figure 4.1: Aerial over Stützpunkt Vigsö, 1975 [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

4 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

LANDSCAPE AS ARCHIVE The design thesis targets one moment along the Atlantic Wall, StĂźtzpunkt VigsĂś (Strongpoint VigsĂ¸, a former Nazi Army battery established in 1941 for the defense of the Skagerrak) on the northwest coast of Jutland, Denmark, for the analysis of contesting cultural and natural forces that are shaping this landscape of war. The design proposal itself is a reinscription of the specific site history as a physical/experiential archive in the built environment.

In this case, constructing and revealing a

narrative in a didactic landscape is considered a means for the writing a site history.

The effects of rapid coastal erosion, represented in

cartographic documentation and aerial photography, and the urgency to protect the Atlantic Wall bunkers as cultural artifacts, propagated by the Atlantic Wall Linear Museum, comprise the most relevant evidence for the legitimization of an intervention in the site. While the main thesis objective is to respond to site-specific issues, the project is also a field exercise for a historically driven design process. The thesis is an opportunity to test an approach under extreme cultural and natural conditions and constraints. Writing a history of the site with an architectural/landscape intervention is both a concept for the thesis and a lesson that I will apply in future work. More foundationally, the thesis is a rejection of the epistemological concept of tabula rasa. The site is understood as a palimpsest that cannot be wiped clean, and the new intervention is unavoidably and intentionally informed by events and processes that preceded it. The design elements represent the most recent physical layer of the site, which continues to evolve as a symbiotic system of natural and cultural forces. In order to determine a strategy for unfolding a narrative in the physicality of the site, the emplotment is arranged based on a consultation of cultural and environmental context at the micro- and

macro-scale.1 A sequence of events particular to WWII and the German occupation of Denmark is the most relevant history for explaining the architectural relics of Stützpunk Vigsö.

Mapping of the site at local and

global scales provides an illustration of military strategy and the significance of positioning in light of Nazi objectives. A kind of military urbanism was developed—the physicality of the landscape and the ranges of weaponry, communication, and visuality provided the necessary information to determine the location of the strongpoints as well as the subordinate components. A practice of Bunker Archeology, inspired by the work of Paul Virilio, becomes a means to understand the physical remains as delineations of military space during WWII. Environmental factors such as ocean currents, wind, and coastal erosion are charted alongside the military history—a narration of how the territorial networks have been deterritorialized by nature.2 The element of time—a datum for organizing platforms of experience—is understood as both a linear and cyclical motion (Figure 4.2) according to Hanna Arendt’s framework in her book Between Past and Future. The design proposal anticipates that certain elements will gradually progress towards Ruin, while others will turn inwards for Renewal. Figure 4.3 illustrates the assumption that architecture (the built environment as a cultural construct) follows the more linear trajectory towards eventual ruin, and landscape (a natural phenomenon) is involved in the continual process of renewing itself. Architectural permanence is called into question by a new piece of infrastructure that interrupts and redirects both movements towards Ruin and Renewal of the architectural relics and the natural landscape.

Munslow, Alun. 2000. The Routledge Companion to Historical Studies / Alun Munslow. London: Routledge. p. 89-91, 180. 2 The concept of deterritorialization is borrowed from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattarri and applied to the underpinnings for a theoretical understanding of a current battle between nature and culture on the site. The delineation of territory as it is being contested, is read in the thesis as a series of battles and alliances amongst various “players.” The original formation of the strongpoint for military defense is considered a territorial intervention. Nature represents a deterritorializing force, which decontextualizes the original networks and relationships and accelerates the condition of cultural amnesia—loss of memory or association with significant historical events and/or misunderstanding of how one might relate them to the current expression of culture. See Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1977. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. New York: Viking Press.

4 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS For the purpose of this paper, the thesis is placed in the broader context of Knowledge by association with voices that form alliances with or oppose the theoretical assumptions deployed in conceiving the design solution.

I. ALLIES The articulation and significance of context as a design consideration is a contested topic—debated throughout history and often causing a rift between the practice of architecture and landscape architecture, especially in the United States. In an essay for the book Site Matters, Sandy Isenstadt attests that context “can refer just as easily to surrounding fabric as to widespread attitudes, or even to debates regarding physical fabric...from built form to implied meaning to underlying ideology.”3 This project is aligned with attitudes towards context as any or all of these meanings for the representation of history in the targeted landscape of war.

Isenstadt further articulates the

application of context to architecture by deconstructing the meaning of the word itself:

“The word intensifies the act of joining, with con

meaning together, and text, from the Latin texere, meaning to join, or weave.”4

Joining and weaving are neutral metaphors for a design

process involving some kind of contextual interpretation. This thesis does not disagree with these associations, but assumes a more provocative stance—the act of interpreting historical context is confrontational in this former battlefield. In the fourth chapter of his book Making Social Science Matter, Bent Flyvberg argues that in the realm of social science, contextdependent activities must be abstracted “in order to subsequently explain and predict those activities in terms of formal relations (rules or laws) between the abstracted elements.”5 In line with his thinking, the site analysis consists of abstractions that are drawn from the “behavior” of the natural forces. The progression of coastal erosion is evident in aerial

3 Burns, Carol, and Andrea Kahn. 2005. Site Matters: Design Concepts, Histories, and Strategies. New York: Routledge. 158. 4 Ibid., 160. 5 Flyvbjerg, Bent. 2001. Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again. Oxford, UK: Cambridge University Press. 39.

photography from 1954 to the present.

A pattern of erosion that

generally sweeps sediment in the southeast direction is an abstraction of active complex processes visible from the sequence of aerial photographs. The pattern is assumed for the purpose of predicting how the construction of a jetty will reverse the active processes, causing deposition over the strongpoint. Figure 2 illustrates this practice. The abstraction, in this case, is mobilized to envision how the intervention confronts the deterritorializing force of nature. This not an attempt to recover the original territorial networks, but to engage an aesthetic approach to the inscription of an archive in this landscape—that is, to express the time and space between the proposed intervention and the objects of historical representation. Frank R. Ankersmit, an intellectual forerunner of the concept of aesthetic turn in the writing of history, provides groundwork for the thesis.

His theory recommends, “Historians should be aware of the

essential aesthetic nature of history not to replace rational thought or empiricism but to widen the possibilities of the study of the past.”6 Architecture and landscape architecture as a media for the recording of history face the same predicament as any other means: Will the meaning of the past be absorbed in the form of the representation rather than the actual content? The thesis assumes a middle-ground position between pure

objectivity

and

subjectivity;

between

constructionist

and

reconstructionist tendencies. According to Alan Munslow’s summary: “The key principle of the aesthetic turn is to recognize that in giving a narrative form to the past the act of history writing is unavoidably ‘deforming’ it.”7 The design process is aimed towards the narration of history through an archival layering and de-layering of context, which does not attempt to reproduce any previous physical state. Reterritorialization, the response to natural deterritorialization previously discussed, implies a process of re-claiming the site for

6 7

Munslow, 21. Ibid., 22.

4 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS historical narrative.8 The struggle to design a framework for this process is articulated by Arendt: What is difficult for us to realize is that the great deeds and works of which mortals are capable, and which become the topic of historical narrative, are not seen as parts of either an encompassing whole or a process; on the contrary, the stress is always on single instances and single gestures. These single instances, deeds or events, interrupt the circular movement of daily life…The subject matter of history is these interruptions.9 Thus, reterritorialization is enacted for continuous motion (both in linear and cyclical fashion) rather than a prescribed series of single events. This is accomplished by first acknowledging the ties of the artifacts to natural phenomenon. In doing so the thesis confronts their current representation (and abandonment Atlantic Wall by extension) as a single instance within recent historical accounts and attitudes. The defensive infrastructure that remains on the Jutland coast is embedded in the natural processes, just as the memories that surround their construction and occupation are bound in cultural identity.

The

crumbling permanence of the Atlantic Wall in Denmark embodies the nation’s tolerance of the Nazi occupation—an “embarrassing” memory of WWII.10 Although the area surrounding the former strongpoint is protected under landscape preservation laws, it can also be interpreted that the state of neglect of sites such as Vigsø is the result of reluctance to reconcile contemporary cultural identity with past events. The design is an interpretation based on a context-rooted, but not strictly methodological, reading of site. Voices belonging to continental philosophy

reinforce

this

approach—in

particular,

thinkers

hermeneutical and phenomenological conviction. Hermeneutics supports the conceptual derivation for the project, which deploys historical

Reterritorialization is deployed by the thesis to suggest the act that follows deterritorialization as conceptualized by Deleuze and Guattarri, which is attributed to the nature for the purpose of this analysis. 9 Arendt, Hannah. 1968. “The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern,” in Between Past and Future; Eight Exercises in Political Thought. New York: Viking Press. 10 Postiglione, Gennaro. "Introduction." The Atlantic Wall Linear Museum © 2005. 2005. Web. 14 Mar. 2011. <http://www.atlanticwall.polimi.it/museum/project/project_introduction.php>.

interpretation as a guiding principle for staging the intervention at Stützpunk Vigsö. The proposed interventions; a jetty extended to reverse the process of erosion, and a series of excavations that allow visitors to re-engage the bunkers, are devices for viewing history from a “horizon” of “cultural situatedness.”11

Hans-Georg Gadamer’s concept of

“effective-historical consciousness” is mobilized through contemporary building methods for the construction of archival landscape. This type of record not only presents the subject itself (in this case the architectural artifacts) as remnants of a real history (Danish recollections of WWII), but also extends the opportunity to the current and future generations for the inscription of new memories that are separate from that most common association. Gadamer accepts this possible shift of focus from the

object

historical

representation.

“Every

intentional

experience…always implies a twofold open-ended horizon of what is not really intended in it but to which for that reason an actual intention at any time be directed.”12 He argues that this is still a means for understanding true meaning, because one’s comprehension of historical events is unavoidably united with self-understanding and life world experience.13 According to phenomenologist Martin Heidegger, one’s quest for understanding is a circular structure, through which one’s life world is constructed based on encompassing his or her own existence: The circle must not be denigrated to a vicious, or even to a tolerated, circle. In it lies hidden the positive potentiality of the most original knowledge, which of course is only genuinely grasped if the interpretation has understood that its first, permanent, and final task remains that of not accepting from flashes of inspiration and popular notions of a pretense of its own fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception, but rather to work these out of the subject matter itself and thereby secure the topic under study.14

Munslow, 130. Weinsheimer, Joel, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. 1985. Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method. New Haven: Yale University Press. 157. 13 Ibid., 158. 14 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “On the Circle of Understanding.” In Hermeneutics Versus Science, translated and edited by John M. Connolly and Thomas Keutner, 68-78. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998. Print. 70-71. 12

4 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

y or st re tu na

cu lt u ec ol re og y

individual

n ma

al w ne

landscape

figure 4.2: Cyclical and linear time [original composition]

nature culture

ruin

memory

architecture

human history

ecology memory

figure 4.3: Position diagram [original composition]

How, then, does a choreographed architectural intervention allow the improvisational understanding of historical events and cultural situatedness? This question arises in the translation of hermeneutical theory to practice. Heidegger’s deliberation, as explained by Gadamer, attests “not so much in proving the existence of this circle as in showing its ontologically positive meaning,” and that “all correct interpretation has to screen itself against arbitrary whims and the narrowness of imperceptible habit of thinking, training its sights ‘on the objects themselves.’”15 Ontology, therefore, becomes a means for conceiving the design—both from the perception of the architect-historian and the eventual user (war tourist, wanderer, artist, etc.) This exercise does not assume to cover a multitude of individual experiences by shouldering the burden of anticipating countless interpretations. Rather, the interventions seek resolution in the close combat of conflicting forces such as erosion vs. fortification, nature vs. war, time vs. memory, culture vs. history. Through observing various battles, the eventual user constructs a historical interpretation—based on self-reflection and often pre-disposed agenda (the desire to know something about the site). As the architecthistorian, my role is to provoke this encounter. Although in envisioning the interventions I am also operating from my own ontological horizon, Heidegger and Gadamer assert that this position does not impede the effective recording of history. Principles of phenomenology, as articulated by Heidegger and Edmund Husserl, are integral for imagining spatial materialization. Linear and cyclical concepts of time are at all times considered (Figure 3), even after the arrival of the visitor to the site. This diagram is applied also on an individual basis to the memory of the user, who is able to possess a hind-sight regarding the visit and proceed with subjectivity— that is, his or her own perception of history/reality. Husserl suggests that the experience of the site is guided by a predisposed expectation, but encoded according to less predictable impressions on the user. “Every experience has implicit horizons of before and after, and fuses finally

Gadamer, 70-71.

4 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS with the continuum of experiences that are present before and after into the unity of the flow of experience.”16 Representation of the final design solution and the process throughout is not a construct of empiricist belief—that true knowledge of the past is independent of our representation of history.

Rather,

iterations of several methods of representation (mapping, collage, erasure, palimpsest, superimposition, and diagram) are vehicles for understanding the past and events and processes that have shaped the site in relatively recent accounts. Through these methods, the past, present, and projections of the future can be viewed simultaneously (Figure 4).

II. OPPONENTS A specific context-driven approach to an intervention on this site is, at first, most directly in opposition with the original ambition of the Atlantic Wall, which was the application of a universal solution to the need for a defensive strategy at a grand scale. Hitler’s emphasis on the permanent entrenchment of troops and artillery along the entire Atlantic Coast was a reversal of the previously embraced “blitzkrieg” (“lightning war”) concept of rapid mobile attack and infiltration. Characteristic of a much more defensive posture—fueled by chronic megalomania— Hitler’s obsession with the development of the Atlantic Wall fortifications propagated an outrageous consumption of resources and energy. The Organization Todt (OT), headed by Albert Speer by this time, was mobilized to generate standardized bunker designs for application to the entire system.

Under Hitler, architecture was an

expression of power above all else. To the detriment of his own reign, Hitler refused to accept the conditions of real time and real space—a supposed symptom of the technological surge that breached the confines of pre-virtual warfare. The weapons of the virtual stage projected a vast (to Hitler, an intoxicating) realm of probable conquest.17 The jetty and excavations are a kind of defense—more of collective memory than territory; more of terra firma than original land formation.

Thus, the more variable and spontaneous elements are

16 17

Weinsheimer, 156. Speer, Albert. 1970. Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs. [New York]: Macmillan.

considered the liability here: the multiplicity of user-defined value and identity rather than the previous inscription, which was concerned with one dominant perspective on the military value of the territory. The Nazi ideology (though politically driven and blinded by the megalomania of the Führer) shares similar themes with European Architectural Modernism. In particular, the concept of tabula rasa— erasure upon encounter with a site—propagated a trend that considered context a hindrance to design process. The Atlantic Wall fortifications were built upon this very assumption. In the case of Stützpunk Vigsö, it would have been more advantageous to regard the dynamic forces of wind and ocean currents than a strict adherence to military prowess. Rapid coastal erosion began to cause structural failures within one year of its construction. The terra firma was a method of camouflage integral to the stealth of counter-attack, and yet was being washed away. Once the territorial networks had been exposed, the strongpoint was rendered vulnerable and obsolete. Advocates

mimesis,

such

Paul

Ricoeur,

representation through interpretive means and measures.

oppose

“Mimesis

defines that state or object of aesthetic representation that, it believes, resembles what it resembles what it represents.”18 The thesis, which prioritizes the form of the historical narrative, is not a direct translation or representation of content. This approach was immediately dismissed due to the natural constraints, which would have required extreme structural gymnastics to withstand the force of erosion. The construction of a seawall parallel to the coastline, rather than a jetty, which fortifies in the perpendicular direction, is a more historically accurate means of containing the terra firma. The fact that the Nazis had employed this strategy during the German occupation would further support a practice of

mimesis—possibly

manifesting

similar

type

parallel

infrastructure. The narrative construction—conceived from an ontological horizon—is criticized by thinkers such as Wilhelm Dilthey. Narration, according to Dilthey, requires a re-enactment of history as it was

Munslow, 174.

4 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS experienced in the lives of past peoples.

Therefore, the architect-

historian must be able to distinguish from interpretation based on his or her horizon and that of other story tellers. Paul Ricoeur supplies a major critique of the choice to navigate away from a literal representation of the past for the narration of history. He is insistent upon the historical narrative remaining referential—that is, “there is a fundamental and indissoluble link between ‘telling a story’ and the reality of change over time.”19 In the built environment, this could take the form of Disneyfication/Disneyization, which is a restaging of the pre-existing context in a manner that is more pleasant and approachable.20 Perhaps this concept represents an extreme adherence to principles of mimesis, but it nonetheless articulates a stance that would oppose the hermeneutical, aesthetically driven interpretation.

For an

intervention at Stützpunk Vigsö, Disneyfication would attempt to recreate the experience of the soldiers who occupied the fort, allowing the visitor a clearer perception of how the site was originally operated. This would involve patching up the wear that nature has caused to the concrete, outfitting the bunkers with reproductions of weaponry and equipment, re-digging the trenches that connected the individual components, and populating the space with mannequins in traditional uniform (a kitschy, but often utilized tactic to reorient the visitor within the historically fabricated context.) Like the literal projections of historical fact, the unveiling of universal truth is not an objective of the thesis. The Platonic assertion that “genuine knowledge of the object ‘out there’ is waiting to be ‘discovered’ and is not the product of the mechanism(s) deployed for the inquiry,” contrasts with the ontological understanding of the site deployed here.21 Neutrality of perspective is viewed as impossible and unproductive for the purpose of representing history, because the architect-historian is never divorced from his or her horizon. Therefore, other Enlightenment-inspired ideologies that support the “separations of knower and known, observer and observed, history and fiction, history

Munslow, 174. Ferrell, Jeff. 2001. Tearing Down the Streets: Adventures in Urban Anarchy. New York: Palgrave. 21 Munslow, 68. 20

and historian, and truth and value” are confronted in the theoretical convictions of the thesis.22 Returning to the previously posed question: How, then, does a choreographed architectural intervention allow the improvisational understanding of historical events and cultural situatedness? For Hitler and his architect Albert Speer, an answer to this question was the application of a Theory of Ruin Value.

As articulated in Speer’s

memoirs: The building on the Zeppelin Field was begun at once, in order to have at least the platform ready for the coming Party Rally. To clear the ground for it, the Nuremberg streetcar depot had to be removed. I passed by its remains after it had been blown up. The iron reinforcements protruded from concrete debris and had already begun to decay. This dreary sight led me to some thoughts, which I later propounded to Hitler under the pretentious heading of ‘A Theory of Ruin Value.’ The idea was the buildings of modern construction were poorly suited to form that ‘bridge of tradition’ to future generations, which Hitler was calling for. It was hard to imagine that rusting heaps of rubble could communicate these heroic inspirations, which Hitler admired in the monuments of the past. My ‘theory’ was intended to deal with the dilemma. By using special materials and by applying certain principles of statics, we should be able to build structures which even in a state of decay, after hundreds or (such were our reckonings) thousands of years would more or less resemble Roman models...He himself accepted my ideas as logical and illuminating.23

figure 4.4: “Cathedral of Light” at Zeppelin Field, by Albert Speer in 1938 [top image: http://www.kubiss.de/ In bottom image: http://www.militarynewsnetwork.com] subjective

other words, history would be conveyed, in a purely manner, through the grandeur of predisposed monuments.

While it is arguable that the jetty and excavations are also predisposed to monumentality, they are distinct from Ruin Value in their acceptance of decay and eventual failure.

Additionally, the interventions were

conceived to accentuate the very forces of nature and time that Hitler and Speer were attempting to combat. The process of reterritorialization comprises the poetics of the narrative, allowing the user to place his or herself in the larger ontological context, rather than in a position of

22 23

Munslow, 68. Speer, 1969.

4 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS inferiority to the empire that had established a previous notion of territory. Furthermore, the architectural interventions are not intended to withstand another cycle of deterritorialization, but are presumed to surrender within 100 years. Hitler and Speer would contest the destructive forces of nature that are privileged in the representation and narration of history. The architecture (the bunkers, jetty, and excavation infrastructure) is in submission to natural unrest and the displacement of terra firma, which was not the original intent of the strongpoint.

A praiseworthy

representation, according to the Nazi principles, would exude permanence rather than flux.

Historical realism argues the issue of

representation further, asserting that if the past cannot be represented in its original form, the actual truth cannot be recovered. Therefore, all statements made about the site are considered â&#x20AC;&#x153;true.â&#x20AC;?

III. BATTLE TACTICS Landscape as archive, although representative of a middle-ground stance between total objectivity and subjectivity in its inscription of historical narrative, involved the aggregation of materials.

The legitimized

documentation is made available for the conduction of other types of study, in addition to the purposes of site analysis. In preparation for the design portion of the thesis, historic imagery, text, maps, and drawings specific to the site were compiled for the document. As a prelude to hermeneutical interpretation, the raw materials resemble the untouched site. For the purpose of the architectural design, these materials become the actual siteâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;reinforcing the connection between representation and reality. The defense of the thesis is accomplished through the mediation of a real need to slow the process of rapid coastal erosion in this area and the desire to address issues of collective identity and memory. The Atlantic Wall Linear Museum provides a rationale for the intervention, attesting that the Atlantic Wall fortifications are valued as a transnational cultural heritage that should be safeguarded. Its forerunners (architects, historians, scholars, thinkers, and curators from all over the world) view the bunkers themselves as significant for their architectural quality, their

being a new aesthetic cannon for modernity, and their relationships with natural and urban contexts.

The extensive network of fortifications

represents the largest physical artifact of collective European culture— embodying a public and shared memory of World War II. The design proposal is meant to serve the larger purpose of the Atlantic Wall Linear Museum, encouraging Stutzpunkt Vigso as a destination for cultural definition and didactic exploration. In addition to these ambitions, the thesis also encompasses the blurring of architectural and landscape architectural practice. Although the subject matter is atypical, the process of analyzing and interpreting context aids in blending the two disciplines. In light of the opposition that still promotes a divide in practice, recent discourse expresses the desire to formally acknowledge that architecture and landscape architectural strategies are complimentary and, at times, synonymous. In the preface of the book Recovering Landscapes, James Corner presents the topic of landscape as a fluid practice: Rarely is landscape used to refer solely to pastoral scenery or garden planting, for instance—images with which it is most conventionally associated. Instead, its usage is diverse and rich, embracing urbanism, infrastructure, strategic planning, and speculative ideas alongside the more familiar themes of nature and environment. This richness points to the reasons why the recovery of landscape is such a promising cultural enterprise, for it invokes less the recuperation and restoration of passive artifact and more the extension and realization of landscape’s hidden potential.24 figure 4.5: Dune formation over Stützpunkt Vigsö [Google Earth]

Corner, James. 1999. Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape Architecture. New York: Princeton Architectural Press. ix.

4 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

The thesis is a small maneuver towards this union. Architecture and landscape architecture are a means for imagining the promotion of preservation in memory through confronting complex history and inscribing new memories on the site. The archive embodies an action of collection and restoration in regard to both the natural and cultural forces at war.

figure 4.6: Dune formation near Battery at Hanstholm [http://nordjylland.flyfotoarkivet.dk/]

figure 4.7: Surface texture detail [http://nordjylland.flyfotoarkivet.dk/]

{R E C O N N A I S S A N C E }

figure 5.1: Map of Hanstholm and authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s visit [authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s composition, original map from: en.wikipedia.org]

figure 5.2: Passage 1 [authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s composition, base photograph from: Museumscenter Hanstholm]

5 RECONNAISSANCE

Wanderlust: (noun) a strong longing for or impulse towards wandering. [German: literally, “wander desire”]

WANDERLUST The following images of the Vigsø bunkers and the surrounding landscape were captured during two separate hikes from Hanstholm, Denmark, on June 17th and 19th of 2010. My experience of the site is preserved in this sequence; the order is chronological, and qualities of texture, environment, scale, and spatiality are framed as I encountered them. The photo-journal of Stützpunkt Vigsö was the first of several studies. Prior to the first hike, I consulted Google Earth and a tourist map of Hanstholm (Figure 5.1) to orient myself with the surrounding coastline. I traversed the entire distance to Vigsø on foot along the beach (approximately 8 kilometers) surveying the effects of coastal erosion and discovering the remains of other German bunkers. I spent the majority of June 18th researching at the Museumscenter Hanstholm and was fortunate to meet with Jens Anderson, an expert on German bunkers in Denmark and curator of the museum, who provided me with historic images, maps, and other resources for this compilation of extensive site materials.

I took a second hike to Vigsø on June 19th, this time

traversing small pedestrian paths in the bluffs off the edge of the coast. I explored the site for several hours and watched other tourists clamber around the giant concrete shells.

plate 5.1: Approach to the site from northwest Bunker type F1. 277: Scheinwerferstand, Searchlight Post (#25-01-24) Bunker type 681 (#25-01-19) partially intact, detail of 1 cm core rods

5 RECONNAISSANCE

plate 5.2: Along the beach, in between the bluffs and the fortifications Bunker type 622: Doppelgruppenunterstand, Twin Group Bunker (#25-01-11) East elevation of #25-01-11 showing entry portals â&#x20AC;&#x153;Marsâ&#x20AC;? (bottom right), type 134, Ammunition Bunker I (#25-01-16)

plate 5.3: Weaving through the remains Looking through entry portal of (#25-01-16), Toppled small shelter (type 58c, #25-01-29) and the bluff, #25-01-16 photographed from the west corner and the east (bottom right, two images)

5 RECONNAISSANCE

plate 5.4: On to the bluff Bunker type 69 (bottom image): Circular Position for Heavy Mortar (25-01-43)

figure 5.3: Passage 3 [authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s composition, base photograph from: Museumscenter Hanstholm]

5 RECONNAISSANCE

plate 5.5: Gravel road from Hanstholm, walking up on the bluff towards VigsĂ¸

plate 5.6: Topography and vegetation

5 RECONNAISSANCE

plate 5.7: Edge of the terra firma, footpaths to the strongpoint

plate 5.8: Unearthing #25-01-16 (top and bottom left), #25-01-11 (second on left) Type 501: Single Group Bunker (#25-01-10, bottom).

5 RECONNAISSANCE

plate 5.9: Details of graffiti and board form concrete texture, views of the bluffs and bunker formation #25-01-16 (top and bottom left), #25-01-11 (second on left)

plate 5.10: Wandering through the formation

5 RECONNAISSANCE

plate 5.11: Up on the bluffs, existing tourist infrastructure

plate 5.12: Paths over the site, views from the top of the bluff

5 RECONNAISSANCE

plate 5.13: Views of the edge of the bluffs and the site

plate 5.14: Topography study

5 RECONNAISSANCE

plate 5.15: Views of the site from a distance

plate 5.16: Evidence of erosion

5 RECONNAISSANCE BUNKER REGISTRY An inventory of the remains of StĂźtzpunkt VigsĂś was conducted in 1991 in order to document the types of bunkers that were constructed by the Germans and to note the visibility, accessibility, and security of each structure. Key Danish and German terms and phrases are translated to English on pages v and vi. The drawings of the bunkers were drawn in Autocad, and used in conjunction with the information from the 1991 registry to reconstruct the site digitally for the thesis.

plate 5.17: Bunker registry [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

4 3

29 1

1 2

4 3

figure 5.4: 58c: 29 Ringstand f端r M.G. und Leichten Granatwerfer Circular Position for M.G. Light Mortar 1 (concrete: 11.5 m3)

1 2

figure 5.6: 120: Artillerie-Beobachtungsstand mit Panzerturm Artillery Observation Post with Tank Turret (concrete: 629 m3)

43 66

3 31

1 2

figure 5.5: 69: Ringstand f端r Schweren Granatwerfer 34 Circular Position for Heavy Mortar (concrete: 38 m3) 1

2 21

4 43

3 1

figure 5.7: 134: Munitionsunterstand I 4 Ammunition Bunker I (concrete: 500 m3)

84 31

5 RECONNAISSANCE

3 31

1 2

figure 5.8: F1 277: Scheinwerferstand 150 cm Searchlight Post 150 cm (concrete: 920 m3)

3 4 3 29 figure 5.9: L 409A: Unterstand mit Aufgesetztem Gesch端tzstand 2/3, 7 cm Flak Bunker/Shelter with Mounted Gun Emplacement 2/3, 7 cm Flak (concrete: 635 m3)

12 figure 5.10: 501: Einfacher Gruppenunterstand Single Group Bunker (concrete: 356 m3)

figure 5.11: 607: Munitionsunterstand II Ammunition Bunker II (concrete: 700 m3)

1 6

figure 5.12: 622: Doppelgruppenunterstand Twin Group Bunker (concrete: 600 m3)

5 RECONNAISSANCE

27 1 3

figure 5.13: 636: Befehlsstand f端r Heeresk端stenbatterie Command Post for the Army Coastal Battery (concrete: 960 m3)

2 21

3 30 1 6

figure 5.14: 645: Unterstand für eine Küche Bunker/Shelter for a Kitchen (concrete: 605 m3)

figure 5.16: 681: M.G. - Schartenstand ohne Nebenräume Embrasured Position without Annexes (concrete: 280 m3)

5 4

figure 5.15: 671: Schartenstand für Geschütze auf mittlere Sockellafette Embrasured Position for Guns in the Medium Pedestal Mount (concrete: 320 m3)

5 RECONNAISSANCE

plate 5.18: Original construction drawings and sketches [Museumscenter Hanstholm]

plate 5.19: Cartographic morphology 1: 1842-1899 (left), 1928-1940 (right) [http://kmswww3.kms.dk]

5 RECONNAISSANCE

plate 5.20: Cartographic morphology 2: 1980-2001 (left), 1944 (right) [left image: http://kmswww3.kms.dk, right image: Museumscenter Hanstholm]

plate 5.21: Mapping game study of coastal erosion 1 [Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s composition, original images from: http://kmswww3.kms.dk and Google Earth]

C D

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

A B C D E F G

5 RECONNAISSANCE

H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 R S

T U

V W X Y Z

plate 5.22: Mapping game study of coastal erosion 2 [Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s composition, original images from: http://kmswww3.kms.dk and Google Earth]

{ D E S I G N P R O P O S A L} “The earth’s surface and the figments of the mind have a way of disintegrating into descrete regions of art. Various agents, both fictional and real, somehow trade places with each other - one cannot avoid muddy thinking when it comes to earth projects, or what I call ‘abstract geology.’ One’s mind and the earth are in a constant state of erosion, mental rivers wear away abstract banks, brain waves undermine cliffs of thought, ideas decompose into stones of unknowing, and conceptual crystallizations break apart into deposits of gritty reason...” -Robert Smithson

figure 6.1: Aftermath studies in photography and model

6 DESIGN PROPOSAL

(RE)TERRITORIALIZING INFRASTRUCTURES As discussed in the previous chapters, the intervention is staged on the beach at Vigsö on the northwest coast of Jutland, Denmark, at the mouth of the Skagerrak straight near the port of Hanstholm—one of Denmark’s largest fishing ports. The port of Hanstholm’s economic significance is due largely to its geographical position, from which goods are shipped to Norway, Sweden, and the rest of Northern Europe via the Baltic Sea. This connectivity became a liability at the onset of World War II. In planning operations for the Atlantic Wall fortifications, the German High Command recognized the Skagerrak as a strategic point of entry for an allied infiltration of the Baltic Sea. The hardening of the Jutland coast was a small, but strategic section within the massive network of fortifications that spanned from the tip of northern Norway to southern Spain. The most vulnerable and valuable nodes along the coastline were fortified by extending defensive networks and establishing strongpoints. A kind of military urbanism developed—the physicality of the landscape and the ranges of weaponry, communication, and visuality provided the necessary information to determine the location of the strongpoints as well as the subordinate components.

PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS The defensive formation at Vigsö is comprised of fourteen types of Regelbau construction (24 permanent structures in total). Approximately 3,800 bunkers were built in Denmark during the furious building campaign from 1940-1945. The placement of the bunkers is evident of strategic positioning on the site as well as the internal configurations. Through a practice of Bunker Archeology, inspired by the work of Paul Virilio, the territorial networks that delineated the military space of WWII are exposed and reconstructed for the appropriating the design

intervention. The artifacts generated during this process are inventoried in Chapter Five. Just as this strip of coastline is connected to the larger Atlantic Wall network, so is the boundary line of the terra firma subject to the natural forces of wind and ocean currents at a global scale. Rapid coastal erosion began to de-territorialize the bunker formation within one year of its construction in 1943. A survey of aerial photographs shows that this particular edge has receded fifty to one hundred meters since 1954, a little over ten years since the strongpoint was established. The thesis assumes and accepts that this subject matter is highly controversial.

The intention of the proposal is not to preserve the

bunkers and the Atlantic Wall by extension as relics of a great empire. As the designer in this realm, I also acknowledge that I am a foreigner— both in geography and generation—to the lived history of this site in the context of WWII. Therefore, it is important to rearticulate the theoretical underpinnings, which assert this project as an archive of a significant national history and identity. Having established that this is a battleground, the thesis should be read as an act to disarm Albert Speer’s Theory of Ruin Value that he developed while working as an architect for Adolf Hitler. The concept of Ruin Value was applied to the state architecture in order that the buildings were designed to age as aesthetically pleasing ruins, speaking to the grandeur of the Nazi Empire. This intervention manifests time in terms of cultural and natural processes, making evident the inherent fallacy of Speer and Hitler’s conception of Ruin Value.

DESIGN STRATEGIES The design proposal recognizes that nature is disheveling the territorial networks enforced by the German defensive strategy. Thus this study is at the intersection of cultural and natural histories. As the wind carves away at the coastline, the design interjects to reterritorialize the strongpoint. As a conceptual exercise, the intervention suggests a96 manner of contesting the permanence of architecture in a built

6 DESIGN PROPOSAL

Open air museum Preserved war landscape

Hanstholm Bunker Museum (Museumscenter Hanstholm)

(Re)territorialization Site Jetty and excavations

plate 6.1: WWII pilgrimage sites near Hanstholm [Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s composition, original images from: Museumscenter Hanstholm and http://nordjylland.flyfotoarkivet.dk/]

buildings were designed to age as aesthetically pleasing ruins, speaking to the grandeur of the Nazi Empire. This intervention manifests time in terms of cultural and natural processes, making evident the inherent fallacy of Speer and Hitlerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s conception of Ruin Value.

As a conceptual exercise, the intervention suggests a

manner of contesting the permanence of architecture in a built environment of war. Sited in a fulcrum of dynamic forces, the design itself acts as a catalyst.

plate 6.2: Site analysis and conceptual development 1

6 DESIGN PROPOSAL

plate 6.3: Site analysis and conceptual development 2

plate 6.4: Topography model

100

6 DESIGN PROPOSAL

plate 6.5: Earth-shaping forces of nature and war

101

102

6 DESIGN PROPOSAL

plate 6.6: Topography

103

104

6 DESIGN PROPOSAL

plate 6.7: Vanishing coastline

105

JETTY The issue of rapid erosion is confronted in the perpendicular direction of the coastline with the construction of a jetty that extends past the original front of the strongpoint. The angle of the structure responds directly to the natural forces of wind and ocean currents in order to initiate the reaggregation of terra firma. This maneuver was configured according to standard coastal defensive strategiesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the construction of jetties and groins is a common solution for slowing the process of erosion in similar sites. The jetty, like the bunkers, is monolithic.

Constructed by

consecutive pours of concrete and sculpted to deflect the waves, the new infrastructure, unlike the bunkers, confronts the forces of nature directly. The entire length of the jetty is approximately 300 meters from the current coastline. The structure is crenelated and notched on the surface to denote projections from the formation of the strongpoint and mark the progression of coastal erosion. Once the jetty is in place, deposition of sediment will occur on the west side of the structure, building up over time and eventually partaking in the destruction of the jetty. The jetty serves as a datum also for the deposition process and is re-notched to incorporate information about its own history of interaction with the natural forces of the site. The notches frame cultural views of the coast. This structure may be inhabited along its entire length. A series of diagrammatic cross sections demonstrate how the form of the jetty augments to protect the visitor as he or she moves father from the terra firma.

There is a slight angle to the ground plane that is barely

perceptible until one traverses a great distance along the jetty. The wall, which protects the visitor on the east side of the structure, maintains a consistent elevation. As deposition increases over time, the jetty will also become part of the dry landscape. It is possible that the structure will fail. This is shown in the aerial photography sequence, which anticipates that the jetty breaks off somewhere in its mid-section. The process of erosion

figure 6.2: Notch derivation

106

6 DESIGN PROPOSAL

plate 6.8: Site planning process drawings

107

figure 6.3: Site plan (West)

108

6 DESIGN PROPOSAL

figure 6.4: Site plan (East)

109

plate 6.9: Intervention timeline 1954-2100

110

6 DESIGN PROPOSAL

plate 6.10: Site history story board

111

progression of coastal erosion. Once the jetty is in place, deposition of sediment will occur on the west side of the structure, building up over time and eventually partaking in the destruction of the jetty. The jetty serves as a datum also for the deposition process and is re-notched to incorporate information about its own history of interaction with the natural forces of the site. The notches frame cultural views of the coast. This structure may be inhabited along its entire length. A series of diagrammatic cross sections demonstrate how the form of the jetty augments to protect the visitor as he or she moves father from the terra firma.

There is a slight angle to the ground plane that is barely

plate 6.11: Jetty section diagrams 1

112

6 DESIGN PROPOSAL

plate 6.12: Jetty section diagrams 2

113

Constructed by

consecutive pours of concrete and sculpted to deflect the waves, the new figure 6.5: Rendering: Sunbathing near the jetty

infrastructure, unlike the bunkers, confronts the forces of nature directly. The entire length of the jetty is approximately 300 meters from the current coastline. The structure is crenelated and notched on the surface to denote projections from the formation of the strongpoint and mark the progression of coastal erosion. Once the jetty is in place, deposition of sediment will occur on the west side of the structure, building up over time and eventually partaking in the destruction of the jetty. The jetty serves as a datum also for the deposition process and is re-notched to incorporate information about its own history of interaction with the natural forces of the site. The notches frame cultural views of the coast. This structure may be inhabited along its entire length. A series of diagrammatic cross sections demonstrate how the form of the jetty augments to protect the visitor as he or she moves father from the terra

firma.6.6: There is War a slight angle figure Rendering: voyeurism

to the ground plane that is barely

EXCAVATION SEQUENCE: SPIRAL RAMP As deposition over the strongpoint occurs, the bunkers are buried. The first excavation is suggested to occur in the southern corner of the strongpoint grouping in an area unexposed to the coastal erosion that threatens the front components. This intervention uncovers a Regelbau #120A bunker type, called â&#x20AC;&#x153;Aschberg.â&#x20AC;?

This type was an artillery 114 observation post with a tank turret for heavy artillery. About 629 cubic meters of concrete were needed to construct this bunker, roughly

6 DESIGN PROPOSAL

figure 6.7: Composite site plan

figure 6.8: Conceptual image: A datum for recording marks of culture

115

would begin to carve away at the landform created by the jetty, and the bunkers would be unearthed once more.

This type was an artillery

observation post with a tank turret for heavy artillery. About 629 cubic meters of concrete were needed to construct this bunker, roughly dimensioned 11.6m (L) by 14.35m (W) by 6.4m (H). According to historic maps of the site, the standard bunker is oriented so that the close combat defense and the enfilade fire position faces north towards the coast—the direction of potential enemy invasion. The excavation takes the form of a spiral ramp, which funnels visitors to this strategic point of disarmament (as discussed in Chapter Two), facing the war voyeur with the enfilade fire position and the close combat defense behind. From this point the visitor can cross the threshold and explore the interior spaces. The interior of the bunker is untouched, and any significant artifacts that may be discovered in the excavation process will become property of the Museumscenter Hanstholm. The spiral excavation is created by a continuous retaining wall structure of weathered steel plates anchored in gravel and a concrete substructure. The plates, set in a radial configuration, allow for the seepage of sand, dirt, and plant material back into the excavation. This provides another means of measuring the natural redistribution of earth in this site at a much smaller scale than what is measured by the jetty. The spiral is roughly 100 meters in length, approximately one third of the jetty length. Its structure and configuration can be repeated to expose other portions of the site.

116

6 DESIGN PROPOSAL

plate 6.13: Excavation spiral and reburial sequence

117

plate 6.14: Excavation spiral model and drawing

118

dimensioned 11.6m (L) by 14.35m (W) by 6.4m (H). According to historic maps of the site, the standard bunker is oriented so that the close combat defense and the enfilade fire position faces north towards the coastâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the direction of potential enemy invasion. 6 DESIGN PROPOSAL The excavation takes the form of a spiral ramp, which funnels visitors to this strategic point of disarmament (as discussed in Chapter Two), facing the war voyeur with the enfilade fire position and the close combat defense behind. From this point the visitor can cross the threshold and explore the interior spaces. The interior of the bunker is untouched, and any significant artifacts that may be discovered in the excavation process will become property of the Museumscenter Hanstholm. The spiral excavation is created by a continuous retaining wall structure of weathered steel plates anchored in gravel and a concrete substructure. The plates, set in a radial configuration, allow for the seepage of sand, dirt, and plant material back into the excavation. This provides another means of measuring the natural redistribution of earth in this site at a much smaller scale than what is measured by the jetty. The spiral is roughly 100 meters in length, approximately one third of the jetty length. Its structure and configuration can be repeated to expose other portions of the site.

figure 6.9: Conceptual image of the excavation spiral

119

{ CONCLUSION } FINAL DEFENSE CRITIQUE The overall process and design was commended by the jury, comprised of two architects and two landscape architects, at the final defense on March 7, 2011. Their discussion was reflective of the tensions that I faced during the design process—principally, how to come to terms with the fact that architecture is subject to aging and destructive forces of nature.

The design confronts Speer’s Theory of Ruin Value and

questions the permanence of the built environment on this site. By reorienting the conceptual derivation of the thesis towards acknowledging and

emphasizing

these

processes,

the

design

solution—though

visionary—was successful as a compelling response to the disappearance of the terra firma at Vigsø Bugt, and the evolution of memory, specifically that of war. The jury engaged the project critically, proposing several alternate solutions, most of which had been explored in the design process. The crenellation of the jetty was challenged, as well as the decision to build only one structure. The materiality and configuration of the spiral excavation was also questioned. A good point was brought up by Julie Parrett, one of the landscape architects, who suggested that the structure of the spiral could be minimal.

Rather than a continuous

structure of the spiral could be minimal.

Rather than a continuous

concrete retaining wall encircling the excavation, a strategic holding back of the ground to create the descent might make for a more poetic experience. It would cause shifting ground that is its beauty. As I reflect 7 CONCLUSION on this comment, I think that the design is successful either way—the natural processes, I believe, would begin to vary the structure. Perhaps this is more intriguing, like the jetty, because nature acts as a second architect. Regarding the jetty, Jay Deguchi, one of the architects suggested extending the structure inland. This was an idea that I began to explore in the final week of design. The jury perceived the diagram of the jetty, which appears to form a pin-connection with the coastline, as weak and in contrast with the ambition of the structure. Extending and blending the structure into the terra firma of the dune landscape would ground the massive coastal defense, both structurally, if the design were to be realized, and conceptually as a diagram. The form of the jetty was also questioned, though the jury appreciated the variation of sectional geometry. In particular, the designation of the wall and the decision to allow visitors to only traverse one side of the structure, limiting vistas east of the site. The jury supported the overarching concept of inscribing an experiential archive in the didactic landscape, but encouraged me to push this agenda more.

A deeper engagement of the site analysis would

promote a more informed reinterpretation of the physical history. In order to accomplish this, I would focus on elements of time and the military rituals that would have created other intricate territorial relationships. This could be engaged in the process of excavation, which would be delineated in a manner reflective of this information.

REFLECTIONS The thesis objectives were: 1. To construct a reading of the extended site context that is informed by an abstracted understanding of military strategies, tactics, and maneuvers. 2. To mobilize the processes of architecture and landscape design to inscribe an experiential history of place—an archive in the built environment of war. A third objective was verified by the completion of the project and the defense: 3. To engage in a practice of design in the built environment that is acceptant of nature’s dominance—utilizing this truth as a creative, rather than a restrictive, force in the design process. 121 The final objective represents a current conversation that seeks to unify

questioned, though the jury appreciated the variation of sectional geometry. In particular, the designation of the wall and the decision to allow visitors to only traverse one side of the structure, limiting vistas east of the site. The jury supported the overarching concept of inscribing an experiential archive in the didactic landscape, but encouraged me to push this agenda more.

A deeper engagement of the site analysis would

REFLECTIONS The thesis objectives were: 1. To construct a reading of the extended site context that is informed by an abstracted understanding of military strategies, tactics, and figuremaneuvers. 7.1: Final board montage (site analysis) 2. To mobilize the processes of architecture and landscape design to inscribe an experiential history of placeâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;an archive in the built environment of war. A third objective was verified by the completion of the project and the defense: 3. To engage in a practice of design in the built environment that is acceptant of natureâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s dominanceâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;utilizing this truth as a creative, rather than a restrictive, force in the design process. The final objective represents a current conversation that seeks to unify the practices of architecture and landscape architecture in the built122 environment.

This project presented an extreme condition and a

7 CONCLUSION questioned, though the jury appreciated the variation of sectional geometry. In particular, the designation of the wall and the decision to allow visitors to only traverse one side of the structure, limiting vistas east of the site. The jury supported the overarching concept of inscribing an experiential archive in the didactic landscape, but encouraged me to push this agenda more.

A deeper engagement of the site analysis would

REFLECTIONS The thesis objectives were: 1. To construct a reading of the extended site context that is informed by an abstracted understanding of military strategies, tactics, and maneuvers. 2. To mobilize the processes of architecture and landscape design to inscribe an experiential history of place—an archive in the built environment of war. A third objective was verified by the completion of the project and the defense: 3. To engage in a practice of design in the built environment that is acceptant of nature’s dominance—utilizing this truth as a creative, figurerather 7.2: Final montage (design thanboard a restrictive, forceproposal) in the design process. The final objective represents a current conversation that seeks to unify the practices of architecture and landscape architecture in the built environment.

This project presented an extreme condition and a

visionary solution to this problem, while confronting cultural issues of war and national identity.

By exposing warring factions in this

landscape of war, a physical/experiential archive pays homage to the collective memories of WWII in Denmark as a didactic landscape to be engaged by future generations.

123

BIBLIOGRAPHY AMS Glossary. Web. 09 June 2011. <http://amsglossary.allenpress.com>. Allen, Stan. 1999. Points + Lines: Diagrams and Projects for the City. New York: Princeton Architectural Press. Andersen, Jens. 1999. The Atlantic Wall from Agger to Bulbjerg. [Nørre Nebel]: Blåvandshuk Egnsmuseum. Andersen, Jens, and Rudi Rolf. 2006. German Bunkers in Denmark. Middelburg: PRAK Publishing. Arendt, Hannah. 1968. “The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern,” in Between Past and Future; Eight Exercises in Political Thought. New York: Viking Press. Bachelard, Gaston, and M. Jolas. 1994. The poetics of space. Boston: Beacon Press. Brice, Martin Hubert. Stronghold: A History of Military Architecture. London: Batsford, 1984. Burns, Carol, and Andrea Kahn. 2005. Site Matters: Design Concepts, Histories, and Strategies. New York: Routledge. Corner, James. 1999. Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape Architecture. New York: Princeton Architectural Press. Czerniak, Julia, and George Hargreaves. 2007. Large parks. New York: Princeton Architectural Press. Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1977. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. New York: Viking Press. Diller, Elizabeth, and Ricardo Scofidio. 1994. Visite aux Armées: Tourismes de Guerre = Back to the Front: Tourisms of War. [Caen?]: F.R.A.C. Basse-Normandie. Ferrell, Jeff. 2001. Tearing Down the Streets: Adventures in Urban Anarchy. New York: Palgrave. Flyvbjerg, Bent. 2001. Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How it Can Succeed Again. Oxford, UK: Cambridge University Press. "FM23-22.68 Chapter 5 Combat Techniques of Fire." GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information. Web. 25 May 2011. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-2268/c05.htm>. Freeman, Edward Augustus. 1970. The Reign of William Rufus and the Accession of Henry the First. New York: AMS Press.

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Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “On the Circle of Understanding.” In Hermeneutics Versus Science, translated and edited by John M. Connolly and Thomas Keutner, 6878. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998. Print. Iliescu, Sanda. 2009. The Hand and the Soul: Aesthetics and Ethics in Architecture and Art. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. Jakobsen, F. 2000. "The Wind Influence on the Jutland Coastal Current Interpreted on the Basis of some Observations". NORDIC HYDROLOGY. 31: 127-148. Leach, Neil. 1997. Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory. New York: Routledge. Mallory, Keith, and Arvid Ottar. 1973. Architecture of Aggression; a History of Military Architecture in North West Europe, 1900-1945. London: Architectural Press. Marsh, William M. 1983. Landscape Planning: Environmental Applications. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley. 278. Munslow, Alun. 2000. The Routledge Companion to Historical Studies / Alun Munslow. London: Routledge. Museumscenter Hanstholm. Museumscenter Hanstholm. Web. 20 Sept. 2010. <http://www.museumscenterhanstholm.dk/>. Postiglione, Gennaro. "Introduction." The Atlantic Wall Linear Museum © 2005. 2005. Web. 14 Mar. 2011. <http://www.atlanticwall.polimi.it/museum/project/project_introduction.php>. Sobel, Dava. Longitude: The True Story of a Lone Genius Who Solved the Greatest Scientific Problem of His Time. New York: Walker, 1995. Speer, Albert. 1970. Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs. [New York]: Macmillan. Treib, Mark. 2005. Settings and stray paths Writings on lnadscapes and gardens. Virilio, Paul. War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception. London: Verso, 1989. Virilio, Paul, and Claude Parent. 1997. Architecture Principe 1966 and 1996. Santa Monica, Calif: Form Editions. Virilio, Paul, and George Collins. 1994. Bunker Archeology: Texts and Photos. New York, N.Y.: Princeton Architectural Press. Vitruvius Pollio, Ingrid D. Rowland, Thomas Noble Howe, and Michael Dewar. Vitruvius: Ten Books on Architecture. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Weinsheimer, Joel, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. 1985. Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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Abstract

Despite its contested history, the Atlantic Wall is valued as a transnational cultural heritage that should be safeguarded. The Atlantic Wall bunkers are significant for their architectural quality, influence towards a new aesthetic cannon for modernity, and spatial relationships with natural and urban contexts. The extensive network of fortifications represents the largest physical artifact of collective European culture—embodying a public and shared memory of WWII. Aligning with the ambitions of the Atlantic Wall Linear Museum, the design portion of the thesis proposes an intervention in the coastal landscape proximate to Stützpunkt Vigsö (Strongpoint Vigso), a former Nazi Army battery established in 1941 for the defense of the Skagerrak. Rapid coastal erosion has unearthed several bunkers that comprised the original formation, threatening to submerge the entire site underwater within the next 100 years. The proposed interventions—a jetty extended to reverse the process of erosion and a series of excavations that allow visitors to re-engage the architectural relics—are not an attempt to freeze the current state of certain infrastructural elements or landforms, but to confront the forces—both of nature and culture—that have shaped the site’s condition throughout history. A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Architecture. University of Washington College of Built Environments School of Architecture Spring Quarter 2011