Nongqai Vol 16 No 1B - Dr LD Barnard

VOORWOORD | PREFACE

Hennie Heymans

Dr LD Barnard

Dr LD Barnard was die laaste oorblywende direkteur-generaal van die voormalige RSA se veiligheids- en inligtingsgemeenskap. Al die hoofde van die voormalige SA Weermag en kommissarisse van die SA Polisie wat saam met hom op die staatsveiligheidsraad (SVR) gedien het, is nou oorlede. Slegs enkele voormalige adjunk-ministers wat op die SVR gedien het, is nog in die lewe. Maar mens kan sê dat op ‘n departementele vlak, daardie era nou finaal afgesluit word.

Nadat ek kritiek op dr Barnard in die media waargeneem het, het ek dr Willem Steenkamp, wat dr Barnard as lektor en as DG goed geken het, gevra om ‘n eerlike waardering en huldeblyk oor dr Barnard te skryf.

As lid van die sekretariaat van die staatsveiligheidsraad (SSVR) het ek dr Barnard ‘n paar keer ontmoet. Ek het hom opgesom as ‘n Christen met vaste beginsels. Hy het ook ‘n baie sterk persoonlikheid gehad. Hy het aan my erken dat hy nie veel ooghare vir sommige SAP-lede gehad nie! Ek sou nie onnodig met hom swaarde wou kruis nie!

Die redaksie het uit sy pad gegaan om ‘n gebalanseerde beeld van dr Barnard te skep wat die toets van kruisverhoor in enige hof sou deurstaan. Ook het ons geskryf in die konteks van on tyd!

Dr LD Barnard

Dr LD Barnard was the last remaining directorgeneral of the former RSA's security and intelligence community. All the heads of the former SADF and commissioners of the former SAP who served with him on the State Security Council (SSC) are now deceased. Only a few former deputy ministers who served on the SSC are still alive. But one can say that on a departmental level, that era is now finally coming to an end.

After observing criticism of Dr Barnard in the media, I asked Dr Willem Steenkamp, who knew Dr Barnard well as a lecturer and DG, to write an honest appreciation and tribute about Dr Barnard.

As a member of the Secretariat of the State Security Council (SSSC), I met Dr. Barnard a few times. I viewed him as a Christian with firm principles He admitted to me that he didn't like some SAP members! He also had a very strong personality. I would not want to cross swords with him unnecessarily!

The editors went out of their way to create a balanced image of Dr Barnard that would stand the test of cross-examination in any court. We also wrote in the context of our time!

HULDEBLYK: FAMILIE

NIËL BARNARD WAS ‘N BAANBREKER EN ONDERHANDELAAR, MAAR EERSTENS GESINSMAN EN INTELLIGENSIEMAN

Johan Mostert & Jan-Jan Joubert

Een van die grondleggers van die Suid-Afrikaanse demokrasie en moderne intelligensiedienste, Niël Barnard, is Maandagoggend in die ouderdom van 75 jaar oorlede. Jan-Jan Joubert en Johan Mostert neem bestek op van sy bydrae tot 'n onderhandelde skikking in 1994 in Suid-Afrika.

Foto: Niël Barnard was een van die eerste Westerse intelligensiehoofde wat na die val van die Berlynse Muur in 1989, direkte en uiters geheime skakelverhoudinge met die Komitét Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB), aangeknoop het. (Foto verskaf)

Dr. Lukas Daniël Barnard was ’n onwaarskynlike held, want hy het graag ’n beeld van stugge konserwatisme en behoudendheid voorgehou. Dit was egter juis hierdie onbuigsaam-eerlike gedrongenheid deur logika en feite wat hom daartoe gebring het om as voorste hervormer die onderhandelings vir ’n vreedsame oorgang na grondwetlike demokrasie te laat begin.

Niël Barnard is op 14 Junie 1949 in Otjiwarongo in die hedendaagse Namibië gebore. Hy het as student aan die Vrystaatse Universiteit in Bloemfontein akademies uitgeblink en het professor geword in Politieke Wetenskap (destyds Staatsleer genoem).

Dis vandaar dat hy gevra is om op die jeugdige ouderdom van 31 jaar Direkteur-Generaal van die Nasionale Intelligensie te word.

By bestekopname van Barnard se bydrae tot en deur die intellignsieraamwerke was daar veral twee aspekte wat opval:

• Sy bydrae in die totstandbrenging van ‘n demokratiese Suid-Afrika en in die verband dien Mandela se inskripsie in die kopie van Long Walk to Freedom wat hy aan Barnard gegee het as ‘n bewysstuk: “Best wishes to one of those patriotic South Africans who strived tirelessly & without publicity to help lay the foundations of the new South Africa”.

• Sy insig en onvermoeide ywer om die Nasionale Intelligensiediens (NI) uit te bou tot ‘n ware nasionale intelligensiediens wat ‘n saakmakende rol gespeel het in kritieke besluitneming op nasionale vlak en internasionaal respek afgedwing het.

Volgens sy eie interpretasie was Barnard sterk konserwatief toe hy by NI aangekom het. Sy siening van die bedreiging wat Suid-Afrika in die gesig gestaar het, het grootliks gestrook met die algemeen gangbare opvatting in owerheidsgeledere. Hy was egter ‘n goeie luisteraar met ‘n oop gemoed.

In NI het hy kennis geneem van ‘n alternatiewe siening wat op daardie stadium nie openlik na buite uitgespreek is nie. Volgens hierdie siening was die kernoorsaak van die aanslag teen Suid-Afrika nie in die eerste plek die werk van kommuniste en kwaadwillige agitators nie, maar was die werklike oorsaak geleë in die beleid van apartheid. Die harde realiteit wat deur NI geskilder is, het hom oortuig dat dit ‘n geldige gevolgtrekking op grond van die feite was.

Dit was egter nie ‘n gewilde vertolking nie. Om hierdie boodskap tuis te bring, moes met groot omsigtigheid te werk gegaan word. NI kon as verraaier gebrandmerk word omdat dit vertolk kon word as kritiek op en selfs dislojaliteit teenoor die regering.

Barnard het egter in die stilligheid voortgegaan om die boodskap oor te dra dat politieke verandering onvermydelik is en dat die ANC reeds as so ‘n groot magsfaktor ontwikkel het, dat dit nie in ‘n toekomstige bedeling geïgnoreer kan word nie. Hy het hierdie boodskap onomwonde, maar diplomaties aan die aanvanklike Eerste Minister en latere President PW Botha persoonlik oorgedra.

Teen daardie stadium was Botha so tevrede met die kwaliteit van NI se intelligensie, dat hy geluister het en NI toegelaat het om kontak te maak met die ANC om meer van die organisasie se standpunte te wete te kom. Barnard was toe reeds vir ‘n geruime tyd in gesprek met Mandela in die gevangenis en een van sy uitdagings was om die delikate balans tussen Mandela en die uitgeweke ANC te handhaaf.

Hy moes aan die een kant poog om ‘n verstandhouding met Mandela te bewerkstellig en aan die ander kant sorg dra dat die uitgeweke ANC Mandela nie as uitverkoper beskou nie. Barnard het twee baie belangrike boeke van hoogstaande gehalte oor hierdie fase van die Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis geskryf.

Uitbouing van NI

Barnard het baie bygedra tot die ontwikkeling van NI tot een van die top intelligensiedienste in die wêreld. Hy het NI, soos sommige dit gestel het, op sy kop omgekeer.

Van al die bydraes wat hy gelewer het, is daar een wat uitstaan uitstaan en bepalend was vir NI se sukses: sy bevordering van ‘n etos van uitnemendheid, meriete, harde werk, opoffering en integriteit. Hy het dit nie net verkondig nie, maar ook self die voorbeeld gestel en daarmee die organisasie met hom saamgeneem.

Toe Barnard in 1980 as Direkteur-Generaal diens by NI aanvaar, was die organisasie steeds in ‘n verouderde paradigma vasgevang. Die insameling van inligting (spioenasie) en teenspioenasie het voorrang geniet. Die derde been van intelligensie, naamlik vertolking, was die weeskind.

Dit is een van Barnard se groot verdienstes dat hy vertolking tot sy reg laat kom het. Daardeur is insigte ontwikkel wat hom in staat gestel het om die ware feite van die bedreiging tot op die hoogste vlak onder aandag te bring. Een van die insigte wat deur die navorsers (vertolkers) ontwikkel is, was die volgende:

Om die dringendheid van die veiligheidsituasie te illustreer, het die navorsers ‘n prent van ‘n driebeenpot waaronder ‘n vuurtjie brand met pap wat begin oorkook, aan die Staatsveiligheidsraad vertoon. Die boodskap was, dit gaan nie help om langer pogings aan te wend om met geweld die pot se deksel te probeer vasdruk om te voorkom dat dit oorkook nie. Die vuur is besig om groter te word en daar is nie voldoende vermoë om die deksel styf toe te bly hou sodat die pot nie oorkook nie. Die enigste oplossing is om die vuur te verwyder.

Dit was NI se bydrae om aan die regering te sê, dit gaan nie help om die manifestasie van die aanslag aan te spreek nie, die grondoorsaak moet verwyder word. Van die ministers wat teenwoordig was, het hierdie beeld daarna gereeld opgehaal. Onder Barnard se leiding is die navorsingskomponent uitgebou tot een van die voorste sosiaal-wetenskaplike instellings in die land.

Om die bestuur van die organisasie meer doeltreffend te maak, het Barnard drastiese veranderinge aan die bestuurstyl van die organisasie aangebring. Daarmee het hy verseker dat hy elke dag op hoogte bly van wat in die organisasie gebeur. Wat die bestuurslede in die besonder waardeer het, was sy vermoë om sterk leiding te gee en sy bereidwilligheid om besluite te neem. In die

bestuursvergaderings het navorsers groter as ooit tevore tot hulle reg gekom, wat ook die insamelaars gebaat het.

Hy het ook ‘n aktiewe belangstelling in opleiding in die algemeen gehad en opdrag gegee dat die opleidingsafdeling en die biblioteek drasties uitgebou word. Op sy aandrang is daar ‘n uiters moderne opleidingsfasiliteit buite Pretoria opgerig.

Hoewel hy nie onnodig ingemeng het in die werksaamhede van die hoofdirektorate nie, het hy nogtans sterk oorhoofse leiding en motivering gegee. Hy was aktief in sommige van die inisiatiewe van die insamelaars en het saam met hulle goeie verhoudinge met talle lande opgebou. Ook wat tegniese insameling betref, het hy ‘n sterk ondersteunende rol gespeel.

Nadat die demokratiese bedeling sy beslag gekry het, is Barnard in 1994 aangestel as eerste Direkteur-Generaal van die Wes-Kaap. Hier het hy die streng fokus op korrekte navolging van regulasies en die klem op skoon regering gevestig wat vandag nog die provinsie kenmerk en onderskei – ’n bydrae tot uitnemendheid wat voortleef en waarvoor hy meer erkenning verdien.

Niël Barnard was vertroueling van staatsmanne en spioene, maar hy was eerstens gesinsman –eggenoot vir sy vrou Engela, pa vir hul drie seuns waarvan hy een voortydig moes begrawe, en oupa vir sy vyf kleinkinders. Hy was hartstogtelik lief vir Afrikaans, waarin hy ’n woordkunstenaar was. En as hy jou verby gelaat het by daardie stugge beeld waaragter hy sy ware lewe gelei het, was hy ’n vriend duisend, ’n braaier en wynkenner vir die boeke, ’n sprankelende verteller, emosioneel toegewy aan sy familie, geneig om sy eie foute in te sien en daaroor te lag, ’n raadsman en min kere gelukkiger as wanneer hy voluit kon lostrek teen diegene in die media wat hy as woke beskou het.

Suid-Afrika verloor een van sy groot seuns wat, soos ’n ander wat in Bloemfontein vorming ondervind het, deur die digter gehuldig kan word:

“Maak hom ’n graf op die grond wat sy liefde gewy en geseën het; dis skoon vir ’n held om te rus aan die voete van wie hy beween het.” *

HULDEBLY: KOLLEGAS – TRIBUTE: COLLEAGUES

Dr. L.D. (NIËL) BARNARD: AN APPRECIATION (June 14, 1949 – January 13, 2025)

Dr. Willem Steenkamp

(Vir ‘n verkorte Afrikaanse weergawe hiervan, sien asb. die volgende artikel)

1. MUCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT NIëL BARNARD – BOTH FOR AND AGAINST...

Tall trees catch the most wind...

The late Dr Niël Barnard was one such tree, due to the position he was placed in at a very young age by PW Botha as DG of the National Intelligence Service (NIS).

It is not surprising that, upon his passing, one would read varied comments – some of which pay tribute to his undeniable contribution to national security and in kicking off the negotiation process. Others, however, still scourged him, mainly ad hominem for his pre-history and aspects of his

personality and style. Those so inclined dismiss his alleged contributions as mere flights of egotistical imagination, or manifestations of an intelligence service that seriously exceeded its mandate.

It is also not surprising that the tributes come from the side of those close to him, especially within the National Intelligence Service. The flogging, on the other hand, came mostly from those who served in other components of the bureaucracy of that period, being often officials who had crossed swords with him in the many inter-agency battles of those years. Or from people from the then left of the political spectrum who felt that their rights had been violated by Barnard and/or the security services.

2. FEW LEGACIES ARE EITHER PITCH BLACK, OR PURE WHITE...

What value can I hope to add to this polemic, and: why me?

Perhaps Nongqai 's editor asked me to write this appreciation on the logical assumption that – in addition to the conflicting opinions of the deceased's friends and his enemies respectively – a political-scientific analysis of Niël Barnard and his NIS team's impact on the change of course that South Africa experienced in the run-up to the political transformation of the early nineties, may be of value to readers.

An emotionally neutral analysis, written by someone who indeed knew him personally, and who also knows the professional milieu in which he operated (from both the practical and academic side), but who in addition served in other capacities such as ambassador, which allowed for a broader perspective. Someone who was neither an intimate friend of the deceased, nor an ideological or bureaucratic "enemy" of his...

3. HOW AND WHERE I GOT TO KNOW NIëL BARNARD

I knew Niël Barnard well, both as a Political Science lecturer and as DG of the NIS. Stretching from our Kovsie days in Bloemfontein during the early seventies, when he was my junior lecturer in Political Science. Through his appointment as DG of NIS and his first handful of years as head of the service. (Thus, after I had been a student of his, I had joined the Bureau for State Security and stayed on through its changing iterations of the (short-lived) Department of National Security and subsequently, the NIS – all in order to complete my compulsory national service and Public Service Commission bursary obligations. In the NIS, I held positions (as I will show) where I could observe Barnard first hand.

Upon completing my aforementioned obligations I said goodbye to the NIS, to subsequently obtain admission as a lawyer, and then joined the diplomatic service. This winding path has given me the

advantage of now being able to look back on Barnard’s contributions from the necessary distance, and from different career angles.

Academically speaking, my doctorate in Political Science with its specific focus on the role and function of intelligence within the political system, as well as my (parallel) training as lawyer, equip and oblige me to assess the extent to which the actions that the NIS in the end chose to execute (and which undoubtedly impacted political decision-making) can normatively be seen as having been within the scope of its statutory mandate, and functionally appropriate for an intelligence service to have chosen to embark upon

My broader institutional experience and thus wider perspective came first from my family connection to the Security Branch of the Police (my father at one stage headed it). As mentioned, also my own later life as a diplomat (which included being head of the diplomatic academy, and then the New South Africa's first ambassador to once-hostile Black Africa). Thus, I can assess Barnard and his NIS team's contribution during the critical late eighties and early nineties without having been limited to just one institution's silo vision.

Furthermore, since I became co-editor of Nongqai, the South African Forces history magazine, much unpublished information about once-hidden decisions and shenanigans have come to my eyes and ears, first-hand from reliable eyewitnesses. This has also contributed greatly to providing perspective and understanding regarding the whys and wherefores of what really happened during those turbulent years. Especially within the often dysfunctional and through-out, deeply-divided security and intelligence bureaucracy...

That said, if someone had told me fifty years ago there in Bloemfontein that I would one day write an obituary for Niël Barnard, I would probably have just laughed in amazement.

3.1 THOSE KOVSIE YEARS:

At the time on the Kovsie campus, the two of us certainly didn't see eye to eye ideologically. And with our respective personalities, we weren't exactly born to ever be close friends on a personal level...

Niël, about four years older than me, was a junior lecturer in Political Science in Bloemfontein when I was a third-year Law student who took Political Science as an extra major With me being not exactly tongue-tied (I had won the national debating competition for Afrikaans high schools in my matric year), my classmates often incited me to get under Barnard's skin, whenever his lectures became a bit too academically tedious. Through hours of often fiery class debates with him about the current affairs of that time, I came to know his outlook at that point as politically severely “verkramp” conservative (and he probably perceived me as an outspoken left-wing rebel).

3.2 THE DNS/NIS YEARS:

Great was Barnard's surprise when, a few years later (upon his arrival at the Intelligence Service, as the designated future DG) he found me, the "left-wing" student rebel, there – and to crown it all, then in charge of the South-West Africa analytical desks! (One of my most effective teaser tactics in those varsity debates with him – Barnard being a born and sworn Southwester – was to argue then already that SWA was a millstone around the RSA's neck that needed to be gotten rid of as soon as possible!).

In the several years that I subsequently served under Barnard at the NIS, I was able to observe him as a leader, in very challenging times. Times that were future-defining, seen from the national security angle. Times made extra challenging by the political context of a dogmatic head of government (PW Botha) who did not tolerate dissent. Plus, by our then security bureaucracy's often heated and sly internal politics and tendency to turf protection, operating in silos, and plain personal jealousies.

Thus, Barnard was thrust into a leadership position of a particularly high degree of difficulty and responsibility, which he had to master at a very young age at short notice.

4. AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER, BARNARD CONTINUED THE BUILDING OF THE NIS

My aim here is not to simply chronologically list Niël Barnard's professional successes as NIS-DG. It has already been sufficiently pointed out by competent NIS members (who had been by his side throughout Barnard's intelligence career), that the Service under him was professionally respected internationally, among peer agencies

However, some of the more glowing tributes to him as head of department have gone too far, in my opinion. Especially as regards how he supposedly totally transformed the Service, as if the leadership and entities that had gone before had had little merit.

In my book it is unnecessary to, in effect, denigrate those who had gone before in order to highlight Barnard’s undeniable merits – especially if doing so does violence to the facts.

As a few examples of this exaggeration (which I highlight here not to disregard Barnard's undoubted contributions to the continued development of the Service, but for the sake of balancing the record) is the claim that he was the first intelligence head to have done justice to the analytical component of the Service. That he, allegedly, had completely transformed the Service in this regard

4.1 INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS:

Barnard indisputably had built substantially and very well on the foundation laid by his predecessors. However, it was General Hendrik van den Bergh who, with the creation of the then Bureau,

established South Africa's first contingent of professional intelligence analysts as an integral part of it. Unlike in the SAP and SADF, where policemen or soldiers were temporarily assigned to doing analysis, at the Bureau we were expert economists, ethnographers, political scientists, or from other such professions, recruited from outside specifically for focused careers as professional intelligence analysts.

The fact is, those of us who were there at the time – through the triple-jump transition from the Bureau to the (short-lived) Department of National Security and then to the National Intelligence Service – know very well that it was still the same team, still in their same offices, charged with the same tasks.

In essence, just with new labels...

And, as I will show, that corps of analysts' fundamental professional ethos and also their foundational view regarding what the true nature of the national security threat was (and what government would be best advised to do about it) did not change in any way, with the transition from Van den Bergh’s Bureau to the NIS under Barnard.

What is true is that Barnard (with his conspicuous intellect and his willingness to listen and learn), mastered not only his leadership task, but also the intelligence picture remarkably quickly. With that intelligence picture, in particular, leading thereto that he underwent a total turnaround in his understanding of South Africa’s challenges and the appropriate political solutions (he himself openly admitted this fundamental change of heart, replacing his erstwhile “verkrampte” views, in his autobiography about his time as a spy boss).

Much to Barnard’s credit, he had the intellectual integrity to admit that his initial assumptions and political views were untenable. This he realised from the moment that he could measure his former views against the realities that the true intelligence picture so clearly showed.

So, in terms of the fundamental intelligence analysis of the true nature of the South African dilemma of the time, it was not a case of Barnard transforming the outlook of his inherited team of Bureau analysts. In fact, it was that old Bureau team of eminent experts such as Cor Bekker and Mike Louw (who continued to lead the Service's analytical component) that completely transformed Barnard's own thinking.

4.2 THE ROLE OF COMPUTERIZATION:

In terms of outward "trimmings" it is true that Barnard's time was marked by innovative and very substantive expansion of the Service's capabilities, products and facilities.

However, it is also true that he took over at a time when, with the dawn of the computer age, intelligence services around the world were experiencing a profound revolution in their profession. Not in ethos or outlook, but in terms of the outwardly visible manifestations of their work.

Within the space of a few years, which just happened to coincide with Barnard heading up the NIS, most services around the world took advantage of computerization and especially the new horizons it opened up, particularly as regards the production and especially the visual presentation of their analytical intelligence reports destined for the eyes of the political decision-makers, .

Again, in South Africa's case, it was Van den Bergh's Bureau that had spearheaded this new technology and that had laid the foundation for the expansion that would come to fruition under Barnard – to the extent that the NIS was internationally recognised by other services as a world leader in the application of the new technology to intelligence. I remember very well how the then head of technology of the West German BND had, during a course I took with them in Munich, half apologetically started his lecture with the statement that he did not actually understand why he should address us NIS guys (and not the other way round), because we were then internationally among the recognized leaders in the field of utilization of computing capabilities in an intelligence context...

One of the most significant applications of the new technology which came to full fruition shortly after Barnard's takeover, was a new system of daily production and distribution of analytical intelligence products (the NIFS - National Intelligence Flashes and Sketches). Of this, Barnard was rightly proud. However, the NIFS was undeniably merely the logical completion of a project that had already been conceptualised in pilot form under Van den Bergh and tested at division level in the Bureau/DNS, subsequently then to be established (with the arrival of sufficient computer terminals) throughout the “new” Service's Research (or Analysis) branch.

I know this first-hand, because I myself was central to this process, as regards it conceptualization and initiation (still under the BfSS/DNS), and then the systematic implementation and expansion of this new reporting system under the auspices of the NIS With my interest in computers, it was I who had first conceived and introduced the system of producing daily analytical reports within my then division (the Bureau/DNS’s old analytical Division “K” that dealt with constitutionally related issues such as those associated with Coloured and Indian politics, plus the Homelands, and of course SWA/Namibia.

Equally, under Van den Bergh already, emphasis was placed on the scientific analysis and interpretation of raw information on the basis of social-scientific and economic theory (that, after all, was why he had specifically recruited analysts with the necessary academic training). Barnard's

great merit was how remarkably fast he learned, and how enthusiastically and managerially brilliant he had actively built upon the foundations of what he had inherited.

To claim that Barnard had “restored” the integrity and ethos of the Service (insinuating that what had preceded the NIS was something apparently horrifying?) is also an overstatement. Moreover, averring same is an unnecessary insult to the integrity and honour of all who served in the Bureau at the time (and subsequently continued to form the vast majority of the “new” Service's corps).

4.3 THE ROLE OF THE POLITICS OF THAT ERA:

The Afrikaner politics of the era must be remembered here, because the PW Botha camp's needs and concerns provided the context for such higher claims. This was the time of (and just after) the palace revolution against Prime Minister Vorster, Drs Connie Mulder / Eschel Rhoodie and General Van den Bergh.

A coup that was instigated to put PW Botha and his militaristic circle in power.

During and after this "bloodless coup" underhand tactics were used that today would be called "fake news" and "lawfare". Especially in the form of the so-called Information "scandal" and the thoroughly manipulated, always politically self-serving Erasmus Commission.

Practically all of the aspersions then cast on the old Bureau and Van den Bergh (with Barnard subsequently being held up as a saving transformer and restorer of integrity) actually stemmed from the Botha regime's political need to destroy the image of their predecessors, rather than being based on empirical facts. However, that wheel would turn... (For more on the Palace Revolution, you can read this article: "QUIET COUP D'ETAT" AGAINST PM JOHN VORSTER - Nongqai BLOG )

4.4 BARNARD DID NOT EXAGGERATE IN HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY:

An example of the ethos that Barnard did continue to cultivate and which he rightly presented in his autobiography as characteristic of the steadfast approach of the Service's analysts, is that we were always bound to convey to political decision-makers what they needed to hear, and not what they wanted to hear – something we did without hesitation.

The example that Barnard presented in his autobiography of such unwavering standing by the facts was that of a young analyst who did not succumb during an altercation with the then AdministratorGeneral of SWA, the formidable Dr. Gerrit Viljoen.

I noticed that my fellow former ambassador, Dr Riaan Eksteen, stated in his sharp personally critical review of Barnard's book that in his opinion this story is so highly unlikely that it could hardly be true. In his view, it rather serves as evidence of the "self-serving exaggeration" of which he accused Barnard.

Again, I can personally attest that this incident did indeed happen and that it was by no means exaggerated in the book. I was that analyst, at the time at the head of the SWA analytical desks. In that particular case, I was my department's (DNS) representative on a high-level interdepartmental fact-finding mission to Windhoek, sent there by the cabinet. Other members were Niel van Heerden, who represented Foreign Affairs, and senior officers of the Armed Forces and Security Branch. Viljoen was so dismayed by the analysis I had presented of what actually was going on in the border war, that he immediately phoned my then head of department, Alex van Wyk, to personally complain about how "precocious" I was, due to me having stood so firmly by our analysis – one that did not serve Viljoen's (and the SADF's) political narrative.

Upon my return from Windhoek I was immediately called in, on the carpet in front of Van Wyk, Cor Bekker and Niël Barnard. They in no way condemned me but in fact encouraged me to "keep up the good work, but to please try to not make people so angry unnecessarily...".

The only "error" in the account of this incident in Barnard's book is therefore regarding chronology – this had happened still under the banner of the DNS iteration of the Service, with Van Wyk as DG. Barnard was already present that morning, because of him then doing his six month “apprenticeship” consisting of preparatory orientation with a view to the eventual takeover of the later NIS iteration, which then still lay several months into the future.

This chronological context is important, not in support of Koedoe Eksteen's doubts about the veracity of the story, but in support of my position that the ethos of incorruptible analysis was not newly introduced by Barnard, but was already integral in the Bureau/DNS days. For more details on this incident, please click on the following link: NONGQAI SERIES THE MEN SPEAK Dr Willem Steenkamp Part 2 - Nongqai BLOG

5. A POLITICAL CHALLENGE CANNOT BE SOLVED MILITARILY

The essence of the Bureau/DNS/NIS's threat analysis regarding South Africa itself was always that the country was essentially confronted with a political dilemma, and that a political issue cannot be solved militarily.

If you don't put out the fire under the porridge pot, then sooner or later you won't be able to keep the lid on it – it's going to boil over.

This fundamental insight was ultimately crucial in bringing the De Klerk government back to the negotiation-based strategy of Premier John Vorster. However, it would be laying claim to too much, if it were to be suggested that exclusively the NIS/Barnard had at the time held this (correct) insight. This position was also strongly articulated, for example, in an early February 1987 Security Branch memorandum to Cabinet, in which my late father had made it unequivocally clear that the "blue line"

would not be able to last forever. He therefore repeatedly advised that it was appropriate to start negotiating for a political settlement without delay, doing so while the government could still engage from a position of relative strength.

What my father and Barnard also wholeheartedly agreed on was that we had to stop looking for a communist behind every bush. Non-White resistance, for one thing, could not be fully, nor even primarily, attributed to Soviet incitement. It was essentially Black nationalism, in its essence no different from the Afrikaner's own resistance to domination, my father wrote...

It should be mentioned here that my father as head of the Security Branch held Barnard in high professional esteem. He also knew Barnard much better, in the work context, than some of the other peers who headed other components of the security/intel community knew him. This was because, whereas the others knew Barnard only in the interdepartmental context, my father had been seconded to the top management of the NIS for some length of time as then the permanent SAPSB liaison with the Service, before he became commander of the SAP-SB. Thus, his office was there inside the NIS head office in the Concilium building. As a member of the NIS top management, he sat in on everything, including having been part of the NIS team at the crucial meeting held early in Barnard’s reign at Admiralty House in Simon’s Town to settle between the different services their different jurisdictions (where Barnard in fact saved the NIS, which Military Intelligence – and some in the Police, such as Johan Coetzee – had wished to effectively see disappear).

My father thus not only knew Barnard in the inter-departmental context (as between heads of services) but, had earlier also been able to observe and assess him in his day-to-day leadership, within the context of the NIS as such.

In addition to the correct threat analysis arrived at by the NIS and SAP-SB members like my father, the Department of Foreign Affairs obviously also had had complete clarity throughout that seeking a negotiated political solution would be the only workable strategy

Although I’m writing here from a “within the intel-community” perspective, it is very important to stress that the experts at the Department of Constitutional Development had also held this same view from early on, leading for example to their input to the so-called “Skrik vir Niks” (fear nothing) report of recommendations for fundamental change that had emanated from the non-security state departments around 1987 – which expert advice PW and the “total onslaught” brigade again roundly ignored. (I have it on good authority from within the then Secretariat of the State Security Council, that they as a matter of course had always sought inputs on constitutional matters not from Constitutional Development, but from the NIS).

The political scientist Prof Fanie Cloete, who at that time had been centrally involved at Constitutional Development with the formulation of that input (which had been signed off by21 senior representatives of different civilian departments) is on record describing its gist thus: “The report concluded that the only way to avoid a revolutionary bloodbath in South Africa, was to implement a blitzkrieg of immediate strategic reforms. These reforms included the temporary suspension of parliament, the unbanning of black liberation movements, the release of political prisoners, and an interim GNU representing all South African citizens to draft a new constitution based on a number of non-negotiable principles providing for racially fully integrated democratic legislative and executive political power-sharing among all South Africans at all levels of government.”

6. CENTRAL REDACTION, THE “KIK” AND “LEGAL ADVISOR” TO BARNARD

Soon after Barnard eventually took over as DG of the “new” NIS, and thanks his keen interest in implementing a daily reporting system throughout the analytical branch, I was promoted to help head the new division N.11 – the central redaction and coordination component for the entire analytical production of the Service, charged initially with rolling out the new system and subsequently with managing the daily intelligence flow.

This division fell directly under the Chief Director who headed the analytical branch (called “Navorsing” or research in Afrikaans, hence his alpha-numerical designation as N.1). N.11 thus served as a kind of staff officer component to him, in which capacity I also performed duty as secretary to the interdepartmental coordinating intelligence committee (commonly called the “KIK”, in accordance with its Afrikaans acronym) which was managed by the NIS

Since it was N.11 that edited the input received from the analytical divisions and from it compiled the first draft of the daily NIFS report for consideration by the “Sanhedrin” (top management) at their early morning sessions, where we had to capture and formulate any changes decided upon, I regularly sat in on those meetings.

Furthermore, Barnard knew of course from our university days that my other field of study (parallel to Political Science) had been Law. Since the Service did not have its own legal advisory component when he took over, he therefore started tasking me with preparing legal opinions for him whenever needed.

In the N.11 context as editor, as KIK secretary and as “legal advisor”, I thus had frequent direct contact with Barnard (in other words, not in the typical indirect manner, with a number of hierarchical levels between us, that was the case when I had headed the SWA/Namibia desks).

All of these roles at N.11 had provided me with an ideal perch from which to observe him at problemsolving (such as when a legal problem had surfaced). As I will come back to later when discussing

Barnard’s contribution regarding strategy, it also allowed me first-hand insight into issues that would later become key. Such as: when to release Mr Mandela (reviewed within the KIK context) or, how best to try and manage what we knew had been for many decades already a deep rift within the ANC (between the moderate non-racialists and the Africanists – with the latter bent on a “National Democratic Revolution”, if necessary to be achieved in two steps, as had happened in Tsarist Russia).

This “privileged observational perch” at N.11 lasted till my request for a transfer to the Service’s clandestine collection component was eventually approved (which I had requested in order to expand my professional experience). At that time, a proper Office of Legal Counsel was established.

Of course, in my new, highly compartmentalised covert capacity I had no further contact with Barnard, nor could I ever set foot again in the Concilium Head Office complex

In fact, my next (and only) direct physical presence at any of the more or less “open” facilities of the Service was during the transition to democracy, when – then as ambassador – I was asked to present a lecture to the joint intelligence transition team (at the Intelligence Academy on the Rietfontein “Farm”) regarding the role and function of intelligence withing the political system – as per the theme of my doctoral dissertation.

7. BARNARD AND HIS TEAM'S MAJOR CONTRIBUTION AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

The real value of Barnard's contribution to achieving a peaceful transition (and his contribution was indeed great, especially in getting the process officially kicked off) went far beyond his achievements in managing and expanding the Service as such.

With the broader institutional perspective that my own later life has offered me, I would like to shed some light on the key role that Barnard (and the Service) played in the late eighties in averting a potential bloodbath in South Africa. Referring here to the fact that it was the NIS that, for the first time, had established a concrete – albeit secret – liaison channel with the external ANC and actually met with them at senior official level. In this way the NIS reversed the one-time PW Botha ban on any contact with the external ANC This was a laudable and crucially important breakthrough. Even if the NIS did it – as I will point out – by way of presenting the FW de Klerk government with a fait accompli for which the NIS had “obtained approval” through a slight of hand (but which does raise normative questions about whether it ever behoves any intelligence service to effectively force vital policy decisions by deed, rather than purely by means of the analytical intelligence product they convey to those elected to take government decisions).

Be that as it may, it indeed resulted in a breakthrough in terms of government strategy that ministers Chris Heunis and Pik Botha had not been able to achieve...

Undeniably, it was that first official meeting in Switzerland in 1989, between the NIS's Mike Louw and Maritz Spaarwater on the one hand, and Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma on the other, that got the negotiation process going (an initiative that had potentially held quite some risk for Barnard and the Service).

Thankfully, as history records President De Klerk did get on board with it, so that negotiation once again became the official government policy. This had cut the knot of PW's ban on any official conversation with the ANC (which had previously cost officers such as Cloete and Jordaan of Constitutional Development their security clearances and thus their careers in government service).

Against this brief introductory background sketch, my goal will now be to help contextualize Barnard's contribution on a strategic level – rather than just documenting his managerial accomplishments.

Barnard's job description as DG of the NIS obviously encompassed much more than just management. It is fundamental to that position that Barnard and his analysts (headed by Mike Louw – whom Barnard was wise enough to listen to) had to inform and advise the top political decisionmakers on threats to national security as well as strategic options for dealing with the those threats.

The Service's undeniable contribution, therefore, was in the strategic field, fundamentally changing government policy and strategy. Away from the "total onslaught" strategy of preparing for war, back to negotiating for a political settlement.

This result was possible because Barnard and his team understood the true nature of the real threats and were able to conceptualize the optimal counterstrategies – as said, not that they alone had come to those conclusions, but they had the necessary credible standing to allow their voice eventually to be heard Even though such analysis during those years had run directly counter to the then still Apartheid-inspired political policy of PW Botha and also to the prevailing strategy propagated by the "total assault" brigade in the SADF.

PW Botha did not know the young Niël Barnard personally when he appointed him as DG of the NIS. Niël's doctoral dissertation (in which he had made the case for a South African nuclear deterrence capability) naturally had fitted in with the Defence Force's world view. PW Botha, who before was constantly at loggerheads with the then Bureau and Lang Hendrik van die Bergh, was, in my opinion, mostly motivated in his nomination of Barnard by an objective of "I'm going to make you Bureau bastards understand your irrelevance". This he did by way of appointing such a young outsider over the heads of the "old hands" of the then Bureau, as DG of the newly re-titled National

Intelligence Service. Barnard being someone whom he felt would respect the primacy that PW wished to accord the SADF.

Because Barnard was parachuted in by PW as NIS-DG, therefore making him entirely dependent upon PW's good will (since he had not worked his way up through the ranks), it is undeniably the case that Barnard could very easily have chosen – like the many other yes-men with whom PW surrounded himself – to just keep “going with the flow” within that "total onslaught" brigade's perception of reality. Especially since their outlook had admittedly embodied his own initial views.

The fact that Niël Barnard – after seeing and quickly beginning to understand the real intelligence picture – had had the intellectual honesty to realise that his initial beliefs were wrong, speaks volumes for his integrity and sharp insight. He realized that, proverbially, the emperor (in terms of policy and strategy) was without clothes. Many could see it at the time, but few were willing to admit it, and still fewer were willing to take the necessary action to set things right before it could quite possibly have become too late...

7.1 THE DISPUTE OVER STRATEGY – SHOOT OR SETTLE?

What was it that had so deeply divided the security and intelligence community at the time? Essentially, it was a battle around the nature of the threat faced and, consequently, about the best strategic options.

Coming since the days of John Vorster, it had in essence been a dispute about choosing between shooting or settling (which may appear to be an over-simplification, but which is nevertheless aptly descriptive, as I will show).

The men with the big guns had wanted to retain political power at all costs – in final analysis, with military force. They saw as inevitable a coming armed conflict over who would hold political power and thus own the country, so that (in their view) the highest priority had to be to prepare the entire state and society for total warfare against such a total onslaught. They were not blind to the need for there to be at least the semblance of political change, but the real power had to be retained at all cost

Their strategy, then, was to try to dictate incremental change from above, following the (later discredited) model of the American political scientist, Samuel Huntington.

This culminated, for example, in the disastrous enforcement of the tricameral parliament, which PW had refused to negotiate with the non-White majority in advance, against the explicit advice of his own intelligence community as conveyed to him by the Secretariat of the State Security Council (which had correctly predicted that imposing it was only going to inflame political resistance even higher).

Those in favour of seeking a settlement, on the other hand, realized that the very attempt to try and keep control over political power would bring about the white minority's downfall. It was recognized that it was precisely this unwillingness to recognize majority rights (and ipso facto to relinquish real power) that caused the fire under the porridge pot to burn higher and higher, both domestically and from abroad.

Rather than continuing to fight to the bitter end for the preservation of total power, the side wishing to settle believed that the offer of an orderly, peaceful transfer of political power should be used as a carrot to ensure that the constitutional model under which such power would be exercised in future, would be based on Western democratic and capitalist values.

The danger, in their view, was not so much who would acquire power, but rather: in terms of what type of constitutional dispensation it would be exercised. Certainly, the revolutionary imposition of a Marxist People's Republic (as then still advocated by the ANC/SACP alliance) had to be averted at all costs. However, doing everything to avoid a People’s Republic was not necessarily synonymous with the whites striving to retain all power to the exclusion of non-Whites' rights.

Evidently, the quid pro quo of exchanging the power then held by the whites as colonial heritage, by swapping that for an acceptable state model based on Western values, could only be put into play and legitimately concluded by way of truly free and inclusive negotiations leading to a settlement based upon sufficient consensus

In the media and in academia, as well as in political discourse in general, this debate within the security and intelligence establishment about “shoot” or “settle” as strategic options did not really figure – in the public arena there was discussion about things like being “verlig” or “verkramp” (literally, enlightened or cramped, broadly meaning leaning somewhat liberal or towards very conservative). Also, about what types of constitutional models would theoretically be best, or about which Apartheid measures were petty and could be abolished.

Within the intelligence community, on the other hand, it was precisely this conflict over strategy –whether to prepare for inevitable shooting in order to maintain power, or rather to prepare well and in timely manner for an inevitable eventual settling, that was the primary dividing factor, already from the late sixties onwards.

It was also the configuration of the intelligence community as such that, since the establishment of the Bureau in 1969 (under Van den Bergh's leadership, as official Security Advisor to the Prime Minister), that had caused conflict. Van den Bergh had been seriously at odds with PW and the military leadership. Essentially because the latter believed that they and their input on strategy did

not carry the weight they thought it deserved within this new configuration (this, in addition to the intense interpersonal feuds between PW and Lang Hendrik).

There is still today a perception that Vorster and Van den Bergh had doggedly wanted to cling to Apartheid. This persists, despite all the evidence of what they did with regard to, for example, putting SWA/Namibia on the road to a negotiated non-racial dispensation. At Nongqai , we received evidence from impeccable sources that Vorster had already during his reign stated privately, in confidential conversation, that Apartheid could not work.

Looking at how Vorster, Van den Bergh and the Foreign Affairs team of Minister Hilgard Muller and Dr Brand Fourie (as ably supplemented by the efforts of the erstwhile Information Department – Drs Connie Mulder and Eschel Rhoodie) had approached the SWA/Namibia and Rhodesia conundrums is revealing as regards the strategy which they had in mind for resolving South Africa’s own situation

What I experienced first-hand when I headed up the BfSS/DNS analytical desks on SWA/Namibia during the latter part of Vorster’s reign, was that Vorster and his team had understood the defining importance of process over fixating about policy positions. They understood that no policies unilaterally dictated by any side would be accepted as legitimate. The only policy positions that would be internally and internationally acceptable, would be those born out of and shaped by the give and take of an inclusive, legitimate negotiation process. The fact that Southern Africa was at a crossroad and that it was imperative that peaceful settlements be reached, was publicly very clearly articulated by Vorster already on 23 October 1974, when he unequivocally stated that the alternative to peaceful settlement would be “too ghastly to contemplate”.

“Apartheid” could thus be no more than an initial bargaining position (simply because of being the then pre-existing reality, as thus the historical point of departure). Neither Apartheid, nor any clever permutation of “power sharing”, qualified voting rights, or for that matter Marxist People’s Republic could be put forward during such a process of negotiations by any one side as an immutable goal. Nor could peace be assured by attempting, top-down, to manage by force a series of incremental changes (leading to what, and when?). To be credible and acceptable, the chasm between endless conflict and peaceful co-existence had to be leapt in one jump.

Legitimacy and acceptance of the final outcome would be assured not so much by the WHAT of the constitution (throughout history, there hasn’t been one single “correct” answer as to what a perfect constitution should contain, applicable to all places and all times). So that the exact form that the eventual constitution would or should take, could not be precisely predicted, nor imposed, at the outset of the process.

It was thus the process of negotiation itself that would produce the final form. What was essential, was therefore to prepare your side as best as possible for participating effectively in the negotiation process. To hold as strong a hand of cards as possible. Not having given anything away, gratuitously, beforehand. Focusing on seizing the initiative, on having allies, and crucially on being seen as credible and trustworthy Achieving such respect and acceptance by not trying to dominate and unilaterally impose your will – whilst all the time ensuring also that your side is subliminally perceived and understood by the others to be a key party whose fundamental interests and strengths had to be very much taken into account by them.

In other words, Vorster and his team understood that there was no point in first trying to reform Apartheid, or to try to incrementally enforce change from the top down, in a manner determined by them alone. They understood that they would, first and foremost, need to accept negotiations as the only legitimate way forward, and then trust in the strength of the cards they could muster and in their own negotiating ability, all the while doing their utmost to prepare the ground as favourably as possible and well in advance, thereby to strengthen their hand as much as possible.

Which isprecisely the strategythey had implemented in SWA/Namibia, ablyassisted by the superbly competent Dirk Mudge and the allies he could quickly muster. The Vorster team furthermore understood that international legitimacy would in large part also be bestowed by acceptance on the part of the African states, hence the emphasis on détente and on building relations with them.

If peaceful transitions could be achieved in Rhodesia and in SWA/Namibia, it would have as very important consequence that it could provide a road map for South Africa itself and help incline white South Africans to accept the previously unthinkable, based on proven success… Even though I know from own experience that the military had mostly held illusional expectations that the “moderates” would win in those territories, I know equally well that that had not been the clearlyexpressed assessment of the non-military component of the intelligence community – of people like my father and myself (based on simple ethno-demographic reality); it is therefore in my experience not correct to assume that the acceptance of the need to negotiate non-racial constitutional dispensations was actually driven by fond though unrealistic expectations that doing so would somehow lead to whites being able to retain disproportionate power or privilege.

Vorster’s strategy of negotiation rather than confrontation which dated from the late sixties had showed early promise, at least till PW Botha’s disastrous foray into Angola in 1975 and the subsequent worsening of South Africa’s own internal situation What was nevertheless significant regarding white politics in the subcontinent was that the SWA/Namibia experience (as embodied in the Turnhalle process), did in fact demonstrate clearly that a conservative white populace could be convinced to put their trust in a non-racial constitutional dispensation – as more than nine out of ten

white Southwesters in fact did, when they voted in the referendum held amongst them to approve of the Turnhalle constitution. This fundamental acceptance by otherwise conservative, mostly rural Afrikaners in SWA that a non-racial dispensation was both inevitable and necessary, I actually saw illustrated not only by that referendum’s results, but by a very thorough scientific opinion survey conducted beforehand among SWA whites in which I had been intimately involved This in-depth testing of opinion showed that there were no illusions nor false expectations – just the commonsense realism for which common folk are not often enough given credit.

It is sad history that Vorster’s initiatives regarding SWA/Namibia in the end came to naught, when PW Botha took over and slammed on the brakes (as one general told me late one night in the Kalahari Sands hotel in Windhoek: war over who would own South Africa was inevitable, and the SADF needed battle space to “bleed in” our troops and give them combat experience – which the SWA/Angola arena conveniently provided…).

Fact remains that Vorster clearly had understood the inevitability of resolving Southern Africa’s conflicts through negotiations, from which non-racial constitutions would equally inevitably result (as demonstrated in the case of Zimbabwe and later fully confirmed in Namibia by the late eighties, when even PW had to succumb to this reality – only, after ten wasted years, and then with far fewer cards in hand). Of equal importance was Vorster’s understanding that the emphasis should be on the negotiation process (and properly preparing for that) rather than focusing intra-governmental debate on developing all kinds of policy positions (i.e., constitutional models) to be incrementally imposed from above – because the latter approach was akin to re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, instead of realising that the ship was irredeemably doomed and an entirely new vessel urgently needed to be found…

The same necessity to trust in negotiation proved to be true of South Africa itself, as eventually understood by FW de Klerk and his team – again, unfortunately, a lost decade later and without time for the careful building of alliances that had marked Vorster’s thorough preparation for SWA/Namibia.

As regards General van den Bergh and his understanding of the fatal flaws in Apartheid, he himself had also made it clear in his unpublished autobiography that he was well aware of these. One such fundamental defect was that, in his view, “Separate Development” offered no logical solution with regard to civil rights for the so-called Coloureds and Indians, and that the tricameral parliament would neither work nor gain acceptance

The main defect of Apartheid that he identified, however, was that the policy did not provide for what Van den Bergh saw as the country's greatest single challenge. Which he understood to centre around South Africa's most important demographic, economic and geographical reality – namely,

that the vast bulk of the country's most economically significant surface area was in fact "shared territory", inhabited and worked upon by all population groups, inextricably intermingled (in this regard, he had concurred with prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s position).

That is why, for example, Van den Bergh had us, his analysts, investigate the possibilities of a unitary state model organised on consociative principles.

Under Vorster's team, it was axiomatic that strategy should be focused on preparing well and timeously for holding the best hand of cards possible when inevitably the parties had to sit down at a future negotiating table. Therefore, Vorster and his team took the initiative with regard to such preparation (such as through seeking détente with Black Africa) so that negotiations would not ultimately be forced upon a South Africa unprepared for it... On this score, the Bureau, Foreign Affairs, Department of Information and quite a few in the Police (such as my father) all had agreed.

7.2 UNDER PW BOTHA, TALKING TO THE ANC/SACP WAS A NO-NO:

On the other hand, there were many in the forces, especially in the Army under Magnus Malan, who saw the strategy of preparing for negotiations (as embodied in Vorster's détente initiative and the process of encouraging Rhodesia and SWA/Namibia to move to majority rule by way of negotiation) as a sell-out. This group’s political leader was the ambitious, abrasively self-centred PW Botha.

The PW Botha/Magnus Malan contingent's approach of trying instead to dictate incremental cosmetic change top-down, and to rely on physical force in South Africa’s relations within the region, had led to many conflicts already under Vorster and especially with Van den Bergh – internal conflicts within government that were brought to a head by the overthrow of the Caetano regime in Portugal in 1974 and the independence of the one-time Portuguese colonies.

Few people realize how fierce this internal struggle was, and what significant consequences it would have. PW, as defence minister, followed his own head, launching operations on his own authority. Vorster and Van den Bergh, for example, were only able to stop our forces at the last minute at Komatipoort, when PW had ordered them to enter Mozambique to take over the radio station to support a planned coup in Lourenço Marques by right-wing Portuguese settlers there.

Another example was PW's support for Zambian rebels who wanted to overthrow Kenneth Kaunda – this, while KK was a key interlocutor for Vorster in his détente initiative.

Eventually, PW's wayward military decisions under (but not approved by) Vorster, taken without due consultation nor authorization, culminated in him transforming what had only been authorized as no more than rendering training assistance to UNITA, into a full-scale conventional advance by South African troops in own uniform and armour on Luanda, to try and take it over (Ops Savannah). A

strategic catastrophe that resulted in massive deployment of Cubans into our region, but – more importantly – that sank Vorster's détente.

In strategic-psychological terms, the consequence that we at NIS had most feared (and then saw come true before our eyes) was that when Operation Savannah inevitably failed, it would puncture our balloon of invincibility. In the perceptions of South Africa's non-White population and the rest of Africa, from the moment that they saw the SADF obliged to abandon their Savannah incursion, White South Africa was no longer invincible. The insistence on the transfer of power inevitably began to flare higher soon after, as illustrated by the outbreak and rapid spread of the Soweto riots from June 1976 onwards.

The "total onslaught" men may have thought that they had won the battle against the "settle" faction when Vorster was brought down in the palace revolution instigated through the Information "scandal", when in 1978 PW Botha was elected as Prime Minister bya narrow margin, helped across the line by Pik Botha.

An octopus-type control mechanism to keep the entire bureaucracy in line was soon introduced, in the form of the National Security Management System or NVBS by its Afrikaans acronym (created by decree, outside of the provisions of the Act on Security Intelligence and the State Security Council). The SADF was firmly ensconced in the chair.

Nevertheless, Foreign Affairs for example continued with their negotiation initiatives and was able to obtain cabinet approval for the Nkomati Treaty. However, Prime Minister PW Botha told the SADF that they need not bother with this Accord, to the great detriment of our international credibility. The Defence Forces' wilful ignoring of the Nkomati Treaty led, among other things, to serious headbutting between Niël Barnard and Constand Viljoen as head of the SADF, with Barnard lashing out at Viljoen in a call to him over the SADF's flouting of what was a Cabinet decision (the one that had authorised the treaty – at that time, the Cabinet was still the highest executive authority under the then constitution, which PW then immediately wanted to change).

It must be said at this point that Barnard (his nickname behind his back among other department heads was: Billy the Kid) was not a beloved personality outside of the NIS

Stiff and regarded by many as condescendingly intellectually superior, he made more enemies than friends in the bureaucracy. Because the NIS's field of responsibility encompassed reporting on everything that affects national security – including what might go wrong in other departments' areas – the typical bureaucratic trend of everyone wishing to crow from atop their own dung heap didn't work in his favour either...

Be that as it may, back now to PW Botha and his autocratic management style and the battle between the “shoot” and “settle” camps. It is an open question to me, to what extent PW's stubborn insistence, against advice, to force through the constitutional changes of 1983 (which included the gimmick of the tricameral parliament) was in fact more motivated by the other leg of those changes – being, to abolish the cabinet system of joint authority and make him executive president, with extraordinarily broad powers centralized in his person...

Continuing his disapproval of negotiation, PW immediately had begun to undo the hard preparatory work of his predecessor in SWA/Namibia (with the establishment of Turnhalle process and the creation of the non-racial DTA alliance). The last major decision of the previous cabinet, namely, to accept UN Security Council Resolution 435, was put on hold and PW began to put pressure on Dirk Mudge and the DTA to revert to a more ethnocentric ("Apartheid") vision, which eventually culminated in a total rift between him and Mudge.

7.3 PW BOTHA WOULD NOT CROSS THE RUBICON:

Pressure on the South African government to start negotiations began to ramp up seriously by the middle of the decade, both domestically and internationally.

Another catastrophe came quickly enough, in 1985, with PW's "Rubicon" speech.

A week before the date set for the speech, the cabinet had met for a brainstorming session at the old Observatory (part of Military Intelligence's training facilities at the time). I’ve had sight of the recently unearthed entire verbatim transcript of that meeting. Contrary to what people like Pik Botha had later pretended, fundamental political change and a consensus text for PW’s speech (from which PW then supposedly had deviated in delivery) were NOT agreed upon during that brainstorming session.

In fact, Pik was uncharacteristically quiet all the time.

Chris Heunis, then in charge of constitutional planning, was the only cabinet minister who at all had tried to advocate that the circumstances (Chase Manhattan bank had just caused the Rand to stagger with the refusal of further loans) necessitated a new direction to be announced, but his circumspect pleas were not accepted by PW.

It was evident that PW Botha would deliver his own speech. However, those who had wanted to, could present draft inputs to him. The Departments of Constitutional Development (Heunis) and Foreign Affairs (Pik Botha) did indeed prepare separate such drafts. PW didn't even want to invite Heunis into the Groote Schuur residence – snapping at him from the porch that Heunis could forget about him (PW) delivering that "Prog" speech (i.e., favouring negotiations) that the experts at constitutional planning had drafted

Pik Botha, however, had evidently hoped that he could paint PW into a corner by pushing ahead and widely promoting the draft prepared by Foreign Affairs, overseas and in the media – as if that was what PW was set to announce. It contained the “crossing the Rubicon” analogy and was touted by Pik in Vienna and elsewhere as heralding a brave new direction.

However, the only portion of that draft which PW eventually used in his own speech, was the Rubicon phrase... His focus was not on announcing any fundamental change in policy, but instead on making it abundantly clear to the world that he would not allow himself to be prescribed to. Given what Pik has been foreshadowing in Vienna and elsewhere, this message from PW was obviously experienced exceedingly negatively, both domestically and abroad.

I'm referring to this incident, not to re-hash the past, but to point out how fierce the battle was between either negotiating or rather sticking to “shoot” and – if necessary – to eventually "go down hard-arsed" (“hardegat ondergaan” as per PW’s own words to Barnard, which Masada-like outcome increasingly appeared to PW to be our only remaining option).

PW Botha would not tolerate discussions with the external ANC/SACP alliance, and the consequences for any official who violated this edict were severe (as Cloete and Jordaan of Constitutional Development found out, when Jordaan went on one of the "African safaris" to meet with the external ANC).

7.4 PW ANSWERS THE COMMONWEALTH EPG WITH BOMBS:

Pik Botha would soon once again try to paint PW into a corner about entering into negotiations. During the visit of the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group (EPG) in 1986, Pik prepared for them a text of points on which he told the EPG that the SA cabinet would be willing to agree, with a view to starting negotiations – if only the EPG would agree with him to use his text as their statement about the way forward. The EPG then in good faith released Pik's text as their own. PW's response to this consisted of an Air Force officer phoning up Niel van Heerden at Foreign Affairs with the news that the bombers were already in the air to attack the capitals of the Frontline states... Of course, the EPG immediately packed up and left, convinced that the PW Botha government was not amenable at all to negotiations, and even stricter international measures soon followed.

Not to dwell too much on how PW saw fit to browbeat Margaret Thatcher’s Foreign Secretary, as well as Ronald Reagan’s ambassador…

7.5 THINGS GET HAIRY IN ANGOLA, WITH CASTRO THREATENING INVASION:

As can be seen, even during the late eighties the "shooting" faction remained unwilling to give in to those who could see that settle was the only viable way forward. However, the balance of power within government began to change when the conflict in southern Angola began to go badly wrong

militarily, with a costly stalemate at Cuito Cuanavale and Castro then opening a second front north of Ovamboland. Advanced Cuban MIGs started flying through our airspace. (Barnard is alleged to have, in later years, privately mentioned to a confidant that those MIGs had in fact even flown above the Union Buildings).

A Citizen Force contingent of 140,000 men was called up. The Army's first battle plan was to go in even deeper and "clear" south-west Angola of Cubans, including the port of Namibe (Ops Excite/Faction, part of Ops Hilti). However, this fell through when the Air Force and Logistics made it unequivocally clear that they would not be able to help make such a plan work. Accordingly, as an alternative (if the Cubans did indeed invade SWA), a new battle plan was then prepared in terms of which the Cubans would be allowed to enter as far as south of Etosha, with a "killing ground" to be prepared for them in the northern agricultural districts. (Ops Prone/Pact, part of Ops Handbag).

Full-scale war, then, from the back foot...

Fortunately, Foreign Affairs was able to report that the Cubans simultaneously had reached out to begin negotiations. Also, the NIS had a high-level source in the direct line of command between Havana and Luanda, who confirmed that Castro's deployment of his second front was just bluffing, in order to try to force South Africa to the negotiating table. The USSR had by that time also fundamentally changed their stance about Southern Africa (more about which later) favouring negotiation over continued war. And so, belatedly, the UN Security Council's Resolution 435 was dusted off again and finally implemented (as Vorster already had known to be inevitable). Now however, because of the “lost decade” under PW, with much weaker cards in hand for the negotiations...

7.6 IN SOUTH AFRICA,

CIVIL SOCIETY INCREASINGLY AGITATED FOR NEGOTIATIONS:

Within South Africa itself, the growing insistence on negotiating coming from within business ranks, academic circles, the media and the government’s own constitutional planning experts began to pick up more and more speed, but PW still continued to enforce his dictate within the bureaucracy and assert his influence within the Cape Afrikaans press against any such contact – just look at Rapport's then headline of "DOM DOKTORE VAN DAKAR", (Dumb Doctors of Dakar) referring to those leading academics who went to meet the external ANC in Senegal.

This disorganised situation with all kinds of missions that began to reach out to the external ANC from civilian circles, had worried Barnard. It wasn't because he was opposed in principle to making contact and negotiating. After all, he himself was already in talks with Nelson Mandela (then still in custody), and the NIS had established links with the KGB in previous years. His concern was that uncoordinated efforts could do more harm than good.

Some of Barnard’s detractors from within former government circles criticise him for having supposedly accepted the need for Nelson Mandela’s release only very late. Furthermore, for then allegedly being over-awed by Mandela (even at one point tying Mandela’s shoelaces) and for prematurely accepting that Mandela would be the next president. Without Barnard sufficiently realising that the ANC saw the CODESA process merely as phase one of their “National Democratic Revolution” (the phase of getting rid of the former white regime) and that they would persist in seeking to implement their anti-capitalist, anti-democratic NDR soon after gaining power.

These criticisms stem, I believe, from those that made them not having had full knowledge of, nor complete comprehension for, the intelligence picture that the NIS had known to actually pertain with regard to these matters (which is not a counter-critique, since it was understandable under those circumstances that very few were then let in on these secrets – most of the cabinet, for example, did not know).

I can attest that there was firstly no lack of clarity at all within the NIS about the extra-ordinary personal qualities of Mr Mandela as master politician, as far back as the early eighties already. I remember vividly being secretary to a KIK meeting, convened specifically about how to advise the PW Botha government regarding the issue of Mr Mandela’s detention. Invited to this meeting was the senior psychologist of the Correctional Services, who had been pertinently tasked with observing and assessing Mr Mandela on a continuous basis – which he had done for a considerable length of time and great acuity. This gentleman was very clear: once released, Mr Mandela, with his exceptional charisma and intellect, would run rings around the then crop of white cabinet ministers and would utterly dominate the South African political scene.

One of the Army generals present asked (somewhat disbelievingly) whether the psychologist reckoned that Mr Mandela would run rings around the likes of Dr. Gerrit Viljoen as well? (Viljoen, former Broederbond chair, SWA/Namibia administrator-general and then minister of national education, was regarded as the top Afrikaner intellectual of his time).

The answer of the psychologist was an adamant “Yes!”.

Barnard and the NIS therefore knew two things with total clarity: It would be a disaster for South Africa if Mandela should die in prison, but secondly, that it will be even more of a disaster if he should have been released at the wrong moment. As much as Mandela needed to be thoroughly prepared for his release (to which Barnard himself would later assiduously attend) it was absolutely necessary that the context into which he would be released, be prepared and be conducive to a positive outcome

There would probably be only one chance to do it right (in terms of thereby achieving the desired result of putting the country on the path to peace) because otherwise, his release held the potential for a sharp increase in confrontation.

It needs to be understood that Mandela could under no circumstances be released as merely a token part of top-down incremental change. Firstly, because Mandela himself would not accept conditional release, or being used in a publicity stunt. Secondly, because, if he was released outside of a pre-agreed framework of definitive negotiations for a new non-racial constitution, then confrontation was sure to follow. Especially if released whilst the authoritarian “groot krokodil” was still at the helm and sticking to his guns, literally and figuratively, that there will be no negotiations for a transfer of power to the non-white majority (just think back and imagine PW and Mandela squaring off in public!) That would inevitably have led to serious political confrontation at the highest level, which would assuredly have spread lower down, and abroad. With the PW Botha government most probably not being able to handle Mandela as political adversary…

Mr Mandela could, therefore, only safely be released once (and only if) the white government had beforehand been convinced to accept the need for, and had publicly committed itself to fully inclusive, unconditional negotiations for a new non-racial constitution based on one person, one vote

As much as the NIS and Barnard understood this, it was also understood that it would be absolutely essential – also from the viewpoint of white interests – for Mr Mandela to indeed be released. Not as a publicity stunt to curry favour, but because Mr Mandela was the essential persuader needed to ensure that the moderates within the ANC around the likes of Thabo Mbeki, would overcome the hitherto dominant radical Lusaka faction under the likes of Jacob Zuma and Chris Hani.

The NIS obviously knew very well about the decades-old cleft that had existed within the ANC (and which finally came very publicly to the fore in the run-up to the 2024 elections, with Jacob Zuma and his MK party breaking away). We all knew, back then, with total clarity that there were those within the ANC who would indeed see any negotiations as just phase one of their revolution, allowing them to be rid of the white regime, whereupon they could then in typical Marxist-Leninist fashion focus on instigating a second revolution (the NDR) to thereby impose their ideological ideals. About this risk, there had been no misunderstandings whatsoever. The key intelligence question, though, was which faction within the ANC would prevail if the lure of political power was on the table, offered in exchange for constitutional guarantees for minorities and for property rights

The logically necessary sequence of events, from an intelligence perspective, was therefore to firstly obtain certainty about Mr Mandela’s likely future moderate stance (as Barnard was busy doing, in his many prison meetings with him). Then, secondly, to ascertain whether the external ANC was

indeed open to participating in the negotiation of a new constitution. Thirdly, in parallel and doing so through the NIS’s penetration of the ANC’s communications and decision-making circles (by means of the likes of the hugely significant and very successful Operation Cruiser), to ascertain which faction would likely prevail, if Mr Mandela should be freed and then would cast his considerable weight on the side of the moderates. And fourthly, that the environment into which Mr Mandela is released be conducive to peace, through the white government having publicly and unequivocally accepted the imperative need for inclusive negotiations to arrive at a non-racial new constitutional dispensation.

7.8 OPERATION FLAIR – THE NIS MEETS WITH THE EXTERNAL ANC:

British businessmen with large investments in South Africa in the latter half of the eighties had begun to work on facilitating negotiations (doing so in secret consultation with the Thatcher government) Their focus was on fostering confidential dialogue between Afrikaner leaders and the external ANC This is when the NIS stepped in to create its own channel for future direct contact with the ANC's external wing, specifically with Thabo Mbeki. Because Barnard and his team were not inclined to see “volk” and nation "go down hard arsed" in imitation of PW Botha and his "total onslaught" brigade's Masada fixation...

One of the delegates to these discussions (being held in the English countryside), Prof Willie Esterhuyse from Stellenbosch, was recruited by the NIS as agent "Gert". His task was not to spy on the conversations, but specifically to reach out to Mbeki. “Gert” had to clandestinely identify himself, his NIS connection and his very specific mission to Mbeki, and then test whether there was willingness on Mbeki's part to establish a direct channel between the NIS and himself, representing the external ANC. Long story short, Mbeki provided "Gert" with a phone number. Identifying code names were agreed. And so, the table was set for the NIS to contact Mbeki directly at the opportune moment, in order to arrange a first official but still secret meeting. These events coincided with the end of PW Botha's reign in 1989, when he was given an ultimatum by his cabinet colleagues to resign. FW de Klerk took over, and during his first chairmanship at a meeting of the State Security Council, the NIS put an innocuous-sounding resolution on the agenda. The thrust of it was that, because it was necessary to find out more about views held within the external ANC, the NIS is tasked with doing what was necessary to ascertain this... (SSC Resolution 13/1989). That resolution was passed routinely, without debate... Immediately, Operation Flair was put into action by the NIS.

Mbeki was called, as previously arranged. On 2 September 1989, Mike Louw and Maritz Spaarwater of the NIS, officially met Mbeki and Jacob Zuma of the external ANC at the Palace Hotel, in Lucerne, Switzerland.

On their return to South Africa, Louw and Spaarwater flew to Cape Town to brief President de Klerk. When they told him that they had met with Mbeki and Zuma in Switzerland, De Klerk's first, highly upset reaction was to confront them quite vehemently about where they had obtained permission to take such an important step? They then held up Resolution 13/89 and replied that it was the SSC itself, chaired by him, De Klerk, that had authorised it.

The new president could have taken very strong exception, for two reasons. Firstly, because the resolution was clearly a deliberately woolly-worded ploy that in no way directly and unambiguously requested authorisation to officially meet with the ANC. De Klerk could therefore rightly have perceived this as an undermining of his authority. Secondly, FW could have felt that he wanted to abide by PW's previous prohibition on official contact.

Fortunately, De Klerk magnanimously accepted the "explanation" and immediately started running with the ball. That it could have turned out very differently, however, with less pleasant consequences for Barnard and his NIS colleagues, underlines that it took courage to take the bull by the horns and do what was necessary, come what may... (especially considering that the preparatory work had obviously already been surreptitiously done under PW).

To sum up about Barnard, the Mandela release and the question as to which faction within the ANC would prevail, it is my read that the NIS under Barnard’s leadership had ensured that they were in a position, at the end of 1989 shortly after FW de Klerk took over (who knew nothing about the prison contacts or the direct contact with the external ANC, or of that with the USSR), to go to him and brief him and his government, presenting an intelligence estimation that we can assume may be broadly be paraphrased in the following terms.

Mr President:

• you cannot hope to forever contain the growing internal unrest by force, nor forever resist the ever increasing foreign pressure; a political problem cannot be solved by military means.

• Incremental change imposed top-down weakens rather than strengthens the government because it is perceived as concessions being made under pressure, and thus as a sign of weakness that emboldens the opposition; accordingly, it has been proven over the last ten years not to be a realistic option.

• The only way to avoid a bloody and ultimately unwinnable fight to the finish, which could result in a racial bloodbath destroying the Afrikaner people and whites in general, is to

inclusively and unconditionally negotiate for a new, non-racial constitution, the result of which we have to accept would inevitably be majority rule.

• There is no strategic benefit in further delaying negotiating, because the internal situation is only likely to become more polarised and difficult to contain resulting in wider and more lasting societal damage, plus punitive measures from abroad are likely to sharpen and further weaken the economy, and the international climate within which to negotiate can furthermore take a serious turn for the worse, if the currently relatively friendly governments in the USA and UK are replaced by Democrats and Labour;

• Should the government opt for a strategy of negotiation, then we believe that the West will thoroughly support such a move and from their side will work towards ensuring an outcome preserving their economic interests as well as values, meaning that foreign pressure on us will immediately start abating and that their pressure will instead then shift to be exerted on the likes of the ANC to accept a constitution based upon Western democratic and free market values

• We believe that the USSR will also encourage a process of negotiation, to lead to a constitution that will guarantee the rights of minorities and the whites in particular – this we say, on the basis of secret contact with the USSR over a number of years, through which it has been possible to help turn the Soviet leaders away from continued support for the ANC, leading to the Soviets now actively cooperating with us in important areas such as busting economic sanctions, upgrading our key weapons systems such as the SAAF’s jet fighters with their MIG-29 engines, and openly supporting negotiations rather than violent revolution at places such as the United Nations.

• Another reason for it being an opportune moment to turn to negotiation is because the ANC is historically weak now, given the fact that the USSR as their former main sponsor has been weakened lately and has furthermore undergone a change of heart, plus the fact that MK has been severely debilitated militarily, with their nearest base areas now in Uganda.

• When the government opts for negotiations, then there will be a need for a principal interlocutor in order to give structure and some discipline to the negotiations; the experience in Zimbabwe, for example, has shown that no white government can select its negotiation partner – only the liberation movements will enjoy the necessary legitimacy to take the masses with them and, through their participation, bestow legitimacy upon the entire process

• It should furthermore be comprehended that the internal UDM is incapable of being an effective negotiation partner because of being an amorphous, poorly structured and disorganised group of loosely associated celebrity individuals with whom it will be very difficult

to conduct effective negotiations; they will in any case likely not agree to participate unmless under the auspices of the ANC.

• Because of the foregoing, as well as the PAC and Black Consciousness Movement being, for their part, too radical to be likely to be converted, it needs to be accepted that the ANC headed by Nelson Mandela is the only viable interlocutor, both in terms of ensuring structure for the process and bestowing upon it internal as well as international legitimacy.

• As to what would be the attitude of the ANC/SACP regarding joining such negotiations, it is our analysis, based on some five dozen detailed personal meetings with Mr Mandela and also based on our extensive penetration of the ANC’s communications and decision-making circles, as well as having met directly with Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma abroad, that they would indeed be willing to abandon their failed armed struggle and to enter into such negotiations, if lured by the prospect of thereby acquiring political power at last (which they know they would otherwise not be able to achieve militarily).

• As regards which faction within the ANC would prevail and thus eventually be ruling the country, it is our analysis that – on condition that Mr Mandela be released – the moderate wing of the ANC will prevail over their radical wing. We believe that Mr Mandela and the moderates such as Thabo Mbeki will accept that the new constitution be based on Western norms, abandoning their erstwhile dream of a Marxist People’s Republic in exchange for the chance to hold political power (which will only ever be possible because of the whites, as quid pro quo, being willing to relinquish it to them, under such an exchange).

• It is likely that the SACP will play a positive role in negotiations, on the side of the ANC moderates.

• We believe it to be inevitable that Mr Mandela will, as a result of such negotiations, be elected as the new president because he will enjoy the support of the overwhelming demographic majority; furthermore, we assess that he can be trusted to govern in a responsible way that will respect existing rights and values and not seek vengeance against the white minority in general, and the Afrikaner in particular.

It is history that such an assessment (even if here framed in hypothetical phraseology) was indeed proven to have been correct.

Why could the NIS at that time succeed in convincing the NP government that it was imperative to embark straight away on negotiating such fundamental change, abandoning the policies that they had clung to so steadfastly up to that point? Why couldn’t Constitutional Development achieve that breakthrough, given what they had recommended two years before in the “Skrik vir Niks” report? Obviously, the fact that the obstinate and domineering PW Botha had been replaced as president

by FW de Klerk played a role – but beforehand, FW himself had been (alongside PW) one of the two leading brakes on any substantial change being accepted by cabinet.

As the forementioned Prof Fanie Cloete had accurately described: “The underlaying political atmosphere was one of latent fear, born out of a realisation by several cabinet ministers that the system which they were enforcing wasn’t sustainable. But at the same time, there was an unwillingness to openly accept the implications of power sharing, which was the only way out”.

My own analysis is that the NIS could achieve success because of the reality that the NIS, because of the nature of its focus and inherent tasking, was better able (or, at least, more credibly so – from the point of view of the politicians) to answer the fear-driven questions that had been uppermost in the minds of the political decision-makers, than the “civilian” expertswith their more narrowly-defined functional fields of expertise could realistically hope to do. Vital questions – for the politicians – that went way beyond which constitutional models or strategies would theoretically be most apt. Questions going to the core of what they had understood as an existential threat, to their people but also to themselves, such as: “Can we hold on by force?”; “if we do this, what would be the reaction of the ANC/SACP, of Mandela, of the USSR, of the West?”; “would we be able to obtain from such a process a constitutional system based on Western democratic and capitalist values?”; and, importantly: “are the new powers-that-be, likely to seek vengeance?” (in other words, the answers listed above).

8. BARNARD AND THE NIS's ROLE IN GETTING THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE

What role did Barnard/NIS play at strategic level in bringing the South African government on the one hand, and the ANC/SACP alliance on the other, to the negotiating table?

8.1 BOTH “APARTHEID” AND A “MARXIST PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC” HAD TO BE ABANDONED:

First of all, both parties had to be brought to the point of understanding that the ideologies which they respectively espoused were precisely the other side's worst nightmare. In fact, that the dreams of either one was perceived as existential threats by the other, against which each side would continue to fight to the death. Whites against a Marxist People's Republic. Non-Whites against racial discrimination.

The government therefore had to be moved to face the reality that it was their own racial policies that were underlying the unrest among non-whites, as well as leading to outside pressures. To the same extent, the ANC/SACP had to be made to realise that it was precisely their ambition to try to establish a Marxist people's republic through violent revolution, which made the Whites cling so fiercely to power. This latter point, the future president Nelson Mandela fortunately had grasped, in

part thanks to the intense interaction with him by the secret interlocutors who had engaged with him under Barnard’s leadership while he was still imprisoned

Secondly, both parties had to be made aware that neither of them would be able to realise their ideological aspirations by force of arms – not the government, nor the ANC/SACP. That such a conflict between them could only result in widespread destruction, and was bound to gravely harm the entire population, with no plausible winner in the end.

So, how did the NIS get the National Party government to understand that it was the government's own ideology that primarily endangered national security? Here, Barnard and his team pulled off another semantic sleight of hand. They needed to arm themselves with a plausible "mandate" or justification for them as intelligence service to point out to the elected government of the day that their own policies actually lay at the root of the unrest – because it does not normally behove bureaucrats anywhere to so critically take on the fundamental policies of governments in this way.

The "paradigm shift" (as it became known) that the NIS made in order to justify such a stance, was to emphasise the name change that the Service had undergone – from State Security to National Intelligence. The term "national" was interpreted to mean that the NIS was obliged to look unbiased at anything and everything that threatened the stability and prosperity of the entire nation. Thus, no longer just focusing on threats to the security of the organs of state ... Seen against the broad national perspective, it was evident that institutionalised racial discrimination was what was providing the fuel to the fire.

The analogy used to put this across (depicted graphically with drawings, at briefings to political decision-makers) was that of a pot of porridge that was boiling over – just as the situation in the country was visibly boiling ever fiercer, for all to see. If the fire under the pot was not extinguished, then sooner or later the lid would no longer be able to be kept down on it, even with force of arms

Developments such as those in the conflict in Angola (when Castro began to make the porridge thicker yet with his second front) obviously also contributed to demonstrating to everyone in government decision-making circles the limits of the SADF’s physical abilities, especially as international punitive measures in the area of arms purchases began to seriously bite – particularly as regards the Air Force.

At the same time, the ANC/SACP's belief in their model of a Marxist People's Republic suffered a blow due to the way in which the Soviet Union was on the wane during the second half of the eighties. More importantly, however, was that the South African security forces clearly had the upper hand over Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) in the "armed struggle", partly thanks to the NIS's penetration of their internal communications as well as their decision-making inner circles.

It's not an exaggeration to say that, in military terms, MK never amounted to very much. Their actions constituted at most "armed propaganda" and definitely was not a full-scale guerrilla war (such as in Namibia and Zimbabwe). They had no real hope of ever achieving anything near a military overthrow of the white state. Numerous studies and declarations that can today be found on websites such as that of the Mandela Foundation confirm this truth, from the mouths of ANC leadership figures themselves.

Apart from effectively countering MK in the security sense, the other means to bring the ANC to the negotiation table and to get them to abandon their demand for a Marxist People’s Republic, was the powerful lure of at last achieving political power (albeit in exchange for a constitutional dispensation sufficiently acceptable to whites in order for them to agree to peacefully hand over that power). Last but not least, was to deprive the ANC of the support of its main international sponsor, and to get that sponsor (the USSR) to also exert pressure in favour of negotiations rather than continued conflict.

8.2 TURNING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S MINDS:

The other brilliant strategic insight on the part of Barnard and his team was that the Soviet Union could likely be persuaded to pull back its support for the ANC/SACP’s “armed struggle” and instead start working with the Pretoria government. This did, upon analysis, seem possible because of MK's poor prospects for presenting the Soviets with success, but especially because of the many shared economic interests between Pretoria and Moscow (regarding, for example, the marketing of minerals, precious metals and diamonds).

If the USSR could be persuaded into such a turnaround, it would deprive the ANC/SACP and consequently MK of their most important sponsor.

Strategically, this was an innovative and daring strategy that had not been attempted by any other government threatened by international communism during the Cold War.

The success that was in fact achieved with this move is certainly one of the least known of the achievements of the South African intelligence community during the late eighties.

As early as June 1981 the NIS began to actively reach out to the KGB, with a view to establishing formal contact with them and through them, with the Soviet Union. On March 29, 1987, these ties were officially formalized. You can read more about this initiative to help "turn the minds" of the Soviet leadership in this Nongqai article: https://tinyurl.com/mr2uxnxh

In summary, during the last years of the 80’s decade the then ANC president, Mr Oliver Tambo, was no longer able to obtain appointments to meet with the then Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. By contrast, Gorbachev did however receive Niël Barnard warmly, inside the Kremlin, and moreover –he had rescheduled a Politburo meeting at short notice in order to be able to do so.

Dr. Marc Burger (who was Foreign Affairs' head of sanctions evasion) writes in his book "Not the Whole Truth" of how the Soviet Union has been helpful in evading economic sanctions. An interesting factoid about this sanctions-busting cooperation is that the head of the then KGB in Leningrad (now again St Petersburg) was the main facilitator on the Soviet side – him having undergone part of his schooling at Pretoria Boys High when his father was the Soviet consul in Pretoria just after WW2 Not the Whole Truth - Kindle edition by Burger, Marc. Politics and Social Sciences Kindle eBooks @ Amazon.com.

The chapter in Barnard's own memoir on how the link with the USSR was built can be read here: SUCCCESSFUL

OUTREACH TO THE KREMLIN, VIA THE KGB (Dr L.D.

Barnard - NIS - Issuu

Probably the most telling example of the turnaround in the attitude of the USSR (which was once our erstwhile enemies' main supplier of weapons) was the important joint project to upgrade the Air Force's fighter jets with new engines. That project to replace the Air Force's then-Mirage F1 and Cheetah fighter jets' obsolete French engines with specially converted engines from the advanced MIG-29s of that era (which had to be built into similarly custom-modified SAAF Mirage airframes), was technically highly successful.

The luxury dacha on the outskirts of Moscow that served as a design studio for the joint team of South African and Soviet aeronautical engineers was actually the one that had formerly been used by an earlier Soviet big boss, Brezhnev... The full story of the project to replace the Mirages' engines with those of the MIG-29 can be read in Nongqai 's e-book about it:

Nongqai Vol 14 No 6C Jacobus de Villiers by Hennie Heymans, Nongqai Publications - Issuu

The book was written by the then team leader on the South African side, Kobus de Villiers. He's now a popular novelist, with an easy-to-read skill with the pen – you'll love it!

Although the French firmly believed it was completely impossible to replace their engines with those of the Russians, it can be confirmed that our aircraft with the modified airframes and new engines flew excellently (the book contains interesting photos, as well as a link to a video of the "Super Mirage" in flight).

The change in Soviet attitudes to Southern Africa from the late eighties was attested to by Valerie Shubin, an old school apparatchik and academic who had headed the Africa section of the CPSU’s international bureau at the time. In an article published in November 2008 entitled: “The USSR and Southern Africa during the Cold War” Shubin wrote: “However, on the threshold of the 1990s the Soviet Union underwent serious political and institutional changes. Its foreign policy, directed by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, was rapidly changing as well, and not in favour of the liberation struggle. In a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1989, Shevardnadze pledged “to

oppose ... resolutely all kinds of violence, no matter what had caused or motivated it”, and this could be read, in particular, as opposing any resolute action again the racist regime in South Africa... “Anatoly Chernyaev, then Gorbachev’s assistant for international affairs (and a Central Committee member!), who proved to be another turncoat, wrote in his memoirs: Gorbachev had a rather good nose for people who had no prospects and were “useless to us” ... Gorbachev did not believe that by supporting the ANC and supplying it with arms we were assisting the correct process in South Africa.”

8.3 POLITICAL POWER SWAPPED FOR A DEMOCRATIC FREE MARKET CONSTITUTION:

That ice-breaking meeting in Lucerne between the NIS and the external ANC was therefore not simply an isolated instance which Barnard and his team had dreamt up on the spur of the moment. It was clearly part of a much more comprehensive plan to ensure that both parties (government as well as ANC/SACP) would see the logic for thus engaging, in terms of the own interests of each, and thus both have the inclination to want to stop the conflict and start negotiating.

This was part of the larger plan to persuade the government and the ANC to abandon their respective ideological platforms in favour of peacefully agreeing around a negotiating table on a legitimate new dispensation with general support and acceptance. A constitutionaldispensation that, as quid pro quo, would see the Whites relinquishing their grip on political power, but thereby gaining a constitutional model that enshrined Western democratic and free-market values. Barnard could therefore rightly claim that, although the ANC did indeed win political power in the 1994 elections, they lost the battle over the nature of the constitutional order. In any case, it was clearly historically inevitable that the ANC would win the election, given that they had the support of the overwhelming demographic majority. Yet the ANC clearly lost on the substance of what it had ostensibly been waging the “armed struggle” for, for thirty years – in that it had to give up its stated aspiration for a Marxist People's Republic. This they did in exchange for another prize, namely gaining and exercising power – but bound to do so under democratic, Western-capitalist rules...

Indisputably, this was what scoreboard showed, after the final whistle had blown on the tussle around the negotiation table: Western free-market democracy = 1, Marxist People's Republic = 0.

The entirety of the Security Forces of the time can therefore rightly boast that they were successful in preventing an armed revolution and the imposition of a Marxist People's Republic.

The results of the 2024 election furthermore shows that the NIS assessments regarding the deep divisions within the ANC and the likelihood that the moderates would prevail (and keep on prevailing) over the still revolting NDR faction, were correct. The moderates did not seek to make up with Zuma

or the EFF, but chose to rather go into a government of national unity with the other parties committed to the 1994 constitutional accord…

8.4 AND IF NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT KICKED OFF IN 1990?

To understand how important a contribution Barnard and his team had made (in that they effectively forced the initial breakthrough which saw PW's strategy of "shooting" replaced with an honest willingness under De Klerk to seek to settle, through negotiation), one need only to ask oneself: if the whites had continued to cling to political power with the aid of their armed forces – as they clearly were physically fully capable of, probably for a considerable length of time – what would have happened under the later regimes in the U.S. of a Clinton, Obama, and Biden? With the Labour Party also in power later in Britain?

How strong (or rather, weak) would have been the whites' negotiating position at the inevitable end? (Because, at some point, there would clearly have had to be negotiations).

Remember how the Americans, the British and their allies relentlessly had bombed the Serbs in the Balkans during the mid-nineties, to force them to recognise the rights of the Muslims there, doing so over the course of not one, but two intense and very destructive air wars...

What would have been the outcome if intra-governmental debate had continued to be focused on analysing all kinds of options regarding constitutional models, instead of realising (as the NIS had) that it was imperative to accept that only a process of inclusive, unconditional negotiations could ever birth a legitimate constitutional model? This was perhaps the greatest contribution that the NIS had made to initiating change – convincing the FW de Klerk government that initiating such a negotiation process needed to be their clear and immediate focus, rather than to keep on trying to seek ways to re-arrange the deck-chairs…

Given the foregoing, one understands why Stephen Ellis, with his penetrating/critical judgment of the SA security forces and his Africa Confidental background, mentions in External Mission (p. 132): "Barnard was eventually to become perhaps the most influential political strategist of all on the government side."

9. CONCLUSION

Certainly, Niël Barnard the man was not an easy person to get along with. As the saying goes: he didn't suffer fools gladly".

Certainly, he had a very healthy ego – which was, perhaps, an inevitable and necessary shield, given at what young age and without experience he had to maintain himself among senior officers and heads of rival departments.

However, what Barnard did also have, in addition to ego and condescension, was inner steel, the willingness to listen, as well as the intellectual integrity to change his opinions when confronted with facts. Plus, the ability and will to make decisions, even when it involved risk.

Not necessarily everyone's ideal for a friend, but certainly someone you would appreciate next to you in the trenches..

It is true that other once conservative Afrikaners of the order of a Beyers Naudé could rightly point out that they had recognised the fatal practical and ethical flaws of Apartheid long before Barnard had seen the light. Such claims are undoubtedly true, and such people should rightly be honoured for their insightfulness. To the same extent, Afrikaners of the liberal conviction of a Van Zyl Slabbert could point out that they had already seen the need for negotiations with the ANC long before Barnard did. Once again, that would be true.

However, it is unfortunately also an historical truth that none of the likes of Oom Bey or Van Zyl could ever manage to convince the NP government. The man and the team that first were able to concretely achieve that, undeniably was Niël Barnard and his NIS colleagues

Without pretence at religiosity or in any way wanting to elevate a mere sinful mortal like Barnard to the rank of apostle, the biblical story of St. Paul seems to me to provide a rather relevant perspective here: St. Paul was by no means the first apostle to have seen the light and convert to Christ – in fact, as Saul of Tarsus, he undeniably had caused many Christians very serious harm, due to his earlier political convictions. And yet, he was probably the most impactful of all, in the longer run.

Why? Because St Paul had standing as a Roman, and (though hated for it) thus had access to, plus stature and credibility within the decision-making camp.

Barnard was also first a Saul, likely with much to confess to in that guise – but, once convinced of the truth, he could make up for his Saul's mistakes like a Paul by successfully doing what no one from the left, nor a Chris Heunis or Pik Botha from within, could ever accomplish.

Why? Because Barnard had the necessary position of influence in the inner circle. Foremost, though, because he was willing (once he did see the light), to take responsibility – despite the risk – for doing what he and his team realised needed to be done, urgently, to prevent his people from being led into going under, (be that “hardegat” or otherwise), in a bloodbath of racial carnage.

Does one continue to condemn a Paul solely on the basis of what he did as a Saul, or do you at least also judge him on the strength of the outcome he had helped bring about when it counted most?

On the other hand, speaking normatively, is it ever correct for any intelligence service anywhere to deliberately bamboozle the government it reports to and initiate actions in order to directly change by means of a fait accompli the course of what they as service had full well known to be (rightly or wrongly) long-standing official government policy? As lawyer and political scientist, I have to say NO That would certainly not be the norm. An intelligence service is there to collect, verify and interpret information, converting those bits and pieces into timely intelligence products designed to provide governments with the necessary data and insights to inform their decision-making (which is the sole prerogative of government, in a democratic system).

Just as journalists are bound to report news and not to make or shape it, intelligence line-function officers, whether collectors or analysts, need to stick to their function and maintain their objectivity by not becoming active players in the political game (however great the temptation often may be). They need to respect their structural-functional role in the political system, which is not making decisions, but instead informing them.

Are there ever circumstances dire enough to justify breaking with this norm? Was the South African situation at the end of the eighties such?

You be the judge of that.

What one can also see in this conundrum, is a difficulty which often arises for governments and intelligence services around the world. That is, that governments – also democratic ones – do need an instrument for executing in secret, certain delicate policy decisions. Especially abroad. This kind of requirement mostly serves a noble cause, such as protecting by means of secrecy vital outreach from premature disclosure, which may ruin it. Or to provide governments with plausible deniability, when initiatives that had seemed worthwhile turn out otherwise and get exposed.

The dilemma which then confronts most governments, is that their intelligence service is by its very nature, the principal institutional repository of professional expertise at doing things secretly. So that the service then, willy-nilly, gets tasked with also performing such secret executive missions. Even though these are not intended to collect information, but instead to execute policy decisions in secret Is it sensible, in terms of budgetary cost and efficient organisational structuring, for governments to set up and maintain a separate secret service just for such missions, in order to keep intelligence collection and secret policy implementation structurally completely separate? In most cases, probably not. But what must then be fully understood and assiduously adhered to in the minds of all involved, is the clear distinction between the functions of intelligence collection/production on the one hand, and of secret executive missions on the other, so that the distinct ethical and objective integrity requirements of each be always respected.

A last but very important normative issue (and a common practical one in most societies, as my doctoral research had shown) is the need for the intelligence function not to be viewed as the privileged domain of a select few who practice it behind over-secretive walls. It is best performed as a system-wide function, thus absolutely needing to be integrated with the rest of the institutions making up the political system (such as relevant “civilian” government departments). Otherwise, when intelligence works only “upwards” to the top political decision-makers, it leads to a lack of effective engagement and coordination with the rest of the (much larger) machinery of the political system, and also to members of an elitist intelligence community often laying claim to their products being of higher value than those produced by experts from civilian departments outside of the secretive intel-bubble. How should such a range of inputs from respectively intelligence and civilian departments (from, for instance, the NIS and Constitutional Development) have been coordinated, and were they in fact? Was the South African political system really functioning at the time as a truly integrated system, or did it suit egos and silos within the intel-community to dismiss the civilian experts as “ivory tower idealists” who are not fully trustworthy and lacking in real-world realism, who thus could (or should) be basically cut out of the loop?

I suspect that the latter view unfortunately prevailed within the then intelligence community, as dysfunctional and internally divided as it was. Since that community was patently at odds with each other, and operating in silos (often at cross-purposes), how would they have sufficiently appreciated and coordinated with those “civilian” experts in non-intel departments outside? Or did they see them as potential competition for the attention of the top political decision-makers? (It is a clear risk that those involved in secret intelligence work may often develop, regarding themselves, a perception of elite status because of their direct lines to the top, as well as of superior insights because of the information they possess which other experts don’t).

Which all again goes to show how difficult the decisions were (normatively, legally as well as politically) that Barnard and his NIS team felt compelled to make, when they had effectively taken it upon themselves to kick-start the official negotiations by deliberately creating what was undeniably a self-orchestrated, un-authorised fait accompli with which to confront the new FW de Klerk government. It also makes it quite understandable why the NIS, and Barnard in particular, were seriously disliked by many in the military and the police who still had their minds set on countering a total onslaught, as well as by some constitutional planning experts who patently had been pushed aside when the NIS started taking matters into their own hands.

Whatever one’s own moral and ethical position on what Barnard and his NIS team had done, and especially regarding how they had gone about it, it seems clear in hindsight that the steps they had followed were actually the only viable ones (except of course for not having obtained proper prior

authorisation). It seems evident that government in any case would at first have needed to reach out to the external ANC secretly, exactly as the NIS had done with their operation Flair, and that the NIS would have been the logical entity to undertake that initial secret contact. One may thus proffer the old saying of “all is well that ends well” as justification (although “the end justifies the means” is obviously frowned upon from a legal and moral perspective).

There obviously also will be those who believe (with reasonable justification) that the gravity of the then circumstances constituted a clear emergency situation, and that in emergencies the usual norms and book theories cannot be insisted upon if it impedes taking action that is clearly urgently needed. That principle is indeed true in common law (such as breaking the window of your neighbour’s car without prior permission, in order to urgently save his baby suffocating inside).

I would be personally inclined to support this as long-established principle, but I also need to admit that I do have to ask myself: if they had had time to put a bogus application for authority through the State Security Council, why didn’t they simply ask properly and clearly? Were they scared that they may have been turned down? Or, that it may have been decided by the SSC to involve other players? Or did they genuinely believe that secrecy was of utmost importance, so that the government could enjoy honest deniability if the answer from the external ANC had been NO to negotiations?

These are all imponderables, and I strongly believe that it would be utterly presumptuous for anyone now to try and judge, after the fact, the decisions taken by those who actually were there and who were brilliant, patriotic, principled men Undeniably they did succeed at last in getting things started – not for their own glory, but because they rightly believed that that was what the country needed. It is just sad, however, that it is precisely the manner in which they had chosen to operate (and interact with others) that has led so many to still feel aggrieved and critical to this day

It is, therefore, probably most apt to end this appreciation of Niël Barnard, a complex, controversial yet also very competent man, with the fundamental truth stated in Matthew 5:9 “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God."

DR. L.D. (NIËL) BARNARD: ‘N WAARDERING (14 JUNIE 1949 – 13 JANUARIE 2025)

Dr. Willem Steenkamp

(This a a shortened version of the original one, which is available in English)

1. VEEL IS REEDS GESKRYF – VIR EN TEEN...

Hoë bome vang die meeste wind...

Wyle Dr. Niël Barnard was so ‘n boom, as gevolg van die posisie waarin hy baie jonk deur PW Botha geplaas is as DG van die Nasionale Intelligensiediens (NI).

Dit is dus nie verbasend nie om nou, by sy heengaan, uiteenlopende kommentare te lees – sommige waarvan hulde bring vir sy onmiskenbare bydrae tot nasionale veiligheid en die afskop van die onderhandelingsproses. Ander, egter, gesel hom steeds, in hoofsaak ad hominem vir sy voorgeskiedenis en aspekte van sy persoonlikheid en styl. Diesulkes maak dan sy beweerde bydraes af as bloot maar egotistiese verbeeldingsvlugte.

Dis ewe-eens nie verbasend nie dat die huldeblyke kom van die kant van dié wat ná aan hom was, veral binne die Nasionale Intelligensiediens. Die geseling, daarenteen, kom meesal van diegene uit ander komponente van die destydse burokrasie, wat met hom swaarde mag gekruis het in die vele terrein-gevegte van daardie jare. Of van mense vanuit die destydse linkerkant van die politieke spektrum wat gevoel het hulle regte is deur Barnard en/of die veiligheidsdienste geskend.

2. WEINIG NALATENSKAPPE IS ÓF PIKSWART, OF SPIERWIT...

Watter waarde kan ek hoop om toe te voeg tot hierdie polemiek, en: waarom ek?

Miskien het Nongqai se redakteur my gevra om hierdie waardering te skryf op die logiese aanname dat – aanvullend tot die strydige menings van onderskeidelik die oorledene se vriende en sy vyande – ‘n politiek-wetenskaplike analise van Niël Barnard en sy NI-span se impakop die koersverandering wat Suid-Afrika in die aanloop tot die politieke transformasie van die vroeg-negentigs beleef het, vir lesers van waarde mag wees.

‘n Emosioneel-neutrale analise, geskryf deur iemand wat hom persoonlik geken het, asook ook sy beroepsmilieu, maar wat nóg intieme vriend, nog ideologiese of burokratiese “vyand” was...

3. HOE EN WAAR EK NIëL BARNARD LEER KEN HET

Ek het vir Niël Barnard goed geken, beide as Staatsleer-dosent en NI-hoof. Strekkende dus reeds vanaf ons Kovsie-dae, met hom daar in die vroeg-sewentigs as my junior lektor in Staatsleer, deur tot na hy as DG van NI aangestel is. Ek was student van hom, waarna ek lid geword het van die Buro vir Staatsveiligheid / DNV / NI. In laasgenoemde het ek posisies beklee waar ek hom eerstehands kon waarneem.

Na ek my diensplig en staatsdiens-beursverpligtinge by die Diens voltooi het, het ek egter NI vaarwel toegeroep, om vervolgens toelating as prokureur te verkry en toe by die diplomatieke diens aan te sluit. Hierdie kronkel-pad het my die voordeel gegee van nou te kan terugkyk na sy bydraes vanaf die nodige afstand, en vanuit verskillende beroepshoeke.

My doktorsgraad in Politieke Wetenskap het spesifiek die rol en funksie van intelligensie binne die politieke stelsel as tema gehad, dus kan ek sy bydraes in daardie beroepskonteks objektiefwetenskaplik beoordeel.

My breër institusionele ervaring en dus wyer perspektief het eerstens gekom van my familieverbintenis met die Veiligheidstak van die Polisie (my vader was hoof daarvan). Soos vermeld, ook my eie latere lewensloop as diplomaat (wat onder andere ingesluit het hoof te gewees het van die diplomatieke akademie, en toe die Nuwe Suid-Afrika se eerste ambassadeur na eens-vyandige

Swart Afrika). Dus kan ek Barnard en sy NI-span se bydrae gedurende die kritieke laat-tagtigs en vroeg-negentigs beoordeel sonder om beperk te gewees het tot net een instelling se silo-visie.

Voorts het daar, sedert ek mede-redakteur van Nongqai geword het, vele eens-verborge dinge tot my oë en ore gekom, eerstehands van onkreukbare bronne, wat baie bygedra het tot perspektief en begrip met betrekking tot die hoekoms en waaroms van dit wat werklik gedurende daardie onstuimige jare gebeur het. Veral binne die dikwels disfunksionele en diep-verdeelde veiligheidsen intelligensie-burokrasie...

Dit gesê, as iemand vyftig jaar gelede vir my sou vertel het dat ek eendag ‘n huldeblyk sal skryf vir

Niël Barnard, sou ek toe waarskynlik net verbaas gelag het.

3.1 KOVSIE-JARE: Destyds op die Kovsie-kampus het ons twee beslis nie ideologies oog om oog gesien gehad nie. En met ons onderskeie persoonlikhede was ons nie juis in die wieg gelê om op persoonlike vlak ooit vriende te kon wees nie...

Niël, so vier jaar ouer as ek, was daar in Bloemfontein junior dosent in Staatsleer toe ek derdejaarstudent was Synde dat ek nie op my bek geval was nie (ek het so-by-so die nasionale debatskompetisie gewen gehad in matriek) het my klasmaats my gereeld aangehits om onder Barnard se vel te kom wanneer sy lesings bietjies te akademies-vervelig geraak het Deur ure heen van dikwels vurige klas-debatte met hom oor politieke aktualiteite van daardie tyd het ek sy uitkyk van destyds as polities erg verkramp leer ken (en het hy my waarskynlik as ‘n uitgesproke linkse rebel ervaar)

3.2 DNV/NI: Groot was Barnard se verbasing toe hy ‘n klompie jaar later (by sy aankoms by die Intelligensiediens, as die aangewese nuwe DG) vir my, die “linkse” studente-rebel, daar aantref –en dit nogal toe in beheer van die Suidwes-lessenaars! (Een van my mees effektiewe tempteertaktieke in die debatte destyds op Kovsies met hom – hy synde ‘n gebore en geswore Suidwester –was om toe reeds aan te gevoer het dat SWA ‘n meulsteen om die RSA se nek was waarvan so gou moontlik ontslae geraak moes word!).

In die klompie jaar wat ek vervolgens toe onder Barnard by NI gedien het, kon ek hom as leier waarneem, in baie uitdagende tye Toekomsbepalende tye, gesien uit die nasionale veiligheidshoek

Tye wat ekstra uitdagend gemaak is deur die politieke konteks van ‘n dogmatiese regeringshoof (PW Botha) wat nie teenspraak geduld het nie. Plus dan die burokrasie se binne-politiek en die Afrikaner se tendens van onderlinge vlieë-afvangery.

Dus, hy was ingestoot in ‘n leiersposisie van hoë moeilikheidsgraad en besondere verantwoordelikheid, wat hy op baie jong ouderdom op kort kennisgewing moes bemeester

4. BARNARD WAS ‘n KNAP BESTUURDER WAT PUIK VOORTGEBOU HET

My oogmerk hier is nie om bloot chronologies Niël Barnard professionele suksesse as NI-DG te lys nie. Dit is reeds uitgewys deur bekwame NI-lede wat deur Barnard se hele intelligensie-loopbaan heen aan sy sy was, dat die Diens onder hom internasionaal onder eweknieë professioneel gerespekteer is.

Van die lofliedere wat nou gesing word oor hom as departementshoof gaan myns insiens egter te vêr met betrekking tot hoe hy die Diens totaal sou omvorm het, asof diegene en dit wat hom voorgegaan het, weinig meriete sou gehad het.

Dit is myns insiens onnodig om, ter aanprysing van iemand, dié wat hom voorgegaan het af te kraak – veral as dit die feite geweld aandoen.

As enkele voorbeelde van hierdie oordrywing (wat ek hier uitlig nie om Barnard se ongetwyfelde bydraes tot die verdere uitbou van die Diens enigsins te misken nie, maar ter wille van balans van die rekord) is die bewering dat hy die analitiese komponent van die Diens vir die eerste keer tot sy reg sou laat kom het. Dat hy die Diens geheel sou transformeer het.

4.1 INTELLIGENSIE-ANALISE: Barnard het onbetwisbaar goed voortgebou op die fondasie gelê deur sy voorgangers. Dit was egter generaal Hendrik van den Bergh wat die insig gehad het om, met die skep van die destydse Buro, as integrale deel daarvan Suid-Afrika se eerste komponent van professionele intelligensie-analiste daar te stel. Anders as in die SAP en SAW, waar dit polisiemanne of soldate was wat tydelik afgedeel is om analise te begin doen, was ons by die Buro deskundige ekonome, volkekundiges, politieke wetenskaplikes of uit ander sulke beroepe, wat van buite gewerf is spesifiek vir gefokusde loopbane as professionele intelligensie-analiste.

Feit is, ons wat destyds daar was – deur die driesprong-oorgang vanaf die Buro na die (kortstondige)

Departement van Nasionale Veiligheid en vervolgens na die Nasionale Intelligensiediens – weet goed dat dit steeds dieselfde span was, steeds in hulle selfde kantore, belas met dieselfde take

In essensie, net met nuwe etikette

En, soos ek sal aantoon, het daardie korps van analiste se fundamentele beroep-etos en ook hulle grondliggende beskouing met betrekking tot wat die ware aard van die bedreiging was (en wat daaromtrent gedoen behoort te word), geensins verander nie, met die oorgang vanaf die Buro na NI onder Barnard.

Wat wel waar is, is dat Barnard (met sy opsigtelike intellek en sy bereidwilligheid om te luister en te leer), merkwaardig vinnig sy leierstaak sowel as die intelligensie-prent bemeester het. Met veral laasgenoemde wat by hom tot ‘n totale ommekeer in insig gelei het. Dit het hy self ruiterlik erken in sy outobiografie oor sy tyd as spioenbaas. En, tot groot lof van hom, het hy die intellektuele integriteit gehad om te erken dat sy aanvanklike aannames en politieke sienswyses onhoudbaar was. Dit het

hy ingesien van die moment dat hy sy beskouing kon meet teen die realiteite wat die werklike intelligensie-prent so duidelik aangetoon het.

Dus, wat die fundamentele intelligensie-analise omtrent die ware aard van die Suid-Afrikaanse dilemma van destyds betref, het Barnard nie sy geërfde span Buro-analiste se oorgedraagde uitkyk transformeer nie. In der waarheid was dit daardie ou Buro-span van uitnemende kundiges soos Cor Bekker en Mike Louw (wat steeds die Diens se analitiese komponent bly lei het), wat Barnard se denke geheel transformeer het.

4.2 DIE ROL VAN REKENARISERING: In terme van die uiterlike “trimmings” is dit so dat Barnard se tyd deur vernuwende en baie substantiewe uitbouing van die Diens se vermoëns, produkte en fasiliteite gekenmerk is. Dit is egter ook waar dat hy oorgeneem het op ‘n stadium dat intelligensiedienste die wêreld oor, met die aanbreek van die rekenaar-era, besig was om ‘n diepgaande omwenteling in hulle beroep te beleef. Nie in etos of uitkyk nie, maar wat betref die uiterlik-sigbare manifestasies van hulle werk. Praktiese alle dienste het dus op die oog af, gedurende daardie selfde tydperk as wat Barnard die Diens oorgeneem het en binne bestek van ‘n paar jaar, ook almal uiterlik heel anders begin funksioneer – danksy rekenarisering en veral die nuwe horisonne wat dit ge-open het betreffende die produksie en veral die “verpakking” van analitiese intelligensie-verslae bestem vir die oë van die politieke besluitnemers

Weer eens, in Suid-Afrika se geval, was dit Van den Bergh se Buro wat aan die speerpunt was met hierdie nuwe tegnologie en wat die grondslag gelê gehad het vir die uitbou wat onder Barnard tot wasdom sou kom – tot die mate dat ons internasionaal deur ander dienste erken is as leiers ten opsigte van die aanwending van die nuwe tegnologie. Ek onthou goed hoe die destydse tegnologiehoof van die Wes-Duitse BND tydens ‘n kursus wat ek by hulle in München geloop het, half verontskuldigend sy lesing begin het met die stelling dat hy nie eintlik verstaan hoekom hy vir ons moet toespreek nie (en nie anders om nie), want ons is dan internasionaal onder die erkende leiers op die gebied van benutting van rekenaar-vermoëns in intelligensie-verband

Een van die mees saakmakende en uiterlik-sigbare aanwendings van die nuwe tegnologie wat kort na Barnard se oorname tot wasdom gekom het, was die stelsel van daaglikse produksie en distribusie van analitiese intelligensie-produkte (die NIFS - Nasionale Intelligensie Flitse en Sketse). Waarop Barnard tereg trots was. Die NIFS was egter onteenseglik die volvoering ‘n projek wat reeds onder Van den Bergh in loodsvorm gekonsepsualiseer en op afdelingsvlak beproef is, om toe (met die aanland van genoeg rekenaar-terminale) dwarsdeur die Diens se tak Navorsing (of te wel analise) gevestig te kon word. Ek weet dit eerstehands, omrede ekself destyds sentraal was (reeds in die Buro-konteks en daarna die Diens), in die konsepsualiseer, inisieer en daarna stelselmatige implementering van hierdie nuwe verslag-stelsel...

Ewe-eens was klem op wetenskaplike analise van rou inligting aan die hand van sosiaalwetenskaplike en ekonomiese teorie, reeds skering en inslag onder Van den Bergh. Barnard se groot meriete was hoe merkwaardig vinnig hy geleer het, en hoe entoesiasties en bestuursvaardig hy daadwerklik voortgebou het op die fondamente van dit wat hy geërf het.

Om te beweer dat Barnard die integriteit en etos van die Diens in die reine sou gebring het (insinuerend dat dit wat vooraf gegaan het iets oënskynlik afgryslik was?) skiet te hoog en is boonop ‘n onnodige belediging van die integriteit en eer van almal wat in die destydse Buro gedien het (en daarna toe ene geval die oorgrote meerderheid van die Diens se korps bly vorm het).

4.3 DIE ROL VAN DIE POLITIEK VAN DAARDIE ERA:

Die Afrikaner-politiek van die era moet hier onthou word, want die PW Botha-kamp se behoeftes en benouenisse was die konteks vir sulke hogere aansprake. Dit was die tyd van (en net na) die paleis-rewolusie teen premier Vorster, Drs Connie Mulder / Eschel Rhoodie en generaal Van den Bergh

‘n Coup wat instigeer is om PW Botha en sy militaristiese denke-dampkring aan bewind te plaas

Gedurende en na hierdie “bloedlose staatsgreep” is mildelik en baie onderhands gebruik gemaak van wat vandag “fake news” en “lawfare” genoem word. Veral in die vorm van die sogenaamde Inligting-“skandaal” en die erg gemanipuleerde, altyd politiek-dienstige Erasmus-kommissie.

Prakties al die skadu wat op die ou Buro en Van den Bergh gegooi is (met Barnard wat daarna voorgehou is as reddende transformeerder en hersteller van integriteit), het in werklikheid gespruit uit die Botha-bewind se politieke behoefte om hulle voorgangers se beeld af te takel, eerder as dat dit enigsins op empiriese feite gebaseer was. Daardie wiel sou egter draai... (vir meer oor die paleisrewolusie, kan u hierdie artikel lees: "QUIET COUP D'ETAT" AGAINST PM JOHN VORSTER - Nongqai BLOG )

4.4 BARNARD HET NIE IN SY OUTOBIOGRAFIE OORDRYF NIE: ‘n Voorbeeld van die etos wat Barnard wel bly kweek het en met reg in sy outobiografie as kenmerkend van die Diens se analiste voorgehou het, is dat ons altyd gebonde was om aan politieke besluitnemers oor te dra dit wat hulle moes hoor, en nie dit wat hulle wou hoor nie – iets wat ons sonder skroom gedoen het.

Die voorbeeld wat Barnard in sy outobiografie voorgehou het van sulke onwrikbare staan by die feite, was van ‘n jong analis wat nie geswig het nie in ‘n onderonsie met die destydse administrateurgeneraal van SWA, die gedugte Dr. Gerrit Viljoen.

Ek het bemerk dat my mede oud-ambassadeur, Dr Riaan Eksteen, in sy skerp persoonlik-kritiese resensie van Barnard se boek verklaar het dat hierdie storie na sy mening so hoogs onwaarskynlik is dat dit kwalik waar kon wees. Syns insiens strek dit eerder tot bewys van die “self-dienende oordrywing” waarvan hy Barnard beskuldig het (Eksteen het weer verwys na sy 2015-resensie, in

die brief wat hy na Barnard se afsterwe aan Die Burger geskryf het om steeds skadu te bly werp op die oorledene se bydraes).

Weer kan ek persoonlik getuig daarvan dat hierdie insident wél gebeur het en geensins in die boek oordryf is nie. Ek was naamlik daardie analis, destyds aan die hoof van die SWA analitiese lessenaars. In die spesifieke geval was ek my departement se verteenwoordiger op ‘n hoëvlakse interdepartementele feite-sending na Windhoek, daarheen gestuur deur die kabinet. Ander lede was Niel van Heerden, wat Buitelandse Sake verteenwoordig het, en senior offisiere van die Weermag en Veiligheidstak

Viljoen was dermate onthuts met die analise wat ek voorgedra het betreffende wat in werklikheid in die grens-oorlog aan die gang was, dat hy terstond my destydse departementshoof, oom Alex van Wyk, persoonlik opgebel het om te kla oor hoe “voor op die wa” ek sou gewees het deur so hardnekkig voet by stuk te hou betreffende ‘n waardasie wat nie Viljoen (en die SAW) se politieke narratief gedien het nie.

Ek is ingeroep, op die mat voor Van Wyk, Cor Bekker en Niël Barnard, wat my geensins veroordeel het nie maar trouens aangemoedig het om “vol te hou met die goeie werk, maar tog darem te probeer om mense nie onnodig kwaad te maak nie...”.

Al “fout” in die relaas hieroor in Barnard se boek, is dus betreffende chronologie – die insident het gebeur onder die vaandel nog van die DNV-iterasie van die Diens, met Van Wyk as DG. Barnard was reeds daardie oggend teenwoordig, as deel van sy ses maande van voorbereidende oriëntasie

met die oog op die eventuele oorneem van die latere NI-iterasie, wat toe nog ‘n klompie maande in die toekoms gelê het

Hierdie chronologiese konteks is belangrik, nie ter ondersteuning van Koedoe Eksteen se betwyfeling van die waarheid van die storie nie, maar ter ondersteuning van my standpunt dat die etos van onkreukbare analise nie nuut ingebring is deur Barnard nie, maar reeds integraal was in die Buro/DNV-dae. Vir meer detail oor hierdie insident, kliek gerus op die volgende skakel: NONGQAI SERIES THE MEN SPEAK Dr Willem Steenkamp Part 2 - Nongqai BLOG

5. ‘n POLITIEKE UITDAGING KAN NIE MILITÊR OPGELOS WORD NIE

Die essensie van die Buro/DNV/NI se bedreigingsanalise betreffende Suid-Afrika self, was deurentyd dat die land in wese met ‘n politieke dilemma gekonfronteer was, en dat ‘n politieke vraagstuk ten ene male nie militêr opgelos kan word nie. As mens nie die vuur onder die pap-pot blus nie, dan gaan jy uiteindelik nie die deksel daarop kan hou nie – dit gáán oorkook.

Hierdie fundamentele insig was uiteindelik deurslaggewend daarin om die De Klerk-regering terug te gebring het na die onderhandeling-gebaseerde strategie van Vorster. Dit sou egter wees om te

hoog op te wil gee, indien aanspraak gemaak probeer word dat eksklusief net NI/Barnard hierdie (korrekte) insig openbaar het. Dit is byvoorbeeld ook sterk geartikuleer in ‘n Veiligheidstakmemorandum van vroeg-1987 waarin my oorlede vader dit ondubbelsinnig duidelik gemaak het dat die “blou lyn” nie vir altyd sal kan hou nie. Hy het dus by herhaling aangeraai dat dit aangewese is om onverwyld te begin onderhandel vir ‘n politieke skikking, terwyl die regering dit nog uit ‘n posisie van relatiewe sterkte kon doen.

Waaromtrent hy en Barnard dit ook heelhartig eens was, is dat opgehou moes word om ‘n kommunis agter elke bos te soek. Nie-Blanke weerstand kon ten ene male nie volledig aan Sowjet-aanhitsing toegeskryf word nie. Dit was in wese Swart nasionalisme, in sy essensie nie anders nie as die Afrikaner se eie verset teen oorheersing, het my vader geskryf..

Dit dien hier vermeld te word dat my Pa as veiligheidshoof hoë professionele agting gehad het vir Barnard. Hy het hom ook veel beter geken, in die werkskonteks, as wat van die ander eweknieë vanuit ander komponente van die veiligheids/intel-gemeenskap vir Barnard geken het. Waar die ander vir Barnard net in die interdepartementele konteks geken het, was my vader vir geruime tyd voor hy bevelvoerder van die SAP-VT geword het na die top-bestuur van NI gesekondeer, as die permanente SAP-VT skakel met die Diens. Sy kantoor was dus daar binne NI se hoofkantoor in die Concilium-gebou en het hy as lid van die NI-topbestuur op alles ingesit het. Hy het dus nie net vir Barnard in die inter-departementele konteks geken nie, maar hom ook in sy daaglikse leierskap kon takseer binne die verband van die Diens as sulks.

Benewens die NI-analiste en VT-lede soos my pa, het Buitelandse Sake uiteraard ook deurentyd volledig klarigheid gehad daaroor dat die soek na ‘n politieke oplossing die enigste werkbare strategie kon wees.

6. BARNARD EN SY SPAN SE GROOT BYDRAE OP STRATEGIESE VLAK

Die werklike waarde van Barnard se bydrae tot die bereik van ‘n vreedsame oorgang (en sy bydrae was groot, veral om die proses amptelik afgeskop te kry) het veel verder gestrek as sy prestasies betreffende die bestuur en uitbou van die Diens as sodanig.

Met die breër institusionele perspektief wat my eie latere lewensloop my gebied het wil ek graag vervolgens lig werp op die sleutel-rol wat hy (en die Diens) in die laat-tagtigs gespeel het in die afweer van ‘n potensiële bloedbad in Suid-Afrika Deurdat hulle vir die eerste keer konkreet – wel in die geheim – op ampsvlak skakeling met die eksterne ANC kon daarstel. Só het hulle die eensmalige PW Botha verbod op gesprekvoering ongedaan gemaak. Dit was ‘n lofwaardig en kern-belangrik deurbraak (al het hulle dit gedoen – soos ek sal aantoon – by wyse van ‘n fait accompli wat hulle met ‘n slenter afgetrek het)

‘n Deurbraak betreffende strategie wat ministers Chris Heunis en Pik Botha nie kon regkry nie...

Onteenseglik was dit daardie deeglik-aangevoorde eerste ontmoeting in Switserland in 1989, tussen NI se Mike Louw en Maritz Spaarwater aan die een kant, en Thabo Mbeki en Jacob Zuma aan die ander kant, wat (op groot risiko vir Barnard en die Diens) die onderhandelingsproses aan die gang gekry het

Genadiglik het President De Klerk toe wel aan boord gekom daarmee, sodat onderhandel oplaas weer die amptelike regeringsbeleid geword het Dit het die knoop deurgesny van PW se verbod op enige amptelike gesprek met die ANC (wat beamptes soos Cloete en Jordaan van Staatkundige

Ontwikkeling vroeër hulle veiligheidsklarings en dus hulle poste gekos het).

My doel sal dus vervolgens weesom Barnard se bydrae op strategiese vlak te help kontekstualiseer – eerder as om net maar sy bestuursprestasies te boekstaaf

Barnard se taakbeskrywing as DG van NI het uiteraard veel meer omvat as net bestuur. Dis grondliggend aan daardie amp dat Barnard en sy analiste (met Mike Louw aan die spits – na wie Barnard wys genoeg was om te geluister het) die top politieke besluitnemers moes inlig en adviseer oor die bedreiging en strategiese opsies.

Die Diens se onteenseglike bydrae was dus op strategiese gebied, ter fundamentele verandering van regeringsbeleid en strategie. Weg van “totale aanslag” oorlog-voorbereiding, terug na onderhandel vir ‘n politieke skikking

Hierdie resultaat was moontlik omdat Barnard en sy span die ware aard van die werklike bedreigings verstaan het en die optimale teen-strategieë kon konsepsualiseer. Al het hulle analise daardie jare lynreg ingedruis teen die steeds Apartheid-inspireerde politieke beleid van PW Botha en ook teen die toe-heersende strategie wat propageer is deur die “totale aanslag” brigade in die SAW.

PW Botha het nie die jong Niël Barnard persoonlik geken gehad toe hy hom aangestel het as NIDG nie. Niël se doktorale proefskrif (waarin hy saak uitgemaak het vir ‘n eie Suid-Afrikaanse kernwapen afskrik-vermoë) het natuurlik in die Weermag se kraam gepas gehad. PW, wat altoos hewig in die weer was met die destydse Buro en Lang Hendrik van die Bergh, was myns insiens merendeels in sy nominasie van Barnard gemotiveer deur ‘n oogmerk van “ek gaan vir julle Burobliksems julle irrelevansie maak verstaan”. Dit het hy meen te doen by wyse daarvan om so ‘n jong buitestaander aan te stel oor die koppe heen van die “ou hande” van die destydse Buro, as hoof van sy nuut-betitelde Nasionale Intelligensiediens Iemand wat hy gemeen het die leiersrol wat PW die SAW laat toekom het, sou respekteer.

Omdat Barnard deur PW in-valskerm is as NI-DG, dus geheel afhanklik van PW se goeie wil omrede hy homself nie deur die range heen kon opgewerk het nie, is dit onteenseglik só dat Barnard baie

maklik sou kon gekies het om – soos die vele ander ja-broers waarmee PW homself omring het –net maar binne daardie “totale aanslag” brigade se denke-dampkring te bly beweeg het. Veral omdat dit weliswaar sy eie aanvanklike sienswyses vergestalt het.

Die feit dat Niël Barnard – na hy in sy nuwe pos die werklike intelligensie-prent gesien en begin verstaan het – die intellektuele eerlikheid gehad het om te besef dat sy aanvanklike oortuigings verkeerd was, spreek veel-al van sy onkreukbare integriteit en skerp insig. Hy het besef dat, spreekwoordelik, die keiser (in terme van beleid en strategie) sonder klere was. Vele kon dit destyds insien, maar weinig was bereid om dit toe te sê, en nog minder was bereid om tot die daad oor te gaan om dinge reg te stel voor dit bes moontlik te laat sou geword het...

6.1 DIE TWIS OOR STRATEGIE – SKIET OF SKIK? Waaroor was die veiligeheids- en intelligensiegemeenskap destyds so diep verdeeld? In wese was dit ‘n stryd rondom die vertolking van die bedreiging en bygevolg die beste strategiese opsies

Komende vanaf die dae van Vorster, was dit ‘n dispuut oor kies tussen skiet of skik

Die skiet-manne wou ten alle koste politieke mag behou – in finale analise, met die geweer Hulle het ‘n komende gewapende konflik oor wie die politieke mag sou hou en die land sou besit as onafwendbaar gesien, sodat (volgens hulle) die hoogste prioriteit moes wees om geheel die staat en samelewing voor te berei vir totale oorlog voer teen so ‘n totale aanslag. Hulle was nie blind vir die noodsaak vir minstens die skyn skep van politieke verandering nie, maar die mag moes behou word

Hulle strategie was dus om inkrementele verandering van bo af te probeer dikteer, volgens die (later gediskrediteerde) model van die Amerikaanse politieke wetenskaplike, Samuel Huntington.

Dit het byvoorbeeld uitgeloop op die rampspoedige af-forseer van die driekamer-parlement, wat PW geweier het om vooraf met die nie-Blanke meerderheid te onderhandel, teen die advies in van sy eie intelligensie-gemeenskap (wat korrek voorspel gehad het dat dit die politieke verset net veel hoër gaan laat opvlam).

Die skik-manne, daarenteen, het besef dat juis die poging om teen wil en dank beheer oor die politieke mag geheel in eie hande te probeer hou, die wit minderheid se ondergang gaan bewerkstellig. Daar is ingesien dat dit juis hierdie onbereidwilligheid was om meerderheidsregte te erken (en ipso facto om van die werklike mag afstand te doen) wat die vuur onder die pap-pot al hoër laat brand het, binnelands sowel as vanuit die buiteland.

Eerder as om te bly veg om behoud van totale mag, het die skik-kant daarenteen geglo dat die aanbod van ‘n geordende, vreedsame oordrag van politieke mag as wortel gebruik moes word om

te sorg dat die grondwetlike model waarkragtens sulke mag toekomstig uitgeoefen sou word, gebaseer sou wees op Westerse demokratiese en kapitalistiese waardes

Die gevaar was na hulle mening nie soseer wie die mag sou bekom nie, maar eerder: in terme van welke tipe grondwetlike bedeling dit uitgeoefen sou word. Bepaald moes die rewolusionêre afdwing van ‘n Marxistiese Volksrepubliek (soos wat die ANC/SAKP-alliansie voorgestaan gehad het) ten alle koste vermy word. Maar, alles doen om dit te vermy was nie noodwendig sinoniem daarmee dat die wittes die mag moes behou tot uitsluiting van nie-Blankes se regte nie.

Die quid-pro-quo van die uitruil van die mag wat die wittes as koloniale erfenis gehou het, vir ‘n aanvaarbare staatsmodel gebaseer op Westerse waardes, kon egter net by wyse van werklik vrye en inklusiewe onderhandeling in spel geplaas en legitiem beklink word.

In die media en akademia, sowel as in die politieke diskoers in die algemeen, het hierdie veiligheidsdebat oor strategiese opsies nie werklik figureer nie – in die publieke arena is getwis oor goed soos verlig of verkramp, oor watter tipe grondwetlike modelle teoreties die beste sou wees, of oor welke Apartheid-maatreëls kleinsielig (“petty”) was en maar afgeskaf kon word.

Binne die intelligensie-gemeenskap, daarenteen, was dit juis hierdie konflik oor strategie – of daar voorberei moes word vir onvermydelik te moet skiet ter behoud van die mag, of eerder tydig voor te berei vir onvermydelik uiteindelik skik, wat vanaf die laat-sestigs al die primêre klowingsfaktor was.

Gelyklopend was dit die destydse konfigurasie van die intelligensie-gemeenskap as sodanig wat, sedert die daarstel van die Buro in 1969 (onder Van den Bergh se leiding, as amptelike Veiligheidsadviseur van die Eerste Minister), vir PW en die militêre leierskap dwars in die krop gesteek het. Omrede hulle en hulle insette oor strategie binne hierdie nuwe konfigurasie nie die gewig gedra wat hulle gemeen het dit toegekom het nie (dit, bo en behalwe die interpersoonlike vetes tussen PW en Lang Hendrik).

Daar bestaan steeds ‘n persepsie dat Vorster en Van den Bergh verbete aan Apartheid wou bly vaskleef het, ondanks al die bewyse van wat hulle gedoen het met betrekking tot byvoorbeeld SWA op die pad te geplaas het na ‘n onderhandelde nie-rassige bedeling. By Nongqai het ons van onkreukbare bronne getuienis ontvang dat Vorster privaat, in vertroulik gesprek, toe reeds gestel gehad het dat Apartheid nie kan werk nie.

Van den Bergh ook het in sy ongepubliseerde outobiografie laat blyk dat hy deeglik bewus was van die fatale gebreke van Apartheid, of te wel Afsonderlike Ontwikkeling, as beleidsraamwerk. Een so ‘n defek was syns insiens dat dit geen logiese oplossing gebied het nie met betrekking tot regte vir die sogenaamde Kleurlinge en Indiërs. Die belangrikste defek van Apartheid wat hy identifiseer het,

was egter dat die beleid nie voorsiening gemaak het nie vir wat Van den Bergh beskou het as die land se grootste enkele uitdaging. Dit het naamlik gesentreer om Suid-Afrika se belangrikste demografiese, ekonomiese en geografiese realiteit – synde dat die oorgrote gedeelte van die land se mees ekonomies-saakmakende oppervlak in werklikheid “gedeelde gebied” was, bewoon en bewerk deur ‘n mengsel van almal. Daarom het Van den Bergh byvoorbeeld vir ons, sy analitici, laat ondersoek doen na die moontlikhede van ‘n eenheidstaat georden op konsosiatiewe beginsels.

Onder Vorster se span was dit aksiomaties dat strategie toegespits moes wees op voorberei daarvoor om die beste hand van kaarte moontlik te hou wanneer onvermydelik by ‘n toekomstige onderhandelingstafel aangesit moes word. Om die inisiatief te neem met betrekking tot sulke voorbereiding (soos byvoorbeeld deur détente met Swart Afrika) sodat onderhandel nie uiteindelik op ‘n onvoorbereide Suid-Afrika af geforseer word nie... Hieroor was die Buro, Buitelandse Sake, Departement van Inligting en heelparty in die Polisie (soos my Pa) dit eens.

Aan die ander kant was daar vele in die magte, veral in die Leër onder Magnus Malan, wat die strategie om voor te berei vir onderhandeling (soos vergestalt in Vorster se détente inisiatief en die proses om Rhodesië en SWA aan te moedig om by wyse van onderhandeling na meerderheidsregerings te beweeg) as uitverkoop gesien het. Hulle politieke leier was PW Botha

Die PW Botha / Magnus Malan kontingent se benadering van inkrementele kosmetiese verandering met fisieke mag te probeer bly dikteer het tot vele konflikte met Vorster en veral Van den Bergh gelei – wat tot ‘n spits gedryf is na die omverwerping van die Caetano-bewind in Portugal in 1974 en die onafhanklikwording van die eensmalige Portugese kolonies.

Min mense besef hoe verbete hierdie interne stryd was, en welke saakmakende konsekwensies dit sou hê. PW, as minister van verdediging, het sy eie kop gevolg. Vorster en Van den Bergh het byvoorbeeld net op die nippertjie ons troepe by Komatipoort kon keer, toe PW op eie houtjie gelas gehad het dat hulle Mosambiek moes binnegaan om steun te verleen aan ‘n beplande staatsgreep in Lourenço Marques deur regsgesinde Portugese setlaars daar en die radiostasie oor te neem.

‘n Ander voorbeeld was PW se steun aan Zambiese rebelle wat Kenneth Kaunda wou omvêr werp – dit, onderwyl KK ‘n sleutel-gespreksgenoot vir Vorster was in sy détente-inisiatief. Uiteindelik het PW se eiesinnige besluite op militêre gebied, geneem sonder oorleg, uitgeloop op die omskep van wat slegs maar as opleiding-bystand aan UNITA gemagtig was, in ‘n volskaalse konvensionele opruk na Luanda om dit te probeer oorneem ‘n Katastrofe wat massiewe ontplooiing van Kubane tot gevolg gehad het, maar – meer belangrik nog – wat Vorster se détente gesink het.

In strategies-sielkundige terme was die gevolg wat ons by NI die meeste gevrees het (en toe voor ons oë sien bewaarheid word het) dat die misluk van Operasie Savannah ons ballonnetjie van on-

oorwinbaar wees, sou prik. In die persepsies van Suid-Afrika se nie-Blanke bevolking en die res van Afrika, was Blank Suid-Afrika nie meer onoorwinlik nie, en het die aandrang op magsoordrag onafwendbaar hoër begin opvlam (soos geïllustreer deur die Soweto-onluste se uitbreek die jaar daarna).

Die “totale aanslag” manne mag gedink het dat hulle die stryd teen die “skikkers” gewen het toe Vorster tot ‘n val gebring is in die paleisrewolusie ontketen deur die Inligting-“skandaal” en PW Botha met ‘n kortkop as Eerste Minister gekies is.

‘n Seekat-tipe beheermeganisme om geheel die burokrasie in gelid te hou is in die vorm van die Nasionale Veiligheidsbestuurstelsel oftewel NVBS ingestel (per dekreet, buite-om die bepalings van die Wet op Veiligheidsinligting en die Staatsveiligheidsraad, en met die Weermag in die stoel). Desondanks het Buitelandse Sake met hul onderhandeling-inisiatiewe voortgegaan en byvoorbeeld kabinetsgoedkeuring vir die Nkomati-verdrag kon kry Eerste Minister PW het egter vir die SAW gesê dat hulle hul nie hoef te steur aan die Akkoord nie. Die Weermag se ignoreer van die Nkomativerdrag het onder andere tot ernstige koppe-stamp tussen Niël Barnard en Constand Viljoen as hoof van die SAW gelei, met Barnard wat vir Viljoen voor stok gekry het oor die SAW se ignoreer van die Kabinetsbesluit wat die verdrag gemagtig het (op daardie stadium was die Kabinet nog die hoogste uitvoerende gesag onder die destydse grondwet – wat PW toe terstond wou verander)

Dit moet op hierdie punt gesê word dat Barnard (bynaam onder ander departementshoofde: Billy the Kid) nie ‘n beminde persoonlikheid was buite NI nie.

Stug en deur baie beleef as neerbuigend intellektueel-superior, het hy in die burokrasie meer vyande as vriende gemaak. Omrede NI se taak-veld rapportering oor alles wat nasionale veiligheid raak omvat het – dus ook wat op ander departemente se terreine mag verkeerd loop – het die tipiese burokratiese tendens van elkeen wat haantjie op eie mishoop wil wees, ook nie in sy guns gewerk nie...

Terug egter na PW Botha en sy outokratiese bestuurstyl en die stryd tussen skiet of skik. Dis by my ‘n ope vraag tot watter mate PW se hardnekkige aandrang om, teen advies in, die grondwetlike veranderinge van 1983 deur te forseer (wat onder andere die foefie van die driekamer-parlement omvat het) in werklikheid gemotiveer was deur die ander been van daardie veranderinge – synde, om die kabinet-stelsel van gesamentlike gesag af te skaf en vir hom uitvoerende president te maak, met buitengewoon breë magte gesentraliseer in sy persoon

Ter voortsetting van sy afkeur in onderhandeling het PW die harde voorbereidingswerk wat onder sy voorganger gedoen is in SWA (met die daarstel van Turnhalle-proses en die stigting van die nierassige DTA alliansie) dadelik begin ongedaan maak. Die laaste groot besluit van die vorige kabinet,

naamlik om die VN-Veiligheidsraad se resolusie 435 te aanvaar, is op ys gesit en PW het begin druk uitoefen op Dirk Mudge en die DTA om terug te keer na ‘n meer etnosentriese (“Apartheid”) visie, wat uiteindelik op ‘n totale breekspul tussen hom en Mudge uitgeloop het.

Druk op die Suid-Afrikaanse regering om te begin onderhandel het teen die middel van die dekade tagtig binnelands sowel as buitelands erg begin oplaai

‘n Volgende katastrofe het in 1985 gekom, met PW se “Rubicon”-toespraak.

‘n Week voor die toespraak-datum het die kabinet vir ‘n dinkskrum vergader by die ou Sterrewag (deel van Militêre Inligting se destydse opleidingsfasiliteite). Ek het die gehele verbatim-transkripsie van daardie vergadering onder oë gehad. Anders as wat mense soos Pik Botha later sou voorgee, is daar NIE tydens daardie dinkskrum ooreen gekom op grondliggende politieke verandering en ‘n konsensus toespraak-teks, waarvan PW dan kwansuis sou afgewyk het nie.

Trouens, Pik was deurentyd tjoepstil.

Chris Heunis was die enigste kabinetslid wat enigsins probeer voorspraak maak het daarvoor dat die omstandighede (Chase Manhattan bank het pas die Rand laat steier met die weiering van verdere lenings) dit noodsaak dat ‘n nuwe rigting aangekondig moes word, maar hy is gou deur PW afgemaak.

PW sou sy eie toespraak lewer, maar diegene wat wou, kon wel aan hom konsepte voorlê. Staatkundige Ontwikkeling (Heunis) en Buitelandse Sake (Pik Botha) het wel so gedoen. PW wou nie eens vir Heunis die huis in-nooi by Groote Schuur nie – net vir hom op die stoep toegesnou dat hy kan vergeet daarvan dat PW daardie “Prog” toespraak sou lewer...

Pik Botha egter het gemeen dat hy vir PW in ‘n hoek kon verf deur die konsep voorberei deur

Buitelandse Sake, wyd in die media en oorsee te gaan vooruitloop as PW s’n. Dit het die gewraakte Rubicon-analogie bevat, en is wêreldwyd voorgehou as ‘n belangwekkende komende aankondiging van ‘n nuwe rigting.

Al wat PW egter uit daardie konsep oorgeneem het, is die Rubicon-frase... Sy fokus was daarop om die wêreld duidelik te laat verstaan dat hy nie sal toelaat dat daar vir hom voorgeskryf word nie.

Gegewe dit wat Pik in Wenen en elders loop staan en vooruit skadu het, is hierdie boodskap van PW uiteraard erg negatief ervaar, binnelands sowel as buitelands.

Ek verwys na hierdie insident, nie om ou koeie nodeloos te wil opgrawe nie, maar om uit te wys hoe fel die stryd steeds was rondom óf onderhandel, of dan maar “hardegat ondergaan” (soos wat PW teenoor Barnard verklaar het hy meen die enigste opsie was). PW sou nie gesprekvoering met die eksterne ANC/SAKP-alliansie duld nie, en die gevolge vir enige amptenaar wat hierdie edik oortree,

was ernstig (soos Cloete en Jordaan van Staatkundige Ontwikkeling uitgevind het, toe hulle een van die “Afrika-safaris” om met die ANC te ontmoet meegemaak het).

Pik Botha sou weer ‘n keer probeer om vir PW in ‘n hoek te verf rondom onderhandelinge aanknoop. Tydens die besoek van die Statebond se Eminent Persons-groep het Pik vir hulle ‘n teks opgestel van punte waarop die SA kabinet volgens hom bereid sou wees om in te stem met die oog op begin onderhandel, as en indien die EPG daardie teks van hom sou gebruik as hulle verklaring omtrent die pad vorentoe. ‘n Pad gefokus op die fasiliteer juis van onderhandelinge. Die EPG het toe in goeie trou Pik se teks as hulle eie vrygestel. PW se antwoord daarop was dat ‘n Lugmag-offisier terstond vir Buitelandse Sake laat weet het dat die bomwerpers in die lug was om die hoofstede van die Frontlinie-state aan te val...

Soos gesien kan word, was die “skiet”-faksie selfs in die laat-tagtigs nie bereid om aan die “skik”manne toe te gee nie. Dinge het egter begin verander toe sake in Suid-Angola militêr erg skeef begin loop het, met Castro wat ‘n tweede front teenoor Owamboland geopen het en gevorderde Kubaanse MIGs ons lugruim begin deurvlieg het. (Barnard het in latere jare privaat aan ‘n vertroueling genoem dat daardie MIGs oor die Uniegebou sou kom draai het).

‘n Burgermag-kontingent van 140,000 man is opgeroep. Die Leër se eerste plan was om die suidweste van Angola te gaan “skoonmaak” van Kubane, insluitend die hawe van Namibe (Ops Excite/Faction, deel van Ops Hilti). Dit het egter gesneuwel toe die Lugmag en Logistiek dit onomwonde gestel het dat hulle só ‘n plan nie sou kon help maak werk nie. As alternatief (indien die Kubane wel SWA sou binneval) is daar toe ‘n gevegsplan uitgewerk wat die Kubane sou toelaat om binne te kom tot suid van Etosha, en dan in die noordelike landbou-distrikte vir hulle ‘n “killing ground” voor te berei. (Ops Prone/Pact, deel van Ops Handbag). Volskaalse oorlog, dus, vanaf die agtervoet...

Gelukkig het Buitelandse Sake kon rapporteer dat die Kubane gelyklopend voelers uitgesteek het om te begin onderhandel. Ook het NI ‘n hoëvlakse bron in die direkte bevelslyn tussen Havana en Luanda gehad wat bevestig het dat Castro se ontplooiing van sy tweede front net bluf was, ten einde onderhandeling te probeer daarstel. En so is die VN-veiligheidsraad se Resolusie 435 teen wil en dank weer afgestof en uiteindelik implementeer (soos wat Vorster-hulle destyds al geweet het onvermydelik was). Net, nou met veel swakker kaarte in die hand vir die onderhandelinge...

Binne Suid-Afrika self het die aandrang op onderhandel vanuit sake-geledere, akademiese kringe en die media al hoe meer begin oplaai, maar steeds het PW sy diktaat binne die burokrasie en sy invloed binne die Kaapse Afrikaanse pers bly laat geld teen enige sulke kontak – kyk maar na Rapport se destydse hoof-opskrif van “DOM DOKTORE VAN DAKAR”, verwysende na diegene wat die eksterne ANC in Senegal gaan ontmoet het.

Die situasie met allerlei sendings wat ongekoördineerd vanuit siviele kringe begin uitreik het na die eksterne ANC het vir Barnard bekommer. Dit was nie omdat hy in beginsel teen kontak maak en onderhandel gekant was nie. Hy was immers self reeds in gesprek met Nelson Mandela (toe nog in aanhouding), en NI het in vorige jare bande met die KGB daargestel Sy kommer was dat ‘n los getjommel meer skade as goed sou kon berokken.

Toe Britse sakelui met groot beleggings in Suid-Afrika daarvan begin werk maak het (in geheime oorleg met die Thatcher-regering) om vertroulike gesprek tussen Afrikaner-leiers en die eksterne ANC te fasiliteer, het NI ingespring om op die rug hiervan ‘n eie kanaal te skep vir toekomstige direkte kontak met die ANC se eksterne vleuel, spesifiek met Thabo Mbeki. Barnard en sy span was nie geneë om volk en nasie te sien “hardegat ondergaan” in imitasie van PW en sy “totale aanslag” brigade se Masada-fiksasie nie...

Een van die afgevaardigdes na hierdie samesprekings in die Engelse platteland, Prof Willie Esterhuyse van Stellenbosch, is deur NI gewerf as agent “Gert”. Sy taak was nie om te spioeneer op die gesprekke nie, maar spesifiek om uit te reik na Mbeki. Gert moes homself en sy missie klandestien teenoor Mbeki identifiseer, en dan toets of daar bereidwilligheid was aan Mbeki se kant vir die daarstel van ‘n direkte skakel-kanaal tussen NI en die eksterne ANC. Lang storie kort, Mbeki het aan “Gert” ‘n foonnommer verskaf, daar is ooreen gekom op identifiserende kode-name, en só is die tafel gedek vir NI om Mbeki op die geleë moment direk te kontak ten einde ‘n eerste amptelike maar steeds geheime ontmoeting te reël.

Hierdie gebeure het saamgeval met die einde van PW Botha se bewind in 1989, toe dié deur sy kabinet-kollegas voor ‘n ultimatum gestel is om te bedank. FW de Klerk het oorgeneem, en tydens sy eerste voorsit by ‘n vergadering van die Staatsveiligheidsraad het NI ‘n onskuldig-klinkend resolusie op die agenda geplaas. Die strekking daarvan was dat, omrede dit nodig was om meer uit te vind betreffende sienswyses binne die eksterne ANC, die NI getaak word om die nodige te doen... (SVR-resolusie 13/1989). Daardie resolusie is roetine-gewys, sonder debat goedgekeur...

Dadelik is Operasie Flair deur NI in werking gestel.

Mbeki is soos gereël geskakel, en op 2 September 1989 het Mike Louw en Maritz Spaarwater van NI, amptelik vir Mbeki en Jacob Zuma ontmoet in die Palace Hotel, in Lusern, Switserland.

By terugkoms in Suid-Afrika het Louw en Spaarwater Kaap-toe gevlieg om President de Klerk te gaan voorlig. Toe hulle hom vertel hulle het met Mbeki en Zuma in Switserland ontmoet, was De Klerk se eerste, hoogs ontstelde reaksie om hulle redelik heftig te konfronteer met waar hulle die toestemming gekry het om so ‘n belangwekkende stap te onderneem? Hulle het toe Resolusie

13/89 uitgehaal en geantwoord dat dit die SVR self was, onder voorsitterskap van hom, De Klerk, wat dit gemagtig het.

Die President kon vir twee redes baie sterk eksepsie geneem het. Eerstens, omdat die resolusie duidelik ‘n doelbewus wollerig-bewoorde slenter was wat geensins reguit vir magtiging om amptelik met die ANC te gaan ontmoet gevra het nie. Hy kon dit dus tereg as ondermyning van sy gesag ervaar het. Tweedens, kon FW gevoel het dat hy by PW se voorgaande verbod op amptelike kontak wou hou.

Genadiglik het De Klerk die “verduideliking” gemoedelik aanvaar en dadelik met die bal begin hardloop. Dat dit egter baie anders kon uitgedraai het, met minder aangename gevolge vir Barnard en sy NI-kollegas, onderstreep dat dit durf geverg het om die bul by die horings te gepak het en die nodige te doen, kom wat wil... (veral in ag genome dat die aanvoorwerk uiteraard reeds onder PW gedoen is).

7. BARNARD EN NI SE BYDRAE OM DIE PARTYE TOT ONDERHANDEL TE BEWEEG

Watter rol het Barnard / NI op strategiese vlak daarin gespeel om die Suid-Afrikaanse regering enersyds, en die ANC/SAKP-alliansie andersyds, na die onderhandelingstafel te bring?

7.1 BEIDE APARTHEID EN ‘n MARXISTIESE VOLKSREPUBLIEK MOES

LAAT VAAR

WORD:

Beide partye moes eerstens tot die punt gebring word om te verstaan dat die ideologieë wat hulle onderskeidelik voorgestaan het, juis die ander kant se grootste nagmerrie was. Waarteen elke kant tot die dood sou bly veg. Blankes teen ‘n Marxistiese Volksrepubliek. Nie-blankes teen rassediskriminasie.

Die regering moes dus beweeg word die realiteit in te sien dat dit hulle eie rasse-beleid was wat onderliggend was tot die onrus onder nie-blankes, asook aanleidend tot die druk van buite. In dieselfde mate moes die ANC/SAKP tot die besef gebring word dat dit presies hulle ambisie was om deur gewelddadige rewolusie ‘n Marxistiese volksrepubliek te probeer vestig, wat die Blankes so verbete aan die mag laat vasklou het.

Tweedens moes beide partye tot die besef gebring word dat nie een van hulle hul ideologiese versugtinge met wapengeweld gaan kan verwesenlik nie – nie die regering nie, en ook nie die ANC/SAKP nie.

So, hoe het NI vir die Nasionale Party regering gekry om te begryp dat dit die regering se eie ideologie was wat primêr die nasionale veiligheid in gevaar gestel het? Hier het Barnard en sy span weer ‘n semantiese slenter afgetrek. Hulle het nodig gehad om aan hulleself die “mandaat” toe te dig om die regering met hierdie harde werklikheid te kon konfronteer – want dis nie normaalweg vir burokrate beskore om die fundamentele beleid van die regering van die dag só aan te vat nie.

Die “paradigma-skuif” wat NI gemaak het (soos dit bekend geword het) ten einde hulself te kan verantwoord, was om klem te lê op die naamsverandering wat die Diens ondergaan gehad het –van Staatsveiligheid na Nasionale Intelligensie. Die begrip “nasionale” is interpreteer om te bedoel dat NI verplig was om onbevange te kyk na alles en enigiets wat die stabiliteit en voorspoed van geheel die nasie bedreig het. Dus, nie meer net maar fokus op bedreigings vir die veiligheid van die staatsorgane nie...

Die beeltenis wat gebruik is (grafies, by voorligtings aan politieke besluitnemers), was dié van ‘n pot pap wat aan’t oorkook was – net soos wat dinge in die land vir almal sigbaar al erger gekook het.

As die vuur onder die pot nie geblus sou word nie, dan sou die deksel eventueel nie meer daarop af geforseer kon word nie...

Verwikkelinge soos dié in die konflik in Angola (toe Castro die pap dik begin aanmaak het met sy tweede front) het uiteraard ook die limiete van die skiet-voorstanders se fisiese vermoëns vir almal in regeringskringe duidelik gemaak, veral soos wat die internasionale strafmaatreëls op die gebied van wapen-aankope begin ernstig byt het.

Die ANC/SAKP se geloof in hulle model van ‘n Marxistiese Volksrepubliek het terselfdertyd ‘n knou weg gehad as gevolg van die wyse waarop veral die Sowjet-unie in die tweede helfte van die tagtigs aan die taan was. Belangriker egter, was dat die Suid-Afrikaanse veiligheidsmagte in die “gewapende stryd” baie duidelik die oorhand gehad het oor Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), onder andere danksy NI se penetrasie van dié se kommunikasies en ook van hulle besluitneming-binnekringe.

Dis nie oordrywing nie om te sê dat, in militêre terme, MK ‘n nul op ‘n kontrak was. Hulle dade van terreur was meestens “gewapende propaganda” en nie ‘n volskaalse guerrilla-oorlog met enige hoop op sukses nie. Talle studies wat op webblaaie soos dié van die Mandela-Stigting te vind is, bevestig vandag hierdie waarheid uit die mond van ANC-leiersfigure self.

7.2 DRAAI DIE SOWJET-LEIERSKAP SE KOPPE: Die ander briljante strategiese insig aan die kant van Barnard en sy span, was dat die Sowjet-unie bes moontlik oorreed sou kon word om sy steun vir die ANC/SAKP op ys te sit en eerder met die destydse regering te begin saamwerk. Dit sou wees omrede die swak sukses-vooruitsigte van MK, maar veral ook op grond van die vele gedeelde ekonomiese belange tussen Pretoria en Moskou (rakende byvoorbeeld die bemarking van minerale, edelmetale en diamante). As die USSR tot so ‘n ommekeer beweeg kon word, sou dit die ANC/SAKP en bygevolg MK van hulle belangrikste borg ontneem.

Strategies gesien was hierdie ‘n innoverende en brawe stap wat gedurende die Koue Oorlog deur geen ander land wat deur die internasionale kommunisme bedreig is, probeer is nie.

Die sukses wat toe wel met hierdie innoverende strategie behaal is, issekerlik van die mins-bekende van die prestasies van die Suid-Afrikaanse intelligensie-gemeenskap gedurende die laat-tagtigs. Reeds in Junie 1981 het NI daadwerklik na die KGB begin uitreik, met die oog op die daarstel van formele kontak met die Sowjet-unie. Op 29 Maart 1987 is hierdie bande amptelik formaliseer. U kan meer oor hierdie inisiatief om die Sowjet-leierskap se “koppe te draai” lees in hierdie Nongqai-artikel: https://tinyurl.com/mr2uxnxh

Opgesom, sal u daarin sien dat die destydse ANC-president, mnr Oliver Tambo, in die laaste jare van die dekade tagtig nie meer afsprake kon bekom om die destydse Sowjet-leier, Michael Gorbatsjof, te kon spreek nie. Daarenteen het Gorbatsjof vir Niël Barnard hartlik in die Kremlin ontvang, en boonop ‘n Politburo-vergadering her-skeduleer ten einde dit te kon doen.

Dr Marc Burger (wat Buitelandse Sake se hoof van sanksie-ontduiking was) skryf in sy boek “Not the Whole Truth” hoe die Sowjet-unie ons behulpsaam was met die ontduiking van ekonomiese sanksies. Not the Whole Truth - Kindle edition by Burger, Marc. Politics & Social Sciences Kindle eBooks @ Amazon.com.

Die hoofstuk in Barnard se eie memoir oor hoe die skakeling met die USSR opgebou is, kan hier gelees word: SUCCCESSFUL OUTREACH TO THE KREMLIN, VIA THE KGB (Dr L.D. BarnardNIS - Issuu

Waarskynlik die mees veelseggende voorbeeld van die ommeswaai in die houding van die USSR (wat eens tog ons vyande se hoof-leweransier van wapens was) was die belangwekkende gesamentlike projek om die Lugmag se vegvliegtuie op te gradeer met nuwe enjins. Daardie projek om die Lugmag se destyds Mirage F1 en Cheetah vegvliegtuie se verouderde Franse enjins te vervang met spesiaal-omgeboude enjins van die gevorderde MIG-29s van daardie era, wat in eweseer spesiaal-aangepaste Mirage lugrame in gebou moes word, was tegnies hoogs suksesvol

Die luukse dacha in die buitewyke van Moskou wat as ontwerp-ateljee gedien het vir die gesamentlike span Suid-Afrikaanse en Sowjet lugvaart-ingenieurs, was dié van die voormalige Sowjet-grootbaas, Breshnef... Die volledige verhaal van die projek om die Mirages se enjins met dié van die MIG-29 te vervang, kan u in Nongqai se e-boek daaroor lees:

Nongqai Vol 14 No 6C Jacobus de Villiers by Hennie Heymans, Nongqai Publications - Issuu

Die boek is geskryf deur die destydse spanleier aan Suid-Afrikaanse kant, Kobus de Villiers. Hy is nou ‘n gewilde roman-skrywer, met ‘n lekker-lees vaardigheid met die pen – u sal dit geniet!

Alhoewel die Franse vas geglo het dis heeltemal onmoontlik om hulle enjins met dié van die Russe te vervang, kan bevestig word dat ons vliegtuie met die aangepaste lug-rame en nuwe enjins

uitstekend gevlieg het (die boek bevat interessante fotos, sowel as ‘n skakel na ‘n video van die “super Mirage” in vlug).

7.3 POLITIEKE MAG GERUIL VIR ‘n WESTERS-DEMOKRATIESE VRYEMARK GRONDWET:

Daardie ysbreek-ontmoeting in Lusern tussen NI en die eksterne ANC was dus nie bloot ‘n geïsoleerde geval van Barnard en sy span wat dit op die ingewing van die oomblik (in die geheim, en danksy ‘n slenter) bewimpel het nie. Dit was deel van ‘n veel omvattender plan om te sorg dat beide partye (regering sowel as ANC/SAKP) die inklinasie sou hê om te wil halt roep aan die konflik en te begin onderhandel.

Dit was deel van die groter plan om die regering en ANC te beweeg om hulle onderskeie ideologiese platforms (wat die ander kant na die wapen laat gryp het) te laat vaar ten gunste van eerder vreedsaam om ‘n onderhandelingstafel ooreen te kom op ‘n legitieme nuwe bedeling met algemene steun en aanvaarding. ‘n Grondwetlike bedeling wat as quid pro quo behels het dat die Blankes hulle greep op die politieke mag prysgegee het, maar dat hulle daardeur ‘n staatsmodel geskoei op Westerse demokratiese en vryemark-waardes gewen het.

Barnard sou dus met reg kon aanspraak maak daarop dat, alhoewel die ANC weliswaar die politieke mag in die 1994-verkiesing gewen het, hulle die stryd oor die aard van die grondwetlike bestel verloor het. Dit was duidelik ieder geval histories-onvermydelik dat die ANC die verkiesing sou wen, siende dat hulle die steun van die oorweldigende demografiese meerderheid gehad het Tog het die ANC op die substansie en in terme van dit waarvoor hulle vir dertig jaar geveg het, verloor – deurdat hulle hul verklaarde strewe na ‘n Marxistiese Volksrepubliek moes prysgee in ruil vir die mag te bekom en uit te oefen onder demokratiese, Westers-kapitalistiese reëls...

Onbetwisbaar was dit wat telbord aangetoon het, nadat die onderhandelinge se eindfluitjie geblaas is: Westerse vryemark-demokrasie = 1, Marxistiese Volksrepubliek = 0.

Die geheel van die destydse Veiligheidsmagte kan hulle dus met reg daarop roem dat hulle suksesvol was daarin om ‘n gewapende rewolusie en die afdwing van ‘n Marxistiese Volksrepubliek te voorkom het.

7.4 EN AS ONDERHANDELING NIE WEL DESTYDS AFGESKOP HET NIE? Om te verstaan hoe ‘n belangrike bydrae Barnard en sy span gelewer het (deurdat hulle die aanvanklike deurbraak gemaak het om PW se strategie van “skiet” te laat vervang met ‘n eerlike bereidwilligheid onder De Klerk om te skik), hoef mens net jouself af te vra: as die blankes voortgegaan het om met die wapen aan die politieke mag vas te klou, wat sou gebeur het onder die latere bewinde in die VSA van ‘n Clinton, Obama en Biden? Met die Arbeiders boonop ook later aan bewind in Brittanje?

Wat sou die blankes se onderhandelingsposisie dan gewees het? (Want, op een of ander stadium sou daar duidelik wel móés onderhandel word).

Onthou hoe die Amerikaners, die Britte en hulle geallieerdes genadeloos gedurende die middelnegentigs die Slaweërs in die Balkans tot toegee oor die regte van die Moslems daar bombardeer het, in twee intense lug-oorloë...

Gegewe die voorgaande, verstaan mens hoekom Stephen Ellis, met sy deurdringende/kritiese oordeel oor die SA veiligheidsmagte en sy Africa Confidental agtergrond, in External Mission noem (p. 132): “Barnard was eventually to become perhaps the most influential political strategist of all on the government side ”

8. KONKLUSIE:

Gewis was Niël Barnard nie ‘n maklike mens nie. Soos die Engelse sê: he didn’t suffer fools gladly”. Bepaald het hy ‘n gesonde ego gehad – wat miskien ‘n onvermydelik-nodige skild was, gegewe op welke jong ouderdom en sonder ervaring hy homself moes handhaaf onder senior offisiere en beamptes van kompeterende departemente.

Wat Barnard egter wel ook gehad het, benewens ego en hovaardigheid, was innerlike staal, die bereidwilligheid om te luister, sowel as die intellektuele integriteit om sy opinies te verander wanneer hy met feite gekonfronteer is. Plus, die vermoë en wil om besluite te neem, ook wanneer dit risiko behels het.

Nie noodwendig almal se ideaal vir ‘n vriend nie, maar gewis iemand wat jy langs jou in die loopgraaf sou waardeer.

Dit is só dat mense van die orde van ‘n Beyers Naudé met reg kan uitwys dat hulle die gebreke van Apartheid ingesien het, lank voordat Barnard die lig gesien het (betreffende dat Apartheid die vuur was wat die pot by oorkook gebring het). Sulke aansprake is ongetwyfeld waar, en behoort sulke mense vir hulle destyds insig ge-eer te word. In dieselfde mate sou persone van die destydse oortuiging van ‘n Van Zyl Slabbert kon uitwys dat hulle lank voor Barnard al die noodsaak ingesien gehad het vir onderhandel met die ANC. Weer eens sou dit waar wees, en nou erkenning verdien.

Feit egter, is dat geen-een van diesulkes soos Oom Bey of Van Zyl destyds daarin kon slaag om die NP-regering maar enigsins te oortuig nie. Die man en span wat dit oplaas wél kon doen, was Niël Barnard en NI.

Sonder om te dweep of enigsins daarmee ‘n sondige sterfling soos Barnard tot apostel-rang te wil verhef, gee die Bybel-verhaal van Paulus tog hier ‘n heel relevante perspektief: Paulus was by verre nie die eerste apostel om die lig te gesien het en hom tot Christus te bekeer het nie – trouens, as Saul van Tarsus het hy ingevolge sy aanvanklike oortuigings onteenseglik vir vele Christene baie ernstige leed aangedoen gehad. En tog was hy waarskynlik die mees impakvolle, op die langer duur.

Hoekom? Omdat hy ook Romein was, en (alhoewel daarvoor gehaat), dus toegang gehad het tot, plus statuur en geloofwaardigheid binne die besluitnemer-kamp.

Barnard was ook eers ‘n Saul, met baie om in daardie gedaante voor te bieg – maar, eens oortuig van die waarheid, kon hy soos ‘n Paulus opmaak vir sy Saul se foute deur suksesvol te gedoen het wat niemand van links, en ook nie ‘n Chris Heunis of Pik Botha van binne kon vermag het nie

Hoekom? Omrede Barnard die nodige posisie van invloed in die binnekring gehad het en bereid was om, toe hy wel die lig gesien het, die verantwoordelikheid te aanvaar om ondanks risiko te doen dit wat hy en sy span besef het dringend nodig was, ten einde ‘n potensiële rasse-bloedbad te voorkom.

Bly mens vir ‘n Paulus veroordeel enkel op grond van dit wat hy as ‘n Saul gedoen het, of takseer mens hom darem ook op sterkte van die uitkoms wat hy ten besluite help bewerkstellig het?

As slot-woord is Matteus 5 vers 9 myns insiens hier gepas: Geseënd is die vredemakers, want hulle sal kinders van God genoem word.”

EULOGY: DR LD ‘NIËL’ BARNARD

Prof Tony Turton

For me, Dr Niel Barnard was an enigmatic man. I felt his presence from the time I entered the operational service of NIS, but this was experienced as the ramping up over time. I started my operational life in NIS as a member in a deep cover counter-espionage team. The cloistered life of an operational member creates no opportunities to meet the senior officers, so for me Dr Barnard was a distant figure. Yet I felt his presence, and this is the remarkable aspect of his life, at least from my point of view.

I was attracted to Dr Barnard because of his intellect, and I have always been a closeted intellectual. I had experienced first-hand the inappropriateness of SADF attempts to find military solutions to complex political problems they never understood. This is where Dr Barnard came into my life, because here was a deep-thinking intellectual, now also in a position of authority, but applying his mind to the challenges of the time. I saw in him the leadership that I believed we needed in a society being overwhelmed by the demands for change, being met by a government that was apparently unwilling to accept that change. It invoked in me a deep-seated dilemma because I have always been a deeply loyal South African, and somehow that loyalty was now being questioned when I was deployed into the East Rand Townships after the police had been overwhelmed, but before the Phola Park incident that triggered the Goldstone Commission of inquiry into that specific matter. I had seen first-hand how the state’s response to an extremely complex political problem was met by the unrelenting display of power as might. Instinctively I knew that this would end badly, but I was unable to express the conclusions from my logical thoughts and direct observation, without being branded a traitor, or even assassinated by virtue of Project Dual.

So, for me, this is what Dr Barnard meant. Here was the embodiment of an intellectual man, quite conservative in his pedigree, hailing from a university that I later had the privilege of being appointed to as a professor but applying his mind to the complex challenge of the times. His capacity to analyse, and break free of the shackles of dogma, was an inspiration to me. Many years later, shortly after amalgamation between statutory and non-statutory forces, I managed to get access to my personal file. Written on that file was a report by a vetting officer who noted that I had attended a private school and had displayed a propensity for independent thinking and “might be inclined to accept ideas from the liberation movement”. The comment, scribbled alongside this observation, were the words, “that’s exactly why we need this man” (or something to that effect). The importance of this comment is that the ethos of NIS was deliberately engineered to foster innovation, embrace a diversity of views, and reward independence of thought. This is the legacy of Dr Niel Barnard, the man with a conservative pedigree, who applied his mind, listened to those who had deeper insight then he did on specific topics, and then adapted to the new reality of what he had learned. He was

never constrained by the dogma of a given ideology, and that is a remarkable achievement in a society that was largely defined by racial dogma and hyper-partisanship.

I was attracted to his thinking like a moth to the light in a dark forest. I entered the orbit of that light and increasingly began to experience a sense of hope for a better future. My deployment in the Townships, the operational area of SWA, and into Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, had collectively taught me about the inevitability of the sheer weight of numbers combining to crush the last bastions of white minority rule in Africa. That process would be ugly and primitive, devoid of any finesse. In Barnard I realized that there was an alternative way. I realized that as a 12th generation South African I am in fact an African. Therefore, the power of the intellect could prevail, and it was possible to create a better future for all South Africans.

It was Barnard’s thinking that taught me the subtle but powerful difference between power as military might, versus power as engagement, negotiation and redirection. The English language is incapable of distinguishing these two things, but the French language can. In French, power as force or might is known as “puissance”, which differs fundamentally from power as persuasion, negotiation, discussion and redirection, which is known as “pouvoir”. Through this I learned that the SADF and SAP only understood power as puissance, but Barnard was the master of power as pouvoir. With this single conceptual distinction, Barnard converted NIS into a sophisticated vector of pouvoir (See Nongqai for previous articles on this topic).

The Chief Directorate Covert Operations (CDCO) was an instrument of pouvoir that served Dr Barnard well. The creation of the Special Work Group (SWG I) was an example of this, with details starting to become public domain as insiders begin writing. In this regard, those insiders are emboldened by Barnard’s own works that have laid a foundation for the emergence of a body of literature that will eventually be processed by historians, evaluated by jurists, and pronounced on by ethicists. SWG I supported the initial intelligence response to the rapidly changing circumstances, so it became the hard point of what was known as Operation Flair.

Was any of this controversial?

Of course it was, and will always be, for the simple reason that the capacity of the state to adapt to the overwhelming drivers of change had in effect caused the South African state to fail. I have been working on state failure for some decades now. I define state failure as the inability of an organ of government to adequately respond to changes in its operational environment by creating viable solutions to complex problems. In short, state failure is the result of inappropriate solutions being applied to misdiagnosed problems. Therefore, in extreme cases, the correct diagnosis of those problems literally becomes the single most important factor standing between anarchy and survival. But, more importantly, it also means that normal processes of the state, such as giving legally

defined mandates, are no longer relevant under those specific circumstances. By this definition the state was unable to respond by giving mandates simply because it was unable to. The state existed in name only, devoid of function even while it still retained some structure. This is obviously controversial, but it is also the truth as I lived it during those torrid times. It will also open Barnard to endless criticism about the saviour syndrome, and for having acted sometimes without a clear mandate.

So, the real question is whether the South African state had already failed in the early 1990s?

Today, with the perfect vision of hindsight, these words might sound overly dramatic and even an exaggeration. But in the trenches at the time, the SADF was unable to cope, and the SAP had been overwhelmed in places. The constitutional order remained only as a concept, devoid of institutional power and effective capacity. Effectively the state had failed, yet it didn’t collapse. This is why Dr Barnard will always be an enigmatic man, attacked by his detractors, and honoured by his loyal staffers. Few know just how close South Africa came to a military coup d’etat. Few really care that this was the realistic probability at that time. Some even lament the fact that the military did not seize power. Not many people have applied their minds to what this would have meant to every South African citizen a decade into the future of that event having taken place. Many draw attention to the vagueness of his mandate, even accusing him of treachery, applying the ethical framework of today, onto the misunderstood reality of a past chaotic moment in historic time.

Dr Niel Barnard will always be criticised, for his willingness to find an alternative to a political problem of such complexity that it had the capacity to overwhelm the state in its entirety. The Faceless Few that served Dr Barnard with loyalty know the reality, but mostly remain silent, simply because to speak out attracts the ire of many.

From my perspective, as an operational member in the Faceless Few, and subsequently as a professor at the University of Free State, Dr Niel Barnard is a man of national strategic importance. Neither hero nor villain, but simply an intellectual man with the capacity to change as he learned more from other wise people, who ultimately translated that into the capacity to build trust between former enemies and thereby give South Africa hope. He did what he thought needed to be done, and for that history will certainly judge him.

I salute Dr Niel Barnard, who like any great person of history, had many flaws, and angered many people. But he never lost hope, so his single biggest contribution, in my opinion, was his capacity to create a vision for change, and then build a powerful coalition around that central vision. This is not an insignificant achievement, but it will of necessity, attract adverse comment by those who didn’t like his style, or were offended by his perceived aloofness.

There are three cohorts of people in the world. Those that watch things happen. Those that make things happen. And those that wake up bewildered asking what just happened? Dr Niel Barnard transcended the role of watching things happen – for that was the core mandate of NIS – and stood in the breach to make things happen, when others around him were wavering, dithering or were simply delusional. Agents of change seldom survive the change they enable. History will be the judge.

WAT ANDER SÊ – WHAT OTHERS HAVE TO SAY

SO ONTHOU EK DR LD BARNARD: SLAAN MISDAAD HOK - 1996 - WES-KAAP

Brig Fanie Bouwer (Afgetree)

Redelik na aan die einde van 1996, is ek in gesprek met Dr. Niel Barnard, toe die direkteur-generaal van die Wes- Kaap in sy kantore van die Wes-Kaapse regering in Waalstraat, Kaapstad naby die parlement. Dit was toe die Nasionale Party aan bewind was met Hernus Kriel as premier van die Wes-Kaap.

(Dr. Barnard was vroeër die direkteur-generaal van Nasionale Intelligensie (NI), as ek reg onthou).

Terloops: hy was een van die slimste individue wat ek ooit om 'n vergadertafel ontmoet het.

Ek het baie van die fynere detail van hierdie gebeurtenis na al die jare vergeet; ook omdat 'n kartondoos met die verslag na afloop van die projek daarin by my huis gesteel was. Ek het gister toevallig deur ou dokumente en koerantuitknipsels van my geblaai toe ek weer iets hieroor sien. Ek sal dus net so in breë trekke hieroor skryf.

Dr. Barnard kom toe met die idee na vore dat ons - die SAPD en die Provinsie, soos hulle van hulself gepraat het - vir die komende Desember/Januarie-periode gesamentlike misdaadvoorkomingsprojek moet aanpak.

Hy het toe aangedui dat hy by die provinsiale kabinet sal voorspraak maak vir 'n begroting vir dié doel en wat hulle uitgawes sou dek, terwyl ons (SAPD) se koste uit eie begroting moes kom.

Die projek het in 'n hengse ding ontaard wat baie van my tyd in beslag geneem het, maar wat binne my portefeulje (Sigbare polisiëring/misdaadvoorkoming) geval het. Namens die provinsie het ek vir die SAPD 'n misdaadplan, met talle misdaadoperasies, padblokkades en ander polisie-aktiwiteite teen misdaad opgestel wat vanaf 1 Desember geïmplementeer moes word.

Ons het 'n gesamentlike komitee gestig waarin etlike provinsiale amptenare vir dié doel afgestaan is (sien foto met bo- en onderskrifte - ek staan 2de van regs - zoom in om te lees) om die projek"Safety and Security Campaign", met die kernboodskap "Stamp out Crime in the Region of the Vine" te bestuur, ingeslote die begroting.

Uit die provinsiale begroting is daar betaal vir tientalle groot baniere (SLAAN MISDAAD HOK en STAMP OUT CRIME IN THE REGION OF THE VINE) wat langs paaie oral sigbaar opgerig was. So ook kleiner baniere wat tydelik aan polisievoertuie, die van GPF-lede, reserviste se privaatvoertuie e.d.m. aangebring is. Waar die polisie nie vir sekere items betaal nie, soos die druk

van misdaadvoorkomingspamflette ens., is ook uit die provinsiale fonds betaal. Daar was talle ander uitgawes ook gedek, onder andere vir versnaperinge by stasies se misdaadvoorkomingsbyeenkomste met lede van die gemeenskap in dié tydperk.

Van die provinsie se lede op bg. komitee het hulle ook besig gehou om met plaaslike radiostasies en die SAUK se televisiespanne te betrek by ons program.

Een operasie wat deur die Kaapstad polisie gereël was, was om lede op die trein te plaas laatmiddag op die roete na Khayelitsha omdat daar klagtes was van bendes wat passasiers beroof. 'n Televisiespan (die trip was later op TV uitgesaai) en joernaliste was saam genooi.

Ek het lankal vergeet van hierdie treinryery, maar ek wil hierdie stukkie uit 'n koerantuitknipsel aanhaal: "Yesterday Director Bouwer had a hands-on of the situation on the trains and was astounded by the spontaneous welcome the uniformed police got. Mr. Bouwer, who has a good command of Xhosa, had many commuters rolling with laughter when he cracked jokes in their language. He sparked of a spontaneous flow of communication, which often highlighted issues of security in the trains. Mr. Bouwer broke the tension among commuters, and the word spread in the long train".

Ons het in Februarie die volgende jaar vergelykende statistieke van dieselfde tydperk die vorige jaar voorgelê om die impak van die misdaadprojek te bepaal. Die resultate was so goed dat dit die begrotings geregverdig het.

Hierdie projek was buitengewoon en ek glo nie ander provinsies het ooit iets soortgelyks of van d.s. omvang uitgevoer nie.

DIE TWYFELAGTIGE NALATENSKAP VAN NIËL BARNARD

Prof Piet Croukamp

Die oudspioenbaas is vandeesweek oorlede. PIET CROUCAMP onthou hom as 'n magsbehepte burokraat wat tot die einde met 'n paar onwaarhede saamgeleef het.

RSG bel my die afgelope week om te hoor of ek oor Niël Barnard wil praat. Die voormalige hoof van die apartheidstaat se Nasionale Intelligensie (NI) is oorlede op 13 Januarie 2025, in die relatief rype

ouderdom van 75. Voor Monitor se aanbieder Udo Carelse by my sou uitkom, doen hy eers 'n onderhoud met die Barnard-familie se woordvoerder, Jan-Jan Joubert.

Ek het baie respek vir Joubert en verstaan dat hy as woordvoerder vir die afgestorwene se familie verbind is tot 'n baie spesifieke weergawe van Barnard se politieke nalatenskap. Tog vind ek die “revisionism”, of dan die reiniging van Barnard se spook, ontstellend. Wees hom gerus genadig, maar moenie sy loopbaan vergoeilik nie.

Die voormalige nasionale intelligensiehoof het reeds in sy eerste boek, Secret Revolution: Memoirs of a Spy Boss (2015) oor sy lewe met beduidende sanitering sy eie ego gestreel en die geskiedenis herskryf deur na homself te verwys as die “groot hervormer”. Nou, by sy afsterwe, is dit die narratief waarop die media sonder skroom of ondersoek inkoop. Indien jy sy boeke gelees het, en die twyfelagtige voorreg gehad het om hom te ontmoet, al was dit by 'n enkele geleentheid, sou jy hom dalk soos ek onthou as 'n stugge burokraat met 'n geweldige ego wat sy eie intellektuele vermoëns met 'n ongesonde agting bejeën het.

Lucas Daniël Barnard is op 14 Junie 1949 in Otjiwarongo, Suidwes-Afrika (nou Namibië), gebore en was dus slegs 31 jaar oud toe hy in 1980 sy pos as 'n akademikus aan die Universiteit van die Vrystaat verlaat het om in die binnekamer van PW Botha en die Nasionale Party met hul geheime inligting te gaan werk. Die legende lui dat die NI se voorganger, BOSS (Buro vir Staatsveiligheid), deur 'n “valley of a thousand hills” van skandale en mistastings geteister was, en Barnard moes ’n nuwe begin maak.

BOSS se eerlose verlede het ingesluit die Inligting-skandaal, ook bekend as “Infogate" of “Muldergate". Onder leiding van minister van inligting Connie Mulder en met die hulp van BOSS, is groot bedrae geld aangewend om media-organisasies in Suid-Afrika en oorsee te manipuleer.

Koerante soos The Citizen is gestig met die uitsluitlike doel om waninligting te versprei en die apartheidsregering se belange te bevorder.

Nou, in retrospek, en gegewe die verwagtinge van eerloosheid wat 'n mens van die Nasionale Party het, is dit eintlik verstommend dat die Natte se leierskap nie dié skandaal onder 'n mat kon insleep nie. Tog het dié gebeure gelei tot die politieke val en bedanking van 'n sleutelminister, Mulder, en in Afrikaner-geledere groot skade aan die regering se geloofwaardigheid aangerig. John Vorster was op daardie stadium die eerste minister en het ná die oorname van PW Botha die seremoniële pos van staatspresident beklee.

Die hoof van BOSS tydens die Muldergate/Infogate-skandaal was 'n professionele monster, genl. (Lang) Hendrik van den Bergh, 'n voormalige lid van die Ossewabrandwag en 'n stoere Vorsterman. Hy sou blykbaar by geleentheid gesê het: “Ek het genoeg manne wat moord sal pleeg indien

ek dit beveel. Ek gee nie om wie die prooi is nie, dit is die tipe manne wat ek het.” En hy was reg. Dit was kenmerkend van die outoritêre en meedoënlose aard van Suid-Afrika se veiligheidsdienste daardie tyd.

BOSS was bekend daarvoor dat dit anti-apartheidaktiviste geteiken of geïntimideer het. Die handperde van Van de Bergh was betrokke by die monitering, arrestasie en marteling van politieke aktiviste, insluitend lede van die ANC en PAC en lede van organisasies wat die UDF sou stig. Verskeie insidente en geheime operasies het leiers van die bevrydingsbewegings in die buiteland geteiken met die doel om te elimineer. Sluipmoorde en sabotasie was nie uitgesluit nie.

BOSS het spioene in media-instellings geplaas om verslaggewers te monitor. Joernaliste wat kritiek uitgespreek het teen apartheid is geïntimideer of gearresteer. Donald Woods, die redakteur van die Daily Dispatch in Oos-Londen, 'n uitgesproke kritikus van apartheid en 'n bondgenoot van die antiapartheidsaktivis Steve Biko, was aan die ontvangkant van BOSS se ergernis. Die fliek Cry Freedom, met Denzel Washington, Kevin Kline, Josette Simon en John Matshikiza, is gebaseer op die ervarings en vriendskap van Woods en Biko.

Opgeweeg teen Van den Bergh was Barnard 'n vaalseun met 'n doktorsgraad in “Mag as 'n veranderlike in internasionale verhoudings". Die jeugdige Barnard se siel en wil was plooibaar, en polities en ideologies was hy met 'n naelstring aan PW verbind. Botha was 'n onintellektuele reus wat nét mag – of dan politieke mag – verstaan het. Barnard was 'n skrander, naïewe akademikus met 'n burokratiese begrip van God, sy gebod en die politiek. Barnard het, soos Botha, die drif en strewe na mag as die mees basiese verwysingsraamwerk vir byna alle politieke verhoudings gesien.

Barnard se begrip van internasionale politiek, die Suid-Afrikaanse konflik en sy eie funksie en rol daarin word volledig deur homself beskryf in sy getuienis voor die Waarheid-enversoeningskommissie: “In die eerste plek was daar 'n intense stryd om aan die een kant politieke mag te behou en aan die ander kant om dit te bekom, wat totaal was in omvang, beplanning en met die potensiaal vir grootskaalse konflik.” Barnard se nomenklatuur was deurspek met PW se gelade konsepte soos “totale aanslag”, “hakkejagoperasies” en “terroriste”.

By die WVK het Barnard die wreedhede van apartheid geregverdig deur te argumenteer: “The previous government used all possible methods, which should be seen against the background of this total onslaught to get all power.” Nou, terugskouend, is dit vreemd hoe PW, die Nasionale Party en Barnard aan die konflik in Suid-Afrika kon dink as niks meer as 'n stryd om politieke mag, eerder as 'n menseregtestryd om behoud en oorlewing nie. Soos in die geval van BOSS se Van den Bergh, het die vraag oor die morele ekwivalensie tussen apartheid en Nelson Mandela se strewe na politieke bevryding hom totaal ontgaan.

Barnard was 'n PW-man tot die bitter einde. Botha was net bereid om met Mandela te onderhandel indien hy geweld afsweer. In reaksie op Botha se aanbod van voorwaardelike vrylating as hy geweld sou afsweer, het Mandela so laat as 1985 nog gesê: “Watter vryheid word ek aangebied terwyl die organisasie van die mense [people] steeds verbied is? Slegs vry mense kan onderhandel. ’n Gevangene kan nie kontrakte sluit nie." Botha en Barnard het Mandela gevange gehou totdat FW De Klerk hom vrygelaat het.

In 1988 is Mandela, nadat hy vir tuberkulose behandel is, na 'n private huis op die terrein van die Pollsmoor-gevangenis oorgeplaas. Die skuif het Mandela 'n groter mate van gerief en privaatheid gebied en dit was makliker vir Barnard en regeringsamptenare om diepte-gesprekke met 'n ANCleier te voer. Maar anders as wat Barnard se memoires en Joubert suggereer, was die aanvanklike gesprekke tussen Barnard met Mandela in 1988 – nog tydens die presidentskap van Botha – beslis nie soos hy voor die WVK getuig het 'n poging om die ANC voor te berei op die noodwendige onderhandelinge oor algemene stemreg nie.

Dit was op daardie stadium 'n bekende strategie van die NP-regering om 'n politieke wig tussen dié ANC-leiers wat op Robbeneiland aangehou was en die sogenaamde leiers in die buiteland (exiles) te probeer indryf. Mandela, maar ook die ANC, was baie bewus van hierdie strategie van Barnard en Botha. Alle aanduidings is dat Barnard sy strategie eers gewysig het ná De Klerk die NP-leierskap by Botha op 2 Februarie 1989 oorgeneem het. Dit bevestig die ooreenkomste tussen hom en Botha, eweseer as wat dit hom onderskei van De Klerk wat ten minste teen die einde van sy politieke lewe geteister is deur die onaanvaarbaarheid van die morele regverdigings vir apartheid.

Barnard se weergawe van die doel en funksie van die staatsveiligheidsraad klop grootliks met die getuienis van Pik Botha, Roelf Meyer en Adriaan Vlok wat hulle aksies geregverdig het as alles binne die reikwydte van die wet. Die feit dat die wet ontwerp is om “politieke mag” te monopoliseer en immorele uitkomste te verseker, het hulle duidelik ontgaan.

Ek het kennis gemaak met Craig Williamson, die berugte Suid-Afrikaanse spioen en intelligensieagent tydens die apartheid-era, wat ek by enkele geleenthede ontmoet het. Hy het aanvanklik vir BOSS gewerk, maar was later verbonde aan die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie se veiligheidstak. Williamson was bekend vir sy infiltrasie van anti-apartheidsorganisasies en sy betrokkenheid by internasionale operasies om die apartheidsregering te beskerm. Hy het in Europa, maar ook in verskeie ander dele van die wêreld, gewerk om die staat se belange te bevorder en sy vyande aan die kaak te stel. Sy bekendste operasie was die bom wat in 1982 gelei het tot die dood van Ruth First, 'n anti-apartheidsaktivis, joernalis en akademikus.

Tot vandag nog is daar strydrosse in die bevrydingsbeweging wat 'n diep gewortelde ontsag en vrees vir Williamson het. Vir operateurs wat die indruk skep dat hulle onder normale omstandighede

nie verskoning sou wou maak vir die wandade van die apartheidstaat nie, is Wouter Basson en Williamson verstommend eerlik oor die verlede. Anders as Barnard se stugge begrip van mededingende moraliteite as magspolitiek, het albei 'n begrip van kompleksiteit wat jou verplig om te luister tot hulle klaar gepraat het.

Die woord “elimineer" was een van die apartheidstaat se primêre konsepte, as verwysing na die “verwydering uit die samelewing” van 'n politieke vyand. Soos Williamson voor die WVK sou getuig, was daar dikwels 'n vaagheid of doelbewuste poging tot verwarring opgesluit in die polisie, weermag of intelligensiedienste se omskrywing van spesifieke doelstellings. Maar, soos hy dit ook duidelik gestel het, geen operateur het getwyfel oor die betekenis van “elimineer” nie. Barnard, Pik Botha, De Klerk en Vlok het egter ontken dat “elimineer” die opdrag was om moord te pleeg.

In die SABC se Special Report oor die WVK se werk, haal Max du Preez aan uit 'n notule van die staatsveiligheidsraad wat die volgende opdrag gee: “Identifiseer en elimineer die rewolusionêre leiers, veral dié met charisma.” En in die volgende paragraaf: “Fisiese vernietiging van rewolusionêre organisasies (mense, fasiliteite en fondse ...” 'n Ander dokument van die staatsveiligheidsraad verwys breedvoerig na pogings om Robert Mugabe dood te maak.

Vir my is dit Barnard se nalatenskap en weerspreek dit sy eie opinie van homself as 'n hervormer.

Anders as Williamson ontken hy dat die staatsveiligheidsraad waarvan hy 'n lid was opdragte gegee het dat van die apartheidstaat se vyande in die UDF en die ANC vermoor moet word. Hy het so goed geweet soos alle anderes dat sy ontkenning ’n leuen was met die doel om verantwoordbaarheid vry te spring.

As PW Botha se persoonlike gesant het hy geweet dat nie hy óf Botha met die ANC wou onderhandel alvorens hulle geweld afgesweer het nie. Hy het geweet dat sy aanvanklike gesprekke met Mandela daarop gemik was om hom af te skei van die ANC, veraldie exiles onder Oliver Tambo. Die feit dat Mandela hom uiteindelik sou bedank vir sy rol in die gesprekke tussen die ANC en die apartheidsregering, spel nie die besonderhede uit nie, en hy het dit geweet.

TYING MANDELA’S SHOELACES: NIËL BARNARD’S ACCOUNT OF THE SECRET

REVOLUTION

By Dave Steward

Neil Barnard’s autobiography “Secret Revolution” provides and interesting insight into the secret negotiations between Nelson Mandela and the National Intelligence Service (NIS) that helped to prepare the way to the constitutional transformation of South Africa.

Barnard tells how he established the NIS despite the opposition of the state’s other intelligence agencies, the Directorate of Military intelligence and the Security Branch of the SAP. he also reveals the substantial role that NIS played in establishing secret ties with a number of African governments – often without the knowledge of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

He gives his assessment of the SADF’s ‘forward strategy’ in terms of which it sought to defend the South African and Namibian borders by supporting UNITA in Southern Angola and Renamo in Mozambique. He implies that the SADF missed the crux of the South African problem – which was the need to reach a just political accommodation with black South Africans.

In fact, the SADF had accepted at an early stage that there would have to be a political settlement but that in the meantime its primary duty was to protect the borders with Angola and Mozambique. Failure to do so might have resulted in a military take-over of Namibia by SWAPO – supported by the Cubans – and would have opened South Africa’s industrial heartland to attacks from Mozambique – only 350 kms away.

The SADF’s strategy in Mozambique led to the Nkomati Accord and to a substantial reduction in the cross-border threat. In southern Angola the SADF succeeded with consummate skill in holding SWAPO and the Cubans at bay for 13 crucial years. The SADF’s crushing victory at the Battle of the Lomba River in October 1987 – which Barnard hardly mentions – finally broke the will of the disintegrating Soviet Union to continue its military adventures in Southern Africa. It led directly to the tripartite agreement between Cuba, Angola and South Africa, which in turn resulted in the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and to the relatively successful implementation of the UN independence process in Namibia. These developments were crucial to the transformation process in South Africa.

The core of the book deals with the 48 meetings between Barnard and Nelson Mandela in 1988-89 that helped to prepare the way for Mandela’s release and for the central role that he was destined to play. Barnard prides himself on his ability to read people and to articulate their thoughts – even before they have expressed them. The question is who read whom in his relationship with Mandela – the wily old revolutionary – or the young and inexperienced intelligence chief? Despite PW Botha’s warning, Barnard – like so many others – was mesmerized by Mandela and regarded him – and

treated him – almost from their first meeting as the President-in-waiting. The defining image of the book is of Barnard kneeling down to tie Mandela’s shoelaces before his meeting with PW Botha in July 1989.

However, the book makes no mention of the fact – attested to by Pik Botha and Koedoe Eksteen –that as late as 1987 Barnard regarded Mandela as a dangerous communist and was vehemently opposed to his release. The book does not tell us why he changed his mind.

In 1979, before he had even met him, PW Botha appointed Barnard – a 30-year-old political science lecturer at the University of the Orange Free State – as head of the NIS. He had immediate access to Botha – a crucial advantage in the inner politics of any government. He gives Botha full credit for his administrative skills and for his far-reaching reforms – while acknowledging the problems caused by Botha’s irascible and dictatorial style.

He shows no such balance in his treatment of FW de Klerk. He writes of De Klerk’s reluctant participation in the State Security Council where he likens him to a schoolboy in church who would rather be outside playing. He questions De Klerk’s strategic ability and pours scorn on the manner in which he supposedly ganged up with others to oust the wounded PW Botha.

Indeed, De Klerk did not feel comfortable in the State Security Council, which he believed had usurped the functions of non-securocrat ministers like himself. In fact, De Klerk went out of his way to ensure that PW Botha would be able to finish his presidential term with honour – but there was no way the Groot Krokodil was going to leave office without a fight.

No doubt Barnard was disappointed because he did not have the same immediate access to De Klerk that he had always had with PW Botha. Their strained relationship probably had its roots in NIS’s deliberate failure to inform De Klerk of the first crucial meeting overseas between NIS and the ANC – even though De Klerk had already taken over as Acting President. NIS once again misread De Klerk by thinking that he might have prohibited or interfered with the meeting had he known about it beforehand.

Barnard is proud of the effectiveness of the NIS. However, the key requirement at the commencement of the negotiations was for accurate intelligence on the true intentions of the ANC – and the degree to which it was still influenced by the SACP. It emerged quite soon after the transition that the ANC had never viewed 1994 as the culmination of its struggle but merely as a beachhead in its continuing national democratic revolution. Constitutional compromises could be dispensed with as soon as shifts in the balance of power allowed – and the SACP viewed the NDR as the precursor to the establishment of a communist state. Was the NIS aware of these intentions

before 1994 and did it bring them insistently to the attention of the government’s negotiators? If not, why not?

Subsequently, the greatest threat to the negotiations came from violence perpetrated by faceless elements on all sides of the conflict. There were widespread allegations of complicity by rogue members of the Security Forces. In the end, it was the Goldstone Commission – appointed by De Klerk – that uncovered the operations of the Directorate of Covert Collections in November 1992 –and finally of the Vlakplaas unit in March 1994. These activities were in direct conflict with De Klerk’s clearly expressed orders and were intended to derail the negotiations. Why was the NIS – with all its vaunted capabilities – unable to obtain intelligence on this quintessential threat and advise the President accordingly?

Niël Barnard undoubtedly played an important role in the birth of the new South Africa. (We look forward to hearing about his subsequent role as the Head of the Constitutional Development Service during the negotiations.) He had a very healthy appreciation of his own abilities and of those of the NIS. He accepted axiomatically that Nelson Mandela would become the next President – and within this framework strove to secure the best deal for his people – the Afrikaners – that he could. However, in retrospect, was PW Botha’s decision to appoint a 30-year-old academic – whom he had never previously met – as the head of the country’s main intelligence agency at such a crucial time in our history, really so wise?

DIE SPIOENBAAS EN DIE WIT TUISLAND

Prof Fanie Cloete

FANIE CLOETE, emeritus professor en tydens PW Botha se bewind die hoof van staatkundige beplanning, maak beswaar teen die heldeverering van Niël Barnard, hoof van nasionale intelligensie in die laat-apartheidsjare, wat die week oorlede is.

IN die era van toenemende disinformasie is dit nodig om die verstommende halwe waarhede wat die afgelope paar dae oor Niël Barnard kwytgeraak is, in meer akkurate perspektief te stel vir historiese rekorddoeleindes.

Losweg vertaal, beskryf die Encyclopedia Brittanica revisionisme as “idees en oortuigings wat verskil van aanvaarde idees en oortuigings en probeer om hulle te verander, veral op 'n manier wat

as verkeerd of oneerlik beskou word”. Dit kom dus neer op 'n poging om die geskiedenis deur bedenklike metodes te probeer hervertolk en herskryf.

Die huldebetoon deur Jan-Jan Joubert en Johan Mostert (Die Burger 14 Jan. 2025) aan Barnard ná sy afsterwe die vorige dag, het hierdie propagandistiese taktiek van disinformasie nou weer in die kollig geplaas.

Doelbewuste halwe waarhede

Die skrywers som heelwat positiewe aspekte en resultate van Barnard se persoonlikheid en sy rol in die politieke oorgangsproses van apartheid na ons huidige demokratiese bedeling op. Hulle ignoreer egter verskeie meer negatiewe aspekte van sy komplekse persoonlikheid en nalatenskap waarvan hulle deeglik bewus behoort te wees.

Hulle beoordeling behels dus doelbewuste halwe waarhede en daarom disinformasie wat op revisionisme neerkom. Ek het beter verwag van Jan-Jan en Johan.

Die inhoud van hierdie revisionistiese huldebetoon strook egter heeltemal met Barnard se eie pogings om sy nalatenskap in 'n baie meer positiewe lig te stel as wat dit in werklikheid was. In sy twee boeke oor sy rol as spioenbaas en politieke onderhandelaar beskryf Barnard homself en sy span intelligensie-operateurs as die belangrikste dryfkragte en beïnvloeders van die politieke oorgang na demokrasie in die land. Hy is uiters krities, neerbuigend en afwysend oor alle ander rolspelers in hierdie proses, insluitend ministers, senior amptenare en ander bemiddelaars wat betrokke was.

Hy skep die egoïstiese indruk dat hy die enigste persoon was wat regtig geweet het wat om te doen en dat alle ander bydraes maar oppervlakkig en minderwaardig was en eintlik net sy en sy span se werk bemoeilik het.

Die feite wys egter die teenoorgestelde. Terwyl Barnard se nalatenskap nou onder die soeklig is, en met alle respek teenoor die ontslapene, is dit dus nodig om die volle prentjie te skets om 'n meer akkurate beeld te reflekteer van die man en sy optredes.

Die oorgrote meerderheid resensies van sy eerste boek in 2015 het snydende kommentaar op hom en sy bewerings bevat.

Sy tweede boek is in dieselfde kontroversiële toon en styl geskryf. Onder andere Pik Botha was buite homself van woede oor wat Barnard alles oor hom kwytgeraak het, terwyl FW de Klerk net so kwaad was omdat Barnard se gesprekke met Nelson Mandela as aangehoudene aanvanklik saam met Kobie Coetsee gedoen is, maar gou met slegs Barnard geskied het sonder enige ander politieke teenwoordigheid en leiding.

Roelf Meyer het pas in 'n onderhoud op Litnet bevestig dat Barnard se aansprake dat hy alleen die deurslaggewende rol in die politieke onderhandelinge gespeel het, nonsens is.

Barnard het selfs, volgens sy eie erkenning, nie eens vir PW Botha volledig op hoogte gehou van sy gesprekke nie, en het geen politieke mandaat daarvoor gehad nie. Chris Heunis, wie se

portefeulje politieke onderhandeling ingesluit het, het eers op 'n laat stadium bewus geword van Barnard se sogenaamde verkennende gesprekke. Hy is egter doelbewus deur Barnard en Coetsee weggehou van daardie gesprekke en van die vordering daarmee.

Mandela se versoeke om met Pik en PW te praat is bloot geïgnoreer, en die uiteindelike ontmoeting tussen hom en PW was 'n blote simboliese formaliteit.

Barnard het dus krampagtig persoonlike beheer probeer behou oor toegang tot en interaksie met Mandela. Sy paranoia dat hy moontlik beheer kan verloor oor sy magsgreep op Mandela het ook gelei tot die diskreditering van Heunis en van sy senior amptenare in die destydse departement van staatkundige ontwikkeling wat getaak was met die bevordering en beplanning van die politieke transformasieproses.

Aan die ontvangkant

Ek was ook aan die ontvangkant van sy verskuilde agendas en taktiek. Ek het dus direk ervaar hoe sy manipulasies beplan is en gewerk het.

Barnard het PW, wat toe reeds intellektueel verswak was ná sy eerste beroerte, oorreed tot hierdie veldtog van diskreditering omdat Heunis en van sy amptenare die NP se verbod op persoonlike kontak met swart bevrydingsorganisasies sou oortree het. Hy en Coetsee was egter toe reeds self in die geheim daarmee besig sonder 'n politieke mandaat daarvoor. PW het ingestem tot Heunis en sy amptenare se diskreditering deur ons amptenare se uiters geheime veiligheidsklarings te kanselleer.

PW het dit goedgekeur omdat hy nie met Heunis en sy amptenare se versnelde transformasievoorstelle saamgestem het nie, en Heunis met die meer polities behoudende Gerrit Viljoen wou vervang.

Barnard het tot op 'n laat stadium ideologiese weerstand teen swart politieke meerderheidsregering gebied en selfs probeer om blanke selfregering in 'n tuisland vir wit mense in die finale grondwet in te voeg. Uiteindelik is hy egter deur sy hoofdirekteur van staatkundige onderhandelingsondersteuning, Joh van Tonder, oorreed dat dit nie haalbaar was nie.

Hierdie en ander feite wat Barnard se rol en optredes in meer gebalanseerde perspektief stel, moet dus saamgelees word met Joubert en Mostert se eensydige fokus op wat hulle as die positiewe aspekte van sy nalatenskap beskou.

Barnard en sy ondersteuners se pogings tot revisionisme is dus ongelukkig onsuksesvol.

KORRESPONDENSIE

Ons het dr Willem Steenkamp se artikel (in Engels) ook aan PoliticsWeb gestuur. Hier is hul reaksie:

'Willem Steenkamp: Niël Barnard, the NIS, and the transition to democracy' Politicsweb <noreply@politicsweb.co.za>

00:56 (9 uur gelede)

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Niël Barnard, the NIS, and the transition to democracy

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