After 1973: Phoenix Rising, Quickly

presumed their current successes would continue forever, and they were committed to maintaining the status quo to assure it.

After 1973: Phoenix Rising, Quickly

The late 1960s policies of the major American automobile manufacturers put them in a poor position to respond to the crisis of the early 1970s—the oil shock of 1973. A huge inventory of stylish but large, gas-guzzling cars, along with four- to five-year new car development cycles, made it an impossible situation. All they could do was wait out the crisis and import smaller, more fuel-efficient cars from their foreign subsidiaries. The higher European and Japanese gasoline prices had, over the years, forced them to develop lighter, more compact automobiles with economical drivetrains. While this helped the Europeans and the Japanese only a little at home after the crisis (their already-high gasoline prices just rose proportionately higher, negating any advantage), the European/Japanese automotive solution was ideal for the United States market of that time. Thus imports, unimportant in the United States until the early 1970s, gained a foothold that was to become a significant factor over time. It was against this backdrop that the electric vehicle rose again, like the phoenix from the ashes. Five trends (shown in Figure 3-7) highlight electric vehicle development during this second wave: • The inactivity of GM in distinct contrast to Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors • A period of frantic activity by the independent manufacturers • A period of strong prototype promotion by industry associations and suppliers • Resumption of serious overseas development • Continuation of individuals converting existing internal combustion vehicles GM Leads, the World Does Not Follow

Under the “2nd Wave” heading in Figure 3-7, GM’s inactivity is in marked contrast to what others were doing in electric vehicles during this period. The GM executive’s remarks at the June 1975 Congressional hearings, quoted later in this chapter, clearly convey the reason for GM’s electric vehicle nonactivity.

While GM’s actions are inconsequential today—the times have changed and GM has changed along with them—GM’s strong stance against electric vehicles caused much grief among the pro-EV industry forces of the early 1970s.

Late in the decade GM re-entered the electric vehicle world with its ElectroVette (a converted Chevette) and Bedford Van (a converted GM–United Kingdom van). But GM did nothing technically innovative, and both conversion efforts became self-fulfilling prophecies: neither vehicle’s performance specs were spectacular, and the economics just didn’t make sense for a manufacturer/marketer.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, an 8,000-lb. van would never be my first conversion choice. The Chevette had 20 12-volt maintenance-free batteries, a 53-mph top speed, a 50-mile range at 30 mph, and weighed in at 2,950 pounds—maybe a marginal conversion choice. A contemporary individual electric vehicle converter’s outlay might have been $5,000 for the whole package, perhaps only $2,000 with used parts and heavy scrounging, while GM would have been hard pressed to wring a profit out of a $20,000 retail price. The van performance and pricing were even worse. GM could honestly tout their conclusion without mentioning what they hadn’t done (such as a total systems design like their 1990 Impact EV).

Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors Move Ahead

Ford’s direction was totally different than GM’s during this wave. They took a hard look at the problem and decided the two critical areas were battery technology and drivetrain efficiency. This period marked their planting of seeds in sodium-sulfur battery technology (they invented it in 1965) and integrated AC induction motor drivetrains during the Ford/Eaton Lynx and Ford/GE Escort projects that would later bear sweet fruit.

The Chrysler/GE team took advantage of federal government funding of the Electric Test Vehicle One (ETV-1) program in 1977 to couple a lightweight, low–rolling resistance, streamlined body with front-wheel drive to a unique DC motor, transistorized controller, and 108 volts worth of advanced lead-acid batteries. At the same time, a Garrett/JPL team was working on ETV-2 and learning the benefits of a similarly constructed and identically powered vehicle using rear-wheel drive and aided by flywheel energy storage.

In 1971, the United States Post Office studied electric vehicles in a pilot program implemented at the Cupertino Post Office in California, using British Harbilt electric vans. The program was a resounding success. Because of it, the United States Post Office ordered 350 converted “Jeep”-type electric vans from AMC General Corp., a division of American Motors, for the next phase of the program. The AMC General vans were also a resounding success. Both the Harbilt and AMC General vans had enormously high uptimes and low cost per mile while being driven almost continuously during their evaluation periods. The program had strong support inside the Post Office and was cancelled only after the “third oil shock” made it economically unattractive.

Independent EV Manufacturers Rise and Fall

Numerous independent electric vehicle manufacturers came out of the woodwork after the 1973 oil shock; it was a repetition of turn-of-the-century vehicle development with the good, the bad, and the ugly. There were many EVs to choose from, but most were not technically innovative, manufacturing quality was inconsistent, and component quality was occasionally poor.

Prevailing designs used either conversions of existing internal combustion vehicles or unsophisticated new chassis, and many were poorly engineered. In addition, most firms were severely undercapitalized. While the automotive industry marketed its internal combustion–powered vehicles via public relations, lobbying to blunt legislation, measuring public taste through survey and prototype programs, product advertising, and distribution through a dealer network, EV manufacturers of the 1970s used few of these, and haphazardly.

The Sebring/Vanguard CitiCar seen in Figure 3-8 was the most famous and infamous electric vehicle of this period. Sebring/Vanguard was the first manufacturer out of the blocks in 1974, and for a brief time sold all it could make. Eventually, more than 2,000 CitiCars were produced. It was very popular in its day; owners were fiercely loyal, and it received much publicity. Unfortunately, although it was well built (many are still on the road today), efficient, and practical, its design and styling gave it the appearance of a glorified golf cart, similar to the late 1960s engineering prototypes previously mentioned. When they were unjustly crucified by a Consumer’s Union report (along with Elcar’s golf-cart-sized Zagato imported from Italy), and an unfavorable article went out over the UPI wire, even a letter from the chief attorney of the Department of Transportation saying the criticisms

Figure 3-8 Sebring/Vanguard CitiCar (Source: Wikipedia).

were false failed to undo the damage. The public would always associate EVs with golf carts and some nebulous stigma.

But this painful lesson was well learned by other electric vehicle manufacturers, and later models avoided golf-cart–looking designs like the plague. Another wellknown manufacturer of this period was Electric Fuel Propulsion. Their early Renault R 10 and Hornet conversions led to their original and innovative Transformer (featuring 180-volt tripolar lead-cobalt batteries, a 70-mph top speed, and 100-mile range) with its range-extending Mobile Power Plant trailer. Linear Alpha produced the Seneca (Ford) and Linearvan (Dodge) conversions. U.S. Electricar produced the Electricar (Renault LeCar) and Lectric Leopard conversions. Finally, there was Battronic Truck’s Minivan, co-produced with the Electric Vehicle Council; more than 60 utilities received production versions of this 6,800-lb. van whose 18 6-volt lead-acid batteries pushed it to 60 mph. Electric Vehicle Industry Closes Ranks to Show Support

One of the more innovative promotions of this period involved the development of prototypes by industry associations and individual manufacturers who stood to gain from the sale of their product(s) in electric vehicles. The prototypes were used for all sorts of public relations event-style marketing. The result was raising the level of public awareness about EVs—so much so that individuals, thinking these were production products, frequently called these organizations to place orders.

Japan Gets More Serious About EVs

The Japanese rise in and now domination of the electric drive world is remarkable and still continuing. From the Lexus to the Prius to the Camry, hybrid drive is a world-class drive system. From the Toyota RAV4 EV I drove to the plug-in-hybrid cars they will inevitably launch in the future, Japan is an automotive power. Even before they achieved world dominance in the internal combustion engine vehicle in the 1980s, leading visionaries at Japan’s state planning agencies had seen the future, and it was electric vehicles. Japan needed little incentive—it was the world’s largest importer of oil, had dangerous levels of pollution, and high speeds on its narrow, urban streets were a fact of life.

While the Japanese Electric Vehicle Association and its tight coordination with MITI directives did not arrive on the scene until 1976, Japanese government funding of EV programs began in 1971 with Phase I basic research into batteries, motors, control systems, and components across the spectrum of car, truck, and bus platforms.

The fruits of its labors, augmented by MITI directives to focus on urban acceleration and range, appeared in Phase II. As Table 3-1 attests, Japan’s 1970s Phase II offerings from Daihatsu, Toyota, Mazda, and Nissan put it into a world-leadership class. The Nissan EV-4P truck’s 188 miles before recharging was a record for lead-acid batterypowered vehicles, and its EV-4H truck’s 308 miles was the world record for that period.

Throughout the rest of the 1970s all Japan’s big nine automakers—Daihatsu, Honda, Isuzu, Mazda (Toyo Kogyo), Mitsubishi, Nissan, Subaru, Suzuki, and Toyota—were involved in EV activities, although some to a greater extent than others (see Figure 3-7). Individuals Assisted by More and Better Everything

The best news of the 1970s was for individuals wanting to do EV conversions. More of what was needed was available for conversions, and how-to books even started to appear. Other than the fact that components—particularly the controllers—were still unsophisticated, individual converters enjoyed relating their conversion experiences at regular Electric Auto Association meetings and pushed the outside of the speed and distance envelope at rallies and events. The greatest irony of this period is that at the same time General Motors was providing extremely negative information to the Congressional hearings, the individuals who had actually done a conversion to an electric vehicle were reporting high degrees of satisfaction, with operating costs in the range of two cents per mile, and most had yet to replace their first set of batteries.

Daihatsu Toyota Mazda Nissan Nissan EV-1 car EV-2 car EV-3 truck EV-4P truck EV-4H truck Range (miles) 109 283 127 188 308 Top Speed (mph) 55 53 45 54 56 Battery Pack lead-acid zinc-air/ lead-acid lead-acid zinc-air/ lead-acid lead-acid

Curb Weight (lbs) 2500 2770 1720 5000 5490

Table 3-1 Comparison of Japan’s Second Wave Phase II Electric Vehicles