7 3/8 x 9 1/4 T echnical / Build Your Own Electric Vehicle / Leitman / 373-2 / Chapter 3
C h a p t e r 3 : E l e c t r i c Ve h i c l e H i s t o r y presumed their current successes would continue forever, and they were committed to maintaining the status quo to assure it.
After 1973: Phoenix Rising, Quickly The late 1960s policies of the major American automobile manufacturers put them in a poor position to respond to the crisis of the early 1970s—the oil shock of 1973. A huge inventory of stylish but large, gas-guzzling cars, along with four- to five-year new car development cycles, made it an impossible situation. All they could do was wait out the crisis and import smaller, more fuel-efficient cars from their foreign subsidiaries. The higher European and Japanese gasoline prices had, over the years, forced them to develop lighter, more compact automobiles with economical drivetrains. While this helped the Europeans and the Japanese only a little at home after the crisis (their already-high gasoline prices just rose proportionately higher, negating any advantage), the European/Japanese automotive solution was ideal for the United States market of that time. Thus imports, unimportant in the United States until the early 1970s, gained a foothold that was to become a significant factor over time. It was against this backdrop that the electric vehicle rose again, like the phoenix from the ashes. Five trends (shown in Figure 3-7) highlight electric vehicle development during this second wave: • The inactivity of GM in distinct contrast to Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors • A period of frantic activity by the independent manufacturers • A period of strong prototype promotion by industry associations and suppliers • Resumption of serious overseas development • Continuation of individuals converting existing internal combustion vehicles
GM Leads, the World Does Not Follow
Under the “2nd Wave” heading in Figure 3-7, GM’s inactivity is in marked contrast to what others were doing in electric vehicles during this period. The GM executive’s remarks at the June 1975 Congressional hearings, quoted later in this chapter, clearly convey the reason for GM’s electric vehicle nonactivity. While GM’s actions are inconsequential today—the times have changed and GM has changed along with them—GM’s strong stance against electric vehicles caused much grief among the pro-EV industry forces of the early 1970s. Late in the decade GM re-entered the electric vehicle world with its ElectroVette (a converted Chevette) and Bedford Van (a converted GM–United Kingdom van). But GM did nothing technically innovative, and both conversion efforts became self-fulfilling prophecies: neither vehicle’s performance specs were spectacular, and the economics just didn’t make sense for a manufacturer/marketer. As mentioned in Chapter 1, an 8,000-lb. van would never be my first conversion choice. The Chevette had 20 12-volt maintenance-free batteries, a 53-mph top speed, a 50-mile range at 30 mph, and weighed in at 2,950 pounds—maybe a marginal conversion choice. A contemporary individual electric vehicle converter’s outlay might have been $5,000 for the whole package, perhaps only $2,000 with used parts and heavy scrounging, while GM would have been hard pressed to wring a profit out of a $20,000 retail price. The van performance and pricing were even worse. GM could honestly tout their conclusion without mentioning what they hadn’t done (such as a total systems design like their 1990 Impact EV).
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