Hillard Heintze Report for Schaumburg Police Department by Hillard Heintze

Protecting What Matters

July 1, 2013 Mr. Ken Fritz Village Manager and Chief Administrative Officer Village of Schaumburg 101 Schaumburg Court Schaumburg, Illinois 60193-1899 Dear Mr. Fritz: I am pleased to inform you that Hillard Heintze has completed its independent assessment of the Schaumburg Police Department (SPD). As reflected in our first two findings, many of the Department’s capabilities are vibrant, effective and mature – particularly with respect to four areas: a strong and reliable core of highly professional officers; a genuine commitment to the Schaumburg community; a solid platform of training and proper equipment effectively sustained in challenging fiscal times; and a track record of balancing resources to deliver both traditional policing services as well as other community-enhancing initiatives. At the same time, the Hillard Heintze team has uncovered a number of priorities essential to enhancing Schaumburg’s ability to provide the community with policing services of the highest caliber. In fact, this report includes 55 recommendations relating to critical areas such as leadership, supervision, internal affairs and management of high-risk units to equally important but less visible drivers of long-term program excellence such as policies, technology and the Department’s approach to independent police department accreditation. These challenges are not uncommon across our nation’s law enforcement agencies at every level – federal, state and local – and the Village is addressing them in a direct and proactive manner. Real change is already taking place within the Department – from the top down and from the bottom up. While this engagement began as an assessment, your midstream expansion of our mandate and Kenneth Bouche’s service since April 1 as the Interim Chief of Police, has allowed the Department to begin executing immediately on many of the assessment findings even before this report’s formal publication. We commend you and the Village Board for your courage and foresight in commissioning this independent review and for your ongoing commitment – evident now in virtually every facet of the Department’s operations – to advancing a strategic, well integrated and prevention-oriented approach to serving and protecting the citizen’s and stakeholders of Schaumburg. Sincerely, HILLARD HEINTZE LLC

Arnette F. Heintze Chief Executive Officer

THE SCHAUMBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT

AN AGENCY IN TRANSITION

THE SCHAUMBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT Improving the SPD’s Effectiveness, Efﬁciency and Community Impact

TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

II. KEY FINDINGS

Finding #1: A Solid Foundation – But Important Work Ahead

Finding #2: Individual Areas of Departmental Strength and Excellence

Finding #3: Organizational Realignment and Structural Reform

Finding #4: The Need for New Leadership and More Effective Supervision

Finding #5: Building Conﬁdence in Internal Affairs and the Discipline Process

Finding #6: Greater Rigor and Leadership Needed in Investigations

Finding #7: Challenges in the Special Investigations Arena

Finding #8: The Value of Intelligence-Led Policing

Finding #9: Policies and Procedures Need Improvement

Finding #10: Technology Challenges Linger

III. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

The SPD in Transition: Evolving to a Community-Focused Policing Model

Department Structure: A Critical View of Its Proposed Reorganization

Recruitment and Promotion: Maintaining a High Quality Corps

Recommendations

Remediation Steps Taken Since April 1, 2013

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IV. CRITICAL ISSUES UNCOVERED

LEADERSHIP AND SUPERVISION

Deferral of Responsibility: The Accountability Challenge

Expectations Placed on the Chief of Police: Balancing Oversight and Independence

Gaps in Reporting Relationships: The Importance of Lieutenants

Role Deﬁnitions: Clariﬁcation Needed

The Command Level Culture: An Absence of Debate

Integration at the Supervisory Level: Connecting the SPD’s Leaders to One Another

Building Trust: The Village Manager’s Ofﬁce and the Police Department

Recommendations

Remediation Steps Taken Since April 1, 2013

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Internal Affairs: Building a Collaborative Process

Complaints: Current Intake and Investigation Procedures

Outsourcing Internal Investigations: The Drive to Increase Transparency and Accountability

Discipline and Enforcement: The Value of Structure, Transparency and Consistency

Internal Affairs: Tracking Workload, Case Review and Closure Procedures

Staff Perspectives on the SPD Disciplinary Process

The Disciplinary Review Panel: Institutionalizing Transparency and Fairness

The Early Warning System: Ensuring Its Application

Use of Force: Opportunities for Improvement

Restructuring Internal Affairs: A Blended Approach

Misconduct Allegations: Facilitating Settlement and Early Closure

Recommendations

Remediation Steps Taken Since April 1, 2013

GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS

Effectiveness of the Division: Impact in the Absence of Leadership

Case Development and Workload: Tightening Procedures

Case Load Volume: Prioritization and Resource Allocation

Reporting: Quality, Timeliness and Management Review

File Management: Organization and Consistency

Crime Analysis: A Key Resource and Tool

Evaluations and Rotations: Important Levers of Productivity

Forensic Services: Structure and Organization

Gang Activity and Organized Crime: Cross-Jurisdictional Collaboration

Recommendations

Remediation Steps Taken Since April 1, 2013

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

Strategy and Supervision: Little Oversight in Place

Supervisory Training and Mentoring: The Importance of Experience

ConďŹ dential Informants: Case Management Practices

Impact and Effectiveness: Capturing and Measuring Data

Focus on Other Jurisdictions: The Coordination Imperative

Case Management and Selection: Tightening Procedures

Prostitution Investigations: Needed But Not Pursued

Drug Testing: A Key Deterrent

100

Gang Activity: Resources and Countermeasures

100

File Management: Content and Organization

101

OfďŹ cial Advanced Funds: Control Protocols

102

Recommendations

104

Remediation Steps Taken Since April 1, 2013

105

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POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

106

The New Lexipol System: Implementation Delays

106

The General Orders Manual: The Need for a Few Key New Sections

107

Additional Policy Areas: Attention Needed

107

CALEA Policies: Ensuring Consistent Implementation

108

Training: Baselines and Requirements

110

Recommendations

112

Remediation Steps Taken Since April 1, 2013

113

TECHNOLOGY

114

Technology Leadership: The Top Seat Is Empty

114

IT Training: The Critical Importance of Instruction

115

Support: Gaps in Mission Alignment and Response

116

Connectivity: The Lifelines of the Department’s Operations

117

Strategic and Tactical Planning: Getting the Direction Right

118

Super Users: Tapping In-House Expertise

118

Recommendations

119

Remediation Steps Taken Since April 1, 2013

119

V. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

121

APPENDIX – COMPSTAT: ENHANCING THE SPD’S CRIME CONTROL STRATEGY

130

ENDNOTES

137

7EXECUTIVE SUMMARYStrategic Context: Two recent public incidents are driving the Village of Schaumburg’s need to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the Schaumburg Police Department (SPD). One of the incidents involved the January 2013 arrest of three Schaumburg Police Department Special Investigations Bureau police officers for narcotics trafficking. The second was a criminal investigation into the actions of the Chief of Police. These matters have raised questions among Village leaders – and, more recently, among the general public – about the Schaumburg Police Department on issues that range from its leadership, training and internal controls to its deployment of resources and its organizational culture.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGIC ROADMAP

THE SCHAUMBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Strategic Context: Two recent public incidents are driving the Village of Schaumburg’s need to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the Schaumburg Police Department (SPD). One of the incidents involved the January 2013 arrest of three Schaumburg Police Department Special Investigations Bureau police officers for narcotics trafficking. The second was a criminal investigation into the actions of the Chief of Police. These matters have raised questions among Village leaders – and, more recently, among the general public – about the Schaumburg Police Department on issues that range from its leadership, training and internal controls to its deployment of resources and its organizational culture.

Assignment: In February 2013, Mr. Kenneth Fritz, Schaumburg Village Manager, requested that Hillard Heintze conduct an independent, comprehensive administrative and operational assessment of the Schaumburg Police Department – including an examination of the policies, procedures and practices that may have failed to identify the alleged illicit activities of three undercover Schaumburg police ofﬁcers arrested on drug trafﬁcking charges. Mr. Fritz asked that this strategic roadmap help police and Village leadership enhance Schaumburg’s capacity to deliver the highest quality police services to the community.

Scope of Assessment: The study examined critical elements of the Department’s administration and operations; current resources; organizational culture and structure; stafﬁng, training and Human Resources processes; internal investigations and SPD management oversight functions; policy development, adherence and administration; information-driven policing and management; management of specialized units; discipline, supervision and risk management; crimeﬁghting strategies and tactics; evidence handling and storage; labor relations; use of technology; communications with both internal and external constituencies; and ethics, integrity and public trust. Mid-Stream Expansion of Mandate: Chief of Police Brian Howerton announced his retirement on March 19, 2013, several weeks after the assessment had begun. Shortly thereafter, Village leaders expanded Hillard Heintze’s mandate to include immediate strategic leadership and advisory support to the Schaumburg Police Department until a permanent Chief is appointed. Kenneth A. Bouche, one of the lead assessors on the Hillard Heintze team and a retired Illinois State Police Colonel, was sworn in as the SPD’s Interim Chief of Police on April 1, 2013 and, with the approval of Village leaders, immediately began to implement many of the changes that had emerged from the assessment’s initial phases. In effect, remediation steps began before this report’s publication. To properly communicate each of these concurrent work streams – assessment and implementation – this report includes sections dedicated to the assessment’s recommendations as well as to the remediation steps taken by the Village and the Department since April 1, 2013.

Key Findings: As a result of this assessment, the Hillard Heintze team has drawn 10 key findings. These range from individual areas of departmental strength and excellence to the need for new leadership, more effective supervision, organizational realignment and structural reform. Our key findings also directly address the best opportunities to improve the units dedicated to internal affairs, general investigations and special investigations as well as key building blocks of police department effectiveness such as policies and procedures, technology and maintaining the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) accreditation. Observations, Considerations and Recommendations: Throughout this report, the Hillard Heintze assessment team has identified observations and considerations that may be helpful in improving the Schaumburg Police Department’s effectiveness, efficiency and community impact. When these represent matters that are critical or strategic, they are documented as formal report recommendations. The Hillard Heintze team has compiled a list of 55 recommendations for the Village of Schaumburg and the Schaumburg Police Department. These are organized into eight categories, including Organization and Administration, Leadership and Supervision, Internal Affairs, General Investigations, Special Investigations, Intelligence-Led Policing, Policies and Procedures and Technology. Final Considerations and Next Steps: We suggest that the Village Board and management discuss the findings contained herein and develop an appropriate plan and timeline to guide the implementation of these reforms.

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INTRODUCTION

ACTIONS TAKEN: WHAT WE DID The Hillard Heintze team’s independent and comprehensive assessment of the Schaumburg Police Department and the creation of this strategic roadmap involved a multi-step process in which we:

Conducted interviews with a majority of Department members in both private sessions and group meetings.

Examined the policies, procedures and practices that may have failed to identify the alleged illicit activities of three undercover Schaumburg police ofﬁcers arrested on narcotics trafﬁcking charges.

Reviewed investigative activity for the past three years, examining the use of conﬁdential informants, ofﬁcial advance funds, evidence handling, undercover tactics and asset forfeiture.

Examined the policies, procedures, and practices pertaining to supervision, management, organizational structure, leadership and daily operations of the Department.

Reviewed the process for investigating police misconduct and evaluated the processes supporting Internal Affairs and the Ofﬁce of Professional Standards, including early warning systems.

Identiﬁed key ﬁndings and recommendations that can be incorporated into a Strategic Roadmap, including goals and objectives for police and Village leadership.

Engaged our broader Hillard Heintze team to evaluate the information and capture the insights of our senior leaders and subject-matter experts.

Discussed the most important key ﬁndings and analyses, as they emerged, with Village management.

INTERVIEWS: WHO WE TAPPED FOR INSIGHTS y At the outset of the project, the team interviewed the Police Chief, his management team and the Department’s union representatives. The project team also met with the Village Manager and the Assistant Village Manager. The purpose of these interviews was to develop an initial understanding of the issues and background which led to this assessment. y Over the course of several weeks, the project team conducted an intensive process of interviewing and re-interviewing staff members in every function within the Police Department. Members of the project team met with more than 110 employees in individual interviews – managers, supervisors, line staff and part-time staff. The purpose of these interviews was to collect a wide variety of data and insights to document business processes and practices. y Additional employee input was also obtained through four focus groups held in conjunction with roll call meetings covering day, afternoon and evening shifts. The purpose of these interviews was to capture employee insights regarding management and business processes throughout the SPD’s 24-hour operating schedule. y The project team interviewed each member of the Village Board individually as well as other elected and appointed Village Ofﬁcials. These interviews were used to identify community concerns regarding service delivery, integrity and performance. In addition, team members attended beat meetings and reached out to community stakeholders.

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Kenneth A. Bouche Retired Colonel and Chief Information Ofﬁcer, Illinois State Police; COO, Hillard Heintze

Robert L. Davis Retired Chief of Police, San Jose; SVP and Managing Director, Hillard Heintze

A.M. “Jake” Jacocks, Jr. Retired Chief of Police, Virginia Beach

Arnette F. Heintze Retired U.S. Secret Service Special Agent in Charge, Chicago; Co-Founder and CEO, Hillard Heintze

Terry G. Hillard Retired Superintendent of Police, Chicago; Co-Founder, Hillard Heintze

Thomas O’Reilly Retired Director, USDOJ Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative PMO

Kathleen M. O’Toole Retired Boston Police Commissioner and Chief Inspector of the Garda Síochána, Inspectorate, Ireland

Robert Parker Retired Director of the Miami-Dade Police Department

Carl R. Peed Retired Director of USDOJ Ofﬁce of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)

Dr. Alex Weiss Former Director of the Northwestern University Center for Public Safety

ASSESSORS: THE HILLARD HEINTZE SENIOR LEADERSHIP COUNCIL This assessment was conducted by select members of the Hillard Heintze Senior Leadership Council – an independent council of retired Major City Police Chiefs dedicated exclusively to bringing national and international best practices to the pursuit of excellence in policing and public safety. Individually, Council members have been personally responsible for leading the signiﬁcant transformation of major city police departments and law enforcement agencies for many of the largest municipalities across this nation. Appointed by Arnette Heintze and Terry Hillard, members have outstanding career-long records of leadership and achievement. Engagement Leadership Arnette Heintze and Terry Hillard provided engagement leadership and oversight for this project, including day-to-day counsel and executive guidance in ensuring that the actions and tasks critical to a highly successful engagement were carefully planned and diligently followed at every phase of the assessment.

Project Managers Kenneth A. Bouche, Hillard Heintze Chief Operating Ofﬁcer, served as project manager and the primary point of contact for this engagement until March 30, 2013, when Hillard Heintze agreed to the Village of Schaumburg’s request that the ﬁrm serve as Interim Chief of Police in the immediate aftermath of the incumbent’s retirement and placed Bouche in this position. On the same date, Arnette Heintze assumed the role as project manager and primary point of contact for the rest of the assessment.

Primary Supporting Subject-Matter Experts Additional Hillard Heintze experts who served on the assessment team and made principal contributions to its analysis, key ﬁndings and recommendations included select members of the Hillard Heintze Senior Leadership Council: Dr. Alexander Weiss; Robert L. Davis; A.M “Jake” Jacocks, Jr.; and Kathleen M. O’Toole; as well as Hillard Heintze Senior Vice Presidents John T. Orloff and Thomas N. Kasza, Senior Director Linda M. Butterﬁeld, Director Steven M. Bova, Senior Investigator Carl Anderson and Strategic Communications Advisor Lissa Christman.

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II. KEY FINDINGS

FINDING #1: A SOLID FOUNDATION – BUT IMPORTANT WORK AHEAD The Village of Schaumburg’s current commitment to undertaking an independent, in-depth assessment of the Schaumburg Police Department is future facing and an important step in turning a good police department into one recognized for setting national best practices in policing. An independent and objective perspective can be vital. Two of the hardest challenges faced by every police department in this country include (1) keeping up with national best practices, and (2) transforming the culture of a department – from the inside out. For these reasons, our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that this independent assessment is timely and that while many of the foundational elements of the Schaumburg Police Department are vibrant, effective and mature (Finding #2), there is important work ahead (Findings #3 through #10).

FINDING #2: INDIVIDUAL AREAS OF DEPARTMENTAL STRENGTH AND EXCELLENCE The principal strengths of the Schaumburg Police Department – as it stands today – are evident in four areas including (1) a strong and reliable core of highly professional officers, (2) a genuine commitment to the Schaumburg community, (3) an effective platform of training and proper equipment even in challenging fiscal times, and (4) a track record of balancing resources to deliver both traditional policing services as well as other community-enhancing priorities. A Professional Corps of Officers – The Schaumburg Police Department is staffed, in great measure, by men and women who are highly professional, well-trained and doing an excellent job every day. Commitment to a Safe and Secure Community – Evident across the Department is a commitment to providing a high level of service to the community. Officers handle calls professionally, investigators work cases thoroughly and professional staff provide high levels of customer service. Training and Equipment – In spite of budget pressures over the past four years, the Village has maintained a commitment to training and equipping

SPD personnel with the tools and instruction required to deliver a professional level of service. However, although there were funds allocated for training, they went unspent in an effort by the Department to save overtime expenditures. Because of this, many core training components such as ﬁrearms and defensive tactics were substantially reduced. A Balance of Resources Across Multiple Requirements – The SPD does an excellent job balancing resources to provide traditional investigative and patrol services as well as attention to community needs related to areas such as animal control, community policing, the citizens’ police academy and integration of social services.

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FINDING #3: ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT AND STRUCTURAL REFORM While its staffing levels are generally appropriate, the Schaumburg Police Department’s current organizational structure is not aligned with the Department’s strategic and operational priorities. Clear mission development and structural reform is needed in order to improve accountability, performance, communications and community impact. Strategic Planning – The Village has an effective strategic planning program that it has implemented throughout the Village Departments. While the SPD has clearly defined and documented its high-level mission and vision, the Department does not have a strategic plan that establishes a hierarchy of goals that cascades across all agency functions and individual personnel, which prevents individual employees from participating in the goal-setting process. Compartmentalization – The SPD’s organizational structure is highly compartmentalized. There is too little coordination between the command staff and first-line supervisors. The interaction between the investigations unit and the patrol unit generally only occurs when required, with little team building between the two functions. Communications and Accountability – Compartmentalization has inhibited internal communication and accountability for performance. Every function – from investigations to community policing – is developed as an end to itself with little overall coordination across the agency. Recruitment – The Department does not play an active role in the recruitment and selection of police officers, which is undertaken by the Schaumburg Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. While the independent process is effective at recruiting high caliber officers, the SPD should be engaged in recruiting candidates who represent the community they will serve. Staffing Levels – While a comprehensive staffing analysis was beyond the scope of this engagement, there is evidence that the Department has sufficient resources to respond to citizen-generated calls for service and to engage in a wide range of proactive service activities. Moreover, there are a number of opportunities to better manage the demand for police services, thus allowing the Department to increase officer availability.

Community Engagement – The Department is generally well organized to address community issues. However, its community engagement efforts are limited due to budget constraints, the Chief’s initiative to reduce overtime and the fact that Schaumburg has not yet experienced the major city problems – such as fear of crime, signiﬁcant gang problems, rampant street drugs, school shootings and targeted violence – that drive community involvement with the Department.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGIC ROADMAP

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FINDING #4: THE NEED FOR NEW LEADERSHIP AND MORE EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION After a decade of restructuring, the greatest challenge confronting the Department is ineffective leadership. Many of the Department’s current issues – from discipline, communications and compartmentalization to low morale – stem directly or indirectly from a deficiency in management and reporting relationships. Deferral of Responsibility – Individuals in the Police Chief’s position in the past have been reluctant to accept responsibility for difficult decisions, but accepted credit for the Department’s positive outcomes and blamed others when incidents went awry. Expectations Placed on the Chief of Police and Police Command – Village management appears to occasionally view the Senior Police Command as incapable of serving in key leadership roles in the community responsible for carrying out the policies established by elected officials for the effective operation of the Department on a day-to-day basis. Gaps in Reporting Relationships – In January 2012, the rank of Lieutenant was eliminated and the rank of Commander created. The remaining Lieutenants were assigned as the Patrol Watch Commanders, functioning as civil service lieutenants. In the Investigations Division, this contributed to unsatisfactory outcomes as many of the leadership and supervision duties previously conducted by the Lieutenant were transferred to the Sergeant or not assimilated into the new Commander’s position. This factor, among others, contributed to a void in accountability that may have allowed the alleged criminal acts of three narcotics officers to go undetected and contributed to insufficient supervision at all levels of the Department.

Role Definitions – Sergeants and Lieutenants are covered under the collective bargaining agreements and, partly because of this, the Department has not clearly defined and enforced their roles as supervisors and managers. Simply put, the Command Officers Association should never be used as a vehicle to manage the Department. If the civil service rank of Lieutenant is reinstated, a clear delineation is needed of their responsibilities as members of the SPD management team and their position as union members, which should only concern terms and conditions of employment. The Command Level Culture – Healthy organizations not only respect debate and opposing viewpoints, they see them as opportunities to view multiple sides to complex problems. Our interviews revealed that over the past several SPD administrations, the Department’s Police Chiefs have either castigated or unfairly treated personnel who articulated viewpoints opposed to their own, discounted or ignored logical arguments that conflicted with theirs or rewarded senior personnel who kept their opinions to themselves.

Integration at the Supervisory Level – One of the most important areas requiring attention is the lack of interaction between Sergeants and Lieutenants and Senior Command. We found many individuals in important supervisory positions are isolated and without a voice in managing the Department’s affairs. Relationship Between Village Manager’s Office and Department – Past incidents have contributed to a divide between the Police and the Village Manager’s Office, as reflected in attitudes, opinions and relationships – and the lack of trust involving both parties has impacted normal daily operations. While both sides function professionally, the absence of healthy collaboration negatively impacts the Department’s performance.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGIC ROADMAP

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FINDING #5: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THE DISCIPLINE PROCESS The Department’s approach to discipline, policy enforcement and handling of Internal Affairs complaints is seen as ineffective by employees. In many cases, these systems have not only failed to correct undesired behaviors, they also appear to have promoted the practice of de-policing – a behavior in which officers become reactive instead of proactive in their policing efforts to avoid perceived unfair discipline of their work and civilian staff responds similarly by reducing their work effort to a minimum. y Discipline and Enforcement – Many members of the Department view the disciplinary system as lacking in credibility, consistency and transparency. They consider the system overly punitive and unjust. They also see a weak relationship between behavior and punishment, with an inordinate value placed on a system of “progressive” punishments that mandates penalties that are often excessive relative to the infraction. y Internal Investigative Processes – When employees are investigated, they are sometimes subjected to a process that is lengthy, not transparent to the Senior Command and poorly executed. There is also no formal committee review process by Senior Command of the investigation to better understand the infraction and its impact on the agency. y Morale and Behavior – An overwhelming number of officers we interviewed discussed low employee morale and an erosion of initiative to police proactively. Officers stated they avoid proactive policing opportunities out of concern that a misstep will result in punishment.

FINDING #6: GREATER RIGOR AND LEADERSHIP NEEDED IN INVESTIGATIONS Our review of the general assignment investigation squads revealed highly qualified Sergeants and Detectives conducting competent and professional investigations. Leadership challenges comparable to those impacting the Department as a whole, however, have contributed to deficits in investigative rigor and thoroughness and, in some cases, key deficiencies in investigative policies, practices and systems. Unit Oversight and Supervision – The supervisory gap created by eliminating the Lieutenant from the investigative structure has contributed to the improper delegation of daily management and oversight to the Sergeants supervising investigations. This is evident in matters relating to areas such as case development and workload, caseload volume, reporting and file management. Core Investigative Processes – While the general assignment Investigators clearly demonstrate high degrees of competence, the Department’s policies, procedures and general orders are not designed to guide behavior, instill best practices or promote consistent supervision, leaving officers to make decisions that should be guided by policy. Understanding Gang Activity and Organized Crime – There is little collection, analysis and dissemination of gang, prostitution and organized crime intelligence that would help develop a better understanding of the size and scope of gang activity and organized crime syndicates in Schaumburg. Forensic Services – The Department has a robust professional Forensics unit. The unit, however, is supervised by an Administrative Sergeant without any forensic experience. Consequently, the work product of Forensic Technicians and Evidence Technicians is not appropriately reviewed or supervised.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGIC ROADMAP

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FINDING #7: CHALLENGES IN THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS ARENA The Special Investigations Bureau (SIB) lacks the oversight and strategy-driven approach required to support a high-risk undercover narcotics unit. Strategy and Supervision – Because of insufficient oversight and the absence of a strategy-driven approach to investigative priorities, SIB members frequently operate independently. In addition, policies and procedures relating to several key investigative areas are not clearly developed or implemented. Supervisory Training and Mentoring – Although the SIB unit is proactive in nature, often putting officers in harm’s way in precarious situations with narcotics violators, some of the Sergeants selected to lead the unit have no prior specialized training. As a result, they are forced to rely on the experience of the unit investigators to share their knowledge of SIB policy, procedure and practices. It is critical that SIB Sergeants know the potential risks and dangers involved in the situations they are sending officers into and that planned tactical response countermeasures are developed and implemented if the officers need immediate assistance. Confidential Informants – The SIB Sergeant is not involved in the development and management of confidential informants (CI) or in related case review. This responsibility is placed solely on the SIB investigators with no oversight from any level of supervision within SIB or SPD. Impact and Effectiveness – Data is not examined to determine the narcotics problems experienced in the Village, so Command Officers and the Police Chief have significantly diminished insight on the impact of the SIB unit on drug-related issues in Schaumburg.

Focus on Other Jurisdictions – SIB investigators regularly develop narcotics targets and then make arrests outside of the Village. Investigators merely follow their informant’s information, without regard to jurisdiction or ensuring that the arrest relates to the drug problem in Schaumburg. Additionally, there are no multi-jurisdictional task forces focusing on the narcotics problem in the northwest suburbs to aid in an effective approach or strategy of local narcotics enforcement. Case Management and Selection – Investigators initiate cases based mainly on the information developed through confidential informants with little to no direction from supervisory command or data analysis that informs the strategic importance of the investigation to the Department and community. Coordination with State’s Attorney’s Office – SIB Investigators do not always follow best practices. As a common practice, the SIB unit arrests subjects for narcotic violations and releases them without filing formal charges in anticipation of them becoming confidential informants in the future. This practice should be rare and only undertaken with the full understanding and permission of the State’s Attorney’s Office.

Prostitution Investigations – In our review of the past two years of SIB case ﬁles, the conduct of undercover SIB investigators investigating prostitution cases has not followed best practices. As a result, arrests made were not prosecuted. Furthermore, although the Investigations Commander ordered the improper investigative conduct to cease, the SPD never implemented a written policy, developed proper procedures or conducted training to appropriately address the issue or prohibit the investigative procedures from reoccurring.

Drug Testing – There are no additional random or scheduled drug testing requirements for narcotics officers or Evidence Technicians involved in handling narcotics beyond the Department’s minimum requirements for all SPD officers. Following this best practice could deter poor officer decision-making and would assist the Department in identifying officers in high drug exposure positions who develop substance abuse problems.

FINDING #8: THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING Generally, the SPD does not use data and analysis effectively to support its staffing, crime control and investigative initiatives. For example, data is reviewed in its most rudimentary form and is acted upon as if small patterns of activity (i.e., residential or vehicle burglaries) are solvable without addressing their root causes such as drugs, gang activity or juvenile misconduct. Internal Information Sharing – Critical operational information is not shared among divisions. Highrisk arrest scenarios occurred during investigations without prior notice to patrol command and other critical information was often withheld until the very last minute, hampering operational decisions and potentially putting officers at risk. Anti-Burglary Countermeasures – In 2012, although the two most significant index offenses the SPD reported involved theft (87 percent of total crime reported) and burglary (8 percent), the Department’s arrest rate for burglary was .025 percent. High reports of theft are understandable given Schaumburg’s extensive retail footprint. The SPD has taken countermeasures to address its theft problem including new resource deployment and close collaboration with security at retail centers. However, the SPD currently has no strategy in place to address this challenge. Categorization of Case Closures – A high number of the 2012 investigations were “administratively closed” or determined to be “exceptionally cleared.” Currently the SPD has no mechanism in place that would initiate a case review and capture data that could help develop a better understanding of why a significant number of cases fall into these unusual categories and what efforts are needed to increase the number of successfully closed cases. Crime Analysis – The SPD is not fully embracing crime analysis as a resource to aid in solving or preventing crimes. Needed is a structured approach to timely dissemination of actionable intelligence information about relevant crime trends and patterns, while ensuring that crime control strategies are aligned between the divisions.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGIC ROADMAP

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FINDING #9: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES NEED IMPROVEMENT Current policies – for the entire Department and specifically for the Investigations units – are not well defined or implemented. Training on policies is also deficient. Additional policy issues that must be addressed relate to areas such as investigative case review, operational planning, intelligence handling, crime analysis, standardization and CALEA accreditation.

Policies on Intelligence Collection – While technically not part of a multi-jurisdictional database, the requirement of 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 (the regulation that governs inter-jurisdictional and multi-jurisdictional criminal intelligence systems that are operated by or on behalf of state and local law enforcement agencies) should be used as a best practice guide for development of policies and procedures on intelligence collection.

Migration to Lexipol Policies – The SPD needs to continue the transition to Lexipol but should extend the target date to August 2013. As a matter of routine, all agency members should be provided with the opportunity (15 to 30 days) to comment on most proposed policies prior to their implementation. The SPD is staffed with educated and dedicated personnel who know what they need to best do their job. Clearly this approach adds time to the process, and there may be a few policies where input is not sought up front because immediate implementation is warranted to ﬁll a liability gap. Normally, however, this is time well spent. Upon completion of the conversion, we recommend the command staff hold meetings with all SPD employees to communicate information about the new system for accessing and updating policies. It is vitally important that the Lexipol rollout be deliberate and underpinned by Sergeant buy-in, as they will be the ones responsible for employee understanding and acceptance of policy content.

CALEA Accreditation – A comprehensive discussion needs to take place with the new Chief and all supervisory members in order to ensure a complete understanding of why SPD engages in the CALEA accreditation process. This discussion is the first step in creating buy-in to accreditation throughout the supervisory ranks and ultimately will help ensure that a unified message is presented to rank-and-file officers. Training – The Department would benefit significantly by reexamining the methods of training with respect to policies governing high-risk behaviors and activities to include critical skills so the officers are not validating skills through a simple electronic sign off.

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FINDING #10: TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES LINGER While the Village of Schaumburg and the Department have invested heavily in technology for police services, challenges remain in areas such as strategic planning, technology leadership, training, IT support, vendor accountability, information sharing and after-hours support.

Key New IT Position – Needed is a matrixbased position that reports to both the Department and the Village Director of Technology to serve as a Deputy Director of Technology over Justice Programs. This individual should have a detailed understanding of police processes and technology and comprehensive understanding of the FBI CJIS Security Policy and industry best practices for information security. IT Training – The Department also needs to implement a training structure that incorporates the industry or vendor product expertise, supported by department super users who can provide refresher or onsite training. All IT system training should be offered within a two-week time period of when new systems are to be deployed. Information Sharing and Data Integrity – An IT response network of technicians and super users should be created to address maintenance, training and support issues in the Department. Information sharing and data integrity are considered critical in law enforcement. The ability to obtain accurate and timely information is paramount to public service delivery and ofﬁcer safety.

Vendor Management – Establishment of a management oversight committee would signiﬁcantly improve vendor selection, utilization, monitoring and management. Vendor management is paramount to any information technology implementation. Strategic Coordination and Planning – Enterprise Architecture and IT Management should coordinate planned initiatives, projects, and ongoing IT services (such as application support) and develop an IT Strategic Plan for the Department for a three- to ﬁve-year period, supported by an annual Tactical Plan which delineates the actions required to achieve the organization’s established IT goals. This is the foundation from which all IT activity should be measured.

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III. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

One of the most important priorities in evaluating the Schaumburg Police Department – as it is for police agencies of any size – is to ensure that its organizational structure is optimally aligned with its mission. Does the structure enhance accountability and performance? Does it facilitate strategic communication – both across the Department and Village management and with external stakeholders? Does it advance effective spans of controls and the efﬁcient allocation of resources? Does it support the development of a positive, trust-building relationship with the community? And if the organizational structure is not optimally aligned to address these strategic issues, what changes should be made – and what alternative organizational models considered? These are critical issues to ask and answer early in the process because they impact nearly every facet of departmental operations, the gaps and opportunities uncovered and how quickly and effectively implementation and remediation activities can be sustainably put into place. Based on our analysis of the historical organization plans of the Department as well as the several reorganizations implemented in the past few years, we see a signiﬁcant opportunity for organizational transformation and reform.

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THE SPD IN TRANSITION: EVOLVING TO A COMMUNITY-FOCUSED POLICING MODEL The Schaumburg Police Department has been undergoing significant structural changes since 2003 – and likely well before – as have other policing agencies across this nation for the last 60 years. As this report highlights, the Department’s challenges and opportunities for the future rest on how well the Village and Department leaders, from this point forward, understand the ways that a police agency can be structured and begin systematically putting these into place. Police organizations are, by nature, complex. For decades, police chiefs, government managers, policy makers and academics have sought ways to make these organizations more effective and efficient. Much of this complexity results because of a gap between (1) the manner in which police organizations are structured and managed, and (2) the way in which police officers do their work. At different times, they have championed various organizational structures. Three, in particular, stand out.

THE MILITARY MODEL Some experts have argued that police organizations are “paramilitary” in nature and should be organized in a manner comparable to the military, particularly with respect to rank structure, chain of command and an abiding emphasis on numerous rules and regulations. Police work, however, is quite unlike the work done by soldiers. First, in the typical military organization, soldiers work in groups under nearconstant supervision. In fact, even the most fundamental decisions, like when to fire a weapon, are often directed by the supervisor. Police officers, by contrast, typically work alone or in pairs; and while the supervisor may be on duty, most critical decisions in the field – like the decision to use deadly force – are made instantaneously by the officer without direct supervisory intervention.

THE PROFESSIONAL MODEL

THE COMMUNITY MODEL

The ironies in the military model have not escaped the attention of academics who study the police.1 In the 1950s, one of the key issues in American policing was corruption. In response, those seeking to reform the police looked for organizational models that might address this problem. Among the most prominent was O.W. Wilson, who would later become Superintendent of Police in Chicago. Wilson’s textbook, Police Administration, ﬁrst published in 1950, became for many the guidebook for how to organize a police organization.

At the time O.W. Wilson’s model of police organization was becoming institutionalized, another less prominent scholar released his study of the police at the street level.2 William Westley’s observation of police ofﬁcers on patrol suggested that the bureaucratic model of police organization was ill conceived. He pointed out that, in spite of a strong, formal bureaucracy, police ofﬁcers often ignore rules, policies and procedures in the performance of their work. Moreover, he suggested that the “professional” model of policing had, in fact, caused relationships with the community to deteriorate.

Wilson argued that the solution to the corruption problem was to make the police more “professional” by making their organizations more bureacratic. He advocated that police agency structure should include (1) a well-deﬁned hierarchy, (2) inﬂexible rules, (3) expertise, (4) structure based on job function and (5) limited span of control.

COMMUNITYFOCUSED POLICING: A NATIONAL BEST PRACTICE Today, local police agencies pursuing national best practices in policing and public safety adhere to organizational models that place the relationship between the police and the community it serves at the center of its organizational structure. We believe the most effective model is what we call “community-focused policing.” This term describes a compelling blend of (1) traditional policing, (2) problemoriented policing, and (3) community-oriented policing (or community policing). This is the model we ﬁnd best suited for the Schaumburg Police Department – because we believe it is the most effective means of aligning organizational management, structure, personnel and information systems to support community partnerships and proactive police problem solving.3

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DEPARTMENT STRUCTURE: A CRITICAL VIEW OF ITS PROPOSED REORGANIZATION The Schaumburg Police Department is organized around four bureaus: Patrol, Traffic, Investigations and Administration (Figure 1). This configuration is transitional, as the Department has been undergoing reorganization. The proposed plan was to retain the Deputy Chief in the Patrol Division, replace the Deputy Chief in the Administration Division with a senior-level, non-sworn position and have five exempt Commanders.

As described in other sections of this report, we believe the elimination of the Lieutenant position – and the creation of the Commander position – have contributed to a void in supervision, especially in the Investigations Division. However, in a policing agency the size of the Department, having both ranks with Lieutenants serving as operational management and Commanders serving as departmental leadership is appropriate.

This plan would result in the conversion of the remaining Lieutenant positions (Watch Commanders) to Commander positions. A Commander would lead the Trafﬁc and Investigations Division and a Commander would be assigned to each of the temporal patrol shifts. The decision to use a non-sworn member to direct the Administration Division has merit. Convention suggests that if a position requires the person to either make arrests or supervise persons that make arrests, that position should be sworn. If the position has no such requirement, it can be non-sworn.

We also note that some functions, such as Community Relations, are misaligned in their reporting to the Investigations Commander and in other places, technical functions such as Forensics report to the Community Relations Sergeant. Technical and specialty functions should always align with their reporting structure and be supervised by individuals with the knowledge of the subordinate positions.

This proposed organizational structure, however, has been the subject of criticism by some SPD members, who see it as career limiting. As police organizations get smaller and the number of non-sworn positions increases relative to sworn positions, opportunities for promotion in the sworn ranks decline. While we believe there are sound reasons to civilianize non-enforcement related management positions, agencies that value higher education – like the SPD, in which a substantial number of ofﬁcers have college degrees – need to anticipate that employees may become frustrated with limits to upward mobility.

FIGURE 1

Schaumburg Police Department, January 2013 Initial Organizational Structure During the Hillard Heintze Assessment

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We believe that the Department would be better served by modifying its organizational model to increase command staff supervision and coordination. Focus on Leadership, Accountability and Supervision In this model (Figure 2), the Director of Administration and Deputy Chief of Operations report to the Chief of Police. The police operational commands (Patrol, Investigations and Trafﬁc) align under the Deputy Chief, with the Director of Administration handling all administrative functions including records, budget, personnel, training, CALEA and other non-operational functions. Additionally, the position of Civil Service Lieutenant is retained under Patrol and the Investigative and Trafﬁc Lieutenants are reinstated. The advantage of this approach is that all operations personnel report to one senior executive helping to align the missions of the divisions. This facilitates communication, strengthens reporting relationships and increases accountability.

FIGURE 2

Proposed Model with All Police Operations Under One Deputy Chief

Crime Statistics By most measures, Schaumburg is a safe community. One example is the number of index offenses4 reported to the Department. Note that 2012 crime statistics reported by the SPD (Figure 3) reflect very few violent crimes. Thefts accounted for 87 percent of all offenses. The large retail footprint in Schaumburg accounts for the significant number of theft offenses and the Department is commended for its innovative retail theft reduction programs that result in a 40 percent arrest rate for these thefts. Additionally, despite the low incidence rate for violent crime, the priority the Department places on addressing this critical area is evident in its 46 percent arrest rate for incidents involving aggravated battery. At the same time, the data indicates areas in which the Department needs to focus greater attention. One is in improving its 2012, two-percent arrest rate for burglaries (199 offenses) and its five-percent arrest rate for motor vehicle thefts (62 incidents).

FIGURE 3

Index Offenses Reported by the Schaumburg Police Department, 2012

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Arrest Data Another measure of the Department’s effectiveness is the number of arrests for index offenses.5 To explore the low arrest record for burglaries, we examined data from the Investigations Division. In 2012, the Division assigned 222 burglaries6 for follow-up investigation (186 were assigned to the adult-offender investigators and 36 to the juvenile-offender investigators). The Division’s summary report indicates that of those 222 cases, 179 were “closed,” however; these clearances resulted in only ﬁve arrests or less than one percent. Our analysis included how the Department closed cases in 2012 (Figure 4). The low number of warrant closures obscures the fact that a large number of cases remain open without activity or review because a warrant has been issued for the subject. There is no supervisory or analytical follow-up required to locate these wanted individuals and bring them to justice, so the warrants remain open in case the suspect is identiﬁed through other police action. We suggest scheduling a systematic supervisory review of all open cases including investigations involving the issuance of a warrant. Additionally, investigative reports outlining investigative activity, including attempts to locate wanted subjects, should be required in all open investigations in each review period.

Another area of concern is the signiﬁcant number of cases that are “exceptionally cleared.” For crime reporting purposes, if the following questions can all be answered “yes,” then the offense can be cleared “exceptionally:”7 y Has the investigation deﬁnitely established the identity of the offender? y Is there enough information to support an arrest, to charge and to turn over to the court for prosecution? y Is the exact location of the offender known so that the subject could be taken into custody now? y Is there some reason outside law enforcement control that precludes arresting, charging and prosecuting the offender such as diplomatic immunity or suicide death of the offender?

FIGURE 4

Cases Closed by the Schaumburg Police Department, 2012 In certain situations, law enforcement personnel are not able to follow the steps outlined under “clearance by arrest” to clear offenses known to them, even though all leads have been exhausted, and everything possible has been done to obtain a clearance. While it is beyond the scope of this assessment, future analysis should carefully examine the case review and case closure process and what appears to be a substantial number of cases that are exceptionally cleared or administratively closed.8 This should result in identifying data that appropriately reﬂects a higher number of cases closed by arrest.

Unfounded

113

Referred to Proper Agency

Pending

Warrant Issued

Cleared by Arrest - Adult

165

Cleared by Arrest - Juvenile

235

No Complaint - Adult

374

No Complaint - Juvenile

Exceptionally Cleared - Adult

113

Exceptionally Cleared - Juvenile

Administratively Closed

449

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Calls for Service Data: Prostitution and Narcotics Of particular interest to our assessment is data on crime and calls for service related to prostitution and narcotics. During our interviews, many members of the Department stated that prostitution was a “big problem” in Schaumburg. They suggested that prostitutes operate in many of the Village’s hotels and that patrol officers are “often” sent to these hotels on calls related to prostitution. These perceptions do not conform to the Department’s data. In 2012, police officers in Schaumburg were dispatched to six calls related to prostitution. Moreover, there were only five arrests in 2012 for prostitution. How does this reconcile with statements made by SPD officers during our interviews? There are a few alternative explanations. It could be that calls related to prostitution appear in another category. Second, it could be that the presence of prostitution has reached the status of “urban legend” – everyone thinks it is occurring, but that belief is exaggerated. Third, it may be that hotel staffs have grown weary of calling the police about prostitution because the police have been unable to abate it. It is hard to imagine how the SPD could generate only five arrests for an offense that is thought to be pervasive, particularly considering the importance of the hotel business to Schaumburg. It is also difficult to understand why a special unit that is supposed to focus on prostitution generates only five arrests a year.

FIGURE 5

Drug Crime Arrests by Violation, 2012 Number of People Arrested

Figure 5 illustrates the number of drug crime arrests by the Department in 2012. However, arrest data alone does not always paint the complete picture. There are many indicators other than arrests to consider – such as ambulance responses to overdoses, ER drug cases, substance abuse-related deaths, community information gathering, school/ community surveys and the number of people in treatment locally. In examining the calls for emergency service alone, we identiﬁed 39 responses for drug overdoses requiring a Schaumburg Fire Department ambulance in 2012.

In the two-year period between 2011 and 2012, there were 13 confirmed drug overdose deaths and 10 suspicious circumstance/drug-involved deaths in Schaumburg. This information alone should compel the Department to increase its focus on narcotics enforcement, education and treatment. Figure 6 illustrates drug arrests for the four officers in the special investigation unit for 2012. Note that it reflects the number of charges filed, while Figure 5 reflects the number of people arrested. Once again, levels of activity appear very low. Two or more officers conducted most arrests. This data reflects the cases in which the officer is listed as the arresting (not assisting) officer.

Our review of this data suggests the following: The evidence indicates a narcotics and prostitution problem.

The Department strategy for proactive investigations is not based on date or evidence.

The Department needs to focus on strategies that target local issues. These issues are covered in greater detail in Section IV.

FIGURE 6

Drug Crime Charges Filed by Violation, Schaumburg Police Department, 2012

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One of the most common complaints of officers in any law enforcement organization is that the department is understaffed – that officers go from “call to call.” Ironically, a critical look at evidence usually suggests that officers have large blocks of uncommitted time. While a comprehensive staffing analysis is beyond the scope of this assessment, it is important to examine the nature of police activity in Schaumburg to better understand the implications for service delivery. Citizen-Generated Calls for Service Another important consideration of this assessment is the nature and distribution of citizen-generated calls for service, particularly as they apply to police staffing. Citizengenerated calls are an important indicator of police workload because arguably the Department has limited opportunities to effectively manage these demands.

The following table illustrates the most frequent call types –those that occurred more than 200 times in 2012. Interestingly, property damage crashes and motorist assists account for nearly 14 percent of all calls for service. The Department responds to about six alarms per day, most of which are false. Both of these categories of calls, as well as others, offer signiﬁcant opportunity for alternative methods of service delivery that could reduce calls for service requiring a police ofﬁcer’s visit and free up resources to address priority services. We next examined the distribution of calls by hour of day. This is a fairly typical hourly distribution. Note that the peak demand time is around 6:00 p.m. and that there is a steady decrease in demand beginning at 10:00 p.m.

Schaumburg Police Department Alarm Burglary/Robbery

2,136

Trafﬁc Accident Property Damage Motorist Assist

1,951 1,271

Trafﬁc Accident Private Property Suspicious Auto

1,104 1,040

Domestic Violence Suspicious Person Retail Theft

933 915 854

Noise Complaint Citizen Assist Suspicious Circumstances

806 767 711

Check for Well Being Service Other Law Enforcement Agency

708 596

Burglary from Motor Vehicle Assist Ambulance Stray Dog

531 530 491

Youth Problem

465

2012 Calls for Service by Type Theft Under $300

442

Trafﬁc Accident Injury Parking Complaint

426 418

Person Down Sick or Injured Criminal Damage to Property

408 327

Criminal Damage to Vehicle Disturbance Non-Speciﬁc Theft Over $300

322 300 276

Battery Simple Hit and Run Other Animal Complaints

264 262 262

Lost/Found/Missing Lost: Lost Customer Management Dispute

258 251

Unwanted Subject Lost/Found/Missing Lost: Found Battery Domestic

242 233 228

31,763 Citizen-Generated Calls for Service in 2012

87 per day | 3.6 per hour

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FIGURE 7

Distribution of Calls by Hour of Day, Schaumburg Police Department, 2012

Calls-for-service demand on Friday and Saturday are 7 to 10 percent higher than on Sunday through Thursday, (Figure 8). This is important to note because the current work schedule utilized by the Patrol Division assigns the same number of officers to work and the same minimum staffing levels each day. The Patrol Division is staffed by 65 police officers. Officers are assigned to one of three watches. Figure 9 compares the distribution of calls for service by shift with the number of officers assigned by shift. At first glance, it would appear that the staffing is disproportionate. It is important to consider, however, that this table does not adjust for the nature of the calls. It is safe to assume that calls occurring in the evening and night hours are more likely to require a back-up unit. Further examination of this issue may suggest opportunities to improve efficiency.

FIGURE 8

Calls for Service by Day of Week, Schaumburg Police Department, 2012

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A patrol ofﬁcer is assigned to a permanent shift and works a six-dayson, three-days-off work schedule. The workday is 8.5 hours long. Figure 10 illustrates the work schedule. Days marked are regular days off, often referred to as “RDO.”

FIGURE 9

Distribution of Calls for Service by Shift, Schaumburg Police Department, 2012

FIGURE 10

Work Schedule, Schaumburg Police Department, 2012

It takes nine weeks for an officer to complete the duty cycle and an officer gets four full or partial weekends off (two Saturday-Sundays, one Saturday, and one Sunday). Note in the bottom row that the staffing is equal by day of week, and that no more than 66 percent of the officers on a squad are assigned to work. This compares unfavorably with a five-days-on, two-days-off schedule with eight-hour days, in which 71 percent of officers are assigned to work. In order to evaluate that loss in performance, an agency must carefully examine the net value of the overlap. A positive aspect of the SPD staffing plan is that Supervisors have the same days off as their subordinates. This is critical to effective evaluation and team integrity. While there is no perfect schedule and the current process works, the Department should undergo a thorough staffing study to determine the most effective way to deploy resources.

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Enhancing Crime Control Strategy As part of its roadmap to recovery and reform, SPD should adopt a more cohesive and comprehensive approach to controlling crime and disorder. On the surface, it appears that the Department has a welldesigned program. SPD has beat integrity. There is a modest degree of geographic accountability. The Department has a Crime Analyst on staff – and it has adopted a form of New York City’s COMPSTAT, called CRIMESTAT. In our view, however, the SPD could do more. Many members report they receive too little information about activities in the areas in which they work and virtually no actionable direction derived from the analysis of data or intelligence information. A small research and planning unit could be created to serve as an analytical and communication arm for the agency. The focus of the unit would be to continually monitor data ranging from calls for service and crime trends to community issues. This data would be used to more accurately and effectively deploy resources as problems occur and trends develop. Such a unit would make the deployment of SPD resources more efficient by providing data-driven lessons about crime and traffic activities, and it would enhance accountability by illustrating the effectiveness of operations and strategies. The CRIMESTAT process is largely ineffective, focusing on simple data representing common issues the supervisors easily understand without analysis. The efficiency of SPD operations is hampered without an effective analytical capacity. The Department would benefit significantly from better research and planning. We suggest that Schaumburg adopt and implement a crime control program that uses data analysis as a key determinant of strategic resource deployment. Examples of successful programs include the New York Police Department’s COMPSTAT and the Department of Justice’s Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety (DDACTS). A further discussion of these programs as methods to enhance SPD’s crime control strategy is attached as an Appendix.

FOUR COMPONENTS CRITICAL TO THE NYPD COMPSTAT PROCESS Accurate and Timely Intelligence Effective Tactics Rapid Deployment of Personnel and Resources Relentless Follow-Up and Assessment

RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTION: MAINTAINING A HIGH QUALITY CORPS In Illinois, the selection, promotion and certain aspects of discipline fall under the purview of a community’s Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. In Schaumburg, the three-person board has established the following minimum requirements for police ofﬁcers: y Applicants must be a minimum of 21 years of age at the time of the written exam, and have not reached their 35th birthday at the time of the written exam. Consideration should be given to making the minimum age 21 at the time of academy graduation, which will allow for some prospects to apply earlier and perhaps be hired by SPD before a neighboring agency could employ them. y Applicants must possess a bachelor’s degree from an accredited institution of higher education. The applicant must provide proof of the degree at the time of the written exam. y Applicants must possess and maintain a valid driver’s license and present the driver’s license at all phases of the testing process. y Applicants must be a citizen of the United States, or eligible resident alien, to be employed as a police ofﬁcer for the Village of Schaumburg. y Applicants may not have any felony convictions nor have been convicted of certain misdemeanors.

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The pre-employment testing process consists of the following steps: 1. A written examination is administered by an independent testing agency determined by the Board. The written examination counts as 60 percent of the applicant’s total grade. 2. The Board of Fire and Police Commissioners conducts an oral examination. The oral examination counts as 40 percent of the applicant’s total grade. 3. Considering the physical aspects of the job, a jobvalidated physical fitness test should be administered prior to the oral interview. 4. Additional preference points can be awarded to an applicant who qualifies for current law enforcement certification and/or military service. 5. The Board establishes an eligibility list of applicants based on final scores. 6. Additional applicant testing consists of a psychological evaluation, polygraph examination, a comprehensive background investigation and medical examination.

Missing from this process is the involvement of the Department. The SPD has virtually no input in the selection process for police officers. This is, in our view, a serious deficiency that could be easily addressed. Even though the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners is responsible for the independent selection of police officers, greater involvement in officer selection by the Department can improve the process without impacting the Board’s neutrality. We recommend that the Village consider adopting rules that allow the Chief or senior staff to participate in the process of determining which applicants on the eligibility list will take the additional applicant testing by personally interviewing those on the list. We also suggest that the SPD ensure that the staff understand the mechanics of the promotion process. An issue raised during our assessment was the role of Chief in promoting officers to Sergeant or Lieutenant. Under the current procedures, the Chief is allotted 25 percent of the available points used to establish eligibility for these ranks. There was a fairly widespread perception among members of the Department that the Chief used this capacity subjectively to promote his “friends.” The Chief informed us that, in fact, he allowed the Department’s command staff to participate in the evaluation of candidates, but that the actual assignment of points by members of the staff remained confidential.

We independently confirmed that the process was objective. The committee included command staff, Human Resources and the Chief. Each participant rated the employee and the scores were averaged with every participant having equal weight. The participants signed off on the final scores and they were sent to the Schaumburg Board of Police and Fire Commissioners. While this process helped ensure that promotions were based on merit, explaining the process to the staff would have dispelled the myths and raised the confidence of SPD staff in the process. We believe that the Department should go to great lengths to ensure that members of the exempt command staff are of the highest quality. Using outside assessors to evaluate candidates and allowing persons from outside the agency to apply should be considered. We also suggest that all members of the exempt staff should have earned or be actively making progress towards a master’s degree to be considered for exempt appointment. This requirement will help to strengthen the candidate pool and prove an incentive for others in the agency seeking such positions to continue their education.

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RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that:

1.1

The SPD develop a strategic plan actionable at the employee level that addresses the Department's strengths and weakness and provides both short- and long-term goals and objectives. The SPD should also develop clearly defined performance measures for each unit to ensure it is achieving its mission.

1.2

The strategic planning process include developing an organizational structure that reduces compartmentalization, while increasing communication and accountability.

1.3

The Department sharpen the focus of its crime control and problem-solving activities on neighborhoods, and significantly increase citizen participation in the process. Key actions in this regard include increasing the Departmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s participation in beat meetings, engaging the business community in crime control strategies, and engaging parents and recovering addicts in a drug reduction education program.

1.4

The Department conduct a comprehensive examination of patrol staffing deployment and work schedule to better understand how to best deploy resources to respond to calls, fight crime and serve the community.

1.5

The Village consider adopting rules that allow the Chief or senior staff to participate in the process of hiring new officers.

1.6

Communication between the Department and community be enhanced through greater interaction and a focus on community crime prevention.

1.7

The SPD overhaul its approach to basic performance management, better utilizing information to understand problems in the Village, planning operations and deployments and making staff (especially managers) accountable for performance and results. The Department should enhance its research and analytical capabilities and institute processes to increase utilization of data in departmental decisionmaking. As an extension of this recommendation, we propose that the SPD consider using the DDACTS Program (Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety) and that it also use a more effective model of CRIMESTAT that has a tighter focus, is more data-driven and increases accountability.

1.8

The Village seek to remove the limitations imposed on the Chief and the SPD to recruit and promote high-quality officers.

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REMEDIATION STEPS TAKEN SINCE APRIL 1, 2013 SPD ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES Compartmentalization y The Department has expanded the monthly staff meetings to facilitate agency-wide communications. All Lieutenants and select Sergeants drawn from a pool on a rotating basis now attend one Senior Staff meeting each month. y Investigators are attending roll call on a scheduled basis to provide case updates, answer questions and receive feedback from patrol officers. Communications and Accountability y The Department has also established a Communications Plan to improve communications internally within the Department, between the Department and the Village Manager’s Office and between the Department and the community. y The Department has opened a dialogue with hotel managers and security directors regarding a partnership to identify and reduce prostitution in area hotels. y The Department has also begun developing a broad strategy and program to reduce heroin use that ranges from enforcement and education to social services. Staffing Analysis y The Department held staffing analysis training for the Senior Command and formed a Committee to begin the process of examining data regarding workload, staffing and strategic planning to ensure staff is adequately and appropriately deployed. Structural Changes to Enhance Operations y The Department reorganized the divisional ranks to create parity between those doing the same or similar jobs (see Figure 11). y Reclassified Deputy Chief of Patrol as a Commander. y Reclassified Deputy Chief of Administration as either a Commander (internal sworn) or Administration Manager (civilian). y Identified deficiencies in leadership structure and moved to increased levels of supervision. y Added Deputy Chief of Operations Position.

FIGURE 11

Schaumburg Police Department, Current Organizational Structure Based on Recent Reforms

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IV. CRITICAL ISSUES UNCOVERED LEADERSHIP AND SUPERVISION Law enforcement responsibilities require police to assume leadership positions within their organization and communities. One important component of the SPD’s roadmap for change is examination of the Department’s plan for creating and maintaining an agency environment in which true police leaders can emerge and operate as leaders of subordinates and as leaders within larger networks.

Deferral of Responsibility: The Accountability Challenge

Expectations Placed on the Chief of Police: Balancing Oversight and Independence

Today, the most important challenge within the SPD is the need to strengthen the role and credibility of the Chief of Police’s position and ensure that the individual entrusted with this job is highly effective at mentoring his or her command staff and other senior departmental personnel.

Another obstacle for the Department is that Village management does not view the Police Command as capable of serving as key leaders, responsible for carrying out the policies established by elected ofﬁcials for the effective operation of the Department on a day-to-day basis. Additionally, the level of scrutiny over the Department by the Village Manager and by other functional heads is higher than we would expect or have encountered in comparable agencies.

Our inquiries into the origins and rationale behind poor management practices frequently revealed the widespread view among departmental staff that past leaders have often appeared more concerned about their image than addressing operational priorities and mentoring staff. It appears that individuals in the Police Chief’s position in the past have been reluctant to accept responsibility for difﬁcult decisions, accepted credit for the Department’s positive outcomes and blamed others when incidents went awry.

This challenge is not unique. Clearly deﬁning where the responsibility of the Village management ends and that of the Police Chief begins is an issue for many communities as well as many local government and law enforcement leaders we advise.

It is not always easy to ﬁnd the right balance between oversight and intervention. The former is always important. The latter should be used only in times of crisis.

On one hand, when state or local public sector leaders or any elected official becomes personally involved in the internal functions of the police department, they become vulnerable to charges of “micro-management” or “political interference.” On the other hand, when public or elected leaders take a “hands off” approach to the police department's activities and operations, it risks the perception that it is “anti-police,” that it does not value the department’s efforts or that it has empowered the department to undertake any actions with little oversight. This does not mean that local government leaders cannot require accountability from their police chief and department for its actions – from operational effectiveness and public safety outcomes to financial discipline. This simply means that the relationship between elected officials and the police department is better when this basic rule – allowing the police chief sufficient flexibility in managing the department – is followed. In such an environment, trust and collaboration are more likely to flourish.

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Gaps in Reporting Relationships: The Importance of Lieutenants Another issue impacting the Department’s leadership challenges, particularly in investigations, was its decision to reduce the number of Lieutenants and institute a new position of Commander, which is exempt from Civil Service requirements and was meant to enhance the leadership capacity of the agency. In 2009, the Village appropriately reduced its budgets due to recessionary pressures. The personnel reductions offered by the Department were focused on reducing personnel expenditures without impacting traditional police services to the residents. The reductions in supervision in the Investigations Division went too deep, however, leaving the Department vulnerable to a vacuum in leadership and accountability, as well as a decline in morale. In January 2012, the rank of Lieutenant was eliminated from the chain of command. While evidence exists that problems and inappropriate actions in Special Investigations Bureau existed before the reduction of Lieutenants, this reduction undoubtedly contributed to and exacerbated unsatisfactory outcomes. Many of the leadership and supervision duties previously conducted by the Investigations Lieutenants were transferred to the Sergeants or not assimilated into the new Commander’s position. In addition, the Commander’s responsibilities were updated to focus less on daily supervision and management in favor of a greater emphasis on leadership and policy. This created a leadership void across the division, with the worst consequences emerging in the Special Investigations Bureau unit.

These factors, among others, contributed to an environment that allowed poor practices to go undetected – although the acts of the SIB investigators were indisputably the results of their own poor decisions. No reduction of supervision can serve as an excuse for their alleged crimes. By acting on the ﬁndings and recommendations emerging from this assessment, the Village and Department will be able to address these gaps in reporting relationships and help detect inappropriate behavior earlier in the future.

Role Definitions: Clarification Needed Sergeants and Lieutenants are covered under the same collective bargaining agreements and, partly because of this, the Department has not clearly defined and enforced their roles as supervisors and managers. The assessment team found that, in far too many instances, the Chief attempted to force the Command Officers Association to manage the Department by attempting to use them to develop and implement policy. A clear delineation is needed of working conditions for the Command-level collective bargaining unit regarding the terms and conditions of employment as outlined in the agreement and, separately, their responsibilities as members of the SPD management team. In effect, Sergeants and Lieutenants must be mentored, encouraged and expected to act like supervisors and managers in all aspects of their work and only rely on the collective bargaining agreement when dealing with the defined contractual conditions of employment. Including them as part of the command team in building strategy, problem solving and resource allocation allows them to contribute and lead which will help transition them into leaders.

A lack of leadership is too often explained away by bureaucratic adherence to policy.

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The Command Level Culture: An Absence of Debate Healthy organizations not only respect debate and opposing viewpoints, they see these as opportunities to view multiple sides to complex problems. During our assessment, we were told by many of the individuals we interviewed that over the past several administrations, the Department’s Police Chiefs have castigated or unfairly treated personnel who articulated viewpoints opposed to their own, discounted or ignored logical arguments that conflicted with theirs and rewarded senior personnel who kept their opinions to themselves. The assessment team’s interviews revealed that a majority of the Command Officers felt their opinions were not valued. When bad news was delivered, it was usually in the form of an order with the caveat that it was a Village mandate. When discussions occurred, opinions of Command Officers were often discounted. Command Officers expressed frustration and confusion about how the Chief and the Village Manager arrived at key decisions. No government or police organization can be managed by reaching consensus on all issues and sometimes “no” is an appropriate answer. Yet without a discussion of the Village's viewpoint, Senior Command was often left obeying orders without an understanding of the underlying rationale. Our interviews with members of the Village Manager’s Office revealed a different perspective: they were led to believe that input from the Command Officers was often requested by the Chief, but rarely received. They also believed that their direction was clearly relayed by the Chief and often simply discounted or ignored by the Department’s Senior Command.

By maintaining an open dialogue between the Village management and the senior management of the Department, the Village Manager’s direction can be better understood and acted upon.

Integration at the Supervisory Level: Connecting the SPD’s Leaders to One Another The lack of interaction between Sergeants and Lieutenants and Senior Command should be addressed. We found many individuals in important supervisory positions are isolated and lack a voice in managing the Department’s affairs. Integrating the Sergeants and Lieutenants into departmental decisionmaking – without having Command abdicate its decision-making authority – would yield many benefits. First, as the Department’s first-line supervisors, they are in the field every day, acting on the mission of the agency. As such, they are closest to the community and have valuable insights into the root of issues facing the Department as well as the most promising solutions to address them. Second, their role is to help define the mission and plan of the SPD – and, in effect, bring it to life by putting policies into practice and executing nearly every facet of the plan. Finally, Sergeants and Lieutenants represent the Department’s pool of future leaders. Engaging and mentoring them in leadership early will create a strong bench of commanders that will drive excellence in policing for years to come.

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Building Trust: The Village Manager’s Office and the Police Department We suggest that the Chief and Village Manager pursue a more transparent approach to some, if not all, key decisions in order to improve internal communications, build trust and increase morale among Department staff. A significant divide has developed over the years between the SPD and the Village Manager’s Office, as reflected in attitudes, opinions and relationships – and this lack of trust impacts normal daily operations. While both sides function professionally, the absence of effective communication and collaboration impacts the Department’s performance. One reason is the primary line of communication between Village Hall and the Department runs directly through the Chief of Police. This limits the Village’s exposure to Senior Command, narrowing its perspective on Department challenges to the views of a single individual. There has been little to no mentoring within the Department of the Deputy Chiefs and Commanders regarding interaction with the Village Manager’s Office on policy development and execution. Another reason for this divide is the perception among many members of the Department that the Village Manager and Assistant Village Manager are too involved in the day-to-day operations of the agency. Such a perspective is commonly held in police organizations because many officers believe that for a Chief to be effective, he or she must be truly independent.

While there is some merit to this argument, the actions of the Village Manager have been within his authority and are reasonable considering the Department’s Command has often been described by the Chief as underperforming. At the same time, the Village Manager should have tasked the Chief with documenting and improving this alleged “lack of performance” by the Department’s Senior Command, instead of accepting it as truth. Nonetheless, it is important to strike a balance between providing oversight and potentially undermining the credibility of the Chief. We believe that the resolution of this issue requires that the Village pursue two key strategies. y First, recruit and retain a Chief who is highly qualiﬁed. y Second, provide the necessary resources for him or her to be successful. With effective leadership in place, the Village Manager will have the conﬁdence to step back and let the Chief run the Department.

RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that:

2.1

The Department place greater emphasis on leadership development and mentoring for new supervisors, and continue such development throughout their careers, with new leadership training at each succession of rank. Officers should also receive leadership development training and preparation for advancement to Sergeant to enhance their effectiveness as leaders in the community.

2.2

The Senior Command openly discuss and internally define its role both as a law enforcement agency and as a Department subject to the authority and oversight of Village leadership. This discussion is vital to ensuring that the Department’s mission, delivery and relationships are aligned.

2.3

The Department examine its internal communications process to ensure information is shared appropriately, feedback is honestly sought and individuals are both recognized and accountable for their decisions.

2.4

The Department reinstate the civil service rank of Lieutenant and examine the operational functions to ensure there are adequate levels of supervision to direct, lead and mentor at all levels of the agency.

2.5

All functions and divisions within the Department arrange for regular meetings to share information and ensure coordination of activities. This should be an environment conducive to open debate and even disagreement on issues important to the Department and delivery of service to the community. All meetings should be scheduled in advance and include an agenda.

2.6

The Department establish a Strategic Communications Plan in alignment with its own mission as well as the Village’s that (1) identifies the goals, tactics, messaging and coordination necessary to enhance the relationship between the Department and the Schaumburg community; (2) promotes the Village as a whole; and (3) increases trust and understanding between internal and external stakeholders.

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REMEDIATION STEPS TAKEN SINCE APRIL 1, 2013 SPD LEADERSHIP AND SUPERVISION ISSUES New Emphasis on Leadership y Commanders are now pushing decisions to the lowest appropriate level and mentoring subordinate supervisors on decision-making. This is occurring both in the field and in meetings. y The Department has launched a recognition committee that identifies good work, including exceptional supervision to provide feedback and formal documentation of positive acts and ongoing contributions. y The Department has created an internal and external communications plan to more effectively communicate with officers and the community. y A Supervisory Lieutenant position has been created within both the Traffic and Investigations Divisions to increase supervision, leadership and oversight. Two Sergeants were appointed Acting Lieutenants in these positions. y The Department has requested that the Village Board reinstate the Lieutenant’s civil service rank. y The Department has held meetings with the bargaining unit leadership to improve communications on contractual issues. These meetings have focused discussion solely on contractual issues.

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INTERNAL AFFAIRS One of the most important responsibilities a police department has is to ensure it accepts and handles complaints against its personnel in a way that engenders trust from the community it serves, as well as maintains credibility and moral authority with the rank-and-file members of the agency. Internal Affairs: Building a Collaborative Process Historically, the SPD had a dedicated Internal Affairs function overseen by a Lieutenant. Eventually this position was civilianized with a non-sworn Internal Affairs Investigator reporting to the Chief. In 2007, a decision was made to move this position to the Office of Professional Standards (OPS)9 in the Village Manager’s Office. The OPS is led by the Assistant Village Manager, who oversees the complaint process for all Village employees. After this move, investigations of serious complaints involving police personnel were conducted by a non-sworn, full-time employee with a police background who was hired from outside the Village, but operating out of a Village Hall office. At the time, one reason for hiring someone outside of SPD to handle such cases was to help ensure openness, fairness and objectivity. The Village subsequently determined there were not enough complaints to justify the expense of a full-time employee to handle SPD complaints, and outsourced these investigations to an external investigative firm that could ensure openness, fairness and objectivity.

Managers responsible for overseeing public safety departments the size of the SPD have several options for handling accusations of police misconduct. They can direct the Department to create and manage separate internal affairs function that will investigate the cases. They can direct the Chief of Police to assign internal affairs investigations to ﬁrst-line Supervisors within the Department. They can seek outside assistance and create a civilian review board, appoint an independent monitor, enlist another law enforcement agency to conduct its internal affairs investigations or they can outsource the function to a civilian agency. Each of these systems have advantages and disadvantages. While the assessment team believes the most effective way to manage integrity issues is for the police to be held accountable for both the investigation and public accountability regarding ofﬁcer misconduct, we recognize alternatives can be effective if properly structured, monitored and incorporated into the supervisory process.

In our interviews with SPD employees and Village ofﬁcials, we learned that not everyone agrees on the solution or model for the Internal Affairs function, but there is a united view that the current system needs improving. Many in the Department believe SPD has given up responsibility for the quality and integrity of Internal Affairs investigations.

EXCERPT FROM THE STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE – A U.S. DOJ COPS PUBLICATION Mutual trust and respect are at the heart of effective policing and the overwhelming majority of our nation’s law enforcement officers are principled men and women who provide professional services to the communities they serve with honor and distinction. The responsibilities they shoulder are great, and agency and public expectations are high. Unfortunately, on the rare occasion when an officer is accused of misconduct or criminal activity, he or she may be subject to an investigation. Implementing an honest and fair fact-finding process that uncovers the truth is the important role of the internal affairs function of a law enforcement agency, and it is essential to maintain a process that protects the rights of all involved, including the accused officer. Carl Peed Former Director, the USDOJ COPS Office Member, Hillard Heintze Senior Leadership Council

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Most importantly, handling the complaint investigation process allows police leaders to lead by example, holding themselves and all staff accountable for adherence to agency policies and procedures in a transparent and fair manner. During the interview phase of this assessment, we learned that most SPD employees do not have confidence in the effectiveness of the current internal investigations process. They expressed a loss of confidence in the disciplinary process and, as a result, in the leadership capabilities of many of those in supervisory and command positions. Many questioned the outcomes of the complaint investigations because they believe the Department’s outsourced investigators have little if any experience in local law enforcement practices. Ironically, officers subjected to interviews by the external investigators stated they did not feel the investigators knew what questions to ask to determine whether or not misconduct had occurred. Hence, many feel the current system allows many officers to avoid discipline for misconduct, and this embarrassed a number of those we interviewed.

There is a long-held belief in policing that when police commanders have personal responsibility for the investigation of complaints against employees, there are a number of beneﬁts. The commanders become more aware on a day-to-day basis of (1) the behavioral trends among police employees; (2) the effectiveness of supervisors’ efforts to lead, control and direct the work of subordinates; and (3) areas where the department may need to enhance training efforts to prevent misconduct and to ensure proper compliance with department policy.

The Village Manager’s decision to use an outsourced investigative firm is based on a desire to provide an investigative function for alleged police misconduct that is viewed as free from bias and the perception of bias that often accompanies police misconduct allegations. Village management does not see this as a negative reflection on the Department’s ability to conduct the investigations or an impeachment of its integrity. On the contrary, Village management believes it reflects transparency and demonstrates confidence in its officers to the public. While this is not a widespread practice in law enforcement, it has been successfully implemented in a variety of forms.

One form is complete civilian investigative authority, as demonstrated in Chicago and in the federal government’s approach to inspectors general. Another form involves some level of civilian oversight through community or civilian review boards, civilian auditors, monitors, ombudsmen and other similar titles. Regardless of the process, the Department’s complaint investigation procedures cannot be viewed as a “stand alone” administrative or disciplinary process – one that can simply be outsourced. Instead, it must form a critical part of an overall accountability system that the Department leadership itself needs to manage. In most law enforcement agencies in the United States, this system should include (1) the internal affairs investigation process for all cases, including the most serious ones; (2) proper training for supervisors and Command Ofﬁcers; (3) emphasis on completing effective and timely employee performance appraisals; (4) robust administration of an early warning and intervention process; and (5) implementation of a Crisis Intervention Program to assist ofﬁcers experiencing stress as a result of on- and off-duty experiences.

Complaints: Current Intake and Investigation Procedures The Schaumburg Police Department accepts complaints against personnel regardless of the source. Complaints may be submitted at the SPD headquarters or at Village Hall. The process requires a complainant to complete a written form, known as a Complaint Receipt (CR), and to submit the form for notarization, as required by Illinois law.10 Anonymous complaints are not investigated, but may be reviewed and handled at the discretion of the Chief of Police. When a complaint is submitted at the SPD headquarters, a supervisor reviews and then forwards it up the chain of command to the Village Hall Office of Professional Standards. After consultation with the Chief of Police, the Assistant Village Manager, who also leads the Village’s Office of Professional Standards, determines whether the case will be handled internally by a supervisor assigned by the Chief of Police or outsourced to an external, independent investigative firm comprised mostly of retired federal law enforcement personnel (See Figure 12). Typically, less serious complaints are routed back to the Department and investigated by the subject member’s supervisor, usually a Sergeant. More serious citizen complaints are typically assigned to the external Investigators. Serious alleged infractions uncovered by the Department can be handled by either group, depending on the decision of the Chief and OPS Manager.

FIGURE 12

Schaumburg Police Department Current Internal Complaint Investigative Process

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Regardless of who is to perform the investigations, an investigation is initiated and a memorandum of findings issued as to whether the complaint is sustained. When the external vendor issues its investigative findings, the report is delivered to the OPS Manager who then provides the information to the Chief. For Complaint Receipts that are sustained, the Chief has the option to assign a review of the case down the chain of command and to ask for recommendations on the appropriate course of action required. However, the Chief of Police did not allow the Department Command to question the accuracy of the external investigation; they could only make recommendations on corrective action. The flowchart displayed in Figure 13 depicts the Department’s current process for the external investigation of complaints of misconduct by Department personnel.

FIGURE 13

Schaumburg Police Department External Complaint Investigative Process

After the Chief has digested the reviews of sustained cases, he or she decides what disciplinary action will be taken and the employee is informed of this decision. The Chief’s decision can overrule a Commander’s recommendations when he believes the disciplinary recommendation is inappropriate. The decision can also be overruled by the Village’s Human Resources Department when it does not match the progressive discipline requirements of the Village in general.

The current Internal Affairs system does not allow SPD leaders to speak with one voice on disciplinary matters. There is no formal mechanism to guide the review of the investigation which would allow the Chief and command staff to (1) compare the circumstances and disciplinary outcome to similar cases in the past, (2) obtain input from Human Resources on rules, precedent, and established practices, (3) discuss the investigation with the case investigator or (4) discuss the Chief’s intended course of action.

Outsourcing Internal Investigations: The Drive to Increase Transparency and Accountability As outlined above, while there is signiﬁcant consternation over the Internal Affairs process within the Department, our discussions with the Village Manager’s Ofﬁce revealed a different perspective. The Village Manager does not discount the value of establishing an internal process and believes those mechanisms are in place, when appropriate. However, he also believes that progressive communities can adopt real transparency in government by allowing its citizens to complain against the police without fear of retribution.

In the current process, complaints are received by the Department or the Village. Upon review by the OPS Manager and Police Chief, a determination is made as to whether the allegation will be investigated internally or externally. Once a complaint is assigned to an external investigator, it is managed by the Office of Professional Standards, which is housed at the Village Manager’s Office. Once completed, investigations are returned to the Police Chief for review. During our interviews, we learned that members of the Department perceive two weaknesses with this model. First, there is little faith among Department members in the external investigation process. They feel that the investigations are not thorough and the current private company conducting the investigation lacks any understanding of municipal police work. Secondly, there is no mechanism in place to question the investigation or its findings by members of the Senior Command, forcing them to make recommendations on an investigation that they feel may be incomplete or inaccurate. While civilian outsourcing has its merits, these perceptions must be addressed if the outsourcing is to be a viable and trusted alternative to traditional best practices in internal investigative processes.

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Discipline and Enforcement: The Value of Structure, Transparency and Consistency Disciplinary action is intended or designed not to punish an employee but to manage behavior that does not meet an organization's standards. The primary purpose of a disciplinary process is to help employees recognize and correct performance problems. All best practices in discipline include a mechanism to provide feedback to the employee so he or she can correct the problem and improve performance. The Department and Village operate under a progressive discipline process wherein discipline is issued when an infraction is sustained and then progressively increased with subsequent violations. Many Schaumburg employees view the Department’s approach to implementing a progressive discipline model as unfair, in part because employees can be harshly disciplined for minor infractions simply because of the sequence in which they occur. They also feel that traffic crashes should be dealt with independently because of the frequency, environment and nature of police driving and including them in all discipline decisions unfairly inflates discipline received; we concur. As with many linear progressive discipline systems, the way the Department and the Village have made disciplinary decisions has been heavily influenced by the number of complaints rather than the nature of the complaint and the broader facts and context surrounding the case and prior cases. This is not an uncommon issue and must be addressed and monitored. There is little leeway for a “mistake of the head” (when an officer tries to do the right thing but fails) rather than a “mistake of the heart” (when an officer commits a misdeed, knowing it is wrong). Additionally, officers are disciplined like every other Village employee.

Policing occurs in an inherently dangerous work environment. Officers are often asked to deal with people when they are at their worst while multitasking in stressful environments. As a result over the years, the system has lost credibility with many SPD employees, who do not consider it to be an objective, policy-driven measure of behavior. While significant debate exists as to whether this a problem with the system or its implementation, our examination of disciplinary outcomes in the past several years revealed some situations where the punishment appeared excessive compared to the actual act. This was particularly true for events involving squad car accidents or other occupational safety errors, such as the accidental discharge of a weapon or equipment damage. While some of the disciplinary actions implemented have been questionable, most have followed a logical sequence and were appropriate. Nonetheless, the perception among the Department’s members that the system is unfair and biased undermines morale as it only takes a few legitimate examples of excessive punishment to cast doubt on the entire system. The perception also exists that the danger inherent in policing is not taken into account. For example, given the need for an officer to conduct multiple tasks while driving, members of the Department consider it unfair that they are judged in the same manner as other government drivers who have far less tasks and duties to undertake while driving a vehicle.

Transparency improves the validity of both the investigative and discipline process. One way to remove the negative connotations regarding discipline is to (1) clearly inform employees of the process, (2) have a committee rather than a single individual review discipline decisions and make recommendations to the Chief and (3) route the review of non-negligent squad car accidents or nonnegligent occupational safety errors on a track separate from previous and future discipline reviews. It is essential that the Department create and implement a detailed policy and procedural guide for all units â&#x20AC;&#x201C; especially for Internal Affairs. Many SPD members stated that they do not know how the discipline process currently works at SPD. Furthermore, no SPD manual or guide appears to exist on how to investigate complaints. While there are steps listed in the written labor agreements between the police unions and the Village, and while there is a Village Personnel Manual to guide the Village in SPDâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s disciplinary cases, it is unusual for a police department not to have an internal manual that provides a very clear process about how complaints should be received, forwarded, investigated and adjudicated by Department members.

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Internal Affairs: Tracking Workload, Case Review and Closure Procedures While the Department issues an annual report that tracks complaint intake, the report lacks most of the data useful to a law enforcement agency committed to managing the conduct of its employees. For example, the SPD annual Internal Affairs Summary reports from 2010 through 2012 only provided the number of complaint investigations handled by OPS and the Department and whether these complaints were sustained.

DATA TYPICALLY FOUND IN ANNUAL REPORTS y The number and type of complaints, such as those involving Excessive Use of Force, Rude Conduct, Improper Procedure, BiasBased Policing and Conduct Unbecoming an Ofﬁcer. y The average length of time it takes to complete each phase of the Internal Affairs process, including the time needed to investigate, review and adjudicate each case. y The number of cases generated by citizens versus those initiated by police personnel. y The number of sustained complaints generated by citizens compared to those initiated by Department members. y The number of ofﬁcers generating more than one complaint per year. y The level of discipline for each type of complaint.

Interestingly, some of this data was captured in the SPD Annual Statistical Summaries of Internal Investigations published for 2006, 2007 and 2008, but not since, even though it is available for reporting purposes. Without this information, it is difﬁcult for the Chief and his or her command staff to conduct trend analyses and take proactive steps to address misconduct issues in the Department. This is a missed opportunity to be more open and transparent with the community about how the Department responds to complaints.

Another observation is that when employees commit misdeeds that they readily and openly acknowledge, there is no mechanism to accept their admission, apply the appropriate disciplinary action and move on without a protracted investigation. This is counterproductive on several levels, because it prevents the allocation of investigative resources to other more important priorities and undermines morale when individuals have to wait for months for a complaint to be resolved through the more formal process.

We made two additional observations. One is that in order to protect themselves from an allegation of a failure to act, some Command Ofﬁcers initiate investigations into matters they should resolve themselves – even though the Village Manager’s Ofﬁce and the OPS encourages supervisors to resolve frivolous complaints themselves.

Behavioral Outcomes If handled well, the discipline process is an opportunity to encourage desired behaviors from police ofﬁcers. If not handled well, the process can undermine employee morale and erode behavior on the job. We believe the behaviors below are likely outcomes of the SPD’s current disciplinary system. y SPD employees view the discipline system as lacking in fairness, objectivity and timeliness, and they are therefore more complacent and reactive rather than proactive in their policing efforts, all in an attempt to avoid unfair criticism. y Over time, employees who view the discipline process as unfair may become more likely to tolerate deviant behavior in other ofﬁcers or to break the rules themselves. y Some SPD employees view outsourcing Internal Affairs investigations as an indicator that command staff is not trusted or responsible for instilling and promoting professional integrity, and therefore employees are less likely to support the leaders of the Department.

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Staff Perspectives on the SPD Disciplinary Process Law enforcement agencies are judged, internally and externally, as much by their response to misconduct as by the incidents themselves. Furthermore, understanding how employees view the disciplinary system is an important indicator of organizational health and police department culture. As part of our assessment, we interviewed numerous sworn and non-sworn SPD employees regarding their interactions with the SPD’s disciplinary system. We have summarized their views and provided some information on the possible effects of the current disciplinary system on employee behavior. The following represents the insights from employee interviews:

y Whether employees have direct personal experience with the Department’s disciplinary system or not, many emphasize that faith and trust in the process needs to be reestablished. Compounding this view is the lack of perceived action taken against the past Chief for a recent alleged stalking complaint. Many members believe the Chief’s misconduct was covered up, and that it underscored a lack of accountability up and down the Department’s chain of command. While Hillard Heintze acknowledges that the external investigation conducted by the Illinois State Police did not sustain criminal charges, the investigation did not exonerate him which underscored employees' lack of trust in the current process.

y Concern was expressed that while the Department claims to be implementing a progressive discipline system in which the lowest level of discipline is meted out and then progressively increased with subsequent violations, in reality disciplinary outcomes are based solely upon the number of complaints received with no correlation to the seriousness of past and present complaints. Employees believe that severe discipline is issued for minor infractions against policies and procedures. Employees expressed that while progressive discipline involves increasing the level of discipline for each instance of subsequent misconduct, the principle of fairness requires that facts and circumstances for each case be reviewed to ensure the “punishment ﬁts the crime.”

y Most SPD employees do not understand the disciplinary process. Not knowing or understanding who is leading the internal investigations process in all instances has led employees to conclude the system is disorganized, inefﬁcient and unjust.

y The Village Manager believes that outsourcing cases, especially where the complainant or segments of the community would raise issues of impartiality in an investigation of police-onpolice, is not only prudent, but also demonstrates the Department’s willingness to be transparent in the investigation of its police. However, many of the SPD employees view outsourcing the Internal Affairs process as another indicator of a “not my job” mentality pervasive among command staff and Supervisors whose responsibility should be to encourage professional integrity, enforce compliance with policies and procedures and validate complaint investigations and dispositions.

The Disciplinary Review Panel: Institutionalizing Transparency and Fairness

y Nearly everyone interviewed commented on the protracted time required to investigate and dispose of internal investigations, even in instances that are considered low level. Employees view the lack of closure on lowerlevel cases as a cause of job-related stress. One supervisor reported that simple matters such as a complaint about an ofﬁcer’s attitude lingered for three to four months without any status update provided to the ofﬁcer accused or his or her supervisor. Many interviewed stated there is a lack of communication throughout the complaint’s investigation process.

Establishing a Discipline Review Panel (DRP) process yields many benefits to police departments, especially those facing challenges with respect to fair and consistent application of discipline. By implementing a DRP, agencies can increase internal support for and understanding of disciplinary decisions and focus training on current misconductrelated issues. Additionally, the DRP process provides an opportunity for the Chief to take a leadership role in setting the standards for the conduct of Department personnel. Any time an investigation sustains a charge that could involve suspension, a best practice in policing is to have that investigation reviewed and a recommendation made for potential sanctions by the DRP. These review processes can be designed in a variety of ways, but a DRP usually includes the Supervisor and Command Officers in the subject officer’s chain of command up to and including the Chief, as well as the internal affairs and training units’ commanders. The Panel conducts formal discussion on internal affairs case findings and makes disciplinary recommendations to the Chief, who is present. These recommendations take into account the circumstances of the case, the past disciplinary history and work history of the subject employee and the disciplinary precedence in similar cases. While this information is discussed openly in the panel meeting, the exchange of views is confidential, out of respect for the subject officer. Given that our assessment revealed a need for SPD command staff and Village Hall officials to improve communications and work more collaboratively, consideration could also be given to including representatives from Human Resources and labor relations as well as a legal advisor (when appropriate) as participants in the DRP process.

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The Early Warning System: Ensuring Its Application One tool increasingly used by many police departments, including the SPD, is an electronic database that identifies officers exhibiting signs of repeated, troubling behavior. Often referred to as an early intervention system or early warning system (EWS), such a system involves entering into a database a set of identified variables that assist supervisors in identifying employees whose work-related behavior is problematic and who may benefit from early intervention strategies such as counseling and training before misconduct occurs. Information typically tracked includes data such as complaints an employee receives, use of force incidents, vehicle pursuits and sick leave usage. Approximately one year ago, the Department began a transition to IA Pro, software that helps police departments manage internal affairs processes and includes an automated early warning system.

Between our initial assessment in February and our latest inquiry in April, the IA Pro system became operational. The system is maintained by the Office of Professional Standards staff, Human Resources and the Police Chief’s assistant, all of whom enter information into the automated database. We were advised the system currently captures five variables: y Complaint reports y Use of force cases y Details of any disciplinary or corrective action involving an SPD employee y Squad car crashes y Police pursuits This is the extent of the data collected. Even though the SPD’s Policy on Performance Indicators (1056.3) outlines 11 different data variables that could go into the EWS, nine of them are not tracked in IA Pro. As such, the SPD is not fully utilizing its robust early warning tools. In fact, an early warning report is usually generated and sent to SPD only when a request is made to run a report quarterly to maintain CALEA standards and certification. We learned that supervisors rarely provide any information for the system or check data. The former Chief advised he did not recall ever seeing such a report. There was also no indication that the former software, IA Track, was used any more effectively than IA Pro is currently being used. In short, not enough important data is captured or shared on a routine basis to render any value to the Department for the current use of the early warning component of IA Pro.

For an early intervention or warning system to be effective, routine entries need to be made into the system to track the data variables already noted. Routine reports should then be generated and shared with the Chief of Police and other key staff members, who may discuss the data and take steps to address training needs and potential intervention counseling. At this point in the process, many progressive departments also have either the Internal Affairs Commander or a subject employee’s Command Ofﬁcer meet with the subject employee to have a positive discussion that can lead to corrections in behavior. These interactions provide a supervisor with an opportunity to mentor the subordinate and, when handled properly, can increase the individual’s understanding of the Department’s

expectations and boost both individual and organizational morale. We suggest shifting the responsibility of regular review and reporting of behavioral trends to a single individual in the Department. This individual can be responsible for ensuring information gets into the hands of the supervisors, Command Officers and Chief of Police. Collectively, Senior Command needs to lead, manage and direct the actions of their officers and employees in their roles as leaders, accountable for the Department’s operations. It is also important to train supervisors, Command Officers and the Chief of Police in the input and use of the Early Warning System, so they understand its origin and how to use this information to help employees avoid misconduct.

Use of Force: Opportunities for Improvement We were advised by the former Chief that he did not recall having received a use of force complaint in the last four years. Due to the lack of detail in the recent annual Internal Affairs Summary reports, such data is not reported publicly. The former Chief pointed out that officers rarely use force due to a requirement that a two-page report be completed to document what force was used and why. We found this assertion to be suspect as police officers typically find themselves in situations where use of force is required to affect an arrest, quell a disagreement, respond to domestic altercations or separate individuals who are fighting. Not using force when necessary due solely to the requirement that a written report be completed appears unlikely. Our subsequent examination of data revealed that in 2012, officers self-reported 18 incidents of use of force, which is unusually low for 30,000 calls for service and 2,300 arrests. We also note that in the event of an officer-involved shooting, the absence of an internal affairs function within the SPD diminishes the Department’s ability to be accountable to the community for the use of force by Schaumburg officers in the field. In Cook County, the SPD has access to the Illinois State Police (ISP) Public Integrity Task Force for investigating all officer-involved shootings to determine whether criminal laws of the jurisdiction were violated by the use of such force. However, in addition to the ISP investigation, the chief of a police department that is involved in a shooting is responsible to the community and the department for monitoring and reviewing officer-involved deadly force incidents to determine whether department policies and procedures were followed. Most progressive agencies complete this task by having the Commander of their internal affairs unit monitor the criminal investigation of an officer-involved shooting without actively participating in it. This ensures that the Commander stays informed on the issues and facts surrounding the case so the ultimate administrative review is more accurate.

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Restructuring Internal Affairs: A Blended Approach It is widely recognized by many within the law enforcement profession that the two main purposes for a department-run internal affairs process are to set a professional standard for the organization and to change bad behavior. Organizations successful in reducing complaints against officers and holding personnel accountable for their behaviors have processes in place to involve rank-and-file staff in the receipt, response, investigation and adjudication of complaints. While we firmly believe a community and the members of its police department receive much greater value from having the police department handle its own internal affairs process due to the responsibility and accountability placed on supervisors’ and command officers when they lead, control and direct the response to complaints, we recognize the desire of Village leaders to maintain a process they believe demonstrates oversight and transparency. The steps below illustrate, and Figure 14 outlines, an internal affairs process that blends the internal and outsourced models, as well as increases departmental involvement and allows for more transparency. 1. A formal complaint is made to a Department member or Village employee, who then notifies his or her supervisor. The supervisor forwards the information to Internal Affairs and notifies the chain of command. 2. When a formal complaint is made to the Village Manager’s Office of Professional Standards or the Department, or is uncovered internally by a Department member, the information is forwarded to the Chief of Police and the OPS Manager, where it can take one of the following three tracks: a. When a member of the public submits a serious complaint – such as one involving an alleged constitutional violation, racial profiling or discriminatory policing or racial prejudice, dishonesty, drug use, sexual misconduct, and misconduct likely to result in litigation against the agency or its members – the Chief of Police and the OPS manager will meet to determine whether the investigation should be conducted by an external investigations firm or by the SPD Internal Affairs Unit. b. Investigations of less-serious allegations of misconduct by rank-and-file members should be conducted by the Department’s Senior Command. Examples of conduct that may be appropriate for investigation at the unit level include complaints alleging discourtesy or rudeness. Examples of conduct that may be appropriate for investigation at the Department level include complaints by the public regarding citations and enforcement; internal allegations of infractions of agency regulations or policies, preventable traffic collisions, or performance issues; and alleged excessive or unreasonable uses of force not involving death, serious injury or willful misconduct. c. When a complaint alleges serious criminal activity, the case may be transferred to another agency such as the Illinois State Police/Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office Public Integrity Task Force or the FBI for investigation. An SPD Internal Affairs or OPS investigation would still be conducted on the misconduct at the appropriate time, not to conflict with the criminal investigation.

3. An external or Department Investigator or Commander investigates the complaint and conducts the investigation. If an investigation alleges criminal activity not rising to the level (c) above, the investigation will require coordination with the State’s Attorney’s Office. 4. If an allegation is unfounded, exonerated or non-sustained, the officer is notified of the findings at the earliest possible opportunity. 5. An OPS investigator completes the investigation and submits a report outlining the results of the investigation. 6. The investigation is reviewed by the OPS Manager who, in the event the allegation appears to be sustainable, after discussion with the Chief of Police, routes the case to the subject officer's Command Officer to make a disciplinary recommendation. 7.

Upon completion of a Command investigation, should the investigating Command Officer sustain a finding that misconduct did occur and that a recommendation for discipline less than a two-day suspension is warranted, he or she can make a disciplinary recommendation to the Chief through the chain of command. Alternatively, if the supervisor or any member of the chain of command makes a disciplinary recommendation that could include a suspension, the investigation should be forwarded to a review body, such as a Disciplinary Review Panel, to make the final disciplinary recommendation to the Chief of Police.

8. The Chief of Police makes the final decision on discipline. 9. The officer is notified of the findings and disciplinary recommendation. 10. The complainant is notified whether or not the case was sustained against the officer.

While this complaint process may seem formal and labor intensive, it represents an effective model in several respects. y It is a thorough, fair and objective process for all parties involved – one that includes the protection of due process rights for the subject officer. y It keeps the subject officer’s supervisor and chain of command informed about the details and circumstances of the incident. This enables proper training and ongoing supervision of the subject officer and increases the likelihood that the officer will not engage in similar misconduct again. y It provides the Command Officers and supervisors the opportunity and ability to lead the organization. It often reveals the proactive steps that could have been taken to identify behaviors of concern before a misconduct incident occurred or a citizen complained. At the same time, it ensures that everyone in the Department is aware of the organization’s high standards and what they must do to ensure these are met. Most members of a law enforcement agency support a department and its leaders when they know the internal affairs process is thorough, fair and objective – even when it leads to discipline.

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FIGURE 14

Example of a Blended Internal Investigative Process

Misconduct Allegations: Facilitating Settlement and Early Closure Internal affairs investigations at Schaumburg often take an unnecessarily long time. This causes stress to the complainant, the officer, the Internal Affairs team and the Department. We heard from many employees investigated for minor infractions that they knew they had made a mistake, but ultimately considered the stress and uncertainty of a lengthy investigation much worse than the discipline they received. On average, it takes 142 days for a sustained external OPS investigation and 41 days for a sustained internal SPD investigation from the time of complaint to the notification of the disciplinary decision to the employee. While on the surface these numbers appear to show huge disparity between internal and external investigations, that is not necessarily the case. The internal cases can range from very simple to complex investigations. The external investigations are generally more complex involving serious rule violations or citizen complaints with an extra level of transparency that is usually handled by a police internal affairs unit or in Schaumburg’s case, the Village’s OPS and an external investigative company. An innovative way to reduce the duration of a complaint investigation is to offer the accused officer the option to acknowledge the misconduct and agree upon the appropriate discipline. This results in many benefits to the Department. By reaching an early agreement, the employee accepts responsibility and accountability for his or her actions, corrects behavior and moves forward with a more positive attitude for having resolved the matter quickly. Supervisors are empowered to deal with minor infractions at the lowest possible level. This frees up their time and allows them to focus on other important priorities.

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RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that:

3.1

The SPD restore the Internal Affairs unit. If the number of complaint cases is too low to support full-time Internal Affairs staff, then specific collateral assignments should be made to personnel. The appropriate training should then be provided to Command Officers handling investigations (best provided by attendance at law enforcement-specific internal affairs courses, several of which we can recommend). This will provide SPD leadership with the ability to lead and manage discipline processes more effectively and reap the positive organizational benefits that accompany such an effort.

3.2

As an alternative to reestablishing an in-house Internal Affairs unit, the SPD create a blended approach to internal investigations with investigations conducted by Senior Command when possible and outsourced through the Village Ofﬁce of Professional Standards when appropriate. If the outsourced civilian investigation process of police misconduct is retained, it must become part of an overall process with transparency and accountability to the Chief of Police. Regardless of the process, the investigations must be thorough, complete and accurate.

3.3

The SPD place greater emphasis (from the chain of command) on the need for supervisors to more closely monitor the conduct of all ofﬁcers under their command. Close supervision is a key facet of any early warning system, and can lead to positive outcomes, such as employee productivity and wellbeing.

3.4

The SPD provide annual reports on the internal investigations to the Village Manager and include the report ﬁndings in the Department’s Annual Report. Such an effort would help demonstrate management’s adherence to the discipline process, provide openness and transparency to the SPD’s efforts to improve the way discipline is handled, as well as help guide SPD’s training unit in its learning needs assessments.

3.5

The SPD create its own Internal Investigations Policy that outlines the roles and responsibilities every Department member has to receive and forward both citizen and Department-initiated complaints. Included should be a written policy requiring all Department personnel to report misconduct immediately to a supervisor when they observe it or become aware of it.

3.6

An Internal Investigative Procedures Manual be created for staff assigned to assist in compliance with the proper handling of Internal Affairs complaints as well as learn the existing electronic records management system for internal investigations to facilitate information retrieval and analysis.

3.7

A formal written plan of action for officer-involved shootings be created (although it has been years since such an event has occurred within the Village), that outlines the steps Department staff should take, describes proper notification procedures up the chain of command and to Village management, defines the necessary coordination with Illinois State Police investigators and specifies the crisis intervention steps to assist involved officers and other Department personnel. SPD personnel should then be trained on the process.

3.8

A Disciplinary Review Panel process be established that will afford the Chief of Police, command staff personnel and supervisors the ability to collaborate in a positive fashion as discipline cases are reviewed prior to the ﬁnal decision. This will inform the Department’s leaders about where those who have engaged in misconduct require assistance and the steps they can take to prevent similar misconduct by all personnel in the future.

3.9

A review of the progressive discipline process be conducted to ensure punishment is not unfair or unduly harsh simply because of the sequence. Great pains should be taken to enact discipline that is fair, equitable across the agency and consistent with the act being corrected. Additionally, all preventable, not negligent, squad car accidents should not be part of a discipline process and can be reviewed with corrective action determined by the safety committee.

3.10 A review of the Village of Schaumburg’s Personnel Early Warning System (PEWS) be conducted to determine (1) how it can be used more effectively in a positive and proactive way to help at-risk Department members avoid misconduct incidents and (2) whether the administrative duty to maintain and update PEWS data should reside with the Department or with the Village.

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REMEDIATION STEPS TAKEN SINCE APRIL 1, 2013 SPD INTERNAL AFFAIRS ISSUES Restructuring Internal Affairs y The Department has formed a committee to review the current Internal Affairs process and make recommendations on strengthening it. The Early Warning System y The Department has initiated a review of the existing system to determine the inclusion of additional data sources to improve its effectiveness. Officer-Involved Shootings y The Department has issued a bulletin outlining the responsibilities for responding officers, supervisors and investigators responding to an officer-involved shooting.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS Effectiveness of the Division: Impact in the Absence of Leadership Since 2003, the Investigations Division has been reorganized five times. This chronic restructuring has reflected deficiencies in the Department’s leadership and the changes have, in many respects, deepened the leadership crisis. They resulted in the elimination of training for personnel selected for supervisory roles in the Investigations Division and led to a poor understanding on the part of many, supervisors of the duties of their position. We find that, on an operational, day-to-day level, the General Investigations Division, excluding SIB, performs effectively – although primary leadership of the Investigations Division is provided by the two Detective Sergeants rather than the Investigations Commander. The Detective Sergeants oversee the daily management of the Division. They are intimately involved with all aspects of their respective squads’ cases as is appropriate and are diligent in opening cases and investigating them properly. Each assigns cases to their respective Detectives based on the type of crime committed and case workload. The communication between these first-line supervisors appears very good and they consistently collaborate regarding case assignments and information of mutual interest. The value of their extensive knowledge of investigations and high levels of personal commitment to the tasks is evident. The Investigations Division Commander, however, remains detached from the leadership and control of the unit. During our interview, the Commander stated the unit was led by assigning case management to the two General Investigation Sergeants and the SIB Sergeant – and viewed the role as more advisory in nature, facilitating the flow of information to the Chief. It is the practice of most police investigative units to delegate the daily direction of investigations to the supervising sergeants. However, in the case of the SPD Investigations Division, the Commander also ceded leadership and control to them.

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The Chief was also disconnected from the unit. Rarely did he enter the office of the Investigations Division, even though his office was around the corner. He also made few calls, if any, to the Detective Sergeants to inquire about the status of investigations. We suggest, from this point forward, that the Department and the General Investigations Division make the following leadership tasks a priority: y Setting a strategic vision and clearly defined goals for the Division y Incorporating crime analysis into planning y Establishing analytical mechanisms to determine which types of investigations should be pursued y Understanding unit performance by conducting multi-level supervisory case review, analyzing case closure times, outcomes and conviction success y Liaising with the State’s Attorney’s Office, adjoining departments, federal agencies and area task forces y Monitoring critical alert flyers y Distributing and implementing law updates y Developing policies, procedures and policy updates y Sharing case updates and data on crime trends with the Patrol Division y Developing a training matrix for members of the Division

Case Development and Workload: Tightening Procedures General investigations are handled by two squads, each comprised of seven Detectives. Detectives are individually assigned to cases involving general investigations as well as juvenile crimes, crimes against persons, burglary, auto theft and financial crimes. In addition, one is assigned as the School Resource Officer at Schaumburg High School and another is assigned as the School Resource Officer for all the elementary and middle schools in the Village of Schaumburg. The majority of investigative cases are developed based upon reports taken by the Patrol Division, while the balance is generated from residents. These are reactively generated cases. The Department’s distribution of casework by discipline is done well and is a practice routinely seen in professional police departments of similar size and larger. This allows Detectives to become subject-matter experts in their specific discipline. Many crimes are complex in nature and require significant expertise to solve. Training and consistent exposure to the same types of crimes enhances an Investigator’s competency in addressing them. Additionally, small details in one case may lead to similar investigative details that may be lost if case types are spread among multiple Detectives.

Case Load Volume: Prioritization and Resource Allocation The highest volume of cases opened involve theft, followed by burglary and burglary to a motor vehicle. We were informed during interviews that Detectives carry, on average, between 15 to 20 open cases each. Currently, the Investigations Division has 231 open cases, with some cases opened more than a year prior. When we sought to acquire specific data – such as batch reports addressing the number of days required to close a case, number of after-hours and weekend call-outs and cases opened by month for 2012 – the newly implemented Record Management System (RMS) parameters had not yet been established and this information was not retrievable. We find this troubling as the system has been operational for six months. Furthermore, neither the Commander nor the two General Investigation Detective Sergeants were able to provide this information for 2012 or any prior time period before RMS was initiated. This indicates a lack of leadership in the Investigations Division with respect to defining a strategic direction for the unit and evaluating performance on a regular basis. We examined how cases are initiated in the Investigations Division. Cases are typically opened based on an informal solvability scale involving factors such as number of leads, modus operandi and evidence of a pattern across other cases. Public sensitivity is considered. Some cases are automatically opened for follow-up investigation – such as those involving sexual assaults, domestic violence and death investigations accepted by the Medical Examiner. However, there is little to no crime-related data collected and no analysis of emerging trends in criminal activity to guide and refine prioritization and resource allocation decisions at either the divisional or departmental level.

Prostitution: Should It Be a Priority or Not? During interviews with members of the SPD, and surrounding police agencies, we were repeatedly advised that prostitution at the hotels in close proximity to the retail district was a signiﬁcant issue. Yet only six prostitution cases were opened in 2012. Either the perceptions shared with us are incorrect or the SPD is not sufﬁciently targeting the issue. A closer examination of the problem is required before resources should be deployed.

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Reporting: Quality, Timeliness and Management Review Our review determined Investigations Division reports are well written, thorough and generally submitted in a timely manner. This reﬂects the abilities of the Detectives conducting the investigations, but is also driven by the efforts of Sergeants directing the work and reviewing the investigative reports once they are submitted by their respective Detectives. The Commander in charge of the Investigations Division has never been a part of the case review process and instead is briefed by the Detective Sergeants when a case becomes particularly noteworthy. This managerial distance is unusual for departments of this size. Although intimate knowledge of every case lead is not critical nor expected, the leader of the unit should have a sufﬁciently thorough understanding of the workload, types of cases worked and case progress to be capable of working with the Department’s Crime Analyst to examine trends and patterns and identify emerging measures that should be taken to solve and prevent crimes. We suggest the Investigations Division take full advantage of the analytical resources of the Crime Analyst to develop a roadmap and strategy for case initiation and management. Unfortunately, due to the poor working relationship between the investigative and analytical functions, the unit has not realized the value that true crime and data analysis can bring to an investigative team. Restoring this relationship and implementing analysis in investigations must be a priority for the new Investigations Commander.

The Department is lacking a policy on timely submission of investigative reports. We located several investigative files opened in September 2012 with no reports submitted as of the date of our review. Absent a formal standardized reporting policy, minor missteps and oversights and, in some cases, more serious failures can become systemic at some level, even if diligent first-line supervision is in place. Currently, both Detective Sergeants managing the Division routinely apply an informal “100-day rule” for submission of investigative reports. This is predicated upon the availability of witnesses, laboratory examinations and forensic results for the assigned Detective to incorporate into written reports. Although no such policy requirement exists, both Detective Sergeants maintain sufficient interaction with their squads that reviews are done informally on a daily basis. It is critical that first-line supervisors are fully engaged with their personnel. As commendable as this hands-on approach is, developing a written policy would ensure structured report submission and review process, rather than leaving it to the discretion of the Investigations Division supervisors. Failure to adhere to well-established processes undermines accountability and is one of the system breakdowns exacerbated by a lack of command oversight. We suggest the Investigations Division, in concert with the Support Services Division, develop a policy requiring specific initial and supplemental report review to ensure consistent investigative reporting.

File Management: Organization and Consistency We randomly selected closed files to review and determined some investigative files are not well organized and do not reflect diligence in retaining a consistent set of documents across cases. We suggest formalizing a written policy outlining requirements for document retention, file structure and organization. We also noted that the administrative staff in the Records Division uses sign-out cards appropriately to document the removal and return of files. This is a best practice which ensures case files are not lost or misplaced.

Crime Analysis: A Key Resource and Tool The SPD is not fully embracing crime analysis as a resource to aid in solving or preventing crimes. Currently, information is shared between the Investigations and Patrol Divisions informally and infrequently during some roll calls by Investigations Division Sergeants and Detectives. Many police departments of similar or larger size have formal, established and scheduled daily or weekly brieﬁngs by members of the Investigations Division for all Patrol Division roll calls. This structured approach aids in timely dissemination of actionable intelligence information about relevant crime trends and patterns, while unifying and ensuring crime control strategies are aligned between both divisions. This information exchange is critical to developing crime prevention strategies and solving crimes already committed. In this regard, the Crime Analyst’s role is important. The Analyst role is designed to work with Detectives to identify crime patterns, conduct crime-mapping analysis and identify trends in offenses. While the SPD Crime Analyst supplies patrol alerts for subjects of interest to Investigations Division Detectives, these alerts are random and inconsistently applied throughout the Division. We suggest the Investigations Division explore the potential tactical, strategic and administrative beneﬁts of fully integrating crime analysis into the initiation and management of investigative cases.

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Evaluations and Rotations: Important Levers of Productivity There are no structured rotation requirements or preventative evaluations in the Investigations Division or other specialty units. Although an evaluation structure and tools are in place, there are extended periods of time during which ofﬁcers operate without an adequate evaluation of their productivity, effectiveness or career development. There are a variety of reasons to have a rotation assignment in specialty functions. The two most often cited are that it allows for career enrichment through the Department and stops the entrenchment of poor habits by individuals who hold the position for years. The assessment team believes that at a minimum the Department should enact a rotation policy based on performance evaluations of all specialty positions.

2012 FORENSIC CALL-OUTS, 441 REQUESTS y Burglary .........................................23% y Domestic violence .......................17% y Criminal damage to property ...10% y Battery.............................................10% y Theft ................................................ 6% y Death investigation ..................... 5% y Gang grafﬁti .................................. 5% y Miscellaneous .............................. 24%

Forensic Services: Structure and Organization SPD staffs the Crime Scene Unit with a combination of sworn and civilian forensic Evidence Technicians. The Patrol Division’s six sworn Evidence Technicians (ET) are assigned to all three patrol shifts. The Patrol Division ETs receive a one-week basic training course for crime scene processing and evidence collection. The four civilian Forensic Technicians (FT) report to the Community Relations Sergeant in the Investigations Division which is staffed Monday through Friday, 24 hours per day. The civilian FTs are highly trained and receive over 200 hours of training and certification from the Northwestern University Center for Public Safety. Those specific certifications include crime scene investigative techniques, photography, fingerprints, forensic evidence recovery and analysis and blood spatter analysis. The FTs are also certified in crime scene investigation by the International Association for Identification (I.A.I.).

When a request is received for evidence or forensic support from the Patrol Division, the sworn officer who has been ET-trained is typically the first to respond. If the crime scene is complex and beyond the limited capabilities of the ET, the FT is summoned. Whether services are rendered by an ET or an FT, a supplemental report is completed and becomes part of the investigative case file. We determined that the FTs have not been trained on proper usage of the RMS and continue to submit reports in the previous format. Our assessment revealed that in 2012 no requests for forensic services were made in support of any search warrants being executed. It has become a best practice in policing to use forensic services when warrants are performed – both to collect evidence and to document the condition of a crime site before and after it has been searched by law enforcement to counter any claims raised in litigation of police misconduct during a search. We found that the Sergeant overseeing the unit has little experience, background or training in forensic sciences – though he did serve as an Evidence Technician early in his police career. We suggest that an experienced Forensic Technician be placed in this supervisory position – one capable of ensuring certifications are kept current, appropriate training is administered and continuing education is offered to the ETs. We also note that the senior FT assumes the primary role of property custodian, which consumes approximately 80 percent of his time. Time management was beyond the scope of this assessment, but we suggest SPD perform a workflow analysis to determine the value of a full-time evidence and property custodian.

Gang Activity and Organized Crime: Cross-Jurisdictional Collaboration In the past, the SPD has participated in gang intelligence associations and meetings, but those activities were reportedly discontinued when the Investigations Command determined the intelligence collected was of little use to the Village. To date, the SPD’s narcotics and prostitution investigations have targeted individuals and not leaders or activity at the criminal organization or enterprise level. A more effective way to approach crimes such as burglary rings, prostitution, narcotics and even retail theft is to focus on the criminal and the enterprise simultaneously. Many of these investigations require active participation with surrounding jurisdictions and all of them require a criminal intelligence recordkeeping system that allows for effective sharing of criminal intelligence information while protecting individuals’ privacy and constitutional rights during information collection, storage and dissemination. We noted that the Department partners with Northwest Central Dispatch which connects 10 surrounding jurisdictions. These jurisdictions at a minimum share a common Computer Aided Dispatch as well as many other records management and intelligence systems. We suggest the Department pursue taking advantage of this infrastructure and engage the surrounding communities in greater levels of information sharing.

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RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that:

4.1

The SPD create a strategic vision, deﬁne the mission and clearly deﬁne the goals of the Investigations Division.

4.2

The SPD capture better metrics on crimes and arrests to prioritize which types of investigations should be pursued and how internal Department resources should best be allocated.

4.3

The SPD initiate an examination of the Investigation Division case ﬁles to determine whether they conform to relevant policy and procedure for case clearance and closure.

4.4

The SPD create a formal case review process to ensure that investigations are reviewed for completeness, timeliness, adherence to policy and mission alignment.

4.5

The SPD initiate a records retention policy including requirements for document retention, purging, ﬁle structure and organization.

4.6

The SPD review its strategic and tactical approaches to prostitution and drug offenses. It is not clear that the Department needs to address these offenses through a dedicated undercover unit.

4.7

The SPD review its approach to supervision of the Forensic Services and assign a supervisor with the background, experience and education required to supervise the unit.

4.8

The SPD Investigations Division explore the potential tactical, strategic and administrative beneﬁts of fully integrating crime analysis into the initiation and management of investigative cases.

4.9

The SPD develop a rotation policy based on performance evaluation of all specialty positions.

4.10 The SPD fully utilize forensic services when warrants are performed to collect evidence and document the condition of a crime site before and after it has been searched by law enforcement personnel to counter any claims raised in litigation of police misconduct during a search. 4.11

The SPD perform a workﬂow analysis to determine the value of a full-time evidence and property custodian.

REMEDIATION STEPS TAKEN SINCE APRIL 1, 2013 SPD GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS ISSUES Implementation of Investigative Improvements y The Department conducted a thorough proactive audit of 80 randomly selected cases. y The policy and process for high-risk investigations was examined. Based on identified deficiencies, the team created an Operational Plan for use on all planned arrests and search warrants. y The investigative command created a consistent review schedule and procedure to ensure appropriate and timely reporting. y The Department hired an independent contractor to conduct a comprehensive physical and procedural audit of the evidence and property in Department custody. The audit found the evidence vault in compliance with excellent procedures in place. There were a few minor policy and procedural improvements identified that the Department is currently implementing. Structural and Procedural Changes to Enhance Operations y The Department began the process of restoring the integrity and accountability of the Investigations Division by taking the following steps: y Removed the Commander of Investigations. y Reinstated the Investigations Lieutenant position. y Made very significant changes to how the Investigations Division currently addresses special investigations. These are outlined in the next section.

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SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS As pointed out earlier in this report, the organizational changes over the past 10 years signiﬁcantly reduced management oversight and have clearly impacted span of control over multiple operational shifts. This is evident in the Special Investigations Bureau.

Strategy and Supervision: Little Oversight in Place The SIB is led by a Detective Sergeant and staffed by five Investigators. Four unit Investigators focus on cases involving narcotics, vice, gang and organized crime investigations. One oversees Village licensure investigations. In 2003, the SIB had two shifts of four officers, each led by a supervisor. This was an effective method of ensuring appropriate span and control for both shifts. Once the Lieutenant and Second Sergeant were removed from the unit, however, the opportunity for mentoring incoming supervisors to the SIB was eliminated. That, combined with no formal training or orientation program, forced incoming supervisors to rely on the unit Investigators for guidance. The Lieutenant’s position is critical in providing mentoring, supervision, and leadership to subordinate Sergeants and the unit as a whole. The SIB unit operates most effectively after standard business hours since its ability to develop narcotics and prostitution investigations requires officers to work during non-standard hours. Supervisors, however, are mostly available during standard business hours. The one Sergeant overseeing SIB is not always available to respond to, consult with or assist officers during high-risk, afterhours investigations. As a result, narcotics transactions often occur without a supervisor on scene.

In many regards, the success of a narcotics unit depends on whether the unit’s supervisor is present at all times and completely immersed with each ofﬁcer’s actions as well as those of the squad as a whole. Without a hands-on approach, members of the unit can easily lose sight of their mission.

Responsibility for two additional sensitive areas was delegated to the SIB Sergeant: (1) control of the Ofﬁcial Advance of Funds (OAF), and (2) maintenance of the Asset Seizure File. Command oversight of these two areas was minimal and inconsistent. In contrast, many police departments choose to provide more supervisory oversight to higher risk criminal investigations and match the supervisors’ work schedules with those of the ofﬁcers.

Supervisory Training and Mentoring: The Importance of Experience The SIB unit is proactive in nature, often putting officers in precarious situations and if the Sergeants selected for the SIB unit have no prior specialized unit training, they must rely on guidance from the unit members that they supervise. It is critical that SIB Sergeants know the potential risks and dangers involved in the situations they are sending officers into, and that planned tactical response countermeasures are developed and implemented should the officers need immediate assistance.

Confidential Informants: Case Management Practices While some cases addressed by the SIB are triggered by information received from the Patrol Division or Village citizens, most cases are initiated and generated through confidential informants (CI). Confidential informants are individuals who are subject to arrest for a crime and willing to exchange critical information useful to the arresting authorities for leniency in prosecution or sentencing. Once the defendants meet their bond requirement, they are given formal instructions and parameters pursuant to an agreement between themselves, the Schaumburg Police Department and the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office. The confidential informant must normally initiate a specified number of narcotics-related cases or assist law enforcement in obtaining sufficient evidence against a high-level narcotics violator to satisfy the terms of the agreement.

We uncovered a number of issues in the SIB’s use of confidential informants: y The SIB Sergeant is not involved in the development and management of confidential informants or in related case review. This responsibility is placed solely on the SIB Investigators with no oversight within SIB or SPD. y Policies related to confidential informants are ambiguous, poorly written, disorganized and inconsistently followed. Although SPD Policy 46-10 states that SPD shall maintain a file of individuals to be utilized as informants with CI numbers and fictitious names assigned and forms completed, these forms – as outlined below – are in disarray. y Many of the SIB cases were short in duration because the investigators arrested the targets before the case could be worked to its fullest potential. y In the General Investigations unit, cases are usually assigned to a Detective with a specific discipline or skill set and then further subdivided depending on the current workload of that particular Detective. In SIB, cases are usually self-assigned by the Investigator handling the confidential informant, which depends on the current workload of that particular Investigator at the time the case is initiated. This self-assigning usually occurs because the Investigator is the one dealing with the informant’s information. y As a common practice, the SIB unit arrests subjects for narcotics violations and releases them without filing formal charges, with the anticipation that they will become confidential informants in the future. This is not a best practice and should be considered a rare exception to the rule, and, if practiced, undertaken only with the full understanding and permission of the local State’s Attorney’s Office.

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While these methods are part of the tools of a narcotics officer in making cases and arrests, they are fraught with search-and-seizure issues and other legal roadblocks which can potentially give the defendant unnecessary advantages in litigation. Typically, every effort should be made in an undercover drug squad to have the transaction made between the undercover officer and suspect and to engage other potential suspects higher in the organization to maximize the amount of drugs the target is capable of delivering or selling. Such a methodology would help the SPD command identify the scope of the problem and develop a strategy to address and combat narcotics usage and distribution throughout the Village. Impact and Effectiveness: Capturing and Measuring Data Data is not regularly and consistently examined to determine the narcotics problems experienced in the Village, so the Command and Police Chief have little insight on the impact of the SIB unit on drug-related issues in Schaumburg. As demonstrated in our discussion of the enforcement activity in SIB, the officers work to arrest individuals when they are identified through a citizen complaint, intelligence or an informant. There is no plan based on a true analysis of the narcotics problem to guide enforcement and other components like education or support services. While seemingly a small issue, this goes to the heart of strengthening management decisions. There must be a clear strategy, measures to determine effectiveness and data to support the measures. Without a strategy, the only measure of success the Department had was the number of arrests made, leaving little insight to the arrests’ actual impact on the local problem.

Focus on Other Jurisdictions: The Coordination Imperative During our case review, we learned the SIB conducts many investigations outside of the Village. SIB investigators initiated cases on targeted individuals with known or potential activity outside Schaumburg with no mention in the report of any SIB supervisory involvement or approval, or any contact or deconfliction11 with the police agency in the jurisdiction they were operating. In addition to not strategically addressing the Schaumburg narcotics issues, this dangerous practice risks triggering a potentially fatal “blue-on-blue” event in the field between undercover agents posing as drug dealers. There are no multi-jurisdictional task forces focusing on the narcotics problem in the northwest suburbs to aid in an effective approach or strategy of local narcotics enforcement. Narcotics operations present higher risk situations. The mutual notification process between agencies has become more formalized through initial phone calls between agencies, followed up with written notifications made to the local High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) office, a federally created and funded multi-jurisdictional narcotics task force. HIDTA units assist drug enforcement entities to track narcotics operations and violators to help agencies in many facets of narcotics enforcement, one of which is avoiding blue-on-blue confrontations.

Case Management and Selection: Tightening Procedures Case review and management in the SIB unit is minimal. Although the SIB Sergeant reviews and signs all reports initially, there is no policy dictating a specified timeframe for case reports to be completed and submitted or for supervisory review. The SIB investigators initiate their own cases based on information received from their confidential informants. The SIB Sergeant has minimal input on handling CI-related cases. There does not appear to be any specified strategy in the SIB cases such as target identification, group affiliation, level of narcotics violator or any other strategy in the selection and implementation of SIB cases. The SIB Sergeant is responsible for maintaining a seizure log and filing the appropriate seizure forms through the State of Illinois or federal government. The seizure log is maintained on a clipboard in the SIB Sergeant’s office. Our review of a sampling of seizure files indicates the process is properly maintained. The case reports specify items seized and tracks items through the property system. The following administrative records are also submitted correctly: photo of seized item, Illinois State Police Notice of Seized Property, Cook County Notice of Preliminary Review, Cook County Preliminary Review, Declaration of Forfeiture and Illinois State Police Notice of Seized Property Return.

Prostitution Investigations: Needed But Not Pursued The Special Investigations Bureau conducted five prostitution investigations cases in 2012 and made four arrests. During our interviews, the Investigations Commander, Sergeants and officers commented that prostitution was so prevalent at Schaumburg hotels that another full squad comprised of a Sergeant and five Investigators could be kept busy making cases and arrests if the Department could afford the additional resources.12 One Investigator showed us specific advertisements on the Internet for “escorts”’ and dates at many of the hotels and motels in Schaumburg. However, the unit stopped working prostitution cases in July 2012, after the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office advised complying with stricter parameters on undercover officers’ covert activities regarding the type of conduct they could display in allowing the prostitute to demonstrate the elements of the offense required to make the arrest. In effect, rather than determine how to effectively and professionally conduct these investigations, the SIB simply stopped pursuing them. The Department must develop and implement a strategy for collecting data, determine the problem and then outline a suitable antiprostitution enforcement program.

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Drug Testing: A Key Deterrent There are no additional random or scheduled drug-testing requirements for narcotics officers or Evidence Technicians involved in handling narcotics beyond the Department’s minimum requirements for all officers in the agency. Aggressively monitoring specialty officers in high drug exposure positions is a best practice. It can deter an officer from making a bad decision and would assist the Department in identifying officers who engage in drug use. The Department should strive to institute a more aggressive drug-testing program for individuals in specialty positions that allow greater access to narcotics.

Gang Activity: Resources and Countermeasures While addressing gang-related activity has typically been tasked to the Special Investigations Bureau, the unit has dedicated minimal resources to tracking organized crime factions. Before 2009, SIB would host or attend gang intelligence meetings and seminars with the Addison, West Chicago and Elgin Police Departments – where it shared information and insights into trends involving gang activity. The SIB Investigators and supervisors at that time, however, did not believe that Schaumburg’s gang issues were related to these neighboring towns and gradually drifted away from the cooperative gang enforcement activities. When contact with a gang member occurred, a SIB Investigator merely fills out a Field Interview Card (no photo) identifying the individual and his or her address, vehicles, tattoos, gang affiliation and associates present at the time of contact. In addition, while the Investigations Commander informally maintains a large number of criminal intelligence files, this information is not provided to the Crime Analyst for dissemination to sworn personnel or used in analysis or alerts. Although these files contain useful information13 – and the Department has occasionally acted upon it – there is no formal protocol for investigative response rendering the information useless. A protocol must exist to govern the collection, retention, examination, dissemination and purging of criminal intelligence information.

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File Management: Content and Organization Although we question many of the investigative techniques used by the SIB unit, its reports are generally well written and filed in a timely manner. They also contain the necessary identifying components normally associated with professional police report writing. During our assessment process, we identified a few opportunities to improve the SIB’s file management procedures. y Internal protocols and policies governing the maintenance, dissemination or purging of files need to be defined and followed. y Documentation of informant involvement needs to be included in the future in order to definitively identify which informant is active in each case. Sometimes informants are called upon to testify or must be identified in some manner. y Surveillance reports were missing from the case files. Typically when an officer is undercover, he or she will generate a report memorializing what transpired in the transaction or target contact. Surveillance officers usually complete a surveillance report, detailing their observations in order to verify the time and whereabouts of the undercover officer and any other activity they observed. y The CI files are maintained in a file in the Investigators office, assigned case numbers per each officer, and there is a Master Control file binder maintained in the Investigations Commander’s office which shows all informants signed up each year on a master list. The numbered tracking system uses CI, the year and is numbered chronologically. The informant’s real name is then printed, followed by the date of initiation and the officer and corresponding star number that signed up the informant. There is no electronic input or tracking of the informant’s information or number, and therefore, no method to electronically track the informant’s involvement or effectiveness in cases. The CI activity logs were rarely used, and the informants’ numbers were not entered in the reports that they were active. The end result is no effective method to track productive informants. The SIB Sergeant did not review the CI files or meet with the informants working with the unit. The Investigators dealt with all aspects of CI participation, with no control or activity from SIB or SPD Command. We located other paperwork such as photographs and criminal histories of individuals in many of the CI files with no indication regarding the individual's association with the CI or reason the paperwork was in the files. Greater controls must be developed and placed over this entire process.

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Advanced funds are requested by officers via an official advanced funds receipt request form. The SIB Sergeant compiles a monthly expenditure report which is forwarded to the Investigative Commander. Official Advanced Funds: Control Protocols Official Advanced Funds (OAF) is cash used by investigators, especially narcotics officers to pay informants, conduct undercover operations and purchase evidence. Because of the nature of these funds and how they are used, the funds must be tightly controlled. The SIB Sergeant maintains a dedicated ledger in his office to track the flow of Official Advanced Funds. The ledger is maintained in a twohole punch notebook, rather than a bound ledger book. It tracks date, officer badge number, confidential informant number, funds advanced, funds returned, funds expended and the fund balance. The Sergeant advised it was the book he was issued when he became the SIB Sergeant and he has continued the same practice as his predecessors. We find this type of book to be less preferable than a bound ledger as manipulation of this type of ledger may be performed by simply inserting or removing pages.

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A second bound ledger maintained by the Investigative Commander with a larger fund balance is used to replenish the SIB OAF account. A third bound ledger labeled “Main Book” is maintained by the Investigations Secretary. The Secretary does not handle any cash and makes monthly entries to the ledger based on the paperwork received from the SIB Sergeant and Investigative Commander. The Investigations Secretary compiles a Quarterly OAF Report under the signature of the Investigations Commander which is forwarded to the Chief of Police. The Investigations Secretary also advised that when OAF is audited, the auditors used her ledger only. The SIB Sergeant’s ledger contains a few crossed-out items which were not initialed. The Investigative Commander’s bound ledger contained numerous deletions with no initials attached, along with numerous entries redacted and written over. The third ledger was very neat and contained no obvious errors.

What Went Wrong In the aftermath of the January 16, 2013 arrest and indictment of three Schaumburg Police Officers for narcotics trafficking, what do we know about “what went wrong.” While the responsibility to commit criminal acts rests with the individuals who chose to do so, the Department may have identified these problems earlier or made committing them more difficult. In short, the Investigations Division Commander and Chief of Police engaged the SIB unit without the proper oversight, to (1) ensure effective unit operations, (2) generate high-value policing outcomes, and (3) mitigate exposures associated with this sensitive, highrisk area of Schaumburg Police Department’s activities.

We are conﬁdent in our belief that these arrests are merely one of several types of issues that, in effect, were bound to go undetected given the deﬁcits in leadership and oversight within the Special Investigations Bureau.

What were the dominant factors that allowed these activities to go undetected? y Going it alone carried consequences. Many departments comparable in size to the Schaumburg Police Department participate in a local narcotic task force such as a Metropolitan Enforcement Group14 (MEG) to combat the use and delivery of illegal narcotics in their jurisdiction, instead of maintaining their own in-house drug squad. While no such unit exists to serve the local law enforcement agencies in Cook County, the SPD’s strategy carried consequences. y Thinning the leadership layer reduced critical oversight. The original Investigations organizational structure included an important layer of supervisory oversight with two squads of five Investigators, a Sergeant supervising each squad and one Lieutenant supervising both Sergeants. When the leadership tier was reduced, key activities (where they existed) such as mentoring, guidance and training on specific job duties were discontinued. y The lack of supervisory training undermined the unit’s culture. SIB Sergeants are placed in the SIB unit regardless of narcotic or supervisory experience. While they receive some training, most of this occurs on the job, making them dependent on the character, integrity and work ethic of the Investigators they are charged with supervising. Furthermore, at many times – such as when the SIB Sergeant is sick or on vacation – there is no supervision in place and individual Investigators are merely expected to “let the Detective Sergeants know” what they were doing. This rarely happened. y There is no structured rotational process for SIB investigators. Three of the five SIB Investigators have been assigned to the unit for approximately 12 years. While rotation of assignments was examined and declined by the former Chief, we suggest reexamining this opportunity, particularly for specialty high-risk assignments. Assignment as an undercover narcotics officer for an extended length of time make the officer more susceptible to burnout, a sense of disconnection from traditional policing and, in some cases, even corruption. In general, a typical undercover narcotics assignment should last for two to four years.

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RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that:

5.1

The Special Investigations Bureau be disbanded immediately until the Department can gain a greater understanding of the local narcotics problem â&#x20AC;&#x201C; and determine how a new SIB unit should be organized, structured and led to address this issue.

5.2 The Department conduct a study to aggregate information on narcotics distribution, sale and possession in the Village. Incorporate these findings to develop and implement a strategic blueprint to combat the issues identified based upon effective counter-narcotics policing models currently in use in comparable agencies. 5.3 A training program be developed to better position officers to engage undercover operations targeting prostitution and identifying the organizational leadership behind this vice. 5.4 The Department pursue a coordinated approach to information-driven investigations by creating a robust intelligence-led analytical process. This systematic methodology will help solve, detect and prevent crimes and criminal activity in the Village by analyzing crime-related data from sources such as internal reports, open-source monitoring and national criminal intelligence databases. In support of this initiative, the Department must create policies, procedures and practices to govern the collection, retention, examination, dissemination and purging of criminal intelligence information. 5.5 As no multi-jurisdictional coordinated approach currently exists to affect the local narcotics problem in the northwest Cook County suburbs, Schaumburg use this as an opportunity to partner with other local jurisdictions in developing a strategically coordinated approach to the local drug problem. 5.6 The Department implement a strategy to collect data to determine the problem and then begin a suitable anti-prostitution enforcement program. 5.7 The Department create a rotation policy for high-risk positions and examine the benefits of a mandatory rotation for some specialty position to allow for greater skill and career development across the organization. 5.8 A supplemental drug testing program be established to test officers more frequently â&#x20AC;&#x201C; especially those in sensitive positions with greater access to narcotics. This program should include procedures and rules that define the authority and responsibility to conduct drug testing that is incident-based (i.e., an Evidence Technician that failed to document narcotics that are missing).

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5.9 Policies, procedures and practices on confidential informants be developed and managed that conform to legal standards and best practices in law enforcement. 5.10 Policies, procedures and practices be established on official Advanced Funds management that conform with financial audit standards and best practices in law enforcement. 5.11 The SPD continue finalizing the Lexipol policies for the entire Department and implement procedures for all investigations units that cover investigative and case management, supervision, mentoring and administrative oversight.

REMEDIATION STEPS TAKEN SINCE APRIL 1, 2013 SPD SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS ISSUES Strategy and Supervision y The Department eliminated the Special Investigations Bureau. y The SIB Sergeant was removed and reassigned as Patrol Sergeant. y The Department reassigned remaining members to Investigations squads. Impact and Effectiveness y The Department created a Committee to examine the current issues with drug abuse, with particular emphasis on the heroin problem. OfďŹ cial Advanced Funds: Control Protocols y The Department has completed an examination of the OAF account. This resulted in the creation of a recording ledger and required reporting practice that follows standard accounting practices.

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POLICIES AND PROCEDURES One of the most important ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiencies of the Department is to upgrade the policies and procedures that define the rules, expectations and best practices SPD officers need to comply with every day – from general department polices to specialized procedures.

The New Lexipol System: Implementation Delays Currently, the SPD is in the process of migrating to a new, web-based system that it purchased from Lexipol, a California-based public safety risk management firm which provides law enforcement agencies with state-specific duty manuals that are routinely updated. The conversion to Lexipol began in August 2011 and was targeted to be complete in May 2013 with high-liability policies finalized by April 2013. Unfortunately, the initiative has stalled as a result of (1) time-consuming efforts to customize select SPD operational procedures to conform with processes specific to the Village of Schaumburg and Cook County, (2) labor union objections to some procedures, and (3) the former Chief’s decision to defer approving new and revised policies until training occurred. While customization and training are important, a rollout period that will exceed two years for a project of this size and complexity is excessive. Due to this delay, SPD employees who can’t access Lexipol are using a legacy system called Power DMS. This system contains an outdated “operational” policy and procedures manual along with some portion of the Lexipol policies that have been approved. Additionally, the SPD is unable to fully leverage the Lexipol system, including the daily training updates for officers, even though all of the proposed customized policy changes are apparently written and merely waiting for the Chief’s approval. The Department recently reinstituted its Policy Review Committee (PRC), a voluntary body of employees who review additions, deletions and changes to current policies and deliberates on new policies. For the past 12 months, the PRC had been on hiatus due in part to a lack of interest by rank-and-file to participate. We note that while the command staff and the PRC each have one week to review the policies and provide comments, the process does not incorporate a period for a Department-wide review of proposed policies prior to their implementation. We see this as a missed opportunity for early buy-in to policies by the rank-and-file by giving them an opportunity to have input on policies that directly affect their daily work.

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The General Orders Manual: The Need for a Few Key New Sections

Additional Policy Areas: Attention Needed

Our review of the SPD’s General Orders Manual revealed that while some departmental directives including its General Orders and Rules and regulations have been updated through the purchase of Lexipol and vetted by the appropriate unit in the Department, these have never been implemented by the Chief. As a result, current policy contains information no longer relevant or applicable to the Department. In fact, more than half the policies are in this state of limbo. Failure to update and publish policy exposes the Department to unnecessary liability and is an internal visible sign of disorder. Outdated policies become irrelevant and send the message to employees that compliance with directives is not important or even expected. As a ﬁrst step, the Department should consider conducting a more detailed policy review, prioritizing those policies with a high liability impact such as sexual harassment, use of force and ofﬁcer pursuit.

y Case Review Policy – The SPD needs to implement a formal policy addressing administrative report writing timelines or scheduled due dates for investigative cases.

Additionally, we understand from interviews that policies and procedures outlined in the General Orders Manual are generally guided by the Department’s mission statement and code of conduct which admirably outline expectations for the fair and equitable provision of services by SPD’s employees. We note that these guidelines are not frequently referenced or repeated, in whole or part, throughout the body of policies and procedures we examined. The SPD’s mission statement and canon of ethics should ideally serve as the lens through which all SPD employees view the policies and procedures and their ofﬁcial actions. It may be helpful if actions are taken to ensure these documents, or relevant parts thereof, are referenced, where appropriate, in all training materials, policies and procedures, and ofﬁcial communications.

y Operation Planning – The policy outlining raid planning does not address the use of written operational plans nor does it delineate the supervisory rank of the officer in charge. There is no direction on cross divisional communications; nor are there notification requirements to the Chief of Police on high-risk activities or any policy mandating when operational plans shall or may be used. y Criminal Intelligence Handling – Intelligence information collected by the Investigations Division Commander is arbitrarily being retained in contrast to CALEA Standards under Section 42. y Maintenance of Closed Case Files – Filing practices related to closed case files are weak, absent or unclear. If a case resurfaces or becomes germane in another arena, it is vitally important the Command or investigators can become quickly informed of the major areas of importance without sifting through layers of unimportant documents in order to become fully informed on the issues. y Use of Force – Firing Weapons at a Moving Vehicle – There is no guidance provided regarding shooting at moving vehicles (other than when engaged in a pursuit). We suggest that the SPD Use of Force policy be updated to address this. The substantial risks generated by the use of gunfire against moving vehicles, in combination with the likelihood that such gunfire will prove ineffective, demand that officers resort to firing only in the most extreme and exceptional circumstances.

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CALEA Policies: Ensuring Consistent Implementation Accreditation provides an operational and management framework for the SPD; it is an essential element to the operational efficiency of an agency and the pursuit of professional excellence. The accreditation process strengthens the agency’s accountability, both within the Department and with the community it serves. Earning accreditation from CALEA (Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement) can give members of the community as well as Village management and elected officials valuable assurance that their police department’s operational and administrative policies meet or exceed standards based upon national best practices.15 However, if these policies are not understood, applied and enforced, the benefits of accreditation rapidly diminish. According to CALEA’s website, there are currently 32 municipal law enforcement agencies in Illinois that hold CALEA accreditation, and eight agencies in the self-assessment phase who are seeking accreditation. The Joliet Police Department, with 387 members, is the largest of these agencies. In addition, the Sheriff’s Offices in DuPage, McHenry and Winnebago counties and the Illinois State Police are accredited. As of March 2013, the SPD, which has held CALEA accreditation for approximately 30 years, is pending re-accreditation until the next CALEA conference slated for July 2013. A review of the Department’s re-accreditation was deferred in March 2013, pending the outcome of the internal investigation regarding the allegations against Chief Howerton. The SPD’s last re-accreditation and the pending one are under the Gold Standard Assessment (GSA). Begun in 2011, this voluntary assessment format focuses primarily on processes and outcomes associated with standards specific to agency policies. In short, it measures the impact of accreditation as opposed to simply confirming compliance through a file–by–file review.

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Under the current organizational structure, the SPD’s Administration Commander oversees the Accreditation function. This unit is responsible for overseeing review and revisions to departmental policies and procedures and is currently staffed by an experienced accreditation manager. We observed a lack of understanding on the part of the command staff as to the purpose of CALEA and the benefits accreditation brings to an agency, as well as a lack of ownership of the requirements imposed by the accreditation process. This is difficult to explain considering the Department’s almost 30-year accreditation history and the fact that the command staff members have been with the SPD for all or the majority of that time. Based on our interviews with Schaumburg personnel, it appears that as the agency grew and the command structure changed, the philosophy and the reasons for CALEA were never communicated to the Department’s frontlines or staff nor were they instilled in those assuming new command positions. Individuals were tasked with assignments to meet CALEA standards but were not instructed on the task’s purpose or expected benefits. As a result, complacency took hold. Duplication of previous work became the norm. While

If these reports are not complete and factual, or they are ignored, then the CALEA process is merely a waste of resources within the organization. These actions are generally the result of having the wrong person assigned as the Accreditation Manager without “buy in” from command staff and the organization as a whole. During this assessment, one of the questions often asked was how the Department could have continually been awarded accreditation status for years while the process was not working. The answer is simple: when an independent team would assess the agency, it would find the proper paperwork in the files and encounter the right answers during interviews. But the intent of the standards was not being followed. These actions defeated the purpose of voluntary compliance and allowed the agency to achieve nominal benefits of accreditation but not practical ones emerging from the reviews.

the reports were submitted as completed, the actual task was performed at a minimal level and either rarely or ineffectively reviewed at the command level. The process turned into a “paper exercise,” not the intended practical and “best practices” model intended in the CALEA reaccreditation process. Schaumburg’s purpose for CALEA participation became merely about achieving reaccreditation. The primary purpose of CALEA is to present the Chief of Police with a blueprint that promotes the efﬁcient use of resources and improves service delivery, while providing the necessary reports and analyses a Chief needs to make fact-based, informed management decisions.

Without across-the-board buy-in, especially among the supervisory ranks, consistent implementation and compliance with CALEA standards will not occur. In many law enforcement circles, the efﬁcacy of CALEA has come into question. Our assessment found, however, that if the process as required by CALEA had been followed by Senior Command and the Department, many of the issues identiﬁed in this report could have been uncovered before they reached the levels outlined herein. Nonetheless, the assessment team believes that the Department can and should re-commit itself to CALEA not as a process that occurs every three years, but as a means of advancing the Department’s mission through continuous monitoring and improvement.

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Training: Baselines and Requirements Training within the Department is delivered and monitored by the Training Coordinator in the Administrative Services Division. The Training Coordinator is also responsible for maintaining records relating to ofﬁcer training and the completion of state-imposed mandatory retraining requirements. Some online training is currently offered and more is planned. Many scenario-based and specialized topics require in-person training and the Training Coordinator is responsible for scheduling these activities in the context of the overall scheduling scheme of SPD.

In spite of budget pressures over the past four years, the Village has maintained a commitment to training and equipping SPD personnel with the tools and instruction required to deliver a professional level of service. However, in an effort to save overtime expenditures, many core training components, such as ﬁrearms and defensive tactics were substantially reduced.

The state-imposed requirement for annual training to maintain law enforcement certification amounts to annual firearms requalification. The training unit is responsible for monitoring the extent of training achieved by each employee toward this requirement and maintaining records establishing successful completion of the required hours. The unit provides access to an extensive array of courses, some of which can be taken online. We were informed that in-service training provided by SPD is generally 80 hours per year. We found that in spite of budget pressures over the past four years, the Village has maintained a commitment to training and equipping SPD personnel with the tools and instruction required to deliver a professional level of service. The Department has maintained active participation in external training opportunities provided by regional and nationally recognized organizations such as the North East Multi Regional Training, Northwest University Center for Public Safety, the Federal Bureau of Investigations National Academy and the Suburban Law Enforcement Academy. However, efforts have lapsed relating to in-house, annual training specific to areas such as emergency response, defense tactics, defensive driving and traffic stops. Despite financial considerations and potential staffing issues, focus should be directed to identifying methods to provide regular training in these areas to ensure officers maintain skills levels and are current with proper technique, philosophies and standards on emergency response.

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Some officers expressed concern that civilianizing the Training Coordinator position (in the past, this was a sworn position) interferes with their desire for career development and creates barriers between sworn and non-sworn employees regarding skills development. However, it is important to note that the current civilian in the training coordinator position is a retired police commander (sworn) from a nearby police agency, thus it is reasonable to expect that he brings a “sworn perspective” to the position. We consider the current organizational structure, staffing and systems to be sufficient for the Department to meet its current mission and trust many of the perceived issues with training by officers will diminish as communication improves.

We believe that it is important for the Department and the Village to acknowledge that leadership development is not the sole domain for supervisors. Every ofﬁcer is a leader. When members of the community call for assistance they expect leadership and safe and quick resolution to their problems. A robust and vigorous leadership development program should be established for all members of the Schaumburg Police Department.

With respect to supervisory training, Sergeants and Lieutenants are frequently trained at schools such as The Center for Public Safety, Schaumburg Institute of Professional Development, NEMRT and the FBI National Academy. However, one common complaint is that they do not feel empowered to implement supervisory strategies that they are taught. Additionally, there needs to be an emphasis, starting with the Chief’s Office, that mentoring is a command obligation and while new command may be trained on supervision through courses, they need additional mentoring and development. Sergeants are sometimes assigned to high-risk, complex specialty assignments in which they have no experience. While this is understandably unavoidable at times, such decisions must be mitigated through a combination of enhanced mentoring by other supervisors with the relevant experience, as well as by a sense of urgency in getting the newly assigned Sergeant into appropriate specialized training courses. To do otherwise is to set them up for failure and unnecessarily expose superiors, the Department and the Village to liability risks based on a failure to train. Further, we believe that it’s important for the SPD and the Village to acknowledge that leadership development is not the sole domain for supervisors. Every officer is a leader. When members of the community call for assistance they expect leadership and safe and quick resolution to their problems. We suggest that a robust and vigorous leadership development program be established for all members of the SPD. From the new recruit to the Chief, the concepts of effective leadership should be engrained and practiced. The greatest leaders evolve, continually sharpen their skills and look for opportunities for developing their own personal leadership proficiency as well as the leadership proficiency of their subordinates.

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RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that:

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6.1

A serious discussion take place with the new Chief and all supervisory members in order to ensure a complete understanding of why SPD engages in the CALEA accreditation process. This discussion is the first step in creating buy-in to accreditation throughout the supervisory ranks and ultimately will help ensure that a unified message is presented to rank-and-file officers.

6.2

The SPD continue the transition to Lexipol but extend the target date to August 2013. As a matter of routine, all agency members should be provided with the opportunity (15 to 30 days) to comment on most proposed policies prior to their implementation. The SPD is staffed with educated and dedicated personnel who know what they need to best do their job. Clearly this approach adds time to the process, and there may be a few policies where input isn’t sought up front because immediate implementation is warranted to ﬁll a liability gap. Normally, however, this is time well spent. Upon completion of the conversion, we recommend the command staff hold meetings with all SPD employees to communicate information about the new system for accessing and updating policies. As they move forward with the launch of Lexipol, it is vitally important that the rollout be deliberate and underpinned by Sergeant buy-in as they will be the ones responsible for employee understanding and acceptance of policy content.

6.3

While technically not part of a multi-jurisdictional database, the requirement of 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 (the regulation that governs inter-jurisdictional and multi-jurisdictional criminal intelligence systems that are operated by or on behalf of state and local law enforcement agencies) be used as a best practice guide for development of policies and procedures on intelligence collection.

6.4

The Department re-examine the methods of training with respect to policies governing high-risk behaviors and activities to include critical skills so the ofﬁcers are not validating skills through a simple electronic sign-off.

REMEDIATION STEPS TAKEN SINCE APRIL 1, 2013 SPD POLICIES AND PROCEDURES Transition to Lexipol Policies y The Department conducted an immediate review of all high-risk and high-liability policies to ensure the policies in place addressed the appropriate behavior and expectations. y This review included direction on procedures, including: y Conﬁdential informants y Operation planning y Criminal intelligence handling y Use of force y Harassment y Investigative case review y The Department has also completed a review of all paper intelligence ﬁles to purge old data and ensure compliance with CALEA standards.

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TECHNOLOGY This assessment included a high-level review of the Department’s information technology environment – including the IT-related issues confronting all operational priorities and the SPD’s current infrastructure supporting these activities. Currently, the Department’s infrastructure includes an emergency telephone system, automated report writing capabilities and laptops and video cameras installed in the police cruisers. Additionally, as part of the Northwest Central Dispatch, the Department shares a radio communication system, a computer-aided dispatch center and a records management system with nearby communities. Interviews were conducted with the Manager of the Administration Division, Training Staff, two shift supervisors as well as 17 patrol ofﬁcers. Interviews were also conducted with the IT Director of the Village of Schaumburg and one IT support personnel. In addition, Hillard Heintze participated in a ridealong to observe IT-related issues in the ﬁeld.

One of the most signiﬁcant gaps in the organization’s IT resources relates to records management systems used in ﬁeld reporting and case investigations. The SPD is unable to effectively share information across divisions or mine the data it possesses for lead generation and case resolution and closure.

Technology Leadership: The Top Seat Is Empty The Village’s technology is managed by a Department headed by a Director of Technology. The assessment team observed that, while this Department consistently delivered good technological programs and support across the Village, the Department was not often consulted on the IT purchases until after they had been made. One of the reasons for this is that decisions on technology can be made by the Department, the Village, or the Northwest Central Dispatch board and these decisions may not always involve SPD. Additionally, the IT staff lacked experience in justice IT requirements and the complex law enforcement information sharing environment. At this time, the position of Commander of Administration – the position responsible for IT management to the Department – is unfilled and its responsibilities have been tasked out to various Department or Village staff. This represents vulnerability for the Department for two reasons. One, law enforcement IT systems are intricately linked with life safety issues – both for officers and members of the public. Two, IT systems support every operational and support function of the Department and are considered top priorities (Tier 1) for operational and business continuity purposes. The leadership vacuum is reflected in a number of the Department’s IT challenges, as outlined below, in critical IT areas including training, support, issue resolution, and vendor management. While candidates for the position of Commander of Administration need to fulfill a wide range of non-IT requirements, the individual accepted should at least have a baseline understanding of IT best practices related to domains such as enterprise architecture, portfolio management, life-cycle management, business requirements analysis and end-user support.

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IT Training: The Critical Importance of Instruction In order to meet their responsibilities more effectively and efficiently, SPD officers need a better understanding of their IT-related responsibilities and how to leverage information technology in their daily activities to improve both the Department’s performance as well as their own. Our assessment surfaced the following IT training-related challenges: y Officers are frustrated at the lack of depth in IT training as well as the frequency of new systems and applications. They are not taught system operations well enough to proficiently interact between the multiple programs they are required to use. y Current staffing levels leave officers little time for training, if any, while on shift. y Often, in order to undergo training, officers have to work overtime. But the overtime budget is limited and was allowed to be used to fund overtime costs for training. y While avoiding unnecessary overtime is a legitimate and laudable financial strategy for the Department, there are hidden costs for the agency – some of them quite substantial – when expensive IT systems are misused or not used properly and when officers don’t actively engage the technology to capture efficiencies with clear bottom-line financial impacts. y The “train-the-trainer” model used for increased understanding and usage of the ID Networks and IYETEK solutions is inadequate given the complexity of these systems. y The instructors used for “train-the-trainer” sessions should be recognized as “super users” of the Department’s IT Systems and scheduled to serve during off-hours to supplement the SPD’s IT staff. y Training for some key programs occurred up to six months prior to release to the officers for use. By the time officers were granted access to the new systems, they had forgotten much of their training. Additionally, while SPD and Village training personnel are required to send policy, legal and legislative updates to SPD officers for acknowledgement and signature, some officers do not sign off on policies or updates they do not agree with – and there is no process or procedure in place on disciplinary actions for non-compliance. This undermines training and the integrity of the Department’s policing practices. It also, in some cases, may increase the Village’s liability risk.

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The second issue is that the Department has not had a strong voice in determining key IT training infrastructure investments. The electronic training management system is administered, operated and owned at the Village level and is based on the Village’s Success Factor model. The main problem is the SPD is the only Department that has to schedule extensive outside training and the system was not designed for that type of activity. The system was designed to enter courses and have employees review and enroll in them. Because police training is dependent on NEMRT and other outside training organizations, the training coordinator cannot enter the hundreds of classes that are available. Additionally, the system has no usable reports and training has been delayed until the IT team has developed training reports that will be used on a monthly basis. While the Department has been able to extract some business value from the new system, any new Schaumburg systems that impact police department operations should take into account SPD requirements. Support: Gaps in Mission Alignment and Response While the value of technology is almost always its ability to streamline core process operations and increase efficiencies and effectiveness, it has critical and specialized applications to law enforcement. Police work is a 24-hour operation with continuous calls for service. Our assessment identified a number of opportunities for the Department to improve its IT operations. y The Department’s IT demands are met primarily by Village IT Department staff. Many officers are not aware of this resource, however, and unsure about how to access it. Further efforts need to be invested in educating Department personnel on IT support services currently available. y More importantly, the Village IT Department’s staff has little experience in the application of IT best practices to law enforcement – although members of the Village IT department should be credited for participating in “ride-alongs” to further their understanding of SPD operations and how technology should be configured to support them. y Although there are frequent IT problems across multiple shifts, IT support is not currently a priority. Issues are not resolved quickly or effectively.16 Follow-up for issues arising in non-supported hours takes place the next day or on Monday if the original event occurs over a weekend.

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y Officers are frustrated with the lack of support. Patrol officers and command staff provided the assessment team with extensive documentation of issues such as connectivity blocks, data loss, printing errors and integration challenges. y Application issues are at the top of officers’ concerns. Training is needed, however, as officers still do not have comprehensive knowledge of the two software packages17 that the Department relies upon and how to utilize their features and functions. y Officers often report issues directly to the vendor, bypassing the SPD or Village IT support system.18 These actions circumvent the help desk process for capturing continuous and problematic issues and restrict the Department’s ability to monitor resolution outcomes. y The Department does not have a streamlined process to identify, track and resolve IT support issues – so key IT support metrics cannot be monitored and managed by Command personnel.

We also identified the need to ensure that IT support personnel effectively manage the vendors under contract to provide IT products and services to the Department, including adherence to prescribe performance metrics or service-level agreements and other contracted obligations. This is particularly important when multiple vendors are selected for similar products or services, or separate vendors are contracted to provide distinct services that require significant integration, interoperability and shared access to the network. Until these challenges are addressed by the Village and the Department, they will continue to contribute to unforeseen interruptions to operational priorities, lost productivity and greater inefficiencies across SPD activities. We suggest that the Department consider establishing a much more cohesive and collaborative IT support model that meets the operational needs of its current and future requirements.

Connectivity: The Lifelines of the Department’s Operations Radio and cellular communication between officers, dispatch and command personnel is paramount to officer and citizen safety. This includes the ability of officers to gain access in the field to critical information from platforms and databases such as the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), Law Enforcement Agency Data Systems (LEADS), Secretary of State websites and the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS). SPD officers, both senior and junior, indicated to the assessment team the location area where they have cellular data connectivity and where they do not. We suggest that the Department consider (1) installing cellular boosters to ensure the best locations for continuous connectivity, based on vehicle type and model; and (2) establishing ongoing meetings with the cellular provider to resolve and redress connectivity gaps. If connectivity continues to be a hindrance, the Department should research alternative connectivity solutions. We also suggest that the Department ensure close and ongoing collaboration from the solution provider to support application availability even when low or new cellular data connectivity exists. If vendors are unable to address the issues, actions should be undertaken to migrate from non-performing solutions to ones that will meet the Department's operational business requirements.

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Strategic and Tactical Planning: Getting the Direction Right During the assessment, the Hillard Heintze team reviewed the Village-wide 2013 IT Strategic Plan. It is single-year focused, tactical in nature and includes only two systems operationally used by SPD: CAD and RMS. The plan does not identify key elements – such as organizational goals and strategies and performance measures – nor does it discuss long-term approaches to sustaining Village IT services beyond 12 months. We also noted that the plan includes minimal input from the SPD. The Police Department involvement and multi-year planning are critical for successful multifaceted technology implementation. We recommend that the Village and Department create robust three-to-five year Strategic and Tactical IT plans. The former should outline the strategic roadmap over the full multi-year period. The latter should be documents that specify goals and tactics for the current year. Once the Village sets the goals each year – in accordance with factors such as constituent priorities and budgetary constraints – each Department, including the SPD, should develop their respective tactical plans on how they will contribute to the Village’s goals and how these contributions will be tracked and measured. We also suggest that the Village hold each Department, including the SPD, accountable for meeting planned objectives over the three-to-five year strategic timeline. Super Users: Tapping In-House Expertise One of the best ways for the Department to supplement IT training and support is to leverage super users within workgroups. During the ride-along phase of the assessment, members of the Hillard Heintze team encountered several officers they considered advanced users of the Department’s IT systems – or super users. Super users are individuals with a high level of knowledge, expertise and experience in IT-related tasks and capabilities and knowledge to apply these to meet their responsibilities and those of the Division or unit they support. Ensuring these individuals are mapped to various units, shifts and task forces can go a long way toward supplementing the help desk and support environment activities.

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RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that the SPD:

7.1

Create a matrix-based position that reports to both the Department and the Village Director of Technology who serves as a Deputy Director of Technology over Justice Programs, and hire an individual with a detailed understanding of police processes and technology and comprehensive understanding of the FBI CJIS Security Policy and industry best practices for Information Security.

7.2

Implement a training structure that incorporates the industry or vendor product expertise, supported by Department super users who can provide refresher or on-site training. All IT system training should be offered within a 2-week time period of when new systems are to be deployed.

7.3

Develop an IT response network of technicians and super users to address maintenance, training and support issues in the Department. Information sharing and data integrity are considered critical mass in law enforcement. The ability to obtain accurate and timely information is paramount to public service delivery and ofﬁcer safety.

7.4

Create a management oversight committee regarding vendor selection, utilization, monitoring and management. Vendor management is paramount to any information technology implementation.

7.5

Utilize Enterprise Architecture and IT Management to coordinate planned initiatives, projects and ongoing IT services (such as application support). Develop an IT Strategic Plan for the Department for a three- to ﬁve-year period, supported by an annual Tactical Plan which delineates the actions required to achieve the organization’s established IT goals. This is the foundation from which all IT activity should be measured.

REMEDIATION STEPS TAKEN SINCE APRIL 1, 2013 SPD TECHNOLOGY ISSUES The Village Director of Technology and the Department have been working with Hillard Heintze’s technology experts to develop an enterprise architecture roadmap to guide the Department’s investment in technology over the next ﬁve years and beyond.

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V. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS For your convenience, the following is a recap of the 55 actionable recommendations and operational priorities the Hillard Heintze team has compiled for the Village of Schaumburg and the Schaumburg Police Department.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION We recommend that: 1.1

1.2

The strategic planning process include developing an organizational structure that reduces compartmentalization, while increasing communication and accountability.

1.3

1.4

1.5

The Village consider adopting rules that allow the Chief or senior staff to participate in the process of hiring new officers.

1.6

Communication between the Department and community be enhanced through greater interaction and a focus on community crime prevention.

1.7

The SPD overhaul its approach to basic performance management, better utilizing information to understand problems in the Village, planning operations and deployments and making staff (especially managers) accountable for performance and results. The Department should enhance its research and analytical capabilities and institute processes to increase utilization of data in departmental decision-making. As an extension of this recommendation, we propose that the SPD consider using the DDACTS Program (DataDriven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety) and that it also use a more effective model of CRIMESTAT that has a tighter focus, is more data-driven and increases accountability.

1.8

The Village seek to remove the limitations imposed on the Chief and the SPD to recruit and promote high-quality officers.

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LEADERSHIP AND SUPERVISION We recommend that:

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2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

INTERNAL AFFAIRS We recommend that: 3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

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3.7

3.8

3.9

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GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS We recommend that: 4.1

The SPD create a strategic vision, deﬁne the mission and clearly deﬁne the goals of the Investigations Division.

4.2

The SPD capture better metrics on crimes and arrests to prioritize which types of investigations should be pursued and how internal Department resources should best be allocated.

4.3

The SPD initiate an examination of the Investigation Division case ﬁles to determine whether they conform to relevant policy and procedure for case clearance and closure.

4.4

The SPD create a formal case review process to ensure that investigations are reviewed for completeness, timeliness, adherence to policy and mission alignment.

4.5

The SPD initiate a records retention policy including requirements for document retention, purging, ﬁle structure and organization.

4.6

The SPD review its strategic and tactical approaches to prostitution and drug offenses. It is not clear that the Department needs to address these offenses through a dedicated undercover unit.

4.7

The SPD review its approach to supervision of the Forensic Services and assign a supervisor with the background, experience and education required to supervise the unit.

4.8

The SPD Investigations Division explore the potential tactical, strategic and administrative beneﬁts of fully integrating crime analysis into the initiation and management of investigative cases.

4.9

The SPD develop a rotation policy based on performance evaluation of all specialty positions.

The SPD perform a workﬂow analysis to determine the value of a full-time evidence and property custodian.

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SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS We recommend that: 5.1

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ÂŠ 2013 HILLARD HEINTZE LLC

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POLICIES AND PROCEDURES We recommend that:

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6.1

6.2

6.3

While technically not part of a multi-jurisdictional database, the requirement of 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 (the regulation that governs interjurisdictional and multi-jurisdictional criminal intelligence systems that are operated by or on behalf of state and local law enforcement agencies) be used as a best practice guide for development of policies and procedures on intelligence collection.

6.4

TECHNOLOGY We recommend that the Department: 7.1

7.2

7.3

Create a management oversight committee regarding vendor selection, utilization, monitoring and management. Vendor management is paramount to any information technology implementation.

7.5

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APPENDIX – COMPSTAT: ENHANCING THE SPD’S CRIME CONTROL STRATEGY As part of its roadmap to recovery and reform, the Schaumburg Police Department must adopt a more cohesive and comprehensive approach to controlling crime and disorder. SPD has the symbols of a well-designed program – beat integrity, a modest degree of geographic accountability, a crime analyst and a form of COMPSTAT. In our opinion, SPD could still do much more. The lack of effective analytics limits the efﬁciency of SPD operations. Better analytical research and planning would:19 y Help solve criminal investigations y Increase the ability to prosecute criminals y Support the Chief and the Department’s mission y Proactively inform law enforcement ofﬁcers of crime trends and develop threat, vulnerability and risk assessments y Train law enforcement and other intelligence personnel y Assist in the development of computerized databases to organize information and intelligence

y Foster meaningful relationships with other law enforcement personnel y Ensure compliance with local, state, tribal and federal laws and regulations y Provide support to fusion centers

National surveys of local police and sheriffs’ ofﬁces indicate the percentage of agencies that have crime analysts ranges from 57 to 75 percent (the percentage is greater when taking into consideration that any personnel – not just crime analysts – can conduct analysis)20 and the percentage is likely greater if one only considers large agencies.

Many agencies have recognized the value of a research and planning function.

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A Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) survey illustrates that only 11 percent of agencies do not conduct any crime analysis at all. It also highlights the most prevalent activities of analysts: Identifying crime patterns

67%

Assisting ﬁrst-line supervisors with crime analysis needs

62%

Working directly with detectives

61%

Assisting patrol ofﬁcers with crime analysis needs

59%

Completing Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) reports

57%

Conducting crime-mapping analysis

52%

The PERF survey further ﬁnds that the analysis itself is most often used for: Determining whether the agency is effective in reducing crime and disorder

59%

Determining short-term deployment (e.g., patrol scheduling)

52%

Determining future personnel needs

51%

Holding management and command staff accountable for crime reduction and prevention

47%

Many Department members reported that they receive too little information about activities in the areas they work and virtually no actionable direction derived from the analysis of intelligence information. A research and planning unit could serve as an analytical and communication arm for the agency. It would make the deployment of SPD resources more efficient by providing data-driven lessons about crime and traffic activities and would enhance accountability by illustrating the effectiveness of operations and strategies. A program that would be very beneficial to SPD is Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety (DDACTS). DDACTS is a law enforcement operational model supported by a partnership among the Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and two agencies of the Department of Justice – the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the National Institute of Justice. DDACTS integrates location-based crime and traffic crash data to establish effective and efficient methods for deploying law enforcement and other resources. DDACTS employs targeted traffic enforcement strategies using geo-mapping to identify areas, through temporal and spatial analysis, that have high incidences of crime and crashes. By saturating locations with high crime and crash incidences with highly visible traffic enforcement, DDACTS communities play a simultaneous dual role: fighting crime and reducing traffic crashes and traffic violations. Drawing on the deterrent value of highly visible traffic enforcement and the knowledge that crimes often involve the use of motor vehicles, the goal of DDACTS is to reduce the incidence of crime, crashes and traffic violations in communities across the country.21 We also suggest that SPD adopt and implement a crime control program modeled on COMPSTAT. This would be a very effective method to improve accountability, communication and agency performance.

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COMPSTAT is a relatively new police management strategy that originated in the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in the early 1990s. The effort began as a way to deal with the crime data that was collected on a daily basis at each precinct as the Department’s main information system provided crime data that was nearly one year old. The Department began to convene weekly meetings to discuss the timely crime data. These discussions evolved into an intense and often heated effort to increase accountability for crime control. In each COMPSTAT session, the Department focused on a particular geographic command, typically one of New York City's ﬁve boroughs. The senior staff from the command and the precinct commanders from the borough of interest focused on crime trends, major cases and their intervention strategies. The presenters would be questioned by a group of senior executives of the NYPD. While this dialogue was underway, PowerPoint images of relevant crime and performance data were displayed prominently behind the presenter.

The COMPSTAT process had four critical components:22 1. Accurate and timely intelligence 2. Effective tactics 3. Rapid deployment of personnel and resources 4. Relentless follow-up and assessment

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There were a number of aspects of the NYPD program that were critical to its success including, but not limited to, the following: y Department executives had access to extensive data gathered and prepared by the COMPSTAT unit. Their briefing sometimes included data about incidents that had occurred the evening before the meeting. y COMPSTAT sessions were open to members of the Department of all ranks and could prove to be extremely embarrassing for commanders who were ill prepared. This kind of public scrutiny was very unusual in policing. It was rare to criticize a senior police official in front of his or her subordinates. y NYPD took action when commanders were unsuccessful. Underperforming commanders were replaced. This created opportunities for women and members of minority groups to assume leadership positions. y Commanders who were successful in reducing crime were often rewarded with increased resources and assets. This tended to shift the Department’s focus from programs that did not work to those that did. y COMPSTAT forced units to communicate with each other. For example, if a precinct detective commander failed to share information with the precinct’s narcotics commander, it would reflect badly on the precinct commander and the situation would generally be rectified very quickly. y COMPSTAT emphasized the notion that it was the Department’s responsibility to control crime and improve the quality of life in New York City.

The COMPSTAT process received enormous attention in the police community. Hundreds of departments have adopted COMPSTATstyle programs; among the more notable are Seattle, Minneapolis, Los Angeles and Baltimore, in addition to many small and medium communities.23 Many agencies have learned that it is important to shape and mold the COMPSTAT process to ﬁt its organizational norms – COMPSTAT worked in New York and can work in other places if properly adapted. Some individuals have criticized COMPSTAT, arguing that COMPSTAT is essentially a “top-down” approach to management and, as a result, is inconsistent with community policing, which focuses on individual ofﬁcer empowerment. One study notes there are strong linkages between crime control, community policing and COMPSTAT.24 Among those commonalities are: y Community Interface: COMPSTAT can facilitate a two-way exchange of information between the police and the community by incorporating various kinds of community data, in addition to crime and other computerized police data, in the police COMPSTAT meetings. Other data might include community satisfaction or quality of life surveys. Non-sensitive COMPSTAT information could be provided to the community via the police department website. y Environmental Scanning: This information domain emphasizes the need to incorporate a wide array of data, including social and community data, into the police decision-making process. The COMPSTAT process, in theory, provides a forum for display and discussion of these other data sets so they could be incorporated into the process in much the same manner as police crime data.

y Inter-organizational Linkages: Community policing requires that the police work closely with other governmental agencies, non-profit organizations and the private sector to address crime and disorder problems. The COMPSTAT process can fulfill this requirement either by including other agency data in the COMPSTAT data analyses (e.g., social service agency data that depict possible contributing factors to crime problems) or by including representatives from these other organizations in the meetings. y Workgroup Facilitation: COMPSTAT meets the workgroup facilitation requirement by enabling key stakeholders within a geographic area, both within and outside the police department, to participate in COMPSTAT meetings. y Problem Orientation: The problem orientation requirement stresses the need to focus on problems rather than incidents. COMPSTAT meetings focus on community problems and examine their nature and extent via crime and other trends. In addition, while COMPSTAT processes generally display incident-level crime data, they could also potentially display other data that show potential contributing factors to community problems. y Area Accountability: COMPSTAT is perhaps best aligned with the area accountability requirement that commanders be responsible for specific geographic areas and, therefore, have access to required information about their assigned geographic area. COMPSTAT crime maps are inherently area specific and other analyses, presented as either tabular data or graphs, can be presented in an areaspecific manner as well.

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The Department is already using COMPSTAT– style procedures to support its crime control program. In order to expand the program and enhance its contribution to the Department’s efforts, there are several critical issues to examine. In order to build upon the program, it is necessary to examine the attributes of an effective COMPSTAT program. Those elements include: (1) mission clarification; (2) internal accountability; (3) geographic organization of operational demand; (4) organizational flexibility; (5) data-driven identification of problems and assessment of the Department’s problem-solving efforts; and (6) innovative problem-solving tactics.25

Internal Accountability

Mission Clariﬁcation

Given these constraints, SPD must be adaptive in its approach to internal accountability. It is essential that when commanders make COMPSTAT presentations, they must be subject to close scrutiny. They must be able to demonstrate they are knowledgeable about their commands and that they have designed and implemented effective strategies. COMPSTAT cannot be a meeting where colleagues discuss crime and disorder as if it were a discussion about what color to paint the squad cars. It must be tough and rigorous and focused on the mission. This can be done without humiliation and ridicule. In fact, asking commanders tough questions in front of their peers may be enough to ensure accountability. One observer suggested that COMPSTAT should focus on solutions not explanations.

The first element of a successful COMPSTAT program is mission clarification. In this context, it is preferable to set a specific measureable objective. For example, the NYPD established an initial goal of reducing crime by 10 percent. Establishing a measureable goal lets everyone in the Department know the purpose of the program. SPD might want to consider an alternative approach. SPD could adopt a goal of reducing crime by five percent or to make Schaumburg the safest village in Illinois. This approach could generate significant momentum for the program both in the community and in the Department.

The NYPD model was effective, in part, because it was relatively easy to replace commanders whose performance was inadequate and the Department was able to secure major concessions from its employee groups, thus ensuring the flexibility in resource deployment that commanders required. In many other communities, efforts to implement COMPSTAT were constrained because there was a relatively small pool of personnel capable or willing to assume senior command positions and union and civil service requirements made it extremely difficult to remove officers for poor performance.

The other accountability issue is the manner in which COMPSTAT influences accountability at the street level. A real danger is that COMPSTAT includes a small group of specialists. It is important that police officers, particularly field officers, attend and contribute to the sessions.

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Geographic Organization One of the key elements of COMPSTAT is that commanders are held strictly accountable for performance and are given authority over the units and personnel required to accomplish their objectives. This is particularly difficult to do in a department that is temporally organized. SPD has been operating with a hybrid system of accountability. In addition to their temporal responsibilities, Lieutenants also have responsibility for a set of beats. Unfortunately, the commanders of these “virtual districts” have little authority over the very personnel that are implementing the strategies. Organizational Flexibility The very best organizations are characterized by their ability to adapt and change in the face of changing circumstances. A firmly entrenched bureaucracy and a strong reliance on rules and regulations, by contrast, characterize most police organizations. Many law enforcement agencies are further constrained by collective bargaining agreements that significantly inhibit the department’s capacity to respond to emerging crime patterns. Geographic organization will help SPD eliminate some of the bureaucratic impediments to communication. It will also be important to continue to work with employee organizations to ensure that the Department regains some of the management rights and prerogatives that may have been lost in prior negotiations. Data-Driven Problem Identification and Assessment It is not unusual for a law enforcement agency to begin the process of implementing COMPSTAT only to find out that their data systems will not support such an effort. This occurred in San Francisco.26 Common problems include the following: y Data is not timely. In some agencies, crime and accident data is not available until the case report is coded and entered into a record system, which can take weeks or months. y There are errors in the data that have gone largely unnoticed. For example, many CAD systems do not disaggregate citizen-generated calls for service from officer-initiated activity. y Data systems, in many cases, were designed for a specific purpose and that design might not support COMPSTAT. For example, traffic accident reports have very specific rules about how to classify the cause of accidents. In accidents with a complex set of contributing factors, the investigating officer must choose a finite category. As a result, an examination at the aggregate level may be misleading. Fortunately, the Department has invested significant resources in information technology and crime analysis and is well positioned to support the data requirements of COMPSTAT.

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Innovative Problem-Solving Techniques One of the more ironic elements of the COMPSTAT program is that even when you introduce reliable, timely and useful information, police departments often craft their response based on traditional methods. For example, in most departments, the most common approach to an identified problem is to “saturate the area” or “increase patrol.” One of the goals of COMPSTAT will be to incorporate all operational units. The following are some of the ways to do this: y The sessions should include presentations from officers who have engaged in successful problemsolving efforts. This serves to publicly acknowledge their efforts and is an effective mechanism for others in the organization to learn about these strategies. y COMPSTAT participants should be encouraged to discuss, in some detail, how they will address problems. “Assigning more patrol” should not be an option. y COMPSTAT must include follow-up. It is critical that strategies are critiqued and, when indicated, modified. COMPSTAT managers get good at quick responses to questions. It is incumbent that the senior staff members not permit them to quickly dismiss these strategy discussions.

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ENDNOTES 1

Sherman, Lawrence W. (1974) “The Sociology and the Social Reform of the American Police: 1950-73." Journal of Police Science and Administration.

Westley, William. (1970) “Violence and the police: a sociological study of law, custom, and morality.” MIT Press.

COPS: Community Oriented Policing Services. Retrieved from http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=36

Index offenses are reported in two categories: violent crimes and property crimes. Violent crimes include aggravated assault, forcible rape, murder, and robbery. Property crimes include arson, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. Together these are called Index Crimes because the crimes are considered quite serious, tend to be reported more reliably than others, and are reported directly to the police. (FBI, n.d. Web. "Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook." (2004) FBI/UCR.)

It is important to note that in some cases an arrest in one year may be for an offense that occurred in another year, and, that while offenses reﬂect the number of crimes reported, arrests describe persons. Thus a person could be arrested for burglary, but could have committed more than one offense accounted for in the data.

This number differs from what was reported to UCR due to many factors such as multi-jurisdictional investigations, 2011 investigations identiﬁed in 2012, multiple defendants, etc.

Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook - Examples of exceptional clearances include, but are not limited to, the death of the offender (e.g., suicide or justiﬁably killed by police or citizen); the victim’s refusal to cooperate with the prosecution after the offender has been identiﬁed; or the denial of extradition because the offender committed a crime in another jurisdiction and is being prosecuted for that offense.

Administrative Closures include: failure to locate complainant, complainant refuses to cooperate, no statutory jurisdiction, case transferred to another jurisdiction, among others.

The Schaumburg Ofﬁce of Professional Standards is the function of Village government reporting to the Assistant Village Manager who is responsible for overseeing and conducting investigations into allegations of misconduct by Village employees.

10 Illinois law, 50 ILCS 725/3.8b requires that anyone filing a formal complaint against a sworn police officer must have a complaint supported by a sworn affidavit. 11

Deconﬂiction is the act of searching available data to determine if multiple law enforcement agencies are investigating the same target individual, organization, communications device, or other uniquely identiﬁable entity and, if so, of initiating coordination amongst the interested parties to prevent duplicative work and/ or possible blue on blue situations (i.e., personnel from two or more law enforcement agencies unwittingly encountering each other during a law enforcement operation, such as an undercover situation). “Combatting Illicit Drugs.” (2011, July) GAO Report to Congress. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11763.pdf

12 One of the few homicides in Schaumburg over the last few years was related to prostitution. In February 2010, a prostitute and her pimp in a Schaumburg hotel room were joined by another prostitute. The second prostitute’s pimp entered the room, announced a holdup and held the original two at gunpoint. The first pimp quickly retrieved his own pistol and, after trading fire with him, killed him. 13 This intelligence included information related to areas such as suspicious persons, possible drug activity, gambling at Schaumburg establishments, new Schaumburg residents with violent histories, officer safety alerts, anonymous letters from Schaumburg citizens, narcotics information received through patrol reports, parolees released and living in Schaumburg, motorcycle gang or street gang activity, GPS inmate monitoring, phone scams targeting the elderly, wanted subjects, massage parlors and prostitution and financial crimes.

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14 A Metropolitan Enforcement Group (MEG) is a Multi-Jurisdictional Law Enforcement Task Force, created by statute that has a specific concentration on in illegal drugs, gangs and weapons offenses in a specific geography. 15 The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), Inc. was formed in 1970 as a result of the desire of four major law enforcement membership associations – IACP, NOBLE, NSA and PERF – to have a national credentialing agency for law enforcement. The purpose of CALEA's Accreditation Programs is to improve the delivery of public safety services, primarily by (1) maintaining a body of standards, developed by public safety practitioners, covering a wide range of up-to-date public safety initiatives; (2) establishing and administering an accreditation process; and (3) recognizing professional excellence. 16 On-site IT support for the day shift is only available on weekdays between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. On-site IT support for the 2nd shift is available between 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., but only on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. 17 Patrol officers principally rely on two software packages. IDNetworks provides the modules of the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD), Mobile Query (NCIC, LEADS, and SOS) and Records Management Solution (RMS)/Case Management System (CMS). IYETEK provides the Crash Reporting System. 18 Some vendors only respond back to their Department contact, instead of the officer requiring assistance. This extends the time required to resolve the issue – or results in no resolution or communication back to the requesting officer. It also contributes to high frustration levels among SPD staff and limited or poor trust and use of the Department’s various IT systems. 19 Retrieved from http://www.iaca.net/Articles/analysts_9_steps.pdf 20 Taylor, B. and Boba, R. “Integrating Crime Analysis into Patrol Work: A COPS Office Grant.” 2009 Crime Mapping Research Conference, PERF. Retrieved from http://www.iaca.net/Articles/CAinAmerica.pdf 21 “Data-Driven Approach to Crime and Traffic Safety (DDACTS). National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Retrieved from http://www.nhtsa.gov/Driving+Safety/Enforcement+&+Justice+Services/ Data-Driven+Approaches+to+Crime+and+Traffic+Safety+(DDACTS) 22 Silverman, Eli. (1999) “NYPD Battles Crime: Innovative Strategies in Policing.” Northeastern University Press. 23 Weisburd, David; Mastrofski, Stephen; Greenspan, Rosann; and Willis, James J. (2004) “The Growth of Compstat in American Policing.” Police Foundation. 24 Abt Associates Inc. (2003) “Police Department Information Systems Technology Enhancement Project (ISTEP): Phase II Case Studies.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 25 Willis, James; Mastrofski, Stephen; Weisburd, David; and Greenspan, Rosann. (2003) “Compstat and Organizational Change in the Lowell Police Department: Challenges and Opportunities.” 26 Ishimaru, Heather. “Crime Tracking Program Makes SF Debut.” ABC7. Retrieved from http://abclocal. go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/san_francisco&id=7076856

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