Holland & Knight – China Practice Newsletter: November - December 2020 by Holland & Knight

期刊

NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 2020 2020 年 11、12 月刊

Table of Contents CHINA PRACTICE NEWSLETTER ...........................................................................................................3 TO SUPPLY OR NOT SUPPLY GOODS: CREDIT RISK AND REMEDIES IN UNCERTAIN TIMES.........4 供货与否：不确定时期的信用风险与对策...................................................................................................8 PRE-IMMIGRATION TAX PLANNING IS CRITICAL FOR FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS ...............................11 对外国个人而言移民前的税务规划至关重要 .............................................................................................14 WHEN CONSIDERING BANKRUPTCY, DON'T FORGET ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS.17 当考虑破产时，别忘了环境法的责任........................................................................................................24 NEW CALIFORNIA LAW EXCLUDES SOME INDUSTRIES FROM "ABC" TEST FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS .....................................................................................................................................31 加州新法律将一些行业排除在认定独立承包商资格的“ABC”测试之外...................................................35 ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ...................................................................................................................38 有关本期刊 ..............................................................................................................................................38 ABOUT THE AUTHOR ............................................................................................................................38 关于本期作者 ...........................................................................................................................................38

China Practice Newsletter Holland & Knight is a U.S.-based global law firm committed to provide high-quality legal services to our clients. We provide legal assistance to Chinese investors and companies doing business or making investments in the United States and Latin America. We also advise and assist multinational corporations and financial institutions, trade associations, private investors and other clients in their China-related activities. With more than 1,400 professionals in 27 offices, our lawyers and professionals are experienced in all of the interdisciplinary areas necessary to guide clients through the opportunities and challenges that arise throughout the business or investment life cycles. We assist Chinese clients and multinational clients in their China-related activities in areas such as international business, mergers and acquisitions, technology, healthcare, real estate, environmental law, private equity, venture capital, financial services, taxation, intellectual property, private wealth services, data privacy and cybersecurity, labor and employment, ESOPs, regulatory and government affairs, and dispute resolutions. We invite you to read our China Practice Newsletter, in which our authors discuss pertinent Sino-American topics. We also welcome you to discuss your thoughts on this issue with our authors listed within the document.

霍兰德奈特律师事务所是一家位于美国的全球性法律事务所，我们致力于向客户提供高质量的法律服务。我们向在美国及拉丁美洲进行商业活动或投资的中国投资人及公司提供他们所需的各类法律协助。我们也向跨国公司、金融机构、贸易机构、投资人及其他客户提供他们于其与中国相关活动中所需的咨询和协助。我们在 27 个办公室的 1400 多名对各领域有经验的律师及专业人员能够协助客户处理他们在经营或投资过程中所遇到的各种机会及挑战。我们向中国客户及从事与中国有关活动的跨国客户提供法律协助的领域包括国际商业、企业并购、科技法律、医疗法律、房地产、环保法律、私募基金、创投基金、金融法律服务、税务、知识产权、私人财富管理法律服务、信息隐私及网络安全、劳动及雇佣法律、员工持股计划、法令遵循及政府法规、及争议解决。我们邀请您阅读刊载我们各作者就与中美有关的各议题所作论述的 China Practice 期刊。我们也欢迎您向本期刊的各作者提供您对各相关议题的看法。

To Supply or Not Supply Goods: Credit Risk and Remedies in Uncertain Times By Lynne B. Xerras and John J. Monaghan In ordinary times, a supplier of goods looks to customer-specific underwriting considerations to weigh the benefit of extending credit to a new or existing customer against the risk that the customer will fail to pay for the goods or services supplied. These are not ordinary times. The COVID-19 pandemic that has yet to release its grip on nations around the globe has shifted the underwriting analysis from customer-specific financial review to global health and macroeconomic analyses that are outside of the comfort zone of most company credit managers. Those credit managers have seen their customers in long-thriving industries (e.g., travel, hospitality, entertainment) face a sharp and sudden loss of revenue. Major economic drivers (e.g., automotive and retail) that depend on what the pre-pandemic world referred to as the global economy are dealing with supply-chain disruptions. Suppliers must adapt, real-time, to ensure that credit decisions made today do not result in worthless receivables potentially discharged in bankruptcy tomorrow. That analysis at least starts with evaluating current business relationships and terms to determine an appropriate strategy to reduce risk of loss and litigation, while also considering whether to support the customer through these challenging times. Some important considerations are as follows:

AM I OBLIGATED TO SHIP? A supplier selling goods on credit should first understand whether and under what circumstances it is required to deliver product to a customer before withholding that product out of concern for nonpayment. This inquiry largely depends on whether the supplier and customer are parties to a contract governing their relationship in the long-term, the terms of that contract and a calculation of whether the likely assessment of damages for a breach exceed the financial risk of performance. In certain industries, such as automotive, Tier One manufacturers insist on long-term requirements contracts that require the supplier to sell product in quantities ordered by the customer for the duration of a specific program. These contracts, in the simplest sense, bind the supplier to the relationship for the defined term and are typically drafted to protect the buyer in the event of seller insolvency, but not vice versa. A requirements buyer will contract for the ability to recover consequential damages flowing from the failure of a supplier to meet the delineated requirements of the buyer, amounts that could include not only the cost of replacement product but also lost revenue. Withholding shipments under this type of arrangement, therefore, subjects the supplier to financial risk well beyond the increased costs that the buyer incurs in obtaining substitute performance. Any writings that contain the terms governing the parties' relationship should be reviewed at the time the supplier is considering whether (or whether not) to make delivery of product on credit to assess the ramifications of a refusal to ship. Particular attention to the purchaser's obligations is warranted to determine whether any material breaches by the purchaser justifying contract termination are present. Outside of a requirements contract, the ability to refuse to ship or to exit the relationship out of concern for the customer's solvency without threat of litigation may be more defined in the agreement or subject to applicable state law concepts, discussed below.

WHAT ARE MY UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REMEDIES – PRIOR TO DEFAULT? To the extent that the supplier is a seller of "goods,"1 Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides certain remedies to suppliers that are concerned with ability of a customer to pay for a sale on credit. For instance, Article 2-609 provides that if a seller has "reasonable grounds for insecurity with respect to the performance" of buyer, the seller may issue a writing demanding "adequate assurance of due performance." Until that assurance is received, which could include a certified financial statement demonstrating solvency or a letter of credit, the supplier may suspend performance. This is a powerful right enabling a seller of goods to reevaluate the credit line to be extended to a buyer. To the extent that a seller discovers a buyer to be "insolvent" after shipment, the supplier has the right under Article 2-702 to stop goods in transit, or if the goods have been delivered, to seek to "reclaim" the goods within 10 days of delivery with the latter rights subject to the rights of a good-faith purchaser. The ability to reclaim goods that are in possession of the customer, though, is often precluded when the customer has granted a lien on its inventory to a pre-existing lender.

WHAT ARE MY REMEDIES AFTER PAYMENT DEFAULT AND TERMINATION? Once a sale under a supply or requirements contract has occurred and the buyer has failed to make payment within the required invoice or contract terms, the "breach" by the buyer provides the seller with a variety of contractual or state law remedies. In this instance, the supplier typically holds the right to terminate the parties' business relationship in its entirety to the extent that the breach is material and is not "cured" within a reasonable time or within the cure period delineated by agreement. Termination, like refusal to ship, also comes with consequences so again, suppliers should first determine that any termination notice complies with the contract and applicable state law. A supplier may be required to resort to litigation to collect the debt and otherwise exercise its remedies as creditor, perhaps racing to the courthouse sooner rather than later to beat other suppliers in recovery from the customer's limited resources. To the extent that the supplier desires to be relieved of the obligation to sell to a particular customer teetering on the brink of insolvency, speed is also at a premium to ensure that contract termination is effective prior to the date the customer files a petition for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief. At that point, the supplier's state law rights become subject to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and contract termination and collection efforts come to a screeching halt.

WHAT ARE MY RIGHTS IF A CUSTOMER FILES A BANKRUPTCY CASE? Once a company (referred to as the "debtor" or "debtor-in-possession") files a bankruptcy case, several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code become effective that are of consequence to a creditor of, or supplier to, the debtor. First, the "automatic stay" arises, which prevents a supplier from taking any action – including issuing invoices for shipments made during the pre-bankruptcy period – to collect a debt that arose prior to the filing or "petition" date. Prepetition litigation is subject to the automatic stay and is essentially paused, with any claims for amounts due dealt with in the Bankruptcy Court. The automatic stay protects the broadly defined "property of the estate" of the debtor from collection activity. Among the debtor's property are its prepetition contracts, rendering any effort (with certain limited exceptions) by a supplier to terminate a contract without court permission a violation of the automatic stay that can expose the supplier to sanctions. A difficult corollary to these statutory concepts is that a supplier to a prepetition

contract must generally continue to perform its obligations during the bankruptcy case while the debtor is relieved from its own obligations. While the supplier has remedies in the event it believes that it will be subject to substantial risk of loss should it comply with its own obligations, those remedies can only be exercised through procedures invoked in the Bankruptcy Court. Contracts that were properly terminated before the debtor filed its bankruptcy case are not "property of the estate" within the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, demonstrating the benefits of terminating at the first available pre-bankruptcy opportunity following a customer's breach if a supplier desires to exit the present arrangement. Similarly, those contracts that expire by their terms after the petition date are also excluded from property of the estate once they expire. A supplier that is not under contract with a debtor is not obligated to continue accepting purchase orders after a bankruptcy case is filed. The supplier's effort to collect a receivable owed under that terminated contract, though, is stayed. As a general proposition, a supplier that sold to a debtor on credit without security is a "general unsecured creditor," paid to the extent that secured claims and unsecured claims with a higher statutorily established "priority" are satisfied in full. In a Chapter 11, general unsecured claims are not paid until confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Under a plan, the distribution to general unsecured claimants must be no less than what the claimants would receive if the debtor's assets were liquidated in Chapter 7. Particularly when the debtor's primary asset is "goodwill" or unfinished goods, this is not a high benchmark. All is not lost, however. The highest priority of payment in a business bankruptcy is slated for "administrative claims allowed under section 503(b)" of the Bankruptcy Code. Under Section 503(b), administrative claims expressly include "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate," such as the cost of shipments delivered to the debtor that provided a benefit to the bankruptcy estate. In a successful Chapter 11 case, the holder of an administrative claim is almost certain to obtain full payment, since it is a requisite to plan confirmation that the debtor pay administrative claims in full.2 This right to payment provides the supplier to a debtor with a degree of reassurance that the risk of nonpayment during the pendency of a Chapter 11 case is low, particularly if the debtor has demonstrated that it has a committed funding source during that case. In addition, sellers of "goods" receive an administrative claim under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code for the "value of any goods [sold to a debtor in the ordinary course of business and] received by the debtor within 20 days before commencement of the case." As a result, a subset of pre-bankruptcy claims that would otherwise have been classified as general unsecured claims at the bottom of the distribution waterfall are treated as first priority administrative claims which must be paid upon confirmation of a plan. A Section 503(b)(9) claim, though, must be properly and timely asserted in order to be effective, or the underlying claim will be relegated to the pool for general unsecured claims. In the event that that the debtor defaults on its payment obligations during the post-petition period, the supplier is not without remedies. A supplier (or service provider) may request that the Bankruptcy Court provide it "adequate protection" of its accruing post-petition claim in some form, or even for leave to terminate the contract on account of the debtor's unwillingness or inability to pay for the goods (or services) it expects the supplier to deliver. To the extent that the debtor desires to continue its relationship with a supplier under a contract still executory at the time of the bankruptcy filing, it must formally "assume" that contract under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code prior to the conclusion of its Chapter 11 case, an act that is conditioned on curing both pre and post-petition arrears. A supplier selling without a contract may also be among the select group that the debtor, with court approval, identifies as "critical vendors," to be paid for prepetition deliveries in exchange for an undertaking to continue shipping during the course of the Chapter 11 case.

The outcome of any of these efforts will depend, in large part, on the nature of the business relationship, the terms of any contracts in place and the financial condition of the respective debtor. Given that many of these variables are under the control of the supplier in the present, the stronger the protections built in and the leverage held by the supplier before the bankruptcy case is commenced, the better the ultimate outcome.

____________________ Notes 1

Defined in U.C.C. Â§ 2-105 as "all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action. 'Goods' also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be severed from realty." 2

To the extent that the debtor/customer does not confirm a plan or converts its case to Chapter 7, though, payment will depend on the amount of unsecured funds available and full payment is less likely.

供货与否：不确定时期的信用风险与对策原文作者：Lynne B. Xerras 及 John J. Monaghan

一般情况下，货物供应商会根据客户的具体经济承担能力，权衡向新客户或现有客户提供信用的好处与客户无法支付所提供的货物或服务时的风险。然而现在不是一般的时候。这场 COVID-19 的疫情可能造成全球在是否提供信用的分析方式从对特定客户的财务审查改变为对全球健康和宏观经济的分析，而这些分析超出了大多数公司信用部门经理的熟悉范围。这些信用部门经理已经看到他们长期繁荣的行业的客户（如旅游、酒店、娱乐）面临着突然而急剧的收入损失。依赖于大流行前所称的全球经济的主要的经济驱动产业（如汽车和零售业）现正面对供应链受到扰乱的问题。供应商必须做实时调整以确保今天做出的信用决策不会导致明天发生破产事件时应收账款可能被免除而变成毫无价值的情形。该分析至少应从评估当前的业务关系和条款开始，以确定适当的策略来降低损失和诉讼的风险，同时考虑是否支持客户度过这些充满挑战的时期。一些重要的考虑因素如下：

我有义务发货吗？提供信用额度进行货物销售的供应商应在决定是否因未能付款的顾虑而扣留货物的交付前首先应了解是否以及在何种情况下需要将产品交付给客户。这项调查主要取决于供应商和客户是否是规范双方长期关系的合同的当事方、该合同的条款以及评估违约赔偿金额是否可能超过履约的财务风险的计算。在例如汽车的某些行业，一级制造商坚持依照要求供应商在特定项目期间按客户订购的数量来销售产品的长期供应合同。从最简单的意义上讲，这些合同在规定的期限内将供应商绑定到该关系，且通常合约的规定于卖方破产时对买方提供保护，但在买方破产时却非如此。在长期供应合同中，买方将约定其在供应商未能根据所约定的买方要求供货时其可请求衍生性损害赔偿的权利，而该金额不仅包括替代产品的成本，还包括收入损失。因此，在这种安排下扣留出货将使供应商面临的财务风险远远超过买方为获得替代履行而增加的成本。当供应商考虑是否以提供信用额度的方式交付产品时，应审查包含规范双方关系条款的任何书面文件以评估拒绝发货的后果。尤其应特别注意买方的义务，以确定买方是否存在任何支持解除合同的实质性违约行为。除长期供应合同外，是否可在免受诉讼威胁的情况下基于对客户偿付能力的考虑而拒绝发货或退出关系可能在合同中有更详尽的规定，或如下文所述，需遵循州的法律规定概念。

违约前，我依统一商业法典的规定有什么救济？如果供应商是“货物”1 的卖方，则《统一商法典》第 2 条对涉及客户就信用买卖的付款能力的供应商提供了某些救济方式。例如，第 2-609 条规定，如果卖方对买方的履约有“合理的不安理由”，卖方可以发出书面要求“ 对按时履行的充分保证”。在收到这种保证（其中可能包括证明偿付能力的经认证的财务报表或信用证）前，供应商可暂停履约。这是一项强有力的权利，使货物的卖方能够重新评估向买方提供的信贷额度。 Copyright © 2020 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

如果卖方发现买方在装运后“资不抵债”，根据第 2-702 条，卖方有权停止运输中的货物，或如果货物已经交付，则有权在交货后 10 天内寻求“取回”货物，后者的权利受善意买方的权利约束。然而，当客户将其库存品的留置权授予先前存在的贷款人时，收回客户所拥有的货物的能力通常被排除掉。

付款违约和终止后我有什么救济方式？一旦发生了供应合同或长期供应合同下的销售，而买方未能在规定的发票或合同规定的期间内付款，买方的“违约”造成卖方有各种合同或州法律的救济。在这种情况下，只要违约是重大的，并且在合理时间内或合同规定的补救期内没有“补救”，供应商通常有权终止双方的全部业务关系。与拒绝发货一样，解除合同也会造成相关后果，因此，供应商应首先确定任何解除通知是否符合合同和适用的州法律的规定。供应商可能会被要求诉诸诉讼以取回债务，并以债权人的身份行使其救济措施、可能会尽快赶往法院，以在客户有限的资源中优先于其他供应商而获得偿还。如果供应商希望免除向濒临破产边缘的特定客户出售产品的义务，则在速度方面还应确保能在客户提出第 7 章或第 11 章破产救济申请之前让合同解除生效。当买方提出破产申请时，供应商的州法律权利将受美国破产法的限制和约束，而解除合同的能力和催收的努力将被急速停止。

如果客户申请破产，我有什么权利？一旦一家公司（称为“债务人”或“占有债务人”）提起破产案，《破产法》的若干条款将对债务人的债权人或供应商产生效力。首先，“自动中止”的出现，阻止了供应商采取任何行动——包括为破产前时期的货物开具发票——来收取在申请日或“申请”日之前产生的债务。申请前提出的诉讼受自动中止的约束，基本上是暂停的，任何到期金额的索赔都由破产法院处理。自动中止保护债务人广义的“破产财产”不受催收活动的影响。债务人的财产包括其破产申请前的合同，使得供应商未经法院许可所做解除合同的任何努力（某些有限的例外情况除外）都将违反了自动中止，从而使供应商受到处罚。这些法定概念所造成的一个困难结果是破产申请前的合同的供应商通常必须继续履行其义务，然而债务人却被免除了自己的义务。如果供应商认为若供应商履行自己的义务，它将面临巨大的损失风险，则有救济方法，但那些救济方法只能通过破产法院援引的程序行使。在债务人申请破产前被适当解除的合同不属于破产法院管辖范围内的“破产财产”，这表明，如果供应商希望退出现有安排，在客户违约后的第一个破产前机会解除合同的好处。同样，那些在申请日期之后到期的合同，一旦到期，也不属于破产财产，而未与债务人具有合同的供应商在破产案提交后没有义务继续接受采购订单。不过供应商收回已解除的合同项下应收账款的努力仍将被暂停。一般说来，向债务人提供信用额度而无担保的供应商是一个“一般无担保债权人”，只有在担保债权和具有更高法定“优先权”的无担保债权得到全额清偿，才可以得到偿付。在破产法第 11 章中，一般无担保债权在重整计划得到确认之前不予偿付。根据重整计划，对一般无担保债权人的分配不得低于如果债务人的资产依破产法第 7 章进行清算时其应得到偿付金额。但这不是一个高的基准，尤其是是当债务人的主要资产是“商誉”或未完工产品时。

然而并非一切都失去了。企业破产的最高优先受偿权是《破产法》“第 503（b）条允许的行政债权”。根据第 503（b）条，行政债权明确包括“保全破产财产的实际必要成本和开支”，例如为破产财产提供利益而向债务人交付的货物费用。在一个成功的第 11 章破产申请案件中，行政债权的持有人几乎都可收到完全清偿，因为债务人完全清偿行政债权是重整计划获得确认的必要条件。2 这一受到清偿的权利让债务人的供应商在第 11 章破产申请时能确保不受清偿的风险是低的，特别是如果债务人在该案中证明其有承诺的资金来源。此外，“货物”的卖方根据《破产法》第 503（b）（9）条获有一项等同于“在正常经营过程中出售给债务人，以及债务人在案件开始前 20 天内收到的任何货物的价值”的行政债权。因此原将被归类为分配次序底部的一般无担保债权将可能成为第一优先的行政债权而必须在确认计划时予以支付。然而第 503（b）（9）节中的债权必须得到适当和及时的主张才能生效，否则该主张的债权将被归入一般无担保债权池。如果债务人在申请后的期限内不履行其付款义务，供应商并非没有救济方法。供应商（或服务提供商）可要求破产法院以某种形式为其累积的申请后债权提供“充分的保护”，甚至可以请求因债务人不愿意或无力支付其希望供应商交付的货物（或服务）而解除合同的许可。如果债务人希望根据破产申请时仍在执行的合同继续与供应商的关系，则债务人必须在其第 11 章案件完结之前，根据《破产法》第 365 条正式“承受”该合同，而其是一种以补足申请前和申请后积欠款项为条件的行为。无销售合同的供应商也可能成为经法院批准后由债务人确定为“ 关键供应商”的特定人选之一，而在第 11 章案件期间，由债务人为破产申请前的交货付款，以换取继续发货的承诺。这些努力的结果在很大程度上取决于业务关系的性质、现有合同的条款以及个别债务人的财务状况。鉴于目前这些变数中有许多是在供应商的控制之下，在破产案开始前，供应商所建立的保护措施和所掌握的砝码越强，最终结果应将越好。

____________________ 附注 1

在《统一商法典》第 2-105 条中，定义为“除支付价款的货币、投资证券（第 8 条）和动产以外，在确定出售合同时可移

动的所有物品（包括特别制造的货物）。” “货物”还包括未出生的动物幼崽、正在生长的农作物以及其他与不动产分离的货物一节所述的附着在不动产上的物品。” 2

但是，如果债务人/客户不确认计划或将其情况转为第 7 章，则付款将取决于可用的无担保资金的数额，全额付款的可能性较小。

Pre-Immigration Tax Planning is Critical for Foreign Individuals By Seth J. Entin The United States is an attractive country for high-net-worth foreign individuals looking to relocate. While the need for timely pre-immigration tax planning may not always be readily apparent to a high-net-worth foreign individual who is considering moving to the United States, the failure to plan until it is too late may have extremely costly consequences. Take, for example, the case of Ms. A, who lives in China and is not a U.S. citizen or resident. She has significant wealth of her own. She founded and owns stock in Chinese companies that are now extremely valuable. She also owns a portfolio of stocks that has appreciated significantly. She owns some of the stocks in her name, and some of the stocks through a non-U.S. corporation. She also stands to inherit significant wealth from her parents, who reside in China and are also not U.S. citizens or tax residents. Ms. A is considering moving to the United States, while her parents will remain in China. Such a move will cause Ms. A to be subject to a host of potential U.S. tax liabilities. Fortunately, however, Ms. A can take tax planning steps now to significantly minimize her exposure to U.S. taxes once she becomes a U.S. citizen or tax resident. It is critical, however, that this planning be implemented before Ms. A becomes a U.S. citizen or a tax resident. After-the-fact planning will not achieve the same benefits. The rules for when U.S. residency will start for U.S. federal income and U.S. federal transfer tax (i.e., U.S. federal estate, gift and generation-skipping tax) purposes are fairly technical. Furthermore, the rules for whether an individual is a resident for U.S. federal income tax purposes are different from the rules for whether an individual is a resident for U.S. federal transfer tax purposes. Sometimes individuals who are not familiar with the U.S. tax system are unpleasantly surprised to learn that they have already become U.S. tax residents (for U.S. federal income tax purposes and/or for U.S. federal transfer tax purposes) without knowing it. The following are some examples of critical U.S. federal tax planning that Ms. A should consider.

ESTATE PLANNING FOR MS. A'S OWN ASSETS Estate planning is critical for high-net-worth foreign individuals such as Ms. A coming to live in the United States. Without it, if Ms. A becomes a U.S. citizen or tax resident, her estate will be subject to U.S. federal estate tax upon her death. The estate tax is currently imposed at rates of up to 40 percent of the fair market value of an individual's assets. Currently, each U.S. individual is allowed an approximately $11.6 million lifetime exemption from the U.S. federal estate and gift taxes. (This exemption is set to be reduced by about half after 2025.) Given Ms. A's wealth, even with this exemption her assets are still exposed to significant U.S. federal estate tax. On the other hand, with planning that involves creating and funding a properly structured irrevocable family trust, Ms. A may legitimately avoid those assets being subject to U.S. estate tax upon her death. This type of trust (sometimes referred to as a "dynasty" trust) can also allow the assets to continue in trust after Ms. A's death and avoid estate tax for future generations as well. Furthermore, this type of trust can provide Ms. A's family with significant creditor protection benefits (including protection from divorcing spouses). In many â&#x20AC;&#x201C; but not all â&#x20AC;&#x201C; cases, it is advisable for the trust to be established in the United States (e.g., in Delaware or South Dakota) and to be structured so that it is classified as a "domestic trust" for U.S. federal tax purposes.

ESTATE PLANNING FOR ASSETS THAT MS. A WILL INHERIT FROM HER PARENTS If, after moving to the United States, Ms. A inherits assets from her parents, those assets will become part of Ms. A's taxable estate. Therefore, on Ms. A's death, her estate will be subject to U.S. federal estate tax with respect to those assets. However, with a properly structured family trust created by Ms. A's parents, these assets may be legitimately kept out of Ms. A's taxable estate. This trust can be structured as what is known as a "foreign grantor trust" during the lifetimes of Ms. A's parents. With this type of trust, the non-U.S. income earned by the trust is not subject to U.S. federal income tax during Ms. A's parents' lifetimes. Moreover, with this type of trust, it is possible to structure things so that the tax cost of the assets in the trust is increased to fair market value on the death of Ms. A's parents. This will update U.S. federal income tax on the gain that has built up during Ms. A's parents' lifetime. In many cases, it would be advisable for this trust to become a domestic trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes following the passing of Ms. A's parents. If the trust is not to become a domestic trust for U.S. federal tax purposes, Ms. A could be subject to an unnecessarily high level of U.S. federal income tax on distributions that she receives from the trust of income that accumulated after her parents' death.

AVOIDING DOUBLE TAXATION If Ms. A becomes a U.S. citizen or tax resident, she may also be subject to "double tax" on the earnings of her Chinese companies. That is, the companies will be subject to corporate income tax in China on their earnings, and possibly withholding tax on dividends paid by Ms. A. Ms. A will then be subject to U.S. income tax on the dividends she receives from the companies. Under the recent U.S. tax reform, Ms. A may be subject to tax on the earnings of these companies even though these companies do not distribute the earnings to her as dividends. Assuming for example, a 25 percent corporate tax rate in China, the earnings can be subject to an overall effective tax rate (Chinese plus U.S. tax) of more than 50 percent. But, with proper planning that involves having the Chinese companies elect (on IRS Form 8832) to be treated as "pass-through entities" for U.S. tax purposes, Ms. A may be able to credit some or all of the Chinese income taxes against her IRS tax liability. This can reduce or eliminate double taxation. (Note that a Chinese Gufen Youxian Gongsi is not eligible to make this election.)

AVOIDING TAX ON BUILT-IN-GAINS If Ms. A becomes a U.S. citizen or tax resident and then sells her appreciated assets, she will be subject to U.S. income tax on all of her gain â&#x20AC;&#x201C; even the gain that has built-up while she was a nonresident. But, by making certain elections on IRS Form 8832 for the non-U.S. companies, her tax cost of these assets will be increased. Furthermore, for the investment assets that she does not own through companies, she should consider selling these investment assets to realize her gains free of U.S. federal income tax before she becomes a U.S. resident, and purchasing new investment assets.

PFIC REGIME Finally, U.S. tax law has a number of detrimental sets of rules that apply to U.S. citizens or residents with foreign investments. An example is the dreaded passive foreign investment company (PFIC) regime. A non-US corporation is classified as a PFIC if 1) 75 percent or more of its gross income for the taxable year consists of "passive income," or 2) at least 50 percent of its assets for the taxable year (averaged over the year and determined based upon value) produce or are held for the production of "passive income." For example, many non-U.S. hedge funds, mutual funds and other types of investment funds are PFICs. U.S. persons who own shares of a PFIC are subject to an adverse U.S. federal income tax regime with respect to the income Copyright ÂŠ 2020 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

derived by the PFIC, the dividends that they receive from the PFIC, and the gain, if any, that they derive from the sale or other disposition of their shares in the PFIC. These adverse consequences include having gains realized on the sale of the PFIC shares classified as ordinary income, rather than as favorably taxed long-term capital gain income, the loss of the preferential rate applicable to dividends received on the PFIC shares, and having interest charges apply to distributions by the PFIC and sales of the shares of the PFIC. Ms. A should review her portfolio of investments with a U.S. tax advisor to make sure to avoid exposure to these regimes. In some cases, it may be possible to make a type of election (known as a "qualified electing fund election") to minimize adverse PFIC consequences. In other cases, it may be recommended that Ms. A sell the PFIC stock prior to becoming a U.S. resident.

CONCLUSION Pre-immigration U.S. federal income tax and transfer tax planning is complicated but can be very beneficial. Any pre-immigration plan will have to be designed and implemented with great care. While this often requires significant work, the resulting tax savings may be significant.

对外国个人而言移民前的税务规划至关重要原文作者：Seth J. Entin 美国是一个对计划移民的高净值外国个人具有吸引力的国家。虽然对于考虑移居美国的高净值外国个人来说，及时进行移民税前规划的必要性并不总是显而易见，但如果不及时规划可能会造成极其昂贵的后果。以 A 女士为例，她住在中国，不是美国公民或居民。她自己有很多财富。她创立并持有中国公司的股票，这些公司现在价值极高。她还拥有一个大幅升值的股票投资组合。她以自己的名义持有部分股票，并通过一家非美国公司持有部分股票。她还将从住在中国而且不是美国公民或税务居民的父母那里继承大量财富。 A 女士正在考虑移居美国，而她的父母将留在中国。此举将导致 A 女士承担一系列潜在的美国纳税义务。不过幸运的是，A 女士现在可以采取税务规划措施以大大减低她一旦成为美国公民或税务居民时将需承担的美国税务负担。然而，至关重要的是 A 女士必须在成为美国公民或税务居民之前实施这项规划。事后规划不会达到同样的利益效果。针对美国联邦所得税和美国联邦转移税（即美国联邦遗产税、赠与税和隔代转移税）的美国居民身份何时开始适用的规定具有相当的技术性。此外，就美国联邦所得税而言，个人是否为居民的规则不同于就美国联邦转移税而言个人是否为居民的规则。有时不熟悉美国税收制度的个人会在不知情的情况下惊讶且不快地得知（就美国联邦所得税及/或美国联邦转移税得目的而言）自己已经成为美国税务居民。以下是 A 女士应该考虑的重要的联邦税收规划的一些例子。

A 女士自有资产的遗产规划遗产规划对于像 A 女士这样要移居美国的高净值外国个人来说至关重要。假设没有该规划，一旦 A 女士成为美国公民或税务居民，她的遗产将在她过世时被课征美国联邦遗产税。遗产税目前征收的税率最高达个人资产公平市价的 40%。目前每个美国个人都可以获得大约 1160 万美元的终身免税，免征美国联邦遗产税和赠与税。（这项免税额将在 2025 年后减少约一半）。鉴于 A 女士的财富，即使有这项免税额度，她的资产仍面临着需缴纳巨大金额的美国联邦遗产税。另一方面，透过涉及创建一个结构合理的不可撤销的家庭信托并对其注入资金，A 女士可以合法地避免这些资产在她过世时被课征美国遗产税。此类信托（有时称为“世代”信托）也可以使资产在 A 女士过世后继续留在信托之内，并为后代避免遗产税。此外，此类信托可以为 A 女士的家庭提供重要的债权人保护利益（包括保护其免被离婚配偶取得）。在许多情况下（但不是所有情况下），信托最好在美国（例如在特拉华州或南达科他州）设立，并且其结构应使其被归类为美国联邦税务目的的“国内信托”。

A 女士将继承她父母的遗产如果在移居美国后，A 女士继承了她父母的资产，这些资产将成为 A 女士应税遗产的一部分。因此 A 女士过世后，她的遗产将要缴纳与这些资产有关的美国联邦遗产税。然而由于 A 女士的父母建立了一个结构合理的家庭信托，这些资产可能合法地不列入 A 女士的应税遗产之内。这种信托在 A 女士父母在世时可以被架构为所谓的 “外国授予人信托”。在这种类型的信托中，信托基金获得的非美国收入在 A 女士父母在世时不需要缴纳美国联邦所得税。此外，有了这种类型的信托，就有可能透过规划而使信托资产的税基在 A 女士父母过世时增加到当时的公平市价。这会将 A 女士父母生前积累的美国联邦所得税收益更新到其税基上。在许多情况下，在 A 女士的父母过世后，将该信托基金变为美国联邦所得税目的的国内信托是明智的。如果该信托不变成美国联邦税收目的的国内信托，A 女士可能要对她从信托中所获得因其父母过世后累积的收入的分配被课征不必要的高水平的美国联邦所得税。

避免双重征税如果 A 女士成为美国公民或税务居民，她就其中国公司的收入也可能被征收“双重税”。也就是说，这些公司的收益将在中国缴纳企业所得税，而且可能对 A 女士支付的股息征收扣缴税。A 女士随后将对她从这些公司获得的股息缴纳美国所得税。根据美国最近的税制改革，A 女士可能要对这些公司的收益被课税，即使这些公司不将收益作为股息分配给她。例如假设中国的企业所得税率为 25%，那么收益可能会受到超过 50%的整体有效税率（中国加美国税）的影响。但是如果有适当的规划，包括让中国公司选择（在美国国税局 8832 号表格上）被视为美国税务目的的“穿透性实体”，A 女士可以将部分或全部中国所得税抵减其美国国税局的纳税义务。这可以减少或消除双重征税（提请注意中国的股份有限公司不符合参与这项选择的资格）。

内部收益避税如果 A 女士成为美国公民或税务居民，然后出售其增值资产，她将就其所有收益被课征美国所得税（即使是她作为非居民时积累的收益）。但是通过在美国国税局 8832 号表格上为非美国公司进行某些选择，她对这些资产的税基将增加。此外，对于她不通过公司拥有的投资资产，她应考虑在成为美国居民之前出售这些投资资产，以得以免被课征美国联邦所得税的方式实现其收益，并购买新的投资资产。

PFIC 制度最后，美国税法有一系列不利于美国公民或外国投资居民的规则。令人恐惧的消极外国投资公司（“PFIC”）制度就是一个例子。如果 1）其纳税年度总收入的 75%或以上由“被动收入”构成；或 2）该纳税年度至少 50%的资产（年内平均并根据价值确定）产生或持有用于生产“被动收入”，则非美国公司被归类为消极外国投资公司（PFIC）。例如许多非美国对冲基金、共同基金和其他类型的投资基金都是 PFIC。持有消极外国投资公司股份的美国人士，就其从消极外国投资公司获得的收入、从该消极外国投资公司获得的股息以及他们从出售或以其他方式处置其在该消极外国投资公司中的股份所获得的收益（如有的话），将适用一项不利的美国联邦所得税制度。这些不利后果包括将出售消极外国投资公司股份所得的收益归类为普通收入，而不是税收优惠的长期资本利得收入、丧失适用于消极外国投资公司股票股息的优惠利率、以及将利息费用应用于消极外国投资公司的分配和销售 PFIC 股份。A 女士应该与美国税务顾问一起检视她的投资组合，以确保避免适用到这些制度。在某些情况下，可以进行一种选择（称为“合格的选择基金选择”），以尽量减少消极外国投资公司的不利后果。在其他情况下，建议 A 女士在成为美国居民之前出售 PFIC 股票。

结论移民前的美国联邦所得税和转移税规划很复杂，但可能非常有利。任何移民前的规划都必须精心设计和实施。虽然这通常需要大量的工作，但由此产生的税收节省可以是相当可观的。

When Considering Bankruptcy, Don't Forget About Environmental Obligations By Dianne R. Phillips and Maria de la Motte

HIGHLIGHTS  In light of the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, bankruptcy and restructuring considerations are a reality for many organizations.  Debtors reorganizing under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code should be aware that environmental obligations will not be dischargeable in bankruptcy.  This Holland & Knight article provides an overview of common issues arising at the intersection of bankruptcy and environmental law. ____________________ With economic downturn comes bankruptcy. It is often observed that the intersections between the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and environmental law can create conflict, because while many federal and state environmental statutes seek to hold parties responsible for contamination, in some cases, many years after a release has occurred, the Bankruptcy Code seeks to offer debtors a fresh start. There is little U.S. Supreme Court case law to guide courts in this area, and these matters are often highly fact-dependent, leading to variation in how different jurisdictions will treat similar issues. Depending on the concerns facing your organization, it may be important to bring environmental attorneys into the conversation early in the Chapter 11 process. This article highlights a number of key topics, but by no means represents an exhaustive summary of the challenges that can arise in this complex area of the law.

NOT ALL ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO THE AUTOMATIC STAY One important consideration is whether an environmental claim or obligation will be subject to the automatic stay. Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code mandates that pre-petition claims of creditors are automatically stayed, triggered by the filing of the bankruptcy petition.1 There is an exception to the automatic stay for a governmental entity's commencement or continuation of an action within its police or regulatory power. 2 An action to collect a monetary judgment, however, will be stayed.3 A Chapter 11 debtor must comply with environmental laws prior to filing its plan of reorganization – and afterwards, if it remains in possession.4 Analysis of the police and regulatory power exception to the automatic stay is not only highly fact-dependent, but similar facts are sometimes analyzed differently by courts in counterintuitive ways, highlighting the importance of engaging counsel familiar with this area of the law in your jurisdiction.5 Generally, the automatic stay will not be effective against proceedings to fix penalty amounts, natural resource damage amounts or involving the share of costs to be allocated to a "Potentially Responsible Party" (PRP) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 6 In considering whether such claims fall within the police and regulatory power exception to the automatic stay, most courts will employ one or both of two tests – the pecuniary purpose test and public policy test.7 Under the pecuniary purpose test, reviewing courts focus on whether the proceeding relates primarily to the government's pecuniary interest or to matters of public safety, with matters of public safety falling within the exception to the automatic stay. Under the public policy test, courts except proceedings effectuating public policy from the stay, Copyright © 2020 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

whereas those adjudicating private rights (for example, a government agency's suit to recover from a contractor who failed to deliver goods) will be stayed.8 The automatic stay will, however, be effective against the enforcement of monetary judgments, even if such enforcement is in furtherance of the government's regulatory powers, because otherwise, the government would receive unfair treatment compared with other creditors.9 For example, efforts to collect a PRP's share of CERCLA cleanup costs will be stayed.10

NOT ALL ENVIRONMENTAL "CLAIMS" ARE DISCHARGEABLE Chapter 11 allows debtors to discharge all claims arising before the bankruptcy petition.11 The Bankruptcy Code defines a "claim" as a "right of payment" or "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right of payment."12 The meaning of this definition in the context of environmental obligations has been the subject of considerable – and at times inconsistent – interpretation by courts.

COMPLIANCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS After a Chapter 11 debtor has reorganized, the organization will still need to comply with environmental laws. 13 Accordingly, orders addressing ongoing pollution will often not be dischargeable.14 There are cases where courts have refused to confirm a reorganization plan because the debtor did not satisfactorily demonstrate that it could comply with environmental laws if allowed to remain in possession after reorganization.15 Courts are sometimes skeptical, however, of attempts by government agencies to collect a monetary claim arising from a pre-petition act of the debtor by characterizing the claim as a regulatory action to address ongoing pollution.16 Monetary claims related to pre-petition releases, including natural resources damages, are generally dischargeable in bankruptcy.17 This includes claims brought by the government18 and those brought by private parties.19

FINES AND PENALTIES Fines or penalties payable to a government agency, however, may not be dischargeable in bankruptcy.20 There is noteworthy variation in how different courts have treated fines and penalties. A recent Delaware case found that pre-petition penalties for air emission violations were dischargeable claims.21 In contrast, other courts have not only refused to allow penalties to be discharged, but have granted them first priority payment as administrative expenses that are "actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate."22 These courts have characterized fines and penalties,23 or even administrative and legal costs incurred by a state agency in arranging remediation efforts,24 as part of the "cost of doing business" for the debtor, and therefore benefiting the estate, while other courts have found that penalties that seek to "punish and deter" do not benefit the estate and therefore should not receive administrative expense priority.25

PRE-PETITION MONETARY CLAIMS VS. INJUNCTIONS Another common issue is whether an environmental injunction, consent order, or other such obligation related to pre-petition activities of the debtor constitutes a pre-petition claim dischargeable in bankruptcy. Factors courts examine include (1) whether the debtor is capable of performing the cleanup, (2) whether the pollution is ongoing, and (3) whether the environmental agency has an option under the applicable environmental statute and regulations to remedy the problem itself and seek reimbursement from the debtor. 26

In considering whether the debtor is capable of performing the cleanup, some courts focus on whether the debtor has access to the property, with the ability of the debtor to access the property weighing towards finding a non-dischargeable obligation rather than a dischargeable monetary claim.27 Other courts consider whether the debtor can personally complete the actions required by the injunction, reasoning that any expenditure of money makes an injunction the equivalent of a monetary claim.28 Most courts, however, recognize that almost all injunctions require some money to be spent,29 and one court even found that a requirement to pay a performance bond did not constitute a monetary claim, because the purpose of the bond was to ensure the debtor's performance under the order, not to reimburse costs incurred by the state.30 The issue of whether pollution is ongoing can sometimes be dispositive, as courts are reluctant to allow an ongoing threat to human health or the environment.31 For example, where a debtor's predecessor had improperly drained wetlands, and a state agency sought to require the debtor to build new replacement wetlands in another location, the court found that the agency was, in essence, seeking "compensation for past misconduct," not seeking an order ameliorating ongoing pollution.32 The court distinguished these facts from cases where hazardous waste is continuing to migrate into waterways unabated.33 In another case, an injunction requiring a debtor to remove asbestos from buildings was dischargeable, because the asbestos would create a hazard only if removed or disturbed, and therefore, its presence did not qualify as ongoing pollution.34 Cases discussing whether the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or a state agency could opt to complete the desired action itself and seek reimbursement highlight the importance of understanding the underlying environmental statutes. For example, under CERCLA, EPA has the option to remediate a contaminated site and then sue PRPs for response costs, so an order to clean up a site, to the extent that it imposes obligations beyond any obligation to stop ongoing pollution, will be a dischargeable claim.35 In contrast, under other statutes, such as the Clean Water Act or the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), where the government has no such option to seek payment, an injunction will not likely be found to be a dischargeable claim.36 Courts conduct a similar analysis of state statutes.37

DETERMINING WHEN A CLAIM ARISES A further wrinkle is that the threshold question of whether a claim arose pre-petition, and is therefore even potentially dischargeable, can be complicated for environmental claims, especially for contingent claims, such as claims seeking future response costs and future natural resource damage costs. Different jurisdictions apply different tests to determine when a claim arose, with many endorsing the "fair contemplation" approach.38 In In re Jensen, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that all future response and natural resource damage costs based on pre-petition conduct that can be "fairly contemplated by the parties" at the time of the debtors' bankruptcy are dischargeable claims under the Bankruptcy Code.39 Relevant factors include "knowledge by the parties of a site in which there may be liability, notification by the creditor to the debtor of potential liability, commencement of investigation and cleanup activities, and the incurrence of response costs."40 Other courts hold that an environmental claim arises "when a potential claimant can tie the bankruptcy debtor to a known release of a hazardous substance,"41 look to when the acts giving rise to the liability occurred42 or consider when there was a relationship in which liability could arise.43

ABILITY TO ABANDON PROPERTY MAY BE LIMITED Another issue that can arise at the intersection of bankruptcy and environmental law is whether contaminated property can be abandoned. Under Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee can abandon property which is burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate.44 However, in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public or safety from identified hazards."45 Cases following Midlantic have interpreted this holding with varying degrees Copyright ÂŠ 2020 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

of breadth. On the narrow end of the spectrum, an Oklahoma court allowed abandonment where it "will not aggravate the existing situation, create a genuine emergency nor increase the likelihood of disaster or intensification of polluting agents."46 A Minnesota court, taking a more moderate approach, laid out a balancing test considering "(1) the imminence of danger to the public health and safety, (2) the extent of probable harm, (3) the amount and type of hazardous waste, (4) the cost to bring the property into compliance with environmental laws, and (5) the amount and type of funds available for cleanup."47 Some courts have taken a still-broader reading, holding that a property cannot be abandoned without full compliance with all applicable environmental law.48

PURCHASERS IN 363 SALES SHOULD STILL CONDUCT ALL APPROPRIATE INQUIRIES Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor, upon notice to all creditors and with bankruptcy court approval, to sell assets free and clear of claims and interests.49 Potential purchasers of such a property should be cautioned that real property is not really "free and clear" with respect to contamination, because while a purchaser in a 363(f) sale is not liable for claims and interests as a successor of the debtor, it can still be held liable as a current owner or operator under CERCLA. Therefore, purchasers at a 363(f) sale will still want to establish an available landowner liability defense, such as qualifying as a Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser. For more information about available landowner liability defenses and conducting All Appropriate Inquiries as part of establishing such a defense, see Holland & Knight's previous alert: "Environmental Due Diligence in the Wake of Atlantic Richfield," May 27, 2020.

CONCLUSION AND CONSIDERATIONS For legal guidance on bankruptcy and restructuring issues, contact a member of Holland & Knight's Bankruptcy, Restructuring and Creditors' Rights Group. Holland & Knight's Environmental Team is a multidisciplinary team of lawyers and professionals who are well informed on emerging environmental issues and well positioned to assist with the environmental concerns that may arise throughout the bankruptcy process. For questions about this alert or for legal counsel about a specific situation involving your organization, please contact the authors.

____________________ Notes 1

11 U.S.C. § 362(a).

11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).

Id.

See In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986) (U.S. EPA's RCRA enforcement action not stayed; before filing its plan of reorganization, debtor was required to cease treating, storing and disposing of waste without EPA permit and submit closure and post-closure plans for its disposal facilities). 5

Compare In re Goodwin, 163B.R. 825 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993) (Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's suit seeking injunction stayed as a pre-petition claim because under the applicable statute, the state could have sought money damages instead) and City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991) (New York City's suit for CERCLA recovery not stayed, which sought reimbursement of waste removal costs, natural resource damages, and a declaratory judgment that debtor was liable for future costs).

See U.S. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 804 F.2d 348 (6th Cir. 1986) (Judicial proceeding to fix the amounts debtor owed to various government entities not stayed, as resolution represented a regulatory action and would not affect the assets available to other creditors). See also City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988); In re Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Sugarhouse Realty, 162 B.R. 113 (E.D. Pa. 1993); U.S. v. Alsol Corp., 2014 WL 46775 (D.N.J. Jan. 2, 2014). 7

See In re Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291, 295 (6th Cir. 1988).

Id.

See U.S. v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988); In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1183 (5th Cir. 1986); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Sugarhouse Realty, 162 B.R. 113, 117 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 10

See U.S. v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Alsol Corp., 2014 WL 46775 (D.N.J. Jan. 2, 2014).

11 U.S.C. § 1141(d).

11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A-B).

See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1985); In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Industrial Salvage, Inc., 196 B.R. 784, 790 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1996). 14

See generally U.S. v. Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009); In re Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Taylor, 572 B.R. 592 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2017); Mark IV Industries Inc. v. N.M. Env't Dep't, 438 B.R. 460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Industrial Salvage, Inc., 196 B.R. 784 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1996). 15

See, e.g., In re Jager, 609 B.R. 156 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 2019); In re Lewis, 215 B.R. 880 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1997).

See, e.g., In re Peabody Energy Corp., 958 F.3d 717 (8th Cir. 2020) (state statutory and common law tort claims discharged in bankruptcy as claims to recover money, not claims brought under the police or regulatory power of the state); In re G-I Holdings Inc., 654 Fed. Appx. 571, 574 (3d Cir. 2016) (New York City Housing Authority's claims seeking asbestos removal discharged in bankruptcy as a monetary claim for property damage, not a regulatory action to abate ongoing pollution). For further discussion of the Eighth Circuit's recent decision in In re Peabody Energy Corp., see Holland & Knight's Energy and Natural Resources Blog: "U.S. Court of Appeals Holds That Climate Change Tort Claims Are Dischargeable in Bankruptcy," Aug. 21, 2020. 17

See generally Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985); In re Nat. Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).

See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 283-85 (1985); In re Peabody Energy Corporation, 958 F.3d 717, 724 (8th Cir. 2020); In re Chateauguay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1008 (2d Cir. 1991); In re G-I Holdings Inc., 654 Fed. Appx. 571, 572 (3d Cir. 2016); In re Jimmo, 204 B.R. 655, 660 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1997). 19

See, e.g., In re Chemtura Corp., 439 B.R. 561, 570 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Texaco Inc., 182 B.R. 937, 953-54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). 20

See, e.g., Cumberland Farms v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 116 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1997); In re Jimmo, 204 B.R. 655, 659 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1997). 21

See In re Exide Technologies, 613 B.R. 79, 81 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-8023 (3d Cir. April 23, 2020). 22

11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a), 503(b)(1)(A); see In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1009-10 (2d Cir. 1991).

See Cumberland Farms v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 116 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The payment of a fine for failing, during bankruptcy, to meet the requirements of Florida environmental protection laws is a cost 'ordinarily incident to operation of a business' in light of today's extensive environmental regulations."). 24

See Com. of Pa. Dep't of Env. Res. v. Conroy, 24 F.3d 568, 569-71 (3d Cir. 1994).

See In re Exide Technologies, 613 B.R. 79, 89 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-8023 (3d Cir. April 23, 2020). 26

Mark IV Industries Inc. v. N.M. Env. Dep't, 438 B.R. 460, 467-68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).

See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 283 (1985); In re Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 8 F.3d 146, 151 (3rd Cir. 1993); In re Taylor, 572 B.R. 592, 603 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2017); Mark IV Industries Inc. v. N.M. Env. Dep't, 438 B.R. 460, 469 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 28

See, e.g., U.S. v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1988); Gable v. Borges Const., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 117, 123 (D. Mass. 2011). 29

See, e.g., U.S. v. Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009); In re Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 805 F.2d 1175, 1186 (5th Cir. 1986); Mark IV Industries Inc. v. N.M. Env. Dep't, 438 B.R. 460, 467 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Industrial Salvage, Inc., 196 B.R. 784, 789 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1996). 30

See U.S. v. Hubler, 117 B.R. 160, 164-65 (W.D. Pa. 1990).

See generally In re Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 8 F.3d 146, 151 (3rd Cir. 1993).

See In re IT Group, Inc., Co. 339 B.R. 338, 342-43 (D. Del. 2006).

Id.

In re G-I Holdings Inc., 654 Fed. Appx. 571, 574 (3d Cir. 2016).

In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1008 (2d Cir. 1991).

U.S. v. Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2009); In re Taylor, 572 B.R. 592, 603 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2017).

See, e.g., Mark IV Industries Inc. v. N.M. Env. Dep't, 438 B.R. 460, 469 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (where New Mexico Water Quality Act did not allow the state to conduct the cleanup itself and recover costs, injunction was not a dischargeable claim). 38

See, e.g., In re Crystal Oil Co., 158 F.3d 291, 298 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Nat. Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 409 (N.D. Tex. 1992); In re Motors Liquidation Co., 598 B.R. 744, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 39

In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted).

United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Cal. Regional Water Quality Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d 796, 831 (2019).

In re Crystal Oil Co., 158 F.3d 291, 298 (5th Cir. 1998).

See, e.g., In re Parker, 313 F.3d 1267, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 2002); Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir. 1988). 43

See In re Motors Liquidation Co., 598 B.R. 744, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

11 U.S.C. § 554(a).

Midlantic Nat. Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986).

In re Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986). See also In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 16 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Brio Refining, Inc., 86 B.R. 487, 489 (N.D. Tex. 1988). 47

In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 272 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).

See, e.g., In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 946-47 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).

11 U.S.C. § 363(f).

当考虑破产时，别忘了环境法的责任原文作者：Dianne R. Phillip 及 Maria de la Motte

重点摘要 

鉴于 COVID-19 流感大流行造成的经济衰退，许多单位实际面临到需考虑进行破产和重组的情形。



根据《美国破产法》第 11 章进行重组的债务人应意识到，环境法的责任可免于自动中止，并且某些环境法的责任在破产时不会被免除。



本 Holland & Knight 文章概述了破产法和环境法交会处出现的常见问题。

____________________ 随着经济衰退，破产随之而来。人们经常注意到，美国破产法和环境法之间的交会可能会产生冲突，因为虽然许多联邦和州的环境法规寻求追究各方对污染的责任，但在某些情况下，在污染发生多年后，破产法试图为债务人提供一个重新开始的机会。美国最高法院很少有判例法来指导法院处理这一领域的问题，而且这些事件往往高度依赖事实，导致不同司法管辖区处理类似问题的方式有所不同。根据您所在单位所面临的问题，在第 11 章破产程序的初期，让环境法律师参与讨论中可能很重要。这一文章突出了一些关键问题，但绝不是对这一复杂法律领域可能出现的挑战问题的详尽总结。

并非所有环境法的责任都受自动中止的约束一个重要的考虑因素是，一项环境法的债权或责任是否适用自动中止。《破产法》第 362（a）条规定，债权人申请前的债权在提交破产申请后自动中止。1 政府实体在其监督或监管权力范围内启动或继续采取法律行动是自动中止的一个例外情况。2 但为执行金钱判决所采取的行动将被自动中止。3 第 11 章破产债务人在提交重组计划之前必须遵守环境法律 ——且如继续进行破产程序的话应继续遵守环境法律。4 对作为自动中止的例外的监督和监管权的分析不仅高度依赖事实，而且法院有时会以违反直觉的方式对类似事实进行不同的分析，而此一情形强化了您的司法管辖区内聘请熟悉这一法律领域的律师的重要性。5 一般来说，自动中止的规定对于为确定罚金金额、自然资源损害金额或涉及根据《综合环境反应、赔偿和责任法》（CERCLA）分配给“潜在责任方”（PRP）的费用份额的诉讼不会生效。6，在考虑此类债权是否属于自动中止适用的监督和监管权力的例外情况，大多数法院将采用两种测试方法中的一种或两种：即金钱目的测试和公共政策测试。7 在金钱目的测试中，审查法院的重点是程序是否主要与政府的金钱利益或公共安全有关，而公共安全事项属于自动中止的例外。根据公共政策测试，法院将中止执行公共政策的程序，而那些裁决私人权利的程序（例如政府机构向未能交付货物的承包商追偿的诉讼）将被中止。8

然而自动中止的规定对货币判决的执行将是生效的，即使这种强制执行是为了促进政府的监管权力，否则，与其他债权人相比，政府将受到不公平的待遇。9 例如，为向潜在责任方收取其所应分担的《综合环境反应、赔偿和责任法》（CERCLA）清理费用而作出的执行努力将被中止。10

并非所有的环境“债权”都是可以免除的第 11 章破产允许债务人免除破产申请之前产生的所有债权。11《破产法》将“债权”定义为“付款权”或“如果违约行为导致付款权的对违约行为享有公平救济的权利”。12 就这一定义在环境责任方面的含义，法院对这一问题的解释相当多，有时甚至不一致。

遵守环境法律法规第 11 章破产债务人重组后，该单位仍需遵守环境法律。13 因此，处理持续污染的命令通常不会被免除。14 有些情况下，法院拒绝确认重整计划，因为债务人没有令人满意地证明如果允许重组后继续进行破产，它可以遵守环境法。15 但是对政府机构试图以将其定性为处理持续污染的监管行动来收取债务人在破产申请前的行为产生的金钱债权的作法，法院有时会持怀疑态度。16 与申请前产生的有关金钱债权，包括自然资源损害，通常在破产时是可以免除的。17 这包括政府提出的索赔 18 和私人当事人提出的索赔。19

罚款和处罚然而应付给政府机构的罚款或处罚在破产时可能不能被免除。20 不同法院处理罚款和处罚的方式存在显著差异。最近特拉华州的一个案件发现，对违反空气排放规定的破产申请前处罚是可以免除的债权。21 与此相反，其他法院不仅拒绝免除处罚，而且给予他们作为“实际保护破产财产的必要成本和开支”的行政费用的第一优先付款。 22 这些法院将罚款和处罚款 23 甚至国家机构在安排补救工作中产生的行政和法律费用 24 作为债务人“经营业务成本”的一部分，从而使破产财产受益，而其他法院则认为，旨在“惩罚和威慑”的惩罚措施对破产财产不利，因此不应获得行政费用优先权。25

申请前的金钱索赔与禁令另一个常见问题是，环境禁令、同意令或与债务人的申请前活动有关的其他此类义务是否构成可在破产中可被免除的破产申请前债权。法院审查的因素包括（1）债务人是否有能力进行清理;（2）污染是否持续; 以及（3）根据适用的环境法规和条例，环保机构是否有权自行补救问题并向债务人寻求赔偿。26 在考虑债务人是否有能力进行清理时，一些法院将重点放在债务人是否有权使用财产上，由于债务人有能力获得财产，这一能力将有助法院将其视为一项不可免除的债务，而不是一项可免除的货币债权。27 其他法院考虑债务人是否能够亲自完成禁令所要求的行动，理由是任何金钱支出都使禁令等同于金钱债权。28 然而大多数法院承认，几乎所有的禁令都要求花费一些钱，29 而且有一个法院甚至认为，要求支付履约保证金并不构成金钱债权，因为担保的目的是确保债务人在命令下履行义务，而不是偿还国家发生的费用。30

污染是否持续的问题有时可能是决定性的，因为法院不愿意允许对人类健康或环境的持续威胁。31 例如如果债务人的前手不当地将湿地排干，而一个国家机构试图要求债务人在另一个地方建新的替代湿地，法院认定该机构实质上是在寻求“对过去不当行为的赔偿”，而不是寻求一项改善持续污染的命令。32 法院将这些事实与危险废物继续有增无减地迁移到水道的案件区分开来。33 在另一个案件中，一项要求债务人从建筑物中移除石棉的禁令是可以免除的，因为石棉只有在移除或受到干扰时才会产生危险，因此其存在不符合持续污染的条件。34 讨论美国环境保护署（EPA）或州政府机构是否可以选择自行完成所需行动并寻求补偿的案例，突显了理解基本环境法规的重要性。例如，根据《综合环境反应、赔偿和责任法》（CERCLA），环境保护局有权选择补救受污染的场地，然后起诉污潜在责任方，要求其支付相应费用，因此，在其规定的义务超出任何阻止持续污染的义务的范围内，一项清理场地的命令将是一项可以免除责任的债权。35 相反地，根据其他法规，例如《清洁水法》或《资源保护和恢复法》（RCRA），如果政府没有寻求付款的选择，则禁令不太可能被视为可免除债务的权利要求。36 法院对州法规进行了类似的分析。37

确定债权何时发生另一个问题是，对于环境债权，特别是对于或有债权，例如寻求未来因应成本和未来自然资源损害成本的债权，债权是否在申请前产生，因此甚至可能被免除的临界问题可能会很复杂。不同的司法管辖区采用不同的标准来确定债权何时产生，许多司法管辖区赞同“公平考虑”方法。38 在 In re Jensen 一案，美国第九巡回上诉法院认为，根据《破产法》，所有基于申请前行为的未来因应和自然资源损害成本，在债务人破产时可以“由各方公平考虑”的，都是可根据《破产法》免除的债权。39 相关因素包括“当事人对其中可能包括责任、债权人向债务人发出的潜在责任通知、调查和清理活动的开始以及应对费用的产生。”40 其他法院认为，“当潜在的索赔人可以将破产债务人与已知的有害物质释放联系起来时”41，就产生了环境债权注意引起责任的行为何时发生 42 或考虑何时有可能产生责任的关系。43

放弃财产的能力可能受到限制破产法和环境法交会处可能出现的另一个问题是，是否可以放弃受污染的财产。根据《破产法》第 544（a）条，受托人可以放弃对破产财产造成负担或不重要价值的财产。44 然而，在 Midlantic 国家银行诉新泽西州环境保护部一案中，美国联邦最高法院认为，“受托人不得在违反合理设计以保护公众或安全不受特定危害的州法规或条例的情况下放弃财产”45。之后案例以不同程度的广度解释了这种观点。在狭义的范围内，俄克拉荷马州法院允许在“不会加剧现有情况、造成真正的紧急情况、也不会增加灾难或污染源加剧的可能性”的情况下放弃。46 明尼苏达州一家法院采取了一种更为温和的方法，考虑到“（1）对公众健康和安全的紧迫性，（2）可能的危害程度，（3）危险废物的数量和类型，（4）使财产符合环境法的成本，以及（5）可用于清理的资金的数量和类型。”47 一些法院采取了更广泛的解读，认为在不完全遵守所有适用的环境法的情况下，财产不能被放弃。48

363 销售中的购买者仍应进行所有适当的查询《破产法》第 363（f）条允许债务人在向所有债权人发出通知并经破产法院批准后，出售不含债权和利益息的资产。49 此类财产的潜在购买者应注意，不动产在污染方面并非真正“自由和明确”不含债权和利益，因为 363 （f）作为债务人的继承人，出售不承担债权和利益的责任，它仍然可以作为《综合环境反应、赔偿和责任法》（CERCLA）下的当前所有人或经营者承担责任。因此，在 363（f）出售中的购买者仍希望建立一个可用的土地所有者责任抗辩，例如作为一个善意的潜在购买者的资格。有关可用土地所有者责任抗辩的更多信息以及作为建立此类抗辩的一部分进行所有适当调查的信息，请参阅 Holland & Knight 的先前的提示文章：“大西洋里奇菲尔德事件后的环境尽职调查”，2020 年 5 月 27 日。

结论与注意事项有关破产和重组问题的法律指导，请联系 Holland & Knight 破产、重组和债权人权利小组的成员。Holland & Knight 的环境团队是一个由律师和专业人士组成的跨领域团队，他们对新出现的环境问题有充分了解，并且能够帮助解决破产过程中可能出现的环境问题。有关此文章的问题或对涉及您单位的特定情况的法律问题咨询，请与作者联系。

____________________ 附注 1

11 USC §362（a）。

11 USC §362（b）（4）。

3 同上。 4 参见

In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 805 F.2d 1175（5th Cir. 1986）（美国 EPA 的 RCRA 执法行动未中止；在提交其重组计划之前，要求债务人停止处理，存储和处置废物，但不得 EPA 许可并提交其处置设施的关闭和关闭后计划）。 5 比较

In re Goodwin, 163B.R. 825（Bankr. D. Idaho, 1993 年）（爱达荷州卫生和福利部的要求禁制令的诉讼仍保留为请愿前的要求，因为根据适用法规，该州本来可以要求金钱赔偿）和 City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020（2d Cir. 1991）(纽约市寻求 CERCLA 的救济的诉讼不被停止，其要求垃圾搬运费、自然资源损害，并且宣告式判决债务人为未来的费用负责）。 U.S. v. Jones＆ Laughlin Steel Corp., 804 F.2d 348（6th Cir. 1986）（司法程序确定未拖欠各政府实体的债务人的数额，因为决议代表一项监管行动，不会影响债务其他债权人可用的资产）。另见 City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020（2d Cir. 1991）；US v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202（3d Cir. 1988）；In re Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291（ 6th Cir. 1988）; US v. Sugarhouse Realty, 162 BR 113（E.D. Pa. 1993 ）；US v. Alsol Corp., 2014 WL 46775（D.N.J., 2014 年 1 月 2 日）。 6 参见

7 参见

In Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291，295（6th Cir. 1988）。

8 同上。

9 参见

U.S. v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202（3d Cir. 1988）；In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 805 F.2d 1175，1183（ 5th Cir. 1986）; Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep’t of Envtl Res., 733 F.2d 267, 272（3d Cir.1984）; US v. Sugarhouse Realty, 162 BR 113, 117 （E.D. Pa. 1993）。 10 参见

U.S. v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202（3d Cir. 1988）；US v. Alsol Corp., 2014 WL 46775（D.N.J., 2014 年 1 月 2 日

）。 11

11 USC §1141（d）。

11 USC §101（5）（AB）。

13 见

Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 US 274，285（1985）；In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1146（7th Cir. 1992）；In re Industrial Salvage, Inc., 196 BR 784, 790（Bankr.SD Ill. 1996）。 14 一般参见

US v. Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734（7th Cir. 2009）; In re Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. NJ Dep't Envtl. Prot., 8 F.3d 146（3d Cir. 1993）; In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997（2d Cir. 1991）；In re Taylor, 572 BR 592（Banker. E.D.N.C. 2017）; Mark IV Industries Inc. v. NM Env't Dep't., 438 BR 460（Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010）；In re Industrial Salvage, Inc., 196 BR 784（Bankr. SD Ill. 1996）。 15 参见，例如

In re Jager, 609 BR 156（Bankr. W.D. Penn. 2019）; In Re Lewis 215 BR 880（Bankr. D. Alaska 1997）。

16 参见，例如

In Re Peabody Energy Corp., 958 F.3d 717（2020 年 8 月 8 日）（州法定和普通法对在破产中解除的侵权索赔作为追讨款项的索赔，而不是根据警察或政府的监管权提出的索赔状态）；In re GI Holdings Inc. , 请参阅 654 Fed. Appx. 571, 574（3d Cir. 2016）（纽约市房屋委员会要求破产清算的清除石棉的索赔是财产损失的货币索赔，而不是减轻持续污染的监管行动）。有关第八巡回法院最近在 In re Peabody Energy Corp.中做出的决定的进一步讨论，请参见 Holland＆Knight 的能源与自然资源博客：“美国上诉法院裁定，可以在破产中撤销对气候变化侵权的要求”，2020 年 8 月 21 日。 17 一般参见

Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 US 274（1985）；In re Nat. Gypsum Co., 139 BR 397（Bank ND Tex. 1992）。

18 参见，例如

Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 US 274, 283-85（1985）；In Re Peabody Energy Corporation, 958 F.3d 717, 724（ 2020 年 8 月 8 日）；In re Chateauguay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1008（2d Cir. 1991）；In re GI Holdings Inc., 请参阅 654 Fed. Appx. 571, 572（3d Cir. 2016）; In re Jimmo, 204 BR 655, 660（Bankr. D. Conn. 1997）。 19 参见，例如

In re Chemtura Corp., 439 BR 561，570（Bankr. SDNY 2010）；In re Texaco Inc.案中，182 BR 937, 95354（Bankr. SDNY 1995）。 20 参见，例如

Cumberland Farms v. Fla. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 116 F.3d 16，20（1st Cir. 1997）; In re Jimmo, 204 BR 655，659（Bankr. D. Conn. 1997）。 21 见

In re Exide Technologies, 613 BR 79，81（Bankr. D. Del. 2020）, 上诉摘要,编号 20-8023（3d Cir. 2020 年 4 月 23 日）。 22

11 USC§§507（a）, 503（b）（1）（A）；参见 In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F. 2d 997, 1009-10（2d Cir. 1991）。

Cumberland Farms v. Fla Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 116 F.3d 16，22（1st Cir. 1997）（“鉴于破产期间未能达到佛罗里达州环境保护法的规定而支付罚款是“通常与企业运营有关的费用”今天广泛的环境法规。”）。 23 参见

24 参见

Com. of Pa. Dep't of Env. v. Conroy, 24 F.3d 568, 569-71（3d Cir. 1994）。

25 参见

In re Exide Technologies, 613 BR 79, 89（Bankr. D. Del. 2020）, 上诉摘要，第 20-8023 号（3d Cir. 2020 年 4 月 23 日）。 26

Mark IV Industries Inc. v. NM Env. Dep't, 438 BR 460，467-68（Bankr. SDNY 2010）。

27 参见，例如

Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 US 274, 283（1985）；In re Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. NJ Dep't Envt. Prot., 8 F.3d 146, 151（3rd Cir. 1993）; In re Taylor 中, 572 BR 592，603（Banker. EDNC 2017）; Mark IV Industries Inc. v. M Env. Dep't, 438 BR 460, 469（Bankr. SDNY 2010）。 28 参见，例如

US v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147, 151 （6th Cir. 1988 ）；Gable v. Borges Const., Inc.,案卷 792 F.2d 117, 123（D. Mass. 2011）。 29 参见,例如

US v. Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734（7th Cir. 2009）；In re Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. NJ Dep't Envtl. Prot., 8 F.3 d 146（3d Cir. 1993）; 联邦石油精炼公司，805 F. 2d 1175，1186（5th Cir. 1986）; Mark IV Industries Inc. v. NM Env. Dep't, 438 BR 460，467（Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010）；In re Industrial Salvage, Inc., 196 BR 784, 789（Bank. S.D. Ill. 1996）。 30 见

U.S. v. Hubler, 117 BR 160, 164-65（W.D. Pa. 1990）。

31 一般参见 32 参见

In re Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. NJ Dep't Envtl. Prot., 8 F.3d 146, 151（3rd Cir. 1993）。

In re IT Group, Inc., Co. 339 BR 338, 342-43（D. Del. 2006）。

33 同上。 34

In re GI Holdings Inc., 654 Fed. Appx. 571, 574（2016 年 3 月 3 日）。

In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1 008（2d Cir. 1991）。

U.S. v. Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734, 736-37（7th Cir. 2009）; In re Taylor, 572 BR 592, 603（Banker. EDNC 2017）。

37 参见，例如

Mark IV Industries Inc. v. NM Env. Dep't., 438 BR 460, 469（Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010）（《新墨西哥州水质法案》不允许该州自行进行清理并收回成本，强制令并非可撤销的要求）。 38 参见，例如

In re Crystal Oil Co., 158 F.3d 291，298（5th Cir. 1998）；In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925, 930（9th Cir. 1993 ）；In re Nat. Gypsum Co., 139 BR 397, 409（ND Tex. 1992）；In re Motors Liquidation Co., 598 BR 744, 756（ S.D.N.Y. 2019）。 39

In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925, 930（9th Cir. 1993）（省略内部引用）。

United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Cal Water Quality Control Bd., 255 Cal Rptr. 3d 796, 831（2019）。

In re Crystal Oil Co., 158 F.3d 291, 298（5th Cir. 1998）。

42 参见例如

In re Parker, 313 F.3d 1267, 1269-70（10th Cir. 2002）; Grady v. AH Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 203（4th Cir.

1988）。 43 参见

In re Motors Liquidation Co., 598 BR 744, 755（S.D.N.Y. 2019）。

11 U.S.C. § 554（a）。

Midlantic Nat. Bank v. NJ Dep't. Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 507（1986）。

In Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 BR 562, 565（Banker. WD Okla. 1986）。还可参见 In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12，16（4th Cir. 1988）；In re Brio Refining, Inc., 86 BR 487, 489（ND Tex. 1988）。 47

In Franklin Signal Corp., 65 BR 268，272（Bankr. D. Minn. 1986）。

48 参见，例如，In 49

re Peerless Plate Co., 70 BR 943, 946-47（Bankr. WD Mich. 1987）。

11 USC § 363（f）。

New California Law Excludes Some Industries from "ABC" Test for Independent Contractors By Samuel J. Stone

HIGHLIGHTS  A new California law, Assembly Bill (AB) 2257, modifies the earlier enacted AB 5, which had a strict "ABC" test that effectively precluded many industries that traditionally relied on independent contractors from utilizing contractors, instead requiring that such contractors be classified as employees.  Numerous industries were impacted by AB 5's functional preclusion on entities retaining independent contractors, including news/journalism and online content providers, musicians and artists, consultant services, transportation services and many other services in the so-called "gig" economy.  AB 2257 aims to limit the sizable impacts of AB 5 on a number of these professions and industries by specifically excluding many of them from analysis under the ABC test. AB 2257, however, notably does not make accommodations for certain transportation and technology companies that serve as an interchange to connect drivers to passengers. ____________________ On the eve of the Labor Day weekend, California Gov. Gavin Newsom signed Assembly Bill (AB) 2257 into law. The new law, which took effect immediately, modifies the recently enacted AB 5. As Holland & Knight previously covered, AB 5 marked a sea change in how employees and independent contractors are classified under California law. (See Holland & Knight's previous alert, "New California Law Codifies – and Expands – Strict ABC Test for Independent Contractor Status," Sept. 25, 2019.) AB 5's strict "ABC" test effectively precluded many industries that traditionally relied on independent contractors from utilizing contractors, instead requiring that traditional contractors be classified as employees. Under AB 5, a person providing labor or services for remuneration shall be considered an employee rather than an independent contractor unless the hiring entity demonstrates that all of the following conditions are satisfied: A. that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact B. that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity's business C. that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation or business of the same nature as the work performed While Condition A is reminiscent of the primary right-to-control test under certain formerly controlling case law, the B and C conditions make it significantly more difficult to classify workers as independent contractors. AB 5 established that the "ABC" test applied to misclassification analyses under not only the Labor Code, but also California's Unemployment Insurance Code and Wage Orders.

AB 5 did contain a limited – and extremely difficult to establish – business-to-business exception. To establish this exception, the contracting business was required to satisfy each of the following 12 conditions:  the business service provider is free from the control and direction of the contracting business entity in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact  the business service provider is providing services directly to the contracting business rather than to customers of the contracting business  the contract with the business service provider is in writing  if the work is performed in a jurisdiction that requires the business service provider to have a business license or business tax registration, the business service provider has the required business license or business tax registration  the business service provider maintains a business location that is separate from the business or work location of the contracting business  the business service provider is customarily engaged in an independently established business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed  the business service provider actually contracts with other businesses to provide the same or similar services and maintains a clientele without restrictions from the hiring entity  the business service provider advertises and holds itself out to the public as available to provide the same or similar services  the business service provider provides its own tools, vehicles and equipment to perform the services  the business service provider can negotiate its own rates  consistent with the nature of the work, the business service provider can set its own hours and location of work, and  the business service provider is not performing the type of work for which a license from the Contractors State License Board is required, pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 7000) of Division 3 of the Business and Professions Code A significant criticism of AB 5 was that the business-to-business exception could not be used by many contractor-heavy industries legitimately engaging independent contractors because the restrictive factors effectively required the putative contractor to have a physical place of business. Further criticism derived from the piecemeal carveouts and exemptions to AB 5. For example, many politically connected and well-funded industries waged successful lobbying efforts to get their industries exempted from AB 5 – such as the building and construction trades, which received a specific carveout. Other less-connected industries heavily reliant on contractors – such as newspapers and news reporting agencies, artists and musicians and consulting professionals – were not as fortunate. Between the time that AB 5 was codified and passage of AB 2257, many of these "left out" industries lobbied the Legislature for revisions to what they viewed as AB 5's inequitable application of the ABC test.

AB 2257'S RECASTING OF AB 5'S COVERAGE There are numerous well-documented examples of industries impacted by AB 5's functional preclusion on entities retaining independent contractors, including news/journalism and online content providers, musicians and artists, consultant services, transportation services and many other services in the so-called "gig" economy, where putative contractors work on a self-governed basis, frequently when and where they desire. AB 2257 aims to limit the sizable impacts of AB 5 on a number of these professions and industries by specifically excluding certain of them from analysis under the ABC test. Copyright © 2020 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

As modified by AB 2257, new professions added as exemptions from the ABC test include:    

fine artists, freelance writers, translators, editors, advisors, producers, copy editors, illustrators insurance underwriters those providing professional consulting services certain occupations involved with creating, marketing, promoting, or distributing sound recordings or musical compositions  musicians for the purpose of a single-engagement live performance event and other performance artists  a modified exemption for photographers, photojournalists, videographers and photo editors working under contract, as well as a new exemption for content aggregators  real estate appraisers and home inspectors The law also creates a new exemption for business-to-business relationships between two or more sole proprietors. While hiring entities will still have to establish 12 factors, now, the factors have been modified to reflect that contractors may provide services directly to the hiring entity's customers, whereas previously this would necessarily violate Prong "B". The service provider must still hold itself out under its own name and must have the ability to provide services to other businesses in order to take advantage of the expanded businessto-business exemption. Significantly, putative contractors need not actually provide services to other entities, so long as they "can" provide services to other clients. Notably, AB 2257 established a new exemption for "single-engagement events." These are engagements where contractors perform services on-site for a single engagement, including specialized, highly-skilled labor. As long as certain conditions are met, the ABC test will not apply to situations where an individual (or entity) contracts to perform services at "a stand-alone non-recurring event in a single location, or a series of events in the same location no more than once a week." An additional significant change in AB 2257 was expansion of the referral agency exemption. While the previous exemption contained a multifactor showing that a hiring entity must establish, the newly-expanded exemption included specific occupations and industries, essentially short-circuiting businesses in these industries need to establish the multiple factors. The newly-expanded exception expressly applies to, among others, consultants, youth sports coaches, caddies, wedding/event planners and services provided by the same, and interpreting services. AB 2257, however, notably does not make any accommodations for certain transportation and technology companies that serve as an interchange to connect drivers to passengers. AB 2257 also creates the possibility for increased litigation regarding joint employer status. The legislation provides that the ABC test is used to determine "whether an individual worker is an employee" of a contractor referred to provide services, or an employee of the client to whom the contractor was referred. Adopting the ABC test for determining employee status in these situations creates a significant possibility that even when a business can avail itself of the business-to-business exception to hire contractors, the contractor's employees could still be determined to be employees of the hiring entity. For the new positions exempted from the ABC test, determining whether a worker is a putative employee or contractor reverts to the multifactor test under existing law, as expressed in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341 (1989). Under Borello, the primary test of an employment relationship, known as the "right to control" test, is whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.

CONCLUSION AND CONSIDERATIONS Although AB 2257 is a significant modification to AB 5 and provides some relief to certain industries, AB 5 still remains a complex framework of exceptions, exemptions and qualifications. There is still the possibility of significant changes to AB 5 by way of referendum. In the interim, however, businesses that use independent contractors or contract with "gig economy" workers in California should closely review all independent contractor classifications and gig worker arrangements to assess the potential impact of AB 5, AB 2257 and the ABC test on operations, as well as to determine their next steps to avoid potential misclassification exposure going forward.

加州新法律将一些行业排除在认定独立承包商资格的“ABC”测试之外原文作者：Samuel J. Stone

重点摘要： 

众议院法案（AB）2257 这一项新的加州法律修改了早先颁布具有一个严格的“ABC”测试的AB 5，而该测试有效地阻碍许多传统上依赖独立承包商的行业利用承包商，而是要求将这些承包商归类为雇员。



AB 5 功能上阻碍事业单位使用独立承包商一事对许多行业造成了影响，这些行业包括新闻记者和在线内容提供商、音乐家和艺术家、咨询服务、运输服务和所谓“共享”经济中的许多其他服务业。



AB 2257 旨在限缩 AB 5 对这些专业和行业的巨大影响，具体而言，AB 2257 将其中许多专业及行业排除在 ABC 测试的分析之外。然而，值得注意的是，AB 2257 并没有解决某些作为连结司机和乘客的信息交换服务的运输和技术公司的问题。 ____________________ 在美国劳动节周末前夕，加州州长加文·纽森签署了众议院第 2257 号法案使之成为法律。这立即生效的新法律修改了近期颁布的 AB 5。正如 Holland & Knight 之前所报导，AB 5 标志着加州法律对雇员和独立承包商的分类方式发生了巨大变化。（参见 Holland & Knight 先前的提示文章，“新的加州法律明文规定并扩大用于认定独立承包商身份的 ABC 测试”，2019 年 9 月 25 日）。AB 5 的严格“ABC”测试有效地阻碍许多传统上依赖独立承包商的行业利用承包商，而要求传统承包商被归类为雇员。根据 AB 5，提供劳动或服务以获得报酬的人员应被视为雇员，而不是独立承包商，除非雇用实体证明满足以下所有条件： A.

根据工作履行合同和事实上，该人员不受雇用实体对工作履行的控制和指导

该人员从事的工作超出了雇用实体的通常业务范围

该人员通常从事与所从事的工作性质相同的独立的行业、职业或业务

虽然条件 A 使人想起在某些以前具有决定性的判例法下的主要控制能力测试，但 B 和 C 条件造成将员工归类为独立承包商的难度大大增加。AB 5 确认了“ABC”测试不仅适用于劳动法下的错误分类分析，而且业适用于加州失业保险法和工资命令的问题。 AB 5 确实包含了一个有限且极难建立的企业对企业的例外规定。为了符合这一例外规定，雇用事业实体必须满足以下 12 个条件：  商业服务提供人不受雇用事业实体对工作履行的控制和指导，无论是根据工作履行合同还是根据事实  商业服务提供人直接向雇用事业实体提供服务，而不是向雇用事业实体的客户提供服务  与商业服务提供人的合同是书面的  如果要求商业服务提供人在必须具备营业执照或营业税登记的司法管辖区内开展工作，则商业服务提供人具有所需的营业执照或营业税登记  商业服务提供人具有一个与雇用事业实体的业务或工作地点不同的业务地点  商业服务提供人通常从事与所从事的工作具有相同性质的独立设立的事业 Copyright © 2020 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

 商业服务提供人不受雇用实体的限制，实际上与其他企业签订合同以提供相同或类似的服务并维持客户  商业服务提供人进行向公众宣传其可以自己的名义提供相同或类似的服务的广告活动  商业服务提供人提供自己的工具、车辆和设备来执行服务  商业服务提供人可以协商自己的费率  根据工作性质，商业务服务提供人可以制订自己的工作时间和地点；以及  根据《商业和职业法》第 3 部分第 9 章（从第 7000 节开始），商业服务提供人不是从事需要州承包商许可委员会所发执照的工作对 AB 5 的一个重大批评是，企业对企业的例外规定不能被许多合法聘用独立承包商且严重依赖承包商的企业所利用，因为限制因素实际上要求推定的承包商有一个实际的营业处所。进一步的批评来自于零碎的 AB 5 的例外及豁免。例如，许多政治关系密切、资金充裕的行业进行了成功的游说努力，以使其行业免受 AB 5 的限制，例如建筑业和营造业，它们得到了特定的例外对待。其他关系较弱但严重依赖承包商的行业，如报纸和新闻报导机构、艺术家和音乐家以及咨询专业人士，就没有那么幸运了。从 AB 5 被编入法典到 AB 2257 法案通过，这些“被忽视”的行业游说立法机构对他们认为不公平地套用 ABC 测试的 AB 5 进行修改。

AB 2257 重铸 AB 5 的涵括范围就 AB 5 功能上阻碍事业单位使用独立承包商而对许多行业造成影响一事，有许多经详细记载的行业的例子，包括新闻/记者和在线内容提供商、音乐家和艺术家、咨询服务、运输服务和所谓“共享”经济中的许多其他服务，所认定的承包商在自己管理自己的基础上工作，并通常是在他们想要工作的时间和地点工作。AB 2257 旨在限缩 AB 5 对这些专业和行业的巨大影响，具体而言，是将其中某些行业排除在 ABC 测试分析之外。根据 AB 2257 的修改，豁免于 ABC 测试的新增职业包括：  文艺艺术家，自由撰稿人，翻译，编辑，顾问，制作人，文案编辑，插画家  保险承保人  提供专业咨询服务的人  从事音乐录音及音约词曲乐创作或销售、行销、推广或销售的职业  单一聘用的现场表演音乐家和其他表演艺术家  对以合同聘用的摄影师、摄影记者、摄像师和照片编辑提供的一个修订后的豁免，以及对内容聚合工作人员的一项新的豁免  房地产估价师和房屋检查员该法还为两个或多个独资企业主之间的企业对企业关系设立了新的豁免。虽然雇用实体仍必须确定 12 个因素，但现在，这些因素已经被修改以反映承包商可以直接向雇用实体的客户提供服务，而以前这必然违反“B”项。为了利用到这个扩大的企业对企业的豁免，提供服务的人仍然必须以自己的名义且必须有能力向其他企业提供服务。值得注意的是，认定的承包商不需要实际向其他实体提供服务，只要他们“能够”向其他客户提供服务。 Copyright © 2020 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

值得注意的是，AB 2257 规定了一个新的“单一聘用情况”的豁免。这些活动是指承包商在现场为一个项目提供服务，包括专业的、高技能的劳动力。只要满足某些条件，ABC 测试将不适用于个人（或实体）签约在“单个地点的独立非重复情况（或同一地点的一系列活动中每周不超过一次）”的情况下提供服务。 AB 2257 的另一个重要变化是扩大了转介机构豁免。虽然之前的豁免包含了招聘实体必须显现达到多个因素，但新扩大的豁免包括特定职业和行业，基本上径行对许多需要建达到多个因素的行业提供豁免。新扩大的例外明确适用于顾问、青少年体育教练、球童、婚礼/活动策划人及其提供的服务以及口译服务等。然而，值得注意的是， AB 2257 并没有解决某些作为连结司机和乘客的信息交换服务的运输和技术公司的问题。 AB 2257 还可能增加关于共同雇主身份的诉讼的机会。法律规定 ABC 测试用于确定一个人员是否是介绍来提供服务的承包商的“雇员”或承包商所提供服务的客户的雇员。在这些情况下，采用 ABC 测试来确定雇员的身份，这就产生了一种很大的可能性，那就是即使企业可以利用企业对企业的例外情况雇用承包商，承包商的雇员仍然可以被认定为雇佣实体的雇员。对于豁免于 ABC 测试的新职位，根据现有法律，如 S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc.诉工业关系部一案 48 Cal. 3d 341 （1989 年）中所述，认定一人员是否为雇员或承包商的方法将回复到多因素检测方法。根据 Borello 案的判决，雇佣关系的主要测试方法，即被称为“控制权”测试的测试方法，是被服务的人是否有权控制实现预期结果的方式和方法。

结论与注意事项尽管 AB 2257 是对 AB 5 的重大修改，并对某些行业提供了一定程度的缓解，但 AB 5 仍然是一个包含复杂的例外、豁免和资格限制的法律框架。并且仍然存在透过公投对 AB 5 进行重大修改的可能性。然而在此期间，在加州使用独立承包商或聘用“共享经济”人员签订合同的企业应仔细审查所有独立承包商分类和共享经济人员的安排，以评估 AB 5、AB 2257 和 ABC 测试对运营的潜在影响，以及确定他们的下一步行动，并避免发生可能的错误分类情况。

About This Newsletter 有关本期刊 Information contained in this newsletter is for the general education and knowledge of our readers. It is not designed to be, and should not be used as, the sole source of information when analyzing and resolving a legal problem. Moreover, the laws of each jurisdiction are different and are constantly changing. If you have specific questions regarding a particular fact situation, we urge you to consult competent legal counsel. Holland & Knight lawyers are available to make presentations on a wide variety of China-related issues. 本期刊所刊载的信息仅供我们的读者为一般教育及学习目的使用。本期刊并不是为作为解决某一法律问题的唯一信息来源的目的所设计，也不应被如此使用。此外，每一法律管辖区域的法律各有不同且随时在改变。如您有关于某一特别事实情况的具体法律问题，我们建议您向合适的律师咨询。美国霍兰德奈特律师事务所的律师能够对许多与中国相关的问题提出他们的看法及建议。

About the Authors 关于本期作者 Maria de la Motte is a Boston real estate attorney. While in law school, she worked at the Massachusetts Division of Capital Asset Management and Maintenance, where she gained exposure to the practice of real estate, construction and energy law. Seth J. Entin is a Miami tax attorney who focuses his practice on international taxation. He was named Miami Lawyer of the Year in Tax Law for 2016 by The Best Lawyers in America guide and is ranked in Band 1 for Tax in Florida by Chambers USA – America's Leading Business Lawyers guide. He has experience handling international taxation of high-net-worth individuals, international corporate taxation, Internal Revenue Service international tax audits and litigation, and offshore voluntary disclosures. John J. Monaghan serves as the co-national practice group leader of the firm's Bankruptcy, Restructuring and Creditors' Rights Practice Group. He is particularly focused on representing major case participants in complex commercial insolvency and restructuring matters, with a particular focus on Chapter 11 cases. He represents both U.S.-based companies and non-U.S. companies in both in-court and out-of-court domestic and crossborder insolvency proceedings. His creditor representations focus on matters involving senior lenders, both in syndicated and bilateral deals. He also has extensive experience representing creditors' committees, equity committees, purchasers of assets, landlords, licensors, trustees, parties to prepetition contracts and leases, litigants in adversary proceedings and unsecured creditors. Dianne R. Phillips concentrates her practice in litigation, regulatory, energy and environmental law. Her environmental practice focuses on brownfields redevelopment and remediation, including former military installations, former manufactured gas plants (MGPs) and vapor intrusion sites. She regularly advises developers, lenders and investors in real estate transactions involving contaminated property, enforcement defense, regulatory compliance, due diligence, and complex project development and permitting matters, including those under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), among others. Copyright © 2020 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

Samuel J. Stone is a Los Angeles labor and employment attorney. He represents employers of all sizes on a variety of litigation issues, complex civil and criminal investigations, and advice-and-counsel matters, including first-chairing a number of bench trials, administrative hearings and administrative appeals to decision. His clients include companies in the retail, hospitality, financial, legal services, construction, manufacturing, and transportation industries, including international airlines and carriers. Lynne B. Xerras is a Boston attorney and a member of the firm's Bankruptcy, Restructuring and Creditors' Rights Group. She has focused her more than 20-year career representing companies in distress in and out of bankruptcy court, having guided numerous management teams through the Chapter 11 process from petition to plan confirmation as debtors-in-possession. She has extensive experience representing trade creditors and creditors' committees in complex Chapter 11 cases and continues to advise clients across a wide range of industries regarding their rights as suppliers, contract-counterparties and purchasers in transactions invoking the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or other state law remedies.

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