Deterrence: An Art of War

RUSSIA AND UKRAINE RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

Deterrence is not just the ability to fight; it’s the will to fight. By announcing that the United States possessed no such will for Ukraine, the White House told Putin all he needed to know: he would not be deterred.

By Nadia Schadlow

Acredible deterrent is designed to alter a potential aggressor’s calculations of risk and reward. Vladimir Putin determined that the potential cost of invading Ukraine was relatively low, and on February 24 he attacked. It will be the job of historians to try to understand why deterrence failed.

Deterrence involves two factors: capability and will. Capability means having the military strength to deliver intolerable damage to an adversary. Will is the determination to use that strength and deliver that damage.

The United States spends hundreds of billions of dollars a year to strengthen its military capabilities, and they are formidable. Resolve costs nothing, but it is priceless when it comes to deterring aggression. By signaling that the United States had no intention of using its capabilities, the Biden administration seriously weakened their deterrent value.

Nadia Schadlow is a national security visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. She is a former deputy national security adviser for strategy.

The White House has consistently broadcast what it won’t do, removing a crucial component of deterrence: the ability to amplify risk through ambiguity. Putin now knows exactly how much to escalate the conflict because US officials have told him exactly what the maximum US response will be.

In early December, President Biden ruled out the possibility of using US military power, stating that any consideration of American combat troops in Ukraine was “off the table.” In January, even after trying to explain his comment that a “minor incursion” wouldn’t warrant a forceful response, Biden repeated what he wouldn’t do. There wouldn’t be “any American forces moving into Ukraine,” he said. In February he did it again, explaining that US actions were “totally defensive” and that we “had no intention of fighting Russia.”

What is particularly puzzling is that these messages were broadcast against a backdrop of increasing intelligence that Russia was preparing for war. While the White House apparently had a strategy to “aggressively release” intelligence, it concurrently made clear that it wouldn’t act on this intelligence to deter Putin.

Most recently, Secretary of State Antony Blinken discounted the possibility of deploying North Atlantic Treaty Organization warplanes to support the Ukrainian resistance. He explained publicly that he was worried such an arrangement might drag the United States and NATO into open conflict Could this conflict have been averted with Russia. This view with a more convincing demonstrawas repeated by top mili- tion of US resolve? We will never tary leaders. The com- know. manding general of the US European Command announced that the American intelligence community had assessed that the “transfer of MiG-29s to Ukraine may be mistaken as escalatory.” In case this wasn’t clear, the command further clarified that it had no plans to “facilitate an indirect, or third-party, transfer of Polish aircraft.”

Such statements consistently play down the will of the United States. The Biden administration’s repeated statements that it is unwilling to escalate under any circumstances increases the risks of unintended escalation. Putin and his military are measuring American will based on what they see and hear. This is probably why they are acting as though there is little threat of resistance from any power more potent than the Ukrainian military.

This doesn’t necessarily mean that the United States should deploy its troops to Ukraine or establish a no-fly zone by contesting Russian aircraft.

The current bipartisan consensus is that such actions aren’t in the American interest. But there is no reason to broadcast our reservations and reveal the weakness of our will.

Why share internal policy discussions and military deliberations with an adversary? A plausible explanation is that the White House has decided to give priority to the US domestic audience, as There’s no reason to broadcast our opposed to signaling to reservations and reveal the weakness Russia. But by openly takof our will. There are plenty of reasons ing options off the table, not to. the administration not only undercuts its operational flexibility but it also gives the enemy additional clarity. There is value in ambiguity—especially when Russia is a master at it.

The Russians, with their vivid history of resisting better-equipped armies from imperial Sweden, France, and Germany, understand the importance of will. It is a key component of their military doctrine and is expressed in their concept of “escalate to de-escalate.” That means that the Russian military has stated its willingness to increase the intensity of violence to end a war on favorable terms. Few observers doubt either Putin’s ability or his willingness to do so.

Could this conflict have been averted with a more convincing demonstration of American resolve? We will never know for sure. Deterrence is an art, not a science. But the United States almost certainly faces a challenge if it wants to keep the peace in the future. Restoring the perception of American will to deter conflict may, ironically, require an even more forceful manifestation of that will on the battlefield. In a world of diminished deterrence, the desire for peace could make conflict more certain.

Reprinted by permission of the Wall Street Journal. © 2022 Dow Jones & Co. All rights reserved.

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