Daikonia report zero draft final

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diakonia PEOPLE CHANGING THE WORLD

51°E

Somalia Conflict Analysis & Facilitation of Peace-Building Programming, Somalia

Final Report December, 2013 Conducted by:

Submitted To:

Research and Development Associates

Diakonia

P.O Box 103533-00101

P.O. Box 21323

Tel 254- 700139514

Nairobi 00505 Kenya

Tel: +254 20 6180200

diakonia PEOPLE CHANGING THE WORLD

Acknowledgement Many persons contributed to the success of the assessment process. We are grateful to the Diakonia Nairobi team for approving the process and availing assistance to the process and making it a success. The process also benefited from the expertise of consultants who oversaw and aided the assessment exercise. We extend exceptional gratitude to RDA evaluation team for being of service in providing professional knowledge, gathering data, collating, analyzing and producing the final report.

Finally, we are indebted to the key informants who took part in the assessment for their invaluable input to the process. In a specific way, we would like to express our deep appreciation for their efforts and acknowledge and their contribution.

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Conflict Mapping Report - December, 2013

Abbreviations AMISOM Africa Union Mission for Somalia AS Al-Shabaab ASWJ

Al-Suna Wa Jama

BBU

Building Bridges of Understanding

CAF

Conflict Analysis Framework

DfID

Department for International Development

DO

Direct Observation

FGD

Focus Group Discussion

GOE

Government of Ethiopia

IDPs

Internally Displaced Persons

IGAD

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

JVA

Juba Valley Alliance

KDF

Kenya Defence Forces

KII

Key Informants Interview

MP

Member of Parliament

QN

Quraca Nabadda

SFG

Somali Federal Government

SNA

Somalia National Army

SNF

Somali National Forces

SPM

Somali Patriotic Movement

SSC

Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn

SSDF

Somali Salvation Democratic Front

TFG

Transitional Federal Government

TNG

Transitional National Government

UIC

United Islamic Courts

USC

United Somalia Congress

VW

Validation Workshop Conflict Mapping Report - December, 2013

5

Table of Contents Acknowledgement 4 Abbreviations 5 Table of Contents

6

List of Figures

7

Executive Summary

8

Summary of Key Findings

10

Section I: Introduction 1.1 Background and Context

12

1.2 Objectives of the Assignment

13

Section II: Assessment Methodology 2.1 Methods and Tools

14

2.1.1 Desk Review

14

2.1.2 Key Informants (KI) Interviews

14

2.1.3 Direct Field Observations

15

2.2 Validation Workshop

15

Section III: Results and Discussion 3.1 Somaliland

16

3.1.1 Context

16

3.1.2 Conflict Hotspots

16

3.1.3 Eastern Borderlands, Togdheer Region and Western Region

18

3.1.4 Summary of Dividers and Local Capacities for Peace in Somaliland

25

3.2 Puntland Region

26

3.2.1 Context

26

3.2.2 Conflict Hotspots

27

3.2.4 Conflict Between Puntland and Somaliland over Sool and Sanaag Regions

30

3.2.6 Mudug Region

30

3.2.5 Conflicts Timelines: Puntland

31

3.2.6 Summary of Dividers and Local Capacities for Peace in Puntland

32

3.3 South-Central Somalia

33

3.3.1 Context

33

3.3.2 Conflict Hotspots

33

3.3.3 Conflict between the Federal Government and the Emerging Regional States

40

3.3.4 Summary of Dividers and Local Capacities for Peace in South Central Somalia

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Section IV: Conclusions and Recommendations 4.1 Conclusion

44

4.2 Recommendations for Action

44

Appendix

6

List of Documents Reviewed I

49

KI Guide Questionnaire II

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Conflict Mapping Report - December, 2013

List of Figures Figure 1: Conflict Hotspots and Actors in Somaliland

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Figure 2: Conflict Actor Mapping: Somaliland

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Summary of Dividers and Local Capacities for Peace in Somaliland

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Figure 3: Conflict Affected / Prone

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Figure 4: Actor Analysis: Puntland

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Summary of Dividers and Local Capacities for Peace in Puntland

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Figure 5: Kismayu Clan Alliances

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Figure 6: Conflict Actors in Kismayu, Lower Juba Region

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Figure 7: Clan Conflict in Lower Shabelle Region

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Figure 8: Land Dispute Timelines

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Summary of Dividers and Local Capacities for Peace in South Central Somalia

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Conflict Mapping Report - December, 2013

7

Executive Summary Key Points

This report presents key findings, outcomes, main conclu-

Somalia’s history of conflict portrays a contra-

sions and recommendation for action based on conflict anal-

diction in that many of the factors that drive

ysis conducted in Somaliland, Puntland, and South-Central

armed conflict have also played a role in man-

Somalia. The undertaking was scheduled to provide infor-

aging, ending, or preventing conflict. Clan is

mation on relevant conflicts in the specified geographical

a peace building mechanism and also a key

areas as well as recommendations to inform Diakonia’s pro-

driver of conflict.

grammatic interventions in the country.

Clan-based and politically-motivated tension

Evidence based programming and policy development in the

serve as a trigger for sporadic incidence of vio-

field of conflict mapping, analysis and viable peace building

lence across the three regions examined.

programming highlights the need for comprehensive, reli-

The key conflict drivers in the examined regions include self-determination, oil exploration, sovereignty over disputed territories, proliferation of clan-based states, under development, political control, clan politicking, and competition for MP seats and government appointments.

Conflicting administrations have overlapping interests and needs to securing political and administrative legitimacy.

able, good quality data collection, and analysis in order to support timely and effective decision-making and programming. This is particularly important in complex emergency situations where dramatic changes occur rapidly and where there is a need for continuous humanitarian needs assessments. Measuring the outcome and impact of interventions to deal with clan, political and resource based conflicts is of paramount importance to advance collective understanding of what works or does not work.

The exercise was conducted in the context of a historical milestone where Somalia has recorded an improvement to-

Conflicts are manipulated by politicians at a

ward recovery from devastation after more than two dec-

political level, but it is at the community level,

ades of civil war. The report established that while the first

where clans engage and fight each other and

formal Federal parliament was sworn-in in August 2012 and

where the impact is most felt.

subsequently voted in the President, marking the end of a 12-year transition, the country is still engulfed in various

Communities neither co-exist nor share power

challenges including political dissimilarities, ongoing mili-

as they see each other as enemy. To address the

tary operations, insecurity due to extremist groups, clan dif-

challenge, there is need to focus on civic dia-

ferences, suspicion and mistrust and scramble for resources

logues towards democratization, facilitating

among the clans and local administrations. It is these chal-

social reconciliation, enhancing local capaci-

lenges that the new Somali Federal Government (SFG) has

ties for peace, and support tangible evidence of

to deal with to restore security and stability in the whole

renewed collaboration of the “other” through

country – including in Somaliland and Puntland which both

jointly managed peace dividend projects.

have tense relationships with the SFG. In this regard, the

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Conflict Mapping Report - December, 2013

report has given specific recommendations for action to inform the recovery process.

Significant attention still needs to be devoted to implementation of the Provisional Constitution, governance arrangements in many areas of South-Central Somalia need concentrated effort, and their remains substantial sensitivity around talks with Somaliland. There is currently an absence of substantive dialogue and thinking on the details of the new Provisional Constitution (June 2012). The constitution remains provisional – pending a national referendum – with many of the key components remaining unresolved. The Federal government is no closer today than it was 18 months ago to agreeing on a process through which the text can be adopted and presented in a national referendum. The highly asymmetric nature of the status and competencies of emerging administrative units within Somalia will require consideration of flexible and innovative governance arrangements to link these emerging administrative entities at the “sub-national” level to the national level. A “one size fits all” approach will not be sufficient. To genuinely engage Somalis in broad, internallyled consultations on the arrangements they desire to govern themselves in the future; will require provision of frameworks and options to enable Somalis to generate these arrangements themselves, rather than being presented with an externally-generated arrangement.

This report contains the executive summary and four other sections. The executive summary presents the summary of key findings and a summary of key recommendations. Section I discusses the background and objectives of the assessment while Section II details the assessment methodology. Section III is a discussion of the assessment findings from the three regions examined and finally section four highlights the main conclusion and key recommendations for action.

Conflict Mapping Report - December, 2013

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Summary of Key Findings Despite the fact that there are similarities in the nature, scale and impact of conflict in the three regions examined, there are distinct differences unique to every location which requires region-specific programmatic interventions.

In the case of Somaliland, conflict hotspots are in the western province, eastern borderlands and Togdheer Regions. Somaliland, Puntland and Khatumo1 states and clans in these regions are primarily the conflict actors. Overall, conflict in Somaliland revolves around political, social and resource-based triggers including clan-based and politically-motivated tension which serves to set off sporadic incidences of violence across the region. There are political factors such as self-determination, conflict over territorial control and attainment of political legitimacy in the region among different actors. There are also socio-economic triggers such as poverty and underdevelopment, land and resource-based issues such as conflict over oil exploration contracts. The region’s southern areas, Buhodle District, plays host to a spill-over of Somaliland’s borderland dispute with Puntland and Khatumo States. Moreover, there has always been an intense rivalry between region’s two major Isaaq sub-clans – i.e. Habar Yonis and Habar Je’lo – over the region’s socio-political and economic supremacy. Western province (Awdal), which was considered one of Somaliland’s most socio-politically stable region, has suffered from sporadic incidents of violent conflict following the aftermath of Somaliland’s most recent local election (Nov. 2012). The election results have had an unintended consequence pinning Awdal’s clans against one another along socio-political interests in which democratic institutions have become grounds for ethnic and political rivalries. Among the conflict’s major impact is the absence of all levels of cooperation at the state level between the various conflicting actors (Somaliland, Puntland, Khatumo and the SFG).

In regards to Puntland, the primary conflict actors are Puntland, Somaliland, Khatumo, Galmudug states and the SFG; extremist groups, pirates and clans. The democratization and election process is one of the obvious triggers of violent conflict in Puntland. Other conflict issues in the region is due to lack of effective social reconciliation, resource-based conflict (land and pasture), natural resources (potential oil and gas reserves), mistrust and suspicion among clans and politicians, radicalization of youth as a result of lack of employment opportunities, lack of security coordination among regional administrations, overlap of regional and clan borders, territorial dispute, historical grievances, and power struggles. Among the conflict’s major impact is the absence of all levels of cooperation at the state level between the conflicting actors (Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug, Khatumo and the SFG).

Concerning South-Central Somalia, the primary conflict actors are clans, Somalia National Army (SNA), Al-Shabaab (AS), Al-Suna Wa Jama (ASWJ), Africa Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM)

1 Khatumo State was formed in January 2012 following the announcement of elders and politicians in eastern Sool, Sanaag and Ayn regions due to continued dismay with the administrations in Somaliland and Puntland, neighboring regions as a result of long-running territorial disputes covering parts of Khatumo.

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Conflict Mapping Report - December, 2013

forces, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) and Diaspora established clan-based mini-states. The conflict triggers in the region entail scramble for power to establish clan-based local and regional administrations, political and economic marginalization, inter and intra-clan mistrust, social atrocities including rape and vendetta killings; resource based-conflict including farmland invasion, water and pasture; animal theft and historical injustices and grievances. Today, there are significant challenges in the Region: political consensus within Somalia remains fragile (particularly in terms of the regions verses the Federal government); military operations are on-going; security gains need to be solidified through separate political dialogue and reconciliation efforts at village and district levels up to regional and national levels is key; and the continued displacement of Al-Shabaab could lead renewed violent conflict in the regions as war lords and clans scramble for local and regional power (i.e. Kismayu and Merca). The nature of the status of Somaliland, Puntland, and the emerging administrative units (such as Jubaland and others) will require consideration of flexible, innovative, and possibly asymmetric governance arrangements to link these emerging administrative entities with the SFG. A “one size fits all� approach will not be sufficient.

Conflict Mapping Report - December, 2013

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Section I

Introduction 1.1 Background and Context Somalia has undergone two decades of prolonged conflict, plunging the country into a unique state of affairs unparalleled elsewhere in the world. It gave rise to the extremist groups, warlords and war economy of profiteers which fostered anarchy and the segmentation of the country into several clan fiefdoms. Several national reconciliation conferences were held outside the country that culminated in the formation of Transitional Administrations for the country. The notable ones were the Arta-Djibouti in 2000 (Transitional National Government - TNG), the Mbagathi-Kenya (Transitional Federal Government-TFG) in 2004 and in 2009 in Djibouti that saw the formation of the last Transitional Federal Government. These Transitional governments did not only make no headway in resolving the country’s political crisis but were also unsuccessful in the reestablishment of governing institutions and ending persistent corruption, thus creating an enduring difficult transitional period.

Today, however, Somalia is beginning to recover from the devastation of war. In August 2012, Somalia’s first formal Federal parliament was sworn-in and subsequently voted in the President, marking the end of a 12year transition. It is reviving statehood and entering a period of transformation and reform. It is paramount that governance institutions, particularly the local regional/district administrations, which will foster stability, are in place and functioning in line with the government’s policy and the provisional constitution. The need for these locally rooted and acceptable governance structures that address and provide services and support for local communities cannot be disputed.

Despite the progress made thus far, significant challenges remain: political consensus within Somalia remains fragile (particularly in terms of the regional administrations verses the Federal government); military operations are on-going; security gains need to be solidified through separate political dialogue and reconciliation efforts at village and district levels up to regional and national levels is key; and the continued displacement of Al-Shabaab could lead renewed violent conflict in the regions as war lords and clans scramble for local and regional power. Towards the end of 2013, violent clashes were experienced in several parts of South-Central Somalia which could threaten the country’s progress towards peace and stability. Clashes were experienced in Middle Shabelle, Hiraan and Lower Shabelle regions. This analysis established that the clashes continue to cause death, injury, displacement and the destruction of property and crops in the fields. The current disintegration shows communities remain divided along clan lines. This division leads to limited interaction among groups, increasing mutual suspicion and mistrust among the population, which often are precursors to escalating tensions and conflict.

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As captured in the Somalia National Government’s President priority pillar three1, “More than two decades of prolonged state collapse caused social fragmentation that makes social reconciliation an important priority area of peace building.” It therefore, follows that state reconstitution must be predicated on social reconciliation and dealing with the past. Today the, SFG’s immediate priority is to stabilize the newly recovered areas from Al-Shabaab, avoiding a local scramble for power and deterioration of security by fostering peace building and civic dialogues of all community stakeholders and providing localized projects aimed at rendering services to the citizens. This will set the very first foundations to prepare the country for the vital next stages of selecting administrations and laying groundwork for one-person, one-vote political elections in 2016.

It is against this that Diakonia called for a conflict analysis for South-Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland to provide information on relevant conflicts in the specified geographical areas as well as recommendations to inform Diakonia’s programmatic interventions in the country. Conflict analysis is a practical process of examining and understanding the reality of a conflict from a variety of perspectives. This then forms the basis on which strategies and actions for intervention can be developed. This conflict analysis encompassed examining the structural, proximate and triggers of the conflict in the selected regions. Structural causes include examining the pervasive (persistent) factors that have become built into the policies, structures and fabric of a society and may create the pre-conditions for violent conflict while proximate causes entailed looking at the factors contributing to a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation, sometimes apparently symptomatic of a deeper problem. On the other hand, analysis of the conflict triggers involved looking at the single key actors, events, or their anticipation that will set off or escalate violent conflict.

1.2 Objectives of the Assignment

Objectives The overall objective of the undertaking was to make a conflict analysis for the three areas of intervention (South-Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland). Specifically, the conflict analysis provided information about and assessments of relevant conflicts in the specified geographical areas as well as help Diakonia and its partners to: Plan and implement a conflict sensitive programme in Somalia; Include relevant and effective peace-building activities as part of the broader programme; Facilitate of the formulation of peace-building goals and strategies; Fine-tune suggested formulation of peace-building goals and strategies for the new programme.

1

During his inauguration, the Somalia National Government President has identified a 6 pillar policy upon which the transformation agenda in the country will be anchored. This part is an excerpt of pillar 3 of the policy. Other pillars are as follows: Pillar One: Full Stability - Supremacy of the law and Good Governance Pillar Two: Economic Recovery - Livelihoods and Economic infrastructure Pillar Three: Peace Building- Social reconciliation through Building Bridges of Trust Pillar Four: Service Delivery - Health, Education and Environment Pillar Five: International Relations - Building collaborative relations and Polishing the National Image.

Pillar Six: The Unity and the Integrity of the country

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Section II

Assessment Methodology 2.1 Methods and Tools Diakonia’s conflict analysis & facilitation of peace-building programming report was prepared through mixed methodology that consist of compiling data and information gathered four research methods and tools. Desk reviews of published and unpublished reports, mapping exercise in conflict prone areas, Key Informants Interview (KII) and Validation Workshop. It was complemented by field direct observation techniques. The conflict analysis followed a deductive analytical process where conclusions and recommendations were drawn on the basis of information gathered through the different data collection techniques described below. Overall, the assessment was guided by USAID’s Conflict Analysis Framework1.

2.1.1 Desk Review Desk review was the starting point for the conflict assessment activity to determine the data gap. It encompassed the review of existing secondary data on the conflict situation in Central-South Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland Regions. Secondary data refers to data that has been collected, collated and analyzed by another sources i.e. other researchers, agencies, institutions or bodies.

2.1.2 Key Informants (KI) Interviews The second step of the assessment was to conduct a key informant interviews. A key informant is a person with unique skills or professional background on the issue being assessed or evaluated. In this assessment, qualitative interviews were conducted between November 29 to December 10, 2013 and covered Saylac, Awdal, Burco, Las-Anod, Buhodle, Eragavo, Galgala, Galkacyo, Marka and Kismayu towns (assessments sites). Thirty-five (35) KIs were contacted and interviewed in these locations. They included clan elders, researchers on the subject under investigation, politicians, civil society groups working on peace and reconciliation activities, local authorities and security experts. Each interview lasted between 45 minutes to 2 hours. Key informants offered information related to the regional conflict situation and support projects required for the region’s sustainable peace and development.

1 For more information on the Conflict Assessment Framework see USAID (2012) Conflict Assessment Framework available at: http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-

do/working-crises-and-conflict/technical-publications

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Conflict Mapping Report - December, 2013

2.1.3 Direct Field Observations Observations during the field visits to assessment sites were aimed primarily at assessing the context and conditions in which the responses were derived from. In addition, direct observation method was used for “triangulation� and cross-checking the information gathered from the KIs and desk study.

Validation Workshop

2.2 Validation Workshop

The first phase of the conflict mapping and analysis exercise was to review the available reports and secondary data on conflict throughout the three regions of Somalia.

The second phase involved the collection of primary data from assessment sites. The results from the desk review and KIs were presented to Diakonia team and partner or-

Results from the desk review and KIs presented to Diakonia team and partner organizations in a one-day validation workshop for feedback

ganizations in a one-day validation workshop held in Nairobi. The validation workshop provided feedback from the various stakeholders on the findings of the conflict mapping and analysis.

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Results and Discussion 3.1 Somaliland 3.1.1 Context Somaliland has enjoyed peace and stability since unilaterally declaring independence from Somalia in 1991.

The stability found in Somaliland is a product of the combined strength of its traditional leadership mechanisms and a sustained commitment to the democratic process. Immediately following the end of the Somali civil war in what was then known as Somalia’s northern regions, Somaliland held a series of clan-based reconciliation efforts at the regional levels as a strategic transition to peace. These efforts culminated in three major national conferences which were held in Burao (1991), Borama (1993), and Hargeysa (1997) which served as platforms for all-encompassing resolutions at the clan-level, but also consensus on issues relating to power-sharing governance. The three national conferences have each taken Somaliland’s peace, stability and subsequently socio-political reconstruction to new heights that enabled the government to expand its control and mandate across its territory. Moreover, increased peace and stability have paved the way for the business establishment to make tremendous progress in a number of sectors critical to overall economic growth.

The region has made tremendous progress in establishing formative government institutions and has successfully held a full cycle of elections. Despite the fact that no country has officially and diplomatically recognized Somaliland as a sovereign state, many including major UN agencies have along the way engaged the region as a de-facto state. The EU, Denmark and the UK all have non-diplomatic offices in Hargeysa which mainly focus on development and related mutually-beneficial matters.

Despite being a pocket of stability inside an extremely volatile peninsula, Somaliland’s remarkable achievements and the consolidation of its peace and stability has been hindered by a range of social, economic, political and security challenges. It is worth noting, however, that none of these incidents have had an impact significant enough to threaten the wider stability of the entire region. Located along Somaliland’s contested borders with Puntland, Sool and Sanaag Regions, particularly the Dhulbahante-inhabited areas, have demonstrated extreme socio-political volatility and instability since Somaliland unilaterally declared independence from the rest of Somalia. While Somaliland and Puntland have been engaged in a struggle to control the region since 1998, the formation of Khatumo State in 2012 has exacerbated the situation to unprecedented levels. While Khatumo poses equal threat to the legitimacy of both Somaliland and Puntland, it is Somaliland that has sustained the most serious destabilizing effect.

3.1.2 Conflict Hotspots Figure 1 below demonstrates the three prioritized hotspots in Somaliland, actors and their relationships which can be found in the Eastern Borderlands, Togdheer Region, and Western Regions. A detailed discussion on the key factors, conflict dynamics, conflict actors and fear-need mapping in the hotspots is presented in section 3.1.3

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below.

Conflict Mapping Report - December, 2013

Figure 1: Conflict Hotspots and Actors in Somaliland

WESTERN REGIONS

EASTERN REGIONS

Somaliland

Saylac District: The balance of local government seats in 2012 elections tipped in favor of the Gadabuursi; Issa clan lost dominance over their stronghold in Somaliland

Gadabuursi Clan

Oil Resources

Issa Clan has denounced Somaliland administration following the 2012 elections outcomes

Issa Clan

Political issues: To secure political and administrative legitimacy and relevance both inside the Somali and beyond

Issa has political influence in Djibouti which may have an impact in the Issa-Gadabuursi conflict

Somaliland

Puntland

Clan issues: Dhulbahante and Warsangeli sub-clans of the Harti/Darood clan and the Habar Yonis and Habar Je’lo sub-clans of the Isaaq have genealogically-driven socio-political differences (Somaliland and Puntland) Teleh Town: Khatumo State Stronghold

Khatumo State

Somaliland

Buhodle District: Control over Buhodle and Lasanod districts; Buhodle district, is the only Somaliland territory which has endured a spill-over of Somaliland’s borderland dispute with Puntland and Khatumo State

TOGDHEER REGION Puntland

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3.1.3 Eastern Borderlands, Togdheer Region and Western Region This section discusses the key factors, conflict dynamics, conflict actors, conflict analysis as well as fear-need mapping in all three hotspot areas of Somaliland-Eastern borderlands (Sool and Sanaag), Togdheer Region and Western Region of Awdal.

Eastern Borderlands: Located along Somaliland’s contested southeast border with Puntland, Sool Region, particularly the Dhulbahante-inhabited areas of Las Anod, Hudun and Taleh, continue to be the scene of extreme socio-political volatility and instability. Somaliland and Puntland have been engaged in a struggle to control the region since 1998. More recently, the formation of Khatumo State has exacerbated the situation. With Taleh as its stronghold, Khatumo poses real and constant threat to the engagement of both Somaliland and Puntland in Sool region as both regions have engaged in efforts to destabilize the burgeoning state.

Located along Somaliland’s eastern contested border, Sanaag region has seen far less violence than Sool. Sanaag Region, particularly the Isaaq-inhabited areas, has enjoyed overall relative peace and political stability.

This stems from the fact that Isaaq sub-clans are unanimous and absolute on their allegiance to Somaliland and its pursuit of sovereignty from the rest of Somalia. However, intra-clan skirmishes due to dispute over the access and ownership of natural resources as we all as unresolved longstanding blood feud are common. The Dhulbahante sub-lineages living in Sanaag region share much of the political precariousness of their clansmen in Sool region, the Warsangeli, which is the dominant clan along the north-eastern parts of this region, are equally aligned to both Somaliland and Puntland. This, along with the fact that they have in place a strong traditional leadership in place, has enabled the Warsangeli to avoid recurrent violence over allegiance to either administration. Nevertheless, peace and stability in this region continues to be rendered fragile by the serious complications in neighboring Sool region.

Sool and Sanaag regions are inhabited by the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli sub-clans of the Harti/Darood clan on the one hand, and by the Habar Yonis and Habar Je’lo sub-clans of the Isaaq clan on the other. The complicated history these sub-clans share is rife with the genealogically-driven socio-political differences the regions are known for today (note however, that the fault-lines have never been as pronounced). The functional traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution have been hampered by the ongoing conflicts in the regions.

The competing political interests among Somaliland, Puntland and Khatumo states remain the most pressing dividers at the moment. Although this is the case, it should be noted that social platforms rooted in Somalia traditions such as intermarriages and sharing of resources present opportunities for resolving the conflicts.

Sool region’s economic context, particularly the Puntland-Somaliland borderlands, can be described as one of extreme precariousness. The major livelihood, which is livestock production, has been on a significant decline due to the combination of manmade and natural calamities like unprecedented rates of charcoal production and recurrent droughts. More recently, the Government of Somaliland has granted concessions to two major oil exploration companies, which can potentially transform the lives and livelihoods of the communities in this region. However, with a region plagued by multi-layered conflict, this is expected to add to the already long list of complexities.

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Somaliland, Puntland and Khatumo State are the three main conflict actors in Eastern Borderlands —each with overlapping interests and needs to securing political and administrative legitimacy in their territories and beyond. While Somaliland aims to protect its territorial integrity upon which it seeks international recognition as an independent state, Puntland seeks to remain a semi-autonomous region of Somalia’s Federal Government with administrative jurisdiction along much of the territories in Sanaag, Sool and Southern Togdheer.

Khatumo State is a relatively newer actor in this conflict, which has resulted from successive efforts and conferences spearheaded by the elites and political establishment of solely the Dhulbahante clan who have been attempting to exercise full control over all territories traditionally belonging to the Dhulbahante.

With respect to conflict dynamics, there has been an escalation in tension between Somaliland and Puntland on the one hand and between the administrations and Khatumo State on the other. Somaliland and Puntland have

engaged in intermittent military confrontations since 2002 over particularly the control of Las Anod town—the largest, most populated and most socio-politically strategic city. The SSC and Somaliland forces were engaged in a series of violent conflict between late 2010 and late 2011 which have claimed the lives and property of those

living in Southern Togdheer region and parts of Sool. While there has not been a full-on war between forces loyal

to Khatumo State and Somaliland, Puntland has been the target of much of Khatumo’s military confrontations since its establishment. For instance, in November 2013, there were clashes between Puntland and Khatumo

forces in Taleh, Khatumo State’s de-facto capital, in which there were several deaths and many injuries. All sides continue to engage in rhetoric over the media, which only suggests sustained political and social tensions along the same fault-lines that have existed over the past two decades. Moreover, several international companies have

initiated oil and mineral exploration efforts inside the contested territories and are currently at various stages

of implementation processes. While this seems to be a positive development on the surface, the exercise of these concessions on disputed territories will certainly be faced with extreme difficulties.

While conflict in Somaliland’s eastern borderlands with Puntland – and Khatumo State – is certainly the result of layers of multi-dimensional complexities, the difference over statehood and self-determination has been the region’s most persistent root cause of conflict. Among the conflict’s major impact is the absence of all levels of cooperation at the state level between the three polities, which has, in fact, been replaced by full-on war.

Moreover, this area is designated as the most underdeveloped areas of both Somaliland and Puntland with severe disruptions to the flow humanitarian and development assistance. The facilitation of increased dialogue between the different clans at the social level has been recommended as a feasible solution to cultivating excellent cross-border rapport and collaborative partnership. Moreover, the utilization of these social bonds as leverage for increased diplomatic, economic and social cooperation and relations between the different political administrations is another solution with a degree of validity.

Togdheer Region: has enjoyed overall security and stability since 1998. However, for many reasons, the region is rife with clanbased and politically-motivated tension that has served as a trigger for sporadic incidence of violence across this region. Firstly, apart from Sool and Sanaag regions, the southern parts of this region, Buhodle district, is the only Somaliland territory which has endured a spill-over of Somaliland’s borderland dispute with PuntConflict Mapping Report - December, 2013

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land and Khatumo State. Primarily inhabited by a Dhulbahante population whose affiliations are divided between Somaliland, Puntland and Khatumo, Buhodle district has been the scene of political turmoil and military confrontations since 2000. The armed struggle for control of the area was initially between Puntland and Somaliland administrations. However, this struggle shifted to the hands of the SSC1 which aimed to establish an administration for Dhulbahante of Harti sub-clan in Sool, Sanaag and Cayn regions. As the SSC eventually succumbed to political pressures and internal rife, control over this areas is now mainly a struggle between Somaliland and Khatumo State on the one hand and Puntland and Khatumo on the other. Secondly, the region’s Habar Yonis and Habar Je’lo sub-clans of the Isaaq have been engaged in an age-old struggle for the region’s socio-political and economic supremacy. While this conflict has not been militarized since 1997, its remnants can still be felt and has often impeded full and exhaustive social reconciliation across the region.

Despite increased and expanding government control, the region has a strong clan-based structure where all clan/sub-clan, lineage, and other clan-segment interests and sovereignty are protected through clan links.

This strong sense of tradition has enabled the various communities to settle their land and resource-based disputes. However, this traditional rootedness also continually undermines the strong strides Somaliland has made in establishing formal judiciary and law enforcement institutions such as police stations and courts in the region. The overlap between the two systems is often a source of conflict.

In addition, Togdheer region is the hub of the Somalia’s livestock exports as its capital city, Burco, is believed to have the largest livestock market in east Africa. The region’s business community has played an important role in creating and sustaining a stable environment that attracts investment as a result of which the region has several water purifying plants, two soap/detergent factories and several abattoirs. Togdheer is, therefore, often called Somaliland’s industrial region. Many believe that increased crop farming and further industrial development will serve as viable alternative for the region to livestock production which is on a rapid decline as it is across the country. More importantly, the region has hosted two oil exploration efforts, which have been ongoing during the last one year and half.

Buhodle District is critical to Somaliland’s legal premise for seeking sovereignty and international recognition based on the territory inherited as the former British Somaliland Protectorate. The district and the entire southern block of this region has a different, but equally intense, importance for Puntland whose main interests include remaining a polity with allegiances spanning across a diverse set of regions and clan compositions. Khatumo State, however, denounces the rule of both administrations on Dhulbahante and instead vows to bring this district under a Dhulbahante-led and owned political entity.

Tensions between Somaliland and SSC militias have deescalated in the last year and half. Somaliland ap-

1

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As a result of long-running efforts on the part of Dhulbahante elites, political figures and traditional elders, the SSC was a council that was established in 2009 to administer the Dhulbahante-inhabited areas of Sool, Sanag and Cayn Regions. The group fought against both Puntland and Somaliland for the control of Dhulbahante-inhabited areas of these regions with Cayn carved out of Togdheer region. The group engaged in several bloody clashes against Somaliland forces in particularly late 2010 and a number of smaller skirmishes against Puntland forces early 2011. However, despite being able to rally support from the wider the Dhulbahante establishment, during especially the war against Somaliland, the group had never been able to establish the necessary structures and systems to ensure its survival as a polity. And, having finally succumbed to external pressures and deep internal rife, the group disbanded as a result of which part of its leadership joined Somaliland to become ministers and army commanders while the remaining figures, mainly its military wing, joined forces with Khaatumo State.

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pointed the former leader of the SSC as its Minister of Health as a result of which most of its commanders and military wing have joined forces with Somaliland while the rest have defected to Khatumo State. As such, while it continues to suffer from insecurity and occasional flare-ups, Buhodle district has been relatively calm. Relations between the district and Puntland also remain precarious over conflicting interests and aspirations. However, there has never been a full-on war between Puntland and Buhodle militias. Apart from the occasional skirmishes resulting from dispute over land and related natural resources, inter and intra Isaq clan relations are increasingly stable across the Togdher Region. However, there is increased competition over government seats, which has often fuelled age-old grievances between the sub-clans while also giving way to chauvinism, schism and politicking along clan lines.

While development activities have certainly increased during the last 3 years, perceived or real insecurity still poses serious obstacles for local and international agencies to fully engage the wider communities of this region. Several international companies are actively exploring oil and other mineral resources across the region. While this certainly has had positive outlook for the country’s economic growth prospects, incidence of dispute and violent conflict over the ownership and benefits of these resources is expected to increase.

Widespread and intense insecurity in Buhodle district, coupled with rampant revenge killing, is among the core issues in this region with regards to conflict. While the nature of the root cause of this dispute remains political with Somaliland seeking sovereignty and Buhodle communities ascribing to a greater Somalia union, its impact has been largely social. There is huge mistrust between clans supporting the national government and those supporting Somaliland administration, a reality that has gravely diminished access of pastoralists to grazing land on conflicting clans while also large pastoralist populations have been displaced within the region. Fostering a collaborative partnership between opposing sides has been recommended as the most important solution to sharing basic service delivery mechanisms between conflicting clans. Such a partnership is also expected to free up the flow of business and commerce between communities.

All three key actors in this conflict – i.e. Somaliland, Puntland and Khatumo – have overlapping interests in Somaliland’s eastern borderlands which is legitimacy as the sole political administration presiding over its control. Similarly, all the three have the same fear of any increased legitimacy of the other which impacts its territorial integrity in the case of Somaliland and genealogical pluralism in the case of Puntland. Both, in particular, reciprocally fear increased legitimacy of Khatumo State to certainly pose the most serious threat to their legitimacy. However, as a neighboring state with significant interests in sharing secure borders both with Somaliland and Puntland, Ethiopia’s main concern is lack of central authority in the borderlands which it certainly expects will lead to increased volatility and insecurity. In particular, Ethiopia concern presence of Al-Shabaab elements due to the porous nature of the borders.

Similar to the eastern borderlands, Somaliland and Puntland have overlapping interests and needs in Southern Togdheer region—sovereignty over territories which they concurrently lay equal legal claims. In turn, both administrations are engaged in efforts to destabilize Khatumo State which seeks legitimacy as the appropriate authority over Dhulbahante-inhabited regions. Ethiopia which shares a long border with Togdheer Region, however, fears increased presence of the Al-Shabaab whose entrance and continued presence would be aided by the region’s volatility and insecurity.

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Western Region: Awdal Awdal region has always been one of the most socio-politically stable regions of Somaliland. The region played a central role in the promotion of the Somaliland’s peace and stability by hosting the 1993 Borama Reconciliation Conference. Moreover, Mr. Dahir Rayale Kahin who was Somaliland’s president for 8 years (from 2002 to 2010), is from this region. There has always been a center-periphery divergence between the Isaaq-dominated government and the region’s mostly Gadabuursi population. This is among the key challenges that speak to the socio-political complexities surrounding Somaliland’s succession from the rest of Somalia. Several incidents involving land-based disputes, particularly on the border areas between Hargeysa and Awdal regions, have served as tangible source of underlying conflict and, ultimately, as barrier to sustainable stability across the entire Somaliland.

Equally important, the Gadabuursi and Issa clans have over the course of the last two decades been engaged in a struggle over the region’s political control. This struggle, which has rarely transformed into violent conflict of nationwide significance between the two clans, reached unprecedented heights following Somaliland’s most recent local election (Nov. 2012). The ensuing clan-politicking and eruption of violence in several areas has significantly changed the face of the region’s peaceful history. As a result, Awdal’s wider communities are more than ever polarized along socio-political interests which points to another serious contention to the stability of this region.

Mixed farming (livestock rearing and crop production) has always been the principal source of food and livelihoods for the people of Awdal, the central pillar in its economic structure and a fundamental way of life.

Due to improving education system in mainly the region’s capital, Borama, there is increased development of new enterprise sectors including fisheries and salt-making. However, according to the KIs interviewed, employment and government revenues continue to be low which impedes the development of the social service infrastructure.

There is also a marked level of tension between the two major clans – i.e. Gadabuursi and Issa – that populate Awdal region which is primarily due to the strong claims of both clans to the traditional habitation of the shared territories and the subsequent competition for resources and development assistance. While historically scattered across Somaliland, Djibouti and Ethiopia, Saylac town is where the Issa clan’s traditions and cultural heritage are rooted. With the balance of local government seats tipping in favor of the Gadabuursi, the outcome of the 2012 local council elections ushered in a new reality and led the Issa clan to lose dominance over their last true stronghold in Somaliland. As a result, a limited number, but acute violent conflicts have occurred between the Issa and Gadabuursi—while also some members of the Issa clan leadership have outrightly denounced Somaliland. The Somaliland government and Issa clan leaders have been engaged in negotiations for nearly a year now in the aftermaths of the 2012 elections.

The Issa clan, which is among the most resilient and resourceful Somali clans, has been engaged in a turf war with neighboring Gadabuursi sub-clans over the course of the past two decades—a period that has seen a large outflow of Issa populations into Djibouti where the clan enjoys its highest socio-political hegemony. The Gadabuursi have, on the opposite, been gaining greater socio-political significance as a clan in Somaliland’s

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seat of power over the same period. Somaliland administration has sought to create a peaceful and stable Awdal Region upon which to administer effective electoral processes.

There have been several flare-ups since the height of the conflict during when Somaliland armed forces have had to make military interventions to halt violence. While an outbreak of full-blown war is not expected in the near future, there are strong indications the existing standoff between Issa clan’s traditional leadership and other stakeholders like Somaliland central government and the Gadabuursi clan elders will continue. Several locally-sponsored efforts at reconciliation have failed as the basis for a resolution could not be agreed upon between the clans. Equally noteworthy, mediation efforts by other Somaliland clans at the national level have not been able to produce positive results. While the standstill has not had an impact on the flow of trade, there has been a cessation to several international development efforts.

While Somaliland’s democratization process has enabled the government to expand its control over remote areas far from its headquarters in Hargeysa, the process, particularly elections, have led to unintended negative consequences in Awdal region. As a result of disputed local election in 2012, there is widening clan-based friction between particularly the Issa and Gadabuursi clans with both claiming unfair representation in positions of authority within regional government institutions. This assessment findings primarily recommend that the necessary space and time be created for community-driven, locally-sponsored social reconciliation efforts to first settle clan-based grievances between conflicting clans prior to addressing the state-level political settlements/issues. A summary of the conflict actors in Somaliland is presented in figure 2 below.

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Figure 2: Conflict Actor Mapping: Somaliland

Khatumo State

Clans Somaliland

Puntland Conflict among Puntland, Somaliland and Khatumo State revolves around political & socio-economic issues

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Resource Issues

• Oil exploration • Poverty & underdevelopment • Water and pasture

Political Issues

Clan Issues

• Clan politicking • Water and Pasture • Establishment of clan based Federal member States • Competition for MPs and government seats • Mistrust

Puntland, Somaliland and Khatumo State have weak ties amongst themselves.

All of them, however, have good ties with clans

The clan conflict issues also form the basis for inter-state conflict (i.e. conflict between Puntland, Khatumo and Somaliland States)

• Political control • Self determination • Political and administration legitimacy • Contested borders • Overlapping territorial claims • Under-representation and marginalization

3.1.4 Summary of Dividers and Local Capacities for Peace in Somaliland Consensus on issues relating to power-sharing governance (product of the reconciliation process)

Sustained commitment to the democratic process

Strength of its traditional leadership mechanisms

Unifying identity through shared culture, clan linage, language, intermarriages, and religion (Sunni Islam)

Traditional community-based settling of traditional land and resource-based disputes

Transition from civil war to peace through a consensus building process, that was Somali owned and drive and was an inclusive series of reconciliation efforts from regional to national and clan-based levels

Functioning government institutions

Oil exploration is underway

Somaliland contains the largest livestock market in East Africa as well as purifying plants, soap factories, crop farming

Connectors/ Local Capacities for Peace

Dividers Clan minorities feel under represented and marginalized.

Conflict between Issa clan’s traditional leadership and the Somaliland government

Oil exploration in disputed areas

Clans are divided in loyalty between the three political administrations

Inflammatory speech by the conflicting parties through media

Livestock, the major livelihood, on decline due to environmental degradation

Pastoralists conflict over access to water and pasture

Tension and mistrust between clans which often lead to inter and intra clan conflict

Contested borders and three-sided conflict over over-lapping territorial claims with Somaliland, Puntland and Khatumo Administrations

Under-develop ment and high unemployment

Competition over government seats (may fuel intra-clan conflicts)

Somaliland

Business community’s interest in attracting investment

Flow of terrorists, weapons, pirates and freelance clan militias in the borderlands

Clan identity and clan politicking

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3.2

Puntland Region

3.2.1 Context Puntland State of Somalia is a federal member state in northeastern Somalia, headquartered in Garowe, Nugaal province. Its leaders declared the territory an autonomous state at the homegrown conference known as “Garowe Community Constitutional Conference” (May-July 1998). It was held in Garowe over a period of three months and was attended by the area’s political elite, traditional elders (Issims), members of the community, intellectuals and other civil society representatives. The autonomous Puntland State of Somalia was officially established in order to deliver services to the population, offer security, facilitate trade, and interact with both domestic and international partners in the absence of Somali State. Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the former leader of Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and later the president of Transitional Federal Government, was elected as the president. It should be noted that this period of history, Somali Central State was dysfunctional incapable of governing Somalia.

The name “Puntland” is derived from the Land of Punt, a centre of trade for the ancient Egyptians and a place shrouded in legend. Puntland is a part of the Federal State of Somalia. As such, the region seeks the unity of the Somalia and adheres to a federal system of government. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland is not trying to obtain international recognition as a separate nation-state. However, like Somaliland, Puntland has one also bases its support on clan elders and their organizational structure along lines based on clan relationships and kinship.

Puntland is the traditional territory of the Harti (Darood) clan and a number of other Darood clans and is thought to be one of the most homogeneous Somali Regions. “The Harti clan group comprises the Majeerteen in (Bari, Nugaal and North Mudug Regions and Zone 5 of Ethiopia), the Dhulbahante in (Sool and Sanaag Regions), the Warsangeli in (Sanaag and Bari Regions) and the Deshiishe clans in (Bari region)2”. A number of smaller Majeerteen sub-clan also inhabit northern Bari region, as well as a number of other Darood clans, including the Leylkase and Awrtable and minority groups, such as the Arab Mohamud Saalah, Madhibaan, Tumaal, and Bantu. The formation of Puntland State, in 1998, claimed a wider territory to incorporate parts of Sool, Sanaag and Buhoodle District in Togdher Region in Somaliland to the west due to kinship ties to Darood clan communities living in the two regions. Puntland’s claims to these western territories are contested by Somaliland. In the past, there has been violent confrontation between the two regions over the contested regions. “Territorial disputes with the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in the contested borderlands of Sool and Sanaag continue to affect Puntland’s fragile clan-consensus, especially the representation of Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans in the new parliament.”3

2

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3

Puntland Research Development Center (PRDC). Interpeace. The Search for Peace. “The Puntland Experience: A Bottom-up Approach to Peace and State Building.” 2008.

P. 9.

International Crisis Group (ICG). “Puntland Punted Polls” December 2013. P. 1

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3.2.2 Conflict Hotspots The three prioritized hotspots in Puntland are: conflict of Galgala mountains, the conflict with Somaliland over Sool and Sanaag regions; as well as the conflict in Galkacyo. This section looks at the key factors, conflict dynamics, conflict actors, conflict analysis as well as fear-need mapping in all three hotspot areas of prioritized Puntland Region. Figure 3 below presents a summary of the conflict hotspots in the three areas of Puntland. It also details the causes and the main conflict actors in the region.

Figure 3: Conflict Affected / Prone AREA: GALGALA CAUSE / ISSUE -Competition for the control of Galgala mountains -Historical grievances related to Maakhir sultanate -Clan and political based conflict

AREA: SOOL AND SANAAG CAUSE / ISSUE • Natural resources (potential oil and gas reserves) • Overlap of regional and clan borders • Political/territorial dispute • Clan-based conflict

ACTORS -Galgala militia vs Puntland administration - Warsangali VS Majerteen sub-clans.

-Somaliland (concerned); -International concerned about Galgala militia linkages with Al-Shabaab

ACTORS • Puntland, Khatumo and Somaliland administrations • Clans and sub-clans for Harti/Darod and Isaaq clans

AREA: GALKAYO CAUSE / ISSUE • Power struggles • Resource-based conflict (land and pasture) • political and clan mistrust and suspicion • Radicalization of youth • Lack of security coordination • Political assassinations • Clan rivalry ACTORS • Administrative authority of Puntland (North Galka’yo) • Administrative authority of Galmudug, (South Galka’yo) • Traditional clan leadership • Clan freelance militia • Armed radical groups • Pirates

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3.2.3 Actor Analysis Puntland is no stranger to existential crises that have usually been resolved by political compromise. However, its people are still heavily armed, and despite the presence of security committees, violence around elections, including indirect, clan-related incidents within the Dhulbahante in Taleex, Galgala militia and in Bosaso, as well as political and clan based conflict in Galkacyo remains a real challenge. While Puntland’s political institutions have evolved, they are still intrinsically weak, and incumbents have not always used constitutional means.

In the past, the loyalties of residents within Sool and Eastern Sanaag were torn, with some espousing allegiance to Somaliland, others to Puntland, and a third group to a strong central state in Mogadishu. But matters have been complicated by the declaration of Khatumo as the governing regional state of Sool and Eastern Sanaag by significantly large proportion of the Dhulbahante sub-clan including titled traditional leaders, prominent politicians, intellectuals and members of the Diaspora community. The fall-out of this long-standing disagreement is the lack of assistance following into these contested regions, because the international agencies were unable to operate there, leading to high scale impoverishment and deprivation for the people of Sool and Eastern Sanaag. Figure 4 on the next page summarizes the various conflict actors in Puntland.

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Figure 4: Actor Analysis: Puntland

Puntland is a semi-autonomous administration; faces security and territorial control and expansion challenges from all its neighboring administrations (Somaliland, Khatumo and Galmudug state). Have no working relationship with any of above plus the Federal Government

These include Somalia, neighboring states and inter-governmental organizations. Claim they focus on restoration of peace and security in Somalia. Puntland and Somaliland have good relationship with regional actors

Claim sovereignty and unity of Somalia as indivisible entity. Mainly based in Mogadishu; have limited or no influence in the regional states. Have weak relationship with all local administrations

The question of self-determination and territorial integrity; Somaliland is in conflict with Puntland, Khatumo and the federal government. It has good relationship with Ethiopia

Affects Dhulbahante sub-clan elite, some traditional leaders and communities; Control some areas of Sool and Ayn regions. Establish and maintain independent status free from both Puntland and Somaliland as part and parcel of united, federal Somalia.

SOMALILAND PUNTLAND ADMINISTRATION

REGIONAL ACTORS

KHATUMO

Actor Analysis

GALMUDUG

SOMALI FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AL SHABAAB DIASPORA

These are Somalis living abroad.

Somali people living rural urban areas are supported by their Diaspora kin. Established, finance and run schools, hospitals and othr charity work. Have political and economic influence in Puntland.

Affiliated are the Hawiye clan communities in Mudug Region. it involves struggle for the control of Galkacyo and competition for scarce resources with Puntland

PIRACY

Common in South-Central Somalia. Interested in creating Islamic state in Somalia; Created political instability, conducted type of guerilla warfare, bombings and assassinations. Have no relationship with any administrations

Mostly involve Unemployed youth, former army officers, fishing communities and armed freelance militia. The goal is to get quick rich.

Disrupted sea cargo movements. It costs the international community a lot of money.

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3.2.4 Conflict Between Puntland and Somaliland over Sool and Sanaag Regions Perhaps no conflict threatens the future of Somalia as much as the contest between Puntland and Somaliland over Sool and Eastern Sanaag, claimed by both administrations as integral to their respective territories. The Puntland regional administration claims Sool and East Sanaag as part of Puntland on the grounds that people of Sool and Eastern Sanaag are kinsmen to the Harti clan of Puntland, which consists of Majeerteen, Dhulbahante, Warsangali, and other clans. While Somaliland lays claim to Sool and Eastern Sanaag on the grounds of history and tradition, because these regions were historically part of British Somaliland and shared the colonial experience.

3.2.5 Mudug Region Mudug Region in general and Galkacyo city in particular is a potential conflict flash-point between South-Central Somalia and Puntland. During and after the civil war, inter-clan fighting (Darod versus Hawiye) for the control of Galkacyo and by extension, the Mudug Region ended in a stalemate and did not produce any shift in pre-conflict borders. After intense negotiation, the Mudug Peace Agreement was signed in 1993. Although this accord brought an end to conflict among the warring clans, it has not been able to achieve long-term political reconciliation, formal economic integration, and inter-clan cooperation. While fragile peace continues to hold, several factors threaten long-term reconciliation, including the enduring competition for clan ascendancy, unresolved land and property rights, and competition for scarce pastoral resources. If not handled sensitively, the deep level of mistrust among the clan communities could easily be transformed into violence.

Mudug region has a conflicting political structure due to its demographic position in the social arrangement.

It comprises five (5) districts namely, Galkacyo, Galdogob, Jariban, Harardhere and Hobyo. North Galkacyo , Galdogob and Jiriiban are part of the political administration of Puntland, whereas south Galkacyo, Hobyo and Harardhere districts are part of the Galmudug political administration. This administrative and structural difference is indicative of their mistrust with respect to where their respective allegiances lie. Furthermore, the capital of the region is situated exactly on the clan divide between Darood and Hawiye. In light of that, Galkacyo experienced numerous inter-clan conflicts. According to the KIs interviewed, because unemployment level in the district is about 90% in the city, less than 5% can afford to buy enough commodities for the household. And that is reason enough for the youth groups to become tools of conflict. Specifically, conflicts that Galkacyo district experienced is embedded in the dynamics of its unique structure and actors. Section 3.2.5 below details the conflict timelines and events in recent history.

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Time

EVENTS

ACTORS

1992

Puntland and Somaliland authorities and forces

Puntland Forces; ICU; Ethiopia

Reer Mahad and Reer Khalaf Sub-sub-clans

Puntland and Somaliland authorities and forces

Qayaad and Bah-Hararsame of Dhulbahante Sub-clan of Harti/Darod elders

2006

2004

2003

2001-2003

Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, vs. Jama Ali Jama and Mohamoud Mussa Hersi (Adde Mussa)

Militias from Omar Mohamoud and Reer Mohamoud sub-clans

1994

Resourcebased Adada

Puntland and Somaliland authorities and forces

2012

2013

Puntland Forces attacked the self-proclaimed Khatumo State.

Puntland Forces, Authorities; Khatumo Authorities and Armed Militias

Somaliland, Puntland and Khatumo authorities and forces

2012-2013

Clan-based militias and Puntland administration and security agencies

Galgala militia, Puntland forces and Majeerteen and Warsangali sub-clans

Al-Shabaab, Puntland Authorities and Security Agencies & youth

2011

Dispute over Sool and Sanaag regions

A religious sheikh was shot dead in the Galkacyo north

Clan-based, political and resource-based conflict in Bosaso, Sugure and Laag

Assassination of a well-known mullah in Bosaso (Dec, 2011)

Two Harti Sub-clans of Bah-Hararsame, Dhulbahante, and Omar Mohamoud of Majeerteen

2007

Resource and clan-based conflict over Sool and Sanaag regions

Islamic Courts Union (ICU) attacked Puntland from the South

Resource and clan-based conflict over Sool and Sanaag regions

Clan conflict (revenge killings)

Clan fighting in southwest Laas-Anood in Sool region over territorial boundary

Dispute over Sool and Sanaag regions

Conflict between the forces of Abdullahi Yusuf vs. Jama Ali Jama’s/Mahmud Muse Hersi’s armed militias

Fighting between two Majeerteen sub-clans in ‘Iid’ Ethiopia spilled over to Puntland

SSDF and Al-Itihaad, clan elders, armed youth and businessmen

Hawiye and Darod Clans and their sub-clans; SSDF, USC, SNF;

1991-1993

The struggle to control Galkac’yo town

Resource-based conflict and conflict to control of the main port and city of Bosaso

3.2.5 Conflicts Timelines: Puntland

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3.2.6 Summary of Dividers and Local Capacities for Peace in Puntland

Unifying symbols including Mosques which are visited by almost all community members

Common experience of loss of lives and property as a result of violent conflicts and natural disasters

Mudug peace agreement in 1993 managed to put an end to conflict among warring clans – and continues to hold even through most of the civil war period.

Strong CSOs including traditional and religious institutions, women groups, etc that promote dialogue and inclusive development

Natural resources – oil and marine resources

Clan cohesion and clan-based territory (Harti/Darod)

Strong business communities including telecommunication and hawala companies

Functioning administration of Puntland State

Puntland

Connectors/ Local Capacities for Peace

Dividers Clan identity and clan politicking

Armed militia groups’ activities – clan-based militias, extremists groups, organized street gangs, pirates and radicalized youth

Disputed territories, divided administrations and overlap of regional states – Puntland, Somaliland, Galmudug, Khatumo

Struggle for political power (particularly for the presidency)

Attempt to transition from clan-based representation system to directly-elected government (which has failed so far precisely because it increased tension)

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Widespread poverty and scarcity of resources

Competition for economic and natural resources including pasture, water, oil, gas, and minerals

Manipulation and politicization of clan identities

Dividing symbols such as flags of Puntland, Galmudug, Somaliland, and Khatumo States in some areas

3.3 South-Central Somalia 3.3.1 Context South-Central Somalia consists of 11 regions including South Mudug, Galgadud, Hiiraan, Middle Shabelle, Banadir, Lower Shabelle, Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Bay, Bakool and Gedo. It has experienced more instability and prolonged clan, political and resource-based conflict than Puntland and Somaliland regions. This is because the region is the breadbasket of Somalia and has more resources than the rest of Somalia particularly in arable land. The assessment established that the violent clashes witnessed in December 2013, in several parts of South-Central Somalia could threaten the country’s progress towards peace and stability. Clashes were experienced in Middle Shabelle, Hiraan and Lower Shabelle Regions. The clashes continue to cause death, injury, displacement and the destruction of property and crops in the fields. Those affected often come from smaller, or minority communities. While each sector is critical to achieve stability, governance carries special importance. Governing structures and systems must exist to ensure 1) ensure full participation of all stakeholders in the decisions that affect their lives and livelihoods 2) the prioritization of major needs against limited resources; and 3) coordination to avoid conflict and duplication of services. Without a proper governing system - even limited, de-facto or interim – the results on the ground are mixed at best. At worst, it provides openings to power brokers, economic exploiters, warlords and fosters chaotic service delivery.

3.3.2 Conflict Hotspots There are three prioritized hotspots within South-Central Somalia. They include: Kismayu, Lower Shabelle Region and the conflict between the upcoming regional states VS the Federal Government.

Kismayu: Since the onset of state collapse, Kismayu has been hotly contested among various groups due to its strategic location at the port. As Ken Menkhaus put it, Kismayu city has changed many hands since state collapse but has always been in the control of clan-based warlords and/or Islamists. Since January 1991, Kismayu has been fought over by the USC, SPM, SNF, SSDF, JVA, (all clan militias), as well as UIC, Al Shabaab & Hisbul Islam (all religious sects), and the TFG/FSG. The region is currently under the control of various political actors under Jubaland authority, AMISOM and others such as the Somali National Army (SNA) and the Raskamboni Brigade troops. The forces are collectively described as anti-Al-Shabaab forces.

Since the onset of state collapse and civil war in 1991, Kismayu has been what Ken Menkhaus called as “Somalia’s Sarajevo” -- a chronically contested city, at times half-emptied by armed conflict, at other times bloated with hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons. It has changed hands many times over the past two decades but has always been in the control of warlords or jihadists and has never enjoyed good governance”.4 The net effect has been large-scale destruction of the infrastructure and a huge inflow of IDPs into the city from the rural areas.

4

As described by KEN MENKHAUS, OCTOBER 3, 2012 at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:rse0L55cWUoJ:www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2012/10/03/somalia_Kismayu_al_shabab+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ke

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For the period 2006-2012, Kismayu was under control of AS. In 2012, the anti-AS alliance led by KDF removed AS out of Kismayu town and the district at large. Since the capture, Kismayu city and nearby areas under antiAl-AS’s influence have been held by AMISOM, the Somalia National Army (SNA), and Raskamboni Brigade troops. Since 2012 when AS were dislodged from Kismayu, other clan militia such as the Marehan militia has been reasserting their control over various sections of the city. Clan conflict and control of the strategic port city of Kismayu has been on and off. A trail on the clan conflict in Kismayu insinuates that the Ogaden and Harti clans were squeezed out of Kismayu by a combination of Marehan and Haber Gidir militias in 1990s.

The key contestants since the Hawiye were pushed out have been the Ogaden, Marehan and Harti clans (all Darod). Other clans in the conflict include Warday, Galjeel, Sheikhal, Huber, Bajuni and Awramale. Refer to figure 5 below for the various clan alliances in Kismayu .

Figure 5: Kismayu Alliances Kismayo ClanClan Allliances

KEY

Main Conflict Issues • • •

Administrative Control of the port city and its revenue Trade Opportunities Clan Rivalry/ Suspicion

Major Player Other Clans

The Hawiye were pushed out of Kismayo in the 1990’s. After the Hawiye lost control, the key players were the Marchan, Absame and Harti Clans.

Conflict Alliance

Absame (Darod)

Harti

Marehan

(Darod)

(Darod)

Walaalaha Galgadud (Juba Valley Alliance)

Gakjeel Warday

Huber

Bajuni

34

Sheikhal

Awramale

Somali CEWERU. From the Bottom-up: Southern Regions - Perspectives through conflict analysis and key political actors’ mapping of Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, and Lower Shabelle. September 2013.

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Control of Kismayu has been contested since the downfall of the central government in 1991. Since 1991, the Absame of the Darod sub-clan have been frozen out power in Kismayu by some combination of Harti, Marehan, and Haber Gedir militias (such as when the Marehan and Haber Gedir were loosely allied to the JVA).

After the ouster of AS from Kismayu in September 2012, a Local administration headed by Ahmed Madobe, and supported by KDF and the Ras Kamboni forces was formed. Juba State was later established in May 2013.

The main feature of Kismayu city is the seaport. In Somalia, seaports provide the most important source of revenue for authorities. Control of the port provides the resources to extend control in the region. The persistent struggle for control of resources along clan lines contributes to inter-communal tensions in the city and in the region. The region has been the scene of frequent fights between the conflicting clans and political actors since state collapse.

The most common forms of conflict in Lower Juba are: Political power struggles; Clan Resource-based Conflict: Clan conflicts are primarily based on competition over resources such as land tenure, grazing rights, water, farmlands, livestock, humanitarian aid or are motivated by revenge killings. The nature of the conflict in Lower Juba is the complex clan composition of the area. Lower Juba Region in general and Kismayu city in particular lack the homogeneity of the northern regions. Unlike more homogeneous central and north pastoralists clans, diverse complexity of social organization, cultural and language are evident in Kismayu. It is an area where pastoral, agricultural, and coastal traditions meet. Despite of the clan diversity, the Darod family sub-clans dominate politics and business in the city, and their rivalry fortifies conflict in the district.

The main players are Ogaden, Harti and Marehan and the Hawiye. They all make historical claims to the control of Kismayu (refer to Figure 6 on the next page). Kenya’s interest in the conflict and particularly the formation of Juba State is seen as her interest to have a buffer zone to protect its own borders from the threat of Al-Shabaab.

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Figure 6: Conflict Actors in Kismayu, Lower Juba Region

GOE KDF IGAD

Somalia Govt

Lower Juba Region Kismayu

Somalia Troops Ras Kamboni Brigade

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AS Juba Administration

Who was in CONTROL?

TIME

SNP/ SPM/ SSDF

1991

USC

1992

SNA

SPM 1994 - 1999

JVA 1999 - 2006

UIC 2006

TPG & Ethiopian Troops 2007

2008

Marehan Militia

Source: Source: Somalia CEWERU. From the Bottom-up: Southern Regions - Perspectives through conflict analysis and key political actors’ mapping of Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, and Lower Shabelle. September 2013

1993

Al-Shabaab 2009/2012

AMISOM Ras Kamboni Brigade & SNA 2012 - to date

Kismayo Conflict Timelines

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37

Lower Shabelle: Lower Shabelle region lies south-west of Mogadishu; it borders to the south by the Juba region; to the east by the Indian Ocean and Mogadishu; Middle Shabelle to the north and Bay to the west. In the absence of an official census, UNDP recorded the region’s population at approximately 850,000 in 2005 making it one the most populous regions in the country. It has eight (8) districts namely Marka, Afgoye, Wanlaweyn, Baraawe, Sablaale, Qoryooleey, Awdheegle and Kurtuntwaarey. The population is classified under four categories: agricultural, Agro-pastoralist, pastoralists, fishers and urban sedentary.

Secondary data reviewed indicates that clan conflict is still widespread in Lower Shabelle Region. The overall triggering factors include farming land invasion, political, social and economic marginalization and social atrocities. The triggers are executed by stronger, well-armed clans on the non-armed weaker clans. The politicization of clan identities has sharpened differences among clans living in Lower Shabelle. Clan identities are politicized to advance a particular course such as individual and resource protection. Figure 7 captures clan conflict events in Lower Shabelle since the state collapse.

Figure 7: Clan Conflict in Lower Shabelle Region KEY

Clan Conflict in Lower Shabelle Region

Biryama Hawiye

Ongoing Conflict

Jarerweyn

Past Conflict

Rahamweyn

1998 - Afgoye

Garre 1997

Hintire

1998 - Afgoye

Wacdaan

- Afg

oye

weyne

12 - Wanla

1994 & 20

Abgal 1998 & 2002-05 - Warmahan & Qoryoley

199

oye

Afg

1993 - present at Marka, Shalan-bood & #50

Habar Gidir 199

6-K

1993 - Janaley/Baraawe

Shekhal

urtu

1993 - present at Dhanaane, Ceel Saniino & #50

20

199

8-

09

Bar

aaw

-A

fgo

ea

ye

Shanta Caleemo

rea

aarey urtunw

4-

K 1996 -

Murursade

Hawadle

1994 -Wanlaweyne

e fgoy

6-A

199

Galjeoel

Biryamal

Tuuni

Al-Shabaab

nwa

arey

1996 - Kurtunwaarey

Jiide

1999 - Qoryooley area

Jarerweyne

Source: Somalia CEWERU. From the Bottom-up: Southern Regions - Perspectives through conflict analysis and key political actors’ mapping of Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, and Lower Shabelle. September 2013.

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Efforts aimed at setting up local governance structures in the Lower Shabelle have been facing myriad challenges leading to their collapse. These are essential peace building and conflict resolution resources that need more harnessing to consistently monitor and resolve emerging conflicts. Peace agreements have not been adequately implemented in the region since they are deemed to have not been comprehensive; leaving out most of the actors including community members. There remain high levels of suspicions among clans to the extent that Somalis see the state as an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empowering those who control it and exploiting and harassing the rest of the population; a clan that feels improperly represented in the government opposes its very establishment. These issues and concerns must be adequately addressed by the current administration for peace to be realized in the region.

Historically, the Somali society has been organized along clans, which also define their socio-economic activities. The clan loyalty and identity follow an ancestral lineage, which forms part of the Somali society’s deep held social capital. According to Somali CEWERU Report 2013, the major clans in the Lower Shabelle Region are: Biyamal, Digil, 12 Koofi (12 Hats) and Wacdaan clans are “original inhabitants “(asal) of Lower Shabelle Region. Hawiye clans including Habar Gidir, Abgal, Murursade and Hawadle (farac/ new settlers) are from Mogadishu and the central regions. They are led by powerful clan militias that came to the area, primarily after 1991, and occupied the area before the Islamic Court Union (ICU). There has been tension and armed conflict between the Asal and Farac social groups since the collapse Barre regime in 1991. Eyle, Jarer, and Darods are minority groups in the region. In the absence of state, clan identity, loyalty and affiliation among social groups in Lower Shabelle Region remain an important source of protection. A summary of the clan conflicts in Lower Shabelle is presented in Figure 7 alongside.

Conflict of farming land in Lower Shabelle has a historical significance. The farming land question dates back to the 19th century when Italians came to the country (see figure 8 below). Somali CEWERO Report, there was an agreement between Biyamal community and Italian settlers in 1907 where the Biyamal community was to provide farming land to Italian settlers for banana plantations for exportation. In return, the Biyamals were to remain shareholders and their land could be returned to them after the contract expired. The agreement was to last 50 years. This agreement opened a door for the Italians to occupy a lot of farm land in the region. After the agreement between the two parties expired, it was neither renewed nor was the land returned to Biyamal community. Since then, the farming land has changed hands several times, however it has never been returned to the Biyamal community.

The root cause of conflict in the region has revolved around clan domination, economic marginalization, land invasion and political control. One of the major problems, which remain a key future conflict trigger, is the unlawful occupation of farmlands by clans that are considered Farac (“new settlers”).

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Figure 8: Land Dispute Timelines

1907

Italian and Biyamal community enter a year farming landing agreement

1969

Said Barre Government nationalized all Italian farming lands

1991

Source: Somali EWERU. From the Bottom-up: Southern Regions - Perspectives through conflict analysis and key political actors’ mapping of Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, and Lower Shabelle.

September 2013.

Clan militia from outside the region overtake and occupy government owned farming lands

2009

Al-Shabaab takes over the government ownwed farms from clan militia and gives to AS leaders and supporters.

3.3.3 Conflict between the Federal Government and the Emerging Regional States After many years of efforts, Somaliland and Puntland have developed state structures and established relatively competent governments in a way that has eluded attempts at the national level5. The Federal Provisional Constitution declares that any two provinces or more can form a member federal state to become a part of the Federal government. However, the provisional constitution does not go into detail about the process of how the regional states will be formed. Since 2008, several new entities have emerged and are seeking to emulate Somaliland and Puntland’s success at regional state building, but many of these entities have a narrow clan base and incorporate relatively small communities.

In the past 12 months, Jubaland has moved ahead to declare a regional state that the Federal Government has acknowledged as an interim regional state made up of Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo Regions of southern Somalia. However, currently there is a meeting in Baidoa led by Rahenweyn politicians and elders who are looking to form a regional administration consisting of six southern regions (including the three that the government has already recognized as the interim administration of Jubaland). Additionally, central regions 5 International Commentary. December 2013. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/_COMMENTARY_SOMALIA_ISSUE_DEC_2013.pdf

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have also been seeking to move a process forward.

While there tends to be a trend moving towards decentralization and the creation of regional states that represent a genuine desire by the communities to administer their own affairs and govern themselves, there is also hostility expressed by Somalis towards clan based sub-national entities, which stems from suspicion that the clan-based entities are primarily vehicles for promoting clan interests rather than community-level governance projects. Many fear that the growth of new and competing entities will cause Somali national identity to disintegrate into clan fiefdoms. They blame clanism for much of the fighting over the last two decades and also see it as the main impediment to building any kind of sustainable national government. As such, it appears an unsuitable template for rebuilding the country. Critics argue that a country established on clan entities cannot be stable, because clan areas of residents overlay each other, competition will be provoked and clan politics will obstruct national development and lead to incoherent and dangerous exclusive policies.6 Secondary data reviewed indicate that “Somaliland and Puntland has shown the value of bottom-up approach not only with regard to cost efficiency but also sustainability of solution. Durable solution comes when people participate in the search for solution and own the outcome.”7 Somaliland and Puntland are, to some extent, clan-based entities and have within them dominant clan groups (clearly not as diverse as southern Somalia).

Nevertheless, both have achieved relatively complex political arrangements, which incorporate different clans and sub-clans, and both make concessions through inclusive policies. Some of the aspiring “mini-states” appear to be clan and sub-clan interest groups rather than genuine regional collaborations.

In 2014, it will be critical that the Federal government works to develop consensus with others including Puntland, Jubaland, Somaliland, Galmudug and other emerging regional states about the process of how to proceed forming emerging states in order to build states from the bottom up. If not conflict could become violent at local, regional and/or national levels.

6 Chathamhouse. Meeting Report. “Somalia’s Transition: What Role for Sub-National Entities?” 2012. http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/

public/Research/Africa/0112report.pdf page. 9

7 International Commentary. December 2013. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/_COMMENTARY_SOMALIA_ISSUE_DEC_2013.pdf p. 1

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3.3.4 Summary of Dividers and Local Capacities for Peace in South Central Somalia

Clan composition is cosmopolitan and diverse

South Central Somalia

Strength of its traditional leadership mechanisms

Unifying symbols including Mosques which are visited by almost all community members

Strong civil society including traditional and religious institutions, women and youth groups, etc that promote dialogue and inclusive development

Shared cultural norms and religious beliefs

Common experience of loss of lives and property as a result of violent conflicts and natural disasters

Connectors/ Local Capacities for Peace

Dividers Conflict over Kismayu due to its strategic location (control of the port provides resources to extend control in the region)

Huge inflow of IDPs to from rural areas to urban centers such as Kismayu, Mogadishu, Merka, and Baidoa

Clan identity and clan politicking as well mistrust of leadership

Aid dependent and corruption are consider business as usual

42

Rich farmlands that could feed the entire region if properly utilized

Lack of local governance structures

Suspicions of clans vis-Ă -vis the Somali state (seen as an instrument of accumulation and domination in favor of majority clans)

Political, and economic marginalization, social discrimination well as social atrocities-revenge killings, forced labor and rampant rape cases

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Farming land invasion by stronger clans from other regions

Despite clan diversity, the Darod family sub-clans dominate both politics and resources in Kismayu city

Politicization of clan identities to advance particular interests such as protection of individuals or resources

A fully traumatized population that is stuck in cycle of violence

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Section SectionIVIV

Conclusions and Recommendations 4.1 Conclusion In conclusion, as part of efforts to engendering greater sustainable peace and stability across all three areas examined, the vast majority of those interviewed as well as information gleaned from the secondary data, recommended that the key underlying causes must first be identified in a collective manner that involves all stakeholders. There is an emphasis on participatory and inclusive processes. It is a daunting challenge to bring together clans and/or regions that view each other as “enemies�. Respondents and the literature review showed that building social cohesion through a number of activities (such as finding common values and building from that point) can harness the commitment and strength each stakeholder brings to a broader process to cultivate peace and stability. In particular, key findings of the study led to the following key strategic programmatic recommendations:

4.2 Recommendations for Action

Recommendation A:

Social Reconciliation (All Areas) One of the daunting tasks faced by a society left in ruin after war is the rebuilding of the social fabric. In transitional societies, the outward signs of poverty and destitution often mask the importance of rebuilding the structural social institutions that maintain peace and harmony. The very people and places most ravaged by war can be the most powerful resources in this painstaking work of rebuilding lives, re-knitting communities, and reconstructing nations. And yet, these same people are often the least consulted by their own government and the international community in rebuilding efforts. Community centered dialogue and reconciliation activities are strongly recommended. As such, platforms for the said reconciliation should be established and strengthened at the district and village levels. Fair-minded actors should implement the programs. Example of potential programming:

1

Quraca Nabadda (QN) or Tree of Peace is a grassroots social reconciliation program endorsed

and supported by Somalia Federal Government whose aim is to build peace within and between communities, stimulate a national dialogue around reconciliation, nurture resurgent Somali culture and lay the foundations for effective local governance and development. It is the place where Somali communities can come together to socialize, laugh, settle their disputes, and declare both war and peace for centuries. QN will

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help individuals and communities overcome the trauma experienced during the war and move towards lasting reconciliation and peace through a program of volunteer led intensive sessions. The QN model delivers 12-week reconciliation sessions in villages. These are safe spaces for people to express themselves and share their stories with others to help them and their community to overcome their trauma and make a positive decision to break free from the cycle of violence. These sessions have been developed and piloted with a range of communities across South Central Somalia.

2

Building Bridges of Understanding (BBU) is a concept used to describe a range of interventions used to promote integration among parties involved in conflict. The purpose of BBU initiatives is to strengthen the capability and commitment of various actors in the region to promote peace, security, and development through strengthened communitycentered approaches to peace building. Under BBU banner, the following initiatives targeting different groups should be put in place to promote integration among warring communities:

ƒ

Sports for Peace: this should target mainly youth from different clans and or regions. In more general terms, sports provide opportunities for community members to come together and work towards a common goal, share space and respect with others. These are aspects crucial to peace building. Sports comprise an important reconciliation tool by encouraging tolerance and understanding among parties taking place. Sports also help form a strong local, regional or/and national pride thereby forming a cohesive national identity. This is one way of promoting peace in the region.

ƒ

Cultural and Social Exchanges: a well designed exchange program between members of different clans and/or regions should be initiated. In this initiative, selected members of one clan especially (community leaders, women and youth groups) are taken to another region for a short-term residential tour (or camp) to different areas where they meet with their colleagues. This will diffuse inter-clan and inter-region tensions and mistrust which are key conflict triggers in the region.

Recommendation B:

Institutional Dialogue (All Areas) In the whole region, the conflict’s major impact is the absence of all levels of cooperation at the state level between the various conflicting actors (i.e. Somaliland, Puntland, Khatumo, Jubaland, Galmudug and the SFG). To supplement social reconciliation activities, it will be important to support institutional dialogue between the regional state actors, as well as, between regional actors and the federal government. Example of potential programming:

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1

Facilitate dialogue on issues of common interest as part of efforts to fostering improved institu-

tional relationships between the different polities – i.e. Somaliland, Puntland, Khatumo, SFG, Jubaland, Galmudug (and others) – which regard one another with extreme suspicion as they fight for control over disputed areas.

While this is a cross-cutting recommendation, all programs would have to be specifically designed given the specific conflict drivers involved in each of the high level conflicts described above.

Recommendation C: Civic Dialogue towards democratization and good governance (Puntland and South Central) As stated in the introduction section, across the board, Somalis want to be involved in the design of their future governance structures, systems, and chose their leaders, elements of democratization. They do not want to leave the decisions about their future to the elite clan leaders in the various capitals or to the international community. The approach must be participatory and inclusive. This is the way to practically and tangibly develop a culture of good governance that people will own and defend. If the bottom up strategy is to be meaningful, consultations with, and decisions by, the grassroots population is essential. Past administrations failed, in part due to the fact that political arrangements were not grounded in social reconciliation and focused on middle and top-level power elites. Communities professed agreement in word, but not in practice rendering the political arrangements incapacitated over time and giving rise to extremism and warlordism. Example of potential programming: ƒ

1

Civic Dialogue Process

Undertaking a civic dialogue process using a model pioneered in Rwanda, where a series of dialogues occurs in different regions to help communities at village levels, understand key issues and enlist their preferences. This program is required in both South-Central Somalia, as well as, in Puntland. Communities hear feedback from all areas and agree to synthesize results for a standardized way forward. The program must use a cadre of highly trained facilitators to introduce the current political and social agreements, national laws and relevant parts of the provisional constitution, and then to work to

gather information on the following: 1) Good leadership; 2) Type of electoral system available to form local and regional administrations; 3) The meaning of inclusive governance and how that would translate to the district on a practical level (including decisions on how to transcend clanism for the great-

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er good needs); and 4) Gender and youth dynamics in the political process. The dialogue sessions would then be synthesized and feedback to all communities at district levels for endorsement. All districts results would be presented in a general assembly meeting and debated for systems to achieve standardization across a region.

Recommendation D: Conflict Management Structures (All regions) Given the erosion of traditional governance systems and minimally resourced and overstretched modern local government institutions, new institutions are required that are inclusive and have the ability to react quickly to resolve conflict before it happens as well as react after there has been a flair up of conflict. This intervention should be supplemented by the establishment and strengthening of peacebuilding processes in the region.

Example of potential programming:

1

Peace Committees should be formed within villages to receive complains and responds to them immediately. This type of network should tie into a larger conflict early warning and early response system, where conflicts can be identified before violence breaks out. Influential community members from all regions should be identified and encouraged to join the peace committees.

Recommendation E: Peace Dividend Projects (All regions) Absence of development and no or limited access to the basic services and poor or limited governance structures in marginalized communities enables crime, corruption and violence to fester. It is recommended to use peace dividends in the form of tangible, shared infrastructure as a key element in the peace-building process of increasing people’s sense of security, promoting peaceful co-existence, prompting communities to resist violence and transforming the conflict economy by working with the private sector to implement development projects that address structural drivers of conflict. Example of potential programming:

1

Peace dividend projects

include the provision of basic services such as schools, roads, water points, health facilities, and improving people’s livelihoods. Peace dividend projects can serve as a vehicle for emerging peace leadership to get involved in local governance and development. Peace dividends have made

a highly effective contribution to uniting communities with a history of conflict and cycles of violence, and have reduced tension through increasing interaction and exchanges. They also serve as visible symbols of peace and development that embody the history of community peace processes.

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Appendix 1. List of Documents Reviewed 2. KI Guide Questionnaire

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List of Documents Reviewed 1. Inter-peace/Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC), Pillars of Peace, Somali Programme, Puntland Note: Mapping the Foundations of Peace; Challenges to Security and Rule of Law,

Democratization Process and Devolution of Power to Local Authorities, Garowe, November 2010

2. International Crisis Group (ICG), Policy Briefing, Somalia: The Trouble with Puntland, Africa Briefing No 64, Nairobi/Brussels, 12 August 2009

3. World Bank, Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics, January 2005

4. Human Development Report (HDR), Draft Background Paper on Puntland, September 2011

5. Reuters Exclusive, Western oil exploration in Somalia may spark conflict – UN report, Wednesday July 17, 2013

6. Inter-peace/PDRC, The Search for Peace, Somali Programme, The Puntland Experience: A Bottom-up Approach to Peace and State-building, Peace Initiatives in Puntland, 1991-2007

7. Berouk Mesfin, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), The Political Development in Somaliland and its Conflict with Puntland, ISS Paper 200, September 2009

8. World Bank and UNDP, Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), Deepening Peace and Reducing Poverty, Volume III: Puntland, Draft, October 2007

9. Ingvild Magnaes Gjelsvik and Tore Bjorgo, UNIVERSITY OF TROMSO UiT, Expirates in Somalia:

Disengagement Processes and Reintegration Programming, Center for Peace Studies – University of Tromso – uit.no/peace, 2012

10. SomaliaReport, Galgala Conflict (Analysis), April 2012

11. SomaliaReport: Part One: What is Galkayo? Galkayo governed by both Galmudug and Puntland Regional States, 13 August 2012

12. African Development Bank Group (ADBG), Somalia, Country Brief 2013-2015 13. Africa Briefing Report, Somalia’s Prospect, Brussels, 2 July 2010 14. UNICEF Somalia, 2012 Annual Report

15. The Federal Republic of Somalia, The Somali Compact (2014-2016), September 2013

16. TFG of Somalia and AMISOM, National Disengagement Framework (NDF), August 2012

17. Hoehne, Markus (2007) ‘From pastoral to state politics: traditional authorities in northern Somalia.’

18. Barnes, Cedric (2006) ‘U dhashay – ku dhashay: genealogical and territorial discourse in Somali history’.

19. APD (2010) Democracy in Somaliland: Challenges and Opportunities. Pillars of Peace Note.

20. Accord (2010) Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peace-making. Issue 21 21. Interpeace (2010) Vote for Peace II.

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KI Guide Questionnaire

A. INTRODUCTION

A1

Name of the key informant

A3

Gender of the KI 1=Male 2=Female

A2 A4 A5 A6

Contact details of the key informant Region

District Village

B. CONTEXT/STRUCTURE ANALYSIS

B1 Describe the current political context of this area: Region -District -Village

B2 Describe the emerging political context of this area: -Region -District -Village

B3 Describe the current economic context of this area: -Market prices behaviours -Affordability of food and non food items by the population -Youths employment

-Women income and buying powers -Households economic status

-Infrastructures (schools, hospitals, roads etc)

B4 Describe the emerging economic context of this area: -Market prices behaviours -Affordability of food and non food items by the population -Youths employment

-Women income and buying powers -Households economic status

-Infrastructures (schools, hospitals, roads etc)

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B5 What is the social composition of this area (Fill the table below):

Clans/Ethnic Groups Mapping:

CLAN

SUB CLAN

AREA

DOMINANT (YES/NO)

B6 Which are the natural resources used by this community? (Rivers, pasture lands, water points etc). Fill the table below: NO.

B7 Discuss the time trends of conflicts in this area that you are aware of. Fill the table below: NO.

MARGINALISED (YES/NO)

Communities using this resourcesource of conflict (yes/no)shared resource (yes/no)area of locationnatural resource

Conflict fully resolved? (Yes/no)actors involved (clan, politicians, youths, women etc)conflict/incident/ eventperiod/timeline

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B8

B9

Are there any significant population movements eg displacements, IDPs, refugees returning or leaving? 0=No 1=Yes If Yes above, are these population movements causing any conflict? 0=No 1=Yes If Yes, describe how it is causing conflict

B10 Is there presence of armed forces within this area?

0=No 1=Yes B11 If Yes above, is this causing any form of tension or conflict? 0=No 1=Yes If Yes, describe how and what has happened B12 What are the conflict prone areas within this area? Fill the table below.

NO.

Nature of conflictareas prone to conflicts

B13 Are there any critical events such as peace processes, mediation efforts or external interventions that are currently on going to resolve conflicts? 0=No 1=Yes If Yes above, fill the table below: PEACE PROCESS

C1

NO.

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Status of process (not yet started, ongoing, complete) actors involved, location, conflict to resolve

C. CONFLICT CAUSATION

What are the root causes of conflict in this area?

Fill the table below.

Conflict Mapping Report - December, 2013

SOLUTIONSEFFECTS OF THE PROBLEMROOT CAUSESCORE PROBLEM

C2

C3 C4

C5 C6

C7

C8

C9 C10

C11 C12 C13 NO.

Are there any forms of poor governance issues from the authorities that are in control of this area? 0=No 1=Yes What are these forms of poor governance experienced by the people?

If Yes above, is this poor governance a source of conflict in this area? 0=No 1=Yes Describe how it is causing conflict.

Are there any marginalised clans or sub clans who feel that they are not participating politically in this area?

0=No 1=Yes If Yes above, which are these politically marginalised clans or sub-clans?

Is the political marginalization of these clans or subclans a source of conflict in this area? 0=No 1=Yes If Yes above, explain how.

Do all communities (clans and sub-clans) in this area experience equal economic opportunities? 0=No 1=Yes If No above, is this unequal economic opportunity a source of conflict? 0=No 1=Yes If Yes above, explain how this unequal economic opportunity causes conflict Do all the communities (clans and sub-clans) have equal access to the natural resources in this area?

0=No 1=Yes If No above, is this unequal access to natural resources a source of conflict? 0=No 1=Yes Is the security sector well managed by the government in this area? 0=No 1=Yes Is there loose presence of light weapons within the community members or organized groups other than the government forces? 0=No 1=Yes Are there any forms of human rights abuse in this area?

0=No 1=Yes If Yes above, who are the perpetrators of these human rights abuses.

Is there any role that the people in diasporas play in this area? 0=No 1=Yes If Yes above, what roles do they play?

Are the roles played by the diasporas people causing any form of conflict?

What are the triggers of conflicts in this area? Fill the table below.

WHEN LIKELY TO OCCURCONFLICT TRIGGERS

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D. ACTORS ANALYSIS D1

Who are the main actors in various conflicts that occur in this area? Fill in the table below.

ACTORS

D2

Of the actors named above, who are the primary, secondary and spoiler actors?

ACTORS

Areas of influcence, support base, interests, characterists

Resources they haveare they spoilers (yes/no) primary/secondary

E. NEEDS-FEAR MAPPING E1

What are needs, fears and options of all the parties involved in conflicts in this area? Fill the table below.

PARTIES (eg youths, women, armed groups, local authorities etc)

F1

Options means fears interests/needs issues

F. OPTIONS/STRATEGIES

What are the windows of opportunity that exist to resolve these conflicts? Fill the table below.

POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT

END OF THE KI GUIDE 54

Conflict Mapping Report - December, 2013

How they can be strengthened factors supporting them

diakonia PEOPLE CHANGING THE WORLD