bodymind & voice: foundations of voice education, Revised Edition, Vols. 1 - 3

THURMAN WELCH

bodymind & voice

bodymind & voice: foundations of voice education

foundations of voice education

“ ...only full-voiced, free-singing bluebirds”

(Book IV, Chapter 1)

A REVISED EDITION Co-editors Leon Thurman EdD Graham Welch PhD

1 P U B L I S H E R S The VoiceCare Network n National Center for Voice & Speech Fairview Voice Center n Centre for Advanced Studies in Music Education

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1 6/9/08

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REVISED EDITION

bodymind & voice: foundations of

voice education

" ...only full-voiced, free-singing bluebirds" (Book IV, Chapter 1)

Co-editors

Leon Thurman EdD Graham Welch PhD

Publishers The VoiceCare Network National Center for Voice & Speech Fairview Voice Center Centre for Advanced Studies in Music Education

bodymind & voice: foundations of voice education A

REVISED

EDITION

Co-editors Leon Thurman, Ed.D. Founder, Development Director, The VoiceCare Network ■ Specialist Voice Educator, Fairview Voice Center

Fairview-University Medical Center ■ Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA

Graham Welch, Ph.D. Directorof Educational Research ■ Director, Centre for Advanced Studies in Music Education ■ University of Surrey Roehampton London, United Kingdom

Publication Editor Julie Ostrem, B.S., M.B.A. Continuing Education Coordinator ■ National Center for Voice and Speech The University of Iowa ■ Iowa City, Iowa USA

Publishers The VoiceCare Network, Axel Theimer, D.M.A., Executive Director, Music Department, St. John's University Collegeville, Minnesota, 56321 USA, 320/363-3374,320/363-2504 FAX, atheimer@csbsju.edu National Center for Voice & Speech, Ingo Titze, Ph.D., Director, 330 Speech and Hearing Center, The University of Iowa Iowa City, Iowa, 52242 USA, 319/335-6600,319/335-8851 FAX, webmaster@ncvs.org Fairview Voice Center, Leon Thurman, Ed.D., Specialist Voice Educator; Carol Klitzke, CCC/SLP, Speech Pathologist, Fairview-University Medical Center 2450 Riverside Avenue, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 55454 USA, 612/672-7910, 612/672-2189 FAX, lthurmal@fairview.org

Centre for Advanced Studies in Music Education; Professor Graham Welch, Ph.D., Director; Froebel College, University of Surrey Roehampton, Roehampton Lane, London SW15 4HT, United Kingdom, +44-181/392-3020, +44-181/392-3031 FAX, g.welch@roehampton.ac.uk

Publication Information Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data: Bodymind and voice: Foundations of voice education [edited by] Leon Thurman, Graham Welch

pp. 860 Includes bibliographical references and index

1. Voice education-Singing and speaking. 2. Voice-Anatomy, function, acoustics, morphology. 3. Singers/speakers-Health and voice protection. 4. Neuropsychobiology of learning.

I. Thurman, Leon Ed.D., II. Welch, Graham, Ph.D. Revised Edition Copyright© 2000 by The VoiceCare Network®, the National Center for Voice and Speech, Fairview Voice Center, Centre for Advanced Studies in Music Education and the contributing authors. Original Edition Copyright © 1997

ISBN:

0-87414-123-0

Printed in the United States of America.

This book, including all parts thereof, is legally protected by copyright. Any use, exploitation or commercialization outside the narrow limits set by copyright legislation, without the publishers' and authors' consents, is illegal and liable to prosecution. No part of this book may be translated, reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the VoiceCare Network, National Center for Voice and Speech, and the contributing authors.

Publication Support Julie Stark, A.A., Production Editor, Doug Montequin, B.A., M.S., Science Reviewer, National Center for Voice & Speech Andrew Hackett, Assistant to the Editors, The Voice Care Network

contributing authors ■

Robert Bastian, M.D. Associate Professor of Otolaryngology, Stritch School of Medicine, Loyola University Medical Center, Chicago, Illinois

■

John Cooksey, Ed.D. Professor of Choral Music, School of Music, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah

■

Mary Ann Emanuele, M.D. Department of Endocrinology, Loyola University Medical Center, Chicago, Illinois

■

Darrel Feakes, M.S., CCC/A Senior Audiologist, Minnesota Ear, Head & Neck Clinic, Minneapolis, Minnesota

■

Patricia Feit, M.A. Director of Vocal/Choral Music, Elk River Public Schools, Elk River, Minnesota

■

Lynne Gackle, Ph.D. Adjunct Professor of Choral Music Education, Director, Gulf Coast Youth Choirs, Inc., Tampa, Florida

■

Elizabeth Grambsch, M.A. Early Childhood Music Education Specialist, University of St. Thomas Conservatory of Music, St. Paul, Minnesota

■

Elizabeth Grefsheim, B.A. Co-Director, Son-Sheim Music School, Spring Lake Park, Minnesota

■

Norman Hogikyan, M.D. Director, Vocal Health Center, Department of Otolaryngology, University of Michigan Medical Center, Ann Arbor, Michigan

■

Carol Klitzke, M.A., CCC/SLP Speech Pathologist/Voice Specialist, Fairview Voice Center, Fairview-University Medical Center, Minneapolis, Minnesota

■

Anna Langness, Ph.D. Music Specialist, Bear Creek Elementary School, Boulder, Colorado

■

Van Lawrence, M.D. (deceased) Senior Otolaryngologist, MacGregor Medical Clinic, Houston Texas

■

John Leman, Ed.D. Professor of Choral Music (retired), College-Conservatory of Music, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio

■

Alice Pryor, M.Ed. Director, Texas Center for the Alexander Technique, Austin, Texas

■

Axel Theimer, D.M.A. Professor of Voice and Choral Music, Music Department, St. John's University, Collegeville, Minnesota

■

Leon Thurman, Ed.D. Specialist Voice Educator, Fairview Voice Center, Fairview-University Medical Center, Minneapolis, Minnesota

■

Mary Tobin, M.D. Division of Allergy and Immunology, Loyola University Medical Center, Chicago Illinois

■

Graham Welch, Ph.D. Director of Educational Research, Centre for Advanced Studies in Music Education, Froebel Institute College, University of Surrey Roehampton, London, United Kingdom

Hi

dedication Leon and Graham Gratefully Dedicate Bodymind and Voice: Foundations of Voice Education to Our Parents...

Marie Campbell Thurman and Virgil Thurman Joyce Welch and George Welch ...and to Our Primary Mentors in Education, Voice, and Voice Health Oren Brown Faculty of Voice, Juilliard School, New York (Retired)

Van Lawrence (Deceased) Senior Otolaryngologist, MacGregor Medical Clinic, Houston, Texas Charles Leonhard Professor Emeritus of Music Education, University of Illinois

Charles Nelson Professor Emeritus of Voice and Choral Music, Abilene Christian University, Abilene, Texas Robert Shaw (Deceased) Conductor Laureate, Atlanta Symphony Orchestra, Atlanta Symphony Orchestra Chorus

Charles Cleall Her Majesty's Inspector for Music (Retired) Stephen Rhys Lecturer in Music Composition, Royal Academy of Music, London (Retired)

Edmund Semmons (Deceased) Head of Music, Sir Walter St. John's School, London Desmond Sergeant Head of Music and Music Education, Roehampton Institute, London (Retired)

iv

table of contents Contributing Authors................................................................................................................................................................... iii Dedication.................................................................................................................................................................................... iv Preface...........................................................................................................................................................................................ix Reading this Huge Book: Suggestions andOrientations................................................................................................. x Fore-words: Sunsets, Elephants, Vocal Self-Expression, and Lifelong Learning........................................................................ xi Leon Thurman, Graham Welch

Volume 1 Book I: Bodyminds, Learning, and Self-Expression

The Big Picture............................................................................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1 A Brief Context about How We Know What We Know, and Do What We Do.................................................. 7 Leon Thurman Chapter 2 The Astounding Capacities of Human Bodyminds............................................................................................... 18 Leon Thurman Chapter 3 The Human Nervous System.................................................................................................................................. 27 Leon Thurman Chapter 4 The Human Endocrine System................................................................................................................................61 Leon Thurman

Chapter 5 The Human Immune System.................................................................................................................................. 68 Leon Thurman

Chapter 6 Human Sensory Experiences................................................................................................................................... 75 Leon Thurman Chapter 7 Internal Processing of Life Experiences and Behaviorial Expression................................................................. 86 Leon Thurman Chapter 8 Bodyminds, Human Selves and Communicative Human Interaction............................................................. 134 Leon Thurman

Chapter 9 Human-Compatible Learning............................................................................................................................... 188 Leon Thurman

Volume 2_____________________________________________________________________________________ Book II: How Voices are Made and How They are ’Played’ in Skilled Singing and Speaking The Big Picture.......................................................................................................................................................................... 303 v

Chapter 1 What Sounds Are Made Of................................................................................................................................... 307 Leon Thurman, Axel Theimer, Graham Welch, Patricia Feit, Elizabeth Grefsheim Chapter 2 What Resonance Is................................................................................................................................................. 316 Leon Thurman, Axel Theimer, Graham Welch, Patricia Feit, Elizabeth Grefsheim Chapter 3 What Vocal Sounds are Made Of..........................................................................................................................321 Leon Thurman, Axel Theimer, Graham Welch, Patricia Feit, Elizabeth Grefsheim Chapter 4 The Most Fundamental Voice Skill....................................................................................................................... 326 Leon Thurman, Alice Pryor, Axel Theimer, Elizabeth Grefsheim, Patricia Feit, Graham Welch Chapter 5 Creating Breathflow for Skilled Speaking and Singing...................................................................................... 339 Leon Thurman, Axel Theimer, Graham Welch, Elizabeth Grefsheim, Patricia Feit Chapter 6 What Your Larynx Is Made Of.............................................................................................................................. 356 Leon Thurman, Graham Welch, Axel Theimer, Patricia Feit, Elizabeth Grefsheim

Chapter 7 What Your Larynx Does When Vocal Sounds Are Created............................................................................... 367 Leon Thurman, Graham Welch, Axel Theimer, Patricia Feit, Elizabeth Grefsheim Chapter 8 How Pitches Are Sustained and Changed in Singing and Speaking................................................................ 382 Leon Thurman, Graham Welch, Axel Theimer, Elizabeth Grefsheim, Patricia Feit Chapter 9 How Sound Volumes Are Sustained and Changed in Speaking and Singing................................................. 394 Leon Thurman, Graham Welch, Axel Theimer, Elizabeth Grefsheim, Patricia Feit Chapter 10 How Your Larynx Contributes to Basic Voice Qualities................................................................................... 409 Leon Thurman, Axel Theimer, Graham Welch, Patricia Feit, Elizabeth Grefsheim Chapter 11 The Voice Qualities that Are Referred to as 'Vocal Registers'.......................................................................... 421 Leon Thurman, Graham Welch, Axel Theimer, Elizabeth Grefsheim, Patricia Feit Chapter 12 How Your Vocal Tract Contributes to Basic Voice Qualities........................................................................... 449 Graham Welch, Leon Thurman, Axel Theimer, Elizabeth Grefsheim, Patricia Feit

Chapter 13 Vocal Tract Shaping and the Voice Qualities that Are Referred to as Vowels'............................................ 470 Graham Welch, Leon Thurman, Axel Theimer, Elizabeth Grefsheim, Patricia Feit Chapter 14 Consonant Clarity Without Vocal Interference................................................................................................. 484 Leon Thurman, Axel Theimer, Patricia Feit, Elizabeth Grefsheim, Graham Welch Chapter 15 Vocal Efficiency and Vocal Conditioning in Expressive Speaking and Singing........................................... 492 Leon Thurman, Carol Klitzke, Axel Theimer, Graham Welch, Elizabeth Grefsheim, Patricia Feit

Chapter 16 Singing Various Musical Genres with Stylistic Authenticity: Vocal Efficiency, Vocal Conditioning, and Voice Qualities................................................................... 515 Leon Thurman, Graham Welch, Axel Theimer, Patricia Feit, Elizabeth Grefsheim

Volume 3 Book III: Health and Voice Protection

The Big Picture........................................................................................................................................................................... 523 vi

Chapter 1 Limitations to Vocal Ability from Use-Related Injury or Atrophy................................................................... 527 Robert Bastian, Leon Thurman, Carol Klitzke Chapter 2 How Vocal Abilities Can Be Limited by Immune System Reactions to "Invaders"........................................538 Leon Thurman, Mary Tobin, Carol Klitzke

Chapter 3 How Vocal Abilities Can Be Limited by Non-Infectious Diseases and Disorders of the Respiratory and Digestive Systems....................................................................... 546 Norman Hogikyan, Leon Thurman, Carol Klitzke Chapter 4 How Vocal Abilities Can Be Limited by Endocrine System Diseases and Disorders..................................... 556 Leon Thurman, Mary Ann Emanuele, Carol Klitzke

Chapter 5 How Vocal Abilities Can Be Limited by Diseases and Disorders of the Auditory System............................ 564 Norman Hogikyan, Darrel Feakes, Leon Thurman, Elizabeth Grambsch Chapter 6 How Vocal Abilities Can Be Limited by Diseases and Disorders of the Central Nervous and Musculoskeletal Systems................................................................................ 573 Norman Hogikyan, Leon Thurman, Carol Klitzke

Chapter 7 How Vocal Abilities Can Be Limited by Anatomical Abnormalities and Bodily Injuries.............................582 Norman Hogikyan, Leon Thurman, Carol Klitzke Chapter 8 Neuropsychobiological Interferences with Vocal Abilities............................................................................... 586 Leon Thurman, Carol Klitzke Chapter 9 Diagnosis and Medical Treatment of Diseases and Disorders that Affect Voice............................................. 598 Norman Hogikyan, Leon Thurman, Carol Klitzke

Chapter 10 Medications and the Voice.................................................................................................................................. 613 Norman Hogikyan, Carol Klitzke, Leon Thurman Chapter 11 Vocal Fold and Laryngeal Surgery...................................................................................................................... 620 Robert Bastian, Carol Klitzke, Leon Thurman Chapter 12 Sermon on Hydration (or "The Evils of Dry")................................................................................................... 632 Van Lawrence

Chapter 13 How Vocal Abilities Can Be Enhanced by Nutrition and Body Movement................................................. 637 Leon Thurman, Carol Klitzke

Chapter 14 Cornerstones of Voice Protection........................................................................................................................ 646 Leon Thurman, Carol Klitzke, Norman Hogikyan

Book IV: Lifespan Voice Development

The Big Picture........................................................................................................................................................................... 657

Chapter 1 Foundations for Human Self-Expression During Prenate, Infant, and Early Childhood Development........................................................................................................... 660 Leon Thurman, Elizabeth Gramsch Chapter 2 Highlights of Physical Growth and Function of Voices from Pre-Birth to Age 21.......................................... 696 Leon Thurman, Carol Klitzke

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Chapter 3 The Developing Voice...........................................................................................................................................704 Graham Welch Chapter 4 Voice Transformation in Male Adolescents..........................................................................................................718 John Cooksey Chapter 5 Understanding Voice Transformation in Female Adolescents..........................................................................739 Lynne Gackle Chapter 6 Vitality, Health, and Vocal Self-Expression in Older Adults.............................................................................. 745 Graham Welch, Leon Thurman

Book V: A Brief Menu of Practical Voice Education Methods

The Big Picture.......................................................................................................................................................................... 759

Chapter 1 The Alexander Technique: Brief History and a Personal Perspective............................................................. 760 Alice Pryor Chapter 2 Learning Speaking Skills That Are Expressive and Vocally Efficient.............................................................. 765 Leon Thurman, Carol Klitzke Chapter 3 Classifying Voices for Singing: Assigning Choral Parts and Solo Literature Without Limiting Vocal Ability........................................................................................ 772 Leon Thurman, Axel Theimer, Elizabeth Grefsheim, Patricia Feit Chapter 4 Vocally Safe "Belted" Singing Skills for Children, Adolescents, and Adults................................................... 783 Leon Thurman, Patricia Feit

Chapter 5 Design and Use of Voice Skill 'Pathfinders' for 'Target Practice,' Vocal Conditioning, and Vocal Warmup and Cooldown........................................................................................................... 786 Leon Thurman, Axel Theimer, Carol Klitzke, Elizabeth Grefsheim, Patricia Feit Chapter 6 Helping Children's Voices Develop in General Music Education................................................................... 803 Anna Peter Langness

Chapter 7

Female Adolescent Transforming Voices: Voice Classification, Voice Skill Development, and Music Literature Selection...................................................................... 814 Lynne Gackle

Chapter 8

Male Adolescent Transforming Voices: Voice Classification, Voice Skill Development, and Music Literature Selection...................................................................... 821 John Cooksey

Chapter 9 Redesigning Traditional Conducting Patterns to Enhance Vocal Efficiency and Expressive Choral Singing................................................................................................................... 842 John Leman After-words: Science-Based, Futurist Megatrends - Voice Education in the Year 2100................................................... 848 Leon Thurman

Appendix 1: Brief Biographies of Contributing Authors....................................................................................................... 850 Appendix 2: Brief Descriptions of Publishing Organizations............................................................................................... 856 Index........................................................................................................................................................................................ 861 viii

preface t has given me personal pleasure to help sponsor the production of Bodymind and Voice. As director of the National

I

Center for Voice and Speech, an organization supported by the National Institutes of Health, I have been given a mandate to make research in the area of voice and speech more accessible to the consumer. But who is the primary consumer of information about voice? Professional vocal artists always come to mind first, but they are a small percentage of those who either make a living with their voices or rely on their voices for avocational and recreational endeavors. The many teachers, salespeople, choral singers, and story tellers of our country (and the world) are given far too little information about how that little sound source in the throat works. Even less is given to them about how to protect, preserve, and train this instrument for optimal usage. Bodymind and Voice is a significant step

toward correcting this problem. Scientists and physicians could argue about some of the terminologies, analogies, and

metaphors used in this text, but little argument could be made about the interest of the authors to communicate effectively—to speak in the language of the consumer. Even less argument could be made about the passion the authors display as educators. They are more than lecturers and presenters; they nurture and teach. The love for their audiences and their students rings out. To some their book may be the first and final reading about voice, but I hope that for most it will be the beginning of an adventure into the science and art of vocal communication. Ingo R. Titze, Ph.D. September 1997, May 2000

ix

reading this huge book! Suggestions and orientations ■

Begin by reading any chapter in the book that attracts your interest

If there is background information that you need for a more complete understanding, you will be referred to the chapter(s) in the book where that information is located, and you may find information in the references.

■

The "Forewords to This Book" is not written in a conventional way Begin with it? It is intended to express the core substance or feeling of this book. The book's editors also express a sense

of where Bodymind and Voice "came from" and what's in it.

■ In Book I, you may wish to begin by reading Chapter 9 first.

Its presentation of "real-world" human-compatible learning practices is based on neuropsychobiological documentation from the first eight chapters in Book I. ■ Bodymind and Voice can be thought of as a kind of turn-of-the-century encyclopedia of human-compatible learning and of vocal self-expression in speech and vocal music. Most any curiosity about human voices and human learning is addressed somewhere herein. When a wonderment or question or a difference of opinion arises in your everyday experience, check the table of contents or the index for where relevant information can be found.

■ In Bodymind and Voice, concepts and actions about human learning are founded in the neuropsychobiological sciences, and concepts and actions about vocal self-expression are founded in the voice, speech, and voice medicine sciences. In so many ways, we believe that the benefits of optimal empathic human relatedness, constructive compe­ tence, self-reliant autonomy, and exquisite self-expression have been withheld from many human beings. How? Assumptions about "reality", that were once logical and "right", have pointed many people (includ­ ing ourselves) toward limitations rather than optimal benefit. Many long-held assumptions about the nature of human learning and vocal self-expression are now being questioned or have been shown to be incomplete,

inaccurate, or invalid. In conceiving, writing, and editing this book, we have done the best we can to set aside our own familiar patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting about human learning and about how human beings express themselves

well in speech and song. We undertook a delicious adventure: to look preponderantly into the accumulated perspectives of the relevant sciences in order to learn "what actually happens", from big pictures to finer details, and to present documented evidence for alternative ways of "looking at" human learning, speaking, and singing. We believe that, even though the scientific method is carried out by fallible human beings, it is still the best

means we human beings have of finding out what is "real", or what is more completely "real", in our world of human experiences. That knowledge can help us point ourselves toward perceptions, conceptions, and actions that

are emotionally satisfying and optimally beneficial to us and to our fellow human beings. ■ x

See the "Big Picture" at the beginning of each book for information about content.

fore-words to this book sunsets, elephants, vocal self-expression and lifelong learning Leon Thurman, Graham Welch

This book is too big." "It covers way too much. It's way too complicated-

just look at that table of contents'' "If this book is just a rehashing of what's already been written about voices, why should I go to the expense of buying it and the trouble of reading it?"

pretty sure that much of this book is not a rehash of what has already been written in books about voice skill learn­

ing, but again, that's for you to decide. Most of all, we hope to communicate some of the passion that all of the book's contributing authors feel about human beings and vocal self-expression. Along the way,

you just publish five different books? Maybe I don't want

we hope to introduce you to what we believe to be some of the book's unique perspectives.

to know about the effects of endocrine disorders on voices or about bodyminds, whatever that is."

First Wonderings

"A book divided into five different books?! Why didn't

We admit it. The book is big. And some of its parts

are more complicated than some people may ever be ready for. But we wonder if, maybe, some science-based detail about voices or bodyminds may open a door that leads to: 'Aha!!" "Hmmmmmm. So if that's what happens, then maybe if I...." "Ms Music, I really like to sing. It makes me feel like I'm flying" Well, you'll have to judge for yourself about the book, but in the rest of these Fore-Words, we would like to make the case for this book's bigness, its sometime complicated­ ness, and why it is five books rolled into one. Our intent is that you can begin reading it with any chapter that strikes your interest, and that if you need additional background

to fully understand what you are interested in, you will be pointed to where you need to go. And by the way, we're

The choral conductor was a first-rate musician. His life-mis­ sion was to serve music by getting singers to make the music of master composers come alive, being true to their vision of how the music was to be performed. He detested recruiting singers for his choirs, but he had to. There was about a 35% turnover in membership every year. He attributed the turnover to a lack of self-discipline by the singers. His singers called him "Old Eagle Ear". He always heard when they made a mistake or did something wrong, and he always pointed it out. He let them know that perfection was the goal in every piece of music they performed. He was the master interpreter and the corrector of their mistakes. On a few occasions, a singer or two asked him, "You always tell us when we do something wrong. Do we ever do anything right?" A well known singing teacher taught private lessons to an 18year-old male singer in that choir. She taught in much the same way

xi

as the conductor. She said to him once, "Adam, you have a very nice voice, hut it will never be a solo-quality voice." At age 22, Adam learned that he did have a solo-quality voice, and at age 29, he learned that the strong fear he felt at the prospect of singing for others was closely related to his earlier choir and voice lesson experiences.

And thus it was so. Those boys loved to sing so much, that they-with help from their parents-were not going to be stopped by common customs or curriculum policies. They had mastered expressive singing skills and in their six years of music classes, they had learned that music and skilled, expressive singing were fascinating and filled with MMMMMMMMMMMMM experiences.

Linda Mack, Ed.D., Professor of Choral Music at Lewis & Clark College, Durango, Colorado, once started a community chorus of people

who "knew" that they could not sing. As part of her doctoral disserta­ tion (1979), she interviewed the members of that choir. An 86-yearold man told her: "As a child, I loved to sing. I sang all the time. One day the music teacher at school had us all sing for her by ourselves, and she divided us up into two groups-the bluebirds and the crows. "I was a crow. "Well, I grew up on a farm, and I knew what crows sounded like. I haven't sung since. "But I guess that before I die, I want to learn how to sing."

She taught grades K through 6 for a public school in Minne­ sota. The first group of 6th grade children that had been her students since their kindergarten year were preparing to audition for the junior high school choir director. During the next school year, they wanted to sing in either the 7th and 8th grade concert choir or the girl's choir. Every single one of her sixth grade students auditioned. When the choir lists were announced, 23 boys were not placed in the concert choir. They were turned away from any singing experi­ ences at the junior high school. The reasons? (1) The choir director had never had that kind of male turnout for the auditions; (2) the select concert choir had to have a balance of SATB voices and most of these boys were unchanged-too many sopranos who cannot sing in the tenor pitch range; (3) only the best singers could be selected for the best choir; and (4) there was no boy's choir because in previous years, there had never been enough boys who were interested. The story does not end there. Those boys wanted to sing so much, that they asked their par­ ents to help them be in a choir. Several parents met with the junior high school principal. They pointed out that their sons had been turned away from membership in the concert choir. The girls who had not been selected for the concert choir were placed in the girl's choir. There was no boy's choir, so they urged the principal to create one for the 23 sons of taxpayers who voted in school board elections.

xii

Physicians change the anatomy the biochemistry the physiology, and the health of people. 50 DO TEACHERS. Physicians have to know rather clearly and in great detail what it is they are changing and how the changes will

affect life processes. They must be intimately familiar with

how their work changes the human nervous, endocrine, immune, digestive-metabolic, and musculoskeletal systems, among others. Does the work of teachers really change the anatomy, the biochemistry, the physiology, and the health of people? Does the education of teachers include a detailed knowl­ edge of how the nervous, endocrine, immune, metabolic, and musculoskeletal systems of human beings are changed by teaching-learning experiences? When we human beings interact with people, places,

things, and events in our lives, we say that we have percep­ tions, emotions, cognitions, and memories, and we say we have learned and behaved, and have been in and out of health. When those psychological processes change in us, we say that we are changed, do we not? The evidence is in. There is no question about it. Change in what we call physical, psychological, and health processes are brought into existence by changes in: 1. nervous system anatomy, physiology, and biochem­ istry; 2. endocrine system biochemistry and glandular anatomy; 3. immune system cellular processes and biochemis­ try;

4. digestive and metabolic anatomy and biochemis­ try; and 5. neuromusculoskeletal anatomy, biochemistry, and physiology.

When we encounter a novel sensorimotor experience

that engages our conscious attention (such as learning to drive an automobile or learning a new song), the prefrontal

cortex of our brains activates and "entrains" a wide variety of other brain areas as we make sense of the experience and gain mastery of it. With increased re-encountering of the experience, unneeded brain areas no longer activate. Even­

tually, these sensorimotor processes are largely transferred

to subcortical motor areas where more automatic, habitual, or other-than-conscious action is carried out. The more detailed, intricate, and fine-tuned the sen­ sorimotor experiences become, (1) a greater number of neu­ rons will be selected into the neural networks of the brain that activate the neuromuscular coordinations that are in­ volved, and (2) more neuronal dendrites and synapses will be formed. The finger and hand areas of the sensorimotor cortex will be larger, for instance, in experienced piano and violin players, and the laryngeal areas will be larger in ex­ perienced, expressive singers and speakers (Book I, Chapter 7 has some details). Unpleasant internal feeling states that are enacted dur­ ing the evolution of these skills involve activation of inhibi­ tory neurochemical processes that reduce the probability that the experiences will be voluntarily engaged in again. Pleas­ ant internal feeling states that are enacted during the evolu­ tion of these skills involve activation of excitatory neuro­ chemical processes that increase the probability that the ex­ periences will be voluntarily engaged in again (Book I, Chap­ ters 2, 3, and 7 have some details). In general, we are more

likely to get sick if our immune system functions have been suppressed by distressful life experiences, and we are more

likely to avoid being sick if our immune system functions have been enhanced by interesting, self-fulfilling experiences

in emotionally safe settings (Book I, Chapter 5 has some details; also Book III, Chapter 8). When we have life-learning experiences, the anatomy,

biochemistry, and physiology of our brains are changed. When we say that a person becomes frightened at the pros­ pect of self-expression through singing or speaking, we are saying that past experiences with people, places, things, and/ or events related to singing and speaking "taught" that per­ son a well documented physio chemical reaction that has been given several word labels such as threat, fear, stage

fright, performance anxiety (Book I, Chapters 2 and 4 have

When we say that a child once sang all the time and loved to sing, and something a teacher did, truly following a

well known teaching method of her time, stopped cold that self-expressive love of singing for nearly 80 years, we are re­ ally saying that what the teacher did changed the child's neuroanatomy, biochemistry, and physiology. That particular teacher, of course, lived in a time when the intricacies of neuroanatomy, biochemistry, and physiology had not yet

been fully discovered. Mind and body were still separate, and teachers affected non-physical minds, not bodies. The teacher was doing the best she knew how to do under her life circumstances, but...she never had a clue about how the

method changed that person's life. On the other hand, when we say that every child in an elementary school's sixth grade wanted to sing in a seventh grade choir, well, that teacher influenced a very different array of perceptions, emotions, cognitions, and memories over their seven years together, compared to the other teacher. And we would say that they learned and behaved differ­

ently. Yes, very different neuroanatomical, biochemical, and physiological changes occurred.

Please forgive us for writing some serious introduc­

tory words about bodyminds. What Is a Bodymind? At first glance, the term bodymind may create an un­ easy feeling in some people. It may be associated with interpretative, mystic points of view about human beings that have little scientific basis, if any. The use of bodymind in this book has a scientific basis. Historically, mind has been thought of as a non-physi­ cal entity that "resides" in each human being and is separate

from a human being's body. The mind "operated" the body. Conscious awareness, rational thinking, and intention were purely "mental" activities that had no physical manifesta­ tion. The unruly passions or emotions had to be con­ trolled by a rational mind because they were regarded as two separate mind processes. Currently, the terms psychol­ ogy, psychological phenomena, or cognition are commonly used as substitutes for mind, but psychological language com­ monly continues the disassociation between psychological

phenomena and physio chemical processes in the whole body. Among many cognitive psychologists, the biological processes of the whole body, including nervous system

some details.) xiii

processes, are not considered relevant to an understanding

various attachment disorders, and so forth. Their experi­

of mind (more details in Book I, Chapter 1). Although mind-body and emotion-cognition duali­

ences of the people, places, things and events of their lives have altered their electro-physio-chemical constitution away from a balanced and healthy state of being. Medical practitioners are gradually dismantling the historically separated mind-body concepts of "physical health" and "mental health". There are fewer "plain" psy­

ties are still assumed in everyday social interaction, and in nearly all educational practices, there is overwhelming evi­ dence that these centuries-old duality assumptions are not accurate and never were. Several scientists who have vast backgrounds and renowned research experience in the ge­ netic and neuropsychobiological sciences (including Nobel laureates) have assembled viable biological theories of con­ sciousness (Edelman, 1989; Crick, 1994; Damasio, 1994). Based on massive amounts of research that have been car­ ried out in the past several decades, there now is well estab­ lished evidence for the inseparable intermeshing of (1) all

human sensory or perceptual experience, (2) all internal bodily processings that are commonly referred to as think­ ing, reasoning, cognition, feelings, emotions, empathies, in­ tentions, judgements, memory, learning, immunity, and health, and (3) all of the behavioral expressions of those internal processings (more details in Book I, Chapters 2 through 8). A biological explanation of consciousness and psy­ chological phenomena represents an astonishingly differ­ ent explanation of what we refer to as mind. According to

this point of view, for instance, photosynthesis is an adap­ tive biological feature of plant life, and consciousness and intentionality ("mind") are adaptive biological features of human life (Searle, 1992). The two processes differ vastly in their complexity, of course, and that is part of the reason why photosynthesis does not produce consciousness and intentionality. The world renowned neurologist and cogni­

tive neuroscientist, Antonio Damasio (1994, p. 118), adds, "...the separation between mind and brain...is mythical....The mind is embodied, in the full sense of the term, not just embrained." So-called mental diseases are physiochemical diseases of the brain. Although genetic and epigenetic processes can pro­ vide a greater susceptibility for physio chemical diseases in the brain, life experiences can produce such dispositions as well (see Book I, Chapter 8). For example, people who are emotionally abandoned to some extent during some or most of their growing-up years are likely to manifest a range of self-destructive and/or anti-social behaviors. They may in­ clude depression, schizophrenia, defensiveness, aggression, xiv

chiatrists, neurologists, endocrinologists, and immunolo­

gists in medicine, and fewer plain psychologists. Now, there

are physiological psychiatrists, neuropsychologists, psycho­ biologists, cognitive neuroscientists, psychoneuroendocrinologists, psychoneuroimmunologists, and so on. The search is on for a single term that reflects the unity of psy­ chophysical processes. Body/Mind, body-mind, and mind-body are common forms that preserve the duality. The unifying term bodymind appears to have been coined by Candace Pert, Ph.D., former Chief of Brain Bio­ chemistry for the Clinical Neuroscience Branch of the Na­ tional Institute of Mental Health, Washington, D.C., USA. [She is now Pharmacologist and Adjunct Professor, Depart­ ment of Physiology and Biophysics, School of Medicine, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.] The term is based

on the discovery that:

1. biochemical transmitter molecules enable multi­ channel communication between the nervous, endocrine, and immune systems (Strand, 2000); 2. biochemical receptor sites for these transmitter molecules are embedded in the surfaces of cells in the ner­ vous, endocrine, and immune systems, and also in cells of organs and systems throughout the body; and 3. all such processes activate the perceptions, feelings/ emotions, memory, learning, behavior, and health of all

human beings. In a 1986 article for Advances magazine, Dr. Pert wrote, "I believe that neuropeptides and their receptors are a key to understanding how mind and body are interconnected and how emotions can be manifested throughout the body. Indeed, the more we know about neuropeptides, the harder it is to think in the traditional terms of a mind and a body. It makes more and more sense to speak of a single inte­ grated entity, a 'bodymind'" [Neuropeptides are a promi­ nent type of transmitter molecule.] In this book, we will base our use of the term bodymind in the neuropsychobiology of perception, memory, learn­ ing, behavior, and health.

• Neuro- because the human nervous system is cru­

cially and powerfully involved; • Psycho- because all of our physio chemical processes produce our perceived psychological phenomena; • Biology because human bodyminds and the processes that make us bodyminds are biological in their essential nature. All environmental interactions, adaptations, and learn­ ings are carried out by our human bodyminds. All self­ expression, therefore, is a manifestation of bodymind pro­ cesses including, of course, all vocal self-expression in speak­ ing and singing. To approach teaching and learning and self-expres­ sion without a consideration of how bodyminds carry out

those functions, would be like trying to repair a television set without considering its electronic functions. Without considering how bodyminds "work," we run the risk of asking

the impossible of ourselves and others, of bruising or crush­ ing self-identity, of contracting preventable diseases that limit self-expression, of denying to ourselves and others an op­ timum fulfillment of our potential for self-expressive speak­

ing and singing. We also run the risk of presenting insig­ nificant, comparatively uninteresting experiences for young

bodyminds to encounter, and we risk being considered an educational frill. [Books I and III address these matters.] On the other hand, if people who are called teachers know how their teaching affects the neuroanatomy, bio­ chemistry, and physiology of people who are called students, we may be able to teach so that all sixth graders every­ where will want to audition for their junior high choirs,

into which they will all be accepted because they are all skilled, expressive singers. And they will be more likely to interact more empathically with other people. And they just may grow up to confidently and skillfully speak in front of groups of people, to seek out and be fulfilled by singing solo songs for others, to sing in choirs for a lifetime, be­

come members of boards of education who vote enthusi­ astically for effective school music programs, become mem­ bers of legislative bodies that stand to sing in four-part harmony before the daily deliberations, and most impor­ tantly of all, sing expressively for and with their own chil­ dren.

Second Wonderings

For over two years, a high school choral conductor's high so­

prano voice had gradually deteriorated. She spoke and sang with severe hoarseness and very limited pitch and volume range. She had hem examined medically three times by general practice and ear-nosethroat physicians with varying diagnoses. She was treated for aller­ gies, asthma, upper respiratory infections, post nasal drip, and depres­ sion. She kept a list of medications that had been prescribed for her over the two years that covered three typewritten pages! One course of speech-voice therapy during that time had not resolved her extreme vocal limitation. A K-12 music educator's voice was severely dysfunctional for ten years. A clear vocal sound could not be made at all, pitch range was limited to about one octave, and vocal volume was greatly dimin­ ished. So much neck-throat effort was required for speaking and sing­ ing that neck muscles had bulked noticeably. Four different medical examinations were undertaken, resulting in inconclusive diagnosis. Brief, but unsuccessful voice therapy was provided by one speech pathologist and a singing teacher. Insurance company coverage for continuing treatment had been urged but denied. Eventually, she resigned herself to a permanently dysfunctional voice. A voice educator presented a program on voice skills with a group of 5th and 6th grade children. He noticed a child who had a noticeably hoarse voice quality when she spoke and sang. Her upper register pitch range was severely limited and her voicing was rather effortful. He suggested that the teacher recommend an examination by a voice-ear-nose-throat doctor and the school speech-language patholo­ gist. The teacher was surprised and said that making such a recom­ mendation had never occurred to her. When the parents were contacted, they said that the girl had always had a hoarse voice, and they thought that was just the way her voice was supposed to sound. The girl was seen by an ENT physician and she had long-standing vocal fold nod­ ules in the usual locations and a white nodular area toward the rear of her left vocal fold. Eventually, the two teachers and the child were exam­ ined by an interdisciplinary voice treatment team made up of a voice-ear-nose-throat physician, a voice experienced speech-language pathologist, and a specialist voice educa­ tor who was trained and experienced in the therapeutic care

of vocal performers. After taking an extensive medical and

vocal health history, using a fiberoptic laryngeal videostroboscope to videotape her vocal folds with high xv

magnification and slow motion, and observing and dis­

cussing all of the diagnostic and evaluative findings, the team concluded that the first teacher had a large hemor­ rhagic polyp on her right vocal fold (described in Book III,

Chapter 1) and severe laryngo-pharyngeal reflux disease (described in Book III, Chapter 3). Her condition was greatly influenced by a hyper-extroverted personality and profes­

sional commitments that several people would be challenged to complete. An extensive medical and vocal health history and fiberoptic laryngeal videostroboscope recordings also were obtained with the second teacher. The school's heating sys­ tem used coal and the choral room was very close to the furnace. Furniture in the room was covered with coal dust by the end of every teaching day, and this residue was in­ haled by the teacher and students. Following medical diag­ nosis and voice evaluation, the team concluded that this teacher had a paralyzed left vocal fold (described in Book III, Chapter 6) and a condition called sulcus vocalis on both vocal folds (described in Book III, Chapter 1). Both teachers required surgery and voice therapy, fol­ lowed by reconditioning of larynx muscles and vocal fold tissues, so that their voices could assume the best possible function. The first teacher's soprano capabilities returned, but her greatest challenges were to change the lifestyle choices that precipitated the condition, that is, numerous profes­ sional commitments versus personal restoration time, voice use versus voice recovery time, and her eating and sleeping patterns. The second teacher's surgery moved her para­ lyzed fold toward her functioning fold so that a clearer voice with minimized effort was possible. Therapy focused on physical and acoustic efficiency in the changed voice-use circumstances and on optimum reconditioning of larynx

Would we have fewer problems with our own voices if we knew more about what can happen to them and how

to deal effectively and quickly with such problems? Would we be able to help other people who have voice problems if we were comprehensively knowledge­ able about voice disorders, how they happen, how to rec­ ognize them, how they are treated, and who should treat them?

Third Wonderings An 11 year-old sixth grade hoy has enjoyed singing in music

classes throughout elementary school and admires his music teacher At the beginning of his sixth grade year, he notices that he can no longer sing the higher pitches of the songs that his music teacher and classmates are singing so easily As the year progresses, he notices that his voice is not any good anymore. It cracks when he tries to sing the higher notes, and he has to work his voice muscles so hard when he sings, that he just stops. The teacher is surprised that he is no longer singing and has started disturbing other children when they are sing­ ing. He occasionally reprimands the boy, and their admiring relation­ ship deteriorates. The boy does not audition for the junior or senior high school choirs, and rarely sings again after the sixth grade. A high school sociology teacher had been raised by her grandfa­ ther. She had never been able to sing, and always wanted to. Specifi­ cally, she had never been able to sing "Happy Birthday" for her beloved grandfather on his birthday. When she was young, siblings, peers, and teachers had ridiculed her early attempts at singing. At the age of 21 years, with her grandfather at age 88, her concern was deeply felt. She had been led to believe that she was a "monotone", and that learn­ ing to sing was not possible, especially at her age. The boy had begun his pubertal growth. His voice was beginning its adolescent transformation. Perhaps the

Could the teachers' voice disorders have been pre­ vented by preemptive voice health education during un­ dergraduate training? Could early and expert medical diagnosis with func­ tional evaluation followed by specialist voice therapy have prevented the extensive distress over their near loss of voice function?

teacher lives in a culture where male adolescent voices be­ come broken during early adolescence. In such a culture, adolescent voice transformation is misunderstood and sing­ ing by boys of that age is "stopped for their own good." Or, perhaps the teacher lives in a culture where the training of music educators rarely provides complete, accurate, and useful education about how to guide adolescents through their voice transformation. Elementary school music edu­

Can the voice disorders of school students or family members be observed early and dealt with by an educator

cators do not need that education at all, of course, because the phenomenon never begins during the elementary school

muscles and vocal fold tissues.

who has comprehensive voice education? xvi

years.... The sociology teacher saw an ad for a class that prom­

ised to teach people who had never sung with accurate pitches, how to do so. With great apprehension, she en­ rolled. Her grandfather's birthday was two months away. The teacher of the singing class was especially determined

to see her through this learning process and spent extra time with her. At the birthday party, she sang "Happy Birth­ day" for her beloved grandfather by herself. Tears and em­ braces of joyful satisfaction and love followed. What would happen if all educators (especially edu­ cators of vocal self-expression):

1. were knowledgeable about the effects of physical

maturation on self-expressive vocal capabilities? and 2. knew many ways to help people of all ages to de­ velop self-expressive sound-making, speaking, and singing skills?

Final Wonderings

The Pirsigs, however, did get to enjoy the mmmmmmm of nature's sights, sounds, and sensations-except when they were waiting for the repairs. So: Could there be a relationship between the mastery of efficient speaking and singing skills, preventive voice health maintenance, and the mmmmmmmmmmmm of expressive speaking and singing? During the past forty years, on our respective sides of the Atlantic, we have sung in a fairly large number of ama­ teur and professional choirs; performed in solo recitals and operas; acted in plays, musicals, and radio/TV commer­ cials; and announced on radio. We have studied choral conducting and music education methods in several presti­

gious settings. One of us (Graham) has studied singing privately with 3 singing teachers, and the other has studied with nine. In undergraduate and graduate speech and the­ atre training, voice skills were never addressed. We were asked to use many different vocal techniques in our private singing lessons. In music education and choral methods courses, in the choirs in which we sang, and at the choral conductor convention sessions and summer work­

He and his teenaged son traveled on their one motorcycle from

shops that we attended, we learned many quick-fix gim­

their hometown of Minneapolis, Minnesota, to the west coast of Or­ egon. They traveled with a married couple-family friends-who rode on their own motorcycle. They all wanted to experience the real countryside, so they rode the smaller U.S. highways-not the Interstates. Ahhh! Celebrate the sensory joys of the open road-the beautiful scenes offarmland plains, trees, hills, and wide open sky; the sounds of mountain echoes and crickets at night; the smells of newly mowed grass; the feel of the wind and the rain in their faces and hair. Mmmmmmmmmmmm! At the time, Robert Pirsig (1974) was a writer of technical manu­ als for a manufacturing company in Minneapolis. He appreciated how machines worked, and what to do to maintain them in working order. At the end of each day's ride, he checked the tuning and fluid levels of his motorcycle. Small adjustments were made when neces­ sary. The couple, on the other hand, were into the sensory joys of the trip—the wind and the rain in their hair, the mmmmmmm of open road travel. They had no interest in how to ride their motorcycle plea­ surably and protectively, and they were clueless about how their ve­ hicle worked and the details of motorcycle maintenance. And their motorcycle kept breaking down. The trip was interrupted by visits to motorcycle repair shops and waiting for the delivery and installation of spare parts. For them, mmmmmmmm eventually became arrghhhhh! and even #@%*}:\@%#!

micks to get our students-singers to sing the music correctly. We developed quite a "bag of teaching tricks" such as: 1. sing "on top of the pitch", raise your eyebrows to avoid singing flat or lower them to avoid singing sharp; 2. lift your upper lip and cheeks in a perpetual smile to brighten or focus your tone; 3. avoid singing any vowel that is not a cardinal vowel (will becomes weel, for instance);

4. match voice qualities in choir seating arrangements, so that the reed, flute and string voices will create a blended

choral sound;

5. sing as though you are older singers than you are, or sing like you are opera singers;

6. "place" your upper tones through the top of your

head for good resonance; 7. don't sing loud passages at full volume in the final rehearsal-just mark it and save your voices for later. We know that all of our teachers and conductors taught in the best way they knew how at that time in their lives. They had our best interests in their hearts when they taught us solo and choral singing skills, and we learned useful skills from all of them. Over the years, however, we became somewhat puzzled-especially when we changed singing xvii

teachers or choral conductors. With some frequency we

or between your eyes, or out the top of your head). Lift

were:

your cheeks in a quasi smile to brighten your tone. See that

1. asked to do tasks that conflicted with what a previ­ ous teacher or conductor had taught;

nail in the wall over there? Drive it into the wall with the

2. given conflicting, sometimes puzzling anatomicphysiologic-acoustic explanations of vocal production, with terminology that sometimes was confusing or unclear.

laser beam of your focused tone. Warmer colors of tone can be added by rounding your lips on all vowels." Other teachers wanted us to produce "more resonant tone" by opening our throats more. We were instructed to use the sense of a yawn when singing, and to sing with a

For instance, at various times we were taught three very conflicting ways to breathe for singing.

low larynx. The /oo/ vowel or the schwa vowel /uh/ were frequently used in vocal exercises. "Lift your soft palate.

1. Some teachers taught the so-called "down-and-out" way to create exhaled breathflow for voicing. "Push your

Feel like you have a pear (or hot potato, or...) in your mouth

gut down with your diaphragm like you are defecating a resistant solid-waste bolus from your body. Your gut must push so strongly that someone could hit you in the stom­ ach while you are singing and your tone would not be affected. To sing well, you will need to develop powerful back muscles" 2. Some teachers taught the so-called "in-and up" way to exhale breath for singing. "Your abdominal and rib cage muscles contract to press your guts up underneath your

and upper throat, and sing with 'pear-shaped' tones. Feel the yawn in your throat when you sing" At times, in choirs, we were confused about whether

we should sing the /ah/ vowel with a "three-finger-wide" jaw-mouth opening, or a "two-finger" opening. Regardless, one of us (Leon) set his jaw into a held-open position to make sure that his mouth was open widely enough. One

teacher, though, asked him to place a pencil cross-wise in the mouth and gently bite down on it to hold it in place, and then to speak all the vowels of the English language as

diaphragm which moves upward to create a positive air pressure in your lungs." 3. Other teachers wanted us to learn a balanced inter­ action of the breathing muscles for singing exhalation-

clearly as possible. The point was that all the vowels could be spoken very clearly only by adjusting the pharynx while the jaw-mouth was held in a nearly closed position. This manner of articulating vowels was to result in the purest,

appoggio, in the Italian language. "Your diaphragm muscle is involuntary, so you cannot consciously control it. When

most open-throated and resonant tone possible.

you are balanced, your abdomen and chest wall will barely move, if at all" When we (or a choir we were in) were not singing up

to expectations a common phrase was, "You need more breath support; breathe from your diaphragm," and teach­ ers or conductors would point to their abdomen. For many years, we had little idea what the term meant. We thought

that the abdominal wall was the diaphragm muscle, and that tightening it was how you increased breath support (we were actually engaging several abdominal wall muscles).

Some teachers wanted us to "focus the tonal reso­ nance by placing it in the facial mask". We were instructed to place the tone as far forward as possible to make the tone as bright and "ringing" as possible, and to use nasal conso­ nants and the /ee/ vowel on progressively ascending pitch exercises. "Focus your tone into your teeth (or nose, or face, xviii

Registers and register "breaks" were the greatest mys­ teries. Different teachers and vocal pedagogues had widely different points of view about what registers are, how many registers existed, and what their appropriate labels should be. What did head voice and chest voice mean? Several teach­ ers said that everything above chest is your falsetto register, but we could produce two very different sound qualities above chest voice. Heavy mechanism, chest, and modal were terms we encountered for the register that had the lowest pitch range. Some people said that head was just above chest, and falsetto was above head. Others said that falsetto was just above chest, and head voice was above falsetto. [To us, falsetto was that upper pitch range, female-like sound that was unique to males.] Others said that the lowest register was chest voice and highest register was head voice, and there was a middle register in between that was a "mixture" of chest and head.

She slapped her abdominal wall with her hands and said,

"Breathe from your diaphragm, Leon." With that communication,

Irma Lee Batey showed me where my diaphragm was. When my diaphragm "filled up", my chest and shoulders fell down. The falling of my shoulders and chest was never mentioned, so...I had learned how to breathe right. Years later, I learned where my diaphragm muscle was actually located. I also learned what its functions were, and the interrelation­ ship between how my skeleton was arranged and the efficiency of my breathing and voicing. Ms. Batey was my first college-level singing teacher. I still re­ member her with great respect and fondness. She was a very strong woman and a good person, but eventually, I concluded that her knowl­ edge of voice and voice skill teaching was not very extensive.

in nighttime. As any area of the Earth rotates into the sun­ light, people standing on the planet will experience the illu­ sion that the Sun is moving up from the horizon, thus the expression sunrise. The illusion continues through the day­

time, and daytime ends with sunset, as their part of the Earth revolves away from the Sun. That is what is real about the Earth and the Sun, and

that raises some disturbing questions! Can we human beings make logical assumptions about what is real, based on direct experience, and then accept the assumptions as TRUTH, and convey the assumptions to others as the way things really are? Can what we directly experience with our senses al­

ways be reliable? Elephants? Three men-blind from birth-approach an elephant.

Can the credibility of singing teachers, choral conduc­ tors, and music educators be called into question if confus­ ing, conflicting, or inaccurate information about voices is delivered to learners as they change from one teacher to another? Can the credibility of the voice education profes­

sions become suspect?

Wondering Toward Roads Less Traveled Sunsets? To begin each day, does the Sun really rise in the di­ rection we call the East, then move across the sky as the day

passes? And to begin each nighttime, does it set in the direction we call the West?

If you've learned something from the legacy of Nicolas Copernicus and Galileo Galilei, you would be inclined to say, "No". But, wait a minute. Nearly everyone-including you-

has been awake early enough in the morning to directly expe­ rience the Sun rising-and it moves across the sky and it sets, just the way it was described above. How can anyone say that the Sun does otherwise? If you believe Copernicus and Galileo, you would say that the Earth orbits around the Sun, and as it does so, it revolves on its own axis. The half of the Earth that faces the Sun is in daylight and the half that is away from the Sun is

They are asked to describe the elephant. The first man encounters one of the elephant's legs. 'Aha! Elephants are like trees!" The second man encounters the elephant's tail. 'Aha! Elephants are like ropes!" The third man encounters one of the elephant's sides. 'Aha! Elephants are like curved walls!" Are their perceptions accurate? Basically, yes. So, what's the problem? Could the perceptions of the men be limited because they had not yet perceived "whole elephantness"? Can perspectives that are limited to parts of a whole reality, be perceived as the whole reality, until placed in the context of The Big Picture? Sunset Assumptions, Part-Elephant Perceptions, and Voices? In our culture, when a person speaks and then sings,

we become consciously aware of the obvious differences between the two. Singing teachers help people with their singing voices. Speech trainers help people with their speaking voices. So, can we make the logical assumption that we have two anatomical structures that produce our two voices, so that when we sing, we use one larynx, and when we speak, we use our other larynx? And, of course, do we have two completely distinct brain areas that produce sung and spo­ ken language? xix

Two Scenelets: An elementary school music educator with a hoarse voice sees an ear-nose-throat physician. The physician notes that the patient uses his singing voice in his work, diagnoses "singer's nodules'' and says, "Stop singing for three weeks and then I want to

examine you again'' The patient complies completely, returns, and there are no changes in the size of the nodules. The physician begins to discuss further treatment options including surgery. A choir is singing a composition that includes a section for spoken chorus. The music is about human determination and cour­ age and the singing is high in volume. The choir sings skillfully with a beautiful choral sound. When the speaking section happens, the group's vocal quality suddenly sounds tense, edgy, pressed, and some­ what unpleasant to listen to. To that choral director, they were using their speaking voices, and she had never been taught any speaking voice teaching methods, so, they just used their "natural" speaking voices.

We have one voice, not two. We have one collection of neural networks-from both cerebral hemispheres-that produce both singing and speaking (with variations that produce the obvious functional differences). Speaking and singing are two ways we coordinate our one voice to ex­ press ourselves. There is more similarity in the two coordi­ nations than there are differences. Most of the types of methods that help speakers speak more skillfully and ex­ pressively can also help singers sing more skillfully and expressively, and vice versa. But in the United States, most members of the Voice and Speech Trainers Association are likely to say that they are not trained to teach the singing voice to speakers and ac­ tors, and most members of the National Association of Teachers of Singing are likely to say that they are not trained to teach the speaking voice to singers. Among teachers of singing, including vocal music edu­ cators and choral conductors, a centuries-long tradition of vocal pedagogy has been developed. According to Mori (1970), the earliest discovered written evidence for a West­ ern civilization tradition of vocal pedagogy appeared in

documents from the pre-Renaissance middle ages. These concepts were described long before human cadavers had been dissected to find out what was inside and before physi­ ologists had discovered how voices worked. In those times, when singers sang in their upper pitch range, they felt a prominence of vibration sensations somewhere in the front

and top of their heads. They thought their voices were coming from there, so they called that way of singing their

head voice (voce di testa). When they sang in their lower range, they felt a prominence of vibrations in their throats and upper chests. They then thought that their voices origi­

nated from there, so they called that way of singing their throat voice (Mori, 1970). Singers and singing teachers of the 17th century also wrote of two voices, but labeled them chest voice (voce di petto) and falsetto voice (falsetto then re­ ferred to all pitches produced above chest). When some singers sang in their middle pitch range, they noticed sensa­ tions and sound qualities that were different from those that they noticed when singing in their uppermost and lower ranges. This came to be called middle voice. How Can We Develop Accurate Assumptions and Whole-Elephant Perceptions of Human Voices? Copernicus and Gallileo set off an enormous revolu­ tion in human perception and learning that has changed

world history. It grew into a process that we now refer to as science. Before that revolution, sunset assumptions and part-elephant perceptions about the nature of the physical

world were embedded in the tightly controlled doctrine of the Roman Church (Book I, Chapter 1 has some details).

Those points of view were regarded as unquestionable truths, so Copernicus and Gallileo were the first to doubt some very strongly entrenched biases of their time. Originally, the scientific orientation promised to elimi­ nate the influence of all human biases so that valid and reliable knowledge could be gathered. So, the scientific method was invented as a means of determining objective reality and thus overcoming subjective bias. This is not possible-never has, and never will be. Scientific "objectivity" implies that the human beings who engage in scientific investigation can disconnect the

parts of their brains that process feeling and emotions (bi­ ases) from those brain parts that process perception and conceptualization. For instance, in scientific investigations there is a possibility that human investigators-inside or out­ side their conscious awareness-may orient research proce­ dures and findings so that a previously held, emotionally embedded point of view is supported. In spite of those realities, the methods of science are still the best means we human beings have yet devised to

minimize the influence of human bias. In judging the cred­ ibility of spoken or written communications-or of teaching methodologies-the scale of validity and reliability in Table

1 may be helpful.

Developing Accurate Assumptions and Whole-Elephant Perceptions When We Teach Expressive Voice Skills In the past few decades, there has been-and continues to be-an explosion in voice research in the fields of anatomy,

Sunset Assumptions, Part-Elephant Perceptions, and Voice Education The process of teaching singing skills to other people

physiology, acoustic physics, the neurosciences, medicine,

is commonly referred to as vocal pedagogy. Traditional

voices have been and are continuing to be invented. The volume of this research is now so great that scientists who study the nature of vocal anatomy, physiology, acoustics, and health are now allied in new scientific fields of voice

vocal pedagogy has a long and distinguished history. It originated at least in the middle ages and includes a centu ries-long accumulation of knowledge about singing by adults. The tradition developed and grew during times when

human beings had little or no idea what vocal anatomy looked like, how it actually functioned, or what the nature of sound was. In order to devise tasks that would help people achieve the goal of skilled singing, sunset assump­ tions had to be made about such matters, and part-elephant perceptions were inevitable (Jorgenson, 1980). Mostly, the assumptions were based on physical sensations observed by experienced singers, and on sound qualities observed by experienced singing teachers. The absence of precise knowledge about vocal func­ tion led to the development of: 1. explanations of vocal function based solely on per­ sonal sensation and opinion; and

2. the use of metaphoric language in the voice skill development process.

Historically, speech training has emphasized language

and psychology. Instruments for gathering more detailed and accurate information about the actual functioning of

science and voice medicine. The new scientific information frequently has impli­ cations for the teaching of voice skills. Some of the neces-

Table 1 A Scale of Validity and Reliability for Spoken or Written Communications and for Teaching-Learning Methodologies

1. Unsubstantiated, raw opinions:

Hearsay assumption and per­

sonal interpretation or judgment is based solely on a person's history of feelings and emotions with little or no "facts" to substantiate it They are speculations based only on personal preferences, pleasant-unpleasant feel­ ing biases, and associated behaviors. In other words, opinions are like belly buttons-everybody's got one.

2. Opinions or explanations based on careful, studied observa­ tion and informed intuition: Complex phenomena are repeatedly ob­ served through one or more of the observer's senses. Categories and sub­ categories are formed, and then the phenomena are described as extensively and completely as possible in literal or metaphoric language or in the sym­ bols of mathematics. Studied observations may be generalized to form insights, guesses, or relational concepts related to observed phenomena.

articulation, pitch inflection, and voice projection, and has empha­

sized skilled breathing as fundamental to training the speak­ ing voice. In more recent decades, voice skills have gradu­ ally been added. Speech sciences have a long history in Western civilization. Most of the science has been devoted to helping speech-language pathologists (referred to as

phoniatricians in Europe) whose occupation is to provide therapeutic voice rehabilitation to people whose voices are not functioning normally. A new program of comprehen­ sive study in voice is called vocology. It originated at the National Center for Voice and Speech at the University of

Iowa, and it integrates speech communications, speech pa­ thology, and singing with voice science. A new interna­ tional voice journal is now named Logopedics Phoniatrics

3. Scientific findings: The method of science is used to systemati­ cally identify and/or analyze a detail of complex phenomena, and prior findings, scientific procedures, results, and implications are described and published for all to observe and evaluate.

4. Scientific theories: Several-to-many scientific findings related to a complex phenomenon are assessed to explain "big picture" relationships between the findings. Theory must have evidential substantiation but the evidence is always subject to continuing evaluation in the light of ongoing scientific findings. 5. Scientific facts or laws: The scientific method has been used to

observe and explain complex phenomena for cause-effect relationships. Rep­ lication of early findings have consistently validated and verified the obser­ vations and explanations, so there is a very high accumulation of evidential substantiation. The probability that the same findings will occur under the same or similar circumstances is extremely high. 6. SWAGs: Speculation that is based on broad science-based knowl­ edge and personal experiential memory so a Scientific Wild-Assed Guess is made. In other words, same as item two above.

Vocology. xxi

sary assumptions of the past are being confirmed, some are

While the guiding processes of voice education have a

being disconfirmed or challenged, and some are being up­

scientific foundation, that does not mean that learners should

dated. All of us who are concerned about expressive speak­ ing and singing and voice health have an opportunity to

In the 18th century, a common practice among physi­

be inundated with uninteresting scientific minutiae that are beyond their current biological and experiential age and are guaranteed to drive them away from passionate vocal self-expression. That would completely violate the most important principles of learning that are derived from the neuropsychobiological sciences. Those principles indicate that when the guidance processes are suffused with fasci­ nating exploration and discovery of personal self-expres­

cians was the cutting open of a large vein in a patient to

sive capabilities, then constructive learning occurs along with

allow a brief period of bleeding in order to rid the body of

a bonded attachment with the people, places, things, and events that were experienced in the process. Voice education guidance processes may be grouped in the following categories: 1. singing and speaking skills; 2. health and voice protection;

examine concepts and teaching approaches in light of more

accurate information about vocal anatomy, physiology, and acoustics. But, why bother?

infectious poisons. Would we choose physicians for our­

selves who use practices that are based on assumptions

and perceptions from 300 years ago, 100 years ago, even 30 years ago? Would we see physicians who had not exam­ ined their own medical practices and updated them as new science-based discoveries, procedures, and approaches were developed? People who see physicians for help typically expect state-of-the-art care. They expect that the physi­

3. verbal and non-verbal interactions; and 4. teaching-learning methods that result in people of

all ages loving to express themselves skillfully with their voices.

cians will have had deep training in the physio chemical processes that sustain human life, deep training and experi­

Key to the practical usefulness of scientific findings

ence in how to diagnose and treat human disease, and they

and theory is the translation of the scientific language into

expect that physicians have kept up-to-date in the latest knowledge and current practices in their profession.

terms that non-scientists can easily understand and com­

How many singing teachers, speech trainers, music educators, and choral conductors are aware of the phe­ nomenon of acoustic loading and overloading of the vocal folds? It has enormous implications for helping people produce the sound qualities that reveal the innate vocal talent that nearly all human beings possess. The phenomenon of vocal reg­ isters is richly affected by acoustic loading (Book II, Chap­ ters 9 through 12 have details).

and How They Are 'Played' in Skilled Speaking and Sing­ ing" all chapters begin with a section that is written in ev­

In this book, the term voice education is an umbrella term that refers to the process of guiding other people (bodyminds) as they develop and maintain self-expressive abilities that include voice. Voice educators, however, base their human-to-human interactions and their guidance pro­ cesses on the neuropsychobiological, voice, and voice medi­ cine sciences. These knowledge-ability domains are the foundations of voice education.

xxii

fortably use. Particularly in Book II, "How Voices Are Made,

eryday colloquial language, and only the necessary ana­ tomic, physiologic, and acoustic terms are introduced. Following that section of the chapters, there is a sec­ tion labeled For Those Who Want to Know More... It presents a gathering of documented scientific details that are intended not only to deepen the knowledge base of voice educators but to substantiate the concepts presented in the colloquial sections of the chapters as well.

Comprehensive and Specialist Voice Educators As a result of training and experience, comprehensive voice educators are able to guide people in all four of the areas listed above, but in addition, they have the training

and observational skills to determine who may have a voice disorder that may require medical examination and thera­

peutic evaluation. Comprehensive voice educators also are able to communicate skillfully with such people, or their parents-guardians if they are under age, so that they under­ stand the importance of seeking specialist attention, and they personally know the voice-experienced medical and thera­

peutic personnel from which help could be sought And finally, comprehensive voice educators also have the skills to serve as an auxiliary member of a cooperative voice treatment team (see next paragraph) in the rehabilitation of people who are recovering from a voice disorder. In other words, when people have been diagnosed and therapeuti­ cally treated for such a voice disorder, and they are return­ ing to their "real world", comprehensive voice educators are qualified to assist them in accommodating their new

confidence. Vocal abilities are not just valuable in preparing and presenting musical and dramatic expressions, but are quite valuable in everyday living such as getting and per­ forming employment and for effective social communica­ tion. Fear, anxiety, social pressures, stress reaction, burn­ out, and depression all affect the mastery and display of self-expressive skills and self-confidence (Book I, Chapter 9, and Book III, Chapter 8 have details).

When we help people with their voices, we are influ­ encing their neuroanatomy, biochemistry, and physiology. "Technique lists," "tricks" and "method procedures" alone, while helpful up to a point, ultimately limit us into roles

thologist, and a specialist voice educator. In addition to all

that are like TV repair technicians. Deep contextual knowl­ edge and experience empowers us to design learning expe­ riences that help people develop such life-abilities as em­ pathic relatedness, constructive competence, and self-reli­ ant autonomy. Broad context enables us to evaluate our designed learning experiences, modify them or discard them, create new ones and to know how to improvise modifica­ tions "in the moment". Breadth of understanding undergirds

of the skills that comprehensive voice educators have, spe­

the practical, and frees us to be creative, exciting senior learn­

cialist voice educators have undergone the training and ex­ perience that qualifies them to participate as a professional

ers. Vocal self-expression really cannot be separated out from everything that we human beings are and may be­

of equal status in the therapeutic rehabilitation of people

come.

whose voices have become disordered. They may be allied

So, all of this book's authors hope that its bigness, complicatedness, and comprehensiveness will help us all be healthier, more fulfilled, and more expressive human be­ ings, and we hope it will provide more wherewithal' to us so that we can help others be the same. A map is not the actual territory. If you so choose, this book can become part of a map. What you do is the territory.

voice and voice protection skills to that real world. The

colloquial parts of the chapters in Book II are written with comprehensive voice educators in mind. Cooperative voice treatment teams are made up of a voice-ear-nose-throat physician, a speech-language pa­

with or employed by a private medical practice or a hospi­ tal, and legally, their therapeutic work is under the auspices of the physician and speech-language pathologist. The For Those Who Want to Know More... sections of the chapters in Book II are written with specialist voice educators in mind.

The Conclusion Line The parts of us that produce voice are interfaced with

References

a wide array of biological functions. Our voices are inti­ mately connected with everything we have ever experienced,

felt, learned, or done, and those are all biological processes. So, when we deal with human voices we are not just teach­

ing voice skills that can be used as an instrument for music-making.

Crick, F. (1994).

The Astonishing Hypothesis.

New York: Charles Scribner's

Sons. Damasio, A.R. (1994).

Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain.

New York: Avon Books.

Edelman, G.M. (1989). The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Conscious­ ness. New York: Basic Books.

The state of our neuropsychobiological selves is re­

flected in the state of our voices. Mastery or lack of mastery of self-expressive skills can contribute to or subtract from what we sometimes refer to as self-identity, self-esteem, and self­

Jorgenson, D. (1980). History of conflict. The NATS Bulletin, 55, 51-55.

Mack, L. (1979). A Descriptive Study of a Community Chorus Made Up of 'Non-Singers'. Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Ur­ bana-Champaign.

xxiii

Mori, R.M. (1970). Coscienza della Voce nella Scuola Italiana di Canto.

Milan:

Editzioni Curci.

Pert, C.B. (1986). The wisdom of the receptors: Neuropeptides, the emotions, and bodymind. Advances, 3(3), 8-16.

Pirsig, R. (1974). Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. New York: William Morrow.

Searle, J.R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Strand, F.L. (2000). Neuropeptides: Regulators of Physiological Processes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

xxiv

book one bodyminds, learning, and self-expression

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

the big picture n a book on voice education, isn't it overkill to

I

excitatory synapses will be formed, the functional integrity

address the neuropsychobiology of perception, memory, learning, behavior, and health? Why not

of synaptic connections will be altered physio chemically,

Everything that we human beings experience, do, feel, learn, think, say, or sing involves changes in our anatomy,

ings of human bodyminds points any educational enter­

and production of transmitter molecules will be increased just address voice anatomy, function, and health-like or most decreased in the nervous, endocrine, and immune sys­ voice books do-and be done with it? tems. As a result, unique patterns of perceptual, valuePhysicians change the anatomy and biochemistry of emotive, conceptual, and sensorimotor processing are people, and often their physiology as well. formed. So do educators, be they singing teachers, speech train­ So, why go into this level of detail about human learn­ ing and self-expression in a book on voice education? ers, music educators, choral conductors, theatre directors, 1. An appreciation of the absolutely astounding work­ school teachers, professors, or parents.

biochemistry, and physiology-especially in our brains. Our nervous, endocrine, and immune systems are functionally integrated and can alter electro-physio-chemical processes throughout our bodies at genetic, molecular, cellular, tissue,

prise in human-compatible directions, rather than uninten­ tional human-hurting ones.

organ, system, and behavioral levels. These changes pro­

2. All learning results from interactions between the people, places, things, and events of our world. Those ex­ periences result in what we call perception, feeling, memory, cognition, learning, behavior, and health. It is changes in the

duce what are commonly termed the human mind and our

nervous, endocrine, and immune systems-regulated and modulated

behavior psychology. But it is our biology that actually processes and constructs what we perceive, feel, remember, and learn.

by transmitter molecules-that bring perception, feeling, memory cog­ nition, learning, behavior, and health into existence.

When people who are called teachers interact with

Some educators may not be familiar with such an

people who are called students, some types of interactions can contribute to inhibition of vocal self-expression in both

groups. Other types of interactions can contribute to an enhancement of vocal self-expression. Inhibition or en­ hancement of vocal self-expression can be learned. Learn­

ing means that as bodywide physio-chemical networks are altered, new nerve tissue filaments are likely to be grown in various neural networks of the brain, new inhibitory and

orientation.

Actually, this book's framework for human

learning represents a relatively different way of conceiving teaching and learning processes. And even though it may make some of us uncomfortable, we need to know how what we do affects the anatomy, biochemistry, physiology, and health of the people we teach. And, just as importantly,

we need to know how teaching affects our own anatomy, biochemistry, physiology, and health.

the

big

picture

1

Helping People Love to Learn and Express Themselves: Integrating Theory and Practice Nearly all educators have their students' best interests

at heart Always. Just like nearly all doctors have their patients' best interests at heart Educators have had to make practical decisions about what to do based on what was available to them-mostly the accumulated practices of ex­ perienced teachers, their own accumulated experiences, and culturally delivered implicit assumptions about the nature of human beings and their learning. Three assumptions seem to underlie the real world of class-and-grade assem­ bly-line schools: (1) minds are nonphysical entities that op­ erate bodies, and schools are for minds, (2) what we call feelings and emotions are separable from cognition and aca­ demic behavior, and schools are about cognition and aca­ demic behavior, and (3) all human beings of the same chro­ nological age should learn the same abilities at the same rate. To get "results", many such schools predominantly use

the train cannot steer us onto alternative tracks on its own. The train's engineer makes those decisions. The engineer represents our conscious awareness and decision-making capability. If our engineer is to steer us into interesting, beautiful landscapes, she or he will be helped by (1) a jour­ nal of previously traveled tracks, (2) a map of possible des­ tinations, (3) criteria by which destinations are selected, and (4) plans for how to get where we want to go. The caboose is at the rear of the train. It represents a place where conscious memories are stored and evaluated, plans for the future are made, and where symbolic expres­ sion occurs (thinking and talking). So, in order to evaluate past travel, and think and talk about future options, the

engineer has to stop the train of life-living and go to the

are decontextualized away from "real life", (3) conscious

caboose. When the directions are decided and plans are made, the engineer goes back to the engine and starts the train moving again. New experiential adventures are then possible that can add to, subtract, or change the nature of the train's passenger and cargo cars. Instead of "Ready, set, go", a high percentage of our actual experiential reactions are more like, "Ready, go...set" (Oliver, 1993, p. 7). The chapters of this book are written in the caboose of the train of thought and action, and that's where you are now as you read. We're temporarily stopping our experi­

analysis, including correction of "errors" and "mistakes", (4)

ential trains so that we can evaluate past and recent educa­

(1) linguistic telling, reading, and writing, (2) language-based, short-answer, standardized and non-standardized tests that

extrinsic rewards that have little or no relationship to the

tional tracks that we have traveled, become familiar with

abilities that are to be learned, and (5) military-like coercion

updated maps that present alternate possibilities, evaluate

and punitive discipline. Are these the most effective ways to educate people for 21st Century realities? How do we determine what the most effective ways are? A train of thought and action is moving along the track of an experience (Oliver, 1993, pp. 9-11, 169-171). The first human reaction to an experience occurs in just a few

new travel directions, make travel plans, and anticipate pos­

hundred milliseconds: a high-speed, other-than-conscious appraisal of the people, places, and things that we encoun­

ter. Within a few more milliseconds internal body sensa­

tions are generated that we often refer to as feelings or emo­ tions. The train's engine represents those feeling sensations because those feelings lead into existence our automatic, habitual, outside-of-conscious-awareness patterns of be­ havior. Our automatic reactions are represented by the train's

sible new adventures. A term that we all use for such analysis, reflection,

and planning is theorizing. Educational and learning "theory" have a bad reputation among some educators. The "theory" to which many eductors have been exposed has not been useful. There is not enough time to theorize about the most effective ways to interact with learners. The real world of "What do I do on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday?" must be dealt with. Typically, teachers activate their habitual teaching patterns that were learned implicitly when they observed their own teachers in elementary, middle

passenger and cargo cars. There are many experiential tracks that our trains of

school, high school, and college. Those behavior patterns are based on assumptions (theories) about how people learn of which teachers are often not consciously aware. What is "theory"? In Western science, theory is an

thought and action can travel on, and the engine that pulls

explanation of what actually happens when observable

2

bodymind

&

voice

events turn out the way they do. A theoretical explanation must have considerable, studied evidence to substantiate it Research evidence may present many "bits and pieces" of a larger, patterned "picture," but a theory suggests how the parts are related in a "big picture". Effective theory points people toward what to do in order to accomplish goals effectively It is the basis upon which useful practices or objects are created. Practical application of a theory generates observable data that can help validate the theory or be used to modify it. Assuming questions of what to learn are settled, is it reasonable to say that decisions about educational practice (what to do) need to be based on the best available research findings and on theories that address the following ques­ tions? 1. What happens inside us human beings, and to our behavior, when we learn in the most constructive, produc­

tive, and beneficial ways? 2. What are the most effective ways to arrange educa­ tional environments so that constructive internal events and behaviors are most likely to occur? 3. What are the most effective ways for teacher-people and student-people to interact and communicate so that both groups experience emotional connectedness with the other, and optimally constructive, productive, and benefi­ cial learning is facilitated?

centered teaching? Some people physically punish children by hitting them in order to teach them "discipline". To them,

that practice is in the best interest of children, so therefore, it is child-centered. What about teachers who regularly use threatening

consequences as a "motivational tool" to achieve compliant behavior by students? Or teachers who commonly use an adversarial language of coercion and control when setting goals, and languages of dependency or accusative judgment when delivering feedback? What about teachers who regu­ larly call attention to what they perceive to be student in­ adequacies, and rarely call attention to increasing mastery. A spelling test is given. Ten words. A student spells eight of

them accurately, and two are spelled creatively. Where do

the red pencil marks go to call attention to the results? Are these examples of child-centered teaching? Learning processes involve a great deal of what we call psychology. Speaking and singing with optimum skill and expressiveness are rather complex acts that require a somewhat lengthy string of branched learning experiences.

They necessitate a blending of what can be referred to as cognitive-emotional-behavioral abilities. Whether or not people choose to continue singing over their life-span de­ pends to a large extent on how their earlier singing experi­ ences felt to them, pleasant or unpleasant, successful or un­ successful. Not only must there be decisions about what

"'Tis the gift to be simple..."

Simple generalizations

music to sing, what skills to learn and in what sequence;

about complex realities can produce feelings of pleasant well being and they can arouse feeling-charged commit­ ment to a preferred course of action. And that can be a very good thing. However, the prickly American humorist and newspaper columnist of the early 20th century, H.L.

there also are decisions about how the human beings in­ volved will interact with each other (see Chapter 9). Guid­

Mencken, is supposed to have said, "To every complex ques­ tion, there is a simple answer. And it's wrong!" Simple, feel­

good generalizations need to be supported by valid, verifi­ able details. If they are not, they can point us toward unex­ pected derailments of our trains of thought and action. Can both angels and devils be in the details? For example, an educator may passionately say, "I be­ lieve deeply in child-centered teaching", and other educa­ tors may nod affirmatively. The opposite, of course, is teacher-centered teaching. Teachers must lead any orga­ nized learning situation, so, what criteria will be used to determine the difference between child-centered and teacher­

ing the learning of skilled, expressive speaking and singing

includes interactions that significantly influence those reac­ tions. Constructive verbal and nonverbal communication skills are major tracks to steer our trains onto as we help people develop a love of expressive singing and speaking.

A Teaching Profession *! In the mid-1960s, teachers in the United States at­

tempted to establish themselves as members of a profession. Back then, common yearly wages for first-year teachers ranged

from about $4,000 to $6,000. Teachers highlighted their value to society, in part, by claiming that their training and exper­ tise were comparable to the already highly valued profes­

sions such as physicians, lawyers, architects, and engineers. the

big

picture

3

Many similarities between teaching and the traditional pro­

engine that requires gasoline or other fuel, that it has brakes

fessions were noted, but one significant difference was never brought fully to the attention of educators or the public. All of the traditional professions require deep education in ex­ tensive, universally accepted theoretical knowledge. Lawyers must learn many theoretical principles of social organization, law, and jurisprudence as well as the traditions, forms of court­ room practice, and precedent decisions. Architects and en­ gineers must learn many forms of mathematics, physics, and other bodies of theoretical knowledge before they can create a bridge or a supercomputer. Physician diagnoses

and lights and so forth. We can call this the orientation

and medical and surgical treatments are built up from de­ tailed theoretical foundations in human anatomy and physi­ ology, biochemistry, pharmacology, and years of mentored training in medical practice. In these professions, foundational knowledge begins to be learned during pre-practice training. If pre-practice theoretical knowledge is not assimilated sufficiently, train­ ing is delayed until it is, or training is discontinued. Practic­ ing professionals continually update their theoretical knowl­ edge throughout their careers. If the updating lags, effective practice can be compromised. Why? The day-to-day decisions made by practicing members of those professions are richly rooted in that knowledge, and current decisions depend on its current accuracy Is there a rich tradition of universally accepted theoretical knowledge that guides educational practice? No, but sig­ nificant progress has been made in the past decade. The big question is, "When will it become a universally standard aspect of pre-service and in-service teacher education?" Leslie Hart was the first person to (1) document the

inadequacies of traditional educational practice (The Class­ room Disaster, 1969), (2) assemble a brain-based theory of learning (How the Brain Works, 1975) and (3) apply that theory to educational practice (Human Brain and Human Learning, 1983). Hart (1983, pp. 20-27; 1998, pp. 43-54) clarified the practical relationships between theory and practice by con­ sidering "levels of knowledge structure" and "levels of ex­ pertise". He used the metaphor of floors in a building and the design, manufacture, and operation of automobiles as a way of conceptualizing his point of view. • "For example, think of the ground floor of our structure of expertise as occupied by those who do not drive, but know what a car is, what it is for, that it has an

4

bodymind

&

voice

level.

• "On the next floor are the many who can operate a car on a procedural basis. They know how to start the motor by turning a key, how to move the gear shift, how to

press the throttle to control speed, and so on; but they may have little idea of just what happens when the key is turned or the gearshift lever is moved. • "On the third floor are those who do have a gen­ eral grasp of the mechanics of an automobile. This is the comprehension level. By knowing to a degree "what is going on" they drive more expertly, detect developing prob­ lems, and are able to take simple remedial actions to deal

with difficulties. • "On the next floor of our structure are the mechan­ ics and skilled amateurs, those whose understanding is deep

enough to test and repair. This is the technical level. • "On the fifth floor are the engineers who employ far deeper knowledge to evaluate materials and parts, direct production, and use sophisticated instruments to test and measure results. This is the lower engineering level. • "On the sixth floor are various design engineers with deep knowledge that permits them to design parts, subsystems, and perhaps an entire vehicle. At this level, more and more of the work is done on paper or on com­ puters, making more and more use of theory. • "Occupying the highest floor are specialists, scien­ tists, and researchers; a physicist concerned with the be­ havior of hot gasses in a cylinder, a chemist involved with antipollution catalysts, a mathematician analyzing front end

geometries, all working intensively with theory." When a car's motor is chugging, an auto mechanic is

the level of expertise needed for testing and repair (technical level). The design and production of reliable, precisionmade, longer-lasting, and aesthetically interesting automo­ biles requires experts from the top three levels who must use increasingly deep-background theory to guide their prac­ tical actions. "The higher the responsibility, the greater the need for sophisticated theory" (p. 51) • "Where for millennia we did things procedurally, 'the way things were always done', we now are far more

dependent on theory....a three-year-old can procedurally operate a color television, an incredibly complex, precision

Conclusion

apparatus, because somewhere there are people at the vari­

Peter Drucker (1969, p. 192) wrote a book about hu­

ous structural levels who utilize the theories that are the foundation for television....

man organizations (including schools), and cautioned that "The most difficult and most important decisions in respect

• "As shocking as it may be, we must realize that we have not had a parallel knowledge structure in education. Education's "higher ups" do not necessarily have more grasp of theory. A viable theory of learning and theory of teach­ ing just hasn't existed to any extent! The procedures that

to objectives are not what to do. They are, first, what to abandon as no longer worthwhile and, second, what to give priority to and what to concentrate on....The decisions about what to abandon are by far the most important and

are widely used in schools do not rest on sound, substantial theoretical foundations. In that sense, education has never entered the twentieth century. It is still fundamentally back in prescientific times and more and more suffering the con­ sequences." (pp. 24-26) At which of Hart's levels of knowledge structure and expertise are teachers who begin teaching after four years of

college? Procedural? Do they teach the way they were taught as youngsters in primary, middle, and high school and in college, or do they teach the way they were taught to teach? What if they are taught to teach in the same way that they were taught? At which level do most experienced educa­ tors function? Comprehensive? How many teachers com­ bine the use of sophisticated learning and educational theory at the lower engineering and design engineering levels? Would the specialist levels be filled by neuropsychobiological

scientists? At which level are parents, legislators, school board members, educational administrators, or inspectors?

Pre-service educators may take courses that supply an eclectic, simplified sampling of claimed theoretical con­ tent, such as introductions to psychology, sociology, and philosophy. More often than not, "methods" courses are based on theoretical opinion, practical experience, and, in

some cases, an array of "tricks and gimmicks that work" (What does "...that work..." mean?). Some methods systems have been devised and are based, to some extent, on scien­ tific research findings. But to what extent have the implicit assumptions about the "nature of human beings", that un­ derpin the studies, been examined, and how might they affect validity?

the most neglected." What would constitute real learning and educational theory, and would it make a significant difference in what teachers do every day? A "vastly different form of educa­ tion," as suggested by the Averch Report (1972), would have

to emerge from vastly different theoretical sources than have traditionally existed. Until Hart (1975, 1983) proposed his brain-based "Program-Structure Theory of Learning" (ab­ breviated to "Proster Theory"), no learning theory had ever been based on wide perspectives of the actual "internal op­ erations" of human beings such as occurs in their nervous systems. As noted in Chapter 1, most philosophers and psy­ chologists now realize that all of the human sciences are allies in the process of understanding how human beings learn, that is, (1) make sense of their world, (2) react to threat and benefit, and (3) gain mastery of self and world. A cru­ cial foundation to that process is understanding how the

nervous, endocrine, immune, and transmitter molecule sys­ tems interact in whole human beings. The nine chapters of Book I cannot possibly present all of the details of human neuropsychobiological anatomy and function that have been discovered by scientific inves­ tigation. Neither can all of the implications of those find­ ings for human learning be presented. A big picture with some details is presented in the hope that voice educators can exert a more pervasive and constructive influence on the human experience. Take a comfortable seat in your caboose, "keep your hand on the plow and hold on" (as the slave spiritual sings). Maybe this can be an adventure.

the

big

picture

5

Chapter 1-A Brief Context about How We Know What We

Know, and Do What We Do Chapter 2-The Astounding Capacities of Human Bodyminds Chapter 3-The Human Nervous System Chapter 4-The Human Endocrine System Chapter 5-The Human Immune System Chapter 6-Human Sensory Experiences Chapter 7-Internal Processing of Life Experiences and Be­ havior Chapter 8-Human Selves and Communicative Human In­ teraction Chapter 9-Human-Compatible Learning

References Averch, HA, etal. (1972). How Effective Is Schooling? Santa Monica, CA: Rand

Corporation. Drucker, P.F. (1969). The Age of Discontinuity. New York: Harper and Row. Hart, L.A. (1969). The Classroom Disaster. New York: Teachers College Press. Hart, L.A. (1975). How the Brain Works. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

Hart, L.A. (1983). Human Brain and Human Learning. Kent, WA: Books for Educators.

Oliver, E. (1993). The Human Factor at Work: A Guide to Self-Reliance and Consumer Protection for the Mind. Canton, MI: MetaSystems.

6

bodymind

&

voice

chapter 1

a brief context about how we know what we know, and do what we do Leon Thurman

uman beings do not move, sense, feel, or

H

think without nervous system activity--

Knowing, and Knowing About Knowing

mainly the brain. The brain is an organ of the According to cognitive archeologists, cognitive fluid­ adult body that is estimated to contain over 100 billion ity (global mapping within the brain; see Chapter 3) ap­ neurons and over 900 billion support cells, according to pears to have emerged in the brains of Homo sapiens sapiens estimates by neuroscientists (see Chapter 2). It is the cen­ (modern humans) between 60,000 and 30,000 years ago tral locus for the regulation of all bodily processes, the (Mithen, 1996, p. 194). Before that time, cognitive domains perception and "interpretation" of all sensory experience, that Mithen refers to as general intelligence, social intelli­ and the internal initiation of all movement, thought, con­ gence, technical intelligence, and natural history intelligence scious and other-than-conscious awareness, as well as feel­ were distinct operations that could not be integrated. The ings, moods, and emotions. The brain is interfaced with earliest language was spoken, and emerged almost exclu­ the endocrine (glandular) system and the immune system sively within the social intelligence. With the development in carrying out learning, behavior, protective, and healing of cognitive fluidity, however, all of the cognitive domains functions. The complexity of the human brain is greater became integrated and language proliferated. The earliest than for any animate creature on earth, and is the principal speculations about the origins and nature of the physical reason for the vast adaptive (learning) capabilities of hu­ world, and the nature of human knowing, were elaborate, man beings. anthropomorphic mythologies that were passed to suc­ We do not consciously sense the operation of the ner­ ceeding generations by means of crafted objects and im­ vous system. Other than for some aspects of pain, it does ages and spoken language (Mithen, 1996, pp. 164-167). not have sensory nerves that enable any sensation of its Written symbols of spoken language emerged about function. We do not sense any of the brain's functions. For 5,000 years ago (Mithen, 1996, p. 27), and then the my­ many centuries of recorded history, little was known about thologies could be recorded in written form. Among di­ the brain, and nothing was known about its function in, verse peoples, written language also enabled a sharing of for instance, conscious awareness or "knowing." Histori­ speculations about the physical world and human know­ cally, therefore, explanations of human knowing were rea­ ing so that they could be analyzed and evaluated. In West­ soned speculations, philosophies, or theories that were ern civilization, reasoned speculations about the nature of based on the experiences, perceptions, assumptions, and reasonings of the people who originated them. a

brief context

7

the world and people first emerged in the ancient Greek

Until about the 15th and 16th centuries, the philosophi­

civilization and came to be called philosophy (Greek: philo+ sophos = loving that which is wise). The English title of Aristotle's treatise on the natural world, Metaphysics, was adopted as the categorical term for philosophies about the nature of the physical world (Greek: meta- + phusika = pursuit of physical nature). Philosophies about the nature of human knowing have come to be cat­ egorized by the term epistemology (Greek: episteme + logos = knowledge words). Two other philosophical categories arose, ethics (Greek: ethos and ethikos = moral character) and aesthetics (Greek: aisthetikos = that which is perceptible by the senses; aisthesis = sense experience). Ethics related to interacting morally, justly, and honorably with other human beings, and aes­ thetics related to the sense reactions that result from con­ templating nature or expressive "objects" that have been created by human beings. Elaborated, consistent philosophi­ cal systems such as idealism, realism, and naturalism have

cal writings of Plato and Aristotle, woven together with

been formulated that have encompassed all four of the

above areas of philosophical discourse.

Knowledge About the Physical World In the time of Socrates and Plato, learned people knew that the physical world was made up of four elements— water, earth, wind, and fire. Aristotle introduced methods of descriptive observation of the physical world. Time concepts were derived from observations of astronomical events such as daylight and dark and the cyclical positions of the sun, moon, and stars. The writings of the 2nd century Greek physician Galen (131-220) were quite sophisticated in their knowledge of the human body, including the brain and the vocal organs (von Leden, 1997). He was the preeminent physician of his

time, and he wrote over 300 books, of which only about 120 remain in existence. He was the first to describe the

laryngeal cartilages and paired muscles, and described the larynx as the organ of voice production. He wrote a trea­ tise on voice (which did not survive), and is regarded as the founder of laryngology. His writings were regarded as the "bible" of medicine for about 15 centuries.

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standard religious doctrines, constituted the accepted knowl­

edge about the physical world. But, with the invention of printing in the 15th century came gradual increases in the distribution of basic information, written philosophies, in­ creased critical analyses of them, and richer curiosity about and exploration of the nature of the physical world.

For

example, the first extensive, detailed, printed human

anatomy book was published in 1543, De Humani Corporis Fabrica (the human body structure) by Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564). From the controversies that arose between

diverse philosophies and observations of the physical world, there evolved a need for greater substantiation and valida­ tion of speculations about the nature of the world. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the pioneering work of such men as Nicolas Copernicus (1473-1543) and Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) contributed significantly to the formu­ lation of a very new and "dangerous" way of studying the world. They originated a new method of investigating the physical world that began by wondering about and doubt­

ing accepted perceptions and assumptions about its na­ ture. While both of them suffered unpleasant punishments for their "heresies", curious people who followed them, such as Isaac Newton (1642-1727), came to believe that the method would remove subjective investigator bias from the procedures and conclusions of such investigations, so that purely objective knowledge could be obtained. The method and the discoveries that have resulted have come to be known as science (Latin: scientia = knowledge, skill; sciens = having full knowledge). The method of science evolved as a means of exam­ ining the nature of the physical world in more objective ways than speculative opinion and religious doctrine could allow. In summary, the method involves: 1. identifying a phenomenon to examine and narrow­ ing the examination of it to achievable proportions; 2. gathering as much existing information about the phenomenon as is available; 3. formulating an hypothesis about how the aspect of the phenomenon that is to be examined is constructed,

and/or how it behaves under various conditions; 4. devising a procedure for reliably examining the phenomenon and converting those observations into valid

symbolic form such as descriptive language and/or math­

mind, such as remembering, willing, and so forth, were trans­

ematical representations; 5. analyzing the gathered data to detect relational pat­ terns that confirm or disconfirm the original hypothesis, and presenting conclusions, based on the gathered data, that increase knowledge about the phenomenon beyond what was already known.

lated as faculty of remembering, faculty of willing, and so on (Woodworth & Sheehan, 1964). Early Roman Church phi­

Investigation of the natural world with the scientific method eventually resulted in the scientific disciplines that we now know as physics (the study of the nature of mat­ ter and energy and their interactions); chemistry (the study of the composition, structure, properties, and reactions of matter, especially its atomic and molecular aspects); biol­ ogy, biophysics, and biochemistry (the study of the na­ ture and life processes of living organisms). Each of these broad domains of science have subcategories and cross­ categories, of course, such as astrophysics, acoustic phys­ ics, biophysics, organic chemistry, plant biology, molecu­ lar biology, human anatomy and physiology, and so forth.

losophers interpreted the unintended term faculty from a categorical noun to a functional noun, so that people were able to remember because of the mind's faculty of remem­ bering. Thus, the concept of faculties of mind was evolved. The pivotal philosopher who cemented the mind-body duality in Western culture was Rene Descartes (1596-1650). His proof of his own existence was summarized in his well known phrase, Cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am.) The domain of one's own physical body and the external world, res extensa, could only be perceived by the bodily senses, and the senses could be deceiving. The domain of pure conception or reason, res cogitans, was not physical, so mind could exist without matter and was more important than matter. Descartes' work influenced the current common practice of addressing three entities that constitute the hu­

man being—body, mind, and spirit.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and his successor John Locke (1632-1704) were British philosophers who opposed

Knowledge About the Nature of Human Beings, Human Knowing, Human Feelings, and Human Behavior Epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics are the categories of reasoned philosophical debate about the nature of hu­ man beings and their interactions with people, places, things, and events. The dialogues of Plato—with his teacher Socrates as the central character—and Aristotle's Metaphysics indel­ ibly implanted the dual identity of body as distinct from soul/spirit into Western philosophy. The duality of body

Descartes. While Descartes was ensconced in the Roman

Catholic church's view of the world, Hobbes and Locke

were not. Hobbes believed that there were only two men­

tal operations that accounted for all thought, sensation and association, and association governed recall. Locke reasoned that the senses were a primary source of knowledge and expressed the possibility of a rational demonstration of moral principles. Their work is regarded as the beginning of an important thread in Western philosophy—British empiri­ cism. David Hume (1711-1776), and others, extended the

and spirit was subsumed into many future Western reli­ gions including Christianity. Based on the state of knowl­

tradition of empiricism, and Voltaire (1694-1778) expressed

edge about human beings at the time, this assumption was consistent with the direct experiences of people—it "made

bring about the demise of the faculties of mind concept.

sense"—and it has been a central assumption of Western religious thought from those ancient times until the present. The terms mental and mind have roots in Latin (men,

mens, mentis), Old High German (gimunt), and Old English (gemynd). Mind, too, was assumed to be a disembodied entity within each person that produced thinking and rea­ son, and directed the body to move according to the mind's

thoughts. When the works of Aristotle were translated into Latin, his descriptive categorical terms for functions of the

Locke's empiricism in France. Eventually, empiricism helped Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) attempted to reconcile Descartes and Locke with his German idealist orientation.

For many centuries, the passions—sensed feelings and the named emotions—were associated with phenomena that

ranged from infestation by evil spirits to the absence of reason. In Western philosophical and religious thought, a goal of educated people was to use the mind's reasoning capacity to control the passions; thus, there was another duality—a separation of reason from emotion. The Swiss

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author and socio-political activist Jean Jacques Rousseau

(1712-1778) expressed a naturalist orientation. He defied many of the conventional mores of his time, proclaiming that human beings were, by nature, prone to emotion and natural feelings, particularly those of sympathy and empa­ thy. This orientation was known by the French expression

la sensibilite. His book Emile (1762) described the education of a young gentleman according to "natural" principles. The Social Contract (1762) advocated democracy and denied the divine right of kings. He had to leave France, but his book became the bible of the French revolution and a prime philosophical source for the American revolution. By the 19th century, the sciences of anatomy, physiol­ ogy, and medicine began to have an impact on epistemo­ logical philosophy. Pragmatism was advanced by the U.S. philosopher C.S. Peirce (1839-1914). It was not a philo­

sophical system but a philosophical procedure which asked the pragmatic question, "What difference will a given course of thought or action make?" This turn in philosophical orientation was influenced by the growing pervasiveness of science in the culture of Peirce's time, and bears a resem­ blance to the scientific method. John Dewey (1859-1952) became the most famous pragmatist. He was heavily in­ volved in learning theory and education. He wrote many books such as Democracy and Education, and Art as Experience,

and was the guiding light of the progressive education movement in the 1930s.

The Meeting of Science and Philosophy in the Study of the Human Psyche

ports of subjects in response to verbally delivered or writ­ ten questions were analyzed to determine the content and structure of mental life. Psychiatrists of the 19th century were physicians who studied and treated mentally ill people who were unable to function in society. Sigmund Freud, M.D., (1856-1939) de­ veloped introspective psychoanalysis and posited vari­ ous elements of mind such as the ego, the id, and the su­ perego, and various mental processes such as repression and defense mechanisms. His work was among the first to introduce an integration of reason and emotion in mental processes, with emotion playing a very significant role. He is credited with "discovering" the existence of the unconscious, that is, aspects of the human psyche that affect the mind,

yet are outside conscious awareness. A student of Freud's, Carl Jung (1875-1961), came to disagree with his teacher in some respects and set out on his own analytical psychol­ ogy path. He wrote several books such as The Psychology of the Unconscious and The Collective Unconscious. In the latter book he recognized the learning that occurs when groups of people interact over time—culture. The first influential United States psychologist was Wil­ liam James (1842-1910). He and others were of the func­ tionalist orientation to psychology. The general purpose of functionalism was to study the structure and function of human consciousness. The functionalist questions were, "What do people do?" "How do they do it?" and "Why do they do it?" Showing a pragmatic orientation, they fo­ cused on mental functions or dispositions that are experi­ enced under actual life conditions like perceiving or think­ ing or recalling. The philosopher John Dewey and the psychologist

The method of science was applied to the study of the

James Rowland Angell (1869-1949) sought to place psy­

psyche in the 19th century. The science came to be called

chology in the general field of biological science. At the

psychology, the study of the mental-emotional-behavioral

University of Chicago they developed an animal labora­ tory on the assumption that when an animal accommo­ dated to a new environment or solved a problem, they

aspects of individual human beings. The work of Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894), Gustav Fechner (1801-1887),

Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and others laid the ground­ work for the new science. Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920)

were demonstrating evidence of consciousness. The prin­

established the first psychological laboratory in 1879, and he is regarded as the founder of the new science. He de­ vised and elaborated the method of introspection as a means of studying the structure of mental life, and so es­ tablished a structuralist orientation to psychology. Re­

functionalists were incorporated into a laboratory school for children that Dewey founded and through which he

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ciples of psychology that were elucidated by the Chicago

helped develop the progressive education movement.

Jean Piaget (1896-1980) is regarded as a functionalist (his work asked the three questions), but has also been

claimed by the cognitivists (described later). Piaget was a biologist who became interested in how children reason.

He referred to himself as a genetic epistemologist (Gardner, 1985). In 1925, he was appointed Director of Studies at Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute in Geneva. From 1925 to 1933, he very closely studied his own three children as they grew from infancy to adolescence. He devised many clever problems for them to solve and took careful notes on their responses as they aged. His observations became the foundation of an extensive theory about the changing "structures" of perception and reason in children. Affect, feeling, and emotion were not directly included in his work.

ated from that situation, so that when the situation recurs the act is less likely than before to recur (Thorndike, 1905, p. 203). Around the turn of the century, Ivan Pavlov (18491936), a Russian physiologist, studied the responses of re­

search animals (dogs) to selected stimuli. He described the

responses as purely physiological, associative, stimulus­ response connections (Pavlov, 1927). When an experimental dog was chewing meat, a bell was rung. After that event was repeated a number of times, the ringing of the bell in the absence of meat would produce salivation in the dog's

mouth. Pavlov disliked psychological explanations of be­ havior and sought to remove any suggestion of expectant,

He proposed that processes of assimilation and accom­ modation interact as children pass through four develop­

subjective, or emotional mental states from his scientific

mental stages from infancy through adolescence, that is,

conditioned stimuli (US)—the meat; conditioned stimuli

the sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete operational, and

(CS)—the sound of the bell; and conditioned responses (CR)-salivation. His work was integrated into the behaviorist

formal operational stages of perceptual and reasoning ca­ pabilities. His work had a profound effect on educational

practice in the second half of the 20th century.

The psychological orientation that is referred to as associationism evolved from the British empiricist orien­

tation in philosophy (initiated by Hobbes and Locke). Hobbes' concern with sequences of thought became the

concept of successive association, and Locke's orientation to experiential integration became simultaneous association. The principle of experiential association is still accepted as a basic aspect of psychological processing and learning. Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850-1909), and others, proposed adopting the research model that is used by the physical sciences—the scientific method—and applying it to the study of human psychology. He favored an experimental psy­ chology, with dependent and independent variables. He demonstrated the method by using it in studies of memory

and physical skills and summarized them in a book, Memory: A Contribution to Experimental Psychology. His work, and that of contemporary associationists, studied the strength of al­ ready-formed associations by the extent of subsequent re­ call. For example, Edward Thorndike (1874-1949) intro­ duced his "law of effect" which he stated as follows: Any act which in a given situation produces satisfaction be­ comes associated with that situation, so that when the situation re­ curs the act is more likely than before to recur also. Conversely any act which in a given situation produces discomfort becomes disassoci­

study. He is credited with elaborating the nature of un­

school of psychology. In 1912, a new orientation in psychology was born in Germany—Gestalt psychology—and moved to the United States in the first half of the 20th century. Gestalt psychol­ ogy was a reaction to the structuralist psychology of Wundt, or "brick and mortar psychology", as they referred to it. Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), Kurt Koffka (1886-1941), and Wolfgang Kohler (1887-1967) felt that the scientific approach to psychology had taken an "elements" of mind approach and was studying mind "from below upward" and never a

"wholes" approach that would study mind "from above

downward". They did not believe that higher mental pro­ cesses were required in order to combine and construct the unorganized elements of a sensory experience into a whole. They believed that the sensory field as a whole unit was self­ organizing. They opposed notions of connecting links be­ tween discrete perceptual entities in order to explain per­ ception and learning. Their research began with how free association tests could uncover hidden knowledge (Wertheimer), imagery and thought (Koffka), and auditory perception (Kohler). Kurt Lewin (1890-1947) was a highly influential Gestaltist who steered his own course. He blended the associationist and Gestaltist orientations in his study of motivation in human behavior. He believed that associa­ tive and instinctive (Gestalt) processes must be activated

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by needs and temporary interests or intentions. Lewin's field theory therefore, was "...in the realm of action, emo­ tion, personality" (Lewin, 1940, p. 33), and thus was "...life space, containing the person and his psychological envi­ ronment" (Lewin, 1938, p. 2), as the person perceived and understood it in relation to personal needs and interests. If objects appear to meet the person's needs, then they have a positive "valence". If objects appear not to meet the person's needs, then they have a negative "valence". Ob­ jects of a positive valence attract the person; objects of a negative valence repel the person. Another very different rebellion in the science of psy­ chology traces its roots to the 1914 publication of a book

in the United States. The rebellion was against Wundt's structural psychology and its method of introspection, James' functionalism, the functionalism of the Dewey-Angell Chicago group, and against the then current definition of

psychology as the scientific study of conscious experience. It was initiated by John Watson (1878-1958), a professor at Johns Hopkins University, and the title of his book was Behavior. From the beginning, he called the new school of psychology behaviorism. Watson was frustrated by the intangibles of psychol­ ogy and was determined to redefine it as "...a purely objec­ tive experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. It is pos­ sible to write a psychology, to define it...as the 'science of behavior', and...never to use the terms consciousness, men­ tal states, mind, content, will....perception, affection, emo­ tion, volition...imagery, and the like....It can be done in terms of stimulus and response, in terms of habit formation, habit integration, and the like...." (Watson, 1914, pp. 1-13)

Behaviorism became the predominant school in psy­ chology until the 1970s. Classical or methodological behavior­

ism proposed that in the interaction of all organisms with their environment, including humans, the environment se­

lected, therefore determined, the organism's behavior. Com­ plex stimulus-response patterns conditioned the behavior of all animate creatures. Their behavioral repertoire was all that could be observed and analyzed with the scientific method. Physiological processes inside the body were not directly observable with accuracy and should not be part of a science of psychology.

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By about 1930, various behaviorists had veered from pure behaviorist orthodoxy to create their own imprints. An early influence on Clark Hull (1884-1952) was the 1927 English publication of Pavlov's book Conditioned Reflexes. Hull introduced several modifications of early behaviorism as did Edward Tolman (1886-1961) and Burrhus F. Skinner (1904-1990). Skinner became the most prominent advo­ cate of a form of behaviorism called radical behaviorism. He accepted internal processes as a significant influence on behavior. He asserted that a person's genetic code and environmental history "shape" the physical processes that produce behavior, and that someday physiologists will learn what those internal processes are (Skinner, 1974). Until then, he believed, an individual's interaction with environment

results in consequences that evolve what he called "contin­ gencies of behavioral reinforcement'' Throughout a person's lifetime, repertoires of behavior are "selected" in a manner that is similar to the selection of physical traits in the theory of evolution. In these processes, affect, feelings, and emo­ tions were regarded as inconsequential "by-products" of contingencies of reinforcement. Cognitive Science and Cognitive Philosophy of Mind In the middle 20th century, cognitive psychology and

cognitive science emerged. In September, 1948, a sympo­ sium titled Cerebral Mechanisms of Behavior was held on the

campus of the California Institute of Technology, spon­ sored by the Hixon Fund. Prominent scientists from a variety of disciplines were invited to discuss how the ner­ vous system controls behavior. The presentations and dis­ cussions became a statement of opposition to behaviorism and the Hixon symposium is cited by Gardner (1985, pp. 10-16) as the beginning of cognitivism. Gardner (p. 6) de­ fined cognitive science as "...a contemporary, empirically

based effort to answer long-standing epistemological ques­

tions—particularly those concerned with the nature of knowledge, its components, its sources, its development, and its deployment." Gardner listed five trends in scientific theory and prac­

tice that influenced the cognitive revolution against behav­ iorism: (1) mathematics and computational machines, (2) the neuronal and neuron network model of computational

cognition, (3) the cybernetic synthesis as initiated primarily by mathematician Norbert Wiener in his book Cybernetics, (4) information theory that made the claim that transmis­ sion or communication between any two or more entities constitutes information, and information is not matter or energy, and, neither mode of transmission nor content is relevant, and (5) findings from neuropsychological studies of brain-injured human patients who display dysfunctions in normal cognition. Gardner also listed five key features of cognitive sci­

ence, the first two are key assumptions and the latter three are methodological features (pp. 38-45). • Mental representations of knowledge occur between perceptual input and behavioral output. These representa­ tions are necessary in the explanation of human thought and behavior, and are described in terms of "...symbols,

schemas, [rules], images, ideas, and other forms of mental representation". • Artificial intelligence (computers) is a key feature that has evolved into a computational model of both cognition and brain operations. • Affect, context, culture, and history are de-emphasized and commonly eliminated in cognitive studies in or­ der to determine the essential nature of cognition. • Interdisciplinary cooperation is necessary to ascer­

tain the many facets of cognition, therefore such disciplines as the neurosciences, linguistics, psychology, artificial intel­ ligence, and anthropology are included as cognitive sci­ ences. • Classical philosophical problems are the primary subject matter for study in cognitive science. Critics of cognitive science have noted that its "pure" form divorces it from human reality. For instance, to study

human cognition as though it was disconnected from hu­ man nervous and endocrine systems guarantees the emer­ gence of scientific invalidities. To study the parts of ner­

vous systems that only produce thought and reason is an

attempt to do the impossible because normal human ner­ vous systems are completely and vastly interfaced with the

rest of the body. The limbic system, brainstem, and auto­ nomic nervous system are never disconnected from the cerebral cortex or from the bodywide endocrine system,

for instance. Cultural influences are always influential in human cognition. Gardner (1985, p. 45), with a strong back­

ground in the neurosciences, wrote, "...unless the cognitive aspects of language or perception or problem solving can

be joined to the neuroscientific and anthropological as­ pects, we will be left with a disembodied and incomplete discipline." Andreason (1997) has attempted to update and clarify current developments in the cognitive sciences. She sug­ gests that "...'mind'...is the expression of the activity of the brain and that these two are separable for purposes of analysis and discussion but inseparable in actuality....mental phenomena arise from the brain, but mental experience also affects the brain, as is demonstrated by the many ex­ amples of environmental influences on brain plasticity....Mind and brain can be studied as if they are separate entities...and this is reflected in the multiple and separate disciplines that examine them." Philosophers John Searle (1992, 1998), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999) would agree. According to Andreason (1997), the term cognitive has been defined very narrowly by some and very broadly by

others. She proposes a broad definition that encompasses "...all activities of mind, including emotion, perception, and regulation of behavior" The study of mind or mental phe­

nomena has been the province of cognitive psychology which has "...divided mind into component domains of in­ vestigation (such as memory, language, attention), created theoretical systems to explain the workings of those do­ mains (constructs such as memory encoding versus re­ trieval), and designed experimental paradigms to test the hypotheses in human beings and animals." Other disciplines have studied the brain in relation to human cognition and behavior. "Neuropsychology has used the lesion method to determine localization [of func­ tional brain areas] by observing absence of function after

injury in humans." Neurobiology, neuroanatomy, and neurophysiology "...have mapped neural development and connectivity and studied functionality in animal models." Psychiatry "...studies mental illness as diseases that mani­ fest as mind and arise from brain" (Andreason, 1997)

Because the boundaries of all of these sciences have become blurred over the past few decades, Andreason pro­

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poses a blanket designation for them all, cognitive neu­ roscience. Additional terms have evolved as modular per­ spectives of mind and brain give way to the interconnected nature of whole human beings, for example, neurophysi­ ology, psychobiology, psychoneuroendocrinology, psychoneuroimmunology, and neuropsychobiology. In recent decades, nervous system research has focused on the brain and its integration with the endocrine and immune systems. Some brain processes can now be de­ scribed very precisely and other processes can be described only in more general terms. In most cases the research has not, however, reached a level at which specific neurochemi­

"ft does not come easily to believe that I am the de­ tailed behavior of a set of nerve cells, however many there

cal pathways have been identified as the conduits for spe­

istry, and molecular biology. It is largely responsible for the spectacular developments of modern science. It is the only sensible way to proceed until and unless we are con­ fronted with strong experimental evidence that demands we modify our attitude. General philosophical arguments against reductionism will not do."

cific thoughts.

Cognitive neuroscientists believe that adaptive (learn­ ing) capabilities are determined by the genetic and epigenetic morphological events that occur as the physio chemical properties of the body emerge after conception. These ini­ tial properties constitute a primary repertoire of neuron net­ works that enable base-line survival. Abilities are selected over a lifetime, however, as a result of interaction with the

people, places, things, and events of the experienced world. These experiences result in changes in the nervous, endo­ crine, and immune systems that are either threatening or beneficial to survival and well being. Over a lifetime, these nervous system changes embody an ever-evolving second­ ary repertoire of neuropsychobiological networks that coa­ lesce to form a conscious human self. How can a biological, electromagnetic, physiochemi­ cal entity give rise to conscious awareness or psychologi­ cal phenomena? Recently, three authors (Crick, 1994; Edelman, 1989, 1992; Damasio, 1994, 1999) have made ma­ jor contributions to answering that question. Crick, (1994, pp. 3, 7-9) a Nobel Laureate physicist and biochemist, and the codiscoverer of the structure of de­ oxyribonucleic acid (DNA), summarized the point of view by writing, "The astonishing hypothesis is that 'You', your

joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambi­ tions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules....This hypothesis is so alien to the ideas of most people alive today that it can truly be called astonishing.

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may be and however intricate their interconnections. ...(M)any people are reluctant to accept what is often called the 'reductionist approach'--that a complex system can be

explained by the behavior of its parts and their interac­ tions with each other....(R)eductionism is not the rigid pro­ cess of explaining one fixed set of ideas in terms of another fixed set of ideas at a lower level, but a dynamic interactive

process that modifies the concepts at both levels as knowl­ edge develops....'(R)eductionism' is the main theoretical method that has driven the development of physics, chem­

Application of the Cognitive Neurosciences to Teaching and Learning Processes Based on wide assimilation of research and theory in

such fields as the cognitive neurosciences, psychology, so­ ciology, anthropology, and computer science, Leslie Hart (1975) authored a book called How the Brain Works. It fo­ cused on the brain's learning capacities, and he proposed a Program-Structure Theory of how brains learn (abbrevi­ ated as "prostr theory"). Andreason's broad definition of cognitive processing is clearly included (1997), that is, "...emo­ tion, perceiving, and regulation of behavior Hart's next book, Human Brain and Human Learning (1983, updated with

Olsen, 1998), presented some principles of "brain-compat­

His books may be the first to apply neuroscientific research to educational processes. Hart proposed that human beings have three genetically prescribed brain drives that make learning inevitable through­ out life as a function of survival of the species. Drive #1: Make sense of or "interpret" encounters with the people, places, things and unfolding events of the perceived "world" and of sensed events inside the body; ible" learning.

Drive #2: Protection of the person from perceived threats to safety and well being; Drive #3: Gain and increase mastery of personal interactions with the people, places, things and events of the perceived world, in­ cluding one's own bodymind (Adapted from Hart, 1983). Hart distilled much highly complex information into four brain processes that enable a person to carry out these drives: Process #1: Active seeking of sensory input; Process #2: Detecting familiar and unfamiliar patterns within the sensory input, interpreting them, and encoding them in memory; Process #3: Formation, elaboration, and selection of bodymind

"programs "for carrying out the three drives; Process #4: "Downshifting" from the current ongoing stream of bodymind programs to protective ones when safety and well being are threatened (Adapted from Hart, 1983). Every person's bodymind receives sensory input, in­ ternally processes it, and enacts behavioral expressions that form the "scaffolding" of learning that takes place over a lifetime (see Figure I-1-1). Clearly, cultural symbol systems

The vast adaptive or learning capacities of bodyminds and their relationship to perceived environment is the ba­

sis of the human enterprise called "schooling," "education," or any form of what we call "teaching and learning." Edu­ cators have devised many methods, teaching approaches,

disciplinary techniques, assessment tools, and models of school organization that constitute the environment of

learners. How much do we really know about the inter­ nal physio chemical processing that heavily influences what human beings actually learn during formal education? Appreciating the nature and functioning of the brain— the "primary organ of learning"—and its bodywide inter­ actions with all the body's systems and organs, can help educators and learners interact more congruently with how

human beings are genetically "pre-wired" to enjoy curiosity and learning (human-compatible learning). On the other hand, human antagonistic teaching-learning experiences can stifle this genetic birthright.

References and Selected Bibliography

such as languages and the expressive arts play a significant

role in the sense making. (Deacon, 1997; Langer, 1951, 1953, 1967, 1972, 1982; Searle, 1998).

General Fancher, R.E. (1979). Pioneers of Psychology. New York: Norton.

Mithen, S. (1996).

The Prehistory of the Mind: The Origins of Art, Religion and

Science. London: Thames and Hudson.

Smith, R. (1997). The Human Sciences. New York: W.W. Norton. von Leden, H. (1997). A cultural history of the larynx and voice. In R.T. Sataloff (Ed.), Professional Voice: The Science and Art of Clinical Care (2nd Ed., pp. 7-86). San Diego: Singular.

Philosophy Churchland, P.M. (1984). Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduc­

tion to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Descartes, R. (1641). Meditation on First Philosophy (trans., L.J. Lafleur, 1951).

New York: Liberal Arts Press. Dewey, J. (1934). Arts as Experience. New York: G.P Putnam. Dewey, J. (1938). Experience and Education. Bloomington, IN: Kappa Delta Pi.

Fodor, J.A. (1981).

Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of

Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kant, I. (1781).

Critique of Pure Reason (trans, by N.K. Smith, 1958).

New

York: Random House. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought. New York: Basic Books.

Figure I-1-1: Lifelong experience cycle.

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Langer, S.K. (1951). Philosophy in a New Key (2nd Ed.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard

Lewin, K. (1935). A Dynamic Theory of Personality. New York: McGraw-Hill.

University Press. Pavlov, I.P. (1927). Conditioned Reflexes. New York: Dover. Langer, S.K. (1953). Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art. New York: Charles

Scribner's Sons.

Skinner, B. F. (1974). About Behaviorism. New York: Vintage Books.

Langer, S.K. (1967). Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling (Vol. 1) Baltimore: Johns

Thorndike, E.L. (1905). The Elements of Psychology. New York: A.G. Seiler.

Hopkins University Press. Langer, S.K. (1972). Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling (Vol. 2) Baltimore: Johns

Turing, A. (1963). Computing machinery and intelligence. In E.A. Feigenbaum & J. Feldman (Eds.), Computers and Thought. New York: McGraw-

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Langer, S.K. (1982). Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling (Vol. 3) Baltimore: Johns

Watson, J.B. (1914). Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology. New

Hopkins University Press.

York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Locke, J. (1690). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (PH. Niddich, Ed., 1975). Oxford, United Kingdom: Clarendon Press.

Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (2nd Ed., reprint, 1961). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Russell, B. (1945). A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Woodworth, R.S., & Sheehan, M.R. (1964). Contemporary Schools of Psychol­ ogy (3rd Ed.). New York: Ronald Press.

Searle, J.R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Searle, J.R. (1998). Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World.

New York: Basic Books. Whitehead, AN. (1925). Science and the Modern World. New York: Macmillan.

Cognitive Neurosciences, Neuropsychobiology, and Psychoneuroimmunology Andreason, N.C. (1997). Linking mind and brain in the study of mental

illnesses: A project for a scientific psychopathology.

Psychoanalytic Psychiatry, Psychology, Cognitive Science, and Cognitive Linguistics

Science, 275, 1586-

1593.

Changeaux, J-P. (1985). Neuronal Man: The Biology of Mind (Trans., Laurence Garey). New York: Oxford University Press.

Chomsky, N. (1975). Reflections on Language. New York: Pantheon Books. Churchland, P, & Sejnowski, T. (1992). The Computational Brain. Cambridge,

Chomsky, N. (1986). Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use. Cam­

MA: MIT Press.

bridge, MA: Greenwood Press. Clynes, M., (Ed.). (1982). Music, Mind, and Brain. New York: Plenum Press,

Deacon, T.W (1997). The Symbolic Species. New York: W.W. Norton.

Crick, F. (1994).

The Astonishing Hypothesis. New York: Charles Scribner's

Fodor, J.A. (1983). The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sons.

Freud, S. (1953). The interpretation of dreams. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 5, pp. 1-630). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work, 1900)

Crick, F., & Koch, C. (1990).

Towards a neurobiological theory of con­

sciousness. The Neurosciences, 2, 265-275.

Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain.

Freud, S. (1961). The ego and the id. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 19, pp. 1-68). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work, 1923)

New York: Avon Books.

Damasio, A.R. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens; Body and Emotions in the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace.

Freud, S. (1950). Project for a scientific psychology. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 2, pp. 281-347). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work, 1895)

Edelman, G.M. (1988).

Topobiology: An Introduction to Molecular Embryology.

New York: Basic Books.

Freud, S. (1957). The unconscious. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 14, pp. 159-216). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work, 1915)

Edelman, G.M. (1987). Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selec­

Gardner, H. (1985). The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution.

ness. New York: Basic Books.

tion. New York: Basic Books.

Edelman, G.M. (1989). The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Conscious­

New York: Basic Books. Edelman, G.M. (1992). Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind. New Inhelder, B., & Piaget, J. (1958). The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence (trans., A. Parsons & S. Milgram). New York: Basic Books.

York: Basic Books.

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tion and Seriation. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Gazzaniga, M. (1992). Nature's Mind: The Biological Roots of Thinking, Emotions,

James, W. (1890). Principles of Psychology. New York: Holt.

Kohler, W. (1929). Gestalt Psychology. New York: Liveright.

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Sexuality, Language and Intelligince. New York: Basic Books.

Gazzaniga, M. (1985).

The Social Brain: Discovering the Netwoks of the Mind.

New York: Basic Books. Hebb, D.O. (1949). Organization of Behavior. New York: Wiley. Luria, A.R. (1973). The Working Brain: An Introduction to neuropsychology. New

York: Basic Books. The Psychobiology of Mind-Body Healing (2nd Ed.).

Rossi, E.R. (1993).

New

York: W.W Norton. Shepherd, G.M. (1994). Neurobiology (3rd Ed.). New York: Oxford Univer­

sity Press. Sperry, R.W. (1974). Lateral specialization in the surgically separated hemi­ spheres. In F. Schmitt & EG. Worden (Eds.), The Neurosciences: Third Study

Program. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Some Theories of Learning Related to Educational Practice Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences. New

York: Basic Books. Hart, L. (1975). How the Brain Works. New York: Basic Books, Inc. Hart, L. (1983).

Human Brain and Human Learning.

Kent, WA: Books for

Educators.

Hart, L., & Olsen, S. (1998). Human Brain and Human Learning (updated edition). Kent, WA: Books for Educators. Piaget, J. (1969). The Mechanisms of Perception. London: Routledge and Keger Paul.

Piaget, J. (1952).

The Origins of Intelligence in Children.

New York: Interna­

tional Universities Press.

Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1971). The Psychology of the Child. New York: Basic Books. Skinner, B.F. (1968). The Technology of Teaching. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-

Hall.

a

brief context

17

chapter 2

the astounding capacities of human bodyminds Leon Thurman

folded and laid flat, it would be about the size of an un­ usually large table napkin and about as thick [about 2.5 mated to consist of about one trillion neu­ square feet with varied thickness from about 4.5 to 1.5 ral cells (1012 1,000,000,000,000; Churchland & millimeters (Webster, 1995, p. 240)1. Sejnowski, 1992, p. 51). The activator cells of the nervous system are the neurons (Greek: neuron = nerve), some­ times referred to as nerve cells. The most commonly ac­ cepted estimate of the number of neurons in normal adult human brains is about 100 billion (1011, or 100,000,000,000) (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 1991, p. 18). In order to de­ Table I-2-1. velop 100 billion neurons from the time they begin to be Units of Dimensional Measurement and created in the neural tube through the time of a nine-month Their Abbreviations pregnancy, an average of about 250,000 neurons must be meter (m) = about 10% longer than a yard; formed every minute (Ackerman, 1992, p. 86). The most about 5.5 feet or 39.6 inches numerous neural cells in the brain are the glial cells (Greek: decimeter (dm) = one tenth of a meter; about .33 of a foot or 3.96 inches (rarely used) glia = glue). They provide protective and facilitative sup­ centimeter (cm) = one hundredth of a meter; almost port for neuron functions. At minimum, there are about four tenths of an inch millimeter (mm, 10-3m) = one thousandth of a meter; 900 billion glial cells in the nervous system, probably many about l/25th of an inch more. micrometer (pm, 10-6m) = one millionth of a meter; about 1/25,000th of an inch (formerly named a The cerebrum (Latin: brain) is the most commonly micron) recognized and talked about part of the brain. The brain's nanometer (nm, 10-9m) = one billionth of a meter; about 1/25,000,000th of an inch cerebral cortex (Latin: tree bark) is the very thin surface picometer (pm, 10-10m) = one trillionth of a meter; about layer of the cerebrum. It was so named because of the bark­ Angstrom (A) 1/25,000,000,000 of an inch like appearance of the multi-folded ridges and valleys of Only structures that are .5 mm or larger can be seen with unaided eyes. its surface (see Figure I-2-1). The cerebral cortex is esti­ mated to contain about 30 billion neurons (Nolte, 1993, p. 360). According to Nobel Laureate neuroscientist Gerald Edelman (1992, p. 17), if just the cerebral cortex was un­ he human

adult nervous system is esti­

T

18 bodymind & voice

Nearly all neurons are so small that they cannot be

seen with the unaided eye. Their parts and interconnec­ tions are so small that even a common laboratory micro­

extend for 100,000 kilometers (62,000 miles or about two and a half times around the Earth's equator).

numbers of microscopic-sized synapses (Chapter 3 has

To compare your brain's operating capacity to a supercomputer is insulting to your brain. Brains have vastly greater operating capacity and are 7 to 8 times more power efficient than the best collection of silicon microchips. The most efficient computers in 1994 operated at about 10-6 Joules per operation per second, but human brains oper­ ate at about 10-16 Joules per operation per second (Haykin,

details). The number of synaptic connections in normal brains is estimated to be about one million billion (1015). That is the same as 1,000 trillion or 1,000,000,000,000,000 (Edelman, 1992, p. 17; Damasio, 1994, p. 108). The cerebral

1994, p. 1). Nearly all neurons spontaneously initiate elec­ trochemical firing patterns (action potentials) to maintain life processes and their own viability. They also may fire in response to stimulation from other neurons or in re­

cortex alone may have as many as 100 trillion of those (1014, Huttenlocher, 1994). Some single neurons of the ce­ rebral cortex receive more than 100,000 direct synaptic contacts. A single motor neuron of the spinal cord may receive up to 15,000 synapses. Edelman (1992, p. 17) suggests two ways to help us understand the enormity of such numbers, and Nolte (1993, p. 360) suggests a third way. 1. If you were to count the one million billion synap­ tic connections in the brain at the rate of one per second, it would take about 32 million years. 2. One large matchhead's worth of cerebral cortex would contain about one billion synapses (see also Stevens, 1989). 3. If all of the axons and dendrites of one human cerebral cortex were laid end to end, they are estimated to

sponse to interaction with the outside world.

scope does not have enough magnification to observe them. Electron microscopes that can magnify up to 50,000 times or more must be used. Table I-2-1 relates these tiny units

of measure to dimensions with which U.S. citizens are fa­ miliar.

Your brain's neurons are interconnected by massive

Table I-2-2. Units of Time Measurement That are

Less than One Second, and Their Abbreviations decisecond (ds) centisecond (cs) millisecond (ms, 10-3) microsecond (ps, 10-6) nanosecond (ns, 10-9) picosecond (ps, 10-10)

= = = = = =

one one one one one one

tenth of a second, never used hundredth of a second, never used thousandth of a second millionth of a second billionth of a second trillionth of a second

A single neuronal firing commonly lasts about one thousandth of a second (.001 second or one millisecond, abbreviated as 1-ms). Some neurons may fire spontane­ ously only a few times per second, and some fire over

Figure I-2-1: Three views of the human brain. [Left is from DeArmond, Fusco, & Dewey, Structure of the Human Brain, 3rd Ed., Copyright © 1989 by Oxford University Press. Used with permission. Center and right are from From LEFT BRAIN, RIGHT BRAIN, 3rd Ed., by Springer and Deutsch, Copyright © by Sally P. Springer and Georg Deutsch. Used by permission of W.H. Freeman and Company.]

astounding

capacities

of bodyminds

19

1000 times per second when under intense stimulation. Transmission velocity can range from about 10 to 100

periences literally change the anatomic and physiologic structure of bodyminds (Greenough & Black, 1992; Wolpaw,

meters per second (about 33-ft to 330-ft per second) to less than one meter per second (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992,

et al, 1991).

p. 9). Perceptual recognition is commonly accomplished in

Several cooperating areas in the brain process con­ scious awareness and intentionality including working memory, attention focus, conscious perception, and non-

about 100-ms to 200-ms (Churchland, 1986). Edelman sug­ gests an analogy for real brains that is at least closer than

linguistic thought. Those processes are closely intercon­

the commonly used computer analogy—a jungle. In jungles, the number of entities existing therein, the complexity of

together can be referred to as the conscious-verbal com­

nected with areas that produce language, and all of them

their interrelationships, the "...sound and light patterns and the movement and growth patterns..." are beyond vast (Edelman, 1992, p. 29).

plex. [See Chapter 3 for more details, as well as Chapters 6

During gestation, when the genetic and epigenetic for­ mation of bodymind anatomical structures is underway, there is variability (plasticity) in what the final formation

networks in the brain, and trillions of physio chemical in­

will be. For instance, collections of neurons are guided to

their final groupings by special molecules, and intercon­ nections are made by action of other molecules (Edelman, 1988). If that chemistry is disrupted, malformations can occur, as seen in fetal alcohol syndrome and lead "poison­ ing" (Schroeder, 1987). During prenatal gestation, many more neurons are pro­

duced for the brain's many structures than will be needed for neurobehavioral function, and then they are pared down as many unneeded neurons die (Cowan, 1973; Cowan, et al., 1984). In some brain areas, as many as 7O°/o of neurons may be pared away. The number of remaining neurons in an interconnected group depends to some extent on whether or not they have been activated by sensory or motor ex­ periences (Greenough & Black, 1992; Chapter 3 and Book IV, Chapter 1 have some details). Bodyminds have even more plasticity, however, in pro­ ducing smaller-scale, microstructural changes that enact

bodymind functions. Synaptic connections that form func­ tional neural networks—and the global interconnections between the many networks—vary in response to sensory experiences that are initiated (1) from within the body and (2) from experiences with the people, places, things, and events of the outside world. In other words, with more experiences, more synaptic connections are grown and strengthened; with fewer experiences, synaptic connections are weakened and may disconnect (Huttenlocher, 1994). Ex­

20

bodymind

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voice

and 7] There are thousands of other neural sheets, nuclei, and

teractions that never communicate their activities into con­ scious awareness. Their functions, too, are modulated by intercommunications with the many systems and organs of the entire body, including the endocrine and immune systems. Many of those sheets, nuclei, and networks can cooperate with others to perceive aspects of the outside world, categorize perceptions and feelings, and direct be­ havior, but they substantially do so outside of conscious awareness (Edelman, 1992, pp. 207-209; Damasio, 1994, pp. 184-189). There is some evidence in the field of nonverbal com­ munications (Mehrabian, 1972, pp. 186, 187), and unsub­

stantiated estimates in psychology (Oliver, 1993, p. 7), that about 10% of bodymind processes occur in conscious awareness. If that is so, then about 9O°/o of human behav­ iors would result from other-than-conscious processes.

Most of our perceptions, categorizations, interpretations, and behaviors are the result of habitual, automatic pat­ terns of behavior, thinking, feeling, and interacting. We began accumulating these patterns when we first received sensations and transported transmitter molecules, that is, their formation began before birth. (Chapters 6 and 7 have

more details; see also Book IV, Chapter 1.) If you tried to estimate the number of physio-electrochemical operations that make us who we are—the pos­ sible number of molecular, cellular, tissue, organ, and sys­ tem operations that occur and intertwine to keep bodyminds

alive, learning,

and behaving successfully in a physical

and social environment—how high would you guess? Keep in mind that in 1992, the fastest digital computers could

perform around one billion operations per second, and

and elaborating patterns of behaving-thinking-feeling, then

that the brain of a common housefly—at rest—is estimated to perform about 100 billion operations per second

we gain more and more constructive mastery over our­ selves and our world. When we do that, areas within the brain that trigger pleasure sensations are activated and reci­ pes of pleasure-sensation-distributing transmitter molecules

(Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992, p.9). Edelman (1992, p. 17) describes those vast estimated numbers for human beings as "...hyperastronomical-on the or­ der of ten followed by millions of zeros. (There are about ten followed by 80 zeros' worth of positively charged particles in the whole known universe!)." (italics added) That may mean that roughly 9O°/o of your bodymind's processing

are activated within bodyminds. Together, they change our

capacity—10 followed by millions of zeros—is likely to be

neuropsychobiological state. We human beings then can use a variety of symbol systems to categorize, label, ana­ lyze, and/or express our experiences. When our experiences are interpreted as threatening to our safety or well being, however, other internal bodymind

engaged in your other-than-conscious processes.

processes are triggered that result in different neuropsychobiological states. These states result in three

Life-Learning and Health

categories of behavior, that is, withdrawal-avoidance, freezeimmobilize, and counter-control or counterattack.

Hart (1985) described three genetically driven bodymind

In carrying out these drives and processes, our

"drives" (introduced at the end of Chapter 1): (1) make sense

bodyminds continually evaluate the people, places, things

of the perceived world; (2) protect self and assure safety

and events within our surroundings 24-hours a day throughout our entire lifespans (Edelman, 1989, p. 152;

and well being; and (3) gain mastery of the perceived world and "fit" one's self into it. There are innate bodymind pro­

cesses by which Hart says the drives are carried out. In paraphrase, bodyminds: 1. initiate an active seeking of sensory experiences (ex­

ploration of people, places, things and events in the sur­ roundings); 2. extract patterns from familiar and unfamiliar sen­ sory input ("making sense" or categorizing people, places and things encountered; interpreting events and discover­ ing "how I and the world work");

3.

form, elaborate, and select the most appropriate

available bodymind "program(s)" for interacting with the people, places, things, and events that are encountered; and 4. protect the person in relative safety and well being.

Bodyminds do not need instruction in how to carry out these drives and processes. Human beings have in­ nately formed capabilities and abilities that optimize sur­ vival in human societies. Memory and learning are two such capabilities. They are especially necessary for sur­ vival in the current social circumstances in which we live our lives. So, human beings do not "learn how to learn". We are born to learn. In fact, we cannot not learn. When bodyminds make sense of the world by seeking nonthreatening sensory input, detecting patterns therein,

Damasio, 1994, pp. 110-121; LeDoux, 1996, pp. 141-169; Thompson, 1992, pp. 351-357). Most of the evaluations

occur outside of conscious awareness and in milliseconds of time. Our bodyminds must quickly decide whether the people, places, things, and unfolding events around us are: 1. literally threatening to successful realization of our innate drives;

2. potentially threatening to them; 3. safe; 4. potentially beneficial to carrying out our innate drives; 5. literally beneficial to their realization.

Response to a Perception of Threat to Safety and Well Being When an interpretation of threat is made, well documented, bodywide physio chemical reactions take place (Andrews & Lawes, 1992; LeDoux, 1994, 1996; Selye, 1974; Vander, et al., 1994, pp. 222-228, 751-754; Thompson, 1993, pp. 189204). Stated simply, the reactions include activation of a collection of nuclei in the brain referred to as the amygdala (Latin: almond) which activates (1) arousal systems within the brain, (2) the sympathetic division of the autonomic ner­ vous system, and (3) the release of an epinephrine-norepinephrine-cortisol prominent recipe of transmitter molecules into

astounding

capacities

of bodyminds

21

the circulatory system. The circulatory system distributes

cated on cells of many organs and systems throughout the

Dr. Hans Selye (1950, 1974, 1976, 1978) popularized the term stress, and defined it as "any demand placed on the body" Digesting food and having a conversation are both

body (Chapters 3 and 4 have some details). Those stimu­

stresses. We must have stresses in order literally to remain

lated cells activate organ and system functions that have

alive. The only truly stressless people are dead. Selye la­

the following physical effects:

beled our physio chemical response to increased demand, stress reaction, and he proposed two categories: distress and eustress (defined later). He defined distress as any demand that was unwanted, produced some degree of unpleasant feeling or emotion, or produced discomfort or psychologi­

the transmitter molecule recipe to their receptor sites lo­

1. increased heartbeat rate; 2. increased blood pressure; 3. increased respiration rate; 4. inhibited digestive function (partly by tensing intes­ tinal, stomach, and esophageal muscles to inhibit motility) and inhibited mucus flow in the digestive tract; 5. reduced blood flow to skin surface, thus lowering skin temperature so that in more intense reactions, perspi­ ration will be "cold and clammy;" 6. reduced blood flow to cognitive processing areas within the brain (reducing functional precision), with in­ creased blood flow to limbic and brainstem areas where genetically "hard-wired survival instinct" programs are stored; 7. increased blood flow to muscles, carrying the bio­ chemical means by which muscles are prepared to "fight or counterattack" the source of threat, or to "flee" (escape from) the source of threat, or "freeze" in the presence of the threat—the fight, flight, or freeze response.

cal pain in some way.

A number of threat-activated brain areas and trans­ mitter molecule recipes that result in unpleasant feelings also are involved in memory formation and recall. The

more intense the perceived threat is, the more intense will be the brain activation and release of transmitter molecules, the more intense will be the unpleasant torso-centered feel­

ing sensations, the more indelible will be the visual, audi­ tory, and kinesthetic memory formation. Any person, place, thing, or event that was perceived in that contextual mo­ ment will be "imaged" in memory and it will be "tagged" with a decidedly unpleasant feeling. After the experience, we then may attempt to label the experience with words. An important consequence of the unpleasant feeling reaction to threat is that people tend to avoid, counterat­

The extent to which these physio chemical reactions take

tack, or freeze in the presence of the sources of perceived threat. Our "interpretation" of threat produces our

place is based on the degree of perceived threat. With greater

physio chemical reaction, and our interpretation is based

perceived threat, the sympathetic nerve response is more intense, more transmitter molecules in the recipe are re­ leased into the bloodstream, and all of the above behav­ ioral reactions are more intense. These physio chemical changes are detected by the sen­ sory network of the central nervous system, mostly within

on our unique experience of people, places, things, and unfolding events in our perceived world. When interact­

the torso.

The generic words we use to describe those changes are unpleasant feelings or emotions. The greater the perceived threat, the greater the physio chemical reac­ tion, the more intense the unpleasant feelings/emotions be­ come. Descriptive words for these reactions may range among alarm, anguish, anxiety, apprehension, concern, con­ sternation, defensive, distraught, distress, dread, edginess,

fear, fright, nervousness, panic, scared, terror, threatened, uneasiness, wariness, and worry.

22

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ing with other people, their interpretation of threat produces their physio chemical reaction, based on their unique expe­ rience of the world. So far, then, there are two ways to create indelible, life­ long memories and reactive behavior patterns [learning] (LeDoux, 1989, 1996): 1. have experiences that are intensely threatening to the perceived well being of people; or 2. have experiences that are minimally or moderately threatening and repeat them.

Response to a Perception of Benefit to Sense-Making, Well Being, and Mastery of World and Self When an interpretation of safety and benefit to well being is made, a less researched but known physio chemi­ cal reaction takes place (Damasio, 1994, 173-183; Thomp­ son, 1993, pp. 157-166, 196-198). It is nearly the opposite of

the reaction to perceived threat, and can reverse those

physio chemical processes. Stated simply, the reaction in­ volves activation of pleasure-producing neural networks in the brain and the parasympathetic division of the auto­ nomic nervous system, and the release into the circulatory system of a recipe of transmitter molecules in which the endomorphine group is prominent (such as beta-endor­ phin, enkephalin, dynorphin). The circulatory system dis­ tributes the recipes of transmitter molecules to their recep­

tor sites located on cells of many organs and systems throughout the body (more details in Chapter 4). Those stimulated cells activate organ and system functions that commonly enhance the following physical effects: 1. normalization of heartbeat rate; 2. normalization of blood pressure; 3. normalization of respiration rate;

4. facilitation of digestive function, partly by releasing

intestinal, stomach and esophageal muscles and normaliz­ ing mucus flow; 5. reintroduction of blood flow to skin surface, thus restoring normal skin temperature;

6. reintroduction of normal blood flow variations within the brain, (restoring functional precision); 7. normalization of blood flow to neuromuscular anatomy, carrying the biochemical means by which muscles

may be restored to a normal state of readiness for use.

The extent to which these physio chemical reactions take place is based on the degree of perceived safety and benefit to well being. With greater perceived benefit, (1) brain ar­

eas are activated that facilitate normalized selectivity of at­ tention and perceptual, pleasant-feeling, and conceptual

categorizations, (2) parasympathetic nerve response is en­ gaged, and neuroendocrine networks that use dopaminenorepinephrine-serotonin-endorphin-enkephalin promi­

nent transmitter molecule recipes are activated to produce bodywide effects. For instance, when we human beings

are safe, then we can make sense of our world and gain

mastery over it and ourselves (learning); the pleasure-pro­ ducing neural networks of our brains (the dorsolateral, ven­ tromedial, and orbital prefrontal cortices, the septal area, and the limbic system's amygdala, hypothalamus, and pi­ tuitary, and the brainstem's nucleus accumbens) can pro­ duce the neural interactions and release the dopamine-norepinephrine-serotonin-endorphin-enkephalin prominent transmitter molecule recipes that produce in us a pleasant

physio chemical state (Becker, et al., 1992; Damasio, 1994, pp. 70, 177-201; Thompson, 1993, pp. 157-166, 196-198, 218-221; Vander, et al., 1994, pp. 377-379).

These physio chemical changes are the state of the bodymind at the time of the experience, and the various states are detected to some extent by the sensory network of the central nervous system. These reactions are a de­ mand on the physio chemical resources of our bodyminds, and Selye defined eustress as any demand on the body that was wanted, produced some degree of personal mas­ tery that produced comfort or pleasure in some way. Ge­ neric words we can use to describe these states are pleasant feelings or emotions. The greater the perceived benefit, the greater the physio chemical reaction, the more intense the pleasant feelings become. High-intensity pleasant feel­

ing states are often given such labels as thrill, euphoria, natu­ ral high, fulfillment, satisfaction, ecstasy, and "words cannot begin to describe how I feel." A number of the pleasure-producing brain areas, and transmitter molecule recipes that result in pleasant feeling states, also are involved in memory encoding and recall. The visual, auditory and kinesthetic senses perceive what­

ever people, places, things and events will or may bring benefit. The more intense the perceived benefit is, the more intense will be the brain activation and release of transmit­

ter molecules, the more intense will be the pleasant torso­

centered feeling sensations, the more indelible will be the visual, auditory, and kinesthetic memory formation. Any person, place, thing, or event that was perceived in that

moment will be "imaged" in memory and it will be "tagged" with a pleasant feeling. After the experience, we then may

attempt to label the experience with words, if the occasion

warrants (more details in Chapter 7). An important consequence of the pleasant feeling re­ action to perceived benefit is that people tend to repeat their astounding

capacities

of bodyminds

23

involvement with the sources of perceived benefit. Our interpreta­ tion of benefit produces our physio chemical reaction, and

are more likely to survive in human societies when sen­ sory input, pattern detection, and bodymind program

our interpretation is based on our unique experience of

elaboration can freely take place. Thus the label well being.

people, places, things, and unfolding events in our world. When interacting with other people, their interpretation of

In response to life's threatening experiences, people will elaborate a range of protective reactions and behavior patterns. These reactions have generally been labeled as self-defense, self-consciousness, self-denial, self-defeat, self-destruction. These orientations may be observed in a range of behav­ iors that can be described as: 1. flight—passive, reticent, dependent, inhibited, with­ drawn, helpless; 2. freeze—tense, immobilized, frozen; 3. fight—disrespectful, imposing, controlling, cynical, smart-mouthed, resentful, belligerent, rebellious, angry, counterattacking, and violent (offense is the best defense,

benefit produces their physio chemical reaction, based on their unique experience of the world. Bonding is a word that indicates a special, pleasantfeeling "connection" in a relationship with another human being. Love, affection, and friend are common synonyms. Parent-child attachment or bonding are other terms. There is a physio chemical reality behind the development of these human relationships. Disbonding, dislike, and enmity occur, of course, when threat or potential threat to well being is interpreted when in another person's presence. There are two more ways to create indelible, lifelong memories and behavior patterns (learning): 1. have experiences that are intensely beneficial to the sense-making, well being, and/or personal mastery of

people; or 2. have experiences in safe, nonthreatening situations that are minimally or moderately beneficial and repeat them.

Accumulated Threat and Benefit Responses Over the Human Life-Span There are actually, then, two categories of feeling states:

the pleasant and unpleasant ranges. What we refer to as emo­ tions are manifestations of these two feeling states that are (1) coupled with perceived environmental circumstances and (2) given culturally used word labels such as love, hate, jealousy, envy, disgust, fear, joy, anger, concern, and so forth. Which of the emotion labels correlate with the pleas­ ant or the unpleasant categories? Genetic predispositions and the lifelong accumulation of experience-feeling "files" in both the unpleasant and pleasant ranges produce a vast

range of unique personal tendencies that have been la­ beled self (see Chapter 8). Some of the words that are associated with self are personhood, selfhood, self-identity, self­ perception, self-concept, self-image, personality traits, and socializa­ tion. There is a genetically prescribed survival function that is being fulfilled when Hart's "drives" are operating: people

24

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get them before they get you). The distress reaction to predominantly threatening life

circumstances makes physiochemical demands on bodyminds. The physio chemical reactions to threat have been linked to the modulatory effects of the bodywide trans­

mitter molecule system. In general, distress results in dis­ ruption and suppression of immune system function (Glaser, et al., 1987, 1991; Guillemin, et al., 1985; Kiecolt-Glaser & Glaser, 1991; Rossi, 1993). People who have a history that has been more threatening than beneficial will likely be more susceptible to disease states. As social circumstances have become increasingly threat-laden, more of what Dr. Michel Odent (1986) calls "diseases of civilization" have

occurred, such as chronic fatigue syndrome, widespread heart disease, AIDS, and the various cancers. In response to perceived safety and benefit experiences (making sense, well being, gaining mastery), people will elaborate a range of constructive reactions and behavior

Figure I-2-1: Illustration of theoretical protective and constructive experience-feeling

files that may be accumulated in various proportions.

patterns. People who display these reactions usually are described as having high self-esteem, self-confidence, self-reliance, self-assertion, and self-realization. These orientations may be observed in a range of behaviors that can be described as independent, purposeful, on-task, engaged, connected, committed, com­ municative, articulate, humorous, empathetic, optimistic, altruistic, creative, innovative, initiator, resourceful, self-starter, convergent thinker and divergent thinker. Eustress reaction tends to enhance immune function (Rossi, 1993). Productive or creative involvement engages brain areas that facilitate normalized selectivity of atten­ tion and perceptual-feeling-conceptual categorizations, parasympathetic nerve response, and bloodstream-distrib­ uted transmitter molecules in the dopamine-norepinephrine-serotonin-endorphin-enkephalin prominent recipe.

These processes have been linked to increased immune system effectiveness and stress-hardiness. Warning: The constructive, eustressful activities that bring pleasant feel­ ings can be converted to protective, distressful reactions if there are too many activities with time deadlines, pressures, or if we encounter enough people whose communications convey to us that we are inadequate in what we do. All human beings have experiences that are interpreted as threatening and we have experiences that we interpret as beneficial, and we evolve reactive behavior patterns in response to them. A theoretical ratio of protective to con­ structive behavior patterns evolve in everyone (see Figure I-2-1). People who have lived in predominantly threaten­ ing circumstances cannot behave in the same way as people who have lived in predominantly safe and beneficial cir­

cumstances. The only way to change a protective-prominent ratio

toward a constructive-prominent ratio is to create consis­ tently safe surroundings and provide constructive involve­ ment in mastering one's real world and self. Chapter 9 presents some possibilities. Cultural variance is extensive, and is a potential source of perceived threat in some people. [How these internal processes relate to the symbolic self­ expressions called "the arts," and how the arts are of bio­ logical benefit to human beings, are presented in Chapters 7 and 8.]

References and Selected Bibliography Ackerman, S. (1992). The development and shaping of the brain. In Dis­ covering the Brain (pp. 86-103). Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Andrews, P.L.R., & Lawes, I.N.C. (1992). A protective role for vagal afferents: An Hypothesis. In S. Ritter, R.C. Ritter, & C.D. Barnes (Eds.), Neuroanatomy and Physiology of Abdominal Vagal Afferents (pp. 279-302). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

Becker, J.B., Breedlove, S.M., & Crews, D. (1992). Behavioral Endocrinology.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Churchland, PS., & Sejnowski, T.J. (1992). The Computational Brain. Cam­

bridge, MA: MIT Press. Cowan, W.M. (1973). Neuronal death as a regulative mechanism in the control of cell number in the nervous system. In M. Rockstein (Ed.), Devel­ opment and Aging in the Nervous System (pp. 19-41) New York: Academic. Cowan, W.M., Fawcett, J.W., O'Leary, D.D.M., & Stanfield, B.B. (1984). Re­ gressive events in neurogenesis. Science, 225, 1258.

Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Avon Books.

Topobiology: An Introduction to Molecular Embryology.

Edelman, G.M. (1988).

New York: Basic Books. Edelman, G.M. (1987). Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selec­ tion. New York: Basic Books.

Edelman, G.M. (1989). The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Conscious­

ness. New York: Basic Books. Edelman, G.M. (1992). Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind. New

York: Basic Books. Glaser, R., Rice, J., Sheridan, J., Fertel, R., Stout, J., & Speicher, C. (1987).

Stress-related immune suppression: Health implications. Brain Behavior & Immunity, 1, 7-20.

Greenough, W.T., & Black, J.E. (1992). The induction of brain sructure by experience: Substrates for cognitive development. In M.R. Gunnar & C.A. Nelson (Eds.), Minnesota Symposia on Child Psychology: Vol. 24 Developmental Behavioral Neuroscience (pp. 155-200). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Guillemin, R., Cohn, M., & Melnechuk, T. (Eds.), (1985). Neural Modulation

of Immunity. New York: Raven Press. Haykin, S. (1994). Neural Networks: A Comprehensive Foundation. New York:

Macmillan. Huttenlocher, PR. (1994). Synaptogenesis in human cerebral cortex. In G. Dawson & K.W Fischer (Eds.), Human Behavior and the Developing Brain (pp. 137-152). New York: Guilford.

Kandel, E.R., Schwartz, J.H., & Jessell, T.M. (Eds.). (1991). Principles of Neural Science (3rd Ed.). Stamford, CT: Appleton and Lange. Kiecolt-Glaser, J., & Glaser, R. (1991). Stress and immune function in hu­ mans. In R. Ader, D. Felten, & N Cohen (Eds.), Psychoneuroimmunology (2nd Ed.) (pp. 849-868). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

LeDoux, J. (1989). Indelibility of subcortical emotional memories. Journal

of Cognitive Neuroscience, 1, 238-243.

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LeDoux, J. (1994). Cognitive-emotional interactions in the brain. In P. Ekman & R.J. Davidson (Eds.), The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions.

New York: Oxford University Press. LeDoux, J. (1996). The Emotional Brain. New York: Simon & Schuster. LeDoux, J.E., Iwata, J., Cicchetti, P, & Reis, D.J. (1988). Different projections of the central amygdaloid nucleus mediate autonomic and behavioral cor­ relates of conditioned fear. Journal of Neuroscience, 8, 2517-2529.

Nonverbal Communication.

Mehrabian, A. (1972).

Englewood Cliffs, NJ:

Prentice Hall. Nolte, J. (1993). The Human Brain: An Introduction to Its Functional Anatomy (3rd Ed.). St. Louis: Moseby.

Odent, M. (1986). Primal Health. London: Century Hutchinson. Oliver, E. (1993). The Human Factor at Work: A Guide to Self-Reliance and Con­

sumer Protection for the Mind. Canton, MI: MetaSystems. Rossi, E.L. (1993).

The Psychobiology of Mind-Body Healing (2nd Ed.).

New

York: Norton. Sapolsky, R.M. (1996). Why stress is bad for your brain. Science, 273, 749750.

Schroeder, S. (Ed.) (1987).

Toxic Substances and Mental Retardation:

Neurobehavioral Toxicology and Teratology. Washington, DC: American Asso­ ciation on Mental Retardation.

Searle, J.R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Selye, H. (1950). The Physiology and Pathology of Exposure to Stress. Montreal:

Acta. Selye, H. (1974). Stress Without Distress. New York: Signet Books. Selye, H. (1976). Stress in Health and Disease. Boston: Butterworth's. Selye, H. (1978). The Stress of Fife (Rev. Ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Shepherd, G.M., & Koch, C. (1990). Introduction to synaptic circuits. In GM. Shepherd (Ed.), The Synaptic Organization of the Brain (3rd Ed., pp. 331)). New York: Oxford University Press.

Stevens, C.F. (1989). How cortical interconnectedness varies with network size. Neural Computation, 1,473-479. Sundberg, J., Nord, L., & Carlson, R. (1991).

Music, Language, Speech, and

Brain. London: Macmillan. Thompson, R.F. (1993). The Brain: A Neuroscience Primer (2nd Ed.). New York:

W.H. Freeman. Vander, A.J., Sherman, J.H., & Luciano, D.S. (1994). Human Physiology: The Mechanisms of Body Functions (6th Ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Webster, D.B. (1995).

Neuroscience of Communication.

San Diego: Singular

Publishing Group. Wolpaw, J.R., Schmidt, J.T., & Vaughan, T.M. (1991). Activity-driven CNS

changes in learning and development. Annals of the New York Academy of

Sciences, 627.

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chapter 3 the human nervous system Leon Thurman

arenting, school education, and one-to-one tutor­

P

ing result in anatomic, biochemical, and physiologi­

was thought to be shaped like one. Names and functions have changed considerably over the past few centuries, and some of the older terms make an odd fit with current knowl­

cal changes in human beings that affect the direc­ tion and quality of their lives (see Fore-words and Big edge. Pic­ So, names and functional descriptions can differ, de­ pending on an anatomic theorist's perception of the multi­ ture). If we teachers, like physicians, need to know what effects our actions have, then we start where physicians startfaceted and overlapping functional relationships within the a grounding in human biology. nervous system. The terms and brief descriptions in this The nervous system is where most of those changes chapter are intended to be a helpful beginning, and they occur. It performs three overlapping, large-scale roles: begin with the two main anatomical divisions of the ner­ vous system. 1. sensory reception (sensory receptors initiate early electro-biochemical processing); 1. The central nervous system (CNS) consists of the 2. internal processing (such functions can be referred to brain and spinal cord. as perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categorizing; 2. The peripheral nervous system (PNS) consists of memory, learning, homeostatic health, and so forth); two major divisions; 3. behavioral expression (effector changes in a. the somatic division (Greek: soma = body) consists physio chemical state of the body and execution of volun­ of the cranial and the spinal nerves that extend out from tary and involuntary movement). the CNS to innervate the entire body; and b. the autonomic division (Greek: auto = self; noLearning the vocabulary of the nervous system can mos = law-governed) consists of the sympathetic, parasympa­ be confusing. Many of its definable parts have been given thetic, and enteric subdivisions). different names by different anatomical and physiological Large-Scale Functions theorists, and their functions have been described differ­ of the Nervous System ently. The original names were assigned centuries ago, and some were based on the resemblance of an anatomic part Sensory Processing to an item that was familiar to most people, but had noth­ Peripheral sensory organs such as the eyes and ears, ing to do with nervous system anatomy. For example, and sensory receptors that are located in the skin, internal amygdala is Latin for almond because that part of the brain

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organs, and muscles, are stimulated by events in the outside

Proprioceptive sensation involves specialized sen­

world and by bodily activity and functions. They then transmit nerve impulses to the CNS. Some of the sensory impulses are processed into conscious awareness, but vast amounts are received and processed outside conscious awareness. Sensory processing carries out three broad cat­ egories of nervous system function. Exteroceptive sensation involves specialized sensory neurons that receive and process stimulation from the out­ side world such as vision, hearing, smell, taste, and pressure on the skin (touching or the pressure of blowing wind, for

sory neurons that receive and process stimulation from muscles, ligaments, and tendons. Proprioception is related to degrees of muscular contraction, release from contrac­ tion, and stretch; and to the body's orientation in space

example).

relative to the earth's gravitational field and terrain.

Internal Processing About 99°/o of the nervous system's one trillion neu­ rons are interneurons. By far, most interneurons are in the brain and are dedicated to the intermediate processing that goes on between peripheral sensory reception and behav­

Interoceptive sensation involves specialized sensory

ioral activation. As is the case with all mammals, large

neurons that receive and process stimulation from any site within the body except for normal functions of muscles, liga­ ments, and tendons. A subcategory of interoceptive sensa­ tion is referred to as nociceptive sensation. These sensa­ tions are processed by specialized neuron groups that de­ tect dyshomeostasis, discomfort, irritation, malaise, and pain.

assemblies of interneurons interact in a classification cou­ pling manner to carry out massively complex perceptual,

Most interoception is processed outside of conscious aware­ ness and participates in the regulation of bodily processes such as digestion, waste elimination, body temperature,

blood pressure, heartbeat, and most of the internal sensa­ tions that we call pleasant and unpleasant feelings.

value-emotive, and conceptual categorization processes

(Edelman, 1989; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). The global result of the categorizations is the formation of memo­

ries, decisions, expectations, and action planning, including the planning of verbal and nonverbal communications. Knowing some of the processing details can help us under­

stand more fully how parents and teachers affect vast changes in nervous system anatomy, biochemistry, and physiology.

Figure I-3-1: Six functional neuron types. [From Kandel, Schwartz, & JesselI (Eds.), (©1991), Principles of Neural Science (3rd Ed.), published by Appleton & Lange. Reproduced with permission ofThe McGraw-Hill Companies.]

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Behavioral Expression All bodily movements happen because numerous

specialized motor neurons in the CNS plan and execute

The motor functions of human bodies are richly in­

terfaced with the sensory functions and the intermediate processing. Integration and cooperation of proprioceptive

complex coordinations of specific muscle groups. When

and motor functions are often referred to as sensorimotor

we act in response to our external and internal experiences, motor processing results in activation of numerous intri­

abilities.

cate sequences and intensities of muscle contractions that produce coordinated movements of the skeletal system. Those movements enable us to: 1. orient our bodies in gravitational space; 2. interact with people, places, things, and events in the surrounding world; and 3. change the spatial location of our bodies from one place to other places.

Building Blocks of the Nervous System: Neurons and Synapses The nerve cell, called a neuron (Greek: nerve), is the smallest functional unit in the nervous system (see Figure I3-1). Most neurons can only be seen with the aid of high magnification such as electron microscopes. Neurons have many component parts. Some of them are:

Cell body. It contains the neuron's nucleus with its

interior materials such as various organic molecules and organelles, including a copy of our genome (genetic code). The diameters of neuron cell bodies range up from about 50 micrometers (one pm = 1/25,000th of an inch, see Table I-2-1 in Chapter 2).

Axon. Neurons usually have one axon—a thin, smooth-surfaced filament that grows from the cell body. Axons range from 0.2 to 20 pm in diameter. They usually branch at their ends into two or many collaterals, and they may branch further into telodendria. At the end of each axon, or collateral, or telodendrion, there is a swelling called

a terminal bouton that becomes connected to the cell sur­ face of another neuron. Dendrites. Some neurons have numerous dendrites (from Greek: dendron = tree). They are collections of neu­ ronal filaments that resemble the branches of a tree. They extend from a cell body and/or an axon and are covered with dendritic spines, tiny nodes that extend from the sur­ face of each dendrite. Each neuron in the cerebral cortex is part of at least one multifaceted neuronal network, and may receive as many as 10,000 connections from as many as 2,000 to 100,000 other neurons. The membrane that encases neurons has a gray col­ oration. A white, largely fatty insulation called myelin also is grown over the axons of many neurons, but never the cell body. The myelin enables much faster transmission of elec­

trochemical nerve impulses. So brain areas that are called Figure I-3-2: Drawings of one synaptic transmission as a series of "snapshots". [From Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell (Eds.), (©1991) Principles ofNeural Science (3rd Ed.), published

by Appleton & Lange. Reproduced with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies.]

gray matter, such as the cerebral cortex, are made up of

collections of neuron cell bodies and unmyelinated axons. human

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Brain areas that are called white matter, such as the corpus

callosum, are collections of myelinated axons that extend from collections of gray neuron cell bodies that have been grouped together. Most neurons are specialized for certain kinds of functions (see Figure 1-3-2), and there may be as many as 10,000 neuron types. When a visual sensory neu­ ron is stimulated into action by events in the outside world, then repeated electrochemical impulses are activated which travel through the neuron and can influence whether or not

believed to be inhibitory (switch off, stop the flow of elec­ trochemical impulses) and others were believed to be exci­ tatory (switch on, impulse flow continues). This interpreta­ tion has turned out to be somewhat oversimplified. Some neurotransmitters and neuromodulators do have

attached neurons will fire.

Those electrochemical impulses are called action po­ tentials. When they are fired, they travel from the cell body through the axon to the axon terminal(s). At that point, the electrical charge activates the release of biochemical trans­ mitter molecules that are generically called neurotransmit­

ters or neuromodulators (see Figure I-3-2 and Katz, 1999). Some of the classic transmitter molecules that are widely

used as neurotransmitters are acetylcholine, epinephrine, norepi­ nephrine, dopamine, and serotonin. Neurotransmitters and neuromodulators are bio­ chemical protein molecules that are synthesized within neu­ rons. They are gathered into tiny bubble-like balls called vesicles. When an action potential travels to the terminal(s) of an axon, the vesicles release their neurotransmitters and neuromodulators into a gap between the terminal bouton(s) of the sending neuron and the surface of the receiving neu­ ron. The sending neuron is lightly tethered to the receiving neuron but a gap remains between them that is about 10 nanometers wide (1-nm = one millionth of a millimeter). The connection between the two neurons is referred to as a

synapse (see Figure I-3-2 and 3) and the area between them

is called a synaptic gap. A sending neuron is referred to as

a presynaptic neuron; a receiving neuron is called a postsynaptic neuron; and the entire transaction is referred to as synaptic transmission. Over 70 neurotransmitters and neuromodulators have been isolated, so far. When neurotransmitter molecules are released into the synaptic gap, they "connect" with receptor molecules that are embedded in the cell wall surface of the postsynaptic neuron. Receptor molecules are chemically structured so that they have a chemical affinity only for molecules that have a particular chemical structure. Until just after the mid-20th century, neurons were thought of as electrochemi­ cal switches. Under some circumstances, some neurons were

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Figure I-3-3: A neuron showing a few synaptic connections to and from other neurons. From Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell (Eds.), (©1991), Principles ofNeural Science(3rd Ed.), published by Appleton &

Lange. Reproduced with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies.)

an excitatory influence on postsynaptic neurons, but some have an inhibitory influence. The primary excitatory neu­ rotransmitters are the amino acids glutamate and aspartate. The primary inhibitory neurotransmitter is gamma-

aminobutyric acid (GABA). A summation of all of the excita­ tory influences on the postsynaptic neuron is referred to as excitatory postsynaptic potential (EPSP), and a summa­ tion of all of the inhibitory influences on the postsynaptic

neuron is referred to as inhibitory postsynaptic potential (IPSP). If the EPSP exceeds the action potential threshold and is greater than the IPSP, an action potential will be generated and will travel through the neuron's axon. If the IPSP is greater than the EPSP, an action potential will not be generated. Synaptic transmission uses up the transmitter mol­ ecules that were stored in the presynaptic vesicles, but reuptake of unused transmitters occurs (those that remain in close enough proximity to the presynaptic neuron). A replacement synthesis of transmitters also occurs, but it can take from a few hours to a day to complete. Typically, multiple interconnected neurons of the brain form networks of interacting neuron groups that carry out

inside the body; having an action like morphine), abbrevi­

ated as endorphins (also termed opioids). Not all of the endorphins have been isolated as yet, but so far the group consists of fl-endorphin, the enkephalins, and the dynorphins. These neuropeptides appear to be involved in pain modulation, and there is evidence that they are in­ volved in producing feelings of well being, pleasure-reward, and euphoria, fl-endorphin is released by the anterior pi­ tuitary and thus also functions as a hormone.

Central Nervous System (CNS) The three largest-scale functions of the CNS are: 1. filtering and processing of all sensory input;

2. reflexive execution of involuntary motor coordi­ nations and the planning and execution of voluntary or learned motor coordinations; and

3. all of the integrated intermediate processing that activates such functions as perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categorizations; memory formations, conscious awareness, intentionality (expectations, decisions, and so forth).

sensory, internal, and behavioral processing.

The more extensively, or more intensely, neuron groups have been used, the "stronger" their synaptic connections tend to be­ come, and the more likely they are to activate under similar conditions. Synaptic "strengthening" is called long-term potentiation (LTP) and can involve (1) a lowering of the threshold of excitation, (2) increased production of trans­ mitter molecules, and growth of new telodendria, dendrites, and/or dendritic spines. When a network is newly devel­ oping and neuron firing patterns have not been intense, this early stage of synapse strengthening is called short­ term potentiation (STP). These factors are related to shortand long-term memory formation and motor skill learning. With reduced use, neuron network synaptic connections tend to "weaken" and are less likely to activate under similar

conditions. This process is referred to as short-term de­ pression (STD) or long-term depression (LTD). Neuropeptides are a class of transmitter molecules that are produced and distributed by, and create interac­ tions between, the nervous, endocrine, and immune sys­ tems (Strand, 2000). Among the better known neuropep­ tides are three groups of endomorphines (Greek: endon =

To appreciate how the vast CNS accomplishes these

functions, the following neuroanatomic parts and their con­ tributions to neurophysiologic functions will begin with the smallest parts and proceed to the larger parts.

Neuron Networks: The Basic Working Units of the CNS When a functionally related cluster of neuron cell bod­ ies are grouped together in the cerebral cortex, they are called a cerebral region or area-Broca's area, for instance. In subcortical areas of the CNS, they usually are called a nucleus-the central nucleus of the amygdala, for instance, or the cochlear nuclei in the brainstem. Collected groups of CNS nuclei usually are given sepa­ rate anatomical names-the amygdala, for instance. The amygdala is a major processing area for pleasant and un­

pleasant feeling reactions, and its central nucleus is one of several nuclei within it (Chapters 7 and 8 have more de­ tails). A collected group of axons in the CNS that extend from one cell-body nucleus to another is called a tract-the optic tract, for instance. In the cerebral cortex of the brain,

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a fasciculus (Latin: little bundle) is a tract of axons that connect one cortical area to another. For instance, the supe­ rior occipitofrontal fasciculus connects superior areas of the oc­ cipital and frontal lobes together (see Figure I-3-12A). When a cortical area or a nucleus sends axons to form synaptic connections with neurons in another brain area, the axons are said to project from one area to the other. In the PNS, a cluster of neuron cell bodies usually is called a ganglion-the inferior vagal ganglion, for instance. The generic name for several interrelated subcortical nuclei in the brain violates this naming principle-the basal ganglia. Also in the PNS, a collected group of longer axons that are wrapped together in a membrane is called a nerve-the va­ gus nerve, for instance. When one area of the nervous system receives neural signals into itself from another area of the nervous system, the transmitting neuron groups are said to be afferent in function (Latin: ad = toward; ferre = carry). The most com­ mon example is peripheral sensory nerves sending afferent

signals into the spinal cord, then to various nuclei within the brainstem, to nuclei within the diencephalon, and fi­ nally to areas of the cerebral cortex. Those pathways are

neural function. Networks are commonly interconnected with other networks to form network systems-the audi­ tory system, for instance. Neuronal groups or networks are the basic functional units of the nervous system. Some brainwide networks use one exclusive neu­ rotransmitter. For instance, the network that uses serotonin is woven into most areas of the brain, including the limbic system. Limbic circuits appear to play a significant role in value-emotive categorization. Deficient or insufficient se­ rotonin processing in people may play a role in eating dis­ orders, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and ag­

gressive or antisocial behavior. Neuronal axons from a local circuit or a network typi­ cally project to cell bodies of other local circuits or net­ works to form synaptic connections with them. Those other local circuits or networks typically project a complement of axons back to the original collection of neurons to form processing loops. Throughout the CNS, axonal transmis­ sion flow between circuits and networks is almost always bidirectional and is referred to as reentry. Reentry enables an intricate functional feedback and feedforward between the circuits and networks of the brain.

said to be afferent.

On the other hand, when one area of the nervous system sends neuronal signals out of itself and into one or

more other areas of the nervous system to effect changes in that area's function, the transmitting neuron groups are said

to be efferent in function (Latin: ex = away; ferre = carry). The obvious example is neuron groups within the primary motor cortex sending signals for patterned muscle move­ ments through the brainstem and spinal cord and out to skeletal muscles that contract in patterned ways to produce bodily movement. There are many ways in which CNS neurons can in­

terconnect to carry out perceptual, value-emotive, and con­ ceptual categorizations and behavior. Multi-synaptic inter­ connections between adjacent neurons are sometimes referred to as microcircuits. Micro circuits that are interconnected with other microcircuits over a wider area are sometimes called local circuits (Shepherd, 1990). Neuronal network, neuron group, neuron cell assembly, or brain module are essentially synonymous terms for a family of intercon­ nected neurons that participate in processing a particular

32 bodymind & voice

Table I-3-1. Levels of Organization in Human Nervous Systems Behavior A A

Global Mapping of Systems A A

Systems with Connecting Reentrant Pathways A A

Local Circuit Neuron Networks with Local reentry A A

Synapses in Neuronal Microcircuits A A

Neurons A A

Membranes, Molecules, Ions

In the nervous system, the metaphor of mapping re­ fers to the fact that the processing within and between some

neuronal networks is patterned in highly structured, pre­ dictable ways. For example, the vibratory pattern of a simple tone causes a frequency-specific area of the cochlear peri­ lymph fluid to vibrate. That vibration causes frequency­ specific areas of the basilar membrane to vibrate, and that, in turn, causes frequency-specific stereocilia (hair cells) within the tectorial membrane to trigger a few frequency-specific cochlear nerve terminals to transmit action potentials to the cochlear nuclei in the brainstem. Only the cell bodies of frequency-specific neurons within the cochlear nuclei re­ spond and transmit this highly organized tonotopic pro­ cessing from earlier parts of the auditory system to the later parts of the auditory system, all the way to the com­ plex right and left auditory cortices (Chapter 6 has more

details). When frequency-specific axons synapse onto fre­

quency-specific cell bodies, the earlier neuron network is said to be mapped onto the next neuronal network in the processing sequence. Such structured specificity occurs in all of the sensory and motor systems, and other systems as well. A local map refers to smaller scale mapping between two or several local circuits. The number of neurons within some local maps in the brain can range into the millions, with synaptic connections that can range into the billions. Local circuits can be mapped to other local maps-or not, as the case may be. Networks may or may not be mapped to each other in reentrant systems. For example,

the visual system, like the auditory system, uses an array of local maps. Each local map processes one feature of a vi­ sual scene—one each for color, spatial orientation, shape, and movement, to name only four. The local maps within a system are commonly connected by pathways—collec­ tions of axons that connect the local maps reentrantly to form the system. Finally, systems can be reentrantly mapped together to form global maps. Global mapping, for example, en­ ables our visual, auditory, and kinesthetic senses to cooper­ ate simultaneously, and to coordinate with motor move­ ment at the same time. It underlies the formation of rela­ tional concepts and what can be called big-picture insights. It also underlies the nearly simultaneous cognitive and emo­ tive processing that occurs when we make decisions, have

expectations, and behave (see Table I-3-1). The more ex­

tensive the global mapping, the more we are able to gain broader perspectives, solve problems creatively, express our­ selves more completely, and realize our human capabilities into abilities.

Major Anatomic and Functional Components of the Brain Brains are made up of collections of neurons, neuron support cells (glial cells), arterial and veinal blood vessels, and various fluids including cerebrospinal fluid. During prenatal gestation, neuron collections are formed into sheets (laminae), and more or less rounded blobs (nuclei). Longer neuronal axons are commonly collected together to form tracts. In addition to its blood circulation, the central ner­

vous system has its own circulatory system of cerebrospi­

nal fluid (CSF). Outlining the exterior of the entire CNS is a fluid-filled buffer, the subarachnoid space. It is filled with CSF. Within the brain, there are four somewhat oddly shaped spaces (ventricles) that also are filled with CSF. They are

continuously connected to each other and to the surround­

ing buffer space. Cerebrospinal fluid is formed in the ven­

tricles, fills them, and flows through and out of them into

the buffer space. The space and fluid provide a protective cushion for the CNS, and the fluid is a medium for transfer of transmitter molecules within the CNS. The triune brain (MacLean, 1967) is the simplest and most general way of describing the large-scale architecture

of the brain. In this concept, there are three large anatomi­ cal sections-the hindbrain, the midbrain, and the forebrain

(see Figure I-3-5). The hindbrain includes the brainstem and the cerebellum. Its processing has been compared to

the degree of complexity evidenced by a reptilian brain. The midbrain would add the limbic system with a small limbic cortex. Its processing has been compared to the degree of complexity evidenced by more developed mam­ malian brains such as mice and rabbits. The forebrain adds an extensive neo cortex and larger subcortical regions to the limbic cortex. It is sometimes called the new mammalian brain and its processing has been compared to the degree of complexity evidenced by chimpanzees and human be­ ings.

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When most brain anatomists list the most general topto-bottom brain areas, they are (see Figure I-3-6):

1. the cerebrum, consisting of the two cerebral hemi­ spheres, the five lobes of cerebral cortex, and many sub­

cortical formations; 2. the diencephalon, including the thalamus, epithala­ mus, subthalamus, hypothalamus, and pituitary body; 3. the brainstem, consisting of clusters of neuron nuclei called the midbrain, the pons, and the medulla oblongata; 4. the cerebellum.

superior and dorsal. Below that neuraxis the direction can be both inferior and ventral. That matching of directional terms does not apply to the vertical neuraxis, however, because of the bidirectional orientations of the CNS. In order to re­ member the dorsal and ventral directions, think of sea crea­ tures. The prominent, above-water fin on the back of a

In order to spatially locate segments of the CNS, ana­ tomical directions have been devised. During early gesta­ tion, the neural tube of an embryo gradually bends into a

horizontal plane (becoming mostly the cerebrum and the diencephalon) and an angled vertical plane (becoming mostly

the brainstem and spinal cord). The two central axes of the CNS are called the neuraxis and they locate the horizontal and vertical planes of the CNS (see Figure I-3-7). Notice that the direction above the horizontal neuraxis can be called

Figure I-3-5: Cerebrospinal circulatory system around the brain (subarachnoid space) and Figure I-3-4: The triune brain. [From MacLean PD: The brain in relation to empathy and medical education. Journal ofNervous and Mental Disease 19 67; 144:5:374-382. Used by

bodymind

Schwartz, & Jessell (Eds.), © 1991, Principles ofNeural Science(3rd Ed), published by Appleton & Lange. Reproduced with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies.]

permission.]

34

within the brain (the four ventricles).. The arrows indicate the direction of flow [From Kandel,

&

voice

shark is called its dorsal fin. The gill structures that most sea

lary selection in a verbal response (language) while local

creatures use to vent water tend to be in and near their ven­ tral or underside. The cerebrum (Latin: brain). The cerebrum is by far the largest segment of the brain (not the same as the cer­ ebellum). It is the forebrain or "new mammalian brain" of

circuits within its equivalent area in the right hemisphere pitch, volume, and tone quality that convey the emotive

McLean's triune brain. The cerebrum is divided into two halves, the right and left cerebral hemispheres. The neu­ rons within each hemisphere are grouped into identifiable regions, areas, or neural structures that carry out a particu­ lar range of functions. Each hemisphere has the same types of regions or areas as the other—though they typically have different dimensions and numbers of neurons—and the paired regions usually contribute unique elements to the same general function. For example, local circuits within Wernicke's area in the left hemisphere contribute vocabu­

1. logical, analytical, linear, sequential organization of planned, conscious behavior; 2. spoken language, and language coding modes such as reading and writing, for about 90-95% of people (about

contribute expressive prosody, that is, variations of vocal

qualities of the words, that is, their "feeling meaning" (paralanguage). There is research evidence that areas within the left hemisphere are predominantly involved in sequential pro­ cessing (Springer & Deutsch, 1989) such as:

95% of right-handers and about 70% of left-handers); 3. timing/rhythmic behavior in speech and music based on the rhythms of the native language; 4. appropriate personal and social decisions or judgments.

Figure I-3-6: The central nervous system (CNS).[From Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell (Eds.), (©1991), Principles ofNeural Science (3 rd Ed.), published by Appleton & Lange. Reproduced with

permission ofThe McGraw-Hill Companies.]

human

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35

Left hemisphere areas also have been associated with:

1. planned response; 2. literal and analytical communication; 3. conscious mind processes and behaviors that are associated with intentionality.

as expressive gesturing (The trained musician involves both hemispheres in musical perception and production.); 7. verbal expression of imaginative and metaphoric

communication and intense emotional words as in cursing. Right hemisphere areas also have been associated

There is research evidence that areas within the right

hemisphere are predominantly involved in whole pattern pro­ cessing (Springer & Deutsch, 1989; Van Lancker, 1997;

Edwards-Lee & Saul, 1998) such as: 1. nonlinear, multi-phase synthesis in literal percep­ tion, and the organization and operation of behavior, in­ cluding social and situational contexts;

2. perception of and attention to visual-spatial rela­ tionships and generation of imagined visual-spatial rela­

tionships;

3. face recognition and recall;

4. spontaneous and emotional response, including fa­ miliarity processing, and direction of attention; 5. perception and production of pitch variation in (a) expressive speech (prosody) and (b) singing;

6. expressive speech and musical perception and the ini­ tiation of expressive speech and musical production as well

with other-than-conscious mind processes and behaviors that are associated with intentionality. Differences in neural network organization within the

neo cortex of the two hemispheres reflects the different ways that the two hemispheres process their afferent and efferent signaling (Gur, 1980; Woodward, 1988). Figure I-3-8 is an attempt to represent those differences graphically. In the left hemisphere neo cortex, the vertical cell columns are highly coupled, but to columns that are in close proximity; neural circuitry is minimally overlapped with circuitry that is spa­ tially more distant. This type of circuitry appears to be needed for processing detailed perceptual and motor differ­ ences, such as fine motor movement with conscious analy­ sis. In the right hemisphere neo cortex, however, horizontal and more distant axon connections predominate and there is considerably overlapped neural circuitry. This type of circuitry appears to be needed for processing more diffuse,

Figure I-3-7: Illustrations of anatomical directions in relation to the neuraxis of the brain. [(A, left), from Neuroscience of Communication, (1st Ed.), by D.B. Webster ©1995. Reprinted with

permission of Delmar, a division of Thomson Learning, FAX 800-730-2215]. [(B, at right), from Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell (Eds.), (©1991), Principles ofNeural Science (3rd Ed.), published by Appleton & Lange. Reproduced with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies.]

36 bodymind & voice

The very thin cortex has a bottom-to-top six-layered struc­ ture of unmyelinated neurons and is referred to as the neo­

cortex. The six layers also are organized into small, closely packed vertical columns made up of numerous neurons. The layers and columns are interconnected by the trillions of synapses in the neocortex. Cortical structures are exten­ sively involved with the vast adaptive or learning capaci­ ties of human beings. Each hemisphere of the cerebrum is divided into five lobes. Four of the lobes are named after the skull bones that are nearest to them. Each hemisphere's lobes include a surface cortex and subcortical structures. The lobes are: 1. frontal (frontal bone); 2. parietal (parietal bone); 3. occipital (occipital bone); Figure I-3-8: Schematic (non-literal) representation of how the neuron network connections in the left hemisphere neocortex are different from the neuron network connections in the left hemisphere neocortex. [Adapted from Woodward, 1988. Drawing from: LEFT BRAIN, RIGHT BRAIN, 3rd Ed., by Springer and Deutsch. Copyright ©1989 by Sally P. Springer and Georg Deutsch. Used by permission of W.H. Freeman and Company.]

collective, whole-mosaic perceptual and motor differences,

such as visual-spatial patterns and speech prosody. Overstatements abound regarding "left- and rightbrain" processes in people with intact brains. Such state­ ments as "left- brained" or "right-brained person" should be considered metaphors, mostly for behavioral tendencies. At this time, there is no scientific verification that those terms describe exclusive hemispheric dominance of characteristic behavioral tendencies. Intact brains work as whole organs with trillions of multichannel interactions between left-right, front-back, and vertical areas, and there is multichannel in­ teraction with all organs and physio chemical systems of the body The surface of both cerebral hemispheres is referred to as the cerebral cortex (Latin: tree bark). So that large amounts of cortex can be fitted into the skull, the cortical surface is convoluted into folded grooves called sulci (sin­ gular: sulcus), thus producing protruding ridges called gyri (singular: gyrus). The gyri and sulci give it its tree-bark appearance (see Figure I-3-9). Deep grooves in the cortex are called fissures, such as the longitudinal fissure that sepa­ rates the two hemispheres. The right and left Sylvian fis­ sures (sometimes referred to as the lateral sulci) separate most of the two temporal lobes from the rest of the brain.

Figure I-3-9: The hemispheres and the cerebral lobes. (A, top) A view from above. [From DeArmond, Fusco, & Dewey, Structure oftheHuman Brain, 3rd. Ed. Copyright ©1989 by Oxford University Press. Used with permission.] (B, bottom) A view ofthe left hemisphere. [From: LEFT BRAIN, RIGHT BRAIN, 3rd Ed, by Springer and Deutsch. Copyright ©1989 by Sally P. Springerand Georg Deutsch. Used by permission of W.H. Freeman and

Company.]

human

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37

4. temporal (temporal bone; and

5. limbic. The right and left frontal lobes are located just be­ hind the forehead and they extend back to their rear border, the right and left central sulci. The right and left parietal lobes begin with their side of the central sulci and continue back to the parieto-occipital sulci, after which the right and left occipital lobes begin. The occipital lobes extend to the back of the head. The right and left temporal lobes form large "thumbs" that lie at both sides of the cerebrum, slightly above the ears. The parts of the frontal and parietal lobes that are to the inside of the temporal lobes, make a large "pleated" fold—hidden by the temporal lobe—that obscures a prominent area of neocortex called the insular cortex (the insula) because it is "insulated" by the "pleat" and the temporal lobe (see Figure I-3-10) (Webster, 1995, pp. 126-131). The functionally defined limbic lobes (Latin: limbus = border) are major parts of McLean's midbrain or "old mamma­ lian brain". If a brain were separated at the longitudinal fissure and the left half removed, then the interior one-half of the brain could be seen. The cortex of the limbic lobe would resemble a border between the neo cortex on one

Figure I-3-10:

When the left temporal

side, and the corpus callosum and brainstem on the other (see Figure I-3-11). The cortex of the limbic lobes is made up of only one-to-three layers of neurons and is referred to as allocortex (Greek: allo = another). It is organized into vertical cell columns as well. The right and left limbic lobes are made up of the cortices of the cingulate gyri, the septal areas, the hippocampi, and most of the parahippocampal gyri. The limbic lobes are considered to be the "older" cor­ tex of the limbic system. The limbic system was defined in the early 1950s by MacLean (1949, 1952, 1990). He cited the functional rela­ tionship of its regional areas and the abundant neural sig­ naling that takes place between them. It is composed of several subcortical cerebral regions that are located within

the right and left frontal, parietal, and temporal lobes. Its structures are reentrantly connected with areas of the neo­ cortex, the diencephalon, and the brainstem (described later). The validity of the limbic system concept has been called

into question as recent data have revealed more details about the many parallel functions of its constituent parts (LeDoux, 1991, 1996). Traditionally, the limbic system has included (see Figure I-3-12): 1. cortices of the cingulate gyri, the septal areas, the hippocampi, and most of the parahippocampal gyri;

lobe is pulled away, and some of the frontal and parietal

The Human Brain. Copyright ©1993 by Mosby-Year Book, Inc., St. Louis. Used with permission.]

38

bodymind

&

voice

lobes are removed, the

insular cortex can be seen.

[From Nolte,

2. the amygdala, located within the right and left tem­

There is a right and a left hippocampal formation

poral lobes of the cerebral hemispheres; 3. the anterior and dorsomedial nuclei of the thala­ mus; 4. the mammillary bodies of the hypothalamus (con­ nected to the pituitary body, as presented later).

that include a right and a left hippocampus. The name was derived from an imagined resemblance to the shape of a saltwater mammal, the seahorse (Greek: hippokampos = seahorse). The hippocampal formations, having massive reentrant connections with the cerebral cortex, are prepon­ derantly involved in processing numerous complex memo­ ries of events in space and time (episodic memory). There is a right and a left amygdala, named for a resemblance to

the shape of an almond (Latin: almond). They are major processors of unpleasant and pleasant feelings and emotional reactions. The brain's single hypothalamus is the regula­ tor and modulator of the pituitary body. Both areas are primary production areas for many transmitter molecules, and they exert major regulatory and modulatory influences over the endocrine and immune systems.

The various regions within each hemisphere are reentrantly connected to each other by tracts of collected axons called fasciculi (see Figure I-3-13A). For example, the left hemisphere's arcuate fasciculus connects Wernicke's and Broca's areas, and the right hemisphere's arcuate fascicu­ lus connects the equivalent structures therein. Just below Figure I-3-11:

A drawing of the limbic

lobe of the

right hemisphere. [From

Neuroscience of Communication, (1st Ed.), by D.B. Webster ©1995. Reprinted

with permission of Delmar, a division of Thomson Learning, FAX 800-730-2215.]

Figure I-3-12:

The

the gray matter of the adult cerebral cortex, there is a large, thick sheet of white-matter myelinated axons that intercon-

limbic system. [From: THE BRAIN, 2nd Ed., by Thompson. Copyright ©1993, W.H. Freeman and Company. Used with permission.]

human

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39

nect most areas of the two cortical hemispheres. It contains about 3 million axons and its name is the corpus callo­ sum (see Figure I-3-13B). Cell bodies of left hemisphere neural networks project their axons into that sheet and they cross to the right hemisphere to synapse with cell bodies of its cortical networks. Likewise, the corpus callosum also contains axons that project from right hemisphere cortical cell bodies to synapse with left hemisphere cortical cell bodies. Each area of one hemispheric cortex projects axons to its corresponding area in the other hemisphere's cortex, and commonly, to other areas as well. The cerebral cortex is the most complex area of the brain. Its 30 billion neurons are formed into local circuit networks (areas or regions) that perform discrete functions. Not all of the functions of many of the cortical networks have been discovered, as yet. Networks are interfaced with

nearby and more distant cortical networks within the same hemisphere and with cortical networks in the opposite hemi­ sphere. Ultimately the entire cerebral cortex can have di­

Figure I-3-14:

Primary cortical areas of the

left hemisphere that process visual,

auditory, olfactory, and somatic sensation, and motor function. [From: LEFT BRAIN, RIGHT BRAIN, 3rd Ed., by Springer and Deutsch. Copyright ©1989 by Sally P. Springer and Georg Deutsch. Used by permission of W.H. Freeman and Company.]

Figure I-3-13:

(A, top) Some of the

axon tracts that connect cortical regions within each hemisphere

and (B, at right) the major tract (the corpus

callosum)

that

inter­

connects regions within the left cerebral hemisphere to regions in the right hemisphere and vice

versa.

[(A) is from

Nolte,

Human Brain (3rd Ed.).

The

Copyright

©1993 by Mosby-Year Book, Inc., St. Louis. (B)

Used with permission.

is from

LEFT-BRAIN,

RIGHT

Figure I-3-15:

Somatosensory and motor pathways between the brain and the

body from the neck down are crossed in the brainstem.

The left somatosensory

BRAIN (3rd Ed.) by Springer and

and motor cortices process signaling for the right side of the body and the right

Copyright © by Sally P

somatosensory and motor cortices process signaling for the left side of the

Deutsch.

Deutsch.

body. [From: LEFT BRAIN, RIGHT BRAIN, 3rd Ed., by Springer and Deutsch.

Used with permission of W.H.

Copyright ©1989 by Sally P Springer and Georg Deutsch. Used by permission

Freeman and Company.]

of W.H. Freeman and Company.]

Springer and

40

Georg

bodymind

&

voice

rect or indirect influence on all of the networks and nuclei of the entire nervous system, and on all of the various or­ gans and systems of the body. Macro-regions of the cerebral cortex can be catego­ rized by their broad functions. There is (1) sensory cortex, (2) motor cortex, (3) association cortex, and (4) higher or­ Four different regions of the sensory cortex process five of the major sensory modalities, that is, vi­ sual, auditory, somatic (body sense), olfactory (smell sense), and gustatory (taste sense). After important preliminary der cortex.

sensory processing occurs in the peripheral nervous sys­ tem, the spinal cord, the brainstem, and subcortical struc­ tures, the processing then arrives at their primary cortical areas. After processing in the right and left primary cortical areas, the signaling is sent to several adjacent cortical areas that are devoted to processing details within that sensory

The primary visual cortex (abbreviated as V1) is lo­

cated in the rearmost cortex of the right and left occipital lobes (see Figure I-3-14). The primary auditory cortex (Al) is located near the upper rearmost cortex of the right and left temporal lobes (see Figure I-3-14). The primary somatosensory cortex (S1) is located at the front ends of the two parietal lobes, just behind the right and left central sulci (see Figure I-3-14). The supplementary somatosen­ sory area (S2), is located adjacent to and just behind the lowest aspect of right and left primary somatosensory cor­ tices. The left somatosensory cortex processes sensation from the right side of the body and the right somatosen­ sory cortex processes sensation from the left side of the

body (see Figure I-3-15; Chapter 6 has details). The right and left olfactory bulbs are located underneath the right and left frontal lobes (see Figure I-3-12 and 14).

modality.

Figure I-3-16:

The nuclei of the basal ganglia—the caudate nucleus, and the lenticular nucleus (includes both the putamen and globus pallidus). [From Nolte, The

Human Brain (3rd Ed.). Copyright ©1993 by Mosby-Year Book, Inc., St. Louis. Used with permission.]

human

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41

Somatosensory cortical regions are closely interfaced

right side of the body and right hemisphere motor cortices

with the frontal lobe motor cortex regions that are devoted

process motor signals to the left side of the body (see Figure I-3-15; read the later section on the brainstem).

to planning and executing coordinated body movements (see Figure I-3-17). The supplementary motor cortex (M3) and the premotor cortex (M2) exchange reentrant signal­ ing with each other, with several subcortical motor regions, with value-emotive processing regions, and with regions that process higher order abilities. They then send final "plans" for muscle activation sequences and intensities to the primary motor cortex for execution of the plans. The motor cortex region is located at the rear of the two frontal lobes, just in front of the central sulcus (see Figure I-3-14). Left hemisphere motor cortices process motor signals to the

The basal ganglia are three large cell body nuclei that are nearly adjacent to the thalamus, one set in each cere­ bral hemisphere (see Figure I-3-16). Two of the nuclei, the caudate nucleus and the putamen, are partially separated by a tract of axons—the internal capsule—that connect the cerebral cortex and the thalamus. The two nuclei func­ tion, however, as a single nucleus called the lenticular nucleus. Along with the globus pallidus, they are key areas that process voluntary motor planning before the plans are sent to the Ml for muscle activation. They interact so

extensively with the subthalamic nucleus (described later)

and a somewhat large midbrain nucleus named the sub­ stantia nigra, that all five may be referred to as the basal ganglia (Webster, 1995, p. 285). They also interact exten­ sively with the cerebellum (described later) in carrying out motor patterning. Abnormal function in the basal ganglia results in the symptoms of Parkinson's disease, a major as­ pect of which is difficulty in starting and sustaining volun­ tary movement such as walking (Thompson, 1993, p. 284). Most of the neurons of the primary motor cortex are interneurons that provide reentrant processing within the motor cortex areas. The axons of many motor cortex neu­

rons extend downward out of the cortex, and carry motor execution signals that the peripheral nerves finalize. Some of the neurons that extend out of the motor cortices are termed pyramidal neurons, and they are larger and longer than most motor neurons. Some of them are the longest neurons in the body, extending all the way from Ml to

their one synapse with peripheral motor neurons in the spinal cord. These neurons can send signals very quickly to the body's muscles. They perform essential functions in highly skilled movements. Many of the axons that project downward from each hemisphere's cortex and upward into it—especially the mo­

tor and somatosensory cortices—take the form of two large

Figure I-3-17:

left

Illustrations that show primary and association cortex in (A) the

cerebral hemisphere with the temporal

lobe to expose the hemisphere with the (3rd Ed.).

left hemisphere removed.

[From Nolte, The Human Brain

Copyright ©1993 by Mosby-Year Book, Inc., St. Louis.

permission.]

42

lobe pried away from the frontal

insular cortex, and (B) the medial (midline) side of the right

bodymind

&

voice

Used with

radiated "crowns" of myelinated, white matter axons. They are named the corona radiata. These axons interlace through many subcortical structures and many of them are funneled together and packed into what is called the inter­ nal capsule. Many of the internal capsule axons eventu­ ally collect into several separate tracts, such as the corti­

cospinal tract, that connect through the midbrain and the

brainstem and eventually enter the spinal cord to which spinal nerves of the peripheral nervous system are con­ nected. Other tracts, such as the corticobulbar tract, ex­ tend from the brainstem to deliver signals to and from the cranial nerves of the peripheral nervous system. The largest regions of the cerebral cortex are devoted to processing (1) detailed features of the various sensory modalities and then (2) associating them with each other and with motor processes in order to facilitate such func­ tions as memory, learning, behavior, and health. They are

referred to as association cortex (see Figure I-3-17). Asso­ ciation cortex is almost entirely located in (1) the prefrontal area of the frontal lobe—the prefrontal association cor­ tex—and (2) parts of three other lobes—the parietal-occipital-temporal association cortex. Association cortex in the parietal lobe is largely devoted to integrating the visual and somatic sensory systems. For instance, when a person sees an object and then reaches for it, vertical columns of neurons in the parietal association cortex activate when the arm begins to reach for the object. Other columns activate when the object is used in some way, and yet other col­ umns activate when the eyes are used to inspect the object (Thompson, 1993, p. 293). Visual association cortex extends from the right and left primary visual cortices into the rest of the occipital lobes and into most of the bottom side of the temporal lobes (see Figure I-3-17). It contains more than 20 areas that process specific features of visual perception such as border fea­ tures, color, and so forth. Shorthand labels for those spe­ cific areas are V2, V3, V4, and so on. Auditory association cortex extends downward and a little forward from the temporal lobes' primary auditory cortices as well as just to its rear in the temporal lobes. It contains more than 6 areas that process specific features of auditory perception. Shorthand labels for those specific areas are A2, A3, and so on. Somatosensory association cortex extends backward from the primary and secondary somatosensory cortices in the right and left parietal lobes and interfaces with the vi­ sual association cortices in the right and left occipital lobes. The limbic association cortex is located in the me­ dial and inferior areas of the neo cortex and in parts of the frontal, parietal, and temporal lobes (Kelly & Dodd, 1991). It reentrantly interfaces various areas of the neo cortex with

the limbic lobe and the limbic system (described later). Func­ tionally, it is involved in linking perceptual categorizations with value-emotive categorizations to provide major input for conceptual categorizations (Chapter 7 has details). These forms of categorization are often referred to as cognition and emotion (Edelman, 1989, pp. 98-100; 103-105). The human prefrontal association cortex is some­ times called "the brain's brain". It is located at the front of the left and right frontal lobes, just behind the forehead (see Figure I-3-17). Compared to any other mammal, the hu­ man prefrontal cortex is considerably larger. Direct and indirect reentrant physio chemical signaling from through­ out the entire bodymind is available to the prefrontal cor­ tex for its extremely complex processing, and it has direct

and indirect effector access to all bodymind motor and bio­ chemical processes. It is involved especially in the process­ ing of higher order capabilities (presented below), such as general regulation of purposeful behavior, orientation to the past, present, and future, planning, projecting, expecting, goal-setting, and goal-completion. Higher order capabilities are processed in the right and left frontal lobes. Higher order capabilities are depen­ dent on sensory, motor, and association processing, and include such processes as perceptual, value-emotive, and

conceptual categorizations, memory, behavior, and health. These processes are commonly referred to with such terms as cognition, thinking, reasoning, contemplation, deciding, imagining, empathizing, sympathizing, emotional intelligence, symbolizing with spoken and written denotative language, mathematics, talent, intelligence, and all skilled movement.

The symbolic modes that are known as the expressive arts are frequently left out or only mentioned when higher or­

der processing is discussed in the neurosciences. The ex­ pressive arts include metaphoric and story language; the visual, auditory, and somatosensory arts; and combination arts (Chapter 7 has some details). One of the higher order capabilities is language per­ ception, processing, and production. After the sounds of

heard language arrive at, and are processed in, the right and left primary auditory cortices, the signals then are sent at very high speeds to auditory processing centers in the up­

per rear areas of the temporal lobes. For over 9O°/o of people, the word memory and language interpretation centers are located in areas of the left hemisphere's temporal lobe that human

nervous

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43

are adjacent to the primary auditory cortex (Webster, 1995,

processing with each other and with the right and left lim­

pp. 253, 254). The logical sequence, or "sense" of speech that

bic areas for detailed value-emotive processing. By way of

is to be produced, is also formed in this general area. The

the arcuate fasciculus (see Figure I-3-18), they then project to areas in the left and right frontal lobes that plan the motor sequences for language and paralanguage response. In over 9O°/o of people, the speech motor sequencing area

heart of this area is named after Karl Wernicke, a polish

neurologist (b. 1848). He was the first person to describe

the function of this area, so it is called Wernicke's area. The areas where the "feeling meanings" are processed (prosody or paralanguage) are located in the corresponding area of the right hemisphere's temporal lobe (Ross, 1980). Because they are reentrantly connected by way of the corpus callosum, the two interpretation centers share their

for words is in Broca's area of the left hemisphere's frontal

lobe, so named because the French surgeon Paul Broca (b.

1824) first described its function. In over 9O°/o of people, the speech motor sequencing area for feeling-emotional expres­ sion (pitch inflection, voice volume, voice quality or tim­ bre) is in the area of the right hemisphere that is the ana­ tomical equivalent of Broca's area. The motor plans are then projected from Broca's area

and its right hemisphere equivalent to the right and left supplementary (M3), premotor (M2), and primary motor

cortices (Ml) of the two hemispheres. The M3 and M2 areas refine the muscle sequencing in conjunction with the

basal ganglia and the cerebellum. Finally, the plans are sent to Ml for activation of the motor "program" through brainstem, spinal, and cranial nerve structures and out to

the muscles that actually produce the unitary flow of speech.

Figure I-3-19 illustrates the general cortical pathways that

Figure I-3-18: The arcuate fasciculus provides reentrant signaling between Wernicke's and Broca's areas for language production during speaking and singing.

[From: THE BRAIN, 2nd Ed., by Thompson. Copyright ©1993, W.H.

are activated when a person raises the right hand in re­ sponse to a spoken request, and then the left hand in re­ sponse to a spoken request. When raising the left hand, note the crossing of signals from the left hemisphere speech

Freeman and Company. Used with permission.]

Figure I-3-19:

Simplified indication of the cortical pathways that activate when a person responds to two different verbal instructions:

(A, top) voluntary movement

when a person is asked to raise the right hand; (B, bottom) voluntary movement when a person is asked to raise the left hand. [From Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell (Eds.), (©1991), Principles ofNeural Science (3rd Ed.), published by Appleton & Lange. Reproduced with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies.]

44

bodymind

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Also passing through it are sensorimotor tracts from and to

the cerebellum and basal ganglia, and tracts from the re­ ticular formation. The subthalamus also has direct projec­ tions into the cerebral cortex, but their function is unknown.

Figure I-3-20:

A cross-section through the

cerebrum and the diencephalon.

[From Neuroscience of Communication, (1st Ed.), by D.B. Webster ©1995.

Reprinted with permission of Delmar, a division of Thomson Learning, FAX 800730-2215.]

The thalamus is egg-shaped, highly complex, and comprises about 80% of the diencephalon (see Figure I-326). Except for the olfactory sense (smell), all sensory sig­ nals are processed through the sensory relay nuclei of the thalamus before being distributed to many processing ar­ eas of the cerebral cortex. For instance, somatosensory projections from brainstem nuclei are processed through the ventral posterolateral and ventral posteromedial nuclei before distribution to the somatosensory cortex. Auditory signals

areas to the right hemisphere motor areas that control the

from the brainstem are processed through the medial genicu­

left side of the body. The Diencephalon (Greek: di = two; enkephalon = brain). The diencephalon is small—about 2°/o of CNS weight—and is located in the center of the brain just below

late nucleus before they are projected to the auditory cortex.

the corpus callosum and lateral ventricles (see Figure I-320). It is continuous with the brainstem which extends downward from it Structures of the diencephalon have extensive influence, however, over the entire bodymind. It is made up of four structures: 1. the epithalamus (above the thalamus), including the pineal gland; 2. the thalamus (from Greek: thalamos = chamber); 3. the subthalamus; and 4. the hypothalamus and its appendage, the pituitary body. The most widely known part of the epithalamus is the single, unpaired pineal gland. It is part of the endo­ crine system and, during darkness, secretes high levels of the hormone melatonin into its rich internal blood supply. During daylight, secretion is suppressed. The pineal re­ ceives indirect stimulation for these actions from the visual system, beginning with specific neurons in the retina of both

eyes, through the hypothalamus, to neurons in the cervical

spinal cord, to sympathetic neurons in the neck which send axons to the pineal. Melatonin is a major trigger for the physiological changes called sleep. Disruption of the mela­ tonin 24-hour secretion-suppression cycle can result in dif­ ficulty in going to sleep. The subthalamus is made up of several nuclei. Most

About 25°/o of the neurons in the lateral geniculate nucleus re­ ceive input from optic tract axons before being projected to the primary visual cortex. Its other neurons receive reen­ trant projections from the visual cortex and the reticular formation, or are interneurons that interconnect with other

thalamic neurons. Several motor relay nuclei process transmissions from the cerebellum and the basal ganglia before being trans­ mitted to the premotor and motor cortices. Thalamic asso­ ciation nuclei are connected by reentry to the frontal lobe's prefrontal association cortex and the parietal-occipital-tem­ poral association cortex.

For example, the dorsomedial

nucleus receives projections from the amygdala and is in­ terfaced with the prefrontal association area. It is involved in processing feelings and anticipation of future conse­ quences. There also are reentrant connections with the cin­ gulate gyrus of the insular cortex, an area that is promi­ nently involved in emotive processing, and there are indi­ rect reentrant neural pathways that interact with the hip­ pocampus in the formation of memory. The hypothalamus [Greek: below the thalamus] and its appendage, the pituitary body [Latin: pituita = flux, flow]

are quite small (see Figure I-3-21). Even though the hypo­ thalamus and pituitary weigh only about 6 grams, they are directly or indirectly affected by nearly every area of the they can effect a wide array of neuropsychobiological processes throughout the whole bodymind (Thompson, 1993, pp. 190-193 and pp. 199-207). For example, the hypothalamus receives direct and indirect brain,

and

of them are relays for bodily (somatosensory) sensations. human

nervous

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45

3. paired hippocampal formations that are located in the temporal lobes (involved in memory processing in the two cerebral hemispheres); 4. paired amygdalar bulbs that are located in the tem­ poral lobes (a major processor of emotive reactions within the two hemispheres); 5. orbital cortex of the frontal lobe of both hemispheres (involved in higher-order processing) and the insular cortex of both hemispheres (involved in processing value-emo­ tive categorization). There are three hypothalamic pathways that are ex­ clusively efferent: (1) an axon tract that indirectly connects

Figure I-3-21:

Views of the hypothalamus and the pituitary body. [From: THE

BRAIN, 2nd Ed., by Thompson. Copyright ©1993, W.H. Freeman and Company. Used with permission.]

brainstem and spinal cord projections that provide input about the sleep-wake state of the body and its degree of arousal (reticular formation and the ascending reticular ac­

tivating system), and the state of the body's visceral organs (includes signals that originated in cranial nerve X, the va­ gus). Its suprachiasmatic nucleus regulates the body's cir­ cadian cycles (Chapter 4 has more). Certain neurons within the hypothalamus are sensitive to the state of the blood­ stream that enable an evaluation of such physical factors as temperature of the body, oxygen and carbon dioxide levels,

the amount of glucose in the blood, and the amount of various transmitter molecules in the blood. A bidirectional axon tract called the medial forebrain bundle is a prominent conduit by which the cerebellum and many areas of the brainstem, limbic system, and cere­ bral cortex can make direct and indirect connections with

the hypothalamus to the thalamus, (2) an axon tract that indirectly connects the hypothalamus to the midbrain re­ ticular formation (described later), and (3) the extensive con­ nections with the pituitary body. The hypothalamus exerts major influence over the autonomic peripheral nervous system (A-PNS) (described later). It projects to an array of nuclei in the brainstem and spinal cord that in turn activate the A-PNS. Mostly, when nuclei in the posterior hypothalamus are stimulated, the sympa­ thetic division of the A-PNS is activated, and when nuclei in the anterior hypothalamus are stimulated, the parasym­ pathetic division of the A-PNS is activated. At the same time, the hypothalamus triggers the release of transmitter molecule recipes from the pituitary body into the circula­ tory system. These transmitter molecule recipes sustain APNS activation until it is no longer needed.

Nuclei within the hypothalamus directly regulate the pituitary body (see Figure I-3-21). Its technical anatomic term is hypophysis [Greek: hypo = under (the hypothalamus); phyein = to grow]. The pituitary is a primary production area for transmitter molecules that are introduced into its

blood supply for bodywide distribution. Through these processes it exerts major regulatory and/or modulatory

influences over bodily growth patterns, the endocrine and

1. septal area of the limbic lobe that is adjacent to the hypothalamus (involved in processing pleasant feeling

immune systems, and bodily processes such as water level management and body temperature, blood pressure, appe­ tite, sleeping-waking and sustained alertness, pleasant-un­ pleasant emotive processing, memory formation, stress re­

states), and other basal forebrain areas; 2. paired optic nerves, thus the retina of both eyes;

action, and the activation of protective behaviors-to name a few

the hypothalamus. In particular, the hypothalamus is di­ rectly and/or indirectly connected-reentrantly-with the:

46

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The pituitary is divided into a posterior lobe and an

anterior lobe. They are technically referred to as the neuro­ hypophysis and the adenohypophysis, respectively. Action po­ tentials in two nuclei of the hypothalamus cause secretion of two peptide hormones—oxytocin and vasopressin (also re­ ferred to as antidiuretic hormone or ADH)—by the neurons of the posterior lobe. The hormones empty into a capil­ lary bed that is located at the lower end of the lobe and are thus distributed to their receptor sites by the circulatory system. Oxytocin has several effects in both men and women, but the most studied effects are the induction of uterine contraction in women during childbirth and the pro­

duction of breast milk during nursing. Vasopressin also

has several effects, but its most studied effect is the trigger­ ing of water reabsorption in the kidneys to decrease its pro­ duction of urine. The anterior lobe is much more glandular in nature.

When it is activated by neurotransmitters from nuclei within the hypothalamus, it can secrete a wide array of small pep­ tides called releasing factors, inhibiting factors, growth factors, and hormones. Based on the signals it has received from the rest of the body, axons within the hypothalamus secrete either releasing or inhibiting factors into a bed of capillaries that is located just above the anterior lobe. The blood drains into the anterior lobe's portal vessels that then deliver the fac­ tors to the lobe's own capillary bed. Specific releasing factors trigger the release of specific anterior lobe hormones into its own capillary bed which is continuous with the bodywide circulatory system. Inhibiting factors either re­

also triggers the release of other hormones and the net effect is longer-term bodily reactions such as heightened arousal, increased heartrate and blood pressure, inhibition of diges­ tive activity, and channeling of blood to muscles. These conditions, in turn, cause a continuation of distress signals to the hypothalamus, among other actions. The Brainstem. The top of the brainstem is continu­ ous with the diencephalon. It is made up of three gross anatomic areas, the midbrain, the pons, and the medulla oblongata. The lower end of the medulla is continuous with the spinal cord, and part of its rear area integrates with the cerebellum (see Figures I-3-6 and 26). It serves: 1. as a conduit for sensory and motor axons that travel through it; 2. as the point of origin from which motor axons exit the brain as part of the cranial nerves and as the point of entry for sensory axons that also are part of cranial nerves; 3. an integrative control function for automatic mo­ tor patterns such as breathing, cardiovascular activity, pain and analgesia, and for degrees of arousal in the entire bodymind.

All sensory reception from the peripheral nervous system (PNS) and the spinal cord, including pain, is pro­ cessed through nuclei within the brainstem before being

distributed to other brain areas. The auditory nerves from the two ears synapse with nuclei in the pons for the first major filtering of auditory reception. All motor signaling that originates from above the brainstem passes through it

duce the secretion of specific hormones or stop their release altogether.

on the way to the PNS. Most motor axons that extend

For example, when the hypothalamus has received

bral hemispheres cross to their opposite sides at the level of the medulla. Axons from the right hemisphere cross to the medulla's left side and eventually connect with spinal nerves that innervate the left side of the body. Axons from the left hemisphere cross to the right side and eventually innervate the right side of the body. Sensory signaling from the left

input that indicates a distressful situation in the surround­ ing environment, it does two things: (1) it signals the sym­

pathetic division of the ANS to engage immediately, and (2)

corticotrophin releasing factor (CRF) is produced in one of the hypothalamic nuclei. CRF accumulates very rapidly in the capillary bed above the anterior lobe, then drains into the lobe and triggers the release of adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH) into the lobe's capillary bed and on to general cir­ culation. When it attaches to its receptor sites on the cortex of the adrenal glands, the adrenal glands secrete the hor­ mone cortisol into the bloodstream. Cortisol has receptor

sites on many organs and systems throughout the body. It

downward from their cell bodies in the right and left cere­

side of the body enters the left side of the spinal column,

crosses to the right side of the medulla, and eventually is processed by the right hemisphere's sensory cortex. The brainstem is the initial processor of all sensory and motor

signals for the head (read about cranial nerves later). Most of the rest of the body is initially processed through the spinal cord. human

nervous

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47

The reticular formation (Latin: reticulum = net) is part

of the brainstem core (see Figure I-3-22). The ascending

reticular activating system (ARAS) is a prominent neuron network that triggers waking-sleeping, alert arousal, and conscious attention to the surrounding environment-all necessary for survival. A prominent part of this network is

a nucleus called the locus coeruleus. It sends networks of projections to nearly every part of the brain.

ing and singing pass through its network of neurons (Davis, et al., 1996). The Cerebellum (Latin: little brain). The cerebellum plays a massive role in all motor functions and in motor learning. It is especially involved in high-speed, intricately timed, complex motor skills such as singing, talking and playing a musical instrument (Ito, 1984; Raymond, et al., 1996). It is located behind the brainstem at the rear base of the brain (see Figure I-3-6) and is divided into left and right lateral hemispheres. It has direct or indirect connections with nearly every part of the CNS. It is made up of: 1. a gray-matter cortex of neuronal cell bodies; 2. their white-matter myelinated axons; and 3. several deep, gray-matter nuclei. The lateral hemispheres of the cerebellum are major parts of the massive neural loop from several regions within the cerebral cortex to the cerebellum and then back to the motor areas of cerebral cortex. The cerebellum also re­ ceives projections from every one of the sensory areas. They are used to activate automatic reflexive movement, plan vol­ untary movement, and to make high-speed motor adjust­ ments during ongoing movement. The cerebellar cortex

has detailed sensory input maps of the skin and body, in­ cluding input on head position (body alignment and bal­ Figure I-3-22:

Illustration of the brain-wide, "net-like" projections

ascending reticular activating system.

Westmoreland BF:

of the

[From Daube JR, Reagan TJ, Sandok BA,

Medical Neurosciences, Rochester, Minnesota, Mayo

Medical School Foundation, 1986.

By permission of the Mayo Foundation.]

The brainstem is a major relay area for the sensorimo­

tor coordinations of voice production. Medullary inspira­ tory neurons are clustered in several areas of the medulla,

ance) and the details of muscle contraction and release. For instance, visual, auditory, and kinesthetic input participates in high-speed reflex motor reactions to threatening sights, sounds, and sensations. The cerebellar cortex has three layers of intercon­ nected neurons: 1. the outermost layer;

Neurons in the

2. a single layer of about 15 million very large, dis­ tinctively designed and myelinated cells called Purkinje cells, each one receiving over 200,000 synaptic connections, for a total of about 3 billion synapses in this one layer (Thomp­ son, 1993, p. 282);

periaqueductal gray (PAG) area of the midbrain can play a powerful role in easing pain sensation throughout the

3. the deep nuclei layer of some 10 billion neurons (Nolte, 1994, pp. 342, 343).

and they are activated by inherent pacemaker neurons to initiate involuntary tidal breathing (see Book II, Chapter 5). Either the same or other neurons are entrained by prefron­ tal and motor cortex for the voluntary breathing that is necessary for speaking and singing.

body. Motor and sensory neurons of the larynx also syn­ apse within the PAG (Bandler et al., 1996). Within the me­ dulla, the nucleus ambiguus is the point of initiation for reflexive or survival vocal sound-making, and the cerebral signaling for consciously initiated or learned habitual speak­ 48

bodymind

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voice

Clearly, there is massive dendritic and synaptic inter­ facing within the cerebellar cortex. Its only external output is through axons of its Purkinje cells that connect to the

deep nuclei of the cerebellum. The deep nuclei are inter­

connected by massive reentry with the cerebellar cortex

through the right and left interposed nuclei that adjust the

before its axons extend out of the cerebellum to make im­ mense reentry connections with the thalamus, amygdala, hippocampus, the basal ganglia, motor areas of the cere­ bral cortex, the many sensory and motor nuclei within the brainstem (such as the vestibular and cochlear nuclei), and

ebellum is involved extensively in:

ongoing movement. These actions take place outside con­ scious awareness unless the conscious attention parts of the cerebral cortex engage to control the movements with con­ scious controls. But then, many more neural processings must become involved, requiring more time, and the ad­ justments are likely to be too late to help. Blood supply. The more intensely neuron groups activate to carry out sensory processing, internal process­

1. muscle tone throughout the body; 2. instantaneous adjustments of the balance and align­ ment of the body as environmental terrain is experienced within Earth's gravitational field; 3. initial, conscious motor learning of timed, sequen­ tial voluntary movement (slower firing patterns) and in memory formation for such motor patterns; 4. refining and "smoothing" repeated voluntary mo­

ing, and behavioral expression, the more they use the oxy­ gen and glucose supplies that are available to them. In particular, the rate of oxygen and glucose use during fo­ cused, intense, detailed, analytic processing is considerable, so adequate and immediate resupply is crucial to optimal brain function. That resupply is delivered by the circula­ tory system's blood. When processing activates in a par­ ticular brain region, arteries that supply that region expand

tor coordinations—especially those that require high-speed, intricate, precisely timed, motor coordinations (higher speed firing patterns); 5. "converting" consciously learned movement pat­ terns to automatic, habitual movement patterns that then can be initiated almost entirely outside conscious aware­ ness. 6. some non-motor cognitive processes (Raymond et al., 1996).

and blood flow is increased for immediate resupply. Fortunately, the CNS has a rich and highly diffuse arterial and venous blood supply, but especially so in the brain. The brain has hundreds of miles of blood vessels. It is only about 2°/o of body weight, but receives about 15°/o of the body's blood supply, and brain tissues receive ten times more blood than muscle tissue (Vander, et al., 1994, p. 229). In spite of that rich blood supply, many of a body's bio chemicals and other substances cannot enter the brain

the spinal cord. With its extraordinary processing capacity, the cer­

The speed of cerebellar motor processing is illustrated

by the fact that one of its paired deep nuclei, the dentate nuclei, interface with the lateral hemispheres to heavily in­ fluence the planning and programming of high-speed, highskill movement that eventually can occur outside conscious

awareness. The premotor cortex sends the initial motor plans to the cerebellum (and other subcortical motor se­ quencing areas), the cerebellum then processes its contri­ butions to the plans and sends them from the dentate nucleus back to the premotor and motor cortices for execution. The neurons of the dentate nucleus, therefore, activate just mi­

croseconds before the motor cortex activates the final ex­ ecution signals down the brainstem to the cranial and spi­ nal motor nerves. The two cerebellar intermediate zones can compare the signals from the motor cortex with the current location and speed of moving body parts and then activate signals

Figure I-3-23:

A drawing that represents the blood-brain barrier around a

capillary within the brain.

All blood vessels in the brain are surrounded by fatty

tissue that prevents most substances from entering the brain. [From: THE BRAIN,

2nd Ed., by Thompson. Copyright ©1993, W.H. Freeman and Company. Used with permission.]

human

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49

because they would interfere with or be toxic to brain cells. The blood-brain barrier prevents most substances from entering the brain. Glial cells called astrocytes form a fatty

shield around all of the blood vessels in the brain (see Fig­ ure I-3-23). If a substance is fat soluble, it will likely be absorbed into the brain. If a substance is not fat soluble, it will be prevented from entering the brain.

Major Anatomic and Functional Components of the Spinal Cord The central core of the spinal cord is largely butterfly­ shaped, and is made up of gray matter sensory cell bodies

Figure I-3-24:

that project axons to the brain (see Figures I-3-24 and 25). The core is surrounded by white matter motor axons that extend downward from the brain. The spinal cord is con­ tinuous with the brainstem and protected by a central core within the vertebrae that make up the spinal column (Latin: spina = backbone). The spinal column has 7 cervical ver­ tebrae (neck), 12 thoracic vertebrae (upper and middle back), 5 lumbar vertebrae (lower back), and 5 sacral ver­ tebrae (just above the tailbone). Several small vertebral elements appear to be fused together just below the sacral vertebrae to form the coccyx or tailbone. The lower termi­ nal end of the spinal cord is in the sacral area of the spinal column.

The spinal column, spinal cord, and spinal nerves. (A) shows the relative sizes of different areas of the spinal cord and the relationship of unmyelinated

cell bodies and interneurons (gray matter) to myelinated axons (white matter). (B) shows a rear view of the brain and spinal cord. The cervical and lumbar

enlargements reflect the greater number of neurons needed to innervate the upper and lower limbs—arms/hands and legs/feet respectively. (C) roughly shows how the spinal peripheral nerves extend from the spinal cord. Note that there are seven cervical vertebrae but eight cervical nerves. [From Kandel, Schwartz, &

Jessell (Eds.), (©1991), Principles ofNeural Science (3rd Ed.), published by Appleton & Lange. Reproduced with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies.)

50 bodymind & voice

Motor nerve tracts from the brain synapse at each vertebral level with the motor neurons of the spinal nerves which branch out between the vertebrae to form the spinal

2. the autonomic division, consisting of the sympa­ thetic, parasympathetic, and enteric subdivisions.

nerves ofthe peripheral nervous system (PNS). Motor nerves of the PNS innervate all skeletal muscles below the head. PNS sensory nerves from skin surfaces, and skeletal muscles below the head, enter the spinal cord between the verte­ brae. Most of the PNS sensory nerves synapse with cell bodies of sensory tracts within the spinal cord, and they eventually transmit signals to many areas ofthe CNS. Rapid­ response motor reflexes, however, such as withdrawal of arm-hand after touching a very hot surface involves only fast-action loops between the peripheral sensory nerves and the peripheral motor nerves of the PNS. While the relays are located in the right and left sides ofthe spinal cord, the CNS is not involved in the processing at all. Autonomic nervous system tracts also extend through and out of the spinal column (described later).

The Somatic PNS The somatic division of the PNS (S-PNS) provides motor and sensory innervation between the CNS and the

The Peripheral Nervous System (PNS) The PNS is made up of sensory and motor neurons that are extensions of the CNS. They innervate the whole body and process all senses and all motor coordinations. There are two basic divisions ofthe PNS: 1. the somatic division, consisting of spinal and cra­ nial nerves; and

periphery of the body. The PNS spinal nerves enter and

leave the left and right sides of each vertebrae of the spinal

column (see Figure I-3-24 and 25). The spinal nerves are paired collections of myelinated axons. The motor (effec­ tor) nerves branch outward from anterior (ventral) roots of the spinal cord and the sensor (affector) nerves enter at pos­ terior (dorsal) roots of the spinal cord. The eight paired cervical spinal nerves provide sensory and motor innerva­ tion for the neck and upper limbs; the 12 thoracic spinal nerves provide sensory and motor innervation for the chest cavity; the 5 lumbar spinal nerves provide sensory and motor innervation for some ofthe abdominal viscera, nearly

all of the abdominal muscles, and some upper muscles of the legs; the 5 sacral spinal nerves provide sensory and motor innervation for the lower limbs; the one coccygeal spinal nerve provides sensory and motor innervation for

the gonadal region. As they progress away from the spinal column, motor axons branch out to innervate skeletal muscles that are near their individual paths. The spinal sensory nerves innervate the skin, muscles, ligaments, and some internal organs that are located below the neck. The branched endpoint sensory terminals form into a long dendrite that extends to their neuronal cell bod­ ies. The cell bodies of the spinal sensory nerves are col­ lected into a root ganglion that is located just outside the spinal cord. The axons of the spinal sensory nerves then extend from the cell body into the spinal cord (see the sen­ sory neuron in Figure I-3-1). There are two basic types of spinal motor nerves: (1) those that deliver the final signaling to muscle fibers that make up whole muscles that make up muscle groups that move skeletal parts; and (2) spinal reflex motor nerves. The signaling within the spinal reflex nerves does not come from

Figure I-3-25: Reflex motor reactions that are triggered by stimulation of sensory receptors in the skin or muscle.

[From: THE BRAIN, 2nd Ed., by Thompson.

the brain. A high speed, automatic reflex loop is formed with paired sensory nerves from skin and muscles. Stimu­ lation of the reflex sensory nerves triggers the motor re­ sponse completely at the spinal level. The knee-jerk test that a doctor performs in a physical exam is an example of

Copyright ©1993, W.H. Freeman and Company. Used with permission.]

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a stretch reflex, and jerking your finger away from a hot stove is an example of a flexion reflex (Thompson, 1993, pp. 273-275).

tion for various organs and motor innervation for various muscles of the torso. Branches of the vagus provide motor and sensory innervation for the larynx and its vocal folds.

There are 12 pairs of cranial nerves (see Figure I-3-

Other cranial nerves that are prominently involved in speak­

26). All of the cranial nerves except one—the olfactory

ing and singing coordinations are the trigeminal, facial,

nerve—extend out of the midbrain, pons, or medulla ob­ longata areas of the brainstem and project to their target

vestibulochoclear, glossopharyngeal, and hypoglossal nerves. The optic, oculomotor, trochlear, and abducens nerves are involved during reading and singing at sight.

organs (see Table I-3-2). Ten of the cranial nerves provide sensory and motor innervation for the head and neck, one

provides the sense of smell, and the other provides motor

and sensory innervation in parts of the head and neck and

extensive innervation within the torso of the body. Just above the central bony roof of the right and left nasal cavities, the paired right and left olfactory nerves (paired cranial nerve I) extend downward from the brain's olfac­ tory bulbs. They penetrate through the roof and into the right and left nasal cavities where their receptors are ex­ posed to inhaled air. The receptors have an affinity for certain chemical components within the air that are gener­

ally referred to as pheromones. When pheromones stimu­ late the receptors, olfactory processing areas in the brain

produce a perception of odor and aroma. The paired tenth cranial nerves—the vagus (Latin: wandering)—extends well into the torso and branches ex­ tensively to provide widespread interoceptive sensation from various internal organs. It also provides effector innerva­

The Autonomic PNS There are three anatomic and functional subdivisions of the autonomic division of the PNS (the A-PNS): 1. sympathetic; 2. parasympathetic; and 3. enteric. The most general function of the A-PNS is to main­ tain an optimal, homeostatic status in the visceral organs of

the body, such as the heart, lungs, larynx, liver, kidneys, adrenal glands, stomach, intestines, and various eliminative organs (see Figure I-3-27). Its three subdivisions provide distinct counterbalancing influences on those target organs.

Figure I-3-26: Front and side views of the brainstem origins of the cranial nerves. [From Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell (Eds.), (©1991), Principles ofNeural Science (3rd Ed.), published by Appleton & Lange. Reproduced with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies.]

52

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Table I-3-2. Innervation by the Cranial Nerves Nerve Number and Name

What It Innervates

Function

I.

Olfactory

Upper area of the nasal cavity

Smell

II.

Optic

Eye retina to brainstem

Visual sense

III.

Oculomotor

Eye muscles

Eye movement

IV.

Trochlear

One muscle of the eyes

Eye movement

V.

Trigeminal

Sensory: Eyes, face, scalp, teeth, mouth, nasal cavity, & jaw to cerebral cortex, cerebellum, and reticular formation

Kinesthetic sensation

Motor: Jaw movement

Mastication, speech

VI.

Abducens

One muscle of the eyes

Lateral eye movement

VII.

Facial

Sensory: Outer ear, taste buds of palate and anterior two-thirds of tongue

taste

Motor: Face, scalp, stapedius muscle in middle ear

Kinesthetic sensation,

facial expression, moderate effects of sound intensity on inner ear

VIII.

IX.

X.

Vestibulocochlear

Glossopharyngeal

Vagus

Sensory: Both ears and vestibular system to brainstem

Auditory sense, sense of balance

Motor: Vestibular system

balance and alignment

Sensory: Outer ear, taste buds of posterior third of tongue, mucous membranes of nasal and oral pharynx and middle ear

Kinesthetic sensation in outer ear, upper throat, and middle ear

Motor: Stylopharyngeus muscle

Pharynx expansion

Sensory: Outer ear, taste buds of epiglottis, chest and abdominal viscera, mucous membranes of larynx and laryngopharynx

Kinesthetic sensation in outer ear, epiglottis, chest, and abdominal organs, membranes of larynx and laryngeal vestibule

Motor: Chest and abdominal viscera (autonomic), larynx and * pharynx

Autonomic nervous system reaction in chest and abdominal viscera, motor coordinations of larynx and pharynx

XI.

Accessory

Sternocleidomastoid muscle

Neck and head bracing

XII.

Hypoglossal

Tongue muscles

Tongue movement

* Some anatomists describe cranial nerve motor innervation of larynx and pharynx as arising from the root of cranial nerve XI, the spinal accessory nerve, and then joining the vagus nerve enroute to the larynx and pharynx (Nolte, 1994, p. 180; Webster, 1995, pp. 114, 115).

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The sympathetic subdivision, for instance, provides

an arousal influence when a bodymind needs to engage in

more vigorous action. Its activation increases the rate of heartbeat to pump more blood to the rest of the body to deliver energy-producing resources. The parasympathetic subdivision, however, provides influences that are nearly

always opposite to the influences of the sympathetic subdi­ vision. When a bodymind no longer needs to engage in vigorous action, the parasympathetic subdivision activates to decrease the heart rate. These counterbalancing influ­ ences are referred to as autonomic tone. The autonomic PNS was so named because, for centu­ ries, Western physiologists assumed its functions were au­ tomatic and beyond conscious control. Just after the mid20th century, scientists verified that practitioners of several Eastern monastic religions were able to bring many auto­ nomic functions under conscious, voluntary control. Be­ havioral responses that are initiated by the ANS, therefore, can be changed by cortical processes that are referred to as a learned ability. The A-PNS has specific anatomic and physiologic characteristics that set it apart from other functions of the nervous system. It is subject to CNS control through its connection with the diencephalon's hypothalamus and pi­ tuitary body and particular nuclei within the brainstem's medulla oblongata. Those brainstem nuclei project axons into various cranial nerves, especially the vagus and the glossopharyngeal nerves that relate to vocal expression. Sympathetic subdivision. Effector neurons of this subdivision extend their axons from their CNS nuclei down the spinal cord. They project directly out of the spinal cord along with various thoracic and lumbar spinal nerves. Their first synapse is with the sympathetic ganglia that are lo­ cated just to the left and right of the spinal column. The cell bodies in these ganglia then send their axons to their vari­ ous target organs (see Figure I-3-27). When the CNS perceives threat or potential threat to its bodymind, the sympathetic subdivision of the A-PNS participates significantly in a bodywide physio chemical and behavioral reaction. It cooperates with the endocrine sys­ tem to increase metabolic energy production in muscles so that, when facing threat, a bodymind automatically engages

54

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the so-called fight, flight, or freeze response (Chapters 4 and 8 have more details): 1. stand and fight; or 2. escape by flight; or 3. freeze or become less mobile. Parasympathetic subdivision. Effector neurons of this subdivision extend their axons from their midbrain and brainstem nuclei, but they project directly out of the

spinal cord at two widely separated locations. Their first synapse is with parasympathetic ganglia that are located near their target organs. Most of the parasympathetic axons travel with four of the cranial nerves to their ganglia (III— oculomotor, VII-facial, IX-glossopharyngeal, and X-vagus). The remainder project from the spinal cord at the sacral projections (see Figure I-3-27). After a perceived threat has subsided, the parasympa­ thetic component of the A-PNS cooperates with the endo­ crine system to counter the fight-flight-freeze response by restoring affected organs toward normalization, thus en­ abling biochemical resupply, cellular repair, and neuropsychobiological "regrouping"—a restoration re­ sponse. Both sympathetic and parasympathetic functions affect immune system function, therefore general health [Chapters 4 and 5 have more details, as do Book III, Chap­

ters 2, 8, and 13, and voice function, Book II, Chapter 7.]

Enteric subdivision. Essentially, the enteric compo­ nent of the A-PNS is self-contained within the digestive tract and is substantially independent of the CNS and the sympathetic and parasympathetic subdivisions of the PNS. It sometimes is referred to as the enteric nervous system (ENS). It provides internal innervation for the esophagus, stomach, the large and small intestines, the rectum, the pan­ creas, and the gall bladder. Sensory functions include ki­ nesthetic sensations of tension in the walls of the gastrointes­ tinal tract and the nature of the chemical constitution within the tract. When conditions warrant, the ENS can be regu­ lated and modulated by its connections with the sympa­ thetic and parasympathetic subdivisions of the PNS, and by their CNS connections. Under literal or potential threat conditions, and during post-threat normalization, sympa­

thetic and parasympathetic innervation overrides indepen­ dent enteric activity.

different organs and systems of the body, such as skin, liver,

nerve, antibodies, and so on. The variety of functions carried out by all the organs and systems create the syner­ gistic "life-ecology" of whole bodyminds. When male sperm and female egg cells conjoin, one half of each DNA spiral ribbon joins to create a new DNA ribbon within one new cell. The cell divides into two and they become four, eight, 16, 32, and so on, and each cell contains the same genome. Combinations of genes in many cell types produce sheets and "orbs" of cells, and the cells divide, migrate, adhere, differentiate and die in the monu­ mental process of building a complete human body with multiple trillions of cells. As enough cell sheets and orbs are formed, they must go to the specific locations where the formation of various organs and systems takes place, and, as a consequence, the overall shape of species-specific components begins to emerge (Edelman, 1988). How do they know where to go and how do they get there? Certain specialized molecules— called morphoregulatory molecules, produced by some of the genes within cells—cause cells and cell sheets to ad­ here to one another. Other morphoregulatory molecules

Figure I-3-27:

The sympathetic and parasympathetic subdivisions of the human

autonomic peripheral nervous system.

The sympathetic system is shown on

the left, and the parasympathetic system on the right.

names of sympathetic ganglia are:

Abbreviations for the

scg = superior cervical ganglion; mcg =

middle cervical ganglion; icg = inferior cervical ganglion; cg = celiac ganglion;

smg = superior mesenteric ganglion; img = inferior mesenteric ganglion.

regulate cell group migration, and others cause additional adherings to other cell groups. Diversity in the physical makeup of human beings is not just because of genetic processes. They also are due to fluctuations in the morphoregulatory chemistry that deter­

mines the location and shape of cell groups, organs, and systems. There is a kind of matching affinity among morphoregulatory molecules that ensures the linking of

The

letters T, L, and S refer to the thoracic, lumbar, and sacral spinal segments, respectively. [From: THE BRAIN, 2nd Ed., by Thompson. Copyright ©1993, W.H.

Freeman and Company. Used with permission.]

Growth and Development of the Nervous System The nucleus of every cell in a human body contains a

spiral ribbon of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)-the human genome. Segments of DNA constitute the genetic material that generates protein combinations that form the constitu­ ent parts of the body's cells. Varieties in the genetic coding generate the trillions of cells of different types, shapes, and functions. The various cell types combine to make up the

certain cell groups to other cell groups. Timing is a factor as well. Certain developmental events must take place in particular locations before others can proceed. These "placing events", called topobiology (from Greek: topos = place), are not directly controlled by genetic expression, but by the epigenetic matching and timing events that determine the location of cell sheets and orbs, forma­ tion of organs, and so forth. Growth factor molecules in­ fluence additional place-dependent mechanisms as well as

the overall dimensions of cell groups and organs-even gen­ eral body dimensions (Edelman, 1988). These genetic and epigenetic processes also determine how the brain is formed into its cortical layers and special­ ized processing networks, and how the initial local maps human

nervous

system

55

are formed and connected. For example, during early ges­ tation, when cortical neurons are formed, they migrate to the cortical plate and form into the layers of the cerebral cortex. The neurons that arrive first, form the lowest layers,

processing all auditory experiences including language and

and later neurons pass through the lower layers to form the

The inner ear is structurally equivalent to that of an adult

upper layers. A very basic array of synaptic circuits and

result from genetic and/or epigenetic disturbances during fetal development.

by the 20th week of womb life, and the auditory nerve is fully functioning by about the 24th to the 26th weeks. The threshold at which a pregnant mother's vocal sound becomes audible to her unborn baby is a duration of about 300 milliseconds and a decibel level of about 40 (a firm whisper is about 35dB). In order to be audible by a fetal baby, outside the womb sounds must achieve a threshold of about 60dB-normal conversational talking (see Table I-6-1). Emotive response and learning occur during fetal life. During the final two months of womb life, brain growth is increasing at a phenomenal rate. Normal late-term and newborn babies are very sophisticated learners, and are extremely sensitive emotionally. Their other-than-conscious processing capacity is much more developed than has been

By the fifth month of womb life, all the brain neurons that a human being will ever have are present. The number

priate prenatal and early childhood interactions and learn­

maps also are formed so that initial functioning is enabled. These initial formations and mappings determine the initial

processing capability of brains—a primary repertoire of neuronal groups, according to Edelman (1988, 1989, 1992).

Disturbance or alteration of genetic and epigenetic processing can result in alterations, misplacements, and mal­ formations in a body's physical makeup, with lifelong con­ sequences to internal physio chemical processing. Fetal al­ cohol syndrome, cancers, Down's syndrome, dwarfism, crack babies, so-called birth defects, and legitimate cases of atten­ tion deficit disorder are but some of the conditions that may

is estimated to be about 200 billion (Personal communica­ tion, Susan Ludington, Ph.D., former Dean, School of Nurs­

ing, University of California-Los Angeles). This number is considerably reduced before and following birth as neuron networks are pared for increased efficiency. Epigenetic physio chemical events and experiential processing selec­ tively prune the available neurons within the many neu­ ronal networks. For instance, sensorimotor neurons that have not been activated by sensorimotor experiences are the most likely candidates for cell death and removal from the body. Most perinatal specialists appear to agree that appro­ priate prenatal and infant stimulation increases the prob­ ability that those neurons that have been sufficiently acti­ vated will be retained. For instance, if a fetal baby fre­ quently hears Western orchestral music (very complex tonal input through the auditory processors of ear and brain)— especially if mother has pleasant feelings during the experi­

ence—an array of neurons in the auditory cortex of the brain will be recruited to process the experience along with the ones that process pleasant feelings. Presumably, that increases the likelihood that more neurons in the auditory and "feeling" systems will be retained and be available for 56

bodymind

&

voice

musical sounds.

All of the senses are functioning at least by sometime during the second trimester (Book IV Chapter 1 has details).

assumed in the past. Safe, emotionally secure, and appro­ ing are the cornerstones of everyone's future (Book IV, Chap­ ter 1 has details). At birth only about 25°/o of the brain's eventual weight and about one-third of its volume are present (to enable passage of baby's head through the birth canal). Following birth, existing neural material continues its astounding growth and complexity. In infant brains—largely as a result of sensory and motor interaction with people, places, things, and events in the outside world—gradual increases occur in: 1. the thickness and length of neurons (Dobbing & Sand, 1974); 2. the number of dendritic trees and the density of synaptic interconnections (Huttenlocher, 1994); 3. the rate and extent of myelinization (Nolte, 1993, p. 14; Yakovlev & LeCours, 1967); and 4. the gradual display of higher-level cognitive ca­

pacities as synaptogenesis and neuron myelinization pro­ ceed over the life-span—especially in the frontal lobes (Dawson & Fischer, 1994; Neville, 1991).

While our primary repertoire of neuronal networks is formed by genetic and epigenetic events during prenatal gestation, our secondary repertoire of neuronal networks

is formed by the lifelong elaboration and variation of syn­

Conclusion

aptic interconnections in response to experience, a process

called plasticity (Edelman, 1989, p. 46; Greenough & Black, 1992; Huttenlocher, 1994). Myelin sheaths are grown around most neurons of the nervous system to form a kind of in­ sulation that enhances the speed and precision with which

nerve impulses are conducted. Myelinization occurs dur­ ing approximately the first 20 years following birth. At birth comparatively few neurons are myelinated. The mo­ tor nerves are myelinated out to the limb extremities by

about age four years (Luria, 1973), and corticospinal motor nerves continue growing in size and myelinization until at

least age 17 years (Paus, et al., 1999). That is one reason for a gradual increase in the speed, accuracy, and "smoothness" of physical coordination in children as they grow older. Axonal myelinization and diameter increases also are re­ lated to the effectiveness of many other bodymind pro­ cesses that result in maturing self-mastery: memory, lan­ guage development, creative problem solving, and decision­ making (Musiek, et al., 1984; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967). Thatcher (1994) has assembled evidence that "...the organization of differentiation and integration of intracortical

connections during postnatal development..." occurs in ana­ tomical cycles with phase transition growth spurts "nested" within them. The anatomic-physiologic changes that occur during the cycles involve (1) increased axonal and dendritic sprouting, (2) increased numbers of synaptic terminals, (3) increased synaptogenesis, (4) pruning of synaptic connec­ tions, (5) production of neurotransmitters and their recep­ tor sites, (6) increased connection strengths in existing syn­ apses, and (7) myelinization. These changes occur in vari­ ous brain regions that process ongoing experience, but the

The nervous system is interfaced with every system and organ of the body. The brain's peptides, for instance, can be released into the circulatory system—mostly through

the pituitary gland—to travel to and attach with their matched receptors in the cells that make up various organs and systems throughout the body. These transmitter mol­ ecules pass through cell walls and initiate intracellular reac­ tions that influence the characteristic function of the organ or system of which the cells are a part. The organ or sys­ tem, in turn, influences the general life-ecology ofthe whole body. The cells of the organs-systems also manufacture transmitter molecules that can travel to the brain and influ­ ence the interactions of its neural networks. When we learn, there is a change in the way the brain is physically formed—in its biochemistry, in its physiol­ ogy, and in its interaction with the organs and systems of the rest of our bodies. The brain is the primary organ of learning.

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Feldman, R.S., Meyer, J.S., & Quenzer, L.F. (1997).

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Kandel, E.R., Schwartz, J.H., & Jessell, T.M. (Eds.). (1991). Principles of Neural Science (3rd Ed.). Stamford, CT: Appleton and Lange.

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Miller, B.L., & Cummings, J.L. (Eds.) (1998). The Human Frontal Lobes. New

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Fischer and Rose (1996) have extended the work of Thatcher and others, and have assembled a comprehensive cognitive-emotional-behavioral-brain theory of human capability and ability development (See Chapter 8 for de­

tails). These developmental cycles are related to measured

Nolte, J. (1993). The Human Brain: An Introduction to Its Functional Anatomy (3rd Ed.). St Louis: Mosby.

Strand, F.L. (1998). Neuropeptides: Regulators of Physiological Processes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Thompson, R.F. (1993). The Brain: A Neuroscience Primer (2nd Ed.). New York:

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60

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chapter 4

the human endocrine system Leon Thurman

he nervous system is the most pervasive signaling

T

Basic Parts and Processes of the Endocrine System

system in the whole body but the endocrine sys­ tem is in second place. It is highly and intricately interfaced with the nervous and immune systems, and has Some bodily organs have a glandular structure. They contribute to the growth and metabolic ecology of the whole regulatory and modulatory effects on nearly all bodywide body when their cells manufacture and secrete biochemi­ processes (Becker, et al., 1992), including physical growth cal substances in fluid form. Exocrine glands (Greek: ex = and psychosocial behavior. It affects the dimensional con­ outside; krine = secretion) secrete biochemical mixtures onto figuration of the body and its parts, such as the respiratory a surface of the body that is exposed to the outside world, system, the larynx and its vocal folds, and the vocal tract sweat, tears, and mucus, for instance. The biochemical mix­ (Sataloff, et al., 1997). The endocrine system is actively in­ tures that are secreted by endocrine glands (Greek: endon volved when anyone is apprehensive or fearful about speak­ = within, internal; krine = secretion) remain inside the body. ing or singing in front of other people, or when someone Many endocrine gland molecules that are mixed into se­ experiences the near ecstasy of a peak musical moment. It creted fluid can influence the processing of other cells, or­ also is involved in the formation of memories when we gans, and systems of the body, often at considerable dis­ have unpleasant or pleasant experiences. tance from their point of secretion. Looking at the endocrine system's big picture, it is ex­ tensively involved in such general physio chemical processes as: 1. cell/organ metabolism; 2. bodymind energy production, restoration, and bal­

ance (homeostasis), including circadian and ultradian cycles; 3. feeling/emotional state; 4. cognitive capability; 5. bodily growth and regeneration; 6. immune function; and 7. sexual function and reproduction.

Embedded on the surface of the membranes that en­ close all cells of the body, there are extremely tiny protein

molecules that have particular chemical structures. When molecules that have been secreted by other cells arrive on or near a cell's surface, and some of the arriving molecules have a specifically related chemical structure, then the two molecules are said to have a chemical affinity for each other. When affinity is present between arriving molecules and

membrane-embedded molecules, they attach or bind to each other. The arriving molecules are referred to as transmit­ ter molecules, and the molecules that are embedded on

endocrine

system

61

receptors.

The number of hormones that are produced for bind­

Specificity is the term used to describe the exclusive affin­ ity between certain transmitter molecules and their recep­

ing depend on such events as: 1. nervous system stimulation of an organ or organs

tors. After a binding, chemical elements of the arriving mol­ ecules pass through the cell membranes and into a cell's interior. Once that happens, a variety of reactions may occur that set in motion that cell's contribution to the ecol­ ogy of the host organ. If enough such bindings occur in

that produce and secrete the hormones; 2. stimulation of producing and secreting organs by

the same organ, then one of the organ's functions is acti­

more receptors to receive the arriving hormone molecules

vated and the organ makes its contribution to the ecology

for which they have specific chemical affinity, then up­ regulation of the receptors has occurred. Receptor up­ regulation occurs when a low concentration of the hor­

the cell surfaces are called receptor sites or

of the whole body. The endocrine system is made up of endocrine glands

that are not anatomically connected to each other, and are

widely distributed throughout the body (see Figure I-4-1). Yet, they interact functionally with each other and with all of the organs and systems of the body (see Table 1-4-1). The cells of endocrine organs secrete biochemical trans­

mitter molecules called hormones (Greek: hormaien = to begin action). They are secreted directly into blood ves­ sels, usually tiny capillaries, that course next to or through the organs in which they are made. By way of the blood vessels, hormones join the circulating blood of the body and thus may be distributed throughout the whole body. Most of these same endocrine system transmitter molecules function as neurotransmitters when they are in the brain, and some function as immunotransmitters when they are secreted by and bind to cells of the immune system. Hormones, then, can bind with cells of any organ that has their receptors. The organs that contain the receptor sites for particular hormones are referred to as target or­ gans. When a sufficient number of transmitter molecules

other transmitter molecules that have bound with recep­

tors on those organs. When a target organ produces and makes available

mone has bound with the organ's receptors over a span of time. Down-regulation of a hormone's receptor sites means that a target organ produces and makes available fewer re­ ceptors to receive the arriving hormone molecules with which they have specific chemical affinity. Down-regula­ tion occurs when a high concentration of the hormones has bound with an organ's receptors over a span of time.

have bound with a sufficient number of receptors, the func­ tion of the organ is either increased or decreased, depend­ ing upon which transmitter molecules have been received and how many.

Regulation and modulation of the functions of the many target organs of the endocrine system are carried out by a balance of two processes: 1. the number of hormones that bind with the target organ's receptors; and 2. the number of receptors on the organ's cell mem­ brane surfaces that are available for binding. Figure I-4-1: Major organs of the endocrine system. [From: THE BRAIN, 2nd Ed., by Thompson. Copyright@1993, W.H. Freeman and Company. Used with permission.]

62 bodymind & voice

Endocrine Hormones There are three chemical classes of endocrine hormones:

1. the amines; 2. the peptides; and 3. the steroids. The amine hormones. These hormones are derived

from tyrosine, one of the amino acids that are the building blocks from which proteins are made. The most promi­ nent amine hormones are (see Table I-4-1): 1. the thyroid hormones; 2. epinephrine and norepinephrine; and 3. dopamine.

refer to all such hormones as peptides. Many peptides func­ tion both as hormones of the endocrine system and as neuromodulators in neurons ofthe nervous system (Strand, 1998). Because ofthe blood-brain barrier, however, many of the hormones cannot gain access to the brain—only the

fat-soluble ones can (Chapter 3 has some details). Among the better known peptide hormones is β-endorphin (Davis, 1984). It is synthesized in the hypothala­ mus and released from the anterior pituitary. It is one of a class of transmitter molecules, referred to as endomorphines or opioids, that modulate pain transmission. Its analgesic or pain-relief effect is well known, and there is evidence that it is involved in producing pleasant feeling and eu­ phoric states in bodyminds. Known receptor sites for β-

Thyroid hormones are secreted by the thyroid gland

which is located at the base of the larynx's thyroid carti­ lage. They affect nearly every tissue in the whole body because they are a major regulator of metabolic rate, physi­ cal growth, and brain development and function (Vander, et al., 1994, p. 274). Insufficient thyroid secretion—hypothy­ roidism—can produce chronic fatigue and various tissue changes. With longer-standing hypothyroidism, a gel-like protein typically forms in the vocal folds, stiffening them,

and results in diminished vocal capabilities (see Book III, Chapter 4). Excess thyroid secretion—hyperthyroidism­ results in faster heartbeat rates, higher metabolic rate, higher

blood pressure, and excess "behavioral energy". The medulla area of the adrenal gland secretes epi­

nephrine and norepinephrine. Their more popularized names are adrenaline and noradrenaline, the terms were origi­ nated by early British researchers. Both hormones activate physio chemical responses that are similar to the actions of the sympathetic nerves during stress reaction, that is, arousal of body-energy processes and increased alertness. Dopam­ ine is not a significant hormone in the endocrine system, but does trigger the release ofthe hormone prolactin in the anterior pituitary (see Table I-4-1). When they are pro­ cessed inside the brain, these three biochemicals are impor­ tant as neurotransmitters (see Chapter 3). The peptide hormones. By far, most hormones are peptides, that is, relatively small chains of less than 50 amino acid units. Other hormones in this class are proteins (50 or more amino acid units) with a carbohydrate chain attached, and are named glycoproteins. Endocrinologists commonly

endorphin, outside the brain, include the intestines, stom­ ach, and esophagus. It likely participates in the gut reac­ tions that are detected by sensory neurons of the vagus nerve when pleasant or euphoric feelings are experienced. The steroid hormones. These hormones are deriva­ tions from cholesterol and are involved in stress reactions (described later) and sexual functions. They are produced in the adrenal cortex, the gonads (ovaries in females and the testes in males), and in the placenta during pregnancy. The two most prominent steroid hormones produced in the adrenal cortex are aldosterone (a mineralocorticoid due to effects on metabolism of such minerals as sodium and potassium), and cortisol (a glucocorticoid due to ef­ fects on glucose metabolism). The androgen steroid hormones are produced by the

ovaries and the testes. The ovaries primarily produce es­

tradiol and progesterone. The testes primarily produce tes­ tosterone. Actually, both of the androgen hormones are produced in both sexes, with males having a clear promi­ nence of testosterone and a prominence of estradiol is pro­ duced in females. A Brief Sampling of Endocrine System Functions The most pervasive endocrine influences on human behavior come from the hypothalamus and its extension, the pituitary body. The hypothalamus receives input from virtually all brain areas including all sensory receiving ar­

eas of the body and brain. These input signals are inte­

grated with various processes of the brainstem,

endocrine

limbic

system

63

Table I-4-1. The Glands of the Endocrine System, the Major Hormones They Secrete, and the Major Function(s) They Regulate and Modulate Gland

Major Hormone(s)

Major Function Regulated and Modulated

Anterior Pituitary

Growth Hmn, GH Thyroid-stimulating Hmn, TSH Adrenocorticotropic Hmn, ACTH Prolactin Follicle-stimulating Hmn, FSH

growth, organ metabolism thyroid gland, general metabolism adrenal cortex breast milk gonads, gamete production, sex hormone synthesis gonads, gamete production, sex hormone synthesis analgesia

Leutinizing Hmn, LH Beta-endorphin

milk secretion, uterine motility

Posterior Pituitary

Oxytocin Antidiuretic Hmn, ADH (vasopressin)

water excretion

Adrenal

Cortisol Androgens Aldosterone

organic metabolism, stress reaction growth; sexual activity in women sodium and potassium excretion

Adrenal Medulla

Epinephrine Norepinephrine Opioids

organ metabolism, cardiovascular function, stress reaction blockage of pain transmission

Thyroid

Thyroxine (T4) Triiodothyronine (T3)

energy metabolism, body growth

Cortex

Calcitonin Parathyroids

Parathyroid Hmn, PTH

plasma calcium and phosphate

Estrogens & Progesterone Testosterone

reproductive system, growth and development reproductive system, growth and development

Insulin Glucagon

organic metabolism, plasma glucose

Gonads: ovaries testes

Pancreas

Somatostatin

Kidneys

Renin Erythropoietin, ESF 1,25-Dihydroxy vitamin D3

adrenal cortex, blood pressure red blood cell production calcium balance

Gastro­ intestinal

Gastrin Secretin Cholesystokinin Gastric inhibitory peptide

gastrointestinal tract, liver, pancreas, gallbladder

Tract

Somatostatin Thymus

Thymus hormone (thymosin)

lymphocyte development

Pineal

Melatonin

sleep-wake cycle, sexual maturity(?)

system, and cerebral cortex. The hypothalamus is made up of many neuronal nuclei . Collectively, they receive afferent input about:

2. the external environment by way of the exterocep­ tive senses.

1. the internal state of the body from the interoceptive

When nervous system and/or hormone input is re­

senses and the bodymind's transmitter molecule networks;

ceived, the hypothalamus responds by synthesizing bio-

and

chemical stimulators. The biochemical stimulators are de-

64

bodymind

&

voice

Figure I-4-2: Relation of the pituitary gland to the hypothalamus and other areas of the brain. [From Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell (Eds.), (@1991), Principles of Neural Science (3rd Ed.), published by Appleton & Lange. Reproduced with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies.]

livered to the pituitary. The pituitary is divided into two important lobes, the anterior and posterior. The posterior pituitary lobe is made up of neurons, and the anterior lobe is glandular in construction (see Figures I-4-2 and I-3-21).

The pituitary has been described as the "master regulator"

of the endocrine system. Pituitary function, in turn, is modu­

lated by multidirectional exchanges of transmitter molecules between the limbic-hypothalamic system, the other endo­ crine glands, and many organs and systems of the body. In response to hypothalamic stimulation, both lobes of the pituitary secrete recipes of needed transmitter mol­ ecules (usually hormones) into the bloodstream. These hormones regulate and modulate the organs of the endo­ crine system and other cellular and organic processes based on metabolic or other needs (see Table I-4-1). Some hor­ mones are produced and distributed at timed intervals in response to environmental events. For instance, the timing and amount of hormone secretion are influenced by tim­ ing of meals, intensity of exercise, sleep-awake times, dis­ tressful and eustressful demand, variations in year-round

outdoor temperatures, the amount of light versus dark, and gravitational variations to which human bodyminds are exposed. These factors and others play an important role

in normal human functioning, such as (1) the 28-day men­ strual cycle in women, (2) the approximately 24-hour circadian cycles (Latin: circa = around; dies = day) that are influenced by 24-hour light-dark cycles, and (3) the shorter than 24-hour ultradian cycles (Latin: ultra = above or less than; dies = a day). Ultradian cycles occur in alternating

intervals of 90 to 120 minutes versus about 20 to 30 min­ utes. They are manifested in (1) fluctuations of cortical function, autonomic tone, and hormonal secretions that (2) produce a longer period of physical and cognitive arousal versus a shorter period of lull and restoration (Lloyd & Rossi, 1992; Werntz, et al., 1982). Disruption of these cycles results in reduction of precision and speed in physi­

cal coordinations, in cognitive sharpness, and a suscepti­

bility to reduction of cognitive control of emotional be­ havior—sometimes referred to as social-emotional self-regula­ tion (Chapter 8 has some details).

endocrine

system

65

The Endocrine System During a Distress Reaction The Austrian physician Hans Selye, who lived most of

his life in Montreal, Canada, almost single-handedly popu­ larized the psychobiological meaning of the word stress. He defined psychobiological stress as any demand placed on the body. His ground-breaking research resulted in the

concept of the general adaptation syndrome. In this sec­ tion of this chapter, stress will be considered as a response to any distressful or potentially distressful experience, such as physical trauma, infection, shock, pain, intense exercise, decreased oxygen supply, longer-term exposure to cold or hot environmental temperatures, and any perception of lit­ eral or potential threat to emotional well being. An auto­ mobile accident, an argument with a friend, boarding an airplane, relocating to or even traveling to an unfamiliar location, meeting unfamiliar people, and so forth, involve distress. When distressful demand is experienced by a

bodymind's perceptual and value-emotive processing net­ works, a very high-speed reaction takes place in the ner­

vous and endocrine systems. In less than one second, the brainstem's ascending reticular activating system activates

highly focused cognitive attention to the source(s) of the threat, the amygdala determines a degree of threat, the sym­ pathetic division of the autonomic peripheral nervous sys­ tem (A-PNS) is toned up, and the limbic-hypothalamicpituitary system and the adrenal glands are engaged to pro­ vide energy to muscles for the fight, flight or freeze re­ sponse (detailed in Chapter 2). When the threat is per­

2. increased availability of norepinephrine at recep­

tors of all sensory systems to heighten their responsive­ ness to the surrounding world; and 3. direct efferent stimulation of the adrenal gland's medulla to release into the bloodstream a flood of the stimu­ lant hormone epinephrine and a small amount of norepi­ nephrine (Rossi, 1993, pp. 72-74; Thompson, 1993, pp. 193204). When the sympathetic A-PNS axons that project to

the adrenal medulla leave the spinal cord, they do not syn­ apse in their celiac ganglia. They are the only sympathetic axons that project straight through the ganglia to their tar­

get organ (see Figure II-3-27). Epinephrine and norepi­ nephrine enhance the sympathetic A-PNS reactions and

sustain them over several minutes. Specifically, the com­ bined effects of the sympathetic A-PNS motor neurons and the adrenal medulla's powerful "uppers" are (Thompson,

1993, p. 196; Vander, et al., 1994, p. 753): 1. increased heartbeat rate; 2. raised blood pressure; 3. raised respiration rate; 4. increased availability of glucose and other meta­ bolic materials; 5. constriction of blood vessels in the viscera and di­ lation of blood vessels in skeletal muscles to make more blood and metabolic materials available to muscles; 6. decreased fatigue in muscles; 7. close the ducts of mucus-secreting glands in the respiratory tract (dry mouth); 8. stimulate sweating in the palms of hands and un­

ceived to be relatively minimal, then the degree of reaction is relatively minimal. When the threat is perceived to be relatively intense, then the degree of reaction is relatively intense. When a life-threatening event occurs, the reaction

derarms;

is massive.

thalamus signals the pituitary to release at least six hor­ mones, and the amounts of each may be different depend­ ing on the nature of the stressor (Rossi, 1993, p. 73). The most documented hormone sequence in stress reaction begins when the periventricular nucleus of the hypothala­ mus [about .5 square millimeter in size with about 10,000 neurons (Thompson, 1993, p. 199)] produces corticotro­ pin releasing factor (CRF). CRF is sent to the anterior

Sympathetic A-PNS activation is the key to the high­

speed response to a distressor. Its initial action is triggered in less than one second and continues at least over the first several seconds (Rossi, 1993, pp. 71-74; Sapolsky, 1992a,b). It is experienced as an immediate reaction to the threat, and includes: 1. direct efferent stimulation of visceral organs and

muscles; 66 bodymind & voice

9. increased coagulability of blood. A few seconds after the above actions occur, the hypo­

lobe of the pituitary body by way of its internal portal circulatory system (see Figure I-3-21). It stimulates cells within the anterior pituitary to release adrenocorticotro­ pic hormone (ACTH) into capillaries of the general circu­ lation system for bodywide distribution. Release of ACTH also can be triggered by other hormones such as vaso­ pressin and epinephrine, and several immunotransmitters in the immune system. ACTH also enhances the neural retention of learning and memory (McGaugh, 1989; Vander, et al., 1994, p. 384). When ACTH binds with its receptors on surface cells of the adrenal gland's cortex, it stimulates the release into general circulation of a larger amount of the hormone cortisol and a small amount of the hormone aldosterone. Cortisol is released into circulation a few minutes after the initiation of stress reaction, but produces effects that are capable of sustaining a heightened energy state for 20 minutes or more (Rossi, 1993, pp. 72-78). The major ben­ eficial effect of cortisol is to increase the availability of bodymind fuels for energy metabolism, such as glucose, amino acids, fatty acids, and glycerol. It also enhances the ability of blood vessels to respond to the constricting ef­ fects of norepinephrine. Many of the beneficial effects of cortisol during stress are not yet known, but larger amounts of cortisol over longer time spans can have harmful effects. Very intense or chronic amounts of cortisol can result in (Vander, et al., 1994, p. 751): 1. retarded growth in children; 2. inhibition or blockage of the inflammatory response; 3. decreases in the number of lymphocytes, antibody production, and activity of T-cells in the immune system, thus a degree of immunosuppression (Chapter 5). The pituitary-hypothalamus complex also has recep­ tors for cortisol. When cortisol is released into general circulation, it triggers a reduction in the release of CRF and ACTH, and therefore, a reduction of its own release from the adrenal cortex. Other hormones also participate in triggering a reduction of cortisol production.

is used by sensory nerves that transmit pain signals. This process is referred to as stress analgesia and typically re­

sults in no conscious awareness of pain while a person is experiencing the stress (Rossi, 1993, p. 74; Thompson, 1993,

p. 159). Typically, an athlete with a bleeding gash on the forearm will not sense pain during a game or practice, but may experience noticeable pain within an hour of game completion. That is the result of β-endorphin producing

stress analgesia.

References and Selected Bibliography Becker, J.B., Breedlove, S.M., & Crews, D. (1992). Behavioral Endocrinology.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Davis, J. (1984). Endorphins. New York: Dial Press. Feldman, R.S., Meyer, J.S., & Quenzer, L.F. (1997).

Principles of

Neuropsychopharmacology. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates. Leucken, L.J., et al. (1997). Stress in employed women: Impact of marital status and children at home on neurohormonal output and home strain. Psychosomatic Medicine, 59, 352-359.

Lloyd, D., & Rossi, E. (Eds.) (1992). Ultradian Rhythms in Life Processes: A Fun­ damental Inquiry into Chronobiology and Psychobiology. Verlag.

New York: Springer-

McGaugh, J. (1989). Involvement of hormonal and neuromodulatory sys­

tems in the regulation of memory storage. Annual Reviews of Neuroscience, 12,

255-287. Rossi, E.L. (1993).

The Psychobiology of Mind-Body Healing (2nd Ed.).

New

York: W.W Norton. Sapolsky, R. (1992a). Neuroendocrinology of the stress response. In J. Becker, S. Breedlove, & D. Crews (Eds.), Behavioral Endocrinology. Cambridge,

MA: MIT Press. Sapolsky, R. (1992b). Stress, the Aging Brain, and the Mechanisms of Neuronal

Death. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sataloff, R.T., Emerich, K.A., & Hoover, C.A. (1997). Endocrine dysfunc­ tion. In R.T. Sataloff (Ed.), Professional Voice: The Science and Art of Clinical Care (pp. 291-297). San Diego: Singular. Strand, F.L. (2000). Neuropeptides: Regulators of Physiological Processes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Thompson, R.F. (1992). The Brain: A Neuroscience Primer (2nd Ed.). New York:

W.H. Freeman

When distress occurs, another peptide hormone that is released from the anterior pituitary is β-endorphin (beta­

Vander, A.J., Sherman, J.H., & Luciano, D.S. (1994). Human Physiology: The Mechanisms of Body Functions (6th Ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

endorphin). When β-endorphin travels through the circu­

Werntz, D., Bickford, R. Bloom, F., & Shannahof-Khalsa, D. (1982). Alter­

latory system and arrives at spinal cord synapses, it blocks the transmission of substance P, the neurotransmitter that

nating cerebral hemispheric activity and lateralization of autonomic ner­ vous function. Human Neurobiology, 2, 225-229.

endocrine

system

67

chapter 5

the human immune system Leon Thurman

uring your post-birth life, numerous living and

D

non-living entities that were not made by your

your immune system's defense is to: 1. prevent any substance that is not you from enter­ ing your body in the first place, or from imbedding itself

body, have constantly invaded you, or have at­ tempted to. If non-self or foreign material enters theininte your ­ body's tissues; rior of your body, they are likely to be threatening or po­ 2. isolate and dispose of any substance that has not tentially threatening to the well functioning of your cellular been made by your body, such as viruses, bacteria, pollens, systems, or to continued life. For example, various microbes fungi, particles in the air you breathe, a swallowed toxin, (bacteria, viruses, fungi, and parasites) can create a disease or inhaled smoke; state in your body that can be quite unpleasant, even life­ 3. dispose of unneeded bodily material such as dead threatening. cells and cancer cells. Your skin participates in your body's defense by pre­ venting many non-you entities from entering your body There are four classes of immune system cells that par­ in the first place. The blood-brain barrier (Chapter 3) pre­ ticipate in both non-specific and specific immunity. vents most substances from entering your well-protected 1. Leukocytes (Greek: leukos = white; kytos = cell) are brain. You also have a vast network of billions of cells commonly referred to as white blood cells. They are the most inside your body that are dedicated to accomplishing the numerous cells of the immune system and there are many prevention, neutralization, or elimination of invading, nonclasses and subclasses of them (see Table I-5-1). you entities. These cells are not formed into one organ like 2. Plasma cells (Greek: plasma = something formed; the heart, or even a multi-organ network like the endocrine Latin: cella = storeroom) are formed when B cells are acti­ system. Constant streams of these cells roam your entire body via the circulatory system and take up temporary residence in all of your body's tissues, being available for

"work" should the need arise. After a brief lifetime, they die and are replaced. These protective cells are referred to as your immune system (Latin: immunis = free from). The study of all body-defense processes is referred to as im­

munology. There are two broad types of immune system func­ tion: (1) non-specific or innate immunity, and (2) spe­ cific or acquired immunity. Collectively, the purpose of 68 bodymind & voice

vated, and then they secrete antibodies that act against in­

vaders. 3. Phagocytes (Greek: phagein = eater + kytos = cell) engulf particles such as microbes and dead cells and de­ stroy them, a process termed phagocytosis. Macrophages are larger than other phagocytes and are found in nearly all organs and tissues of the body (including the voice pro­ ducing organs). They tend to gather in areas of the body where they will most likely encounter the entities that they engulf-just under the body's epithelium (skin), for instance (including the epithelium of the vocal folds).

Table I-5-1.

4. Mast cells (German: Mast = fattening; Latin: cella = storeroom) derive from certain bone marrow cells. They

Four Types of Cells That Carry Out

are distributed by the circulatory system to various organs

Nonspecific and Specific Immune System Functions

and tissues where they then undergo cell division. They

Type of Cell

Cell Function

contain vesicles that secrete a variety of chemicals that in­ teract with nearby tissue cells, and are prominent media­ tors of inflammation.

1. Leukocytes Neutrophils

Engulf particulate matter and usually de­ stroy it Release chemicals that are in­ volved in inflammation.

Basophils

Release histamine and other inflamma­ tion chemicals.

Eosinophils

Destroy parasitic worms. Participate in hypersensitivity reactions.

Monocytes

Enter tissues and become macrophages (type of phagocyte).

Non-Specific or Innate Immunity Non-specific or innate immunity is a generic defense that can engage a wide spectrum of foreign "invaders" Your body's covering of skin, various bodily secretions (such as

stomach acids and mucus flow), and the various enzymes of the digestive tract provide a first line of defense. A sec­ ond line of innate defense flows in the blood of the circu­

latory system where many specialized molecules and sev­

Lymphocytes

Reside mainly in glands of the lymphatic sys­ tem.

B cells

Initiate antibody-mediated immune re­ sponses. Transform into plasma cells which secrete antibodies. Present antigens to helper T cells.

Killer T cells

Bind to antigens on membrane of target virus-infected cells and cancer cells and directly destroy them.

Helper T cells

Secrete immunotransmitters that activate B cells, killer T cells, NK cells, and mac­ rophages.

Supressor T cells

Inhibit B cells and killer T cells.

Natural killer cells

Bind directly and non-specifically to vi­ rus-infected cells and cancer cells to kill them. Function as killer cells in antibody­ dependent cellular cytotoxicity.

ing);

2. Plasma cells

Secrete antibodies.

detecting sensory nerves.

3. Phagocytes

Killing of antigens within cells (phagocy­ tosis). Extracellular killing by secreting toxic chemicals. Process and present antigens to helper T cells. Secrete immunotransmitters involved in inflammation, activation of helper T cells, and systemic responses to infection or injury (acute phase response).

4. Mast cells

Release histamine and other chemicals involved in inflammation.

eral types of white blood cells (leukocytes), can mobilize and cooperate to destroy non-self invaders. Inflammation is a basic immune system response to various types of injury or to penetration of tissues by vari­ ous pathogens. Blood capillaries enlarge (dilate) in the af­ fected area, and simultaneously, cells that line the capillary walls contract so that "spaces" are created to allow fluid plasma to flow into the surrounding tissue. The general symptoms of inflammation are: 1. capillary engorgement with blood (red colored tis­ sue) to increase delivery of immune system cells; 2. engorgement of the affected area by plasma (swell3. rise in tissue temperature; and 4. tissue sensitivity or pain due to stimulation of pain­

Specific or Acquired Immunity Specific or acquired immunity means that special­

ized immune system cells generate killer molecules that have a chemical affinity only with specific invading microbes such as specific viruses and bacteria. Generically, the invaders are referred to as antigens. If a new antigen successfully invades bodily tissues, it encounters a population of white

blood cells called B-lymphocytes (B-cells) and at least three

human

immune

system

69

types of T-lymphocytes (T-cells). B-cells produce special

Systemic Responses to Infection

killer molecules called antibodies.

Some antibodies are referred to as immunoglobulins. Specific immune response occurs in three stages: (1) encounter and binding of specific antigens with specific antibodies, (2) lymphocyte activa­ tion, and (3) the attack. When an antigen enters the body for the first time, the

immune system does not have antibodies that specifically target that antigen. The antigen does, however, encounter a

population of B-cells with an array of antibodies on their surfaces. Each antibody molecule has a differently config­ ured chemical site that enables it to bind onto the surface of any molecule that has a similar chemical site. Antigen surfaces also have chemical sites that can "mesh" with mol­ ecules that have a similar chemical configuration. When

antibodies bind even weakly with antigens, they partici­ pate in attacking the antigen. When that first encounter happens, however, the antigen-antibody binding stimulates the lymphocytes to begin dividing many times, thus creating more and more lym­ phocytes that have the antibodies that helped kill the anti­

gen. In fact, the genes of the "daughter" lymphocyte cells also synthesize, on their surfaces, multiple versions of any antibody that helped kill that first-time antigen invader, and those lymphocytes will continue to divide and make exact copies of themselves. The result? Many more lym­

phocytes and antibodies that are specifically "lying in wait" for another appearance of that same antigen. Allergy is a specific hypersensitive response of the immune system to antigens that normally are harmless. When antigens trigger allergic hypersensitivities, they are

called allergens. Usually, antibodies are released from lym­ phocytes and induce tissue inflammation. The most com­

mon type of allergic reaction is referred to as immediate hypersensitivity in which the reaction is rapid and in­ volves the antibody Immunoglobulin E (IgE). Histamine, a common mediator of inflammation, is released in the

infected area. Over-the-counter medications called anti­ histamines are commonly used to counter the inflamma­ tory effects of histamine, although they can have some ad­ verse side effects (Vander, et al., 1994, pp. 729-730; more information is in Book III, Chapters 2, 9, and 10).

70

bodymind

&

voice

When infection occurs, the site where the immune system's cells produce inflammation is not the only area of the body that is affected. Typically, there is a systemic, whole body response that is not directly part ofthe battle, but is an adaptive response to the battle. The response is referred to as the acute phase response. The most obvi­ ous systemic response to infection is a noticeable rise in body temperature that is termed fever. Fever enhances many of the immune system's protective actions (Vander, et al., 1994, p. 724). Decrease in appetite, associated with infection, may be a means by which invading viruses and bacteria are denied the nutrients that they need to multiply. Acute phase proteins are secreted by the liver to provide additional support for the inflammatory response, immune cell function, and tissue repair. Release of neutrophils and macrophages by bone marrow also occurs along with a host of other systemic immune responses.

Psychoneuroimmunology A relatively new field of immune system study has

emerged in the past two decades that has been given the awesome name of psychoneuroimmunology. It is based on medical research that strongly supports the existence of communications between the nervous, endocrine, and im­ mune systems (Blalock, et al., 1985; Pert, et al., 1985; Ader, et al., 1991; Maier, et al., 1994). 1. Cells of the immune system have chemical recep­ tor sites for certain neuropeptides and hormones. 2. Tissues and organs of the immune system, such as bone marrow, thymus, spleen, tonsils, lymph nodes, are innervated by the nervous system. 3. Cells of the immune system produce immunotransmitters that have receptor sites in the ner­ vous and endocrine systems. Thymosins, cytokines, en­ dorphin, adreno-cortico-tropic hormone (ACTH) and thy­ roid stimulating hormone (TSH) are produced by lympho­ cytes and function as immunotransmitters to modulate hy­ pothalamic and endocrinal function. 4. Autonomic and neuroendocrine pathways are ca­ pable of altering the course of immunity. Dr. Hans Selye's

pioneering description of the General Adaptation Syndrome

Cytokines are soluble polypeptides that recruit and acti­

(also called the biological stress syndrome) resulted in re­

vate immune system cells. The subclasses of cytokines are interferons, lymphokines, monokines, hematopoietic growth factors, chemokines, and other cytokines (Plotnikoff, et al., 1999, pp. 2, 3). While the lifespan of leukocytes is measured in days, transmitter molecules and their receptors have lifespans that are measured in seconds, minutes, or hours. About 25°/o of the immune system's white blood cells are generically called lymphocytes (Latin: lympha = water; Greek: kytos = cell). An estimated one million lymphocytes are manufactured every second in humans (Perelson, 1988b). They are formed in the bone marrow and the thymus gland, the two primary lymphoid organs, and are distributed throughout the body by way of the blood and lymph cir­ culatory systems. Some lymphocytes complete their ma­ turity in the blood and become B-cell lymphocytes ("B" for blood). Eventually, many of them take up residence in the lymph system that filters blood and other bodily flu­ ids. Other lymphocytes mature fully in the thymus gland where they become T-cell lymphocytes ("T" for thymus), and then are released into the circulatory system. B- and T-cell lymphocytes continually travel the blood-lymph cir­ culation system and carry out their functions in organs

search that has substantiated significant interactions be­

tween the nervous, endocrine and immune systems. The neuropsychobiological state of a person can either

enhance or reduce immune response to infection and can­

cer, and these responses have a physio chemical basis (Acterberg, 1985;Ader, et al., 1991; Benson, 1987a,b; Cohen, et al., 1991; Dillon, et al., 1985; Futterman, et al., 1994; Green, et al., 1988; Irwin, et al., 1994; Kiecolt-Glaser & Glaser, 1991;

Maier, et al., 1994; Pert, et al., 1985; Rabin, et al., 1989; Shavit, et al., 1983, Smith, et al., 1985; Sternberg, 1999; Temoshok,

1992). Everyday pleasant experiences, such as laughter, can enhance immune response (Bellert, 1989; Berk, et al., 1988). Responses to involvement with the arts, including theatre and music, can enhance immune response as well (Rider & Acterberg, 1989; Hall, et al., 1994; Tsao, et al., 1991).

For Those Who Want to Know More.... The creation of the immune system's cells begins with

the manufacture, in bone marrow, of prototypical stem

cells. Stem cells are "mother cells" that mature into vari­ ous leukocytes (white blood cells) of the immune system. Healthy adults have about 7,000 leukocytes per cubic mil­ limeter of blood (Rossi, 1993, p. 218). For instance, some stem cells become neutrophils and natural killer (NK) cells that (along with phagocytes) encounter many types of or­

ganic invaders such as viruses, bacteria, fungi, parasites, cancer cells, left-over debris from cell metabolism, and non-

throughout the body. Helper T-cells enhance B-cell pro­ duction of antibodies, and Suppressor T-cells reduce B-cell production of antibodies when they are no longer needed. Most lymphocytes are "stationed" in groups of organs that are termed lymphoid organs. The peripheral lym­ phoid organs are (1) the lymph nodes of the lymphatic circulatory system, (2) the spleen, (3) tonsilar tissue (such as the palatine and lingual tonsils and the adenoids), and

organic materials such as airborne particulate matter and

(4) lymphocyte accumulations in the linings of the intesti­ nal tract, genital tract, urinary tract, and the respiratory

any type of smoke. Basophils and mast cells produce his­

tract (includes the nose, mouth, throat, and larynx) (Vander,

tamine that is involved in allergic inflammation and in shock

et al., 1994, pp. 708-710).

and stress responses.

Cells of the immune system interact with the nervous and endocrine systems via an array of transmitter mol­ ecules (Blalock, et al., 1985; Blalock, 1989; Weigent & Blalock,

1999).

Immune system transmitter molecules are called

immunotransmitters, a major subclass of which are

cytokines (Greek: kytos = cell; kinesis = movement).

There are two general classes of specific or acquired immunity.

Cellular immunity occurs when T-cell lym­

phocytes directly eliminate invaders, and no antibodies are involved. Humoral immunity relates to defensive func­ tions carried out and distributed in the fluids of the body (Latin: humor = fluids or semi-fluids in the body). B-cell lymphocytes can produce plasma cells that can produce

human

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71

specific antibodies (immunoglobulin molecules) to encoun­

ter specific allergens. For example, humoral immunity oc­ curs when Immunoglobulin E (IgE) mediates an allergic response. Antigen and antibody binding stimulates lymphocyte cells to divide repeatedly. The population of those lym­ phocytes and their antibodies, then, is increased manyfold. After the initial invasion, those lymphocytes continue to divide so that, in the future, with every exposure to those same foreign antigen, a more immediate and massive neu­ tralization process occurs. That usually means that the antigens are disposed of before they can penetrate tissues and produce inflammation. Burnet (1959) was the first person to articulate a clonal selection theory of acquired immunity. It has since been substantially verified (Edelman, 1973; 1992, pp. 74-78). These immune system actions are the basis of preventive inoculation against various diseases.

Black, PH., & Berman, AS. (1999). Stress and inflammation. In N.P Plotnikoff, R.E. Faith, A.J. Murgo, & R.A. Good (Eds.), Cytokines: Stress and Immunity (pp. 115-132). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

Blalock, J.E. (1989). A molecular basis for bidirectional communication between the immune and neuroendocrine system. Physiological Review, 69,

1. Blalock, E., Harbour-McMenamin, D., & Smith, E. (1985).

Peptide hor­

mones shaped by the neuroendocrine and immunologic systems. Journal of Immunology, 135(2), 858s-861s.

Borysenko, J. (1987).

The

Minding the Body Mending the Mind. Reading, MA:

Addison-Wesley. Burnet, F.M. (1959). The Clonal Selection Theory of Acquired Immunity. Nash­ ville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press.

Burton-Leiber, D. (1986). Laughter and humor in critical care. Dimensions

of Critical Care Nursing, 5, 162-170. Calabrese, J.R., Kling, M.A., & Gold, P.W. (1987). Alterations in immuno­

competence during stress, bereavement, and depression: Focus on neu­ roendocrine function. American Journal of Psychiatry, 144, 1123-1143. Charney, D., & et al. (1993). Psychobiologic mechanisms of posttraumatic

stress disorder. Archives of General Psychiatry, 50, 294-305.

Cohen, S., Tyrell, D.S., & Smith, A.P (1991). Psychological stress in humans

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chapter 6 human sensory experiences Leon Thurman

ensory reception is a characteristic of nervous

S

systems. The terminal points of neuronal

and specialized receptors activate sensitivity, discomfort, irritation, malaise, or pain. Only the first three of the following six sensory sys­

axons are impacted by energy sources, triggering nerve impulses (action potentials) that travel to synaptic tems will be discussed in this chapter. All six systems pro­ connections with other neurons, and ultimately to mul­ cess perceptual categorizations and they are correlated with each other in the association areas of the brain. They are: tiple destinations in the central nervous system (CNS). 1. the visual system (sight); In every normal human body, there are neurons that are structured to be responsive to: 2. the auditory system (sound); and 3. the somatosensory system (bodily sensation); 1. very high frequency light waves (the visual sense); 4. the vestibular system (body orientation in gravity 2. sound pressure waves (the auditory sense);

3. impact pressure (the tactile sense); 4. muscle and ligament tension (the kinetic sense) 5. balance and alignment of the body in Earth's gravi­ tational field (the vestibular sense); 6. chemical constitution of air and ingested substances (the smell and taste senses); 7. noxious conditions on or in the body (irritationstrain-pain sense).

and spatial terrain);

5. the olfactory system (smell); and 6. the gustatory system (taste). Perceptual categorization occurs when specialized as­ semblies of sensory nerves respond to features and sub­ features of the external world and to the internal milieu of our bodies. In exteroception, the energy elements that make

side the perceiver stimulate on neurons that are especially sensitive to those particular sources of energy. Proprio­ ception occurs when muscles and ligaments are stretched, contracted, or released to carry out coordinated physical movement. Interoception occurs when the internal envi­ ronment of the body changes (except muscle contraction).

initial contact with sensory nerves are far too numerous for the nervous system to respond to in an element-byelement way. Receptors are specialized to initiate electro­ chemical impulses in response to ranges of energy stimula­ tion. Initial stimulation results in a cascade of impulse signal processing by several neuron nuclei. Typically, each nucleus processes one aspect of the initial impulses before sending their own impulses to the next processing area.

Nociception occurs when parts of the body have been sufficiently disturbed away from their homeostatic norm

bined and correlated with other sensory systems in the

Exteroception occurs when energy sources from out­

Eventually, all of the processed sensory details are recom­

sensory

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association areas of the cerebral cortices before conscious awareness occurs. For example, different intensities of light waves from a perceived visual scene first stimulate recep­ tors on the retina of each eye. The nerve impulses are processed by a number of nuclei in the thalamus and the visual cortex, so that eventually, object borders, colors, spatial dimension, motion of objects, and so on, can be perceived in conscious awareness. Variations of vibratory frequency and sound pressure intensity are categorized by various auditory system nuclei so that we can perceive pitch, volume, sound quality, and sound localization. The Visual Sense A photon is the smallest quantity of electromagnetic energy. One form of electromagnetic energy is called light.

Light has no mass but travels through space at a rate of about 186,000 miles per second, thus, the well known speed

of light. The essence of what we perceive as color is vibrational wavelengths (and their relative intensities) in a range of frequencies above one billion trillion vibrations per second (1021). The length of single light waves ranges from 400 to 700 nanometers (millionths of a millimeter) (Hubei, 1995, pp. 161, 162). The seven colors ofthe light spectrum (as seen through

a prism) are produced by light waves of different lengths.

Objects that are seen do not actually "have" color, but ap­

pear to have color because their surfaces reflect certain wave­ lengths of light. Green grass is green because it absorbs all light wavelengths except the one for green, which it reflects. Surfaces that absorb all light rays appear black. Surfaces that can reflect all light rays will appear white in daylight,

but will appear blue under blue light and red under red

light. Eyes are commonly compared to a color television camera lens (Hubei, 1995, p.33; Thompson, 1992, p. 226). When open eyes are pointed in the direction of a scene in the outside world, the light wave radiation that is emitted from the scene passes, as it is, through the lens of each eye. Each lens completely reverses the configuration ofthe light rays. The upside of the scene is projected to the downside of the retina and the downside of the scene to the upside. The right side is projected to left and the left side is pro­ jected to right. That reversed image is registered on a .25-mm thick plate of sensory receptors from the brain—the retina of each eye (Hubei, 1995, pp. 36-39; see Figure I-6-1). The scene's reversed array of light intensities pass by the retina's front two layers of cells to stimulate the over 125 million photoreceptors at the back of each retina. Photoreceptors are commonly referred to as rods and cones (Hubei, 1995, p. 2, 37). Rods and cones are "tuned" to begin producing action potentials only in response to certain fea­ tures of a visual scene for which they have a chemical af­

finity. Rods are more sensitive to light than cones. They can detect smaller amounts of light and process shades of gray, so they are active in "night vision". Cones process the well lighted fine details of visual scenes and their colors. Three types of cones contain pigments that are most sensi­ tive to particular light ray intensities associated with the colors red, green, and blue (Hubei, 1995, pp. 159-189; Th­ ompson, 1993, pp. 227, 228). The rods and cones of each retina are distributed in a variety of numbers and combinations. In the center of each retina, there is an area about .5-mm in diameter where

Figure I-6-1: A drawing ofthe eye and its retina. The magnified area shows the three

layers of retinal cells that end with the rods and cones. [From Hubei, D.H., Eye, Brain, and Vision. Copyright ©1995, Scientific American, Inc. All rights reserved.]

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there are only densely packed cone cells. When we "focus our eyes" to take in the details of one part of a visual scene, the signaling in this central retinal area becomes intense. That central area is named the fovea (Hubei, 1995, pp. 36, 37; Thompson, 1993, p. 237).

Figure I-6-2: (A-above) The major neural pathways from the eyes to the left and right

primary visual cortices. [From: THE BRAIN, 2nd Ed., by Thompson. Copyright ©1993, W.H. Freeman and Company. Used with permission.] (B-lef) The left visual field is projected

to the right primary visual cortex and the right visual field is projected to the left primary visual cortex. [From: LEFT BRAIN, RIGHT BRAIN, 3rd Ed, by Springer and Deutsch. Copyright

©1989 bySallyP. Springerand Georg Deutsch. Used by permission ofW.H. Freeman and Company.]

Within environmental scenes, human visual systems are capable of processing about 340,000 items of wave­ length-intensity (Thompson, 1993, p.255). Light-wave fea­ tures of environmental scenes are initially transduced by retinal cells into selectively organized nerve impulse "rep­ resentations" of the scene's features. The impulses from each retina's 125 million photoreceptor cells are then trans­

tex located at the back of the brain in the occipital lobe (see

duced forward into its middle and front rows of cells. There are about one million "front-row" retinal ganglion cells,

the visual scene such as border or shape, three-dimen­ sional space, movement, and color, among many others.

and their axons extend over the front of each retina and

From the early visual areas, the signals are distributed to visual integration areas in the visual association cortex. Visual processing is then integrated with somatosensory

gather into a bundle that extends out of each eye to form

the right and left optic nerves (see Figures I-6-1 and 1-6-

2). These transduced features are then highly processed in successive topographic mappings of those features. Each feature of an environmental scene that is registered on reti­ nal cells is passed through the visual system via successive synaptic connections to specialized groups of neurons that augment the categorization of those same features. After the retina, the next major augmentation sites are the lateral geniculate nuclei of the thalamus. From the thalamus, the topographically mapped sig­ nals are projected to the right and left primary visual cor­

Figure I-6-2A). V1 is the shorthand designation for the primary visual cortex. Considerable processing occurs in

VI, and from there, the signals are distributed into over 20

specific cortical networks that are located immediately in front of VI. They are designated as V2, V3, V4, and so on.

Each of these networks process one prominent feature of

processing in the posterior parietal cortex before inte­ grating with the auditory sense, and other senses, in the

parietal-temporal-occipital association cortex, and the limbic association cortex. Again, each eye's lens receives light waves from the en­ vironmental scene as they actually are, then reverses the im­ age, and then the image goes to the retina. That means that the left half of each retina is receiving the right side of the environmental scene, and the right half of each retina is receiving the left half of the scene. That also means that the

sensory

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77

left eye's left-side neurons process light from the right en­

vironmental scene and project to the left hemisphere's tha­ lamic area and visual cortex. Accordingly the right eye's right-side neurons process light from the left environmen­ tal scene and project to the right hemisphere's thalamic area and visual cortex and the right eye's left-side neurons process the right environmental scene and project to the left hemisphere's thalamic area and then on to the visual cortex. There also are visual system signals that project from

the optic nerve and the lateral geniculate nucleus that syn­ apse with non-cortical areas such as nuclei within the lim­

bic, brainstem, and cerebellar areas. For example, the vestibulo-ocular reflex system helps us keep our balance

in higher-speed movement; projections from the optic nerve tract innervate the suprachiasmatic nucleus of the hypo­ thalamus to help regulate sleep-wake cycles that respond to the degree of light and dark; projections to the limbic system's amygdala and to the brainstem's ascending re­ ticular activating system provides visual signaling for arousal, especially when danger is perceived. Visual sys­ tem and limbic system interfacing can produce changes in feeling states, particularly in response to amount of light

and to different colors. These changes can influence endo­

immune functions (Ainsworth, et al., 1993; Brainard, et al., 1990, 1993; Cooper, et al., 1986; Fischer, 1991; Joki, 1984; Kuyller & Lindsten, 1992; Maas, et al., 1974; Ulrich, 1991). crine and

In summary, the visual system provides a major form of exteroceptive sensation—the visual detection and cat­

egorization of features within the external world. Light that arrives from the right half of the environment is re­ ceived by the two left-side half-retinas and are projected to the left hemisphere. Light that arrives from the left half of the environment is received by the two right-side half-retinas and are pro­ jected to the right hemisphere. In other words, the right hemisphere receives only the left visual field, and the left hemisphere receives only the right visual field. The rear portion of the corpus callosum contains reentrant axons from both the left and right visual cortices. That sharing enables us to have bi-hemispheric visual function with one eye closed or missing. Direct and indirect projections that

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originate in the retinal areas participate in many integrated brainwide functions.

Table I-6-1. Typical Sound Pressure Levels (SPLs) for Commonly Experienced Sounds The threshold of human hearing is a sound pressure level of about 1 decibel (dB). [Adapted from Daniloff, et al., p. 110]

Experience Sound Pressure Rustle of leaves Silent broadcasting studio Bedroom at night Library Quiet office Conversational speech (at 1 meter distance)

Average radio Light traffic noise Typical factory Subway train Symphony orchestra (fortissimo) Rock band Aircraft takeoff Threshold of auditory system pain

Level in decibels 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 74 80 90 100 110 120 140

The Auditory Sense Features of sound in the external world are categorized by the human auditory system, another major form of exteroceptive sensation. While the visual system processes electromagnetic vibration frequencies in the range of one billion trillion per second, the human auditory system is sensitive to and processes environmental vibration fre­ quencies in the range of about 20 to 20,000 per second. In other words, vibrating objects must create a minimum of about 20 sound pressure waves per second. Human ears also will not detect sound waves beyond about 20,000 sound pressure waves per second. The most common measure of sound vibration inten­ sity is in decibels (dB) or tenths of Bels (named after Alexander Graham Bell). They are a measure that relates the subjectively judged loudness of sound and the amount of measured physical energy (pressure) in the sound. The relationship between the two is approximately logarithmic (not evenly geometric). The absolute minimum sound that human ears can detect is established as 1-dB of "volume". The most intense sounds that can be processed by the hu­ man auditory system are 10,000,000 times more intense than the 1-dB threshold. The auditory system actually com­ presses a very wide range of sound energy levels into ranges

of loudness that it can handle. Its capacity for compress­ ing very high sound energies without damage to its parts depends to a large extent on the duration of the high en­ ergy (see Table I-6-1; Book III, Chapter 5 has some details).

The right and left ears are the first organs of the audi­

tory system to receive vibrational frequencies. Sound waves

340,000 (Thompson, 1993, p. 255). Auditory systems also

impact on their two tympanic membranes (eardrums) to set them into vibrational motions that "mirror" the spatial and time properties of the sound waves. The auditory system is so potentially sensitive that movement of the tympanic membrane of less than one-tenth of the diameter of a hydrogen atom can result in auditory transmission

categorize the distance a sound travels and the location of

(outside conscious awareness) (Thompson, 1993, p. 255).

Within auditory environments, auditory systems are capable of categorizing the same number of items of vibrational frequency-intensity as visual systems—about

its source by comparing the timing of sound wave recep­

The vibrational motions of the tympanic membrane

tion by the two eardrums. Auditory systems are capable

are transduced through each ear's three middle ear bones

of detecting the time intervals between two received sounds

and into its cochlea. Standing-fluid waves are then cre­

on the order of microseconds (millionths of seconds, but

ated in the cochlear fluid which causes the basilar mem­ brane to "mirror" the vibratory characteristics of the stand­ ing-fluid waves (see Figure I-6-3A). That selective mem­ brane movement stimulates movement of corresponding

these perceptions are below the threshold of conscious awareness).

sensory stereocilia (commonly referred to as hair cells). The

movement of the hair cells triggers action potentials in cor­ responding neurons of each ear's cochlear nerve. The cochlear nerve is a collection of about 28,000 neuronal axons. The stimulated axons transmit impulses to their cell bodies that form the right and left cochlear nuclear com-

Figure I-6-3:

(A-left) Snapshots of the peripheral auditory system.

(B-above)

Simplified drawing of auditory processing in the central nervous system. [Gross ear anatomy From Neuroscience of Communication, (1st Ed.), by D.B. Webster ©1995. Reprinted with permission of Delmar, a division of Thomson

Learning, FAX 800-730-2215.] [Other drawings from The Brain, (2nd Ed.) by

Thomson. Copyright ©1993, W.H.

Freeman and Company.

Used with

permission.]

sensory

experiences

79

ditory cortex, the final area of processing occurs in the

right and left medial geniculate nuclei of the thalamus. So, just as is true of the visual system, considerable ad­ vanced refinement of auditory processing occurs before auditory signals reach the primary auditory cortex. Auditory projections from the thalamus travel through the internal and external capsules to synapse with the pri­

mary auditory cortex (Al). The right and left primary auditory cortices are located in the upper rear areas of the two temporal lobes. They cannot be seen on the outside surface of the brain because they are located inside the Sylvian fissure on the gyrus of Heschl (see Figure I-6-4). To the rear of the primary auditory cortex is the planum Figure I-6-4:

Left hemisphere view of the auditory cortex located on the gyrus

of Heschl, and the planum temporal extending rearward.

(From Assessment

and Management of Central Auditory Processing Disorders in the Educational Setting (1st Ed.), by T.J. Bellis, ©1996. Reprinted with permission of Delmar, a division of Thomson Learning, FAX 800-730-2215.]

plex, located at the junction where the brainstem's medulla

oblongata and pons are joined with the cerebellum (see Figure I-6-3B). Most of the neurons that project from the

two cochlear nerves cross to opposite sides of the brainstem where they synapse with the opposite-side superior olive. Many cochlear nerve neurons, however, do project to the

superior olive on the same side. Hair cells in each cochlea start firing only when they are stimulated by frequency-specific movements in the basi­

lar membrane. Each cochlear nerve neuron, therefore, fires in response to tones of a specific frequency At every nuclear synaptic processing level of the entire auditory system this precisely organized tonotopic mapping of auditory sig­ nals occurs, including the primary auditory cortex. From the left and right cochlear nuclei, neuron tracts

travel to the nuclei of the left and right superior olivary complex located in the pons of the brainstem (see Figure I6-3B). The superior olivary complexes substantially con­ tribute to the processing of time differences in the recep­ tion of sound—a crucial factor in identifying the location of a received environmental sound source (sound localiza­

tion; Konishi, 1993). These neuron groups are capable of discriminating time differences that are measured in mi­ croseconds (millionths of a second). Six neuron tracts leave the superior olivary complex and travel upward to nuclei that are named the inferior colliculi, located at the top of the midbrain. Before finally projecting to the primary au­

temporal which is larger in the left hemisphere than the right, but is particularly large in people who have devel­ oped the ability to label pitches with absolute accuracycalled absolute or perfect pitch (Ward, 1999; Schlaug, et al., 1995). Considerable processing occurs in Al, and from there, the signals are sent to over six higher-order auditory asso­ ciation cortices (A2, A3, A4, and so on), which then inte­ grate with other senses in the parietal-temporal-occipital asso­ ciation cortices (visual and somatosensory) and with valueemotive processing in the limbic association cortices and the prefrontal association cortices. Most of the extended auditory areas of the left hemisphere are intimately involved in processing language sounds. Wernicke's area is the area that interprets the more literal language sounds and for­ mulates a relevant verbal response before transmission to Broca's area for motor planning. The right hemisphere's equivalent of Wernicke's area processes such global fea­ tures of sound as qualities (timbre) and frequency con­ tours such as the prosodic aspects of heard language and melodic designs in music (Book III, Chapter 6 has more information). When language is being processed, the auditory sig­ nals that project from the ears to the same-side auditory

cortex are suppressed. In other words, the right hemisphere language processing areas only receive the auditory sig­ nals that have been projected from the left ear, and the left hemisphere language processing areas only receive the au­ ditory signals that have been projected from the right ear (Musiek, et al., 1994, p. 179). The two hemispheric lan­ guage perception and processing areas reentrantly share what they have processed through the corpus callosum.

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Figure I-6-5 (immediate right): Specific spinal sensory nerves provide innervation

to relatively specific skin areas called dermatomes. The spinal nerves are designated by the vertebrae from which they extend. C = cervical, T = thoracic,

L = lumbar, and S = sacral. [From Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell (Eds.), (©1991),

Principles of Neural Science (3rd Ed.), published by Appleton & Lange.

Reproduced with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies.]

Figure I-6-6: The somatosensory homunculus. The figure is laid upon a cross section of

the primary somatosensory cortex, and the proportional anatomical drawings and

separated lines indicate approximately the extent of cerebral cortex devoted to the various organs represented. [From The Cerebral Cortex OfMan by Wilder Penfield and

Theodore Rasmussen, copyright ©1950, Macmillan Publishing Company. Reprinted by

permission of The Gale Group.]

Convergence zones within the prefrontal association and the parietal-temporal-occipital association cortices can integrate simultaneous and near simultaneous processes

Figure I-6-7: Major pathway that transmits proprioceptive and tactile sensation from

the body's periphery to the primary sensory cortex. [From: THE BRAIN, 2nd Ed., by

Thompson. Copyright ©1993, W.H. Freeman and Company. Used with permission.]

sensory

experiences

81

within widely dispersed areas of the cortex to produce in­ tegrated visual, auditory, somatosensory, and motor func­

tioning for speech (Damasio, 1989a; Damasio & Damasio, 1994; Webster, 1995, pp. 262-264). There actually are excitatory and inhibitory efferent pro­

jections from the auditory cortex to the cochlea that paral­ lel the circuitry of the afferent system. It has not been fully studied as yet, but there is evidence that it participates in detecting particular sound characteristics from within an

array of sound characteristics (Noback, 1985). One hy­ pothesis is that the efferent neurons help focus the audi­ tory system on detailed aspects of the auditory environ­ ment, much like the fovea does in the visual system (Musiek, 1986). Efferent neurons suppress signaling from neurons that relay frequencies that are less significant than the ones on which attention is focused.

Between the relay stations of the CNS auditory system, there are numerous parallel reentrant pathways to and from many brain areas including the brainstem (ascending re­ ticular activating system, for example), the limbic system (amygdala, hypothalamus-pituitary complex, hippocam­ pus), the autonomic nervous system, the visual and so­ matic sensory systems, and the motor systems of the body ( cerebellum, basal ganglia, motor cortex). These reentrant interfacings connect the auditory system with the brain areas that instantiate emotional reactions and the encoding and consolidation of auditory memory and learning (Edeline

primarily through the vagus cranial nerve. Pressure sensi­ tive receptors in the skin initiate tactile exteroceptive sen­ sation. Tactile sensation from relatively specific body sur­ face areas—dermatomes—is processed through very specific spinal nerves (see Figure I-6-5). The sensory interneurons that then arise within the spinal cord and connect through the brainstem and thalamus, are all

somatotopically primary sensory

mappedally mapped, including the cortexsensory cortex (see Figure I-6-6). Sensation for touch, deep pressure, two-point touch

discrimination, vibration, and consciously sensed body sensations from the right side of the body, enter the right side of the spinal column. They synapse there with neu­ ron groups that send long transmitting axons up the right side of the spinal column to synapse with the right gracile nucleus of the brainstem. The neurons that they synapse with then project axons to the left side of the brainstem and they then travel up to the ventrobasal nucleus of the

left thalamus where they synapse with neuron groups that

send axons to the left primary sensory cortex (SI). So­ matosensory signals from the left side of the body follow a course that is the reverse of the one followed by right-side signaling (in Chapter 3, see Figure I-3-15). The two S1s are located immediately behind the central sulcus of each hemi­ sphere, at the front of the parietal lobe (Chapter 3, Fig. I-3-14). The somatosensory system also includes the fast and slow pain transmission systems, with specialized neurons

& Weinberger, 1993; McGaugh, 2000).

to carry those processes out, and analgesic processes to modulate pain transmission and perception (Thompson,

The Somatic (Bodily) Sense Sensations from the skin, muscles, ligaments, tendons, and the visceral organs of the body are processed through the somatosensory system of the CNS. Spinal nerves of the peripheral nervous system deliver signals from nearly all of the body—specifically, from the back of the head and upper neck all the way down to the toes. These signals are delivered to the spinal cord for transmission to the brain. Cranial nerves of the peripheral nervous system deliver signals from the face and scalp, and from the visceral or­ gans within the body's torso, directly to the brainstem. Proprioceptive sensation is triggered by stimulation of various receptors in muscles, ligaments, and tendons. In­ teroceptive sensation is initiated by sensory receptors that are imbedded in the visceral organs and project to the CNS

pp. 159-163; Jessell & Kelly, 1991). There are numerous

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parallel reentrant pathways to and from the somatosen­ sory system. There is direct and indirect signaling with the

brainstem's reticular formation, the limbic system, and, of course, there is extensive interfacing with all motor areas. Synesthesia There are a very few people whose parietal-occipital-

temporal association areas are so extensively and unusu­ ally interfaced that stimulation of one sensory system trig­ gers activation of another. For example, some people "see

colors in their mind's eye" when they hear tones, and the colors change as the tones change. The several manifesta­ tions of this phenomenon are referred to as synesthesia (Cytowic, 1989; 1993).

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Health and behavior of children in

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an office interior on mood and performance. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 76(1), 235. Albers, J. (1963). Interaction of Color. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Babbitt, E. (1967). The Principles of Light and Color. Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press.

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The Timing of Biological Clocks.

sensory

New York: Scientific

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chapter 7

internal processing of life experiences and behavioral expression Leon Thurman

the evidence is in yet, because the neuropsychobiology of human beings is so vastly complex. But there are more sciously aware of ourselves and our sur­ than enough valid and reliable scientific findings to build roundings? What happens inside of us that pro­ duces what we refer to as perceiving, thinking, feeling,cogent curi­ theories about how biological processes produce consciousness (Crick, 1990, 1994; Damasio, 1994, 1995, 1999; osity, learning, remembering, interpreting, understanding, rea­ Edelman, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992; Edelman & Tononi, 2000; soning, deciding, intending, expecting, and purposeful be­ ow do we human beings become con­

H

havior? The longest-held explanation is that a nonphysical

"something" is in us that produces consciousness. We com­ monly use such terms as mind or mental processes, and cogni­ tion or thinking or sentience as labels for that "something" (see Chapter 1). Since the emergence of a science of psychology, we have used the terms psyche or psychological phenomena as substitutes for mind and mental processes. In recent decades, an astonishingly different explana­

tion for consciousness has been assembled: Just like photo­

synthesis is an adaptive biological feature of plant life, so conscious­ ness and intentionality are adaptive biological features of human life. The two processes differ vastly in their complexity, of course, and that is part of the reason why photosynthesis will never

produce consciousness and intentionality. How can physical, biological "stuff" possibly produce consciousness, intentionality, and sentience? That is a big question that necessitates a big answer, and this chapter is not going to answer it in very much detail. Life scientists, however, have amassed considerable evidence that this explanation is so. Of course, not all of

86 bodymind & voice

Fuster, 1996; Gazzaniga, 1985, 1988, 1992; Searle, 1992, 1998). These theories are now being tested and adjusted by ongo­ ing worldwide research.

We human beings cannot consciously sense the de­ tailed electro-physio-chemical functioning of our own ner­

vous system's vast neuron networks (briefly summarized

in Chapter 3). And we cannot sense the interactions of our own endocrine system's vast hormonal processes, nor the details of our immune system's vast protective functions (briefly summarized in Chapters 4 and 5). So, not being able to observe the details of neural, endocrine, and im­ mune processing, human beings made sense of (interpreted) their integrated neuropsychobiological experiences and con­ cluded that a nonphysical mind inhabits the body and di­ rects its behavior. Under those circumstances, it was a logi­ cal assumption. That version of mind has turned out to be an inaccurate sunset assumption (explained in the Fore­ Words). Psyche, and the scientific study of it, psychology, was substituted for mind in the 19th century. The behavior of

the body became totally "mindless" in the early 20th cen­ tury behaviorist school of psychology.

Thus, a categorical shift is occurring in what the terms

Studying human cognition as though it was discon­

mind and psyche refer to. According to neuropsychobiological scientists, what we refer to as minds, mental processes, psyche, and psychological phenomena are the streaming unitary "final products", the summated results of uncountable patterned (and some random) electro-physio-chemical events that oc­ cur inside human bodies, particularly in the brain (intro­

nected from human nervous, endocrine, and immune sys­

duced in Chapter 2; more details in Chapters 3 through 6; Tononi & Edelman, 1998; Edelman & Tononi, 2000). Nu­

merous anatomical areas, and hyperastronomical numbers of electro-physio-chemical processes, are both parceled and integrated in a jungle-like mix of vastly complex hierarchi­ cal, branched, and parallel interconnections.

These

processings produce what we refer to generally as mind or

consciousness, that is, perceptions, feeling states, conceptions,

images, reasoning, linguistic labels and interpretative de­ scriptions, and coordinated purposeful movements. These massive internal resources provide innate ca­

pabilities or potentials for adaptation to the surrounding world

that include (1) fluctuations within the internal processing, and (2) the external expression ofthe adaptations (purposeful behavior). Abilities are the complex, actualized adapta­ tions. Two adaptive human abilities are languages and math­ ematics. They are primary symbolic means by which the interactions with, and accumulated adaptations to, people, places, things, and events may be categorized, labeled, and described. As a result, neuropsychobiological phenomena may be examined and categorized introspectively and la­ beled linguistically. For example, accumulated internal states and learned adaptive behaviors are labeled memory. Other adaptive capabilities-abilities and their linguistic labels are consciousness, conscious awareness, perception, arousal, attention, cog­ nition, intentionality, feelings, emotions, pain, empathy, learning, nonverbal communication, behavior, and immunity. When the study of mind was reintroduced in the mid20th century, however, many of its cognitive science inter­ preters created theoretical "cognitive structures and devices", and ignored the biological "stuff" that produces so-called

mental phenomena in the first place (Chapter 1 has a brief

review).

Inferring "cognitive structures or devices" from

sensed or reported mental phenomena and observable be­ havior would be like being ignorant of television produc­

tion and electronic processes, yet analyzing the images that appear on the screen and inferring how they got there.

tems risks making inaccurate sunset assumptions and part-el­ ephant perceptions that can lead to scientific invalidities (those terms are defined in the Fore-Words). If significant courses of action are decided, say, in education, and the actions are based on inaccurate assumptions and partial perceptions about cognition, might some unfortunate consequences be likely for human beings? The controversy over the best method for learning reading skills, phonics or whole language, is an example (see Shaywitz, 1996). So, if consciously perceived introspective evidence of bodymind internal processing provides only partial evi­ dence of "who we are", then what means have

neuropsychobiological scientists devised to gather more complete and accurate evidence about such processings, and how is the evidence gathered? There are numerous methods and technologies for gathering the data. All ofthe methods cannot be presented in this chapter-just a few. 1. Measures of regional or local cerebral blood flow (rCBF and 1CBF) can be accomplished in several ways. Positron emission tomography (PET) (Chugani, 1994; Courchesne, 1991; Kandel, 1991, p. 313). takes advantage of the fact that when any brain area is functioning, the capil­ laries that supply that area dilate and blood flow is in­

creased to provide metabolic support. The more intensely the brain area is engaged, the more the blood flow is in­ creased. Before a PET scanning, subjects have been schooled into consciously focusing on a particular internal process­ ing task, such as listening to spoken words, speaking words aloud, observing pictures of human faces, or remembering a particular event. To accomplish PET scanning, human subjects are in­ jected with glucose that contains safe, trace amounts of positron-creating isotopes that remain active in the body

only for a few hours. When the positrons collide with

electrons, gamma rays are emitted. The greater the blood supply to a brain area, the greater the number of delivered isotopes, the more dense the gamma ray emissions become. The heads of subjects are surrounded by a computer-con­ nected, gamma ray-sensitive camera and it "reads" the loca­ tion and relative density of gamma ray emissions into a computer while the subjects are accomplishing the task. The computer's software translates the location and relative in­ internal

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tensity of gamma ray release onto an image of the subjects'

vertical or horizontal plane images of any part of the brain

brains. Relative density of the emissions is color coded by the computer, videotapes are made for review study and prints can be made of a specific image at any point in time. The images reveal which areas of the brain are active and which are not active during a given task, and which areas

(Purves, et al., 1997, p. 33).

Quantified electroencephalography (qEEG) is also referred to as brain electrical activity mapping (BEAM) (Duffy, 1994). This procedure takes advantage of the fact that, when a particular cortical region is activated, the num­

are more intensely involved compared to others.

ber and intensity of electrical impulses in its neurons in­

2. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a form of MRI (Kandel, 1991, p. 317). MRI imaging takes

crease (action potentials; see Chapter 3). The average intensity of electrical activity is greater, therefore, in cortical areas that are engaged in cognitive processing. Specially constructed head caps, containing many specifically located electrodes, are placed on subjects' scalps. Lead wires connect each electrode to equipment that amplifies the received electrical activity and converts it into a visual display. Computer software automatically and proportionately performs a sta­ tistical analysis of the comparative intensity of electronic signals over the cerebral cortex so that a global electrophysi­ ological mapping can be derived. When one type of cognitive task is performed by a subject, the cortical areas that are activated increase their electrical activity and the qEEG equipment records it. When the cognitive task is changed from one to another, a differ­ ent profile of cortical activation is recorded by the equip­ ment. qEEG is less precise than PET or fMRI, but by re­

advantage of the fact that human tissue contains many water molecules that include hydrogen atoms. The nuclei of hy­ drogen atoms respond to a particular type of magnetic field by behaving like spinning magnets that align themselves along the direction of the applied magnetic field. When a brief pulse of radio waves are projected onto the spinning nuclei, they absorb it and are tipped away from their mag­ netic field alignment. After the pulse, they return to their alignment with the imposed magnetic field, and when they do, they release the radio wave energy. The process is called nuclear magnetic resonance. To accomplish MRI, magnetic fields of different strengths are simultaneously applied and the emitted radio wave pulses return at different frequen­ cies. A device receives the emitted radio wave frequencies, and computer software translates the relative frequency dif­ ferences into an image of the subjects' brains. The location and relative density of the radio waves are color coded for photographic reproduction. Images of whole body areas can be generated, as well as images of "slices", through any vertical or horizontal plane of the body, including the brain. fMRI produces the same images as MRI, but in addi­ tion, it measures local and regional blood flow volumes like PET does. The functional part of fMRI takes advantage of the fact that (1) the blood that flows to functioning brain areas is oxygen-rich, and (2) oxygen-carrying blood hemo­ globin produces a different magnetic resonance than oxy-

gen-depleted blood hemoglobin. The device that receives the emitted radio waves is calibrated to receive these reso­ nance signals and the computer software also is adjusted to these circumstances. fMRI uses the body's own physio chemical processes and involves, therefore, no inva­ sive injection of isotopes. Observations may be repeated with the same subject in the same session with no medi­ cally necessary time constraints. fMRI also can produce

3.

cording and comparing qEEG readings in the same people over significant portions of their life spans, developmental trends in global neurophysiological functioning have been charted (Thatcher, 1994). A more detailed extension of qEEG measures is the

recording of evoked potentials (EPs) (Duffy, 1994; Tho­ mas & Crow, 1994) and event-related potentials (ERPs) (Courchesne, 1991; Nelson, 1994). When particular cortical

areas are processing a discrete cognitive task, such as recog­ nizing a familiar face, electrical activity in those cortical parts is more intense than it was before the task began. Recorded EPs and ERPs measure those differences (Vaughan & Kurtzberg, 1992). These methods have been particularly

helpful in the study of infants, young children, and adoles­ cents. For instance, ERP studies have gathered useful data in the study of speech discrimination and recognition, early word meaning, attention, and recognition memory in in­ fants (Nelson, 1994). 4. The standards for human subject research are such that certain types of anatomic and physiologic studies can­

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not be performed. Most of those types of studies can be performed on animals, usually with humane safeguards relative to pain and discomfort The bodymind systems of nonhuman mammals share many similarities with human bodymind systems, especially in certain primates such as various types of monkeys. So, in many cases, animal studies provide as-close-as-possible information about the anatomy and physiology of human bodyminds. One revealing type of neurophysiological study of animals involves the recording of electrical activity within single neurons that are located within a defined area of an animal's cerebral cortex. The recordings are made within areas of the brain that are suspected to be involved in a cognitive task that the animal has been pretrained to carry out during the recording. Brain tissue cannot be sensed in any way by any animal (or any human), so, under local

anesthesia, a small surgical opening is made in an experi­ mental animal's skull. The opening is then capped and the tissues around the cap are allowed to heal. For the experi­ ment, the skull opening is uncapped, and extremely thin micro electro des are progressively passed through the brain tissue, one micrometer at a time, until each of their tips has entered a single neuron that is located within the brain area to be studied. The electrodes are connected to a series of amplifiers and electrical signal recording equipment so that the electrical activity of the neuron can be recorded. Its firing patterns can then be correlated with a particular sen­ sory, motor, or internal cognition task (Brothers, 1997, p. 33). ERPs in single neurons is one form of data that these studies can gather.

5. Detailed comparative studies of people with nor­ mal and unavoidably abnormal brains have been car­

ried out. Unavoidably abnormal human brains include (1)

people with congenital malformations of the nervous sys­

tem, (2) people who have had accidental changes in their brain anatomy and physiology (Damasio, 1994, pp. 3-33), and (3) people who have undergone necessary surgical al­ terations of brain anatomy and physiology in order to con­ tinue life or to assume a relatively normal life (Damasio, 1994, pp. 34-51; Gazzaniga, 1985). For example, some people who have severe epileptic seizures undergo neurosurgery to sever the corpus callosum so that the two cerebral hemi­ spheres are almost completely unable to communicate with each other. Research with so-called "split-brain" patients

has revealed fascinating findings about how the two hemi­ spheres process perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categorizations and behavior (explained later). As a result of accidents or necessary neurosurgery, some people have had parts of their brains removed. When primary memory processing areas of their brains have been removed, their ability to form recent and long-term memories is destroyed

(Squire, 1992; Zola-Morgan & Squire, 1993). People who have had parts of their frontal lobes removed no longer have the ability to integrate perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categorizations, and, therefore, they make deci­ sions that are not in their own best interests and they make inappropriate social judgments (Adolphs, et al., 1995). 6. A vast wealth of research in the psychological and psychiatric sciences has been correlated with the re­ sults of accumulated brain research in order to link global brain functions with psychological phenomena and behav­ ioral functions. Many ingenious approaches have been de­ vised to study perceived psychological states and psycho­ physiological processes that occur during what we refer to as explicit and implicit memory, normal and abnormal af­ fective states (feelings and emotions), cognition, and behav­ ioral change processes, and so on. Schizophrenia is a well known "mental disease" that has many behavioral manifes­ tations. Non-schizophrenic people might describe some schizophrenic behaviors as odd, but would describe other such behaviors as exceedingly bizarre. But schizophrenia occurs because of imbalances between various neurotrans­ mitters and the number of available receptor sites in one or more areas within the brain (the prefrontal cortex is a ma­ jor area). People with depression, autism, and those with true attention deficit disorder (ADD) or attention deficit hyperactive disor­ der (ADHD) also have brain abnormalities that produce behavioral manifestations. Medications have been devised to modify or normalize these imbalances. The concept of bodymind is an attempt to ensymbol

the unity of the physical processes that produce the concur­ rent psychological phenomena that all human beings expe­ rience. Describing the current known details of how physi­ cal biological processes are likely to produce consciousness and intentionality requires volumes. For instance, Edelman (1987, 1988, 1989) required three volumes to outline his bio­ logical theory of consciousness; the book Principles of Neural internal

processing

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Science, edited and partly written by Kandel, Jessell, and

Schwartz (1991), has 1,060 pages, and The Cognitive Neurosciences, edited by Gazzaniga (1995), uses 1,400 pages. So, this chapter is just one very brief and highly simplified sam­ pling of such details.

Internal Processing and Behavioral expression

tions and conceptions, and they certainly cannot express past experiences in a symbolic way. They are tied to a succession of events in real time. The brain systems that produce higher order con­ sciousness (Edelman, 1989, pp. 91-105) are integrated with the systems that produce primary consciousness. Together, they can produce vast numbers of sensory perception cat­ egories, value-emotive or significance categories, and com­ plex interrelational categories, including distinctions and

According to Gazzaniga (1998a, p. 21), about 98°/o of our internal processing occurs outside of conscious aware­ ness, including the details of our physical coordinations. In spite of that fact, the macro-organization of the central ner­

vous system (CNS) can be interpreted in such a way that

two highly interactive forms of consciousness are produced. These interpretations are supported, in part, by psychologi­ cal research with normal and abnormal people, and by re­ search with brain injured people. According to Nobel Lau­ reate neuroscientist Gerald Edelman (1989, pp. 91-105), the internal bodymind processing that produces primary con­ sciousness usually results in appetitive, consummatory, arousal, attentive, reproductive, and protective behavior patterns. These internal processings and resulting behavior patterns tend to be activated in fairly predictable ways. When considered by themselves, with no cerebral in­ fluences, the macro-anatomical brain areas that produce those behavior patterns include the spinal cord, the essen­ tial sensory modalities, brainstem, cerebellum, and various areas of the limbic system (see Chapter 3 for more details).

Their circuits are arranged in loops and respond in time frames from seconds to months (as nervous systems go, a several-second time frame is slow). These central neural systems do not contain detailed, mapped structures, and in fact, they are interfaced almost exclusively with interior sys­ tems of the brain and body. Essentially, all of the process­ ing is automatic and outside conscious awareness. The primary consciousness systems are not capable of processing vast amounts of unanticipated sensory signals from the outside world, and when they are overloaded with sensory input, protective behavior patterns are triggered. They can construct conscious visual, auditory, and somatic "representations" of immediately perceived surroundings; they can form recognition memories and simpler concepts; but they cannot regenerate internal images of past percep­

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relationships between socially-based self and nonself, a modeling of the world in terms of a past and future, and all forms of cognition and affect. They can trigger large num­ bers of highly refined motor output signals and are exten­ sively interlinked with the body's sensory modalities. These neural systems also form these processings into short- and long-term memories. The capacities of human higher order

consciousness are so vast that long developmental critical periods are necessary (some lasting into late adolescence and early adulthood) in order to select extensive neuronal and synaptic repertoires that optimize complex survival and social abilities. Higher order processes also have symboling capa­ bilities that enable categorizations of, interactions with, and accumulated adaptations to, "the world". Symboling capa­ bility is highly interconnected with sensory perception, re­ lational conception, memory, and action-reaction capabili­ ties. People who share the same symbolic heritages, such as

spoken, signed, and/or written language, mathematics, mu­ sic, dance, space-shaping, story, reenactment, ritual, and so on, have "embrained" knowledge-ability clusters that en­ able expression of unique and shared "as-if" human feeling states (explained in Chapter 8). The brain systems that produce higher order capaci­

ties are organized into detailed, extensively mapped struc­ tures. They include the phenomenally complex neocortex and a large number of subcortical systems such as the thala­ mus and the basal ganglia. Those systems include highly detailed sensorimotor maps, they share massive reentrant interconnections, operate at very high speeds from about one millisecond up to a few seconds, and are richly inter­ connected with the spinal cord-brainstem-cerebellum-limbic system areas that produce primary consciousness. The vast, highly integrated processing of the paired primary and

higher order systems:

1. produces the summated, integrated, unitary, final­

product "representations" of external, nonself surroundings, and of the internal self-milieu, that form what we refer to as conscious awareness, and includes recalled past experi­ ences, denotative symbolic references, plans for the future, and initiating motor skills for purposeful behavior; and 2. produces the summated, integrated, unitary, final­

product "representations" of significance evaluations that are potentially available to conscious awareness but most commonly are outside conscious awareness, and includes what we refer to consciously as impressions, "feelings of know­ ing", familiarity, intuition, hunches, "feels right" or does not, social judgment, empathy, compassion, affect-based symbolic expression, and so on.

to act-react intentionally and purposefully. These classifi­ cation coupling patterns are what bodyminds are born to do. Global neuron network action patterns are in a con­ tinuous flux of elaboration in response to ongoing experi­ ences. They do not function independently of other neural networks but in conjunction with them. Categorizing them in language-bound or mathematics-bound conceptual cat­ egories can be valuable in making sense of their anatomy and function. But there are risks in doing so. The language labels can lead to misperceptions that certain networks are

In human beings, these vast processing capacities are estimated to generate electro-physio-chemical operations in the range of 10 followed by millions of zeros (Edelman, 1992, p. 17; Chapter 2 has a snapshot review of the process­

ing capacities of human bodyminds). The specific "design" of each human bodymind is based on (1) unique genetic ex­ pression, (2) unique epigenetic formation during prenatal gestation and postnatal growth, and (3) unique interactions with the people, places, things, and events that each

bodymind encounters and responds to.

"The forms of embodiment that lead to consciousness are unique in each individual, unique to his or her body and individual his­ tory..." and in essence are "...beyond scientific reach" (Edelman, 1992, p. 136)

Introduction to Perceptual, Value-Emotive, and Conceptual Categorizations As indicated in Chapters 3 and 6, collected networks of specialized neurons in the brain respond to sensory re­ ception in a classification coupling manner (see Figure I-7-

1). Highly complex categorical processing patterns are thus initiated within and between neuron groups. Sensory cat­ egory processing maps (neuron networks) are reentrantly integrated with other category processing neuron networks

such as those that process threat-benefit categories (valueemotive categories) and interrelated discrimination catego­ ries (conceptual categories). Those networks are integrated with collected neural networks that can produce tendencies

Figure I-7-1: A highly schematic diagram of some of the properties of neuronal groups and their classification connectivities. Five groups are represented with a few of their cells indicated (neurons). Group 1 illustrates that each cell contacts cells in its own group and in other groups. Group 2 illustrates the dense connectivity between cells within each group. Group 3 illustrates that each group also receives inputs from a set of overlapped extrinsic inputs that can be selectively stimulated. Group 4 shows that each cell thus receives inputs from cells in its own group, from cells in other groups, and from extrinsic sources. These representations are highly schematic—groups differ in size (ranging perhaps from 50 to 10,000 or more neurons) and in actual connectivity, as determined by the local neuroanatomy of the areas in which they are found. The connectivity routings are activated differentially to produce neuron and neuron group couplings that reflect features of the external world or the body's internal milieu. [From THE REMEMBERED PRESENT by G.F. EDELMAN. Copyright ©1989 by Basic Books, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Basic Books, a member of Perseus Books, L.L.C.]

internal

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functionally isolated, and that can lead to sunset assumptions

cialized receptors within the nasal cavity, and smell catego­

and part-elephant perceptions that are detrimental to human

rizations are created such as pungent and fragrant. The gus­

beings. Example: For many centuries, the medical com­ munity assumed that newborn babies did not perceive pain,

tatory system detects and correlates features of object-borne chemicals that attach to specialized receptors that are lo­ cated on the tongue's surface. Taste categorizations such as

and therefore, anesthesia was not necessary when circum­ cision was performed on male babies. Three language-labeled conceptual categories of in­ ternal bodymind processing are: (1) perceptual categorization, (2) value-emotive categorization, and (3) conceptual categorization (Craig, 1986; Edelman, 1989; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Taylor, 1989). The following paragraphs present a brief introduction to each of the categorization processes. Perceptual categorizations. When we human beings encounter the people, places, things, and events of our lives, our bodyminds change their internal electro-physio-chemi­ cal processing. For instance, the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and somatosensory neural networks are differ­

entially activated by variations in the forms of energy to which they are responsive (Chapter 6 has some details). Perceptual categorizations are based on which neurons have been activated and how intensely. Such nervous system processing can involve billions of neurons that are orga­ nized into millions of neuron groups (networks) and each group may be made up of hundreds of thousands of local circuits and micro circuits. Neurons of the visual system are organized in a topo­ graphic fashion so that particular neurons are responsive only to specific features of visual scenes such as a particular range of electromagnetic frequencies (colors). Neurons of the auditory system are organized in a tonotopic fashion so that particular neurons are responsive only to specific fre­ quencies within an acoustic environment. Neurons of the somatosensory system are organized in a somatotopic fash­ ion so that only particular neurons report certain types of

sweet, salty, and hitter are thus created. The vestibular system detects and correlates features of body position in relation to gravity and environmental topography. Balance categorizations are created such as stability and instability. The somatosensory system detects

and correlates many features of the external environment when they impact on the external or internal skin, such as the touch of other human beings. The somatic system also detects and correlates global features of the body's internal milieu such as changes in muscle contraction and stretch, heartbeat, blood pressure, intestinal "pressure", and air pres­ sure in the lungs, larynx, and vocal tract. Some sensed internal body-state changes are brought about by neuroen­ docrine and immune system functions, such as the sensa­ tions that higher order language areas have labeled as hun­ ger, thirst, satiety, temperature change, feelings, emotions, malaise, anxiety and pain. Correlative processing creates differential classification couplings within the circuits, resulting in categories of per­ ception within each sense (borders, movement; frequency, intensity; weight, force, surface texture). We may see some­

thing that also produces sounds and sensations, of course, so all three sensory modalities are globally integrated in the brain's association areas. Simpler forms of generalization can be performed by these processes so that salient features of people, places, things, and events are compared and placed

sensations that occur in certain parts of the body, such as movement of the skin (tactile sense) and contraction of muscles (kinetic sense), for example. The visual system detects and correlates many fea­ tures of the external environment such as borders, dimen­ sions, shapes, colors, movement, and contextual location. The auditory system detects and correlates many features of the sound environment such as frequency, intensity, tim­

in broad classes, with or without conscious awareness. These categorizations occur before higher order linguistic labels are assigned or activated. The wide variety of people, places, things, and events, for instance, are categorized and gener­ alized by observers according to their various feature pat­ terns. People may be perceptually categorized and general­ ized according to physical features of their bodies, such as general body borders, color, posture, and movement char­ acteristics; facial design and movement; detected scents; quality of physical contact; pitch, volume, quality, and

bre, and spatial location. The olfactory system detects and

durational characteristics of voice and speech, and so forth.

correlates features of airborne chemicals that attach to spe­

Places may be categorized and generalized according to

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immediate geographic location, area landscape, building design characteristics, visual, auditory, and olfactory char­

reentrant neural connections with all other brain areas, and with the rest of the body through physical innervation and

acteristics of space(s) within a building, and so forth. Things may be categorized and generalized according to character­ istic shapes, colors, nature of movement, felt texture, scents, tastes, and sounds (when applicable), such as chairs, lamps, automobiles, newspapers, books, computers, tables, flow­ ers, eating utensils, foods, clothing, child toys, and so forth. Episodic events may be categorized and generalized ac­ cording to the sights, sounds, and sensations that are corre­ lated with the passage of time. Events include such experi­ ences as mutual gaze with smiling mother, crawling, walk­ ing, riding a tricycle, driving a car, having an argument with a friend, studying for an exam, job interview, teaching a class, observing a concert, getting married, conceiving and

through the patterned, highly elaborate, ever-changing dis­ tribution of modulatory transmitter molecules and their

receptors. These bodywide interfacings include various ar­

eas of the right and left frontal lobes (purposeful behavior),

the amygdalae (feeling states), the hippocampal areas (for­ mation and recall of conscious memories), the autonomic nervous system (major part of the emotional motor sys­ tem), the endocrine system (metabolism, feeling states), and the immune system (health). The point: All organs and systems of whole bodyminds can

be stimulated or inhibited, to some extent, by the processing of value-

birthing a child, and so forth. Edelman (1989, pp. 49, 50) refers to these processes as perceptual categorizations. Various forms of environmental energy are transduced into sensory nervous system pro­ cessing (see Chapter 6). These categorizations precede valueemotive and conceptual categorization by milliseconds of time. Neuron groups and networks that process each sepa­ rate sensory modality are connected by reentry with the other sensory modality networks. Those sensory modali­

emotive categorizations (Swanson & Mogenson, 1981; Blalock, et al., 1985; Pert, et al., 1985; Price, 1987; Edelman, 1989, pp. 91-100, 151-153, 166-168; Rogers & Hermann, 1992; Rolls, 1995). These internal processing areas produce continuously evolving homeostatic internal states in whole bodyminds that are perceived by interoceptive, and sometimes prop­ rioceptive, sensory networks. Sensory nerves within the right and left cranial nerve X (vagus) are the primary sources of interoceptive sensation in the internal torso (Porges, 1991; Rogers & Hermann, 1992). Branched sensory innervation

ties can be activated separately or together and may result

of the torso is not as elaborately extensive as the rich sen­

in neuropsychobiological arousal and attentional focus. In other words, unified but filtered sensory "represen­

sory innervation of the hands, for instance. Homeostatic internal states have been referred to by some psychologists

tations" of people, places, things, and events can be "con­

as mood (Farrell, et al., 1987; Thayer, 1989), and by some

structed", "reconstructed", and "displayed" in conscious aware­ ness. The actual nervous system operations that eventually produce conscious sensory awareness occur outside con­ scious awareness and without "supervision" from higher

cognitive neuroscientists as background feeling states

(Damasio, 1994, pp. 150-155). Background states are re­ ferred to when people say, "I feel great, today"; "I'm riding a high"; "I'm feeling fair to middling"; "I'm not feeling very

order consciousness. Perceptions that enter conscious aware­

energetic"; or "I'm really feeling lousy". In general, back­

ness, however, are the summated "final products" of mas­

ground states can be described as pleasant or unpleasant.

sive neural network processings, although, again, we are not aware of any of the neuronal processing itself (Bornstein

as the background against which more intense internal

& Pittman, 1992; Gazzaniga, 1998a, p. 21).

bodymind states may be sensed and categorized. When

Value-emotive categorizations. The neural networks that process the visual, auditory, somatosensory, olfactory,

internal body states occur that are more intense than the

gustatory, and vestibular senses share integrated reentrant

connections with the areas of the brain where value-emo­ tive categorizations primarily occur. The major areas of valueemotive processing and their basic functions are listed in Table I-7-1. These areas, in turn, have direct or indirect

All interoceptive, homeostatic state sensations serve

background states, they have been referred to as feeling states or feelings (emotions are described later). When the more intense feeling states occur, their intensity continues for some period of time, after which they tend to diminish

toward or to homeostatic background states.

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Before they are sent to higher order processing areas, both familiar and unfamiliar sights, sounds, and sensations

are routed through the value-emotive categorization areas of the brain for appraisal. At very high speeds (millisec­ onds), the relevant value-emotive areas (led by the two amygdalae, the hippocampal areas, and the orbital prefrontal cortices) assign a threat-benefit value to the sights, sounds, and sensations (Halgren, 1991; LeDoux, 1996, pp. 174-178; also see Chapter 2). That value is based on (1) innate reflex responses that already may have occurred, and/or (2) memory of past experiences that share similar or same fea­

awareness. Those neural network correlations result in summated pleasant or unpleasant, favorable or unfavorable value-emotive categorizations of the sights, sounds, and sensations. When novel, unfamiliar sights-sounds-sensations are perceived, the amygdala-orbitofrontal cortex areas trigger the ascending reticular activating system to tone up the gen­ eral level of neural arousal, and the vigilant attentional sys­ tems also are engaged to produce a conscious focusing of the sensory and cognitive systems on the person, place, thing, or event that is unfamiliar. If the person, place, thing,

tures with current experience, but are outside conscious

Table I-7-1. Major Brain Areas and Functions That Process Value-Emotive Categorizations orbital area of right and left prefrontal cortex (Rolls, 1990, 1995, Brothers, 1995, 1997, pp. 52-55)

processing of threat-benefit significance, emotional motor system, social interaction responsiveness

anterior cingulate cortex of the right and left limbic lobes (Brothers, 1995, 1997, pp. 52-55; Damasio, 1994, pp. 71-73)

processing of threat-benefit significance, emotional motor system, social interaction responsiveness

right and left amygdala (Everitt & Robbins, 1991; Gaffan, 1991;

processing of threat-benefit significance, emotional motor system, social interaction responsiveness; integrated with the orbital area of prefrontal cortex, thalamus, hypothalamus, and various brainstem and cranial nerve nuclei, the periaqueductal gray area and nucleus ambiguus (emotional voicing), the

Rolls, 1995; Brothers, 1995, 1997, pp. 52-55; LeDoux, 1996; Pribram, 1998)

autonomic nervous system

septal area at the base of the forebrain and the medialforebrain bundle, midbrain nucleus accumbens (Nolte, 1993, p. 397; Feldman, et al., 1997, pp. 455-491)

part of the integration of limbic system with the hippocampal areas, the cerebral cortex, various brainstem nuclei of the emotional effector system

hypothalamus-pituitary complex (Rogers and Herman, 1992; Rolls, 1995; LeDoux, 1996)

integrated with thalamus and cerebral cortex, various brainstem and cranial nerve nuclei, the periaqueductal gray area and nucleus ambiguus, the autonomic nervous system, endocrine system,

immune system

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many brainwide neural networks that use acetylcholine, dopamine, epinephrine, norepinephrine, or serotonin as their neurotransmitters (Feldman, et al., 1997, pp. 235-389)

include integrations of areas within the sensory, motor, and limbic systems, endocrine system, immune system; affect functions such as arousal and attention, sleep-wake, feeling states, memory, learning, health

many neural networks in which the opioid neuropeptides modulate neural activity (Blalock, et al., 1985; Feldman, et al.,

participate in modulating perceptual sharpness, intensity of pleasant-unpleasant feeling states, pain analgesia, relative indelibility of memory, and

1997, pp. 455-491; Pert, 1997)

immune system functions

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or event is appraised as not immediately threatening, then

When bodyminds carry out a threat-benefit appraisal

an orienting reaction occurs as either observation of, or interaction with, the unfamiliar element(s) takes place for a

and literal or potential benefit to survival or well being is detected, a bodily physio chemical state of alert eustress occurs (briefly described in Chapter 2). Certain nuclei within those brain areas and networks that are listed in Table I-71 are likely to be activated. Other brain areas also are acti­ vated and, together, they produce a recipe of transmitter molecules in the bodywide endocrine system that, in turn, produces background or feeling states that can be com­ monly categorized on a scale from "pleasant" to "ecstatic". Damasio refers to them as positive body states. Com­ monly, in these states, a range of constructive behavior pat­ terns is facilitated; "...the generation of images is rapid, their diversity wide, and reasoning may be fast though not nec­ essarily efficient.." (Damasio, 1994, p. 147).

brief period of time. At the same time, heart rate and blood pressure increase and respiratory rate increases or decreases, depending on the nature of the experience. EEG changes

also have been recorded in animal and human experimen­ tal subjects (Pribram, 1998). If an unfamiliar person, place, thing, or event is ap­ praised as nonthreatening, but otherwise uninteresting (no benefit), then the orienting reaction will subside after about 3 to 10 encounters (Pribram, 1998). That process is referred to as habituation. Arousal is lowered and attention goes elsewhere. When the amygdalae have been removed or are no longer functioning, then orientation reactions continu­ ally occur adfinitum. If a person, place, thing, or event has been encoun­

tered enough times to become habituated, the orienting re­ action will be reactivated if some of the sights, sounds, or sensations that it presents are rearranged. This reorientation is referred to as the novelty effect. Arousal and attention are reengaged. When familiar (habituated) elements of a visual, auditory, or kinesthetic environment are rearranged, then more and more perceptual and value-emotive catego­ rizations occur. The value-emotive categorizations are very likely to produce physio chemical states of the body that are conceptually categorized as potentially beneficial, pleasantly interesting, or exciting. These bodymind events occur when listening to music because the designs of sounds and si­ lences produce familiarities that are then rearranged in rela­ tively unpredictable ways (Pribram, 1982). When literal or potential threat to safety or well being is detected, then the brain areas that induce arousal and attention go quickly into a state of alert distress (briefly described in Chapters 2 and 4), and a value-emotive cat­ egorization of unpleasantness occurs. Damasio refers to such background and feeling states as negative body states (Damasio, 1994, p. 147). The emotional motor system be­ comes engaged to activate high-speed, reflexive fight-flightfreeze motor responses (Holstege, et al., 1996; LeDoux, 1996), along with a range of learned protective behavior patterns. During distressed internal states, "...the generation of images is slow, their diversity small, and reasoning (is) inefficient..." (Damasio, 1994, p. 147).

When episodic events occur, the limbic system's memory engines (the right and left hippocampal areas) also are acti­ vated by the reentrantly linked networks of perceptual and value-emotive categorization. In other words, the associa­ tion-cortex-linked visual, auditory, and somatosensory "rep­ resentations" of the episode, and the limbic-system-linked somatosensory representations ofthe body's physio chemical state, activate the hippocampal areas. The particular hip­ pocampal neuron networks that are activated can be reac­ tivated if similar perceptual and value-emotive categories are processed in the future. Those neuron networks also are re-triggered when people "imagine" a past experience in the absence ofthe actual experience (Damasio, 1989, 1990b, 1994, pp. 155-158; Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn, et al., 1993, 1999;

Merzenich & deCharms, 1996; see Chapter 3). The scene will be seen, heard, and felt, in some degree of intensity, by "the mind's eyes, ears, and body". As the same or similar networked neuron groups are repeatedly activated, their synaptic connections become stronger. Long-term poten­ tiation occurs in the synaptic connections of those neuron networks (see Chapter 3). That is referred to as episodic memory by neuropsychologists (more later). Each time a person, place, thing, or event is reexperi­ enced, the memory is recategorized, at least to some extent.

Experiences that are the same except for relatively minor differences are likely to result in adjustments to a "same" experience. If an experience is sufficiently unlike a previous related experience, it often will be processed as a new cat­

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egorization or a variant version of a person, place, thing, or

unlike, in-out, up-down, front-back, center-periphery, higher-lower,

event These processes are common when singers are learn­ ing vocal register skills. Regardless, current perceptual cat­ egorizations are always compared with same or similar value-emotive categorizations that have occurred in the past Conceptual categorizations. Children learn spoken language by hearing and seeing people talk, and sensing what others do when they talk, and by hearing and sensing

visible-hidden, rough-smooth, general-specific, simple-detailed, intensemild, part-whole, sequential-whole pattern, moving-still, slower-faster, origin-path-end, nearer-farther, threatening-beneficial, bitter-sweet,fra­ grant-pungent, irritating-soothing, like-dislike (see Edelman, 1989, pp. 140-143). The foundation of self and non-self conceptual catego­ rizations are formed by contrasts between (1) perception of external surroundings and (2) sensation of the body's boundaries and internal physio chemical states, and (3) prop­ rioceptive sensation of the body's movement in space and time (Damasio, 1994, p. 235; Edelman, 1989, pp. 93, 94). Sensations of background feeling states serve as a means by which more intense internal physio chemical states may be perceived and categorized (feeling states). Pre-language infants regularly form internally pro­ cessed conceptual categorizations (Diamond, et al., 1994). Newborn human infants behaviorally demonstrate the de­ velopment of conceptual categorizations when they select recordings of their mothers' voices reading a story or sing­ ing a song that had been read or sung to them many times during the third trimester of prenatal gestation (DeCasper

what they themselves do when they attempt to talk. But no parent or professional educator engages infants in a sequen­ tial curriculum that includes language labels for the sounds of speech (phonemes: vowels, consonants), or the semantic functions of words (nouns, verbs, and so on). Similarly, children learn to sing in the absence of a sequential curricu­ lum that includes language labels for pitches, rhythms, or melodic contours. When perceptual categorizations have occurred within the sensory modalities, and have been correlated with each other and with value-emotive categorizations, then mul­ tiple relational categories are established among an array of neural networks (Edelman, 1989, pp. 140-146,155-159; 1992, pp. 108-110). Areas within the prefrontal association cor­ tex co-activate with areas within the parietal-temporal-occipital association cortex. These areas, especially the pre­ frontal areas, are directly or indirectly interfaced with all other brain areas such as the thalamus, basal ganglia, cer­ ebellum, hypothalamus-pituitary complex, and the limbic system's amygdala, hippocampus, septal area, and so on

(Edelman, 1989, pp. 159-166; Fuster, 1996, pp. 150-184, 209-

252). Interfaced areas within the prefrontal and parietaltemporal-occipital association cortices then globally map some of the brain's earlier categorizations to each other in hierarchical and parallel interconnections. These interrelational categorizations can be referred to as con­ ceptual categorizations. Most conceptual categorizations occur outside con­ scious awareness, although many do occur in conscious awareness, and they may or may not be language-labeled (Edelman, 1989, pp. 173-185; Millikan, 1984; Weiskrantz, 1988). The following word pairs, however, can be used to linguistically describe many conceptual categorizations, even though the person that is doing the categorizing may never

use them, or use them after the concepts have been instan­ tiated within the bodymind: same-different, self/nonself, alike96

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& Fifer, 1980; Panneton, 1985; briefly described in Book IV, Chapter 1). Newborns prefer even more a recording of

mothers' voices that includes the background sounds of arterial pulse-flow from within a womb (Fifer & Moon, 1989; Moon & Fifer, 1990). Most likely, these conceptual

categorizations are formed outside conscious awareness. Older children and adults form non-language conceptual categorizations when sights, sounds, and sensations are ex­ perienced that are extremely unfamiliar. Hearing a record­ ing of Tibetan monks perform "overtone singing" (without any pre-experience description) is an example. We just hear it and then we begin to make comparisons with sounds from our past experiences and then, if we talk about it, we can only generate metaphoric expressions to describe the experience.

Prototype concepts may be illustrated by consider­

ing "chair-ness". Generally speaking, objects upon which individual people sit are adapted to the dimensions of hu­ man legs, derrieres and backs. Although they are constructed in a huge variety of specific designs, they all have a proto­ type design by which they are conceived, recognized, and used.

"Music-ness" is a culturally defined prototype con­ cept that has many interrelated perceptual features. The most generalized features may be labeled as consecutive pitches (melodies), combined pitches (harmonies), durations (meters, rhythms, tempi), sound qualities (timbres), and de­ signed tonal patterns through time (form). Categorically dis­ tinct and interrelated general features of phenomena in the world, or of objects, can be labeled as conceptual frame­ works, that is, correlated "bigger picture" categories. For example, a conceptual framework for skilled vocal coordi­ nations could be: (1) arrangement of the body's skeleton, (2) efficient generation of breathflow, (3) efficient generation of vocal sound by the larynx, (4) creation of relatively bal­

anced vocal resonance with efficient "shaping" of the vocal tract, and (5) efficient shaping of the vocal tract in the cre­

(Posner & Peterson, 1990; Posner & Rothbart, 1998). Areas within the frontal and parietal lobe cortices collaborate with the visual, auditory, and somatosensory networks to carry out (1) alerting and orientation to a setting in time and place,

(2) selective detection of a specific target for conscious attention, and (3) maintenance of sustained attention or an alert vigi­ lance (Harris, 1995, p. 113-120). An anterior attention system

has been observed in the medial area of the right and left frontal lobes, and a posterior attention system has been located in the posterior area of the right and left parietal lobes. When conscious attention is engaged, some degree of an alert physiochemical state is always present. The brainstem's locus coeruleus, the "core" of the ascending re­ ticular activating system, engages the networks that use nore­ pinephrine as their neurotransmitter. These networks are

ation of language sounds. Almost all, if not all, of the details

distributed to nearly all parts of the brain, and they per­

of vocal skill can be related to those five phenomena of

form a brainwide alerting or arousal function. They are

skilled voicing. Expressive speaking and singing would in­

intimately interfaced with the anterior and posterior atten­

clude additional framework items. Prototype concepts and

tion systems. An hyperalert state produces faster responses,

conceptual frameworks are subdivisible into many com­ ponent concepts that form complex conceptual category webs. These conceptual categorization functions are major elements in higher order consciousness (Edelman, 1989, pp. 186-207) and are always correlated with higher order abili­ ties such as language, decision-making, purposeful behav­ ior, personal and social regulation, and so forth (Fuster, 1996, 150-172). The capability for these enormous abilities have developed since the earliest forms of cognitive fluidity that emerged about 10,000 years ago, according to Mithen (1996). Cognitive fluidity is the result of the kind of global mapping or parallel distributed processing that is evident in the brain's prefrontal cortices. Elaboration of these capabilities into globally mapped conceptual abilities is highly dependent on varied experiences within emotionally safe settings, and on empathic care-givers (such as parents and teachers) who can skillfully facilitate optimal mastery of constructive higher order abilities.

but tends to result in a higher rate of inaccurate responses (Posner, 1978).

Attention, Memory, Learning, and Behavioral expression When conscious awareness is directed onto bodily

sensations or onto specific persons, places, things, or events outside of the body, the result is referred to as attention

Attention is described as involuntary when persons, places, things, or events that are external to bodyminds trig­ ger an automatic, reflexive focusing of attention. Involun­ tary conscious attention is triggered by the high speed threat­ benefit appraisal that is carried out by parts of the limbic system (value-emotive categorization). Attention is described

as voluntary when internal bodymind processes purpose­ fully select features of an environment to focus conscious attention upon.

A searchlight attention hypothesis (Crick, 1984; Treisman & Gormican, 1988) provides a model for atten­

tion. Particular features to be perceived are focused upon, then moved away from so that other features may be "spot­ lighted". In visual attention, the eye field of the prefrontal cortex and the midbrain's superior colliculus are involved in selecting a target and moving the eyes there. In the retina of each eye, the massive number of visual neurons that constitute the fovea activate to take in details of the persons, places, things, and/or events that are the focus of attention. The lateral geniculate nucleus and the thalamic reticular com­ plex prepare the details for further analysis before sending them to the primary visual area of the occipital cortex. There the details are separated and processed further before being internal

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sent to parietal-temporal-occipital association cortex within which the posterior attention system is located. The signal­

ing is then sent to the prefrontal cortex where voluntary attentional decision-making can be processed. In auditory attending (listening as opposed to just hear­

ing), the efferent auditory networks can be engaged to sup­ press the processing of environmental sounds that have not been selected by the posterior and anterior attention systems. That enables a focusing of auditory attention to selected acoustic features that are embedded within a gen­

recollection of encoded representations of those experiences. In neuropsychobiological terms, memory involves (1) the physio chemical instantiation, mainly within the nervous system's brain, of patterned perceptual, value-emotive, and con­

ceptual categorizations that occur during and after interactions with people, places, things, and events, and (2) the reactiva­ tion of those instantiated categorization patterns in response to "triggering" experiences that match some or most of the

features of the original experience. There is a clear difference, then, between (1) the pat­

eral acoustic environment (see Chapter 6). Examples: Se­ lecting the sound of a teacher's voice giving instructions when other people are talking at the same time, or selec­ tively listening to the alto part when the soprano, tenor, and bass parts are being sung at the same time. Similar pro­ cesses enable a focusing of conscious attention on soma­ tosensory reception from selected areas of the body. The right hemisphere sensory and attention areas ap­ pear to have greater capability for attending to and pro­ cessing global, whole-pattern, contextual perception, such

terned features of the actual external environment, or the

as whole faces and expressive pitch contour patterns in

process (Damasio, 1989). The transition from environment

speech and music. The left hemisphere sensory and atten­ tion areas appear to have greater capability for attending to

to constructive physio chemical instantiation can be prone to both accurate matches and inaccurate mismatches with the environment, and the reactivation process may also produce matches and mismatches. In other words, experi­ ences may be encoded with inaccuracies, the encoding may be subject to alterations by subsequent experiences and the passing of time, and the reconstructive retrieval experience can produce inaccuracies (Ceci & Loftus, 1994; Ceci, et al., 1994; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Loftus, et al., 1995; Schacter, et al., 1995; Squire, 1995). Memory and learning are different processes that may

and processing details that are parts of whole patterns, such as observing eye color in a face or identifying one sequenced

pitch progression within multiple simultaneous pitch pro­ gressions (Robertson & Delis, 1986; Sergent, 1982). When the conscious attention spotlight is focused on one set of sensory details within immediate surroundings, there is extremely limited engagement with other possible sensory details within those surroundings (Posner & Peterson, 1990). Conscious attention can be focused on only one perceptual or sensorimotor "activity" at a time. Attention processing areas, particularly in the parietal lobe,

also are engaged when people are asked to imagine them­ selves walking or driving an automobile in familiar sur­ roundings (Roland, 1985). Any one or all of the sensory association areas activate when visual, auditory, and kines­ thetic imagery occurs in conscious awareness (Decety, 1996). Memory is the term that refers to certain complex physio chemical processings. A common concept of cog­

nate memory includes (1) formation or encoding of "represen­ tations" of people, places, things, and events that have been experienced, and (2) subsequent retrieval, recall, recognition, or 98

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actual internal bodily state, and (2) the patterned, internal physio chemical categorizations that instantiate representations

of those actual phenomena (long-term potentiation in se­ lected neural networks, for example). Repetition of similar or same experiences results in some degree of change in the originally instantiated categorizations, thus, recategorizations occur. Memory formation, therefore, is an internal construc­

tive process and memory retrieval is an internal reconstructive

or may not co-occur. Learning refers to adaptive changes in:

(1) perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categoriza­ tions, and (2) behavioral dispositions and behavior pat­

terns as a result of interactions with people, places, things, and events (Edelman, 1989, p. 57). These changes co-occur with changes in the extent of: (1) size and myelinization of neurons in relevant neuron groups, (2) growth and prolif­

eration of axon collaterals, dendrites, and dendrite spines, (3) short- and long-term potentiation of neurons in rel­ evant neuron groups, and (4) the number of neurons that have been selected for mapping or remapping within rel­ evant neuron groups.

Clearly, memory is part of learning, but memory may occur without adaptive changes to conditions in the expe­

rienced world. We can have a memory of seeing grass in a park, but the memory may not be part of an adaptive ad­

justment in our perception, feeling, conception, or behavior

regarding grass or parks. If we perceived the grass as a "deep" green color and it was newly mown and the color and the smell produced a pleasant feeling-state in us, and we then came to the park more frequently for "stress relief", then both memory and learning occurred.

There are many environmental conditions under which adaptive memory, learning, and behavior occur in bodyminds.

Neuroscientists who have studied memory

and learning have identified quite a number of brain areas

that activate differentially during the encoding and reacti­ vation of many types of memories, learnings, and behav­ iors. The analysis of those processes has resulted in mul­ tiple concepts and referential linguistic labels. For example, memories, learnings, and behaviors that are formed and engaged in conscious awareness are referred to collectively as explicit memory and learning. When language is involved in conscious memory, learning, and behavior, the term de­

clarative memory and learning applies (Cohen & Squire, 1980; Cohen, 1981). Semantic memory is the neuropsy­ chological term for the vast associated conceptual categori­ zations we have encoded in memory that are linguistically ensymboled, that is, factual knowledge about people, places, things, events (see Schacter, 1996, p. 135). Memories, learnings, and behaviors that are formed and engaged outside conscious awareness are referred to collec­ tively as implicit memory and learning. When reflexive or habitual physical movement is executed outside con­ scious awareness, the term procedural memory and learn­ ing applies (Schacter, 1987, 1996, pp. 9-10, 170-176). A young man began having convulsive seizures. By the mid1950s, when he was just past his mid-twenties, the seizures became much more frequent and severe. He could not function, and all medi­ cal solutions were exhausted except one: surgery to remove the areas of his brain where the seizures were triggered and maintained. He had the surgery at the age of 27 years. Most of both temporal lobes were removed, and to his great relief, the seizures ended. In cognitive neuro­ science circles he is known as H.M. After the surgery, H.M. appeared to behave normally except for one thing: he had lost the ability to form conscious memories that

lasted for more than about one minute. If you had been introduced to him and had carried on a brief conversation, he would have appeared normal to you. If you then had left his presence and returned about one minute later, you would have had to be introduced again, because he would have had zero recollection of you or anything about the conversation. In fact, if you had done the same thing 50 times every day for one or ten years, the same result would have happened. HM's intelligence measures were normal, he could reason very well, carry on conversations, and he could remember clearly the people, places, things, and events that he had experienced up to about a year or two before the surgery. After that, he remembered nothing. No memo­ ries ever lasted more than about a minute. At the age of about 65 years, nearly 40 years post-surgery he did not know his age, the status of his parents, or anything about his life history during the past 40 years or so. He could not even recognize a photograph of himself. H.M. was studied extensively for over 35 years by neurologists, neuropsychologists, and cognitive neuroscientists. He is very famous in memory research circles and the research has revolutionized what is known about memory. The temporal lobes' right and left hippocampi, and nearby cortical transition areas, are primary loci of conscious memory formation and reactivation (Kesner, et al., 1992). They

provide a kind of reference index for aspects of memories that are stored in other parts of the brain (Damasio, 1989; Schacter, 1996, p. 87; Squire, 1992; Teyler & DiScenna, 1986). The hippocampal areas are rich with highly branched and synapsed neurons, and have extensive long-term potentia­ tion capacities (explained in Chapter 3). They receive sen­ sory input from all of the perceptual senses and share rich, reentrant interconnections with the parietal cortex and the limbic system, especially the amygdalae (value-emotive in­ put; Cahill, et al., 1996). There are rich reentrant intercon­ nections with the areas of the prefrontal cortex that regulate and/or modulate reasoning, decision-making, expecting, and

so forth. Neural circuits within the hippocampal area are capable of retaining their long-term potentiation, and thus

their availability for reactivation, for about two or three years. These indexical encodings of experience are referred

to as long-term memory (hours to months). After about two years, areas of the neocortex-mainly prefrontal areas-assume their "storage" as long-lasting memory (months to lifetime; LeDoux, 1996, p. 193; McGaugh, 2000; ZolaMorgan & Squire, 1993).

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Two decades ago, memories of short duration were referred to as short-term memories (seconds to hours). The concept of short-duration memory was elaborated in

the 1970s into the concept of working memory (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996). Immediate working memory refers to the ability to track and recall people, places, things, and events that occur in an uninterrupted flow of "present" time, for instance, an uninterrupted conversation. Recent working memory refers to the ability to retain and recall people, places, things, and events that have been expe­ rienced in immediate time, but then an interruption of the experience occurs and attentional focus is changed to one or more other persons, places, things, and events. Even though immediate working memory then has different con­ tent, the earlier experiences can be retrieved because they

have been held "on line" and outside conscious awareness. Remembering where you parked your car after eight hours of work is an example of recent working memory. LeDoux (1996, pp. 270, 271) uses the computer term "buffer" to de­ scribe the temporary storage of memories outside of imme­

room and our eyes are closed (Damasio, Grabowski, et al., 1993). After a sufficient number of sensory experiences in

life, and after the neural networks of the prefrontal cortices have elaborated and myelinated sufficiently, human beings have the capability to mutate the vast array of visual, audi­ tory, and kinesthetic memories. When we do that, we say that we are using our creative imagination. Auditory sense processes are involved similarly during musical composi­ tion and improvisation. This capability also enables human beings to engage

in "mental practice of motor skills" (Weiss, et al., 1994). The regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) of a male was mea­ sured as he performed three motor tasks (Roland, et al., 1980; see Figure I-7-2). When he merely pressed a spring with the fingers of his right hand-an act that requires no conscious planning-the hand areas of his primary motor and sensory cortices activated to trigger the peripheral mo­ tor system to move his fingers. When he performed a re­ cently learned complex sequence of finger movements, his supplementary motor and premotor cortices activated along

diate conscious awareness so that they are available if or when needed. In the patient H.M., immediate working memory was still functioning, but he could not form recent working memories. Executive control of the working memory system is in the lateral areas of the prefrontal cortex (Fuster, 1996, p. 4). Those areas can entrain other cortical areas to engage simultaneous oscillatory activation of several to many neural networks (Bressler, et al., 1993; Cohen, et al., 1997; Courtney, et al., 1997; Damasio, 1990b; Eckhorn, et al., 1988; Fuster, 1996, p. 144; Sporns, et al., 1989). Damasio refers to this entrainment process as an activation of convergence zones that can integrate simultaneous and near simultaneous processes within widely dispersed areas of the cortex (Damasio, 1989; Damasio & Damasio, 1994). For instance, the lateral areas of the prefrontal cortex can activate what Schacter calls the perceptual representation system (1996, p. 184) and what Damasio calls perceptual images (1994, p. 96). These systems enable us to have "as-if expe­ riences", that is, we can "see with our mind's eye", "hear with our mind's ear", and remember bodily sensations. In other words, activation of our prefrontal and visual cortex en­ ables us to "see", in our visual imagination, the room in which we regularly sleep, even though we are not in that 100

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Figure I-7-2: (A) shows that only the hand areas of the left primary motor and sensory cortices were activated when a man simply pressed a spring with his right hand. (B) shows that his supplementary motor cortex also activated when he performed a complex sequence of newly learned finger movements. (C) shows only the supplementary motor cortex activating when the man "imagined" performing the finger sequence but did not actually do so. [Illustrations from Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell (Eds.), (©1991), Principles ofNeural Science (3rd Ed.), published by Appleton & Lange. Reproduced with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies.] Illustrations were adapted from Roland, Larson, Lassen, & Skinhof (1980). Supplementary motor area and other cortical areas in organization of voluntary movements in man. Journal ofNeurophysiology, 43,118-136. Used with permission.]

with the primary motor and sensory areas. The supple­

an experience, and the greater their intensity, the more in­

mentary motor and premotor areas helped provide some conscious planning and guidance for the primary motor cortex. When he just "imagined" performing the complex finger sequence, the primary motor cortex did not activate

delibly they will be instantiated. Sensorimotor memory, learning, and behavior are among the richest sources of perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categorizations and memory. Sensorimotor memory and learning enable a reenactment or a repetition

because his fingers did not move for this task. His lateral

prefrontal cortex areas entrained his supplementary motor, premotor, sensorimotor, and parietal-temporal-occipital association areas to participate in producing the image by supplying the planning and guidance aspects of the finger sequence. That is an example of working memory. Episodic memories are neural-chemical instantiations of experienced events that had time boundaries and to which attention was devoted during the event's time-flow, along with the sights, sounds, and sensations that were impor­ tant. Contextual memories of the people, places, and things and the sights, sounds, and sensations that were not the focus of attention were also encoded, but without the "mag­ nifying glass" or the "searchlight" of conscious attention. When an episode (event) is encoded in memory, all forms of memory may be simultaneously encoded, and later

triggered into recall. For instance, explicit emotional memory, or memories of emotional states (LeDoux, 1996, pp. 200-204), are recalled when current perceptual categori­

zations trigger the amygdala-hippocampus connection to send related perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual memories to the lateral prefrontal cortex to create conscious working memories. Typically, perceptual categorizations are formed within an episodic memory. Damasio (1994, pp. 165-201) has elaborated a theory of how environment-trig­

gered physio chemical states of the body (feelings and emo­ tions), mark the associated perceptual and conceptual cat­ egorizations so that when the percepts and concepts are recalled, the physio chemical state is also reactivated. His somatic marker hypothesis explains key features of how feelings are extensively enmeshed in reasoning and deci­ sion-making (Damasio, et al., 1991; Damasio, 1994, pp. 165201; Damasio, et al., 1995). Somatic markers are interocep­ tive sensations of the physio chemical changes that occur within the torso when feeling states are triggered (described earlier). Somatic markers also can include proprioceptive physio chemical states, and they, too, can participate in valueemotive categorizations. The more senses are engaged by

of a previously accomplished sensorimotor act or perfor­

mance. The process involves dynamic changes in synaptic

networks within global mappings. Both implicit and ex­ plicit memory networks are activated. The most useful and most indelible form of explicit memory and learning may

involve proportions of all or several of the senses, sen­ sorimotor action, and the symbolic-expressive abilities of higher order consciousness (speaking and singing, for in­ stance).

Sensorimotor behavior can be (1) reflexive and automatic, (2) associated with one or more elements of an environment, and (3) highly elaborated and refined (a complex skill). Refined sensorimotor skill learning is undertaken to gain efficiency, accuracy, "smooth­

ness", speed, and precision in the mastery of goal-oriented move­ ment (Donoghue, 1996). Threats to physical and emotional safety in the learning environment will restrict sensorimotor process­ ing and prevent optimum skill learning. Physical and emo­ tional safety, then, are prerequisites. Think of throwing darts at a target on a wall. Target

practice means that conscious attention becomes focused on a goal target that has a bull's-eye. Motor planning expectan­ cies are initiated by areas within the prefrontal cortex, aided by the visual and sensorimotor association cortices. An initial throw of the dart occurs, and immediate sensorimo­ tor and visual memories of the event are formed. That feedback can then be used to make adjustments for the next throw, and the process recycles. Bull's-eye missing is nec­ essary so that the nervous system can make adjustments in the neural networks that enact the dart throwing. Contin­

ued target practice, then, enables the nervous system to re­ fine those perceptual and sensorimotor skills. People who are experienced dart throwers can serve as guides who as­ sist in the skill development process. "Brains learn by tak­ ing target practice" is a metaphor that is elaborated upon in Chapter 9. Two types of sensorimotor skill learning are:

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1. initial acquisition of a relatively new or novel skill, its re­ finement, enhancement, and elaboration, and its neural

instantiation and modification in memory; 2. alteration of a previously instantiated skill (habit), the refinement, enhancement, and elaboration ofthe altered skill, and its instantiation and modification in memory. The nervous system areas that change during the ac­ quisition or alteration of sensorimotor skills are briefly de­

scribed in Chapter 3 (see also Asanuma, 1996). Both types of sensorimotor skill learning take place in three phases

(Fitts, 1964): 1. early-cognitive phase; 2. intermediate phase; and 3. late-autonomous phase.

quences and contraction intensities to applicable peripheral

motor nerves and skeletal muscles, and then, first enact­ ments ofthe skill occur. All ofthe sensory events that oc­ cur during each succeeding enactment are then placed into immediate working memory and if a pleasant-feeling is tagged

to the experience, then repetition is primed. After an ap­ propriate number of repetitions, a blueprint neural network patterning is instantiated in the relevant neurons (a degree of long-term potentiation) and recent working memory be­ comes consolidated. This implicit mode of learning is necessary in infancy and early childhood until the neural processing equipment for conscious attention and analysis, and the larynx struc­ tures, have sufficiently matured (Book IV Chapters 1 through 3 have details). When learning a skill for the first time,

In the early-cognitive phase of skill acquisition, a

simple, uncomplicated tasks for pathfinding the skill will increase the probability of successful accomplishment. In­

global goal is consciously conceived, such as singing songs

fants, children, adolescents, and adults who are learning sing­

skillfully and expressively, and literal or potential bodymind benefit for acquiring that skill is assessed by the learners'

ing skills for the first time, need (1) enjoyable, communica­

value-emotive processing. In order to begin learning a novel skill, an internal global framework model of the skill must be instantiated in the brain's sensorimotor networks (various targets with bull'seyes). This model can be established outside of conscious awareness (implicitly) and it can be established in conscious awareness (explicitly). Take the skill of singing, for example. Just listening to and seeing the repeated singing of other people begins the implicit instantiation ofthe auditory and sensorimotor parts of the framework model. If singing is perceived as a pleasant-feeling thing to do, and the skill has

not been associated with personal inadequacy, then the in­ nate imitative, expressive, and exploratory-discovery abili­ ties of human beings will initiate sensorimotor attempts at performing the skill. Frequently heard models of singing, and just "taking target practice" on the neuromuscular co­

ordinations of singing, begins the instantiation of a global framework model of the sensorimotor aspects of singing skills. A rough-draft blueprint (a representation) of motor

sequences and contraction intensities is then constructed for executing "first-trial runs" at accomplishing the skill. The frontal lobe's primary motor cortex sends the planned se­

tive voiceplaysm that includes imitative sound-making, wideranged pitch-sliding, word-making, word-sliding, and the

like, and (2) short, simple, repetitive songs with limited pitch ranges. When neurovocal anatomy has sufficiently ma­ tured, then another person can bring some aspects of sing­

ing skill into conscious attention and guide the learning of

the details of singing skill and expressiveness. Once the global framework model of basic pitch, rhythm, and language accuracy has become instantiated, then conscious attention can be focused on more detailed refinements ofthe global skill. For example, if novice sing­ ers notice that they are able to sing with pitch accuracy in their lower range (shortener prominent lower register) and their upper range (lengthener prominent upper register), but pitch accuracy does not occur in a midpoint pitch range between the two, then attending to and mastering the finer motor skills of lengthener-prominent-to-shortener-prominent coordinations (and vice versa) can be accomplished in conscious awareness (Book II, Chapter 11 explains vocal register coordinations). The visual, auditory, and somatic senses (parietal-temporal-occipital association areas) can then be engaged in visualizing, audiating, and physically "sensing" (imagining) this refinement of the global frame­ work model of singing skill, and knowledgeable teacher­ guides can aid the learning.

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The motor planning areas of the frontal lobes can then begin to activate cortical and subcortical sensorimotor net­ works that could contribute to a realization of the neuro­ muscular coordinations. Conscious pathfinding occurs in the early-cognitive phase as trial runs of the skill include comparisons of the current global framework model with what actually happened in a trial run (target practice). Each well attended trial run creates a degree of recategorization or adjustment of the sensorimotor model. Gradually the model becomes more and more "detailed" as sensorimotor adjustments occur in the relevant neural networks. Explicit pathfinding is a target practice process. Bull'seyes are missed quite frequently in this early-cognitive phase of sensorimotor skill learning. Early experience of the out­

side limits of the target can help the nervous system "home in" on a target's bull's-eye. When consciously developing vocal tract adjustment skills, experiencing a maximally opened and enlarged vocal tract and a maximally narrowed and

"smallened" vocal tract would instantiate a working memory of the extremes of vocal tract adjustment. The nervous sys­ tem will then be better able to guide vocal tract adjustments toward "middle-ground" bull's-eyes. During and after all trial

runs of the skill, the visual, auditory, and somatic senses track (1) internal neuromuscular events (sense of "more work"

and "less work", for example; many of these events are out­ side conscious awareness), (2) trajectory of gross anatomi­ cal movement (global movements in jaw, tongue, soft pal­ ate, pharyngeal and laryngeal adjustments), and (3) any ef­ fects on applicable elements of the environment that oc­ curred (changes in heard vocal sound quality). Some of that sensory feedback can be placed into immediate work­ ing memory for explicit, conscious, analytic evaluation. That constitutes knowledge of results (Buekers, et al., 1994; more in Chapter 9). Such conscious evaluation commonly includes the

elaboration of conceptual categorizations that are aided by spoken or thought language. The sensory tracking infor­ mation that is not placed in working memory is catego­

rized implicitly or outside conscious awareness. Compari­ sons then can be made between the framework model and the perceived results in order to assess how close the actual sensorimotor trial came to matching the current framework model. Spoken or thought language can help in the pro­ cess of refining the motor pattern for the next trial run.

Teacher-guides can assist in focusing sensory attention on

the target practice process, eliciting more sensory feedback

into conscious working memory, and creating correlations between perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual catego­ rizations. The early, unrefined instantiation of a sensorimotor skill in the nervous system can be referred to as a template neuromuscular coordination. When neuromuscular co­ ordination patterns are instantiated in sensorimotor memory, motor skill researchers sometimes refer to them as sen­

sorimotor schema or sensorimotor programs. To alter an already established, habitual sensorimotor skill "pat­ tern", conscious awareness of unmet value-emotive criteria must arise. In other words, elements of the program do not meet newly evolving value criteria for efficiency, smooth­

ness, accuracy, precision, speed, agility, or comfort. For ex­ ample, when teachers notice that their voices are sore, achy,

and tired at the end of most teaching days, they may won­ der if they could learn speaking skills that could help them avoid that discomfort. When singers notice that their voice quality in upper pitch range has become noticeably pinched and effortful, they may seek to alter their habitual vocal coordinations in order to meet new voice quality and ki­

nesthetic sensation criteria. Once the decision is made that a change in vocal co­ ordination will be more valuable than the coordination as it is, then conscious exploration of alternative coordina­ tions can occur. Experienced teacher-guides can facilitate the clarification of new bull's-eye criteria and an exploratory

process. Eventually, new bull's-eyes become identified. Con­ scious awareness of the difference between (1) the habitual sensorimotor coordination pattern, and (2) the altered co­ ordination pattern can then emerge. The motor planning areas of the frontal lobes activate applicable cortical and

subcortical motor areas to construct an initial plan of the altered motor sequences and contraction intensities that are likely to enact the altered skill. The parts of human beings that produce conscious awareness of sensorimotor details can only attend to one activity at a time, so selecting one vocal coordination change at a time will aid progress in learning the skill. Establishing a bull's-eye template coordination in sensorimotor memory is the first step. Simple vocal sound patterns are needed at

first, so that conscious sensorimotor awareness is optimized. internal

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For example, in vocal tract adjustment skills for singing, the

use of a single vowel (perhaps /uh/ or /ah/) and a simple downward sigh-glide would remove potential barriers to skill development that would be present in the more com­

plicated context of a song. For easy onset of vocal sound by the vocal folds and breathflow, downward sigh-glides on single words that begin with slightly sustained /shhh/, /fffff/, or /hh/ consonant sounds can be helpful. As the template neuromuscular coordination is re­ peated, the necessary neural network routings are gradually

selected for the sensorimotor skill pattern and they are gradu­ ally strengthened. Disuse of the former routings gradually occurs, and those neural network routings gradually weaken. This is the intermediate phase of sensorimotor skill learn­ ing. With continued knowledge of results, each repetition enables the synapses of the necessary neuron networks to strengthen, that is, long-term potentiation processes begin. Routings through the right and left hippocampal areas are

glides, to 3-2-1 or 5-4-3-2-1 scale patterns, to wider pitch interval patterns, to snippets of melodies on vowels or syl­ lables, to larger melodic contours. Pitch and volume ranges and voice qualities can be varied. Eventually, whole songs are sung and the more song contexts that are encountered, the more the recruitment and elaboration of neurons oc­ curs within necessary neural networks. In one study, six hours after practicing a new template coordination that was mixed with other skills, different re­ gions of the cortex were activated to produce the coordina­ tion: the premotor, posterior parietal, and cerebellar cortex

structures (Shadmehr & Holcomb, 1997). When learning

novel skills, or changing habitual skills, memory and learn­ ing are consolidated more quickly when goal-focused dis­ tributed practice occurs (several shorter spans of time during a day) rather than massed practice (a single longer span of time) (Kanfer, et al., 1994). Once a skill can be performed frequently with accu­

included, as well as differential recruitment of peripheral neuromuscular motor units that produce the actual coor­

racy, there will be sufficient strength in the neural networks'

dination adjustments. When learning complex skills, like vocal tract adjust­ ments in singing, learning proceeds faster if the skill is parsed

(a filled-in framework model) can activate prefrontal, sen­ sory association, supplementary motor, and premotor cor­

synaptic connections that "imagining" the skill's performance

into simple versions first and complexities are gradually

tices. So-called "mental rehearsal" actually can help refine sensorimotor skills (Roland, 1985; Schmidt, 1988; Kosslyn,

added. When finished skills require accuracy and speed at

et al., 1993; Damasio, et al., 1993; Jeannerod, 1995; Decety,

the same time, one strategy is to repeat the skill slowly at first to learn accuracy, and then gradually add speed (Schmidt, 1988; Winstein, 1995). Muscle fatigue impairs accuracy, smoothness, and speed in the performance of neuromuscular skills, and it disturbs the learning of effi­ cient sensorimotor skills (Carron, 1972; Bigland-Ritchie & Woods, 1984). Conditioning, therefore, is relevant.

1996; Grafton, et al., 1996). Effective practice does not make a skill "perfect". It makes a skill relatively permanent but

During the intermediate phase, template coordinations can gradually be placed into a variety of contexts that gradu­ ally become more complex. Blocked practice sessions in­ volve repeating the same skill many times. Blocked practice results in faster acquisition and consolidation of a new or altered skill. Random practice sessions involve mixing the skills that are repeated. Random practice results in increased retention of a global skill in sensorimotor memory (Schmidt, 1988). For example, the same skill can be rehearsed in a variety of increasingly complex contexts, from single-vowel

sigh-glides to syllable sigh-glides, to multiple-syllable sigh­

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adaptable. When practice activities are intrinsically reward­ ing (see Chapter 9) and are appropriately varied, then skill

elaboration becomes a pleasure and the likelihood of vol­ untary frequent practice is increased. The late-autonomous phase of sensorimotor skill learning is entered when conscious awareness of the skill elements is no longer necessary, the skill is "easy", fluid, ha­ bitual, automatic, and adaptable to a variety of contexts, even unfamiliar ones. Sensorimotor skill mastery is evi­ denced by more and more frequent "sweet-spot" bull's-eye

hits. Very minimal prefrontal activity is needed as subcor­ tical brain areas (such as the basal ganglia and the cerebel­

lum) process the complex skills outside conscious aware­ ness (see Chapter 3). For singing, it is as though the pre­ frontal cortex says, "Sing me this song in the automatic way". Then it "stays out of the way" while the automatic subcor­

tical routine networks execute the highly complex acts of singing. Singing high-speed melissmatic passages from Handel's Messiah would be an example. People with normal, intact brains are shown 500 pictures. Then, those 500 pictures are randomly mixed with another 500 pictures of similar subject scenes that have not been seen previously The people in the study are asked to identify which pictures were seen before. Many such studies have been performed, and the results are predictable: About 450 of the previously seen pictures are accurately identified as familiar (9O°/o accuracy) (Pribaum, 1998). * * * * *

A patient with total amnesia for explicit memories is shown several words on cards, such as pasture or garden. The researcher leaves the room for about 20 minutes and then returns. The researcher reintroduces herself and shows the patient a set of cards that have the firstfew letters of the words that had been shown earlier, such as pas___ and gar___. The group of letters could actually be the beginning of several words. The patient, of course, has no explicit memory of the earlier words, but is asked to say a word that the letters might be the beginning of. Over 90% of the time, the patient speaks the words from the initial list. * * * * *

Another patient with total amnesia for explicit memories is shown how to perform a skill that he had never learned before in his life. He learned to do simple knitting over several therapeutic sessions. At the next session, the neuropsychologist asks the patient, "Do you know how to knit?" Answer: "No." "Here are some knitting needles and yarn, can you show me how to knit?" Answer: "Well, I'd like to, but I really don't know the first thing about it." Without saying anything else about knitting, the psychologist then places the knitting materials beside the patient, sits down and begins knitting while con­ tinuing to converse with the patient. After a few minutes, the patient picks up the knitting materials and begins to knit.

formed, but is outside the conscious awareness of the per­ son who is remembering (LeDoux, 1996, pp. 179-224; Schacter, 1987, 1996, pp. 161-191; Stadler & Frensch, 1998). Implicit memories do not use the temporal lobe, hippoc­ ampus-centered memory system. They appear to use the prefrontal cortex-regulated memory system. The prefron­ tal cortex is richly connected to every aspect of internal CNS processing. As the renowned Russian neuropsycholo­ gist Alexander Luria wrote (1973), the prefrontal cortex is "...the brain's brain'' That is part of the reason why implicit memory can involve so many different human capacities. The first of the above stories demonstrates that a large

number of memories can be stored in and retrieved from

recent implicit working memory by intact brains.

The second story illustrates the priming of implicit semantic memory, and the third is about implicit sensorimotor skill memory, with explicit denial of ever having learned a skill.

None of the initial learning experiences could be recalled consciously, yet memory was clearly demonstrated. The intact implicit sensorimotor memory of the knitting pa­ tient was instantiated when he originally learned how to knit. Another common term for implicit sensorimotor memory is procedural memory. In this patient's case, his im­ plicit knitting skill was primed when the psychologist mod­

eled knitting skills. The fourth story is about implicit emotional memory.

These memories are commonly manifested in much less

dramatic forms (Damasio, 1999). Mangan (1993) has writ­ ten about feelings of knowing. He states that we "...have them about items in working memory that are available to con­ sciousness, but are not conscious in the current moment."

A common example occurs when we say that a word or a name is "on the tip of my tongue". His studies indicate that

* * * * *

feelings of knowing are (1) quite accurate most of the time,

The doctor of a patient with total amnesia for explicit memories always reintroduced himself with a handshake, and the patient al­ ways pleasantly joined in. One day, as an experiment, the doctor con­ cealed a small tack in his hand before entering the room. Predictably, the patient's hand was jerked away with a cry of pain. Upon entering the room the next time, the patient had no explicit memory of the experience, was very pleasant to the new doctor, but absolutely refused to shake his hand (Claparede, 1911/1951, pp. 58-75). The above stories are examples of implicit memory and learning, that is, memory and learning that is neurally

(2) receive high confidence ratings by people he has stud­

ied, and (3) do not involve detailed, structured experiences. Research subjects are given a stack of paper money and four decks of cards that are labeled with the letters A, B, C, and D (Bechera, et al., 1993,1994,1997; Damasio, 1994, pp. 205-222; Adolphs, & Bechera, et al., 1995; Adolphs & Tranel, et al., 1995). As they turn over the cards from each deck one at a time, the cards tell

them how much money they can take from the money stack for them­ selves, and occasionally, how much money they have to put back in the

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cards from decks A and B give $100 rewards and cards from decks C

their card turning strategy, and long before they became con­ sciously aware of their strategy change. In other words, GSR in the normals indicated that implicit emotional processing of threat to well being oc­

and D give $50 rewards. Occasionally and unpredictably however,

curred before they became consciously aware that the high-

cards are turned that produce large losses. They do not know that there

reward decks resulted in greater overall losses than the low-

are more such cards in decks A and B than in decks C and D, and as

reward decks. These results suggest that threat-response

the game proceeds, the subjects have no way of knowing when the

physio chemical state changes occurred (unpleasant feeling

losses will occur and no way of keeping track of the exact amounts of gain or loss. One group of subjects have no neural abnormalities and an­ other group have abnormalities (from accidental brain injury or neces­ sary surgery) in the ventromedial areas of the prefrontal cortices (un­ derside, central areas of the two frontal lobes). The ventromedial areas of the prefrontal cortex are heavily involved in developing value-emo­ tive criteria for planning and enacting appropriate ongoing and future behavior. When the function of those areas is disrupted, behaviors occur that violate self-interest and social propriety. Parts of all subjects' hands are connected to contact electrodes that measure the extent of, and variations, in skin perspiration as the game proceeds (galvanic skin response or GSR). Increased sweat on the skin increases its capacity to conduct electricity. When people are under some degree of threat, the autonomic nervous system is engaged, meta­ bolic rate and body heat are increased, perspiration increases propor­ tionately, and the GSR electrodes record more electrical conductance. As threat subsides, the extent of perspiration subsides, and conductance is reduced. In the game, both groups learn quickly that turning over cards from decks A and B are very rewarding. As the game proceeds, the brain-damaged subjects continue to turn cards from the high-reward decks, and never figure out that doing so results in winning consider­ ably less money in the long term than turning cards from the lowreward decks. As the brain-normal subjects turn high-reward cards from decks A and B and then experience the more frequent larger losses, they start turning more and more of the low-reward cards from decks C and D. Eventually, they begin turning over the $50 cards almost exclusively. The studies' significant findings: (1) The GSR in the brain-damaged subjects never changed. (2) As the brain­ normal subjects turned high-reward cards from decks A and B and then experienced the more frequent larger losses, their GSR increased noticeably. (3) In the brain-normal subjects, increased GSR began before they actually changed

states), and although those changes may not have been

money stack. They also are told that the game will end when a par­

ticular signal is given, but they will never know how long the game will continue. As the subjects turn the cards over, they soon learn that

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interoceptively perceived in conscious awareness, they were encoded as part of implicit emotional memory and learn­

ing.

Somatic markers that are formed outside conscious

awareness are an example of implicit emotional memory

(LeDoux, 1996, p. 201).

The Bodymind’s ’’Interpreter Mechanism” and ’’Observer Mechanism” Cognitive neuroscientists are continuing to determine

which brain areas are globally networked to produce what

is referred to as conscious awareness. These global net­ works are vastly interfaced with neural networks that enact

our learned symbolic expression abilities. The most elabo­ rated mode of symbolic expression is perceived and spo­ ken language. Human beings have, therefore, a global con­ scious-verbal system that enables us to "interpret" our experiences, that is, make sense (perceive, analyze, sequence, label, describe, correlate, hypothesize, theorize), gain mastery (understand, reason, make decisions, adapt, learn skills), and protect (enhance safety and a relative state of well being). Genetic and epigenetic processes produce a primary array of capability-ability clusters, and lifespan experiences con­ vert capabilities into a unique array of elaborated abilities (see Chapter 8). Higher order capabilities include highly sophisti­ cated neural repertoires for perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual processing, and for behavioral expression. So, human beings are born with brain areas that are uniquely capable of converting experiences and images of

self and world into symbolic expression. Symboling capa­ bilities must be converted, of course, into symboling abilities. Internal processing of perceived symbol-making by others, and "practice" of actual symbolic expressions, result in the

learning of symboling abilities (Deacon, 1997). In about 95°/o of normally developed people from Western cultures, large areas of the temporal and frontal lobes of the left cere­ bral hemisphere are devoted to language perception, de­ coding, acquisition, and production. Language is the pri­

mary means by which denotative perceptual and concep­ tual "meanings" are communicated (briefly described in Chapter 3). Corresponding areas of the temporal and fron­ tal lobes of the right cerebral hemisphere are devoted to spoken paralanguage perception, decoding, acquisition, and production, that is, to connotative value-emotive or prosodic "meanings". Connotative meanings in speech are embedded in patterned variations of vocal pitch, volume, quality, and duration. The hemispheric brain areas that produce language

and paralanguage are vastly integrated within (1) the tem­ poral, parietal, and frontal association areas of the neocor­

tex that integrate all sensory experience, (2) the prefrontal

neocortex that plans and sequences behavior, and (3) the limbic association areas that process value-emotive experi­ ences. Also, language and paralanguage processing are "si­ multaneous" due to interhemispheric integration mostly through the corpus callosum. Semantic processing (Greek: semantikos = significant) requires vast arrays of high-speed, specialized, and reentrantly interacting brain areas (Damasio & Damasio, 1992; Edelman, 1992, pp. 124-136). Normal human brains have far more capacity for such processing than any other creature on Earth (Deacon, 1997; Lieberman, 1984, 1991). Gazzaniga (1985, pp. 74-80, 135; 1995; 1998a,b) refers to the conscious-verbal system as the interpreter mecha­ nism or the interpreter. He and his colleagues gathered extensive research evidence that an interpreter mechanism is primarily a feature of left hemisphere processing. Ac­ cording to Gazzaniga, the interpreter mechanism excels at analyzing the details of an experience and generating inter­ pretations and verbal explanations about why events have

occurred and how they occurred. Possible alternative ex­ planations, hypotheses, or "theories" are generated about the logical meaning of events in an attempt to bring "order" and "reason" to experiences. The left hemisphere actively

categorizes specific experiences in a multifaceted, sequential context. The conscious-verbal system also protects self-

Figure I-7-3: If the corpus callosum is severed for medical reasons, nearly all axonal communications between the right and left hemispheres are prevented. [From: LEFT BRAIN, RIGHT BRAIN, 3rd Ed., by Springer and Deutsch. Copyright ©1989 by Sally P. Springer and Georg Deutsch. Used by permission of W.H. Freeman and Company.]

identity by interpreting self-behaviors as logically appro­ priate within the context in which they have occurred. Research with "split-brain" patients, and patients who have had their left hemispheres removed surgically (hemispherectomy), has produced revealing information about left hemisphere interpreter processing and about how right hemisphere interpretative processing is different. Split-brain

patients are people whose corpus callosums have been sev­ ered (callosotomy) in order to save their lives. They fre­ quently experienced intense, long-lasting grand mal seizures. Following the surgery, their two hemispheres cannot coop­ eratively correlate their perceptual, value-emotive, and con­ ceptual categorizations, and they cannot coordinate left side with right side bodily movements through their corpus callosums (Chapter 3 reviews the basic anatomy and func­ tion). When a split-brain person stares at a fixed point, the left side of the person's visual field is received through the right half of each eye, but all visual signaling is sent only to

the right hemisphere for "analysis and interpretation" (de­ scribed in Chapter 6). The right side of the visual field is received by the left half of each eye and all visual signaling is sent only to the left hemisphere for analysis and interpre­ tation (see Figure I-7-3). In a person with an intact brain, all internal

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Figure I-7-4: In this example of right-hemisphere comprehension, a split-brain patient was asked notto draw what he actually saw, but instead to draw a picture of "what goes on it." He drew an English saddle. Subsequently, he was asked to draw what he saw. [FromM. Gazzaniga, The Social Brain, Copyright ©1985, HarperCollins Publishers. Used with permission.]

the visual information would be shared equally in both hemispheres, and each hemisphere would cooperatively participate in analysis and interpretation. In one experiment carried out by Gazzaniga and as­ sociates (1978; 1985, pp. 95-97), the word horse was shown to J.W, a split-brain patient At that time, J.W. had the abil­ ity to comprehend language with right hemisphere pro­ cessing, but could not use right hemisphere processing to produce spoken language. The word was shown only to J.Ws left visual field, thus only to his right hemisphere (see Figure I-7-4). J.W. was asked, "What was it?" Answer: "I don't know" The right hemisphere did not have the ability to use

spoken language to describe the image it had received, but

the left hemisphere had seen nothing and "said so". He was then told, "Draw with your left hand a picture of what goes on the word I flashed" Reply: "But I didn't see anything. How can I draw what goes on something that I didn't see?" Reply: "Oh, go ahead and let that left hand try"

A pencil was placed into his left hand (controlled by his right hemisphere which had received the image "horse").

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Figure I-7-5: Two problems ("What goes with what?") are presented simultaneously to a split-brain patient. The problem posed to the talking left hemisphere is perceived with conscious awareness, and the one posed to the nontalking right hemisphere is perceived without conscious awareness. The answers for both problems are available in full view in front of the patient. See narrative for description of patient's reaction. [Reprinted with permission from M.S. Gazzaniga & J. LeDoux (1978), The Integrated Mind, New York: Plenum Publishing.]

He proceeded to draw a picture of a saddle with his left hand. He also was asked to draw what he had seen, and a horse was drawn. This kind of experiment has been repli­

cated in other patients with the same result

It demon­

strates other-than-conscious, implicit perception and direc­

tion of behavior in the bodyminds of split-brain patients. In another experiment (Gazzaniga, 1985, pp. 70-73;

see Figure I-7-5), P.S.'s left hemisphere was flashed a picture of a chicken claw, and simultaneously his right hemisphere

was flashed a picture of a snow scene in front of a house. The pictures were shown with a tachistoscope which was programmed to flash pictures in less time than eyes would take to shift either to the left or right. A row of four cards

depicting various objects was placed in front of P.S's right hand and another four cards was placed in front of his left

hand. The question was asked, "What goes with what?" The patient's left hand (operated by the right hemisphere)

typically pointed to a shovel, and the right hand to the

head of a chicken.

The response discrepancy was then

pointed out to P.S.'s language-capable left hemisphere, and

he was asked, "Why did you do that?"

Reply: "Oh, that's easy. The chicken claw goes with the chicken and you need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed." In this experiment, the left hemisphere's consciousverbal system did not see the snow scene, and pointing to the shovel was an "illogical" response to the chicken claw. The language-capable left hemisphere was put in the posi­ tion of having to explain that illogical behavior. So, the

shows, however, that the interpreter creates explanations for self-behavior or environmental events, even when there is no logical reason for the events or self-behavior. This interpreter tendency is quite common among people with intact brains. Gazzaniga (1998a, pp. 156, 157) suggests an informal ex­ periment that reveals this tendency, and it can be carried out by anyone who has the courage to do it. Before starting the test, prepare a completely randomized list of about 30 "yes" and "no" answers, with three or four consecutive "yes" answers in the middle of the list and again at the end. Select a subject for the experiment (people who "know-it-all" are the best subjects, according to Gazzaniga). You may say to that person, "I just learned a fun test of reasoning ability-an intelligence experiment. I know a sequence of numbers

conscious-verbal system created a "logical" connection in order to explain the observed behavior. In yet another experiment (Gazzaniga, 1985, pp. 75-

between one and 100 and the sequence follows a logical pattern. To figure out the pattern, you ask me no more than

77), a sophisticated device was used to control which hemi­ sphere was observing a series of films which were intended to elicit strong emotional reaction-some pleasant, some un­ pleasant. One film showed people throwing others into a fire. After she had observed it from her left visual field to her right hemisphere, patient VP. responded this way: M. Gazzaniga: What did you see? VP: I don't really know what I saw. I think just a

quence and how it is patterned" After each question or number guess is offered, the

white flash. M.G: Were there people in it? VP: I don't think so. Maybe just some trees, red trees like in the fall. M.G: Did it make you feel any emotion? VP: I don't really know why but I'm kind of scared. I feel jumpy. I think maybe I don't like this room, or maybe it's you. You're getting me nervous. (The patient then said to an assistant) I know I like Dr. Gazzaniga, but right now I'm scared of him for some reason"

VPs bodywide sensory response to the film was me­ diated by limbic, brainstem, endocrine system, and periph­ eral interoceptive processing that have whole-body, precortical, sensorimotor linkage, such that both hemispheres receive the results of that processing . VPs conscious-ver­ bal interpreter (left hemisphere) then generated an explana­ tion for the bodily feelings that had no apparent cause. So, the interpreter creates reasonable, logical explana­ tions for events and self-behavior. The research clearly

30 yes/no questions about which numbers are in the se­

experimenter responds with the answers from the prede­ termined sequence of yes/no answers. After the first series of consecutive "yes" answers, tell the subject that he or she is doing well and ask if they have a theory about the pat­ tern. Ask what the theory is, and then observe their inter­ preter go to work. Gazzaniga describes the result as "...a frightening spew of gibberish....The (interpreter) insists on generating a theory, even though there really is nothing to

generate one about. The (subject), usually mortified, will not speak to you for a month." In its "enthusiasm" for generating explanations, the interpreter commonly produces inaccurate interpretations of experience, which may be followed by inaccurate reinter­ pretations, especially when defending one's own behavior (self-protection). When an inconsistency between verbally stated beliefs and actual behavior is pointed out, the inter­

preter commonly reinterprets the belief or the situation to justify the behavior.

The interpreter can produce conceptual overgeneralizations about perceived people, places, things, and events. If a large group of people are categorized by one or more common features, and a few of them behave inappropriately, some interpreters may say, "Well, all of those people behave that way. They're always getting into trouble.

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They never do the right thing" And the "offenders" may say "But everyone does that!" Interpreters also commonly construct an altered, pos­ sible past (memory) as opposed to an accurate one. When describing a recent episodic memory, interpreters commonly embellish the event in order to enhance their own role in a successful accomplishment, or to clearly disassociate them­

pable of acquiring a considerable degree of language ability

selves from an unsuccessful one. Such altered interpreta­ tions can create altered, inaccurate, or false memories that are then consolidated in memory as though they were real (Gazzaniga, 1998; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). When two or more people are eyewitnesses to the same event, they each are exposed to the same people, places, things, and tempo­ ral sequences that constituted the event. Variations in eye­ witness accounts of an event commonly occur during a post-event description of it. Typically, the interpreter mecha­

the present moment and responds literally to that input, thus a literal observer mechanism, the observer, can be pro­ posed. If the words "Take a walk" are flashed to the right hemispheres of seated split-brain people, many of them will rise to leave. If they are asked why they are leaving, a typi­ cal reply from the left hemisphere interpreter might be, "Oh, I need a drink of water" So, the right hemisphere's percep­

nism inserts elements of the event that did not actually oc­ cur. The left hemispheres of split-brain patients report many

(Gazzaniga, et al., 1996). Studies suggest, however, that ar­ eas within the right hemisphere do participate in conscious

sensory awareness and behavioral responses, and process a notable degree of language comprehension (Chiarello, 1991; Gazzaniga, 1998a; Hagoort, et al., 1996). The right hemisphere just observes sensory input in

tions and reactions are literal or "truthful", and accurate memories are formed and acted upon. fMRI research has indicated that when people with intact brains recollect memories accurately, only the right hippocampus is acti­

inaccuracies when they are asked to provide "eyewitness

vated (Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998). Both the left and right

accounts" (Phelps & Gazzaniga, 1992; Metcalfe, et al., 1995; Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998a). Ceci and colleagues (1994) had preschool children ran­ domly select cards that had descriptions of events on them. Some of the events had actually happened to the children and some had not. When questioned several weeks later about whether or not a nonevent had actually happened to them, 58°/o of the children said that at least one nonevent

hippocampi are activated when false memories are recalled. Whereas the left hemisphere interpreter places experi­ ences into larger sequential but interrelated contexts, the right hemisphere is structured to attend more to whole pat­ terns of the perceived current environment (Gazzaniga, 1995; Gazzaniga, 1998a,b; Metcalfe, et al., 1995). In people with intact brains, the two hemispheres are always co-active, but which processing orientation predominates? The answers to that are currently under research. One theory is that the

had actually happened to them, and 25°/o elaborated false

details about a majority of the nonevents. In many cases of

"repressed memories" of traumatic events, interrogators or psychologist examiners have helped the interpreter mecha­ nisms in their clients to construct false memories (Ceci & Loftus, 1994; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994; Loftus, et al., 1995; Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998). The left and right cerebral hemispheres internally pro­ cess perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categoriza­ tions differently, and they produce behavioral expressions differently. Unlike the left hemisphere interpreter, the right hemisphere does not interpret perceptions to construct ex­

planations or "deeper meanings". Neuroimaging and re­ search with split-brain and hemispherectomy patients has

shown that the right cerebral hemisphere can only produce rudimentary (one-to-two word) spoken language (Bogen, 1997; Gazzaniga, 1998b, Hamilton, 1986), although it is ca­ 110

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dominance depends on the nature of a current situation, and of past experiences that have "shaped" global activa­ tion patterns in the brain. A teacher who is experienced in nonverbal commu­ nications (Anna Langness, Ph.D., Boulder Valley Public

Schools, Colorado) once portrayed the nonverbal commu­ nications that three stereotypical teachers might habitually

produce. No vocal sounds were emitted, that is, neither language nor paralanguage was used. Only postural move­

ment, arm-hand gestures, facial expressions, and arrange­ ments of clothing were used while pretending to teach stu­ dents in a classroom. An observing group of 12 educators

were asked to note their observations of the three teachers. After the experience, the teachers were asked to share their observations verbally, and they were listed on a chalkboard. Of 68 observations, 57 (84°/o) were categorized as "judg­

mental interpretations" of the teachers' behaviors. They in­ cluded such phrases as, "very sloppy person," " emotionally cold", "looked angry", or "too enthusiastic". These expres­ sions would be typical of a left hemisphere interpreter mechanism. On the other hand, 11 (16%) of the observa­ tions were literally descriptive of what was seen, such as, "bra strap was showing", "did not smile", or "facial expres­ sions were often exaggerated". These expressions would be typical of a right hemisphere that just sees, hears, and senses what it observes, and then influences the left hemisphere to describe same in language. Human Communication and Linguistic Expressions Formed by ‘Interpreter Mechanisms’ People express their interpretations of experience much more frequently in spoken than in written language. In

creating and in perceiving language-embedded interpreta­ tions, human beings draw on their unique array of accu­ mulated perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual catego­ rizations of people, places, things, and events (memories), including their experiences with language symbols. The selection and interpretation of denotative linguistic sym­ bols is a critical part of what interpreter mechanisms do. Human beings are not born with pre-encoded lan­ guage labels for the people (including self), places, things, and events that they encounter or will encounter. Histori­ cally, neural processing capacities proliferated in human

bodyminds as human cultures, and the use of symbolic reference, became elaborated (Deacon, 1997, pp. 334-340). Label words (nouns), action words (verbs), and modifier words (adjectives for nouns, adverbs for verbs) were devised, along with grammatical function words that convey the parsing of "meaning units" within sentences (conjunctions like and, or, but, for example) (Caramazza & Hillis, 1991; Deacon, 1997, p. 284; Edelman, 1989, pp. 147-148, 173-192; 1992, pp. 124136,237-252; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Macnamara, 1982; Millikan, 1984). Nouns and verbs were the first language sounds that human beings devised. Nouns are label words that "stand

for" entities that have material substance, that is, a concrete, bordered, physical existence. Their symbolic reference is indexical, that is, this combination of sounds refers to that material object or that category of material objects. Water,

air, dirt, tooth, mountain, wrench, chair, shirt, boat, and human

being are examples. Over time, human beings developed increased capa­ bility for self-awareness, social interaction with other people, and critical evaluation of ongoing events. As those capa­

bilities were converted into abilities, there arose a need for a

linguistic ensymboling of these complex processes during human discourse. For example, the array of feeling-state sensations that occur during longer-lasting human relation­

ships were not concrete objects like carving tools were, nor was the performance of complex social roles like mating and child nurturance. These complex experiences did not have concrete material characteristics, but noun-words were the only naming words that could be devised. So, human beings used their noun-making abilities to create a category of label words that were noun-like, but stood for complex phenomena that were more interpretative in nature. Such words are now referred to as nominalizations. Nominalizations are concept category words. Most of them are richly enmeshed with nonverbal value-emotive categorizations. Rather than symbolizing concrete entities, nominalizations symbolize complex, multi-patterned, multirelational phenomena, an evolving-event reality. What they represent is abstract and obscured from direct perception. They cannot be seen, heard, or touched by anyone's hands, or tossed back and forth. Nominalizations can produc­ tively facilitate human communication in many ways, but they also can "build limiting familiarity fences" around con­ cepts that can prevent a global appreciation of the complex,

dynamic, multifaceted nature of what they "stand for". So, conscious, analytic description of nominalized phenomena is quite challenging. For example, just what is mind, bodymind, self, thought, cognition, memory, intelligence, feeling, emotion, subjec­ tive experience, hope, attitude, motive, motivation, belief, value, qual­ ity, intention, learning, philosophy, science, even a voice. Other nominalizations are concept words for various complex behavior patterns or roles that human beings en­

act during social interactions, such as teacher, principal, artist, philosopher, scientist, clergy, physician, patient, nurse, psychologist, lawyer, officer, executive, white collar worker, blue collar worker, secre­ tary, corporation, employee, mayor, governor, president, singer, speaker, wife, husband, mother, father, parent, child, daughter, son, friend, peer. Can you touch "teacher-ness", or hold "artist-ness" in your

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hands, or go to a store and buy replacement parts for "lawyer-ness"? One can argue, therefore, that nominalizations are derived from a culture's interpretative language labeling of nonphysical, complex, process-oriented phenomena, and value-emotive biasing is frequently involved. They usually do not exist without two or more human beings to produce whatever the categorical phenomena actually are. Nominalizations are often used when an interpreter mecha­ nism is: 1. overgeneralizing ["Students these days just don't...."; "Teachers always/never..."; "My child always/never..."]

2. parsing or compartmentalizing complex, process-oriented, conceptual relationships [mind vs. body; cognition vs. emotion; objective vs. subjective; cognitiveaffective-psychomotor; young human being vs. student;

human being vs. patient or customer or politician or voter, or...; human being vs. Caucasian or African-American or Indian or...; human being vs. Christian or Muslim or Jew or atheist or...; political history-art history-music history-lit­

erary history; psychology-sociology-neurology-endocrinology-immunology; information about vs. direct experience with or doing and creating; speaking voice vs. singing voice]. [Author's Note: For additional examples of nominalizations,

see the Addendum at the end of the chapter] Many ofthe linguistic labels that are commonly used today were originated during prescientific or early scientific times as human interpreters were trying to make sense and gain mastery of the world. For example, people still com­ monly behave and talk as though nonphysical minds in­ habit human bodies and operate them. Within that tradi­ tion, one manifestation of mind is pure logical reasoning and

another is nonlogical emotions. A logical conclusion, then, is that reasoning and emotions are separate and competing manifestations of mind. But, check the assumption on which that logic is based—minds are non-physical. At the most general descriptive level, what we label as feelings and emotions can be categorized under two headings, pleasant or positive, and unpleasant or negative. The word feel­ ing (Old English: felan; Old Saxon: gifolian; Old High Ger­ man: fuolen = sensing) is a commonly used, colloquial nominalization. Linguistically, it is used in many symbolic 112

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contexts. For example, such expressions as "I feel...(good, bad, indifferent, happy, sad)"; "That feels...(rough, soft, hard)"; "You hurt my feelings"; "How did that make you feel?" refer to different semantic categories. At all times, human bodyminds with normally func­ tioning anatomy and physiology, experience relatively steady background feeling states (explained previously). When individual persons experience feelings, the "intensity" of the body's physio chemical states have been elevated above the intensity of background states. When feelings are experi­ enced, particular recipes of neuron networks are activated and particular recipes of transmitter molecules ofthe endo­ crine and immune systems are released in varied intensities. The sensory domain of the nervous system then is acti­ vated by the particular physio chemical changes that have occurred, and the person then can perceive a categorical change in the status ofthe body. Feelings, therefore, are re­ lated to value-emotive categorizations in the nervous sys­ tem and all memories are feeling-tagged. In a context of internal body state changes, the word emotion (Latin: emovere = to move out, expel) is often used interchangeably with feeling. Both words refer to relatively intense physio chemical body states, but among speakers of English, emotions (1) are associated with defined categories of hu­ man experience, and (2) have been given nominalized language la­ bels. The most colloquially used emotion labels are love and hate. Various psychologists have indicated that there are anywhere from 4 to 17 basic emotions. Sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and happiness are commonly cited in the literature on emotions. Ekman (1992a) and Panksepp (1998) also list rage, anxiety, distress, awe, amusement, satisfaction, nurturance, con­ tempt, panic, lust, embarrassment, guilt, shame, relief, interest, and pride in achievement. Some emotion labels are associated with specific types of experiences, such as jealousy, homesickness, envy. In order to qualify as a categorically distinct, basic emotion, Ekman proposes seven defining criteria: (1) auto­

matic appraisal, (2) commonalities in antecedent events, (3) presence in other primates, (4) quick onset, (5) brief dura­ tion, (6) unbidden occurrence, and (7) distinctive physiol­ ogy.

Damasio (1994, pp. 131-142) proposes primary and secondary emotion categories. Primary emotions are in­

nate and meet Ekman's criteria. They are generated by auto­

matic neural processes that are "prewired" into our limbic

and brainstem systems during prenatal gestation. They are triggered when certain features of our world occur (large

creature size, type of motion, certain sounds) and certain configurations of internal body state occur. Secondary emo­ tions are acquired or learned from our particular experiences with people, places, things, and events. Areas within the cerebral cortices, especially the prefrontal cortex, are neces­ sarily engaged in their triggering and formation into memory. The cerebral areas entrain the prewired limbic and brainstem

networks, and the endocrine system, to produce the inter­ nal state characteristics that we sense when we experience learned emotions. The neural areas that produce emotions have access to motor systems so that emotional behavior can be triggered (Holstege, et al., 1996). Emotional behavior can then be observed by other people who are present, and at times, by the behaver. Word labels such as feeling, emotion, happiness, or fear, are not the actual physio chemical states of bodyminds. Various word labels (nominalizations) have become com­ monly used as denotative symbols for various complex and dynamic, but categorically different, physio chemical body states. The written notations of a musical composition are analogous. Notation symbols are not the actual music. They are a symbolic blueprint that "stands for" the actual sounded musical expressions. In other words, human left-hemi­ sphere-prominent interpreter mechanisms have invented in­ terpretative, conceptual word labels that serve as linguistic

symbols for categorically distinguishable, internally sensed, physio chemical body-states that may result in behaviors

such as facial expressions. Emotions, therefore, are processed by a linkage of brain areas that process value-emotive and higher order concep­ tual categorizations. For example, the physio chemical states that are referred to as love are highly varied in intensity and are associated with different categories of people, places, things, and events. Love for a parent or sibling is very dif­ ferent from love for a potential or actual mate, and those loves are different from love for a toy, an automobile, a city, a style of music, or a platonic friend. The constitution of each of those people-place-thing-event-related physio chemical states change over time as experiences change. So, the words that speakers of English use to label these physiochemical body states are not nouns.

Physio chemical body states cannot be literally held or touched or bounced or tossed. Neither the words feeling and emotion, nor the word labels for the various types of emotion symbolize a concrete, bordered, material entity. Anger, fear, sadness, happiness, and so forth, are used as though they refer to "entities" that have concrete, material existence. For example, "Your emotions get in your way"; "I just want

to be happy"; "pursuit of happiness"; "I was overtaken by fear"; "Get control of your anger". Again, these "affect" words are interpretative conceptual word labels for dynamic, mul­ tidimensional, electrophysio chemical body states that are complex, variable, evolving-event realities. When people be­ have in an angry or fearful, or happy way, we can assume that their immediate and past histories of feeling-tagged ex­ periences were instrumental in triggering the emotional dis­ plays. Psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists use these same nominalizations when they scientifically investigate feelings and emotions. They debate about what emotions ac­ tually are and how we know when we, or other people, are "having an emotion". The challenge that they face is that the symbol systems that are used to describe emotions (lan­ guage and sometimes mathematics) impose limitations on the description. Denotative language symboling is linear, serial-sequential, this-then-that. Language is helpful when

it is used to describe objects and their actions in the physi­ cal world using nouns, verbs, and their modifiers. But phe­ nomena that are simultaneously multilayered, multi-interconnected, and multidimensional processes that occur in complex temporal relationships and are represented in bodyminds as memories that can affect future behavior, do not lend themselves well to denotative description. Can you use descriptive words to convey exactly how fear or anger or happiness feels? That's why nominalizations, meta­ phors, and analogies are commonly used to describe analy­ ses of feelings and emotions-including scientific analyses. The problem is that nearly all of us, including the scientists, have assumed that such nominalizations as feel­ ing, emotion, fear, anger, disgust, sadness, happiness, and joy are nouns. We behave as though such language labels refer to

something that is material. Some scientists have looked for

the places in the brain where those different emotions are

processed. There are identifiable areas of the brain that are dedicated to processing what we refer to as feelings and internal

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emotions, but their interconnections to a vast array of other neural networks and neurochemical processes are unique in each person and are experience-dependent (Black, et al., 1990; Cahill, et al., 1996; Greenough & Black, 1992; Kirkwood, et al., 1996; LeDoux, 1990; Leon, 1992; Phelps & Anderson, 1997). Feelings and emotions are established and altered mostly by lifelong interactions with, and evolving adapta­

tions to, the people places, things, and events that have been encountered. For example, some people react to nonpoisonous snakes as a source of threat, while others relate to them as home pets. Why is this important? How does the difference between nouns and nominalizations relate to learning, teaching, self­ identity, and human communication?

Nominalizations and the Depersonalized Objectification of Human Beings When a category of experience is assigned a nominalized word label or description, the concept becomes "surrounded by a familiarity fence", and becomes bound in memory with an implicit "concreteness" or "bordered object-ness". In other words, nominalizations for complex, dynamic processes can take on a "misplaced concreteness" (a term used by the philosopher A.N. Whitehead, cited in Deacon, 1997, p. 286). When that happens, nominalizations are used as though they are nouns that symbolize an "objec­ tive reality". That misplaced concreteness can inhibit an under­ standing of the complex, dynamic, multidimensional na­

ture of what nominalizations symbolize. As a result, open­

ness to conceptual modification may then be reduced or eliminated, and personal behavior patterns that the nominalizations support may become "solidified" and au­ tomatic. Altering those solidified conceptual or behavioral patterns will then be quite challenging. As use of a nominalization becomes more widespread among mem­ bers of a society of human beings, their "concrete objectiv­ ity" can become implicitly assumed so that their actual com­ plexities are rarely examined for a more accurate and com­

plete understanding. Sunrise and sunset are examples. So are feeling and emotion. A voice educator purchases a plastic model of a hu­ man larynx. By studying it, the teacher learns more clearly how voices are made and how they function. The teacher 114

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then uses the model to help learners understand what their own voices do when they speak and sing. Each time the model is used, the teacher thinks, "This is neat. The model helps me become a more effective teacher of expressive voice skills." The value of material objects to human beings de­ pends on their usefulness in accomplishing goal-oriented or purposeful behaviors. A material object (the model) is a means to a constructive end and a pleasant "feeling connec­ tion" to the object becomes part of a memory formation.

Material objects are not like human beings, of course. The larynx model did not argue about how it was being used. It did not extract a promise from the teacher that it would be the only model used for teaching, and it did not give the teacher flowers after its successful use in teaching about voice skills.

A crucial key to human interaction is the outcome of the fronto-limbic system's threat-benefit categorizations.

Human beings who have contributed to our personal sur­ vival, and to prominent degrees of safety and need fulfill­ ment, are rarely categorized in the same way that material objects are categorized. "Significant others" are rarely con­ ceived of as useful material objects like a hammer, a car, or a building. When initial experiences with one human being (or a group) are categorized as nonthreatening and benefi­

cial to constructive well being, then pleasant feelings and

empathic emotions tend to be experienced and co-categorized with familiar perceptual-conceptual categorizations. When benefit, pleasant feelings, and familiar percepts-concepts are co-categorized, then personalized nominalizations are spoken that enhance constructive human interactions. They tend to reflect a growing emotional bond or connec­ tion, and the interactions may be described as respectful, affiliative, empathic, mutually supportive, caring, or loving. Nominalizations such as friend, good guy, pal, buddy, team member, and friend are likely to be spoken. The interpreter mecha­ nism, then, tends to generalize that reaction to other human

beings who have similar physical and behavioral charac­ teristics. On the other hand, human beings who have not con­ tributed to our survival, safety, and need fulfillment, and who are: (1) unfamiliar (strangers), (2) have physical fea­ tures that are noticeably different from familiar people, (3) dress differently, (4) talk differently, and (5) behave differ­

ently, are likely to be categorized by normal bodyminds as high in potential threat value. That categorization triggers

some degree of an unpleasant feeling state that is co-categorized with the unfamiliar or different perceptual-conceptual categorizations. An emotional disconnection is more likely and possible protective behaviors are called into working memory in case they are needed (avoidance, isolation, counter threat). The emotional-behavioral reaction may be described as ranging from vigilant wariness, suspicious, on-edge, disrespectful, antagonistic, accusatory, to belligerent. Over time, a typical result of threat-benefit categoriza­

tions is that human beings become divided into defined social groupings (addressed in Chapter 9). In-group (famil­ iar-pleasant) and out-group (unfamiliar-unpleasant) social hi­

protect citizens from harm and help them when in certain

types of need. But in some people, those pleasant, or at least neutral nominalizations do not always produce inter­ pretations of safety and service. The terms student and teacher also were intended to be at least neutral value-emotive labels that simply denoted particular complex roles for human interaction. When threat

to well being is the more frequent value-emotive experi­ ence between students and teachers, however, then the la­ bels begin to be used as though they were nouns, and can be imbued with a depersonalized, non-empathic and ob­ jectified feeling-meaning. When that happens, then human beings are more likely to treat each other as though they are inanimate objects rather than complex fellow human be­

erarchies may be formed that range from cliques to orga­

ings. Disrespectful interactions then become easier, maybe

nized associations to whole cultures and subcultures. In­

more likely, between students and teachers. Chapter 9 addresses this challenge.

terpreter mechanisms, then, can easily assign noun-like word labels to the familiar-pleasant in-group people that express

empathic connectedness. And they can easily assign noun­ like word labels to the unfamiliar or different out-group people, so that they can be interacted without empathy, as though they were depersonalized objects. In the United States, nominalizations such as jock, nerd, geek, dummy, bully, enemy, gook, white trash, whitey, redskin, wetback, polack, jew', and nigger may be spoken. The interpreter mechanism, then,

tends to generalize that reaction to other human beings who have similar physical and behavioral characteristics. The nominalized word label(s) help consolidate all of the cat­ egorizations into a bordered concreteness and an indelible memory. These types of nominalization enable a depersonal­

ized, non-empathetic objectification of human beings. And that makes emotionally or physically hurtful behavior to­ ward them easier.

Originally neutral, well intended nominalizations can take on these depersonalized and objectified characteristics. Does your body-state change when you are driving your automobile and you see a police patrol car in your rear­ view mirror? If so, was the feeling pleasant or unpleasant? Most people automatically react with an unpleasant feeling state and protective behavior. In the United States, the terms police, policeman, and police officer were originally intended as references to people who were hired by governments to

Nominalizations and the Compartmentalization of Complex, Dynamic Phenomena 1. An imaginary academic conference on music learning is

announced. The conference is titled "Cognitive Processes of Children in Music Education". The term cognitive processes is defined as the men­

tal operations or structures that children use when engaged in musical activity. 2. A group of music educators are setting goals for a school system's music program. They list curriculum goals and teaching activities under three categorical headings: (1) cognitive, (2) psy­ chomotor, and (3) affective. 3. A professor publishes a book that is titled "Musical Think­ ing" All of the key terms in the previous list are nominalizations that represent explicit knowledge that has been generated by human interpreter mechanisms. They convey the following implicit assumptions. Assumption #1. Mind (mental operations) is a dis­ embodied, depersonalized collection of cognitive structures, de­ vices, or processes that produce psychological phenomena. The structures or devices are subdivisions of the mind, and therfore, they have nothing to do with the physio chemical processes of the body. [Cognitive psychology is the professional

internal

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discipline that theorizes about and studies these cognitive processes, structures, and devices.] Assumption #2. The human mind is divisible into separate operational domains: cognitive operations, psychomo­ tor operations, and affective operations. A consequence of this implicit assumption is that when teachers are engaging stu­

dents in cognitive activities, then psychomotor and affective phenomena are regarded as inconsequential, or not occur­ ring at all, and may not be attended to. Assumption #3. The most important activities in mu­ sic education are those that emphasize musical cognition and conscious analytical thinking. When mind is conceived in these ways, then music educators are more likely to pay a great deal of attention to the consciously controlled, cognitive, reasoning, thinking and sequential aspects of music learning. Compartmentalizing mind into cognitive, affective, and psychomotor operations implies that the three mental processes can be activated independently of each other as though they were disembodied. When stu­ dents engage in musical activities, are they expected to shut off their affective neural processing when cognitive activi­ ties are undertaken? How much time will be devoted to experiencing and gaining insight into the human-expres­ sive affective and psychomotor aspects of music. [Have you ever seen a choir singing expressive text and music

with expression-less faces and bodies?] If the value-emo­ tive or expressive dimension of music is minimized and its perceptual-conceptual-cognitive dimensions are maximized, then might we be saying that musical thinking is the reason that it came into existence in the first place? (elaborated upon later, and in Chapters 8 and 9). When the above interpretations are compared to what actually happens in whole bodyminds, they are shown to be only partially valid or completely invalid. The use of nominalizations to label and describe the "parts and sub­ parts" of complex, ever-evolving phenomena can result in

incomplete and inaccurate perceptions and conceptions, and misplaced value-emotive categorizations. Future perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categorizations, and behav­ ioral interactions with people and events, then, are likely to be less constructive and productive than might be possible. For example, when schools are conceived of as places where cognitive learning takes place, then social-emotional self­ regulation aspects of human beings will often be conceived

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of as interferences with the "true purpose" of education or

as inconsequential to the mission of schools. "Quick fixes" for discipline problems may intensify protective behaviors in

students (and teachers), and the development of empathic re­ latedness and self-reliant autonomy may be disparaged as

evidence of a decline in academic rigor (addressed in Chapter 9).

Connotative Language, Paralanguage, and the Arts Higher order processing enables us to perceive, ac­

quire, and produce sounded, written, and gestured (signed) symbol systems that have a relatively direct, literal, logical, one-to-one correspondence to the world as we have expe­ rienced it. Languages and mathematics provide us with these denotative references to our perceptual, value-emo­ tive, and conceptual categorizations. Symbolic communication over thousands of years has resulted in a linguistic and mathematical heritage that is shared, in varying degrees, with other human beings. The neural networks that enable the perception, acquisition, and production of written language symbols are "built onto" the already formed neural networks that produce spoken language, and are dependent on prior development of spo­ ken language (phonology).

Language is, of course, a common part of episodic events. If particular words have been used frequently enough over a person's life-span, and nearly always in an unpleas­ ant feeling context, eventually a version of the unpleasant

feeling can be triggered just by hearing those words spoken-an implicit emotional memory. If particular words

have been used frequently enough in a pleasant feeling con­ text, eventually a version of the pleasant feeling can be trig­

gered just by hearing those words spoken. Higher order processing also enables us to perceive, acquire, and produce gestured and sounded symbolic com­ munication that has an indirect, implied, figurative, met­ onymic, metaphoric, evocative, analogical, and "holographic" correspondence to current or accumulated feeling states as we have experienced them. Primarily, these symbolic modes are connotative references to value-emotive categoriza­ tions of the experienced world. People use language figura­ tively, for instance, when they say a word or phrase that

has a literal denotative reference but they "refigure" that ref­ erence so that it connotes a related but amplified valueemotive significance. For example, a common metonym is the use of Washington or London to signify complex national government events in the United States and the United King­ dom, rather than as labels for the cities in which those gov­

erning events take place. Metaphors create an implicit comparison of denota­ tive and connotative references that result in a change in bodily feeling states that can be described as a feeling mean­ ing. They are commonly used in the story arts and poetry. An example would be the feeling meaning in the words September and November in the popular "September Song". The months that occur toward the end of each year are meta­ phors for the closing years of a human life. To a six year old child, a song about a caterpillar becoming a butterfly is just a song about a caterpillar becoming butterfly. Some­ time during the ages of 9 to 11 years, the butterfly can ex­ press the transformation of "my soaring spirit" (see the de­ scription of brain growth spurts and cognitive develop­ ment in Chapter 8).

During the production and interpretation of meta­ phoric language, implicit semantic memories and implicit emotional memories are evoked. Linguists refer to such neural network processing as a transderivational search. Various higher order neural networks search for any expe­ riential memory that may be associated with the metaphoric expression. Although specific episodic memories do not arise in conscious awareness, a "feeling of knowing" commonly

occurs and "feeling meaning" is assigned to the metaphor (value-emotive categorization). Paralanguage occurs when prosody is co-produced with spoken language, that is, socially established patterns of vocal pitch contour, volume contour, voice quality, and

durational variation. Prosody is the primary means by which the "feeling meanings" of spoken words are expressed (Ross, 1981,1984,1996; Ross, etal., 1981,1988). Paralanguage is a right hemisphere temporal-frontal function that is inte­ grated with the left hemisphere's language function (in about 95°/o of people in Western cultures). Right hemisphere pro­ cessing also appears to influence the selection of figurative or metaphoric language. Higher order processing also enables more elaborated symbolic modes by which human beings can (1) make sense

of their world, (2) gain mastery over it and themselves, and

(3) ensymbol expressions of a self's life experiences. The

feeling or emotional flow of life experiences can be for­ mally ensymboled by designing and constructing objects

or shapes in space, sounds in time, and bodily movements

in space and time. A human being's life history of visual, auditory, and somatic senses (perceptual categorizations) and feelings-emotions (value-emotive categorizations) and the interrelationships between people, places, things, and events (conceptual categorizations) are the resources from which the expressive designs are constructed. These symbolic modes are referred to as the arts, that is, music, dance, story, reenactment (ritual and theatre), draw­ ing, painting, sculpture, decoration, and so forth. Some origi­

nal creators of these designed self-expressions are referred to as painters, sculptors, composers, writers, poets, and choreogra­ phers. Interpretative re-creators of original creations are re­ ferred to as performers, singers, instrument players, conductors, ac­ tors, directors, and dancers. The crafted designs that some people create can be formed and performed in such a way that they evoke an empathic physio chemical reaction inside perceiving human bodyminds (Hodges, 1996; Wallin, 1991). The reaction is very much like the ebb and flow of the physio chemical states that are responses to actual life experiences, that is, feelings. Perception of the designs tends to elicit a form of memory-wide transderivational search for implicit valueemotive categorizations that bear a formal symmetry to salient features of the designs. The response is a triggering of the brain's perceptual and value-emotive categorization circuits (listed earlier) that, in turn, trigger physio chemical changes in the body. These internal processing events can be referred to as as-iffeeling states (Chen, et al., 1996; Damasio, 1994, pp. 127-164, especially 145,146; LeDoux, 1986; LeDoux, 1990; LeDoux, et al., 1984; LeDoux, et al., 1990; LeDoux, et al., 1991; more details in Chapter 8).

So, the arts are symbolic modes that human beings have invented and elaborated over millennia of time. They involve nonspecific, whole-form symbolic designs that are capable of marshaling a large range of bodymind processes that are integrated with experiential memories and their as­ sociated emotional memories. "Memoried" perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categorizations are the gen­ eral resources that bodyminds draw on for these forms of internal

processing

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self-expression. Many, perhaps most, are implicit memo­

Internal Processing and Health

ries so that the memories are not of specific episodes that

occurred in the past, but of general "forms" or intensity varia­ tions in feeling reactions—as-if feeling states. Visual perceptual and value-emotive categorizations are the primary resources for symbolic self-expression through created designs/shapes/colors/light-dark shadings in the

spatial dimension. The designs are analogues to, and trig­ gers for, visual-dominant as-if feeling states in their human being creators. The designs are perceived visually by other

human beings and also may be analogues and triggers for visual-dominant feeling states in their bodyminds. Draw­ ings, paintings, and sculptures are forms that these expres­

sions take. Somatosensory/kinesthetic perceptual and value-emotive cat­ egorizations are the primary resources for symbolic self-ex­ pression through creations of designed physical movement. They function as analogues to, and triggers for, kinesthesia­ dominant as-if feeling states in their human being creators.

The nervous, endocrine, and immune systems are in­ terconnected by way of highly elaborated physio chemical,

psychosomatic networks (Blalock, et al., 1985; Pert, et al., 1985; Ader, et al., 1991; Maier, et al., 1994; Pert, 1997). The

scientific evidence has been in for several decades now, that longer-lasting, unpleasant, distressful, and threatening life

circumstances adversely affect health in human beings. Strong scientific evidence also supports the conclusion that longer-lasting pleasant, reasonably eustressful, and construc­ tive life circumstances can enhance health in human beings (Rossi, 1993). Chapters 2 and 5 present some of the physi­ cal evidence and Book III, Chapters 8 and 12 through 14 present documented suggestions for pointing behavior to­ ward the constructive, healthy way. Because the arts can

engage human beings in constructive, self-expressive experi­

ences, and because they engage the physio chemical states of

monly combined with music) and mime are forms that these

the body that are referred to as feelings, emotions, or affect, they can be very valuable in a wide variety of therapeutic, health-enhancing, disease preventive applications (see ref­ erences section under the heading, "The Arts, the Immune System, and Health").

expressions take. Auditory perceptual and value-emotive categorizations are the primary resources for symbolic self-expression through

References and Selected Bibliography

The designs are perceived visually by other human beings

and also may be analogues and triggers for kinesthesia­ dominant feeling states in their bodyminds. Dance (com­

creations of sound-through-time designs. They function as analogues to, and triggers for, auditory-dominant feeling states in their human being creators. The designs are per­

ceived aurally by other human beings and also may be

analogues and triggers for auditory-dominant as-if feeling states in their bodyminds. Music, word metaphors, poetry and spoken/written story literature are forms that these ex­ pressions take. Language is primarily based in the auditory sense. Singing combines the symbolic modes of language and music. Two or more of our sensory modes may be com­ bined with their value-emotive categorizations in the cre­ ation of self-expressive symbolic modes that include the­ atre, opera, performance art, and the media arts of film and video.

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Addendum on Nominalizations To illustrate the complex, value-emotive, relational,

wrong, no matter the circumstances. Some said that it was

evolving-events nature of nominalizations, here is an analy­

usually wrong, but there might be circumstances that would justify it, such as when you felt that the professor had been

sis of the term value(s). This nominalization is common among users of the English language, along with such re­

unfair and you had to pass a course. A few students said that cheating without getting caught was okay. The stu­

lated nominalizations as ethics, morality, and character. What are we talking about when we say that we need to instill good values in children? In the sense of that question, what is

dents were then placed in a situation where they could ac­ tually cheat on a non-crucial exam and get away with it completely. Some students in the first and second groups cheated. A subsequent written survey about cheating re­

a good or a bad value? How do we know that we or some­ one else has good or bad values? How are good or bad values instilled? Are values and beliefs related? What are beliefs? Can we determine what another person's learned per­ sonal values are by asking them to tell us what they are? Suppose some teachers are asked about their "philosophy of teaching", and they say, "I believe in student-centered teach­ ing." Suppose that multiple samplings of their teaching over five months reveals a preponderance of teacher talk, mini­ mal student talk, minimal direct student experiencing, and

threatening or punitive talk and action by the teachers. If asked, most teachers' interpreter processing would justify the discrepancy in one or more ways. So, are their actual values revealed by what they say their values are, or by their observed behavior over time? When young people observe how their parents be­ have when they interact with certain people, and then how they talk disparagingly about those people when they are no longer present, might their children behave in similar

ways when they are away from their parents? When a grocery store clerk returns less than the correct change, the parent asks for the correct amount. On another visit, a grocery store clerk returns more than the correct change,

and the parent keeps the money and says, "It's their job to get it right." Are values being learned implicitly? Are values

being learned when young people observe-over and over-

how hero adults in movies and on television programs fre­ quently resolve conflicts by violent means (rather than us­ ing empathic, reasoned communication), and there is little or no mediation of those observations by parental discus­ sion? In one study (Mills, 1958), a small group of university students wrote down whether or not they would cheat on an exam if they knew for certain that their cheating would

never be discovered. Some stated that cheating was always

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vealed that they had changed their written beliefs about cheat­ ing.

Could beliefs and values actually be behavioral tendencies or behavioral dispositions that have been explicitly and im­ plicitly instantiated in complex, highly distributed neural networks? Behavioral tendencies are strongly influenced by past value-emotive categorizations within neural net­ works, and ongoing experiences may change them. In other words, pleasant-unpleasant feeling biases are physio chemically instantiated as a result of life experiences

with people, places, things, and events. A person's history of threat-benefit categorizations would greatly influence the presence of protective versus constructive behaviors, and of confrontational versus empathic human relationships. Verbal reports of beliefs or values often are produced by an "interpreter mechanism" and may or may not reflect a lit­

eral "truth" that has been produced by a "literal observer mechanism". So, when we or other people speak or write of values and beliefs as though they were material, tangible, concrete objects, rather than complex, relational, dynamic processes, then we have the opportunity to pay closer attention to

what we or they are actually expressing. One or more nominalizations are being used that can easily trigger feel­ ing biases and associated behavioral tendencies, and they may or may not be in our best interest. The interpretation that the expresser intended to express may be very different from the interpretation that our interpreters derived. Could this be related to what public relations "spin doctors" do? Are nominalizations more likely to trigger pleasant or un­ pleasant internal feeling biases? Will constructive or pro­ tective behavioral reactions result?

In educational circles, the terms quality, excellence, and standards are common. What are we talking about when we

say that we need to improve "the quality of teaching and learning" or strive for "educational excellence"? What are "higher educational standards" or "performance standards"? Is mediocrity the opposite of educational excellence? How do we determine whether or not education is excellent or mediocre? What are lower and higher standards? Is the nominalization standard the same as, or different from, the 1960s nominalization behavioral objective? How are educa­ tional standards selected and who selects them? In any list of standards, are they based on implicit assumptions about what happens inside human beings when learning takes place, and if so, what are those assumptions? What is learning? How do we know when lower or higher standards have been ac­

complished? Are some high standards more important than other high standards? How does a focus on quality, excellence, and high standards translate into the practical, day-to-day interactions between human beings who are called teachers and human beings who are called students? Will students be asked to accomplish goals that their experiential histories have not prepared them for? Will school policies and teacher behaviors produce more coerced compliance in students, or more exploring, discovering, participating, expressing, alternative thinking, evaluative reasoning, weighing "pros and cons" and then deciding, social-emotional self-regula­ tion, self-reliance, and a sense of community in the student­ teacher relationships? If empathic relatedness between human beings is the neuropsychobiological earth from which con­ structive competence and self-reliant autonomy grow, then where is it in the curriculum of schools? [see Chapters 8 and 9] How do we measure the degree of educational excel­ lence and the achievement of high educational standards? Given what is known about the vast complexities of hu­

present an accurate picture of whether or not quality teach­ ing, educational excellence, and high standards have been achieved? Will placing high in international, national, or local aca­ demic competitions determine the degrees to which quality, excellence, and high standards have been achieved? (See Chap­ ter 9) Will charter schools, magnet schools, site-based school management, different curricular formats, more days in the school year, longer school days, block scheduling of the school day, and more homework achieve those goals?

Most of recorded history is prescientific. It occurred before the analytical process of science was invented. Many of the labels, concepts, and theories that were devised then, involved assumptions about "the world" that were created by interpreter mechanisms that had little or no reliable evi­ dence about that world's "composition and processes". Those early, language-expressed conceptual interpretations (often nominalizations that are tagged with value-emotive catego­ rizations) were logical but inaccurate because of (1) miscategorizations or (2) incomplete or partial categoriza­ tions. Does the sun really rise in the East and set in the West? Are elephants comparable in form to a tree, a rope, or a curved wall? [see the Fore-Words of this book for an explanation.] Miscategorizations can render related behavioral pat­ terns ineffective or under-effective. In other words, the suc­ cessful enactment of purposeful behavior can be under­ mined. For example, an ear-nose-throat physician can di­ agnose singer's nodules in a "singing voice" and ignore the more extensive contribution to nodule formation of "speak­

ing voice" functions.

man bodyminds, will a standardized test measure educational excellence "objectively"? Are tests that use such formats as multiple choice, true-false, label-and-descriptor matching, word definition, word analogy, reading comprehension, and mathematical problem solving the most accurate ways to measure excellence and high standards? Can human learn­ ing be accurately and comprehensively quantified by using "tests" that are converted easily into numbers and letter grades? Will national comparative scores on such tests

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chapter 8

bodyminds, human selves, and communicative human interaction Leon Thurman

hat is a bodymind? What is a self? What

parents' deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). DNA is made up of smaller components called genes. Each human being has a genetic heritage of about 30,000 genes. strong or weak self-identity, or that a human being is becom ­ initiate the formation ofthe many different pro­ Genes ing a person, what are we talking about? tein types that constitute all of the elements in each of the Does human symboling and communication involve body's cells (Hawley & Mori, 1999). They also initiate the more than spoken, written, or signed language? Can hu­ creation, within cells, of protein molecules that are released man communication occur outside conscious awareness and from the cells into extracellular spaces or the circulatory affect how we perceive and interact with other people? What system. These initiating events are referred to as genetic

W

is a person? Are they the same or differ­ ent? When we say that human beings have a

are we talking about when we say that we have formed a favorable or an unfavorable impression of another person? Are the arts related to any of those questions?

Human Bodyminds and Human Selves We can begin by saying that currently living human

beings have prominent characteristics that biological scien­ tists have labeled hominid species (Latin: homo = human; Greek: eidos = form; Latin: species = kind or type). There is now only one class in the hominid species, homo sapiens sapiens (Greek: homos = same or shared characteristics; Latin: sapere = capable of sensing and wisdom). The nucleus of each normal cell in human bodies contains 46 chromosomes (Greek: chroma = color; soma = body). Normal female cells include two X chromosomes and normal male cells include an X and a Y chromosome. Each chromosome consists of coiled double strands in a helix formation that includes a 5O°/o to 5O°/o blend of our 134 bodymind & voice

processes and the activation of each cell's genes is referred

to as genetic expression. Only a few genes within each cell are ever activated. For example, only the genes that create the protein types that make up the cells and functions of a pancreas are activated within a pancreas. Likewise, only the genes that create the protein types that make up the pyramidal neurons of the brain's motor cortex are acti­ vated within those neurons. The other genes within those types of cells never activate. In the topobiological formation of human beings, genes initiate the creation of extracellular tracer molecules that help guide the migration of cells to their normal location. Genes also initiate the creation of adhesion molecules that enable the formation of the collections of cells that form the tissues that make up all of the organs and systems of hu­ man bodies. The interaction of tracer and adhesive mol­ ecules plays a significant role in the external and internal forms that bodies take (Edelman, 1988, 1989). In addition, genes trigger the formation of trillions of transmitter mol­ ecules (proteins) that circulate throughout the body and

bind with receptor sites on cell surfaces (created by genes). These interactions functionally link all of the body's organs and systems. Once any of the body's molecular proteins are formed, the genes no longer have direct control over where they go or how they interact with other molecules or cells. Their post-formation interactions are referred to as epigenetic processes. For example, if the normal chemical constitu­ tion within a pregnant mother's body is altered in some non-normal way, the tracer and adhesion molecules of her gestating baby may become misplaced and physical mal­ formations may occur. So-called "Thalidomide babies" and fetal alcohol syndrome are examples of such events. Sorahan, et al. (1997) noted a greater than normal incidence of childhood cancer in the children of parents who use

tobacco during and after pregnancy. Some of the timing of genetic expression is controlled from within genes and some timing is influenced by nongenetic processes. Epigenetic processes that are affected by environmental experience, for example, can influence the tim­ ing of some genetic expression (Kandel, 1989, 1991). Col­ lectively, about 10,000 of the human genes are informally referred to as housekeeping genes. They maintain the "dayto-day" physio chemical state of human bodyminds. Again, only some of them activate in any given cell of an organ or system of the body. The expression of housekeeping genes is influenced by transmitter molecules that are, in turn, in­ fluenced by the state of the body's physio chemical ecology. According to Nobel Laureate Eric Kandel (1991, p. 1028), "Development, hormones, stress, and learning are all factors that alter gene expression. It is likely that at least some neurotic illnesses (or components of them) result from reversible defects in gene regulation, which are produced by learning and which may

be due to altered binding of specific proteins to certain regu­ latory regions that control the expression of certain genes" (italics added). Rossi (1993, pp. 190-195) proposes that changes in genetic expression can alter general health and physio chemical disease states.

During the in utero genetic and epigenetic processing that creates a normal human body, neuropsychobiological functioning of that anatomy gradually begins to "come on­ line". As prebirth anatomy gradually grows into post-birth anatomy, its functioning becomes increasingly complex. These prebirth-to-postbirth biological processes gradually

initiate and then elaborate human consciousness, intentionality, and behavior. The biological processes that produce human consciousness always occur outside conscious awareness, but the summated results of that processing produce pri­ mary and higher order consciousness (for more details see Chapters 1, 2, and 7, and their references). Consciousness is a generic term for vastly complex biological processes that include the following major aspects of primary conscious­ ness: (1) conscious sensory awareness of surroundings in integrated wholes, (2) protective reflex behaviors, (3) per­ ceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categorization and memory; and the following major aspects of higher order consciousness: (1) volitional, intentional, and purposeful behavior in relation to past and present experiences, (2)

estimates of future experiences, and (3) symbolic commu­ nication with other human beings through language, math­ ematics, and symbolic modes called "the arts". The biologi­ cal processes that produce consciousness always occur

outside conscious awareness. The summated results of that processing, however, produce an integration of primary and higher order consciousness that includes conscious aware­ ness (for details, see Chapters 1, 2, 7, and their references). Bodyminds A television set is made up of complex electronic cir­

cuitry that receives complex electronic signals. The set's circuitry then processes the received signals in complex ways that produce a wide array of ever-changing images of people, places, things, and events on its screen. A set's internal processing literally cannot be separated from the images it produces and still be a TV set. Using a TV set as a very loose analogy, the brain is the main "circuitry" where adaptive human consciousness, in­ tentionality, and behavior (mind) are processed and enacted. But a brain without the rest of its physio chemical body is useless, just as a body without its brain is useless. They are an intricately interwoven whole (see Chapters 3 and 7). The word label bodymind, then, is a nominalization that refers to all of a human being's neuropsychobiological processing. Bodymind "circuitry" and processing is almost infinitely more complex than a TV set, of course. To optimize our survival, our genetically and epigenetically formed constitution confers on us an initial array

of innate capabilities, such as seeing, hearing, sensing, smell­

ing, tasting, and threat-benefit-pleasure-displeasure categobodyminds,

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rizing, as well as moving and vocal sound-making. Before

musical experiences to them, they are highly likely to de­

birth, we also are provided with a primary repertoire of innate abilities that optimize sheer survival, such as suck­ ling for nourishment, pleasure-displeasure sensations, and crying out when in distress (Edelman, 1989; Lecanuet, et al.,

velop the ability that is referred to as absolute or perfect pitch. Experience-expectant growth processes and experi­ ence-dependent sculpting interact with each other through­

1995). In order to survive and thrive over a lifetime, how­ ever, genetically initiated growth processes confer an in­ creasing range and extent of innate capabilities for respond­ ing and adapting to whatever our environment presents to

adapt to it, an estimated 1,000 trillion synapses are sculpted into the brain's numerous, widely distributed, locally and globally mapped neuron networks that provide vast op­ tions for continued interactions with that world (Chapters 2 and 7 have some details). For example, when the experi­ ence-expectant capabilities for emotional perception, feeling

us. In the nervous, endocrine, and immune systems, these innate capability-extending processes are sometimes referred

out life (described later). As we interact with our world and

to as experience-expectant self-organization of physio chemical processes and include a genetically expressed overproduction of neurons (before birth) and synapses (be­ fore and following birth). A long-standing debate continues to occur over the

expression, and emotional regulation "come on-line" in bodyminds, experience-dependent abilities are formed when responses and adaptations to people, places, things, and events occur (Dawson, 1994a; Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Ek­

relative influence of genetics versus environments on cog­ nitive-emotional-behavioral patterns. In this nature-nur­ ture controversy, various scientists have asserted that envi­ ronment accounts for anywhere from 4O°/o to 7O°/o of "intel­ ligence". As Greenspan notes (1997, pp. 133-137), many re­

Panksepp, 1998; Rolls, 1995; Salovey & Sluyter, 1997). A common concept of learning includes any alteration

in perception, cognition, and behavior patterns.

searchers are unaware of "how nature and nurture actually

two processes alone do not result in learning.

work". The debate has focused on polarizing the two influ­ ences rather than understanding how they interrelate. "(M)ost

multimodal perceptual categorizations and their memories only lay the foundation for learning. Such a foundation

genetic proclivities can also be understood only in the con­

cannot be laid without "...multiple interactions among local maps resulting from sensorimotor activity....the moving or­ ganism, actively sampling its environment. This sampling is

text of complex intracellular and hormonal environments" (note the Kandel statement presented earlier). Over the course of a lifetime, the provided capabilities make possible the development of a vast secondary reper­ toire of learned abilities. The pruning and "sculpting" of the excessively produced neurons and synapses into increas­ ingly refined and entwined neuron networks is sometimes referred to as experience-dependent self-organization of physio chemical processes (Greenough & Black, 1992). It appears to be a selective process (Edelman, 1989). For ex­

man, 1992; Davidson, 1994a,b; Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1990;

In

neuropsychobiological terms, perceptual categorization and memory are necessary for learning to take place, but those Ample,

the source of signals underlying the selective and correla­ tive neural events that build procedural memory (automatic, implicit categorization and behavioral patterns) and pro­ vide the basis for learning....(M)emory results from a pro­ cess of recategorization, which, by its nature, must...involve continual motor activity and repeated rehearsal....(P)erception depends upon and leads to action..." (Edelman, 1989, pp. 54,

56; italics by Edelman)

ample, when genetic, epigenetic, and experience-expectant

Learning occurs when perceptual categorizations and

physio chemical processes result in a greater than usual number of neurons in the upper border area of the right

perceptual memories are correlated with value-emotive "set points" that enable (1) mapping or remapping of relevant

and left auditory cortex (the planum temporal), that human being will have much greater capability for processing, inter­

neuron groups (internal concept formation or change), and (2) adaptive changes in behavior during present and future interactions with people, places, things, and events (Edelman, 1989, p. 57). "(H)ypotheses relating conscious plans to motor programs, novelty, and automatization....connect attention

relating, and linguistically labeling the fine details of sounds,

including pitches and tone qualities (Nowak, 1995; Ward, 1999; Zatorre, 1989; Zatorre, et al., 1994; Zatorre & Samson, 1991). If that person's life circumstances present favorable

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to hedonic (value-emotive) states and to peripheral, auto­

nomic, and central arousal....(T)he direction of learning is

during later prenatal gestation (see Book IV Chapter 1). They

strongly influenced by novelty and hedonic needs" (Edelman, 1989, p. 206; parenthetical items added for clarity) Three key abilities appear to derive from the innate capabilities for (1) perceptual, value-emotive, and concep­ tual categorization and (2) adaptive behavioral expression.

are continually constructed, elaborated, and reconstructed over the course of a person's experiential lifetime (Benes, 1994). Construction, elaboration, and reconstruction of the

An initial version of these abilities are part of the primary repertoire of neuronal networks with which human beings are born. They are: 1. an interactive-expressive ability (Bloom & Capatides, 1987; Brazelton, et al., 1974; Chamberlain, 1998; Condon & Sandor, 1974; DeCasper & Fifer, 1980; DeCasper,

the brain's neuron networks (topographic reorganization, Merzenich, et al., 1983); and 2. generation of new synaptic connections within the neural networks (synaptogenesis, Huttenlocher, 1994).

et al., 1994; Dunst, et al., 1990; Field, et al., 1990; Goldberg, 1977; Papousek, et al., 1992; Papousek & Papousek, 1992;

1. genetically and epigenetically produced biological

Rosenthal, 1982; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Tronick, 1989);

2. an imitation ability (Bavelas, et al., 1987; Clarkson & Clifton, 1985; Clarkson, et al., 1988; Kessen, et al., 1979; Meltzoff, 1988a,b, 1990,1995; Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1989,1993; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1989, 1992; Nadel & Butterworth,

1999; Uzgiris, et al., 1989); and

3. an exploratory-discovery ability (Bornstein, 1985; Bruner, 1968; Campos & Bertenthal, 1987; Fischer & Rose, 1994, 1996; Oller, 1981; Papousek, 1979, 1996; Papousek & Papousek, 1978, 1982, 1984, 1991; Siegler, 1996; TamisLeMonda & Bornstein, 1993; Thelen & Fogel, 1989).

These three innate abilities are seeds from which nearly

all learned human abilities grow and branch. As cyclical brain growth spurts occur during infancy, childhood, and adolescence (described later), they bring increased cogni­ tive-emotional-behavioral capabilities "on-line". Learning in­ creasingly complex abilities becomes possible, such as (1) detailed, subtle, expressive interactions between a growing per­ son and the people, places, things, and events that the per­ son encounters, including creation and elaboration of sym­ bolic expression with both gestural and vocal phonationresonation capabilities; (2) imitation of detailed postural, ges­

tural, facial, and general body movements as well as vocal pitch, vocal volume, tonal quality, and duration, (3) de­ tailed sensory and motor exploration of surroundings (people, places, things, events), followed by elaboration. Evidence has accumulated that elemental perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categorizations, and explor­ atory and imitative behavioral expression, begin to occur

relevant neural networks include: 1. recruitment of available neurons for inclusion in

Such changes are subject, however, to:

constraints (Kagen, 1994, pp. 50-56, 165-169; Robinson, ; 1993) and 2. neurochemically triggered cyclical growth spurts in cerebral cortex association areas, into the sixth decade of biological life, that enhance higher order neural processing capabilities (increased neuron size, myelinization, and synaptogenesis, particularly in frontal and parietal lobe neuron networks) (Benes, 1994; Chugani, 1994; Dawson, 1994; Fischer & Rose, 1994, 1996; Fuster, 1996, pp. 34-40, 176-179; Huttenlocher, 1994; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967; Thatcher, 1994). Perceptual categorization networks (visual, auditory, somatosensory) that have been repeatedly activated along with set-point, value-emotive categorization networks (emo­ tional memory; somatic markers-see Chapter 7) can result

in increasingly global neuron networks that are "tuned" to activate in relatively automatic ways when cued. Given cues from a familiar environmental situation, these networks can produce dispositions toward (1) satisfaction of neuropsychobiological needs, (2) possible or anticipated fu­ ture events, and (3) possible self-behavior. When these as­ sociated networks activate, they are commonly referred to as internally generated expectations. Expectations partici­ pate in planned, goal-directed behavior (Fuster, 1996, pp. 145-146, 176-177, 221-222). Damasio (1994, pp. 94, 102108) describes such networks as accumulated dispositions to activate, and refers to them as dispositional representations. A concise summary of Hart's (1975, 1983, 1998) theory of an innate, survival-related, capabilities-to-abilities learning process illustrates many of its prominent features. Human beings: bodyminds,

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137

1. make sense of (categorize, interpret) encounters with

the people, places, things and evolving events of the per­ ceived "world" and of sensed events inside the body; 2. protect the person from actual and potential threats to safety and well being;

tems of the whole body. Neuropeptides are a prominent class of transmitter molecules that modulate bodywide neu­ ral, glandular, and organ processing. They travel through­ out the body by way of a circulatory system that includes

its cardiovascular, lymphatic, and cerebrospinal fluid sub­

3. increase and gain mastery of personal interactions

systems. Each gland's and each organ's contribution to body

with the people, places, things and events of the perceived "world," including one's own bodymind.

ecology is activated or inhibited by nervous system signal­ ing or when varying recipes of transmitter molecules are

delivered to receptor sites by the circulatory system. The

Human beings are genetically endowed with these "drives" and they are carried out by genetically provided processes that produce: 1. active seeking of sensory input; 2. detection and categorization of familiar and unfa­ miliar patterns within the sensory input, interpreting them, and encoding them in memory; 3. formation, elaboration, and selection of bodymind

"programs" for carrying out the three drives; 4. disengaging from the current ongoing "stream" of bodymind programs and engaging protective ones when safety and well being are threatened. Hart's macro-level, capabilities-to-abilities learning process is actualized by incredibly vast cascades of internal, physio chemical microprocesses. All sensorimotor experi­ ences are processed through a vast array of patterned and stabilized but highly plastic neuron and neurochemical net­ works that are highly concentrated in the brain but extend throughout human bodies (reviewed in Chapter 3). At the synaptic interface of the networks' activated neurons, mo­ lecular neurotransmitters and neuromodulators are released into the synaptic gaps so that they can attach to matching chemi­

cal receptors that are located on the membrane surfaces of adjacent neurons.

These transmitter molecules enter the

adjacent neurons and influence the specific routings of the

networks. The glands (thyroid, for example) and tissue or­ gans of the entire body are innervated by associated neural networks (muscles of the vocal folds, for example). All glands (endocrine system) and some organs and systems of the body (intestinal tract and immune system, for instance) also produce recipes of transmitter molecules, and all glands and organs have molecule-specific receptors for them. Nearly all of the known transmitter molecules exist in both the nervous system and the glands, organs, and sys­

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summated interaction of these neural, endocrine, and im­ mune system networks contributes to human neuropsychobio-logical consciousness. Consciousness in­ cludes such phenomena as perceptions, cognitions, memories, feel­ ings, emotions, behaviors, and immunity. Gerald Edelman, a Nobel laureate neuroscientist, has estimated that the num­ ber of electrophysio chemical events that enable us to be what we are, and do what we do, is "hyperastronomical", about 10 followed by millions of zeros (Edelman, 1992, p. 17). So far as we know, human beings are the most com­

plex entities in the known universe. In people with relatively normal anatomy and physi­ ology, experience-expectant capabilities for learning any ability are enormous. The extent of capability for develop­ ing a given ability, however, is different between human beings. Some of the factors that influence variation in the

extent of innate capabilities are: 1. extent to which brain growth spurts occur to bring

various cognitive-emotional-behavioral capabilities "on-line" over the lifespan (presented later); 2. existence of more-than-ordinary physio chemical anatomy and physiology that make more-than-ordinary ability development possible;

3. existence of less-than-ordinary physio chemical anatomy and physiology that prevents ordinary ability development; 4. characteristics of perceptual, value-emotive, con­ ceptual, and behavioral experiences that influence the de­

gree to which capabilities are converted into abilities, espe­

cially during the prenatal, infant, childhood, and adolescent periods of life. Either genetic-epigenetic advantage or appropriate

early experience of acoustically complex sounds can opti­ mize greater-than-usual auditory abilities. If sensory expe­

riences are favorable, language and musical abilities can flourish to an extraordinary degree. On the other hand,

line, or if they are labeled by parents, peers, or teachers as having low "aptitude" or "talent" for singing, then their value-

prenatal malfunctioning of genes that form the auditory

emotive categorizations of personal singing are likely to

system may result in deafness or impairments in the capa­

become threat-laden. The memory of those categorizations are likely to deter them from even attempting further progress

bility to process sound characteristics such as pitch, vol­ ume, sound qualities, timing, localization of sound, isolat­

ing one or a few sounds from background sound, and so forth. Exposure to relatively frequent, longer-lasting 85-dB sounds (or higher) and/or relatively frequent high-inten-

sity bursts of sound, even during prenatal gestation, can result in lifetime permanent hearing loss (see Book III, Chap­

ter 5). Untreated or late-treated ear infections during in­ fancy can result in permanent conductive or sensorineural hearing loss. Appropriate prenatal and early childhood ex­ posure to Western orchestral music and to interactive speak­ ing and singing will enhance the formation and synaptic elaboration of the auditory system, and with it, provide an advantage for developing language and musical abilities.

Figure I-8-1 illustrates a continuum concept of con­ verting a capability into an ability in people with normal anatomy and physiology. Both zero capability and the ca­ pability to be perfect at all times are imaginary and do not

exist. The capability line is longer when favorable anatomy

and physiology exist. The exact length of a capability line, therefore, varies with the individual, but the line is enor­ mously long for all human beings with normal anatomy

and physiology. Current evolved ability can be plotted along the capability line as an informal estimate of the extent to which a capability has been converted into an ability. Valueemotive preferences or biases will determine the extent to which any one capability will be converted to an ability. In the development of singing ability, for instance, less experienced people would plot themselves somewhere on

the left half of the continuum. If they become consciously aware of their relative lack of ability by comparisons with those who already plot themselves on the right side of the I

Potential Ability

I

Capability Continuum Non-Existent Zero Capability

Non-Existent Capability to Always Be Perfect

Figure I-8-1: The concept of an experience-expectant capability continuum that is dependent on experience for conversion into an actual ability [Concept and design by Graham Welch and Leon Thurman].

in the conversion of their actual singing capability into ability. The primary locus of the vast human capability for adaptation and learning is in the brain's two cerebral hemi­ spheres. They are more complex by far than in any other

creature on Earth. The macroanatomy of the right and left hemispheres is very similar in its gross organization and appearance. Certain anatomic areas within the left hemi­

sphere correspond to the same anatomic areas in the right hemisphere. The two hemispheres send and receive about 300 million axons out of and into each other (mainly the corpus callosum). But the macro- , and especially the mi­ croanatomy, of the right hemisphere is not an exact mir­

ror image of the left hemisphere, and vice versa. There are significant asymmetries, therefore, between the two sides of the cerebrum that are unique in every human being. The asymmetries reflect the fact that (1) genetic and epigenetic

"wiring" of each hemisphere is innately unique, (2) the unique experiences of each human being select different densities of neurons, and unique synaptic densities, into the various neuron networks of the two hemispheres, and (3) the differ­ ently arrayed macro- and microanatomical areas of the two hemispheres contribute different but related "influences" on the internal and behavioral functions that are carried out in whole bodyminds. For example, the areas of the left hemisphere that per­ ceive, interpret, and produce denotative language (literal "word meanings") have corresponding areas in the right hemisphere. But the right hemisphere areas perceive, inter­ pret, and produce the prosodic and connotative aspects of language ("feeling meanings" and metaphor). The cell bod­ ies of the neurons that make up those right and left areas send axons to the neurons on the other side so that they are mutually interconnected. The result is a simultaneous inter­ pretation and production of both aspects of human self­ expression. Also, people who have perceived, interpreted, and produced comparatively large amounts of music and language, have anatomically larger language areas than people who have had comparatively minimal music and language experiences. In fact, people who have interpreted bodyminds,

selves,

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139

and produced a great deal of denotative language but have

interpreted and produced minimal prosodic, connotative,

and musical expression, are likely to speak with relatively minimal variation of pitch, volume, voice quality, and word rhythm, and their singing abilities will be underdeveloped. Anatomical and functional asymmetries also change over the human life-span. For example, the fetal right hemi­ sphere develops earlier than the left (Bracco, et al., 1984) but the left is usually larger than the right (Chi, et al., 1977). Although the left planum temporal (auditory processing) is larger than the right in a very high percentage of fetal, new­ born, and infant brains, the frontal operculum (motor pro­

Synaptogenesis in response to experience appears to begin during the second trimester of womb life and a vast over­ production occurs just before birth and into the early post­ natal time (Huttenlocher, 1994). Postnatal experience also induces a concomitant paring of synapses as processing is

refined over about the first ten years of postnatal life. An exception appears to be the prefrontal cortex where maxi­ mum synaptic density appears to occur at about one year post-birth and the paring-refining process extends from about age seven years through adolescence (Huttenlocher, . 1994) MRI evidence shows that the gross anatomic differ­

cessing) is larger in the right hemisphere (Wada, et al., 1975).

entiation of the whole brain is complete by age 2 years

Also, the right hemisphere is functionally dominant in in­

(Salamon, et al., 1990), but compared to adult brains, there is a large disparity between brain structure and the func­ tional capabilities of brains. In normal human beings, there­ fore, there is a long period of time during which functional capabilities come on-line and can be sculpted into abilities that enable adaptation to diverse and unpredictable envi­ ronmental demands (Thatcher, 1994). The prefrontal cortex of the human frontal lobes is the primary regulator and modulator of the abilities of all vertebrate mammals. In human beings, it is considerably larger and structurally much more complex compared to any other creature on Earth. As the prefrontal cortex devel­ ops, there are gradual increases in a bodymind's ability to focus attention on beneficial and interesting tasks, to plan further ahead and foresee consequences of planned action, and to accomplish those plans despite distractions. By age six years, for instance, a child is capable of making elabo­ rate plans for accomplishing a purpose, if the goal is clear (Klahr & Robinson, 1981) and the social circumstances are supportive. The cognitive development studies of Piaget (1952, 1954, 1975) are cited by both Fuster (1996) and Thatcher (1994) as substantially congruent with measured

fants (Chiron, et al., 1997). Genetic and epigenetic processes prepare new human beings for basic survival, and that in­ cludes the ability to process pleasant and unpleasant

bodymind feeling states that relate to body temperature, hunger and satiety, comfort-discomfort-pain, and what some psychologists refer to as social affiliation. In addition, the brain areas of human beings that generate vocal sounds and facial expressions are linked to the brain areas that process bodymind survival states. At minimum, infants can signal these states to attentive caregivers. Eventually, however, the left hemisphere becomes larger than the right as conscious analysis, language, and working memory capabilities increasingly "come on-line". For ex­ ample, as language acquisition evolves in about 95°/o of people in Western cultures, more and more neurons in the left hemisphere come on-line for language processing. In response to increased use, the neurons in those areas in­ crease their size, and their axon colaterals and telodendria proliferate massively along with their receptive dendrites. Along with increases in supporting glial cells, all of these developmental processes increase the macro-dimensions of the left hemisphere's language processing areas. Genetic and epigenetic formation of the cerebral cor­ tex begins at about 10 weeks gestational age and virtually all of the brain's neurons have been formed and the pri­ mary repertoire of synapses have been connected by 18 weeks (Huttenlocher, 1994). Once neurons are formed, they remain remarkably stable throughout most of the lifespan. Neuron cell death appears to occur only when a neuron is

not connected synaptically into a local circuit or network. 140

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anatomic and physiologic development. The development of the eight human capability-ability clusters, as defined by Gardner (1983, 1998), are dependent on lifelong genetic, epi­

genetic, and experiential brain development. The basic internal architecture of the prefrontal cortex has been assembled by the time of birth. At that time, neu­ ronal size, dendritic arbors, and synaptic density are com­ paratively sparse, but all three increase rapidly over the first 24 months of post-birth life in response to environ­

mental interactions (Fuster, 1996, pp. 34-40; Mrzljak, et al., 1988, 1990). Neuronal elaboration continues through ado­ lescence, especially in layer III ofthe neocortex. Layer III is the origination and termination area for enormous cortex-

to-cortex axonal projections that participate in the devel­ opment of cognitive-affective capabilities, including the for­ mation of memory by association (Fuster, 1995, 1996, p. 34). Following birth, myelinization of cortical areas pro­ ceeds in stages with layers II and III being the last to de­ velop, particularly in the prefrontal cortex (Fuster, 1996, p.

37; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967). Full structural maturity is achieved by about age 12 years, with maximum develop­ ment of temporal-integrative capabilities for motor memory, selective and exclusionary attention, working memory, and

planning evolving between the ages of 5 to 10 years (Fuster, 1996, pp. 177-179). Bodymind plasticity is enormous until about ages 9 or 10 years, and then it tapers into puberty. Although plas­ ticity then becomes relatively stable, compared to child­ hood, it remains considerable throughout life. In his early 20s, after lifesaving surgery that severed his corpus callo­ sum, patient J.W (see Chapter 7) had the ability to compre­

hend language within his right hemisphere, but he did not have the ability to produce language from that hemisphere. He could use language to describe his left hemisphere's sen­ sory reception, but remained silent about the sensory re­ ception that was presented only to his right hemisphere.

Thirteen years later, he had learned to do so (Gazzaniga, 1998). That is an example of adult brain plasticity. Over a lifetime, the neural networks that process per­ ceptual categorizations are accumulated in response to en­ counters with the people, places, things, and events of a person's surrounding world. Perceptual categorization net­ works include discriminations between me (sensed body

borders and internal physio chemical states), and not me (ev­

erything else). In people with intact brains, those percep­ tual networks are always interfaced with value-emotive cat­ egorization networks. Based primarily in the limbic sys­ tem, these networks correlate valuative significance with the people, places, things, and events that are encountered. Before birth, genetic and epigenetic processes create automatic threat-benefit and value-emotive tendencies that are related to such core survival needs as oxygen consump­

tion and carbon dioxide expulsion levels, metabolic fluc­

tuations, and social interaction and affiliation. When these core survival needs are commonly met, pleasant feeling states and interactive-affiliative behaviors occur that are associated with the people, places, things, and events that are encountered. When core survival needs are not sufficiently met, unpleasant feeling states occur and

associated distress behaviors result. As life experiences continue, feeling states and behav­ ioral expressions become increasingly discriminated and elaborated in response to increasingly complex aspects of people, places, things, and events. Most of those feeling states and behavioral expressions are not related directly to survival and are not genetically "hard wired" into the ner­ vous system. They are memoried, learned response tendencies that are elaborated over the lifespan. For example, glucose is necessary for metabolic survival. The pleasant taste of glu­ cose is a built-in feature of value-emotive categorization that enables identification of foods that are necessary for

survival. As a result of experiencing candy (glucose that is separated from the many nutrients that are co-provided by nature in fruits and vegetables), many learned value-emo­ tive categorizations and behavioral expressions occur that have little or nothing to do with metabolic survival. The elaboration of such learnings may have nutritional health consequences later in life. The changes in the nervous system that produce the memory and learning of value-emotive tendencies relate to (1) the extent of excitatory versus inhibitory potentials within relevant neural networks, (2) short-term and long-term po­ tentiation and depression dynamics, and (3) extent of corti­ cal-subcortical neuron network map formations. Neural network response sensitivity is dynamic, therefore, and can vary depending on the nature of instantiated sensory and motor experience. For example, when a young person en­ counters an adult person who is identified as a teacher, the internal dynamics of the young person's past value-emo­

tive categorizations may result in either a relatively pleasant-feeling-and-approach-behavior response, or a relatively unpleasant-feeling-and-avoid-behavior response. In es­ sence, then, the nature of each experience of people, places,

things, and events influences the development of activation criteria or activation set-points (Edelman, 1989, pp. 56, 57; 98100; 151-153), or conditions of satisfaction (Searle, 1998, pp. 99-104). bodyminds,

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Thus, value-emotive neural networks are more likely

or less likely to activate based on the valuative dispositions

that determine whether the limbic system initiates criterianot-met feedback signals or criteria-met feedback signals. When these signals occur, they in turn trigger signals that are sent to the hypothalamus-pituitary complex and the autonomic

nervous system so that related physio chemical body states and behavioral patterns are triggered. In everyday lan­ guage, these body states are referred to as feelings (Damasio, 1994, pp. 114-126) and they become pleasant or unpleasant somatic markers of experiences. Whether they are perceived consciously or not, they are still encoded in implicit memory (Chapter 7 has some details). Criteria-not-met feedback signals create physio chemical body states that higher order language ar­ eas might label as unfamiliar, inappropriate, incomplete, inaccu­ rate, uninteresting, puzzling, doesn'tfeel quite right, unsatisfying, nega­ tive impression, apprehensive, potentially threatening to well being, or that person is not connected with me or not attracted to me. Cri­ teria-met feedback signals produce physio chemical body states that higher order language areas might label as famil­ iar, appropriate, complete, accurate, successful, interesting, satisfying, fulfilling, positive impression, potentially beneficial to well being, or that person is connected with me or is attracted to me. In either case, memories occur within neural networks that process perceptual and value-emotive categorizations and behav­ ioral expressions. By their nature, then, value-emotive categorization networks acquire valuative signaling dispositions or biases. They correlate possible benefit or threat to a person's sur­ vival and well being within the perceived world. Internally processed biases can be described linguistically in such terms as benefit-threat, favorable-unfavorable, pleasant-unpleasant, appro­ priate-inappropriate, yes-no, for-against, accept-reject, orfamiliar-pleasant versus familiar-unpleasant versus unfamiliar. Commonly, these valuative dispositions result in expressions of sen­ sorimotor behaviors that can be described linguistically in such terms as smile-frown, approach-avoid, compliment-criticize, or assist-threaten-attack. During the final months of prebirth life and the first few years of post-birth life, as interactions with people, places, things, and events become more com­ plex, these networks become elaborated into increasingly complex patterns of perceptual, value-emotive, and con­

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ceptual categorizations, with resulting behavioral expres­

sions. Finally, global conceptual categorization networks (net­ works of networks) result from generalized correlations that

are carried out mostly within temporal-parietal and frontal association areas, and they may or may not be languagelabeled (Chapter 7 has some details). With relative repetition of similar experiences, long­ term potentiation occurs in both the excitatory and inhibi­ tory neurons within the networks so that longer-term memo­

ries are formed. Higher order language areas of bodyminds might label some of these networks as habitual patterns of thinking, feeling, and behaving. Nominalizations for these

patterns (described in Chapters 7 and 9) then can be created such as beliefs, values, attitudes, motivations, habits, and emotions (love, hate, happy, sad). Development within the prefrontal portions of both hemispheres makes possible an increasing mastery over one's own body and one's world. This area of the brain-the brain's brain-can modulate or regulate most if not all hu­ man neuropsychobiological functions. The planning of all motor action, including speech, is carried out there. Con­ scious learning of new skills is coordinated from the pre­

frontal cortex. The orbital areas are necessary for conscious appraisal of socially relevant threat versus benefit to self.

Reentrant connections between the orbital area of the pre­ frontal cortex and the amygdala and hypothalamus modu­ late and regulate feeling reactions which influence decision­ making for the present and for the future (Adolphs, et al., . 1995) In 1983, Gardner introduced the terms intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence. The current inclusive terms are emo­ tional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Salovey & Sluyter, 1997), emotional self-regulation, and emotion regulation (Barbas, 1995; Brenner & Salovey, 1997; Dehnam, 1998; Eisenberg, et al., 1997; Saarni, 1997; Stroufe, 1996; Thompson, 1994). Areas within the prefrontal cortex must be experientially developed to become key regulators and modulators of emotion regulation (Davidson, 1994a,b; Greenberg & Snell, 1997). Orbitofrontal circuits and the amygdalae, interacting with other cortical and subcortical areas, can mediate empathic, courteous, and socially ap­ propriate behavior, including inhibition of inappropriate behavior (Brothers, 1995, 1997, pp. 49-62; Chow &

Cummings, 1999). Areas within the left prefrontal cortex

through adolescence to young adulthood. Such tiers also

der conditions of optimal environmental support for the conversion of the capabilities into refined abilities. The development of specific cognitive-emotional-be­ havioral abilities, being experience-dependent, is a selective process. For example, if children who have a genetically provided, highly elaborated right and left planum tempo­ ral, experience a minimal amount of music, they may never display the ability to hear and name pitches with absolute accuracy. If much music is heard but they are never ex­ posed to a pitch labeling system to associate with specific pitches, they will recognize very familiar pitches but never refer to them by their letter-names. If, instead, they are exposed to an unusually large number of visual scenes and receive constructive instruction in drawing them, they may display "average" musical abilities but highly elaborated vi­ sual art abilities. The process of general human ability development

have been observed in the age range of 45 to 55 years (Thatcher, 1994, p. 262). They began by reviewing the cog­

tends to be weblike in nature, like a relatively chaotic crossstitch pattern (Fischer & Rose, 1996). Each ability is like a

nitive, emotional, and behavioral development research that has accumulated for over 65 years. The work of Piaget (1952, 1954, 1971, 1985), and others, was included in the cognitive development research. They also reviewed the developmental brain and neuroimaging research of the past 30 years (for example, Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967; Matousek & Petersen, 1973; McCall, 1977; Hudspeth & Pribram, 1992; Chugani, et al., 1994; Thatcher, 1994; Tucker, et al., 1995;

strand in the web that branches and interfaces with other strands. Although ability development (1) occurs differ­ ently in different people (in "fits and starts"), (2) is experi­ ence-dependent, and (3) is highly elaborated only under

have been associated with pleasant emotional orientations and approach behaviors and areas within the right pre­ frontal cortex have been associated with unpleasant emo­ tional orientations and withdrawal behaviors (Davidson, 1994a,b). Using qEEG coherence studies, Thatcher (1994) re­ ported patterned, cyclical reorganization of intracortex syn­ aptic connections in a study of 436 children and adoles­ cents who ranged in age from 6 months post-birth to 16 years. He observed recurring brain growth cycles, during

which differentiation and integration of intracortical con­ nections were marked by periods of phase transition.

Fischer and Rose (1994, 1996) have recently proposed

a global theory of correlated, tiered cognitive-emotionalbehavioral-brain development that extends from infancy

Paus, et al., 1999). They then correlated the cognitive-emo­ tional-behavioral spurts with cyclical growth spurt patterns in the brain as measured by: (1) quantified electroencephalographic analysis (qEEG) combined with the more recent magnetoencephalographic analysis (MEG), (2) positron emission tomography (PET), and (3) magnetic reso­ nance imaging (MRI) and functional MRI (fMRI) (briefly described in Chapter 7), and (4) examination and measure­ ment of autopsied brains (Kinney, et al., 1988).

Fischer and Rose do not propose discretely bordered,

sequential "stages" of cognitive-emotional-behavioral and brain development, as in steps in a ladder. They propose that there are sequenced patterns of growth spurts in physio chemical brain development that appear to coincide

with spurts in global cognitive-emotional-behavioral capa­ bilities. They strongly advocate, however, that optimal cog­ nitive-emotional-behavioral abilities are developed only un­

conditions of optimal environmental support, several differ­ ent ability strands tend to "bud or blossom" in relatively predictable time frames within a lifespan. For example, a noticeable difference occurs in the behavior of infants at about the age of eight months, and there are considerable differences in young people between ages 9 to 10 years and 12 to 14 years. These are examples of a lifelong interplay between brain development and cognitive-emotional-be­ havioral evolution. Developmental range within any one ability refers to the degree to which that ability has been developed opti­ mally or just functionally. Functional ability develop­ ment shows increases that are continually low with almost no detectable plateaus. Optimal ability development clearly shows a series of increase-plateaus or "clusters of disconti­ nuity" (Fischer, et al., 1984; Fischer & Rose, 1996). Different people will develop some abilities optimally, other abilities sub-optimally, other abilities will develop functionally or slightly above functionality, and so forth. According to

Fischer and Rose (1996, p. 275), "The optimal level specifies the most complex skills that the person can consistently bodyminds,

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control under optimal conditions, including an alert state, a familiar context, practice with the task, contextual support for high-level performance, and the absence of interfering

conditions such as conflicting emotions" When optimal support conditions are no longer present, however, an im­ mediate reversion to a near-functional ability level is com­

mon, although reinstating the optimal conditions brings a return of optimal or near optimal ability (Fischer, et al., 1993, . 1996)

Fischer and Rose propose a sequence of four brain­

behavior developmental tiers: (1) reflex, (2) sensorimotor, (3) representational, and (4) abstract (see Table I-8-1). Within each developmental tier, four predictable, repeated cycles of growth in neural network connectivity occur. At the con­ clusion of four cycles, a new developmental tier begins. Each of the four growth cycles is referred to as a tier level. When each level within a tier occurs, (l)a patterned growth spurt of neural network connectivity occurs in a particular area of the brain, and (2) new observable cognitive-emotionalbehavioral patterns are observed. The tier levels have been

named: (1) single sets, (2) mappings, (3) systems, and (4) systems of systems. The systems of systems level of a pre­ vious tier and the single sets of the next tier are the same. The tiers, tier levels, and their patterns of growth are sum­ marized in Tables I-8-1 and I-8-2. Each tier of brain and cognitive-emotional-behavioral development begins with a growth spurt of neuron net­

work connectivity in the right and left frontal lobes, the socalled "brain's brain". This is significant because the frontal

lobes are capable of activating and entraining a large array of neural networks and "hold them on-line" (working memory) in anticipation of the enactment of an ability, during its enactment, and after its enactment. The extent and intensity of these initiating frontal growth spurts is relatively minimal in the reflex tier and become progressively greater in succeeding tiers. The greatest

frontal growth occurs during the late representational and abstract tiers. These interfaced and parallel distributed neu­

ral networks are sometimes compared to computer pro­

grams, but the brain's "programs" are vastly more complex and are subject to innumerable experiential variables. Fischer and Rose refer to these collections of neural networks as control systems. They refer to emerging cognitive-emotionalbehavioral abilities as dynamic skills. 144

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Spurts in the growth of control systems and dynamic

skills are referred to as developmental discontinuities. Ac­ cording to Fischer and Rose (1996, p. 266), After the new networks emerge, they are then gradually tuned to form efficient neural and cognitive control systems at the new level. After a period of consolidation of a network/control system, another new type of network/control system be­ gins to grow for the next developmental level, and so an­ other cluster of discontinuities begins." The first level within each tier begins with growth spurt

patterns of neural network connectivity in the right hemi­ sphere (Table I-8-2). Connectivity increases first between

more distant neuron groups (global), followed by connec­ tivity increases with adjacent or nearby neuron groups (local). Growth spurt patterns in the left hemisphere begin with connectivity increases in nearby neuron groups, followed by connectivity between more distant neuron groups. Each level of growth in network connectivity is completed when both hemispheres undergo simultaneous growth spurts. These simultaneous spurts may indicate that new interhemi­ spheric connectivities are occurring as more axons in the corpus callosum are "coming on-line". During the single sets level, growth spurts occur over broad areas of the brain, but are much more concentrated in the occipitoparietal areas where visual, somatosensory, and sensory association areas are located. During the map­ pings level, growth spurts occur over broad areas of the brain, but are much more concentrated in the temporal lobes where auditory processing and visual association process­

ing occur. During the systems level, growth spurts occur over broad areas of the brain, but are much more concen­ trated in the central areas of the cortex where substantial sensorimotor processing occurs. The systems of systems level introduces the beginning of a new tier, so it begins with a growth spurt of neuron network connectivity in the fron­

tal lobe (see previous paragraph) followed by the cycles just described. According to Fischer and Rose (1996, p. 274), "Mo­ ment by moment we construct, modify, and elaborate con­ trol systems, and moment by moment our neurological states change as our behavior varies" Concurrent with these brain development growth spurts, new cognitive-emotional-be­

havioral patterns can be observed.

During the single sets level of the reflex tier, lasting about one month post-birth, only very simple cognitiveemotional-behavioral ability patterns occur. These ability

patterns are almost entirely from the primary or "hard-wired" repertoire of abilities, such as eye focus, head turning in response to louder sounds, crying when distressed, or grasp­ ing a finger or piece of cloth placed in the hand palm. The mappings level of the reflex tier occurs during

about the second post-birth month. Some single reflexes

are mapped together to form more complex cognitive-emo­ tional-behavioral ability patterns, such as extending arms toward a ball that is held in front of eyes, hearing a familiar voice and looking at the eyes of the vocalist, or beginning

to responsively and spontaneously emit cooing (vowel-like) vocal sounds. The systems level of the reflex tier occurs during about the third post-birth month. Some mapped reflexes are linked with other mapped reflexes to form even more complex cognitive-emotional-behavioral ability patterns, such as seeing a ball and extending arm with open hand, or coordinated "melodic-like" cooing, smiling, and nodding a nonverbal recognition greeting after looking at a face and

hearing its voice.

Table I-8-1. Tiers and Levels of Cognitive Development (adapted from Fischer & Rose, 1994, 1996)

Tiers

Tier Levels

Approximate

Reflex

Single Reflexes Reflex Mappings Reflex Systems Single Sensorimotor

3-4 weeks (1 month) 7 -8 weeks (2 mos) 10-11 weeks( 3 mos)

Actions

Sensorimotor

Sensorimotor Mappings Sensorimotor Systems Single Representations

Ages

15-17 weeks (4 mos) 7 -8 months 11-13 months 18 -24 months

The systems of systems level of the reflex tier is the same as the single sets level of the sensorimotor tier. This level occurs during about the fourth post-birth month. Some systems of reflexes are linked with other systems of reflexes to form even more complex cognitive-emotional-behav­ ioral ability patterns, such as following the movement of a

ball with eye-head-body coordination as the ball follows a more complex moving path and adjusting open hand in

pursuit of ball's trajectory, or highly varied and spontane­ ous exploration of vocal sound-making and pitch-making

with longer durations (squeals, gurgles, raspberries, and so forth). The mappings level of the sensorimotor tier occurs during about months 7 to 8 post-birth. Some single sen­

sorimotor sets are mapped together to form increasingly

complex cognitive-emotional-behavioral ability patterns, such as crawling, looking closely at a ball in order to guide

hand to grasp the ball and bring it to face to examine it more closely, or using immediate and recent working memory to search for a ball that has rolled behind a box, or repetitive babbling of consonant-vowel combinations, or accurately imitating sustained pitches, or accurately imi­ tating the melodic pitch direction of parts of a simple song (not accurate pitches). The systems level of the sensorimotor tier occurs during about months 11 to 13. Some mapped sensorimo­ tor cognitive-emotional-behavioral patterns are linked with other mapped patterns to form yet even more complex cog­ nitive-emotional-behavioral ability patterns, such as first walking steps, moving a rattle in different ways to catego­ rize the different sights, sounds, and sensations that their own action produced and delighting in the different effects, or mixed syllable babbling, or imitating the pronunciation of single words, or speaking nouns that are the names for

commonly experienced people, places, and things, or be­ ginning to sing one or two pitches of a familiar action-song accurately.

The systems of systems level of the sensorimotor Representational

Abstract

Representational Mappings Representational Systems Single Abstractions

3.5 - 4.5 years 6 -7 years 10-12 years

Abstract Mappings Abstract Systems Principles

14-16 years 18 -20 years 23 -25 years

tier is the same as the single sets level of the representa­ tional tier. This level occurs during about months 18 to 24. Some systems of sensorimotor cognitive-emotional-behav­

ioral patterns are linked with other sensorimotor systems to form more complex cognitive-emotional-behavioral abil­ ity patterns, such as free walking and running, moving a bodyminds,

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Table I-8-2. How Skill Levels Within a Tier Relate to Brain Development as Measured by EEG (adapted from Fischer & Rose, 1994, 1996)

Tier Levels Single Sets

Mappings

Hemispheric Coherence Cycle

Front-to-Back Power Spurt Cycle

Right: global to local Left: local to global Both: global

a) Frontal spurt b) Spurts over broad area,

Right: global to local Left: local to global Both: global

Spurts over broad area, especially temporal

Right: global to local Left: local to global Both: global

Spurts over broad area, especially central

especially occipital-parietal

The systems of systems level of the representational tier is the same as the single sets level of the abstract tier.

This level occurs during about years 10 to 12. Some sys­

tems of representational cognitive-emotional-behavioral patterns are linked with other representational systems, such as awareness and evaluation of how parents display con­ formity, or understand honesty as a quality of consistently being truthful in human interactions, or using representa­

tional language in simple abstract ways so that a poem or song about a flying butterfly can take on a "double mean­ ing" or "feeling meaning" that is, an expression of one's self observing the "world" from a distance. With the beginning of this tier, the optimal period for learning spoken language(s)

Systems

Systems of Systems Right: global to local Left: local to global Both: global

ends. The mappings level of the abstract tier occurs dur­

a) Frontal spurt b) Spurts over broad area, especially occipital-parietal

ing about 14 to 16 years. Some abstract single sets are mapped together to form increasingly complex cognitiveemotional-behavioral ability patterns, such as appreciating

doll's feet while pretending that the doll is walking, and

speaking a simple subject-verb sentence, "Doll walk" or spon­ taneously improvising songlike speech, or singing the words, rhythms, and pitches of familiar simple songs with approxi­ mate pitch and rhythm accuracy but may change tonal cen­

ters (keys) after breathing between musical phrases. The mappings level of the representational tier oc­ curs during about 3.5 years to about 4.5 years. Some rep­

how telling some social lies (dishonesty) can display kind­ ness toward another person, or appreciating the use of analo­ gies, similes, and metaphors in speech and literary writing, or appreciating the difference between "how the world is" and "how it could be", or appreciating how expressively contoured melodies, meters and rhythms, harmonic pro­ gressions, and formal designs can be performed in ways that express out and induce feeling states or "feeling mean­ ing" in human beings.

resentational single sets are mapped together to form in­

The systems level of the abstract tier occurs during

creasingly complex cognitive-emotional-behavioral ability

about years 18 to 20. Some mapped representational cog­

patterns, such as pretending that two dolls are mother and father and speaking their parenting dialogue, or knowing a secret that mom or dad does not know, or singing a reper­

nitive-emotional-behavioral patterns are linked with other

mapped patterns, such as delivering "constructive criticism" in several ways that integrate both honesty and respect for

toire of simple songs.

the feelings of other people, or analyzing the melodic, rhyth­

The systems level of the representational tier oc­ curs during about years 6 to 7. Some mapped representa­

mic, harmonic, and formal characteristics of music and us­

tional cognitive-emotional-behavioral patterns are linked with other mapped patterns, such as pretending that the

same two dolls can be mom and dad in one situation but can be fireman or teacher in another situation, or, when the same amount of water is poured from a tall-thin container

to a short-wide container, perceives that the water amount is the same.

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ing the analysis to detect, as much as is possible, what com­ posers or songwriters intended to express in their music, and then using those observations to prepare, and present an expressive performance of the music, or organizing com­ plex sequences of cognitive-emotional-behavioral patterns in the preparation for and leading of a music learning expe­ rience for musically less experienced and skilled people.

The systems of systems level of the abstract tier occurs during about years 23 to 25. Some systems of the

abstract cognitive-emotional-behavioral patterns are linked

with other abstract systems to form principles of cognitiveemotional-behavioral processes, such as understanding and applying the complexities of achieving social justice, or pre­ paring and enacting a learning environment that: (1) is ap­

propriate to the developmental capabilities and current abilities of the learners, (2) applies principles of human learn­ ing that facilitate the development of self-realized abilities (competence and autonomy, more later), (3) uses both ver­ bal and nonverbal communication skills that facilitate hu­ man relatedness with and between the learners, and (4) adapts the enactment of the learning environment and ver­ bal and nonverbal communication to the evolving abilities of the learners.

Selves As unique life-cap abilities and life-abilities evolve, the Homo sapiens sapiens, the human bodymind, becomes a self, a person. Self and person are nominalizations that refer to the cumulative, global expression of: 1. the unique genetic inheritance of each human being, combined with the unique epigenetic events that occur dur­ ing the lifelong topobiological and experience-expectant for­ mation of each human being; and

Self-identity, or personhood, evolves over a lifetime (Harter, 1999). By far, the most powerful influences on its evolution are social interactions with other human beings (Brothers, 1995, 1997). Its foundations begin to be laid dur­ ing womb life as a result of physio chemical interactions with mother, and become more pronounced as awareness of self/nonself distinctions occur. We human beings are very vulnerable to many literal and potential threats at the beginning of our lives. During womb life, we are vulnerable to deleterious chemicals that are inhaled or ingested by mother (smoke, alcohol) or pro­ duced within mother (abundant stress hormones). Being forcibly ejected or removed from mother's womb at birth

has neuropsychobiological effects. It is a form of neuropsychobiological abandonment that can be intensi­ fied or minimized by the events that surround the birth experience (see Book IV Chapter 1). Following birth, we continue to be quite helpless and, therefore, we are depen­ dent on older, more able people for food, water, shelter, and

nurturance. Interactions (or the lack thereof) with caregivers during infancy and early childhood (lost to conscious memory

after about ages 3.5 to 4.5 years) have a profound effect on the lifelong evolution of self-identity. The life-abilities of some human beings may have been

2. the unique, bodywide, experience-dependent, ever­

sculpted by frequently threatening and hurtful interactions

evolving, physio chemical network alterations that occur as

with the people, places, things, and events of their world (Perry, et al., 1995). Their abilities, then, will most likely

a result of each human being's unique collection of percep­ tual, value-emotive, and conceptual categorizations that have been accumulated in bodymind memory over the lifespan

become prominently fearful, self-focused, and protective.

(Snodgrass & Thompson, 1997).

In other human beings, those life-abilities may have been

Preemptive hurting of others may be a common defense. sculpted by frequently safe, beneficial, and interesting inter­

Following birth, convergences occur between (1) ex­

actions with the people, places, things, and events of their

perience-expectant, genetically driven brain growth spurts

world. Their abilities will most likely become prominently

(evolving capabilities), and (2) ongoing, experience-depen­

empathic, fulfilling, expressive, creative, and constructive

dent neuron group selection and elaboration (abilities). Ge­ netic expressions and epigenetic processes produce a phe­ nomenally vast array of potentials for internal categoriza­ tions and their behavioral expressions. Although these human capabilities are vast, there are unique capability differences between individual human beings. The unique life circumstances of each human being will select which of

(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1993; Isen, 1987), leading to self-

the capabilities will be converted into abilities and which abilities will be optimally developed.

reliance and comfortable social collaboration.

Lifelong, daily interactions with other people, places, things, and events result in global accumulations of higherorder perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categori­ zations of ongoing life circumstances and the development of adaptive life-abilities. Verbal (language) and nonverbal expressions of these processings (paralanguage, body pos­ tures, arm-hand gestures, facial expressions) occur both in and out of conscious awareness. Observers of other people bodyminds,

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refer to these outward expressions of internal processing as

of their perceived world through attentional focusing, (2)

personality. In the previous television set analogy, a self is comparable to the ever-changing signals that are processed within the set's electronic circuitry that produce the ever­ evolving images that can be seen on the set's screen.

make and update their value-emotive and conceptual "sense"

poseful behaviors. Learning competencies involves experi­ ence-dependent instantiation of vast varieties of locally and

After extensive clinical experience and review of psy­

globally mapped physiochemical networks within

chology literature, Deci & Ryan (1985, 1995), Ryan (1993), and Ryan, et al. (1996), described a self determination theory. The theory proposes that human beings have three lifelong, experience-dependent, neuropsychobiological needs: (1) relat­ edness, (2) competence, and (3) autonomy. Relatedness is a prerequisite for competence, and relatedness and compe­ tence are prerequisites for autonomy (Greenspan, 1997). [The

bodyminds. Human beings tend to evolve capability-ability clus­ ters that include particular perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categorizations and motor coordination. Ana­ lyzing, ordering, and sequencing of places, things, and events, relating details into whole, global patterns, verbal and non­ verbal symbolic self-expression, empathic social sensitiv­ ity, protection when under threat, spatial orientation and navigation, and fine motor coordination, are examples.

concept of neuropsychobiological needs fits well with Hart's

drives and processes (1975, 1983, 1998; summarized previ­ ously).] Relatedness refers to the need for supportive, emo­ tionally engaging, human-to-human interaction. This neuropsychobiological need emerges during womb life and exists throughout life. It is the foundation upon which all

constructive internal processing and external behavior is built. The most profound of threats to neuropsychobiological well being is unrelatedness or abandonment, and the relative helplessness that accompanies it. Unrelatedness can perva­ sively undermine self determination, and its cognitive-emo­ tional-behavioral effects are commonly outside conscious awareness. For example, during World War II, Spitz (1945, 1946; Spitz & Wolf, 1946) observed orphaned, hospitalized in­ fants, whose substance needs were adequately met (air, wa­ ter, food, shelter). Due to lack of personnel, however, the babies were infrequently held, talked to, played with, and cuddled. Eventually, the babies began to be less and less responsive, they took less and less food, and began to waste away physically. Insufficient or absent relatedness led to changes in neurotransmitter processing in areas ofthe lim­ bic system that produced the neuropsychobiological state that is called depression (Feldman, et al., 1997, pp. 819-821, 838-849; see Book III, Chapter 8 for more information).

Competence refers to the conversion of capabilities into increasingly refined abilities that fulfill needs and ac­ complish desired goals. Core competencies are developed when human beings: (1) categorize more and more details

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of those details, and (3) plan, coordinate, and refine pur­

Human beings also have evolved knowledge-ability dus­ ters. For instance, the symbolic self-expression mode called music is a large knowledge-ability cluster (Langer, 1951,1953), as are the symbolic reference systems called languages (Dea­

con, 1997b), and mathematics, biology, chemistry, kinesiol­ ogy, physics, engineering, and the like. The extent of human capabilities, and the degree of their conversion into abilities, have been labeled with four

nominalizations: aptitude, intelligence, achievement, and compe­ tence. For many centuries, degrees of aptitude and intelli­ gence were assumed to be unalterable, inherited traits. Ap­ titude is the capability (potential) for developing an ability. When psychological scientists have attempted to measure human aptitude for a given knowledge-ability cluster, they

appear to be assessing the immediacy and ease with which

elements of an ability are achieved and displayed. The com­ monly held concept of intelligence in most Western cultures

posits a general intelligence factor. Displays of intelligence have been evidenced by the extent to which analytic rea­ soning was used to solve decontextualized academic prob­ lems, primarily using linguistic and mathematical symbol systems, on a printed test. The tests have been scored to provide a numerical index of general intelligence called In­ telligence Quotient (IQ). In schools, achievement refers to the extent to which one or more knowledge-ability clusters (aca­ demic disciplines) have been mastered. Deacon (1997a, p. 132) presents an alternative descrip­

tion of human intelligence. He writes of intelligence as "...originating, moment by moment, new, detailed, appro­

priate representations [images, concepts, symbols, and so forth] of an ever-changing environment and spontaneously generating new, complex, adaptive responses to that envi­

ronment where none previously existed (italics added), generat­ ing useful information from scratch to fit in with and take advantage of.." unfamiliar environments as they occur. In­

telligence is reflected in "many levels of functioning" and in "highly robust regulatory flexibility". It also is demonstrated

in the ability to judge the extent to which newly originated representations match "reality", and the extent to which new adaptive responses are appropriate to various situations

that are encountered. Gardner (1983, 1998) has proposed labels for eight mixtures of capability-ability clusters and knowledge-abil­ ity clusters that he refers to as domains of intelligence (mul­ tiple intelligences): 1. bodily-kinesthetic; 2. visual-spatial; 3. linguistic; 4. musical; 5. logical-mathematical; 6. intrapersonal; 7. interpersonal; and 8. naturalistic. Sternberg (1996, 1998; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997)

has proposed three global "ways of thinking" or ways of exhibiting successful intelligence in the real world. Criticalanalytic intelligence is used in all career categories, but the specific environmental context will determine the ways this intelligence will be used. Detecting, sequencing, and ex­ pressing the details of an experience, or an anticipated course of action, or the definition of a problem, are abilities that

this intelligence confers. A music educator would use this intelligence to analyze the compositional details or voice production challenges that a musical selection might pose for learners-singers. The use of this type of intelligence in

traditional academic settings will be significantly different from its use in the real world of business, science, and teach­ ing, for instance. The use of critical-analytic intelligence in intrapersonal and interpersonal (socioemotional) intelligence is rarely addressed explicitly in school settings. Creative-synthetic intelligence confers such abilities as observing the connectedness of experiential details that

form "larger pictures" and whole patterns, and rearranging

the details to form unique relationships, patterns, and prob­ lem solutions. A songwriter would use this intelligence to create and refine expressive qualities in an original song; a singer or voice educator would use this intelligence to gain insight into the expressive qualities of the whole song. Prac­ tical-contextual intelligence includes what many people refer to as common sense. It confers such abilities as "reading" the context in which people, places, and things interact, fig­ uring out the practicalities of solving real world problems, and then solving them. Savvy or street smarts are synonyms. A songwriter would use this intelligence to market his song to publishers and record companies; a singer or voice edu­ cator would use this intelligence to arrange a rehearsal sched­ ule, a rehearsal and performance setting, and marketing that brings in an audience. Autonomy refers to the perception by individual human beings that a preponderance of their intentional actions have an internal, freely chosen, from-inside-to-outside origin. Their actions have established a strong self­ identity with self-respect boundaries that they gently pre­ vent others from violating (when possible). They perceive that they "have a voice" in the decisions and actions of groups of which they are members, and they have the option to respectfully disagree, at appropriate times, with the perspec­ tives of other group members, including a group's leader. A preponderance of their intentional actions are not induced, therefore, by an external, nonself control source. When purposeful, goal-directed behavior is perceived to have an internal locus of causality, then behavioral disposition neural networks are activated and overt behav­ ior is expressed out that enhances goal achievement (Damasio, 1994, pp. 102-105,136-138; deCharms, 1968; Deci, et al., 1994; Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1991; Ryan, 1993; Ryan, et al., 1996). Decisions and actions are perceived to be selfdetermined, self-initiated, and self-expressed. When goal-directed behavior is perceived to have an external locus of causality, then the activation of behav­ ioral disposition neural networks appear to be induced by an external agent (person, place, thing, event). Behavior, then, is often described as having been externally motivated, stimulated, elicited, drawn out, brought out, coerced, or forced.

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A teacher was visiting in the home of two former students who

display "uncooperativeness", are likely to have engaged in a

were married to each other and had two adorable sons. The boys

preponderance of experiences that have been extrinsically re­

began to display several competencies with their toys while the adults conversed. Four-year-old Colin had seen his six-year-old brother Bret having a lot of fun riding on a spring-suspended wooden rocking horse, and when it was vacant, he started to get on to ride. But he couldn't get his right leg to go over the horse. He tried several times with increasing frustration, and he finally began to whimper. His father started to get up, go to him, and lift his leg over the horse so he would not be distressed. The guest held up a hand to suggest, "Wait," and the father sat back down. Within two more tries, Colin's leg went over the horse's back, and a huge smile spread over his face as he sat tall in the saddle and rode like the wind.

warding. When people engage in externally rewarded expe­

What do you suppose would have happened inside Colin, to Colin's rocking-horse behavior, and to future whim­ pering, if his father had moved his leg over the horse for him? Compared to preponderantly controlled or depen­ dent people, autonomous people tend to:

1. be more creative (Amabile, 1983);

2. display more cognitive flexibility and depth of pro­ cessing (Grolnick & Ryan, 1987); 3. demonstrate stronger self-identity (Ryan & Grolnick, 1986); 4. report and display greater positive emotional tone

(Garbarino, 1975) and greater satisfaction and trust (Deci, et al., 1989; Yetim, 1993); 5. have better physical and psychological well being (Emmons, 1991, 1992).

Autonomous people have frequently engaged in ex­ periences that have been intrinsically rewarding (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1991; Ryan, et al., 1996). Intrinsically rewarding expe­ riences are engaged in because the sheer having of the ex­ perience, by itself, produces internally sensed, pleasant, re­ warding feeling-states. Engagement in these experiences is perceived to be freely chosen, and thus they have an inter­ nal locus of causality. When people engage in intrinsically rewarding experiences, there are no obligatory "intrapsy­ chic prods" or promises or threats and no external rewards are received during or after the experience itself. People who display a preponderance of dependence on other people, places, things, or events, or whose actions 150

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riences, a pleasant consequence other than the experience itself has been provided by an outside agent. Praise, awards, grades, special privileges or experiences, money, and with­ drawal of punishment are examples. These after-the-experience rewards are perceived as having an external locus of causality. Extrinsic rewards for behavior usually result in an increase of the behavior as long as the rewards are avail­

able, but absence of the behavior when the rewards are withdrawn (see Chapter 9 for more). Scenario One: A teacher invites some children to learn a new

game, and the children join in (perceivedfreedom of choice). The teacher just facilitates learning the game's activities and, as the children mas­ ter parts of the game, the teacher only describes what the children did. The game's activities engage the children's pattern detection, categoriza­ tion, and movement capabilities (perceptual, value-emotive, conceptual, behavioral) and the children enhance their self-mastery. Soon after­ ward, the children are dismissed for free play time and the teacher is not present. Scenario Two: The same teacher teaches the same new game to a different group of children. The game is presented as a required activity in which everyone must participate (coerced choice). Each time the children successfully master part of the game, each child is given a small piece of candy. Soon afterward, the children are dis­ missed for free play time and the teacher is not present. Will one group of children spontaneously choose to play the game more frequently than the other? Research

studies have shown repeatedly (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ross, 1975; Ryan, et al., 1985; Ryan & Powelson, 1991) that there is a high probability that the children in scenario one will frequently choose to play the new game, and a high prob­ ability that the children in scenario two will rarely choose

to play the game. Expectation of remembered or potential intrinsic reward plays a strong role in selection of attentional focus and goal-directed behavior, sometimes referred to in psychology literature as intrinsic motivation or intrinsic interest. The children in scenario one are likely to play the game "for the fun of" playing the game, that is, for its intrin­ sic reward or value. The children in scenario two are much less likely to play the game. From their experience with the game, they learned that it was played in order to

get candy. When no one was present to provide the extrin­

A cascade of increasingly detailed secondary apprais­

sic reward or value, there was no advantage to playing it

als (reappraisals) are then reentrantly looped between the

Often, behaviorist psychologists do not appreciate this dis­ tinction. As a result, parenting and teaching techniques use

sensory association, limbic, and prefrontal areas (and oth­ ers). Denham refers to these processes as cognitive construal of emotional experience. If emotional modification pat­ terns have been learned, they are then likely to be activated and result in coping behaviors. But if not, then "heat of the moment" emotionality is likely to continue, "the interpreter mechanism" may amplify its intensity, and emotional dis­

extrinsic rewards to increase desired behaviors, but they function as bribes to control behavior or gain compliance with what parents or teachers want youngsters to do. When the extrinsic rewards are withdrawn, however, the desired behavior commonly disappears (more in Chapter 9). Primary and secondary caregivers (including parents,

array may become instantiated in neuroendocrine memory

daycare providers, and teachers) can provide interpersonal

(Chapters 2 and 7 have more).

contexts that support the development of relatedness, compe­ tence, and autonomy in children (Ryan, et al., 1995, 1996; Ryan & Stiller, 1991). Their significant others can: (1) devote time for family and one-to-one interpersonal attention and com­ munication, (2) provide appropriate opportunities to inter­ act with a variety of people, places, things, and events, (3) include the child's perspectives and feelings in interpersonal communications (Koestner, et al., 1984), (4) provide and al­ low opportunities to make choices and observe and evalu­ ate consequences within the constraints of safety and well being, (5) allow and then describe self-initiation, (6) mini­

Each person's genetic-epigenetic constitution produces a consistently stable core of reactive value-emotive and behavioral tendencies that are referred to as temperament. Kagen (1994, pp. 140-173) addressed two categories of tem­ perament that he referred to as inhibited and uninhibited. He observed that varied neurotransmitter or receptor site reac­

places, things, and events, neurosensory networks are acti­ vated and the signaling is routed within a few milliseconds to the brainstem's ascending reticular activating system which

tivity in key nuclei within the amygdalae are major effec­ tors of the two temperaments (also see Benes, 1994). The amygdalae are reentrantly connected with the orbital fron­ tal cortices and the hypothalamus, and those two areas are interfaced with most of the neuropsychobiological processes of human bodyminds. Eisenberg & Fabes (1992) proposed two characteris­ tics of individual temperament that influence the success of emotion regulation in social situations: (1) differences in emotional intensity, such as arousal threshold and rise time, and (2) differences in regulatory processes, such as atten­ tion focusing and shifting, voluntary initiation of action, and voluntary inhibition of action. Denham (1998, pp. 164)

triggers an initial orienting response of heightened sen­

suggests that a positive-negative or pleasant-unpleasant

mize controlling interactions and avoid controlling language (Ryan, 1982; Ryan, et al., 1983), (7) minimize pressure to perform or live up to externally dictated standards (Deci, et al., 1982; Grolnick & Ryan, 1987). When we human beings encounter unfamiliar people,

sory alertness and action readiness (Barbas, 1995; Siegel, 1999, p. 124, 125). Within a few more milliseconds, a pri­ mary appraisal and arousal process is activated within the limbic, value-emotive appraisal areas such as the amygdalae and the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cor­ tices, among other areas. They then activate the hypotha­ lamic-pituitary-adrenal axis and the emotional motor sys­ tem (see Chapter 7). If reflexive threat programs are acti­ vated, reflex behavioral responses of fight-flight-freeze will be triggered. If not, a "pay attention now" state is triggered in the "heat of the moment" and possible behavioral reactions are primed (Denham, 1998, p. 151; Siegel, 1999, p.124).

emotional valence might be a temperament characteristic

based on right or left frontal reactivity differences. For ex­ ample:

1. Some children may be highly intense emotionally, yet also highly regulated. These children may be described

as shy, withdrawn, inhibited, emotionally unexpressive, and

unable to enjoy social situations with other people who are unfamiliar to them. If they also have a propensity for nega­ tive emotional processing, they may be more readily dis­ posed to aggressive self-defense if provoked enough. If they have a propensity for positive emotional processing, they may be pleasantly expressive in social situations with other

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people who are familiar to them, and undertake extensive

categorizing, conceptual categorizing, behavior pattern for­

measures to escape when provoked. 2. Other children may be low in emotional intensity

mation and elaboration, memory, learning, and so forth;

and very regulated so that they may be described as emo­ tionally "flat" and socially inhibited. These children may be relatively unresponsive, withdraw excessively from social situations, and experience frequent depression. 3. Children who are emotionally intense and have low emotional regulation allow their emotions almost free

expressive reign. When they are angry, they are very angry and they express their anger with high-intensity displays of

physical and verbal aggression. When they encounter adult anger, they respond with increasing emotional distress, nega­ tive judgmental appraisals, and behavioral aggression. They

are very challenged when parents or teachers help them learn emotional regulation. When they have emotionally rewarding experiences, their expressions may be "over the top" and excessively inappropriate. 4. Children who display moderate emotional inten­ sity and regulation are emotionally expressive, but they can plan responses, cope by solving social problems interac­ tively, and can learn a variety of emotion regulation strate­

see Damasio, 1994, 1999; Damasio, et al., 1995; Davidson, 1994ab; Edelman, 1989; Greenspan, 1997). When threats to

well being are interpreted, emotional reactions can impel protective ability patterns that may not be in the short- or long-term interests of the reacter. Inhibition or channeling of emotional intensity and emotional behavior can be learned, so that emotional responsiveness can produce con­

structive behavior patterns that are in the best interests of the reacter and other people as well. Several nominalizations have been devised to refer to the influence of feelings and emotions over cognition and behavior, such as emotional self-regulation (Bridges & Grolnick, 1994; Tucker, et al., 1995) and emotion regula­ tion (Brenner & Salovey, 1997; Denham, 1998; Thompson, 1994). Emotion regulation has been described as the "...ability to maintain flexibly organized behavior in the face of high levels of arousal or tension..." (Stroufe, 1996, p. 159), and as "...the extrinsic (external) and intrinsic (internal) processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating, and modifying emo­ tional reactions, especially their intensive and temporal fea­ tures, to accomplish one's goals" (Thompson 1994, pp. 27,

gies. Beginning with the constraints of every person's ge­

28, parenthetical terms added for clarity). Gradually, young children can monitor and appraise

netic-epigenetic baseline temperament, the available neuroscientific evidence strongly indicates that (1) experi­ ence-expectant temperament capabilities evolve over the hu­

the intensity and time variations in their emotional arousal, such as the intensity and speed of onset, intensity increases

man lifespan as genetically triggered tiers and levels of neu­ ral capacity "come on-line", and (2) value-emotive and be­ havioral tendencies of temperament are experience-depen­ dent and can be modified by learning during life experi­

extent to which resolution/closure to ground-state homeo­

ences. In other words, inherited temperamental tendencies can be intensified by life experiences, or they can be altered. If shy or unresponsive children's neuropsychobiological needs for relatedness, competence, and autonomy are satis­ fied constructively, they can evolve confident, assertive, con­ structive behaviors in social situations. The same would be true for children who are emotionally intense, low-regu­ lated, and negative by temperament. Feeling-emotional-affective states are primary gover­ nors of cognitive processing and behavior (arousal, attentional focus, perceptual categorizing, value-emotive

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over time, peaks of intensity, intensity decreases, and the

stasis is incomplete or complete. A two-year-old boy wants his mother to turn on the television set, but she is busy

storing newly purchased groceries in the kitchen, and she says, "Not now'' The boy begins wailing, falls to the floor, and beats it with his hands and feet. What if the mother of the two-year-old had asked her son to help her by arrang­ ing selected cans from tallest to shortest on a small table? [Examples of the emotional component of emotion regula­ tion are adapted from Denham, 1998, p. 148]. Teachers, too, can help children to implicitly learn emotion regulation. A four-year-old girl has been playing an outdoor, high-intensity, chasing game with four friends and they do not even hear their preschool teacher calling them inside. Her high-arousal state and slow calming rate prevent her from attending to schooling activities for about

20 minutes. What if, on the way from free-play time, the four-year-old girl's teacher had engaged her in a brief con­ versation about how much fun she was having and then

Greenspan's stages and levels and the tiers and tier levels of Fischer and Rose that were described earlier. According to Greenspan, each of the six sequential,

eased her into an intrinsically interesting, quiet personal task away from other children?

ment of the next level. If any of the levels is incompletely

A relative preponderance of constructive caregiver­

developed, the subsequent levels also will be incompletely

child interactions has been correlated with greater organis­

developed. The common result is mild to severe psychoso­

mic integration (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1991; Ryan, 1993), or a tendency to organization (Piaget, 1971) or actualization and self­ actualization (Rogers, 1963; Maslow, 1971). They also have been correlated with (1) self-reports of task enjoyment and

cial difficulties as a child grows toward and through adult­ hood. Greenspan (1997, pp. 41-53) gives the label security and engagement to the first and most primal stage in the development of a bodymind/self (internal categorization and behavioral expression). He describes this stage's first level of development as making sense of sensations. This level begins prenatally (see Book IV Chapter 1) and extends through the first 3 to 4 months post-birth. As nervous system sensory networks first come "on-line" and intercon­

feeling "trusted" to make autonomous decisions (Deci, et al., 1994), (2) a greater tendency to engage in achievement ac­ tivities, and (3) higher teacher ratings for psychosocial ad­

justment and classroom performance (Deci, et al., 1981; Grolnick & Ryan, 1989; Ryan & Grolnick, 1986). Those

contextual experiences also are more likely to be integrated into longer-term coherent goals ("personal strivings") that are associated with self-actualization, vitality, positive af­ fect, empathy, openness to experience, self-confidence, life

satisfaction, daily subjective well being, and overall coher­ ence of personality (Emmons, 1996; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995; Ryan, et al., 1996). On the other hand, the children of parents and teachers who use controlling external rewards and punishments tend to: (1) report a preponderance of external influences on achievement, and (2) be rated by teachers as less "self-moti­ vated" and more likely to "act out" in the classroom (Deci, et al., 1981; Grolnick & Ryan, 1989; Ryan & Grolnick, 1986).

overlapping levels provides the foundation for develop­

nect during womb life, they begin to categorize incoming experiential input in rudimentary ways. During and following birth, however, a virtual explo­ sion of unfamiliar sights, sounds, sensations, smells, and tastes occurs. As an infant's sensory receptors respond to patterns in the experienced "world", attentional processing begins to be engaged and the first physio chemical categori­ zations of that world occur. With experiential repetition, the perceptual and value-emotive categorizations become instantiated in memory as increasingly familiar patterns and pleasant or unpleasant feeling states are correlated with the people, places, things, and events that are encountered.

The controlling parents and teachers indicated that their

Rudimentary rhythmic features of sounds are catego­

interactions were the best way to help their children toward higher achievement. Research indicates that their actions

rized (speech and song, for instance), and shapes, motions,

actually contributed to interference with the intrinsic pro­

father's facial expressions, warmth, touch, and smell of

cesses that result in greater degrees of relatedness, compe­ tence, and autonomy (also see Becker, 1964, and Chapter 9).

mother and father, the texture of diapers, for instance). Sen­

Greenspan (1997, pp. 41-109) presents an overview of

reflexive movement is synchronized with mother's and father's movements during parent-child interactions. Even­ tually, these movements lay the foundation for more com­ plex abilities such as visual, auditory, and sensorimotor tracking of moving objects, reaching out and grasping, cud­

the experiences that form the foundations of optimally con­ structive self-development from birth to about the age of four years, as well as maladaptive and protective self-de­ velopment. He refers to three developmental stages of mind, (1) security and engagement, (2) from intent to dialogue, and (3) creating an internal world. Each stage has two levels

of mind development for a total of six levels (see Table I-83). There are interesting correspondences between

and body sensations become recognizable (mother's and

sorimotor control of head, arms, hands, and legs begin as

dling, and supported standing in mom's or dad's lap. (1) Ordered predictability in experiences with people, places, things, and events, and (2) remaining calm in the presence of a stimulating environment of sights, sounds, bodyminds,

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and sensations are two core learnings from the security and engagement stage. According to Greenspan (1997, p. 44), "Basic security is grounded in the ability to decipher sensa­ tions and plan actions" The ability to (1) regulate excited versus calm internal states, (2) focus sensory attention, and (3) plan and coordinate gross purposeful body movements are the foundations for the next developmental levels. Greenspan labeled the second level of the security and engagement stage as intimacy and relating. This level begins with prenatal mother-child bonding. Infant relatedness peaks from about 3 to 4 months to about 6 months post­

birth. It involves establishing emotional relationships with people who are frequently in a child's presence. As optimally beneficial sensory exchanges occur be­ tween caregivers and child (seeing, hearing, sensing, smell­ ing, tasting), varying intensities of pleasant feeling states co­ occur. With intense attention, parents repeatedly gloat over their baby and their child becomes enraptured with many synchronous and imitative exchanges that include facial expressions, talking, and singing songs. According to Greenspan (1997, p. 50), "...this first immersion in delirious relating sprouts a sense of shared humanity that can later blossom into the capacity for empathy and love" Over time, a "sense of engagement" with other human

beings marks the value-emotive difference between relating with inanimate things and relating with human beings, and thus, self versus nonself categories begin to be clarified. If connected two-way relating with at least one adult does not occur during infancy, then "...a child may never know the powerful intoxication of human closeness.." or "...never see

Table I-8-3. Greenspan's Three Stages and Six Levels of Mind (Self) Development (adapted from Greenspan, 1997, pp. 43-109)

Stages

Levels

I. Security and Engagement 1. Making Sense of Sensations: Global Aliveness 2. Intimacy and Relating: The Related Self

II. From Intent to Dialogue 3. Buds of Intentionality: The Willful Self 4. Purpose and Interaction: The Preverbal Sense of Self III. Creating an Internal Self5. Images, Ideas, and Symbols: The Symbolic Self 6. Emotional Thinking: The Thinking Self

"Inappropriate nurturing" therefore, can result in a child that is underprepared for making sense of the world, for self-regulation, and for relationship formation. Greenspan characterizes "the earliest self" as "global aliveness". "(T)he related self" results in a "sense of shared humanity". The second stage of self-development is labeled from intent to dialogue (Greenspan, 1997, pp. 54-73), and its first level is called buds of intentionality. This level occurs from about 6 months to about 12 months. During this time, intentional actions and responses are exchanged be­ tween child and others, especially the primary caregivers. These two-way exchanges are the earliest interactional,

1945, 1946; Spitz & Wolf, 1946), and are "...at risk of becom­

preverbal communications in which children participate, and they involve facial expressions, arm-hand gestures, postural arrangements of the body, and vocal sound con­ tours. Greenspan (1997, p. 55) refers to these interactions as "circles of communication". For example, eye contact is

ingself absorbed...unfeeling, self-centered, aggressive [people] who can inflict injury..." on other people.

mutual, a smile is responded to with a smile, an arm-hand movement elicits a similar arm-hand movement, a vocal

These earliest exchanges begin the lifelong evolution

sound results in a similar vocal sound, and any of these gestures can lead to a hug and other forms of holding and touching; "...baby gurgles, Dad raises his eyebrows, baby smiles, Dad picks up baby, baby pats Dad." (p. 58) Over time, babies begin reaching, taking, handing back,

other people as full human beings... capable of feeling what she [or he] feels." Such children come to know the threat and distress of abandonment (Carlson & Earls, 1997; Spitz,

of unique constructive and unique protective internal cat­ egorizations and behavioral expressions. Caregiver re­ sponses to such common occurrences as exploration of sur­

roundings, imitative reactions, and to assertive emotional expression (such as distress, anger, rage, pleasure) contrib­ ute to that evolution.

and making various accompanying sounds, and they imi­ tate and invent increasingly complex gestural and vocal "con­ versations" with others. During this level, reading to chil­

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dren the captions in children's picture books (no story lines

or very simple ones), and singing simple interactive songs

can be part of continuing parent-child intimacy and can

lay the foundation for development of expressive language and music abilities. All of these interactions involve per­ ceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categorizations that are consistent with current brain and experiential develop­

ment Cognitive-emotional-behavioral meshing in social

contexts is occurring, therefore, and these integrated pro­ cesses initiate a sense of engagement that helps form "...a fundamental psychological ability...the child's capacity to define the boundary that separates 'me' and 'you'. For the rest of our lives, the seemingly trivial gestures first under­ stood in late infancy serve to anchor both our human rela­ tionships and our thought processes...(and) delineate the borders of the individual person... With the same simple yet subtle gestural signals...we will negotiate all our adult relationships as long as we live'' (Greenspan, 1997, p. 55; see later section on nonverbal communication) Have you ever had a conversation with someone who gazed slightly to one side with an expressionless face? Have you ever performed before an unresponsive audience? Have you felt some degree of confusion and emotional discom­ fort? A well known study has shown that four-month-old healthy infants react even more strongly than that, when

Earls, 1997; Spitz, 1945, 1946; Spitz & Wolf, 1946)? Cogni­ tive-emotional-behavioral development is arrested. They become expressionless children, and in the absence of physi­ cal stimulation, they begin to make continuous, patterned, reflexive bodily movements such as swaying their heads and upper bodies back and forth endlessly. If they make it to adulthood, many of them do not use mutual eye gaze or gestural communications, and they speak with minimal variation of vocal pitch, volume, word rhythm, and voice quality. Neither do they perceive and respond to such com­ munications by others when engaged in dialogue. Their language use reveals self-absorption, and they report "feel­ ings of numbness" and "lack of relationships" during psy­ chotherapy (Greenspan, 1997, pp. 56, 57). Purpose and interaction is the label that Greenspan

(1997, pp. 60-73) gives to the second level of the intent to dialogue stage. This level occurs from about 12 months to about 18 months. The ability "to see, listen to, and repro­ duce (imitate) whole patterns, rather than bits and pieces of patterns", and to participate in "larger and larger interactive patterns" with others, are hallmarks of this level. Social behavior, talking, reading stories, singing, and other cogni­

tive skills can become more elaborated. In addition to discriminating facial expressions and gestural-postural communications, children now begin to

their faces with no eye contact or facial expression-no smil­ ing, nodding, cooing, touching, and so forth. The reactions

perceive and respond to nonverbal affective cues, catego­ rize their emotional significance, and deepen and widen their sense of relatedness. They can more clearly distinguish be­ tween approval and disapproval, acceptance and rejection, threat and benefit, trustworthiness and untrustworthiness (Greenspan, 1997, p. 64). Contrasting affective states can

of all the infants were predictable: (1) smiling, cooing, and

become integrated into the same sense of self. Play can take

gestural movement gradually became more intense, (2) with

place with emotional comfort in a space that is a near dis­ tance from a caregiver, another room for instance, as long

they experience unresponsive caregivers. While in the pres­ ence of their children, mothers were asked to not interact with them at all, but to just silently stare slightly away from

no reaction, they paused and then exaggerated the same physical and vocal gestures, (3) they became irritable and their physical and vocal gestures became somewhat frantic, disorganized, and purposeless after several minutes, and finally, (4) they disengaged as disinterest and apathy was displayed. At the conclusion of these mother-infant episodes in

the study, the mothers picked up their children and hugged them and engaged in intense communications to establish re-engagement. But what about infants whose life circum­ stances provide little or no such engagement (Carlson &

as the caregiver's presence can be verified vocally. Inten­

tional exploration of a larger "world" is then possible, so that sensory input is increased along with increasing de­ grees of competence and autonomy. Many intentions and affects occur.

Children evolve more details in their "map" of self and others, although the maps are not "set in stone". Con­ tinual, everyday, human-to-human interactions continually

revise the maps as cognitive-emotional-behavioral patterns are recategorized. The unique array of feelings-emotions bodyminds,

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that have occurred during each child's unique self-and-other

history mean that some areas of those "maps" will be more detailed than others; mixtures of effective emotional regulation with flexible abilities and emotional misregulation with constricted abilities occur. No child's family life is perfect One child's family experiences may "teach" a child to readily deal with most encountered problems in resolute good humor, while another child's family experiences may teach a child to per­ ceive many problems as threatening to well being, and to frequently respond to them with "aggression, or anxiety or passivity" (Greenspan, 1997, p. 63). These circumstances are likely to lay the foundation for coping with problems later in life. Some "emotional constrictions" may result in fre­ quent displays of anger, anxiety, or automatic, stereotyped cognitive-emotional-behavioral patterns such as "...intimacy always engenders flight, anxiety always builds up to hyste­ ria, separation always culminates in panic...(or other) ex­

treme and polarized reactions" Countless interactions with primary caregivers, and with other people, are the source of rich complex nonver­

bal perceptions, feelings, and actions. "Does the child ex­ pect others to love her or reject her, to tolerate her anger or abandon her when she shows it, to encourage her curiosity or demand that she remain passive, to allow her to explore in security or condemn her to loneliness when she ventures

out on her own? These earliest behavioral and emotional presuppositions...depend...on the lessons learned directly in innumerable interchanges with others." (Greenspan, 1997, pp. 72, 73) Children who do not get enough interaction time

cannot develop these nonverbal interaction skills to a de­ gree that enables future social relationships in school. "Read­ ing" mom's and dad's facial expressions and responding accordingly prepares the way for reading a teacher's non­ verbal cues and those of classmates. These cognitive-emo­ tional-behavioral patterns are "...the foundations of a sense of self.' Greenspan (1997, pp. 74-109) calls the third stage of self-development creating an internal world. The first level of this stage is called images, ideas, and symbols. This level extends from about 18 months to about 24 months. Children now can form more detailed and complex multi-

dren have images of how they operate (abilities, purposes, strategies, and so forth), how they feel, and what they want. They have an emerging, conscious sense of self that lays the groundwork for building a self-identity that has a past, present, and future. Optimal patterning of a sense of self (making sense,

gaining mastery) includes a "flexible panorama of feelings

and intentions". More global conceptual categories are now possible, such as anger versus love, make-believe versus

reality, and what we want to do versus what we actually do.

Symbolic expression of feelings and intentions (symbolic mode) can replace the sheer acting out of feelings and in­ tentions (action mode). Story reading can express these emerging feelings and intentions, as can songs. Pretend play (enactment of human roles) includes rudimentary story lines and spoken dialogue. Suboptimal patterning of a sense of self includes a comparatively more polarized, rigid, eitheror range of feelings and intentions. Polarized feelings and intentions are more prominently displayed when a signifi­ cant proportion of children's life experiences have been con­ trolled externally or have been threatening to their well be­ ing.

For capabilities to be realized into optimal abilities, children need "...the long-term participation of someone who

promotes interaction, supports greater use of signals, who joins in the child's pretend play, who helps him link the pleasure of relating (with others) to the skills of communi­ cating symbolically. The sheer joy of being listened to, the satisfaction of gaining attention through the use of images, motivates the first step in this epochal move....(As) commu­

nication for communication's sake begins to overtake com­ munication to meet a need, the child embarks on a course he will continue throughout life." These sorts of frequent interactions help children "translate immediate, concrete aims into words and images." (Greenspan, 1997, p. 77, 78) "His love for his caregivers and the pleasure they bring him leads him to enjoy communicating in its own right....(The) plea­ sures of symbolic expression deepen with the years, and gradually conversation, reading, writing, poetry, mathematics, music, drama, painting, sculpture, and all the arts and sci­

"Inner" visual, auditory, somatosensory

ences can become sources of profound gratification." (Greenspan, 1997, p. 77)

images of self-characteristics are included along with simple

Emotional thinking is the label for the second level of

verbal descriptions of perceived self-characteristics. Chil­

the creating an internal world stage. This level occurs during

sensory images.

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the third and fourth years. During this level, children begin to interlink formerly concrete or isolated cognitions, emo­ tions, and behaviors, and they are able to form bridges between their own ideas and those of others. Internally produced images are more detailed and can be "connected" more consistently and held in working memory more co­ hesively. "Reason can supplant fear, inhibitions, or obedi­ ence. Ideas can link up to emotions....Time becomes com­ prehensible, separated into past, present, and future. Space too becomes orderly, perceived as here, there, somewhere else. Categories of fantasy and reality arise..." (Greenspan, 1997, p. 85, 86) The difference between internal experience versus ex­

ternal experience becomes clearer as self and nonself are more clearly distinguished. An "internal locus of causality" for cognitions, emotions, and behaviors (Ryan, et al, 1996) be­ comes clearer (Greenspan, 1997, p. 88) Attention can be

more focused and longer lasting, more cohesive actions can be planned, their consequences better foreseen, and impulse behavior more regulated, and thus reality testing becomes possible. Cause and effect relationships become important and are more clearly perceived and appreciated. These re­ lationships enable greater cohesion in perceptual, valueemotive, and conceptual categorizations. All of these emerg­ ing capabilities and abilities can be incorporated in story reading and songs. A family of grandmother, grandfather, mother, father, five-yearold son, and three-year-old daughter are seated in a restaurant. While waiting for their food, the adults converse and the children play with crayons and paper. The daughter, seated to mother's right, begins making somewhat loud verbal expressions during her imaginary play. The mother places her hand on her daughter's upper back, moves her own face near her ear, and speaks softly and pleasantly, "This is a place where we use our soft voice rather than our at-home play voice." The daughter never spoke loudly again during the family's meal. The interlinks between cognitions, emotions, and be­ haviors can be more completely transformed into symbolic representations. Children no longer express "islands of thought" like "What this?" or "Want juice," or "Me sad" Dur­ ing this level they are more likely to say, "Why?" and "How?" or "I like that juice because it tastes good," or "I feel sad because I'm leaving Grandpa." Parents can use language to "...explore the roots of a situation and connect it to outer reality" (Greenspan, 1997, p. 86) When children behave il-

logically or inappropriately, primary caregivers can ask them

questions like, "How did the doll's head become broken?" and "Is that what really happened?" and "What can you do the next time you play with the doll?" or (after tripping and falling down some steps) "Next time you walk down the steps, what can you do so you don't fall?" Thereby, chil­ dren can learn how to check the accuracy, validity, and "logic"

of their purposeful behaviors, their cognitive-emotional interpretations of events, consequences of actions, and con­ sciously anticipate future actions. Pretend play includes more complex social interac­

tions and "story lines". Actual dialogue with family and friends is integrated with and elaborated upon in later play. Story lines, gestural behaviors, and dialogue that are por­ trayed on television and in movies also become integrated into pretend play. In three different "made for TV experi­ ments" by the National Institute on Media and the Family (Minneapolis, Minnesota), a group of preschool children watched an episode of the children's TV program "Barney", in which empathic, cooperative behavior was portrayed and expressed through action, talking, and singing. The children responded to the program with animated, smiling faces and by singing along and walking in time with the music. Free play time then occurred. The children were videotaped with animated, smiling faces while they played respectfully, quietly, empathically, and cooperatively. One day later, the same children watched a children's TV program called "Power Rangers", in which the costumed "heros" used a version of the martial arts to violently subdue obviously "bad people". During the program, the children began imi­ tating the kicking behavior of the rangers. During the sub­

sequent free play, the children were videotaped while they yelled challenges at each other, and kicked, pushed, and hit at each other in imitation of the behaviors that they had

just observed. Upon viewing their children's reactions, the parents were quite surprised. Even usually reserved chil­ dren joined in the "fun" (10PM News, January, 1997, KARETV, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA). Consciously interlinking cognitive-emotional-behav­ ioral patterns and transforming them into symbolic repre­ sentation lays the foundation for lifelong emotional regula­

tion, self-reflection, and self-regulation. "For this to hap­

pen, of course, the child must be nurtured through years of intimacy, through countless conversations, debates, nego­ bodyminds,

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tiations, responses, remonstrances, and games....Failure to develop this representational ability can lock people into rigid, unproductive patterns. Rather than being able to use ideas to get to the emotional roots of a problem, they re­ peatedly and futilely try to force others to behave in the way that they desire....Children who lack dynamic interac­ tion at this stage, whose parents leave them (only) to their own imagination or pretend play, tend to devise rich and creative symbolic images but may not learn to test them against a stable inner sense of reality. In the face of an emotional challenge, they often retreat into fantasy or re­ main fragmented, living in a piecemeal world of changing images rather than one of stable, coherent meaning" (Greenspan, 1997, p. 87-89). As children continue through middle and late child­

hood, they go through several more self-development lev­ els, according to Greenspan. Each new level brings new capabilities and new social situations with new human re­ lationship and feeling abilities. Optimal negotiation of each new level, however, is dependent on optimal completion of the first six. School experiences begin at about the age of 5 or 6 years for many children, and with them come an array of very different experiences that bring new perspectives,

contexts, conflicts, contradictions, cautions, and responsi­ bilities. "...(E)motional ties and relationships remain at the core.." of optimal self-development, however, so that a "new boldness, expressiveness, and expansiveness" can flourish.

Without grounded emotional ties, children run the risk of

becoming "overwhelmed by all the possibilities" or they may "prematurely narrow the range of...curiosity and cre­ ativity and become overly focused and rigid" (Greenspan, 1997, pp. 103, 104). By the ages of 7 or 8 years, optimal self-development results in "...a firmer grasp of reality, a lively sense of...potential, a rich fantasy life, and a more varied reper­ toire of social perceptions and responses....(T)he politics of the playground and the pecking order of the classroom dominate both social life and children's maturing concep­ tion of themselves....Every second or third grader knows

precisely where she ranks in popularity, attractiveness, de­ sirability as a member of a sports team, ability to spell or

add or read, fashionableness, musical talent, and any of a hundred other (scales) on which children of this age con­ stantly rank themselves" The reactions of peers become

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very important in self-development (Greenspan, 1997, p. 104).

A prominence of "win-at-all-cost" competitive experiences

may entrench relatively rigid either-or conceptualizations of people, places, things, and events, and frequent polariza­ tion in human interactions (Greenspan, 1997, pp. 231-238; Kohn, 1990, 1992). Children with optimal self-development establish a strong internal self-identity during the ages of 10 to 12 years.

Peer reactions may no longer be pervasively influential as abstract cognitive abilities begin, value-emotive self-regula­

tion expands, and self-perceptions become more defined and stable. Instead of being guided more by a fear of pun­ ishment, or threat of loss in competition and other "either-

or" categories, behavior now can be guided more and more by conscious altruism, that is, empathy, reflection, accep­

tance of ambiguities or "gray areas" (Greenspan, 1997, pp. 236-238). These abilities form a strong foundation for the challenges of early adolescence (about ages 12 to 15 years) when massive physio chemical growth spurts associated with reproductive capacity occur.

During early adolescence, bodily appearance changes noticeably, physical capabilities increase considerably, ab­ stract cognitive abilities develop further, the greatest amount of vocal transformation occurs, and feelings-emotions are much more intense. These realities bring a considerable array of challenges to self-development. "Friendships are now deeper, those with the opposite sex more problematic....(P)ossible identities become more diverse and the need to define (self is) more pressing...a geek, a jock, a punk, a nerd...popular, attractive, smart?" But if the self­ development rests on shaky prior foundations, then ado­ lescents "...will not be able to cope with the powerful feel­ ings—sexuality, loss of childhood, new kinds of humilia­ tion—that must be faced" (Greenspan, 1997, p. 105, 106). Middle adolescence (about ages 15 to 18 years) brings substantial stabilization of physical appearance and cogni­

tive-emotional-behavioral capabilities and abilities. These

changes, however, are by no means finished. Typically, middle adolescents contend even more intensely with the differing value-emotive tendencies in their peers and be­ tween their own evolving value-emotive tendencies and those of their parents. They can develop wider interests in such endeavors as "...politics, moral and religious issues, social movements, and the like. Growth of the brain also enables

them to consider future (hypothetical) possibilities and to imag­

ine hypothetical worlds: 'What would happen if Jane agreed to be my girl friend?' 'Should I go to a state university or try for a more prestigious school?' 'What would it be like to be a doctor/ a pilot/a teacher..'' as an adult? Considerations of marriage and family may occur as a means of escaping an unpleasant home environment that has not provided the self-development sup­ port that is needed during prior growing-up years (Greenspan, 1997, p. 106). Late adolescence (about ages 18 to 21 years) brings

the challenges of entering the workforce or leaving home for college or military service. The social environment ex­ pands again and more serious responsibilities for financial and socioemotional self-support are taken on. Long-term

romantic relationships, marriage, and family may be con­ sidered or undertaken. The needs for relatedness, compe­ tence, and autonomy are still present, but must be satisfied by new cognitive-emotional-behavioral abilities. Typically, early adulthood (about 21 to 35 years) brings the establishment of a career and the parenting of children. "This calls on a much more subtle empathy and a greater selflessness than most people have known up to this point. To succeed, a person needs both a strong self­ definition and the ability to tolerate a range of intense feel­ ings as dozens of interpersonal constellations form. In the face of competition, resentment, fatigue, frustration, uncer­ tainty, anger, responsibility, mother or father love, anxiety, and the rest, parents must maintain a position as leaders of their families and also see to the financial and work realities of paying the bills" (Greenspan, 1997, p. 106). With middle adulthood (about 35 to 65 years) and

late adulthood (about 65 years and up) come the increas­ ing realization that one's own lifespan is passing and will

have an end. As one's own children grow through the levels previously described, leave home, and establish their

own autonomous adulthood, the gradual, years-long dis­ engagement from the details of their lives brings a need for yet another range of cognitive-emotional-behavioral abili­ ties. The temptation may be great for parents to satisfy their own past unmet needs by overidentifying with the lives of their children. While memory and physical capa­ bilities diminish in varying degrees during aging (athletic

abilities and menopause, for instance), "the capacity for judg­ ment and wisdom may well increase", partly because of ac­

cumulated experience and partly because of growth spurts in the frontal lobes of the brain (Greenspan, 1997, p. 107; Greenspan & Pollock, 1990; Thatcher, 1994). "The eyes go, the waistline, much of the physical beauty of youth: the lovely hair that used to make one proud, the smooth skin, the strong muscles. Feelings of rivalry, loss, disappoint­ ment, and awareness of the shortening of time become more pressing" (Greenspan, 1997, p. 107). There is evidence from psychologists that nearly all young children and most adults have an innate altruistic and optimistic orientation (Kohn, 1990; Schulman, et al., 1993). That innate orientation can become pessimistic and hurtful if life experiences include substantial threats to well

being that prevent constructive mastery of world and self (Greenspan, 1997; Peterson, et al., 1993; Seligman, 1993). Seligman (1990) proposes that people's life experiences can result in a prominence of learned helplessness or a promi­ nence of learned optimism. The extent to which people have developed implicitly learned helplessness or implicitly learned optimism can be reflected in how they explain life events (Seligman, 1990, pp. 40-53). Explanations of positive or negative life events can convey relative permanence of the events. Are the events a temporary or permanent condition? Permanence

is about time, that is, how long a person perseveres or gives

up in the face of experienced events. Pervasiveness refers to the extent to which a recent event influences future events. Is the influence universal or specific to a single event? Per­ sonalization refers to the extent to which blame or credit are internalized (self) or externalized (others). An explanatory style that is pessimistic may include such exemplar state­ ments as, "I'm not any good at dating", or "I'm not attrac­ tive" or "It was just luck that I....". An explanatory style that is optimistic may include such exemplar statements as, "I'm not any good at dating yet" or "I'm not attractive to Sam" or "I took advantage of an opportunity to...."

Emotional reactions are learned behaviors that begin their development with emotional modeling by parents and

others in response to specific situations. Throughout our lives, the people, places, things, and events that we encoun­ ter trigger accumulated, automatic, value-emotive behavior packages called habitual emotional behavior. According to Oliver (1993, p. 76), emotional behaviors are "...habits of thought and action cued to begin by a physical sensation" bodyminds,

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(Damasio's somatic marker). Emotional behavior patterns that are not in a person's best interest can be altered by

difficulties with the cognitive, emotional, and/or behavioral

patterns that are learned and used throughout life.

specific learning experiences that are mediated by parent(s) or teacher(s) (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Conscious aware­ ness of the old pattern and a targeted alternative reaction precede target practice on new emotion regulation skills (Patterson, 1991; Seligman, 1990; Seligman, et al., 1995).

Summary of Optimal Self Development In a nutshell, Greenspan (1997, p. 108) describes a se­ quential series of foundational building blocks for optimal self-development:

These themes are extensively substantiated in the neuropsychobiological science literature, for example, Bowlby (1988), Brothers (1997), Carlson and Earls (1997), Csikszentmihalyi (1993), Damasio (1994, 1999), Damasio, et al. (1995), Dawson and Fischer (1994), Edelman (1989), Deci and Ryan (1985), Gollwitzer & Bargh (1996), LeDoux (1996), Panksepp (1998), Porges, et al. (1996), Rolls (1995), Ryan, et

al. (1995), Salovey and Sluyter (1997), Schore (1994), Spitz (1945,1946), Thatcher, et al. (1996), Zahn-Waxler, et al. (1986).

1. the ability to attend: emotional interest in various

sights, sounds, and sensations;

2. the ability to engage: experience pleasant feelings and

Human Verbal and Nonverbal Interactions

emotional warmth in the presence of another person;

3. the ability to be intentional: purposeful behavior that is directed by value-emotive tendencies;

4. the ability to form complex, interactive, intentional patterns: connect one's own emotional signals with those of others during human-to-human interactions;

5. the ability to create images, symbols, and ideas that are invested with affective import: the basis of reasoning and emotional coping;

6. the ability to connect images and symbols: simultaneous awareness of one's own value-emotive orientation while

comprehending the expressions of value-emotive orienta­ tions by other people.

In 1900, a German man named von Osten purchased

a horse and named him Hans. He taught Hans to count by tapping one of his front hooves. Then, quite surprisingly, Hans learned to add, subtract, multiply, divide, and to solve

problems involving factors and fractions. He could tell time,

use a calendar, and recall musical pitch. Hans learned the alphabet coded in numbers (hoof taps) and developed the ability to answer any question presented orally or written! von Osten exhibited Hans' foot tapping skills before public audiences-for a fee of course. Hans seemed to have total comprehension of the German language. The horse could do what many humans had difficulty doing! Hans became internationally famous.

From Greenspan's review of levels of self-develop­ ment, there are three central themes: 1. What we call feeling, affective, emotional, and value-emo­ tive states (behavioral tendencies) are foundationally integrated with all percepts, concepts, and actual behaviors that con­ stitute self-identity. 2. Respectful, empathic, communicative, human-tohuman relationships are the bedrock of all constructive and productive human endeavor.

3. The experiences that human beings have from the time of their prenatal growth through the first four years of

postbirth life lay the foundation for development of a sig­ nificantly satisfying, confident, competent, autonomous selfdetermination, or a self-development that poses pitfalls and

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The media

dubbed him "Clever Hans" But there were some very prominent skeptics! So, an investigating committee was formed, made up of profes­ sors of psychology and physiology, a zoologist, veterinar­ ians, cavalry officers, and the director of a circus. Hans was asked to respond to questions created by the committee members while von Osten was absent. There was no change in Clever Hans' apparent intelligence and that proved his authenticity. Hans received incredible international press after that. Skepticism continued, however. Another investigat­ ing commission was formed. A man named Otto Pfungst

was the lead investigator. In 1911, he published a book about his findings (Pfungst, 1965).

In one of the tests, von Osten whispered a number ber into the other ear, and Hans was to add the two num­ bers and tap the answer-an answer that neither von Osten

ences occurred, the things that were present, and the events that occurred are tagged as well-episodic memory. When memories are unfavorable, we will be less inclined to inter­ act with that person, place, thing, or event in the future. If

nor the onlookers knew Clever Hans was stymied. He

favorable, then we will be more inclined to interact.

into one of Hans' ears and Pfungst whispered another num­

failed many other clever tests as well. Pfungst had observed the nonverbal or other-thanconscious communication that had occurred between Hans and anyone who knew the answer to a question that had been posed to Hans. When a question was asked, onlook­ ers who knew the answer: 1. assumed an expectant posture and facial expres­ sion;

Our other-than-conscious impressions are formed by

a high-speed brain system that bypasses our attentional, working memory, and language networks (Bargh, 1988,1994; Bargh, et al., 1989; Cappella, 1991; Damasio, 1994, pp. ISO187; LeDoux, 1996, pp. 200-204; Newlin, 1981). Neuropsychologists refer to this system as the implicit learn­

2. make a slight upward movement of their heads.

ing and memory system. Key parts of the brain that pro­ cess feelings and emotions are prominently involved in that system-the amygdala and the hypothalamus-pituitary com­ plex. The autonomic nervous system is then engaged and that is where the implicit somatic marker comes from. On the other hand, after you have met people at a social gathering, perhaps someone says to you, "What did you think of Sarah Everywoman?" You may then review your recent working memories and their feeling tags in your

And Hans would stop tapping. Pfungst claimed that

conscious awareness and say, "Oh, I don't know. I guess we didn't hit it off very well," or "Oh, yes! Sarah and I hit it off

2. increased their body tension; and 3. bent their heads slightly forward. Hans paid attention to them, and when he reached

the correct number of hoof-taps, those onlookers would: 1. relax, and

Hans could detect head movements as slight as one-fifth of

a millimeter, and would cease tapping if knowledgeable on­

immediately" Your implicit impression has been brought into con­

lookers raised an eyebrow or dilated their nostrils. A French

scious awareness and formed into a retrievable episodic-

horse, dubbed "Clever Bertrand," copied what Hans had done-but Bertrand was blind. You guessed it: he read au­ ditory cues. Pfungst established that Clever Hans did, too.

declarative memory. Impressions that came to conscious awareness as the experience was occurring are routed through a more complex and slower-acting brain system

sions. Accordingly, the impressions that we form of other

that includes attentional, working memory, and language networks. Neuropsychologists refer to this system as the explicit memory and learning system. A key part of the brain systems that create conscious memories includes the hippocampus (which is interfaced with the amygdala, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the orbital area of the pre­ frontal cortex; see Damasio, 1994, pp. 180-187; LeDoux, 1996, pp. 200-204). In 1972, Dr. Albert Mehrabian, psychologist at the

people-and the impressions that they form of us-are either

University of California at Los Angeles, published a book

favorable or unfavorable (Zaidel & Mehrabian, 1969; Bargh

titled Nonverbal Communication. He reported a large collec­ tion of research data and estimated that when people de­ liver and receive spoken communication, about 45% is trans­ mitted vocally; 55% is transmitted by facial expression, arm­ hand gestures, and postural arrangements of the body. His breakdown is shown in Table I-8-4.

Clever Humans When we human beings communicate with each other, about 9O°/o of that communicating is outside conscious aware­

ness. That 9O°/o produces feeling reactions inside the people who are communicating with each other. As noted in Chap­ ter 7, feelings are either pleasant or unpleasant, positive or negative.

We refer to those feeling reactions as impres­

& Pietromonaco, 1982; Riggio & Friedman, 1986).

Instantly, memories of the people we communicate with are categorized with a favorable or unfavorable value and a pleasant or unpleasant physical sensation-a somatic marker. To varying degrees, the places where the experi­

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Table I-8-4. Verbal and Nonverbal Communication That Occur During Spoken Conversation

Nonverbal, Other-Than-Conscious Communication The parts of human beings that process outside con­

[Adapted from Mehrabian, 1972, pp. 186, 187]

scious awareness have enormous processing capacity and

GESTURAL

COMMUNICATIONS..................................................................... 55%

[nearly always produced and perceived outside conscious awareness as part of the nonverbal "context" of spoken communication] VOICED

COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................................... 45%

Verbal Content: Denotative, "dictionary meanings" of words...... 7%

[nearly always produced and perceived in conscious awareness as the verbal "text' of spoken communication]

Nonverbal Content: Connotative, "feeling meanings"......................38% [nearly always produced and perceived outside conscious awareness as part of the nonverbal "context" of spoken communication; it is imbedded in variations of vocal pitch, volume, timbre, and durational aspects of speech such as timing-pacing-pausing]

The nervous system's capacity for conscious, attention-

focused, cognitive and behavioral processing is limited to one activity at a time. So, during person-to-person spoken

conversation, the conscious reception and interpretation of incoming verbal communication, and formulation and de­

livery of language responses, nearly always occupy con­ scious cognition and behavioral processing. That is what Mehrabian referred to as the text of spoken communication, and it constituted 7% of the total communication. The prosody of person-to-person spoken conversation

(vocal pitch, volume, timbre, and durational aspects) com­ municates the connotative or "feeling meanings" of language (paralanguage). According to Mehrabian, these nonverbal aspects of communication constitute about 38% of total com­ munication behavior and are received and interpreted out­ side conscious awareness. Speech prosody and all gestural communications are what Mehrabian referred to as the con­ text of spoken communication. If Mehrabian's observa­ tions are accurate, then, we are not consciously aware of about 9O% of what we are communicating. That means that about 9O% of our communicating is the result of habitual, implicit communication patterns.

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those parts are significantly developed by birth. Babies have been videotaped moving in synchrony with their parents during spoken parentese (Condon & Sandor, 1974). Parent-child eye gaze patterns, touching, gesturing, and hold­

ing are of rich communicative significance. These commu­

nicative capabilities are well developed in children before language emerges (Berinieri, et al., 1988; Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1989; Meltzoff & Moore, 1989). In fact, these communica­ tions can be life and death matters for infants. In London, during World War II, orphaned children who were fed but not touched, held, or talked to very much began to eat less, remain relatively still and expressionless, and began to waste away physically (Spitz, 1945, 1946; Spitz & Wolf, 1946). Even as adults, respectful recognition is often an unrecognized mainstay of personal efficacy. As the nonverbal communications literature indicates, just about everything we human beings do in the presence of others, and just about everything other human beings

do in our presence, are observed through the senses (per­ ceptual categorizations) and "read" for emotional signifi­ cance (value-emotive categorizations) and interrelational significance (conceptual categorizations) (DePaulo, 1991; Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991; Hamann, et al., 1996; Knapp & Hall, 1992). People respond first to other-than-conscious "messages", and sometimes do not respond to the consciousverbal ones at all (Personal communication, David Dob­ son, Ph.D., psychologist, 1986; Mehrabian, 1981). During

communication, people usually respond more to the pat­ terned communications delivered by our bodies while we talk, and to the connotative, prosodic, paralinguistic aspects of speech, than to the denotative language we speak (Zaidel & Mehrabian 1969; Ochsner, et al., 1997; O'Sullivan, et al., 1985). As sociologist Marshall McLuhan said, "The me­ dium is the message" Rapport is a common term for empathic, respectful, and comfortable human communication. Some people might say that there is a feeling of connectedness between the communi­ cators. On the other hand, some people do not "hit it off" well when they communicate, and there is a feeling of dis­ connectedness. Some people seem to have immediate rapport

with nearly everyone they meet, while other people fre­ quently feel disconnected when they attempt to communi­ cate with other people (Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, 1987, 1990). So, what are the connected communicators doing that the disconnected communicators are not doing, and can less effective communicators learn to communicate well? Emotional memory triggers what Davidson has called approach or withdrawal behavior (Davidson, 1994). Pleasant

ness" produces pleasant familiarity feeling states in both children and parents, and between peers and colleagues,

and all such experiences are instantiated in implicit emo­ tional memory networks. Nonverbal and verbal social in­ teraction appears to be a key element of cognitive-emo­ tional-behavioral and brain development (Brothers, 1997). In any casual conversation with a friend, both conversants will match some aspect of their friend's behav­

familiarity feelings, in connection with people, places, things, and events tend to produce approach behavior. If you en­ ter a large room, and at one end of the room are people who are strangers but you know that they are in the same line of work as you, and at the other end are strangers whose work you have had zero acquaintance with, which group would you be most likely to join? There are many principles and skills in establishing respectful, comfortable communication (Burgoon, etal., 1985; Feldman, et al., 1991; Knapp & Hall, 1992). One of the more important principles is: Most people are more emotionally comfortable when they are in safe, pleasantly familiar cir­

ior, and never be consciously aware of it. One friend may tilt her head to the left and soon after the other may tilt hers

cumstances as opposed to unfamiliar, potentially unsafe circumstances. When nonverbal communicants emit fa­ miliar nonverbal gestures and vocalizations, then comfort­ able, constructive, and empathic communication is much more likely. What do people do when they are communicating

Behavioral mismatching also commonly occurs, that

nonverbally? When people are talking without a pre-written script, they are always communicating nonverbally. Human-to-

human rapport, or emotional "connection" is observable when people interact by matching each other's gestural and vocal patterns to a degree. The scientific term for behavioral matching is interaction synchrony (Bernieri, 1988; Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991; Knapp & Hall, 1992, pp. 210-217). Matching another's behavior introduces a degree of pleas­ ant familiarity, favorable engagement, and pleasant-feeling attachment into the nonverbal dialogue. This form of nonverbal communication is rooted in our innate ability for imitation and our early imitative vo­

cal and gestural interactions with our parents and others during infancy (Meltzoff, 1990; Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993; Uzgiris, et al., 1989). This ability becomes increasingly elabo­ rated through interactions with peers throughout childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. A kind of mutual "like me-

the other way; one may cross her feet, and the other does likewise; one may speak several sentences with a relatively unique pitch inflection, and the other may speak her next sentence with a similar uniqueness; one may incorporate the other's unfamiliar term for an automobile into her own

conversation; one may smile while telling a story and the other smiles immediately without knowing how the story ends. Friendly human beings perform fascinating matching

dances every day, outside conscious awareness.

is, interaction dysynchrony. When the habitual, outsideconscious-awareness, nonverbal behavior patterns of one communicant mismatches the nonverbal patterns of the other person, then a degree of unpleasant emotional disen­

gagement is introduced into the nonverbal dialogue. Typi­ cally, the likelihood of meeting again by choice is dimin­ ished. Mismatching also occurs when a person is nega­ tively disposed toward another person. A young woman is being interviewed for a job; a job for which she has excellent training. How might a match­ ing vs. mismatching dance be performed? The experienced interviewer is in a totally familiar

and comfortable setting. This next interviewee is another in a long line of interviewees. The interviewer is likely to put on her figurative judge's robes. The interviewee, however, is in totally unfamiliar circumstances, and a setting that is laden with potential threat to well being. Habitual threat responses are much more likely. Behavioral mismatching is highly likely. The interviewee enters the room with her arms and hands held close to her body, a slight shoulder slump, a lowered intense face with one fast smile-and-glance at the interviewer's face during the introduc­ tion, and she sits down quickly, whereas the interviewer stands tall bodyminds,

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with a relaxed body and a smile as she introduces herself. The

interviewer's voice is calm and even, and she speaks in sentences that have closure, but the interviewee's voice has high-pitched inflections

and a relatively pinched voice quality, and she makes a nervous giggle after some answers; the interviewer's arms and hands are fairly steady

and only necessary movement occurs, while the interviewee's arms and hands move in repeated semicircular motions when she talks; the

interviewer's gaze is steady and she frequently looks at the interviewee, while the interviewee frequently looks down or away, and rarely meets the gaze of the interviewer. A first impression of the interviewee is formed in the first few seconds, and it is unfavorable. The remainder of the interview makes it worse.

4. how to breathe in deeply one or more times before meeting the interviewer, in order to counteract the effects of

distress (see Book III, Chapter 8); 5. how to enter the room with a pleasant look on the face, possibly with an expectant smile (Knapp & Hall, 1992, pp. 261-287), look at the interviewer during the introduc­ tion (Knapp & Hall, 1992, pp. 295-311), and shake hands firmly with hand-web meeting hand-web;

6. to compliment a feature of the interviewer's ap­ pearance, or a personal item in the room if/when appro­

priate, and only if genuine, and accept any refreshment that

is offered and have it prepared the same way as the inter­ viewer, if applicable; 7. how to match small aspects of the interviewer's physical demeanor, such as tilt of head or smile intensity, or

Unless the interviewer is empathic, will the interviewee's actual job skills receive a qualified assessment? Maybe, but probably not. What could the interviewee have learned ahead of time to improve her communication skills so that her impression would have been more favorable? [These suggestions are based on nonverbal practices in the United States, and may or may not be appropriate in other cul­ tures.] Before the interview, she could have sought out rel­ evant information about the company and the job for which

"tone of voice" (never directly imitate behavior, of course, just a "suggestion" of the behavior is all that is necessary);

application was made. If/when appropriate, she could pref­ ace questions about the company or job with a relevant item of information that she had learned about the com­ pany or the job, or mention the satisfaction of a current or

What could the interviewer have done or said to im­ prove the communicative situation? She could have gone outside her office to where the interviewee was waiting, greeted her there with a smile and use of her name with words of welcome, an invitation into the interviewing room, offering a comfortable chair with no desk in between, offer­ ing water or a beverage, perhaps complimenting her attire,

former employee or customer. She could come to the inter­ view prepared to describe, in as much detail as is appropri­

ate, how her job and people skills will benefit the company, but without presenting the information in a "cheerleader"

manner. In addition, the interviewee could have learned: 1. the common effects of distress on bodyminds and some ways to lower its interference with cognitive and com­ munications abilities, including voice (Knapp & Hall, 1992, pp. 326-371); 2. how to move, stand, and sit with a comfortably tall body demeanor, and practice it enough times so that it does not appear stiff and "put on" (see Book II, Chapter 4); 3. how to choose apparel that is likely to be consis­ tent with the expectation of the interviewer and how to

wear it appropriately (Knapp & Hall, 1992, pp. 122-132);

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8. to listen closely to the interviewer's explanations and questions, and when appropriate, incorporate terms used by the interviewer into responses, and perhaps one of the interviewer's arm-hand gestures; 9. to ask thoughtful questions about the company and the job requirements.

and engaging in "small talk" about the interviewee's travel to the interview site or the weather to provide a time for comfort to develop before asking a nonthreatening first in­ terview question. A teacher is presenting verbal and nonverbal com­ munications to a group of 25 students. Two students begin a whispered conversation near the back of the room.

Interaction Scenario #1: The teacher stops talking and

becomes still, places fists on hips and stares at the two students with a facial expression of angry disapproval. [Some teachers describe that expression as "giving a student the evil eye", that is, head slightly down with eyes straight ahead, forehead and eyebrows furrowed downward, eyelids narrowed, lips closed, tightened, and slightly protruded.] Then,

with higher vocal volume, the teacher says, "You two are talking when I'm talking! I do not tolerate that in my classroom. That is one of my discipline rules that I wrote on the board at the beginning of the year This is your first warning. The next time, the consequence will be a trip to the principal's office and a call to your parents. When I'm talking, you will be quiet. Do you understand?" After a short staring pause, the teacher then resumes teaching with a "softened" version of the anger look and "tone of voice". Interaction Scenario #2: The teacher stops talking and becomes still, establishes mutual eye contact, raises eyebrows with a pleasant look on the face including a slight smile, nods, broadens the smile, then resumes teaching. In scenario #1, the teacher's stillness and silence broke an ongoing situational pattern, and attention of the two

boys was arrested. The teacher's nonverbal behavior also thoroughly communicated an adversarial mind-set and con­ trolling, accusative, punitive, disrespect for the human be­ ings who are called students (see Chapter 9 for more). Emo­ tional disconnection was widened between the teacher and nearly all of the students, and between the students and the place where the interaction took place, the materials being used, and the events that commonly take place. Protective behaviors are more likely to emerge (withdrawal, immobi­ lization, counter-threat or counterattack).

In scenario #2, the teacher's stillness and silence also broke an ongoing situational pattern. This teacher's non­

verbal behavior communicated respect for the normal hu­ man beings involved, and indicates that a collaborative mind-set is the everyday norm (see Chapter 9). Clearly, the above scenarios do not include any information about the psychosocial history of the relationship between teacher, students, students' families, the school, and the community in which the school is located. The nonverbal communica­ tion in scenario #2 might not be effective if the students and-teacher relationship already included emotional dis­ connection, distrust, and disrespect for the humanity of the

other. Establishment of some degree of mutual empathic respect might be a prerequisite to rapport (see Chapter 9).

The appropriate use of nonverbal communication skills increases the probability that mutually respectful, com­ fortable interactions can take place. Any set of human be­ haviors can be used for good or ill (DePaulo, 1991). Be­ havioral matching can be used in an attempt to selfishly manipulate people into doing what is, or is not, in their best

interest. That is not respectful communication, and often,

the deception will be read by the implicit emotional memo­ ries of the communicant, and an unfavorable impression will be formed with protective reactions.

The Arts: Their Neuropsycho­ biological and Social-Emotional Value for Human Beings What are "the arts"? Where did they come from? Are they substantially valuable to human beings? Or do they only provide just-for-fun distraction and entertainment?

And if the arts are important to us, do they rise to the level

of esteem in which languages, mathematics, science, social history, and sports are held? The questions are short and simple. The answers may be as long and complicated as the answers to "What is con­ sciousness?" They cannot be given in precise detail, yet, and the upcoming paragraphs cannot possibly express in-depth answers. They will suggest a surface.

The Arts As is true of present-day homo sapiens sapiens, pre-language humanoids (homo habilis), perceived novel experiences through their visual, auditory, and somatic (bodily) senses. Their somatic senses included perceptions of reactive physio chemical affective states (feelings and emotions). All such experiences were instantiated into their nervous sys­ tems as visual, auditory, and somatic memories. Simple referential gestures emerged that "stood for things" that had been previously experienced and instantiated in memory, or the gestures signaled the undertaking of memoried ac­ tions. Simple referential vocal sound combinations also emerged. Those gestures and vocal sounds now are re­ ferred to as protolanguage (Brown, 2000; Lieberman, 1998, pp. 84, 85). These referential signals brought into conscious awareness neural "representations" or "internal images" of a person, place, thing, or event that had been experienced previously.

Over the course of about one million years (homo erectus, homo sapiens), the referential vocal sound combinations be­ came elaborated into increasingly complex symbolic sys­ tems that now are referred to as languages. These abilities were dependent on: (1) concurrent increases of particular bodyminds,

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neural capacities, particularly in the prefrontal cortex, (2) concurrent development of characteristic laryngeal struc­ tures and vocal tract shapes, and (3) detailed motor control of them (Deacon, 1997, pp. 321-410; Lieberman, 1991, 1998). These capabilities and abilities considerably increased the

probability of survival. But even before referential vocal signals emerged, early humanoids emitted various types of vocal sounds and noises when they were in various affective states. Some of them are referred to as calls or primal sounds. Various body pos­ tures and movements, facial expressions, and arm-hand gestures also were displayed during affective states (Dea­ con, 1997, pp. 376-410; Lieberman, 1991, 1998, pp. 133-151). Lulling a baby to sleep with vocal sounds, rocking motions, and affectionate facial expressions is an example. Whoop­ ing and yelping with rhythmic movement and gestures af­ ter successfully killing an animal for food (survival) is an­ other example. Loud, yelled, or growled sounds occurred after being frustrated in a search for food or shelter. Wail­

extensive and intense the physio chemical events become (beyond ground state), the more intense the sensory per­ ception of an affective-feeling-emotional state. Affective attachment with other human beings (and animals), celebration of accomplishment, frustration-angerrage, and loss of affective attachment (separation, death) are

four feeling-loaded reactions to people-places-things-events. In response to events that extend over a course of time, the intensity of physio chemical affective-feeling states can in­ crease slowly over longer time periods—friendship with another human being, for instance. Sometimes the inten­ sity increases at faster and faster rates, and sometimes the increase is abruptly intense. At some point in time, a peak of feeling-intensity occurs, after which intensity subsides slowly or more quickly toward closure in a ground state.

a mate, or a child, or a friend. Each vocal expression co­ occurred with characteristic postures, gestures, and facial expressions. Even though present-day human beings cannot know

Sometimes, feeling-state episodes subside into a ground state that is more intense than the previous ground state (per­ haps incomplete or unresolved). Memories of the people, places, things, and events that made up the experiences, along with their feeling-state patterns, are instantiated in the ner­ vous, endocrine, and immune systems. These ebbs and flows of perceived feeling-state inten­ sities happen as a result of ebbs and flows in nervous sys­ tem activation intensities, intensities with which transmitter

how homo habilis humanoids felt during such experiences,

molecules bind to their receptors to change organ func­

paleoanatomists and paleoanthropologists have provided evidence that limbic systems were well developed in their brains (Deacon, 1997; Mithen, 1996). So we can assume

tions, and in perceived state changes in the torso. Primarily,

that after those expressive vocal sound-makings, posturings, gesturings, and facial configurations, they often "felt better". As described earlier, affective states in all humanoid beings are created when numerous physio chemical events are cascaded inside bodyminds as a reaction to actual or remembered people, places, things, and events. Right and left limbic system areas (the limbic lobes, the amygdalae, and hippocampal areas in particular), and the orbital areas of the right and left frontal lobes, interact with the hypothalamus-pituitary and the autonomic nervous system. They all influence the endocrine and immune systems to pro­ duce bodywide physio chemical state changes, especially in the torso (see Chapters 2 through 5, and 7). The interocep­ tive sensory system can then detect global changes within

ence vast numbers of complex feeling-state patterns that

ing and sobbing were reactions to the death of a parent, or

the torso and report them to the various brain areas that can produce conscious awareness and attention. The more

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these internal processings are reactions and adaptations to the outside world. Over a life-span, human beings experi­ co-occur with experiential episodes. The visual, auditory,

and somatosensory aspects of the episodes, the feeling-state patterns, and associated actions, are encoded in bodymind memory patterns. When memory recall occurs, summated neural "rep­ resentations or images" of the people, places, things, and events that were part of the original experience are reacti­ vated. Sometimes, when memories are retrieved, human beings overtly relive or reenact the experiences in some way. During the reliving or reenacting, a degree of the original physio chemical affective state—sometimes a considerable degree of the original—is reactivated for a period of time,

and then subsides into a ground state afterward. Offen, the people who are reliving and reenacting "feel better" afterward.

Preverbal and early-verbal humanoids recaptured, reinstated, or realized feeling-laden experiences with people,

Some of the bordered, visually perceived contours of a feeling-favored animal, place, thing, person, or event were "memorialized" in drawings on cave walls, creation of decorated tools, an­ thropomorphic "monuments", ceremonies, and ceremonial meeting places. Over at least a million years, these material media expressions of actual and imagined experiences have evolved into what we now can refer to as the visual arts, drawing, painting, sculpture, and architecture (Chapter 7 has more information). places, things, and events in material media.

Reenactments also involved vocal pitch and volume contours and voice qualities that recaptured something of the original affective-state experiences with people, places, things, and events. Part of early humanoid reenactments included depicting a time-succession of events. As spoken

language became elaborated, these time-successive and af­ fective-state reenactments developed into oral histories and mythical stories. Affective-state vocal sounds were elabo­ rated into the prosodic, paralinguistic aspects of spoken lan­ guage (vocal pitch, volume, duration-timing, and tonal qual­ ity), and into vocal analogues of the ebb-and-flow con­ tours of affective-state intensities. Metered, metaphoric spo­ ken language evolved, and was blended with prosody to create songs. Eventually, other sound sources that were ca­ pable of sustaining tones and a variety of rhythms were invented as an extension of vocalized affective-state expres­ sion (musical instruments). Over at least a million years, these earlier event sequences, and sounds-over-time affec­ tive-state expression patterns, have evolved into what we now can refer to as the auditory arts, music, poetry, and the spoken and written story arts. Rhythmicized physical movement and nonverbal ges­ tures were part of early humanoid reenactments of feeling­ laden past experiences with people, places, things, and events. The movements often were exaggerated in the reenactments in order to enhance the intensity of their "feeling meanings". Over at least a million years, these aspects of ritual and ceremony have been elaborated into what we now can re­ fer to as the somatosensory-kinesthetic arts, mime and dance.

Prelanguage humanoids also relived and reenacted feeling-laden experiences with people, places, things, and

events in rhythmic actions based on heartbeat, walking, and gesturing, and on the vocal pitch and volume contours that were emitted during common affective-state experiences. Metered, rhythmicized, percussive sound sources amplified the rhythmic actions of participants when various types of rituals and ceremonies were created. Events were reenacted as people portrayed gods, other people, or animals, and speech and chanting were used to relive a story and express the feeling reactions of the portrayed people. Over at least a million years, these re-livings and reenactments became elaborated into what we now can refer to as the combina­ tion arts of theatre, film, opera, and performance art. And after these recapturing, reliving, reenacting expe­ riences, humanoid beings have often "felt better".

Over the two million years from homo habilis to homo erectus to homo sapiens to homo sapiens sapiens, bodymind pro­ cessing capacities have increased massively along with vast increases in perceptual, value-emotive, conceptual, and be­ havioral capabilities. Those capabilities increased concur­ rently with the invention and elaboration of a vast array of learned abilities. Human inventiveness and creativity have produced vast variety and complexity in intra- and inter-

cultural social relatedness, organization, object-making, and process-making. Two highly complex abilities are the two symbolic systems-languages and mathematics-that human

beings use to denote and describe the bordered elements and episodic phenomena of their experienced world. In the present, the number of culturally produced possible expe­ riences are so vast that they can overwhelm current human cognitive-emotional-behavioral capabilities (distress, burn­ out).

Those expanded processing capacities and capabili­ ties also have made possible the invention and elaboration of ever more complex symbolic modes that human beings

use to connote (re-captivate, relive, reenact) the multitudi­ nous contours of their memoried affective-state intensities. The comparatively complex, designed, and crafted patterns of the visual, auditory, somatosensory-kinesthetic, and com­ bination arts are analogues for the dynamic forms of hu­ man affective-feeling-emotional states. These symbolic modes do not activate physio chemical, feeling-state reac­ tions to real people in real places, things, and events. They activate a human bodymind's memoried, feeling-state, neu­ rochemical networks to produce as-if feeling or affective bodyminds,

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states. We human beings respond, therefore, to ensymboled virtual experiences by internally generating a feeling re­ sponse. When creating or enacting any of the arts, these sym­

bolic modes enable an "expressing from inside out" of ac­ cumulated, ebb-and-flow feeling-state intensities that real life experiences have encoded in memory. These forms of expressive creation have primal roots in human neuropsychobiology. Original expressers call on feeling-state memories that are unique, personal, and often recent in their lives. Many original ensymboled expressions must then be brought into existence by other human beings (perform­ ers). This secondary form of expressive creation involves interpretations of the originally ensymboled feeling-state in­ tensities. A common reaction by performers is an empathic captivating or enacting of the originators' ensymboled feeling-state-intensities-through-time. When people other than the originator or the per­

physio chemical feeling contours have been activated in

which their intensities have increased, peaked, decreased,

and closed. The nervous, endocrine, and immune systems are all activated during this process (see Chapters 5 and 7; Hall, et al., 1994; Pert, et al., 1989). More often than not, a

well crafted original "expressing out" or a skilled and ex­ pressive enactment, or an empathic observation and reac­ tion produces a resolved neuropsychobiological state, that

is, some form of homeostatic ground state that can be de­ scribed as "feeling better" or "feeling pleasantly whole again".

So, what we now refer to collectively as the arts have neuropsychobiological roots that extend all the way back to preverbal, feeling-based, affective-state experiences. Hu­ man beings ensymbol those feeling-state experiences into self-expressive designs that are analogues for those memoried contours. When experienced well, they can in­ duce a re-sensitization of one's empathic self-identity and

social-emotional competence.

former observe and react to the expressed creation, an em­

pathic as-if feeling-state is induced by the increase of feel­ ing-intensity, peak-of-intensity, decrease-of-intensity, and

closure contours of the observed creation. This is a form of virtual symbolic enactment. The more an expressed cre­ ation taps into universally experienced feeling-state con­ tours, the more richly human beings will respond to it and, at least eventually, more and more people will empathically respond to it. Original creation of symbolic expression of feeling­ state intensities can trigger a reflective "working out" of per­ sonal insights—a perspective-taking—that can result in con­

structive "mind-sets", constructive behavior patterns, emo­ tional equilibrium, and biological and social benefit (Langer, 1951, 1953, 1967, 1972, 1982; Pennebaker, 1990, pp. 12-56; 98-101). Over millennia of time, the early reenacting, recap­ turing, realizing, and expressing out of as-if virtual feeling experiences have evolved into ever richer levels of varia­ tion and complexity, while retaining many of the simpler

aspects of earlier times. Increased variation and complexity enabled the symbolic expression of finer subtleties or "nooks and crannies" of feeling-based experiences. How is it that human beings "feel better" after recap­

Music All memoried experiences are weblike clusters. Chil­ dren, for example, have a large cluster of experiences in their individual family settings. Their experiences may be categorized as mother experiences, father experiences, brother-sister experiences, grandparent experiences, neigh­ borhood experiences, friend experiences, self experiences, and so on. When a family goes on vacation, they leave the

familiarity of home locations and friends while they travel to unfamiliar surroundings where they have unfamiliar experiences. Then they return to the familiar comforts of home with some relief. Another large categorical cluster of experiences occur when they go to school. The people, places, things, and events that they have experienced at home are almost en­ tirely different from the people, places, things, and events that they experience when they first leave home to go to school. At the end of each school day, they go home. Even­ tually, the people, places, things, and events of school be­ come familiar. In a valuable educational setting, many new and unfamiliar experiences will be embedded within that

familiarity. These two major experience clusters overlap in

turing, reliving, and reenacting feeling-state experiences? When "feeling better" happens after writing a poem or go­

time, of course. Many macro- and micro-experience clus­

ing to a play or singing a song, then memoried "as-if"

ing-states that they induce vary greatly over time.

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ters overlap in time and the intensity of the numerous feel­

Life's experiences are laden with multiple affectivefeeling-emotional episodes. Some episodes induce highly intense feeling states, others induce mild feeling states, and there are many intensity gradations in between. Experien­ tial episodes begin at different times and follow time courses

of varying durations before they dissipate. Multiple epi­

sodes are in progress at any one time. Anticipated or ex­

pected progressions and unexpected "surprise" turns occur along the way. Familiar experiences are varied in subse­ quent versions, and most of these perceptual, value-emo­ tive, conceptual, and behavioral experiences are instanti­ ated in the nervous system as implicit or explicit memories.

How long a "piece of music" lasts is irrelevant to its core expressive nature. Music is an analogue of experience­ feeling-intensity time, not clock time, and experience time can be very short to very long. The basic time-course and

feeling-intensity contours of human experiential episodes (rise-peak-recede-resolve) are embedded in the time-course

tonal contours of nearly all Western musics. Because the

time-intensity contours of human feeling-states can display numerous subtle variations, so can the time-tonal intensity contours of the musics. The architectonic levels of music ensymbol the vary­ ing time-courses and feeling-state intensities of experiential episodes. For example, a larger architectonic level in music is the sonata-allegro form that is commonly used in sym­ phonic first movements, that is, the exposition, develop­ ment, and recapitulation sections. A small version of this

with a degree of variation and words that bring the "story" and feeling-course of the song to a familiar feeling-closure. Other musical macro-forms have differing feeling-state dy­ namics. On an even smaller scale, single musical phrases (even three-pitch motifs) ensymbol aspects of feeling-state dy­ namics. In simpler musical compositions, increases of feel­ ing-intensity may be ensymboled when a phrase begins with tonal center pitches and harmonies, then moves to pitches and harmonies that are more distant from the tonal center, and then returns to tonic or dominant pitches and harmonies. An increase in feeling-intensity also may be ensymboled when melodic pitches progressively rise to a peak height, when sustained pitches-harmonies crescendo (those that are near the beginnings of phrases), and when the tempi become faster (accelerandi, for instance) and the rhythms become shorter. The highest melodic pitch, or the harmony that is most unlike the tonal center, may occur at

the peak of expressive feeling-intensity. A decrease in feel­ ing-intensity may be ensymboled when melodic pitches progressively lower (a falling pattern), or when sustained

pitches or harmonies decrescendo near the ends of phrases, and when the tempi become slower (ritardandi) and rhythms become longer. As a single design of sounds-and-silences-throughtime is crafted by an original expresser (a composer, songwriter, or improviser), it ensymbols a time-dynamic

"moving picture in sound" of one human being's expres­

macro-organization in music is widely used in the ABA song

sion of ebb-and-flow feeling-states. The symbolic feeling

form. An 8-measure melody-rhythm-harmony is introduced and then repeated, with a small variation. Then, an 8-mea-

contours were "imagined" in the "as-if" value-emotive neu­ ral-chemical networks of the expresser. Composers may remember specific people, places, things, and events that they have encountered in their lives, but they are not ana­ lytically describing their visually perceived appearances or physical movements in tone combinations. They focus on creating sound designs that ensymbol facets of the feeling­ state intensity contours that have accumulated implicitly in their life-memories. During original composition, after an original frame­

sure "bridge" or B section introduces new melodic-rhyth­ mic-harmonic material, sometimes in a different tonal cen­

ter. Finally, the original melody-rhythm-harmony returns

in the original tonal center, but is altered, especially as the song closes. Think of the song "Les berceaux" by Gabriel Faure, or "The Impossible Dream" from the musical play Man of La Mancha. They are both in ABA song form. The initial melody-rhythm-harmony is sounded and then repeated to

establish familiarity with the expressive music. Then a dif­ ferent, unfamiliar melody-rhythm-harmony is sounded along with words that heighten the feeling-intensity of the music. And finally, the original melody-rhythm-harmony returns

work design enters into their conscious awareness, express­ ers change their designs and craft them several times. When composers appraise their own designed sounds and silences, their right hemisphere's global, affect-pattern, literal observer complex compares implicitly processed feeling-intensity­ bodyminds,

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contour memories with the whole sound-through-time designs that have been created so far. This whole-pattern observer determines the extent to which there is a relative match between imagined affect patterns and whole soundsthrough-time designs. This is whole-pattern, big picture editing. The left hemisphere's conscious-verbal complex analyzes and "interprets" what has been created so far, us­ ing learned-knowledge criteria to evaluate the details of a sounds-through-time design. This is technical editing in the crafting of the time designs. The two "editors" interact with each other, of course. If there is a considerable mismatch between affect

patterns and time-tonal designs, then an immediately no­ ticeable, unpleasant feeling-of-knowing state is triggered and sensed in the torso, particularly in the organs within the abdomen (see Chapter 7; Bechera, et al., 1997; Mangan, 1993).

The designer may then say, "This just doesn't work," or "The idea is OK, but this version of it is just no good." The design

is then rejected or large-scale redesign begins. If there is a match, but it is not quite a complete match, then a milder

unpleasant feeling-of-knowing state is triggered. The de­ signer may then say, "Something still doesn't feel right," or "Something itches me about this; where do I need to scratch?"

In both cases, the two hemispheres collaborate in pro­ ducing edits that move the designs more and more toward matches between implicit feeling-intensity-contour memo­ ries and the imagined sounds-through-time designs. When

a complete match occurs, then a pleasant feeling-of-knowing state is triggered and felt in the abdomen. The designer may then say, "Yes. That's it" If the designer is asked, "How did you know to make that change?" or "How did you know it was 'right'?", then a common reply might be, "I don't know. I just knew" or "I just have a feel for how it should go", or "It was intuitive" The big picture editor commonly operates outside conscious awareness and communicates through such feeling-states. Increasingly complex sound sources have been in­ vented over the centuries, along with many customary ways

to combine them. Notational systems were invented so that human beings could share their customary ways of expressing themselves across distances with other people who expressed themselves in a variant way. The Western system started out as a rough indication of the sources of sound, their pitch levels, how they were timed, and how all 170

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of these elements were combined. Currently, the represen­

tation of serial and simultaneous patterns of pitches, pat­ terns of volume variation, and patterns of durational varia­ tion can be quite complex and new forms of notation have

been and are being invented. Composers of crafted sounds-and-silences-through-

time place their expressive work into the customary nota­ tional system. Then other people obtain the notated music and begin a process of bringing the ensymboled feeling­ intensities into expressive life. This process is, in a sense, an attempt to recreate something of the composers' original creation. Without direct knowledge of the composers' feel­ ing-intensity insights, however, musical performers must deduce as much as possible from the composers' notation of the music, but beyond that, they must bring their own

life-experience insights into an interpretative process. Per­ formers, too, develop a "feel" for how music needs to be sounded in order to optimally express out its feeling-inten­ sities. They, too, use pleasant and unpleasant feelings of know­ ing as guides in such decisions. Over the centuries, mastery of music's expressive com­ plexities has necessitated an increasing involvement of the conscious-analytic-verbal complex (conscious cognition). The increased complexity requires increased cognitive-analytic engagement in order to create and enact these sym­ bolic forms. If the cognitive-analytic aspects of music are attended to more frequently and intently than the expres­ sive human feeling-intensities, then musical performances may become "lifeless" and relatively inexpressive—an ex­ ercise in control of cognitive-analytic abilities, rather than expressive abilities. When music is true to its roots, cogni­ tive-analytic abilities only serve to clarify and enhance hu­ man expressive abilities. Vocal Music Song singing is always musical theatre. So is choral

singing. They are enactments or expressions of significant human feeling-states that are perceived by others visually,

auditorily, and kinesthetically (empathic as-if feeling states). Sometimes songs are embedded in a theatrical story line. Most often, songs "stand alone", outside the context of a macro-story line. Singing stand-alone songs is still musical theatre. A feeling-based point of view is expressed in the words. That point of view rises to amplified significance

when the music, in which the words are embedded, capti­

A good place to begin might be to retrace the com-

vates the human feeling-essence of the words and is ex­

poser-songwriters' path: start with the words, the lyrics, the text, the poetry and get a feel for the human feeling-stuff that is expressed in the words. Read them silently at first

pressively well crafted. In solo songs, a human being is expressing that feeling-based point of view for one or more

other human beings. In choral music, of course, multiple human beings are expressing a feeling-based point of view for other people. The observers of singing performances can empathically engage with what is being expressed only to the extent that the singers genuinely and convincingly ex­ press as-if human feelings (Scherer, 1995). When singing human beings credibly express as-if feelings, the feeling­ stuff is ensymboled by the words and the music, of course, but also by the voice qualities, facial expressions, body pos­ tures, and arm-hand gestures that are employed by the sing­ ers. If that kind of nonverbal expressive involvement is minimal or missing, then observers will be less able to en­ gage empathically with the words and music. With rare exceptions, original compositions of vocal music blend metaphoric language (poetry) and story lines with music. The words are almost always written first. Composers of vocal music (called songwriters in Western popular music) nearly always begin the music-writing pro­ cess by becoming intimately familiar with the story line poetry, or lyrics. The design of the words-poetry will likely

dictate both the meter(s) and the macro-design of the mu­ sic, such as verse-chorus, binary, or ABA song form. Explicitly or implicitly, songwriters develop a "sense" for (1) the human feeling-stuff that is being expressed in the

words, (2) which words in each language phrase are the most feeling-charged, (3) a "feel" for the rhythms of the spo­ ken words, and (4) where the macro- and micro-peaks of expressive "energy" are in each word phrase. They also begin to brainstorm melodic-rhythmic-harmonic possibili­ ties and to form a conceptual framework of the whole song. Sometimes, very experienced songwriters conceive whole entire songs that seem to "write themselves". The song is then crafted as described earlier. Enter singers. How might skilled, expressive singers bring a song into expressive existence, so that listening and observing human beings are impelled to move their bodies in time to the music or empathically go "inside" and empathically sense the music's human feeling-stuff?

and contemplate their literal and feeling meanings. Then, read them out loud over and over. Read them expressively, as though they were lines in a play. Come as close as pos­ sible to speaking them the way a real person might say them. How do the word-rhythms "feel" as they are expres­ sively spoken? Where are the macro- and micro-peaks of expressive "energy" in the words of each phrase? Which words in each language phrase are the most feeling-charged? How might changes of vocal pitch, volume, quality, and timing affect the expressiveness of the words? Experiment with the prosody of the language-the connotative feeling­ meanings of the words. Then, "get a feel" for how the composer-person inter­ preted the language by examining the relationship between each word and its corresponding pitch-rhythm-harmony.

How did the songwriter match the expressive melodic "un­ dulations", rhythmic "tapestries", harmonic "colors", and phrase contours to the word phrases and to the songwriter's sense of the feeling-charged words? Melodic contours in songs and the prosody of spoken language are nonidenti­ cal twins. The macro-interpretation of a song can begin by ask­ ing, "Who is the as-if human being that is being portrayed? What is this person like? What has their life been like? What has just happened to that person that made this song's expression spontaneously inevitable?" The words are likely to reveal some answers to these questions. But what they do not reveal can be imagined, as long as it is consistent with what has been revealed. Singers' own life experiences can be primary resources for these amplified biographies. In theatre circles, this is referred to as developing or creating a character. To whom or about whom is the song sung? What is the relationship between the singer's character and that other person (or those other people)? What is the situation in which the song is sung? Does the song, therefore the singer,

address the audience directly (a monologue)? Is the other person present so that the song is addressed to that imagi­ nary person (part of a dialogue)? Is the song a soliloquy

(the illusion is created that no one else is present and the bodyminds,

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singer-actor is talking-singing to him- or herself)? For ex­ ample, the song "Embraceable You" by the Gershwins is an

up-tempo celebration of newfound love. If, however, only the refrain were to be sung in a slow tempo and the singer conceived a reversal of the situation—a broken and ended relationship—then the same words-melody-harmony would express a deep poignancy. Singing is musical theatre (enactment).

Among singers, when some part of the words or music "doesn't feel right", then the right hemisphere appraiser trig­ gers a subtle unpleasant feeling-state change in the body's

torso. Then the big picture editor and the technical editor trade perceptions and generate alternative possibilities that are "tried out" until the appraiser triggers a subtle pleasant feeling-state change in the body's torso: "Mm hm! That feels right."

During conversation, we compose sentences that have multiple referential denotative meanings, but we are not aware of "where the words come from". They come from the vast stores of semantic memories in the brain's left hemi­ sphere. Massive experiences with words, starting while we were still in the womb, have enabled us to "improvise", in a moment of need, long-lasting strings of meaningful word

port and increase its expressive reason for being, then feeling­ state intensity contours will be increasingly "brought to life"

by singers in order to connect feelingfully with fellow human

beings. Singers' neuropsychobiological needs for related­ ness, competence, and autonomy are very likely to be en­ hanced if a teacher provides: (1) opportunities for singers to learn how to create solutions to analytic and skill chal­ lenges and how to create expressive interpretations (see Chapter 9), (2) opportunities for singer assessment of per­ formance, (3) teacher feedback that is constructive (also see Chapter 9), and (4) gestural communications (postural, fa­ cial, arm-hand) that flow consistently with the expressive import of the music. Before about the age of 9 or 10 years, senior learners (par­ ents and teachers) can engage, age-appropriately, the voicerelated imitative, exploratory-discovery, self-expressive, and cognitive-emotional-behavioral capabilities of children by: 1. singing child-length and adult-length songs, and playing recordings of children and adults singing songs, for personal pleasure, while going about daily family routines or mundane, nonteaching, classroom business; 2. expressively reading stories and shorter poems aloud for and with children, and when the children can read, lis­

combinations. When human beings have had massive ex­ periences with music and song-singing, we are capable of improvising melodic contours in a moment of need. Jazz and scat singing, are examples.

tening to them attentively as they develop their ability to

Vocal Music Education and Voice Education Meeting the needs for empathic relatedness, con­ structive competence, and autonomy depends on the na­ ture of teacher-student interactions. If a teacher always tells singers what to do and when to do it, then the singers will be deprived of opportunities to develop autonomous selfdetermination. If the teacher continually points out mis­

lips, and on mid-abdomen during singing, with or without

read expressively; 3. expressively singing many child-length songs for or with children so that they can hear and see what people

do when they sing (placing children's hands on jaw, near

takes, errors, and inadequacies, and presents them with ac­

cusative and punitive gestures and "tones of voice", then unpleasant feeling states will occur in singers. Those feel­ ings will be associated with singing and protective reac­ tions, and fulfillment of their relatedness, competence, and autonomy needs will be prevented (Chapter 9 has details).

If, on the other hand, the consciously controlled, ana­

lytic, sequential experiences of music are engaged to sup­ 172

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comment, can enhance the somatosensory-kinesthetic senses), in order to enhance their internally generated, spon­ taneous imitation and exploration-discovery of singing abilities; 4. presenting appropriately worded voice exploration­ discovery goals for children, in the context of speaking­ singing games and theatrical scenes, followed by questions that facilitate the development of self-perceived kinesthetic and auditory feedback and voice skill vocabulary (see Chap­ ter 9; Book IV Chapters 1, 2, and 3; Book V, Chapter 6);

5. providing opportunities for children to improvise and write down their own stories, poetry, or theatrical scenes about subjects of their own choosing, and to read them

aloud, act them out, and reproduce them for others to con­ template;

6. providing opportunities for children to improvise their own songs about subjects of their own choosing (song­ speech at first), and eventually, to write down their own

poetry-song combinations and, perhaps, include them in theatrical scenes.

exploring unique self-identities and self-borders, socialemotional relationships with other people, and the greater intensity of their feeling-states;

2. examining the human feeling expression that is embedded in songs in order to further deepen the self-ex­

pressive quality of their singing; Between the ages of 9 or 10 years to about 12 or 13 years,

3. continuing to provide opportunities to write po­

senior learners can engage the voice-related imitative, ex-

ems, scenes, and songs that metaphorically express the feel­ ing meanings of their own life experiences, and to share them with friends, family, and the public, as appropriate; 4. building expressive voice skills within the context of male and female voice transformation processes (see Book IV Chapters 4 and 5; Book V, Chapters 7 and 8); 5. using gestural communications as visual-kinesthetic metaphors that enhance efficient vocal coordinations so that musical expressiveness can be optimum.

ploratory-discovery, self-expressive, and cognitive-emo­

tional-behavioral capabilities of children by: 1. singing more and more complex music that has metaphoric feeling meanings (at about age 9, a song about a butterfly may no longer just be a song about a butterfly, but an expression of one's self, soaring above the world and observing it from a distance), and by examining the human

feeling expression that is embedded in those songs in order to deepen their understanding of human-to-human rela­ tionships (empathy) and the expressive quality of their sing-

During middle-to-late adolescence, between the ages of

about 15 or 16 years through about 17 to 19 or 20 years, senior

ing;

2. continuing to provide opportunities for children to write poems, scenes, and songs, realizing that they now are

capable of embedding metaphoric feeling meanings into them (taking care to preserve the privacy of very personal or family-event expressions); 3. providing opportunities to share their poems, scenes, and songs, with friends, classmates, family, and the public, when appropriate; 4. continuing to build on or "detail" previously learned expressive voice skills (see Book II and Book V Chapter 2) and begin to supply information about male and female voice transformation before it begins (see Book IV Chap­ ters 4 and 5; Book V, Chapters 7 and 8); 5. using gestural communications (arrangements of skeleton, arm-hand gestures, facial expressions) as visual­ kinesthetic metaphors that enhance, and do not inhibit, ef­ ficient vocal coordinations so that musical expressiveness can be optimum. Between the ages of about 12 or 13 years through about 15 or 16 years, senior learners can engage the voice-related imita­ tive, exploratory-discovery, self-expressive, and cognitiveemotional-behavioral capabilities of early adolescents by: 1. singing increasingly complex music with metaphoric feeling meanings that relate to their own engagement with

learners can engage the voice-related imitative, exploratory­ discovery, self-expressive, and cognitive-emotional-behav­

ioral capabilities of learners by: 1. singing increasingly complex music that expresses even more subtleties of metaphoric feeling meaning related to their own self-identity development and associated feel­ ing-states, the growing complexity of their social-emotional

relationships, empathic personal morality, and larger soci­

etal issues such as justice and the best interests of human beings; 2. examining with increasing insight the human feel­ ing expression in songs in order to further deepen the selfexpressive quality of their singing; 3. continuing to provide opportunities to write po­ ems, scenes, and songs that metaphorically express the feel­

ing meanings of their own life experiences, and to self-di­ rect the rehearsal and performance of them in the presence of friends, family, and the public; 4. building increasingly detailed expressive voice skills within the context of a "settling" of male and female voice transformation processes (see Book IV, Chapters 4 and 5; Book V, Chapters 7 and 8); 5. using gestural communications as visual-kinesthetic metaphors that enhance efficient vocal coordinations so that musical expressiveness can be optimum. bodyminds,

selves,

interaction

173

General Music Education. In home, school, and re­ ligious settings, when the voice-related imitative, explor­ atory-discovery, and self-expressive capabilities of children and early adolescents are engaged in learning skilled vocal self-expression, then their neuropsychobiological needs for

empathic relatedness, constructive competence, and self-re­ liant autonomy can be greatly enhanced. What would happen if all vocal music educators

adopted this long-range goal: At elementary and junior-high/

middle school levels, a minimum of 15% of the music that is sung in classes and public sharings will be composed by members of the classes, and rehearsed and sung or led by the composers? Choral Music Education. In school or religious set­ tings, engaging the voice-related imitative, exploratory-dis­ covery, self-expressive capabilities of children and adoles­ cents in choral group singing can deepen the satisfaction of human neuropsychobiological needs.

What would happen if all choral music educators adopted a long-range goal: At upper elementary, junior-high/ middle school, high school, and college-university levels, a minimum of 15% of the music that is sung in choral performances will be com­ posed by members of the choir, and rehearsed and conducted by the composers? When preparing music for performance, many cog­ nitive-emotional-behavioral capabilities are converted into

increasingly detailed abilities. Constructive senior learner and learner interactions engage and sharpen attentional fo­ cus, linguistic elaboration, conscious cognitive analysis, non­ verbal communication skills, emotional interpretation, physi­ cal coordination, and spatiotemporal relationships. They all are part of learning developmentally appropriate, selfexpressive musical and vocal skills. These experiences help fulfill the neuropsychobiological needs for relatedness, com­ petence, and autonomy (Ryan, et al., 1996). If, however, music is nearly always experienced as a consciously con­ trolled, analytic, sequential experience, will singers then learn that singing is a consciously controlled, analytic, sequential experience that minimally engages human feeling states? Do we get what we rehearse? (see Chapter 9). The choir is singing "Silent Devotion and Response" from Avodath Hakodesh (Sacred Service) by Ernest Bloch. Thepitches are accurate and in-tune, the rhythms precise, the diction is clear, the composer's dynamic markings are faithfully performed, the singers'

174

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voices are coordinated with reasonable efficiency, and the music is sung

with authentic style. The singers' bodies are quite still and their faces show intense concentration...but their bodies and faces are emotionally blank. Their bodies do not subtly ebb and flow with the ebb and flow of the musical phrases. Their faces do not show the subtle expressions of deep devotion as they sing, "Oh Lord, may the words of my mouth and the meditations of my heart be acceptable before you." And there is no subtle change in body movement and facial expression when they then sing, 'Adonoy my Rock and Redeemer, Amen." Bloch's music is an elegant expression of a deep, pri­ mal, human quest for identity in the universe. Might one

conclude that conductor and singers were all doing the best they knew how as they sang Bloch's richly expressive mu­ sic? And might we wonder how often the human essence

of the biblical text and the ebb-and-flow contours of Bloch's music were visited during the music's preparation?

One-to-One Voice Education. In one-to-one voice education settings, the cognitive-emotional-behavioral ca­ pabilities of children, adolescents, and adults are engaged very personally. Attention is focused on developing one's own voice. Actually, voice "lessons" are experienced throughout our lives. Our first lessons come from our parents. Out­ side conscious awareness, we hear their voices (especially mother's) before we are born, and begin imitating their voice use patterns after we are born, both speaking and singing.

Cultural influences often begin with television-cartoon-type characters. All listening to speaking and singing, and all personal speaking and singing (especially when we are fa­ tigued, distressed, or ill), influence the details of everyone's vocal coordinations in both abilities. Voice lessons also occur every day during schooling experiences. Other-than-conscious influences on vocal co­ ordinations come from peer-to-peer and teacher-student

interactions and from expanded cultural influences such as sports, popular musics, movies, TV, and idolized adult mod­ els. Any general music education, choral singing, and speech­ theatre education that a student encounters also provides voice lessons. The gestural communications that are used

by music, speech, or theatre educators, and choral conduc­ tors, will influence the relative inefficiency or efficiency of vocal coordinations. Efficient, expressive speaking and sing­ ing can be learned by students to a remarkable degree of mastery in those educational settings in which teachers have

deep knowledge about voices, their efficient use, and ap­

liant autonomy. Most of these processes occur outside our

propriate ways to facilitate learning and voice health. Although one-to-one education in speech voice skills

conscious awareness. Self-expression with our voices is connected to the deepest, most profound sense of "who we are". The neuropsychobiological roots of the arts are richly enmeshed with the feeling-state intensities that have accu­ mulated in explicit and implicit memory over a rich emo­

is relatively rare in grades one through 12, one-to-one voice lessons for singing do occur in some U.S. high schools. For the most part, private singing lessons for children of those

ages are provided by community schools or private-studio teachers and paid for by parents who have the financial

means to do so. Much detailed, one-to-one voice educa­ tion takes place in the music and theatre departments of colleges and universities. The training of speech and singing teachers also takes place in colleges and universities. In singing, the musics that are acceptable for use in voice study are the "classical" music styles. As a result, only the vocal coordinations that are necessary for singing classical styles are taught and learned. Among most Western singing teachers, the vocal

coordinations that are necessary for Western opera are re­ garded as the one and only "correct" way to sing. The vocal coordinations that are used for popular styles of music tend to be regarded with deep suspicion or are rejected outright as "ugly" and injurious to voices. Commonly, popular music singers are wary of classically trained singing teachers. Another belief among many singing teachers is that

tional lifetime. The expressive arts are primary means by which human beings can express out, "exercise", and "stay in touch with" our human feeling-states and enhance our social-emotional self-regulation. When our engagement with the arts is connected to those neuropsychobiological roots, their value absolutely matches that of denotative languages and mathematics.

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chapter 9

human-compatible learning Leon Thurman

arth did not come with word labels attached

E

to its parts.

So, a long time ago human be­

and "teacherness" are not bordered, material objects. They only exist when two or more people enact those complex

interactional roles. vocal-sound labels for them. They also began to inventPeople, person, human being(s). Those are the nouns. We exist. labels for themselves, their own parts, and the things that And why is this important? they created from Earth's parts. Nouns are names for things In the summers of 1991 through 1993, six different groups of that have physical, material, bordered existence, like air, water, teacher-people were asked to close their eyes and remember being in a dirt, mountain, rabbit, body, hand, knife, bowl. teachers' lunchroom or lounge-with no student-people present-and to And human living gradually became more and more remember what words they heard themselves or other teachers use as complicated. Eventually, names had to be invented for labels for students. Many word labels were remembered and many of "things" that do not have bordered physical existence. them expressed respectful human care, but the only term that was al­ Nominalizations are names for complex, multi-patterned, ways spoken in every group was, Animals!", as in "They're just multi-relational, evolving-event realities that do not have animals", spoken with a disparaging tone of voice. borders and cannot be analyzed easily (see Chapter 7 for Upon hearing about that, one very bright seventh-grade-old some details). Many such words drip with interpretative, daughter of a high-ranking state education official, said, "Oh. We value-emotive glue. For example, mind, feeling, emotion, mo­ have a name for the teachers. We call 'em 'the aliens'' tive, attitude, values, concepts, intelligence, goals, love, hate, discipline, Animals. Aliens. Not human beings who smile and excellence, standards, society, and prejudice are nominalizations. laugh? Who sometimes feel ecstatic, or feel threatened or We cannot hold one of those in our hands, or toss one back hurt and sometimes cry? Who have unpleasant and pleas­ and forth, or sit on it. ant experience histories? Who have and are developing Other nominalizations label the various complex be­ many competencies? Who need to express themselves? Who havior patterns or roles that human beings enact during need to be cared about and to "connect" with other human social interactions. Patient, doctor, lawyer, client, customer, em­ ings began to categorize Earth's parts and invent

ployee, employer, executive, administrator, bureaucrat, politician, legis­ lator, mechanic, plumber, cop, police inspector, and criminal are ex­ amples. That's where the words teacher and student come in. According to the above reasoning, we could say that teach­

beings? Who are still trying to figure life out (and the list goes on)? Animals seems to imply that the school behavior of children and adolescents is subhuman and not "governed" by human empathy or reason. Aliens seems to imply that teachers are foreign, "the opposition", or "from another planet",

ers do not physically exist, nor do students. "Studentness"

that is, teachers are "disconnected" from students, unfriendly,

188

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and potentially threatening to well being. [When a police cruiser is seen in auto traffic, how many adults have expe­ rienced a similar unpleasant disconnection from an author­ ityfigure?] In most cultures, the words teacher and student have emotion-laden histories. They can signify help solidify, and trigger recall of respect-filled emotional attachments between the human beings who are called teachers and the human beings who are called students. They also can signify, help solidify, and trigger recall of emotional dependence or emo­ tional disconnection between student-people and teacher­ people. How? When we encounter people, places, things, and events

that have frequently produced unpleasant feelings in us in the past, some degree of an unpleasant, physio chemical feeling state is quite likely to be reproduced in us (Chapter 7 has more details). In other words, seeing or hearing the person, being in the place, encountering the objects, or reexperienc­ ing a version of the event are likely to bring unpleasant emotional memories into explicit or implicit working

memory. Typically, unpleasant feeling states result in greater

probability of avoidance, counter control with disrespect­

ful communications, and/or some form of behavioral im­ mobilization. Those reactions are consistent with an innate human propensity for self-protection (see Chapters 2 and 7). When teacher-people attempt to help student-people

fulfill their neuropsychobiological need for competence (see Chapter 8), but they do so in ways that model emotional disconnection and frequently threaten or stifle human needs for well being, relatedness, and self-reliant autonomy, then unpleasant feeling states will occur inside the students. If, as a result, student-people learn to interact with teacher­ people in a way that frequently threatens the teachers' hu­

man needs for competence, well being, and relatedness, then unpleasant feeling states will occur inside the teachers. Then, when students hear the word teacher, the word itself can trig­ ger unpleasant feelings and some form of avoidance, im­ mobilization, or counter-threat behaviors. When teachers

hear the word student, the word itself can trigger unpleasant feelings and some form of avoidance, immobilization, or escalated control behaviors. Interpreter mechanisms (see Chapter 7) may overgeneralize those unpleasant experiences into "All students..." or 'All teachers..."

From their school cultures, many teacher-people have implicitly learned to treat student-people as though they are: (1) units on an assembly line (read about Henry Ford and the effects of the industrial revolution) or (2) the frontline officers that are leading battles against an enemy (read about Horace Mann's implementation of Prussian military orga­ nization as a model for schools). The sunset assumption and part-elephant perception behind the military organization model (terms defined in the Fore­ Words) is that school administrators are general and execu­ tive officers, and teachers are the frontline, in-the-trenches, commissioned or noncommissioned officers who instill unquestioning discipline in the student troops and lead them into battle against.... The sunset assumption and part-el­ ephant perception behind the assembly line model is that entering students are unformed knowing-reasoning-behav-

ing "raw materials". Teachers are the assemblers and build­ ers of minds and as students progress along the academic curriculum sequence, the class-and-grade conveyor, they are shaped by teachers into predetermined curricular prod­ ucts called "productive citizens". On the other hand, when we encounter people, places, things, and events that have frequently produced pleasant feelings in us in the past, some degree of a pleasant, physio chemical feeling state is quite likely to be reproduced in us (see Chapter 7). In other words, seeing or hearing the person, being in the place, encountering the objects, or reex­ periencing a version of the event are likely to trigger the pleasant feeling state. Typically, pleasant feeling states result in greater probability of constructive engagement and re­ spectful, comfortable communication. Those reactions are consistent with an innate propensity to make sense, gain inventive mastery, seek safety and relatedness with others,

and to experience relative states of well being (see Chapters 2 and 7, 8). If the words teacher and student are used in mu­ tually constructive, respectful, beneficial relationships, then pleasant feeling states and a higher probability for construc­ tive engagement will occur whenever either of those words

are heard. As described in Chapter 7, the nominalizations that we wrap around human beings (including ourselves) can make it easier for us to polarize and dehumanize ourselves and treat each other more the way we would treat material objects. Or, the labels that we use can make it easier for us human-compatible

learning

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to be real human beings with each other and treat each other with the respect that is deserved by the most capable creatures in the known universe (cf the beginning of Chap­ ter 2).

ceptual processing patterns and their behavior patterns? Isn't that what happens to all of us throughout our life-spans? All learning is uniquely constructed within each human

being's bodymind. This point of view is consistent with

So, who is a teacher (Old English: tan = one who

theory and research in the neuropsychobiological sciences

demonstrates knowledge to another)? Would it be accurate to say that a teacher is any human being who educes or

(see Chapters 7, 8) and with the constructivist perspective in education (Brooks & Brooks, 1993; Cobb & Yackel, 1996; Fosnot, 1989, 1996a,b). Can we "do" formal education in a human-friendly way that is consistent with what actually happens inside human beings when we say that we develop (grow up), perceive, remember, feel, learn, behave, build a self-identity, and express ourselves? Can educational experiences be enacted so that whole human beings are acknowledged and respectfully interacted with, and so that lifelong neuropsychobiological needs for relatedness, competence, and autonomy are optimally fulfilled in both students and teachers? Can preschools through high schools, and col­ leges and universities, be organized in such a way that stu­ dent-people and teacher-people want to be there every day to accomplish emotionally fulfilling, constructive learning?

helps another human being toward adaptive changes in

their own perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual pro­ cessing patterns and, thus, their behavior patterns? Can such changes be labeled learning (Old Saxon: leornian; Old English: learnt = acquisition of knowing who, what, where,

when, why, and how)? Teachers and professors are some­ times referred to as educators (Latin: e = out; duco = guide, draw) or facilitators of learning (Latin: facilis = move nim­ bly and with ease). So, teachers are people who draw out and guide learning nimbly and with ease. Would teachers include people who are called mothers, fathers, children, sib­ lings, grandparents, peers, friends, school teachers, mates, work super­ visors, professors, doctors, film/television writers and producers, adver­ tising producers, and, of course, our own selves? Formal learning is a nominalization that signifies deliberately planned, organized, and sequenced experiences that are intended to evoke learning. Such experiences com­ monly are referred to as a curriculum (Latin literal meaning = circular racetrack; figurative meaning = course of a career). Formal learning commonly occurs in a building called a school (Latin: schola = group of learners). People who have

been trained in complex skills called teaching interact with student-people to actualize the curricular experiences that are intended to result in the formal learning. Informal learn­ ing is a label for learning that is unplanned or serendipi­ tous, and takes place outside of a school's planned curricu­ lum. All of the experiences that people have outside of a curricular setting fall into this category, including social in­ teractions, most personal preferences, and savvy "street smarts". Which category of learning is most pervasive in

the lives of human beings? Who and what are the most influential teachers? Who is a student (Latin: studere, studens, studium = one who has an eager affection for detailed learning)? Would it

be accurate to say that students are human beings who respond to all of their informal and formal teachers and adaptively change their perceptual, value-emotive, and con­ 190

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&

voice

There is an elementary (primary) school in the state of New

Jersey (U.S.A.) where the students can't wait to get in the building in the morning. Some of them arrive before the custodian opens the doors. For them, what they do in a place called a school is interesting and fulfilling. With guidance from a team of teacher-people, the first and second grade students have created a "town". The students elected to name the town Averyville, in honor of the lead teacher. The town has an elected mayor and town council, a monetary currency, a bank, a newspaper, and several "businesses", including a company that pub­ lishes collections of student stories or poetry. One day, the mayor of Trenton, New Jersey, spoke to the students and gave a complimentary copy of his published book to the mayor of Averyville. The mayor of Averyville then presented the mayor of Trenton a complimentary copy of his recently published book of very short stories. No assembly line or military metaphors influenced the building of that school's community. There are very few walled-off rooms with neat rows of chairs in Averyville. The people who are called students interact with the people who are called teachers as they, together, organize a wide variety of learning experiences, on and off campus, which create a dedicated interest in reading, writing, and math.

The students take the standardized tests that the state gov­

ernment requires, and they do as well on the tests as other

students in the state. But... these young people love to go to

3. the imposition of external control over the cogni­

school. Their parents are very pleased. But very puzzled.

tive-emotional-behavioral patterns of student-people

[For other examples, read Schools that Work by Wood (1992).]

through the use of (a) threatened and actual punishments

Skilled teachers interact with students in ways that are consistent with the following science-based principles (see Chapters 7 and 8 for evidence). 1. All human beings are vastly capable

and (b) extrinsic rewards (described later).

neuropsychobiological bodyminds (mind and body are not separable). 2. Every human being is formed by a unique array of genetic and epigenetic processes and a unique array of ex­ periential learnings that evolve into unique human selves 3. What we call feeling, affective, emotional, and value-emo­ tive states are foundationally interwoven with all cognition (percepts, concepts, memories, and the like) and with social interactions that shape self-identity, emotion regulation or dysregulation, and accumulation of protective and construc­

tive behavioral tendencies. 4. Respectful, empathic, communicative, human-tohuman relationships are the bedrock of all constructive, productive, and autonomous human endeavor. That's why the terms teacher, student, mother, father, child, and human being are so important.

Human-Antagonistic Education If I were organizing a kindergarten-through-bac-

calaureate-degree school, and I wanted it to result in suboptimal development of human capabilities into abili­ ties, then what would it be like? How would it be orga­ nized and operated? What would the teachers be like, and how would the teacher-people interact with the stu­ dent-people? Organizational and operational decisions would be based on historical assumptions about the nature of younger human beings and on the culturally transmitted educational practices of the past. Some of those assumptions and prac­ tices include: 1. the separation of mind from body, with education being devoted to building minds; 2. the disconnection of feeling-affect-emotion processes from cognitive processes; and

Organization and Operation of a HumanAntagonistic School 1. The purpose of the school will be to achieve the highest possible standards of excellence in well defined aca­

demic and employment training disciplines, and in social behavior.

2. A hierarchical, top-down, businesslike organizational

structure will be adopted, with a policy-making group at the top (made up mostly of business owners and managers, but no educators), one chief administrator, an administra­ tive staff, and teachers. Teachers will be regarded as em­ ployees, parents as the customers, and students as the prod­ uct that the teachers produce according to policy and cur­ ricular specifications. 3. The school buildings will be strictly functional and their design and construction will be based on a cost-benefit analysis that favors low costs. They will include stan­ dard-sized classrooms and hallways, large multipurpose rooms, and a gymnasium, as applicable. All rooms will be self-contained with immovable seats and desks. The design and paint colors of the rooms and hallways will be stan­ dardized throughout the building, following the low-cost policy. Athletic facilities will be built and programs for the most talented sports athletes will be instituted. 4. Children will be admitted to kindergarten at age

four years and to first grade at age five years. All students will be grouped by chronological age and will be expected

to proceed through all of the school's parcelated subjects over the same time course. The lower achieving students will be weeded out during the primary and middle school years, so that only the highest achieving students will be admitted to the high school, and only the highest achieving high school students will be admitted to the college

5. Disciplinary policies will be formulated by the policy-making group and the administrators. Strict control

will be established over student social behaviors. Teachers will create an emotional distance from the students so that they can better function as the primary enforcers of the

human-compatible

learning

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disciplinary policies. Respectful forms of address for the

teachers (Dr., Mr., Mrs., Miss) will be required from the stu­ dents. Student compliance with policies will be expected

and social behavior goals will be clearly stated to the stu­ dents and their parents. Reports of student progress in social discipline will be made to parents along with aca­ demic grades. 6. Student intellectual and academic behaviors will be formulated by the policy-making group and the adminis­ trators. Detailed curricula for each school grade and sub­ ject area will be written and will follow traditional scholas­ tic fact-knowledge and basic skills models. Curricula will be enacted in a sequential manner and teacher-practice stan­ dards will be listed. Academic courses will be extremely challenging and excellent academic performance by the stu­ dents will be expected. 7. The auditory sense will be the predominant sense through which instruction will be carried out, with mini­ mal attention to the visual and kinesthetic senses. The de­

velopment of motor skills, therefore, will be minimized. Vocabulary, spelling, reading, and writing skills will be key

features of the early years. Teacher talk, rote memory, and verbal lectures, with students taking written notes, will be the primary means transmitting knowledge. Each student will interact with the following learning materials: text­ books, a computer, workbooks, and worksheets. Very few, highly controlled experiences will occur away from the school grounds. Indirect experience of the wider world will be provided by commercially produced educational television and selected CD-ROM programs. Analytic skills will be emphasized through the use of language and math­ ematics. The arts will be studied analytically and histori­ cally, and primarily as a means of increasing academic per­ formance. Performance of art works will emphasize tech­ nical mastery and historical authenticity. Interconnective, global, and "big picture" perceptions and conceptions will be minimized. The academic learning emphasis will mini­ mize the learning of alternative thinking, evaluation, social, and judgment skills in favor of a rules-oriented, either-or, right or wrong, black-and-white (very little gray) means of making sense and gaining mastery of the "world". Debate will occur only on "safe", noncontroversial topics. Implicit learning and nonverbal communication skills will not be addressed at all. 192

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8. The primary means of student interest in, and mo­ tivation to accomplish, academic and social behavior stan­

dards will be: (1) repeatedly pointing out mistakes, errors, and failures so that students may avoid them in the future and thereby improve their academic performance, (2) the threat and implementation of punishing consequences when academic performance does not meet high standards, or when social behavior violates disciplinary policies, and (3) extrinsic rewards for high academic performance and com­ pliant social behavior (awards, special privileges, public recognition, and so forth). Competitive games, organized competitions, and comparative rankings of students will be primary motivating resources for achieving academic ex­ cellence. The emphasis will be on the highest standards and "being the best". 9. Impersonal, external evaluations and assessments will be administered by the teachers. Teacher-created forcedchoice tests of explicit semantic and declarative memory (see Chapter 7) and sequential analytic reasoning, using the symbolic systems of language and mathematics, will be the predominant means for assessment of academic achieve­ ment. Summative letter grades (A, B, C, D, F) will be given at

the end of academic terms as an index of academic achieve­ ment. Teachers will have high standards in their grading practices. Only a very few students will receive the highest grade, a few more will get Bs, most will get Cs, a few will get

Ds, and Fs will be rare. Obscure facts will be included on tests to weed out those who are not deserving of the highest grade. Assessments of academic achievement will be re­ ported in clear, familiar, and easy-to-understand ways to students, their parents, other learning or training institu­ tions, and places of employment. Ranking of each student based on grade points and standardized tests will be the

ultimate means of assessment. 10. Faculty teaching practices will be threat-oriented. Teacher communications with students will be adversarial, coercive, accusative, and punitive so that students will com­ ply with the academic and social behavior goals of the in­ stitution. Informal advice to younger teachers regarding social discipline will be, "Crack down hard and let up slow", and, "Never smile before Christmas." A teacher guidebook for classroom management will be provided.

Teacher Guidelines for Maintaining Student Discipline Setting limits on student behavior and maintaining

student discipline are absolute prerequisites for school or­ der and academic achievement Effective teachers are not friends or "buddies" with their students. You are there to teach and they are there to comply with the rules of good discipline and to learn academic knowledge and skills. Al­ ways follow the school's disciplinary policies and always establish yourself as the absolute disciplinarian in your classes. Consistently use an adversarial language of coer­

cion and control (see Table I-9-1) to obtain and maintain student discipline. Communicate to the learners how they must behave in your class. Always be serious in your facial expressions and body language, speak with a strong voice of authority, and expect immediate compliance with your rules. Make a list of rules for prohibited classroom behav­ ior (minimum of three) that you expect your students to follow in your classes. Beside each rule, state a logical but punitive consequence that will be imposed on any student

who violates that rule. After your rules have been approved by the principal, present them to your classes and explain each rule and its punitive consequences. Be strong and consistent in your enforcement of the rules.

Teacher Guidelines for How to Set Academic Goals in Class In setting academic goals, you also use an adversarial language of coercion, control, and dependency (see Table I-9-1). Follow the school's curriculum and communicate

to the students what they must learn in order to get the best grade possible in your courses. Never involve the students in the process of selecting goals to be accomplished. That's your job. They are not experienced enough to participate in such decisions. Always be serious in your facial expres­ sions and body language, and speak your academic goals with a strong voice of authority. Teacher Guidelines for Giving Academic and Behavioral Feedback in Class When giving teacher feedback to students, use a lan­ guage of dependency and a language of accusative judg­ ment (see Table I-9-2). Almost never allow learners to per­ ceive and express their own observations and feedback. The primary purpose of teacher feedback is to point out student

Table I-9-1. An Adversarial Language of Coercion, Control, and Dependency A teacher's language of coercion and control.

Don't... You need to...

You must... You've got to... Why don't you... Why can't you... You really should... You have to... You ought to... You'd better... Sing it right... Sing correctly... Sing properly... Try to... Try hard/harder... Work harder... Keep.../Hold.../Maintain.../Retain... A teacher's language of dependence.

I want to... I want you to... I need you to... Do this for me:... Give me... Sing for me... If I were you, I'd... A teacher's language of praise and reward for manipulating and controlling student behavior.

"I like the way Sheena is sitting quietly in her chair!' "I can tell that Misha is ready to learn. He is quiet and paying attention", "Good for you, basses. Nearly all of you were sitting up straight all the way through that piece!' "Good for the altos! Not one of them talked after I stopped your singing!' "Did you see how Horace walked onto the stage just the way you're supposed to?" "If you all behave well today, I'll show a short movie at the end of class." "Unless you start working harder, I will cancel our Friday perfor­ mance at the Middle School!' "Sing well today and I'll give everyone an A" for today's work!' Controlling talk that will communicate the need to achieve high standards of excellence in performance and behavior.

"How many times do I have to tell you?! You must make the vowel 'speak' on the rhythmic impulse! You need to pay attention to me. Do it again and don't be late!" "Troy, you'd better shut up and start singing or you're going to get an F in this class!' "I'm just not going to put up with all this talking. You people are old enough that you ought to know better. Why don't you act your age?" "Everyone in this choir will be at that concert or I will personally see to it that you are transferred to general music class!' I want you to sing the first phrase again, and this time I need you to make a slower-paced crescendo!' "That is the sound I want!'

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Table I-9-2. A Teacher's Language of Dependendency and of Accusative Judgement You can't... You could have... You know better than to... You should have.../You shouldn't have... You ought to have.../You ought not to have... [You messages such as "You got behind the beat" or "You're singing sharp"] That was good/That was bad Not bad (a negative compliment?) That's the right way to.../That's the wrong way to... You sang that correctly/You sang that incorrectly That was the proper way to sing/You're not singing that properly That was better/That was worse That's not acceptable That was dumb/stupid/smart That was excellent/perfect/wonderful I like the way you... "I like the way you sang that song so well for me!' "Clarissa, you used your yelling voice in that song again. That is not the correct way to sing!' "You're late on that entrance, again! How many times do I have to tell you?! "You could have sung that better!' "You can't make the music work when your tempo is too slow!' "Sopranos, you're singing sharp again!' "No, no, no! Tenors, your tone is too tense and your diction is sloppy!' "John, your phrasing does not show a credible interpretation of the music!'

mistakes and errors so they can improve their academic and behavioral performance. Deliver your verbal feedback in a serious, matter-of-fact tone of voice. Add more inten­ sity to your voice when mistakes are repeated to convey that inadequacy and "falling short" will not be tolerated. Table I-9-2 is a list of suggested feedback words and phrases.

Praise should be given minimally and only when it

has been earned through hard work. It can be used to enhance compliance with curricular and behavioral goals. Three types of praise can be used: 1. Praise that provides teacher approval of academic and social behavior by students. Students need this form of teacher feedback so that they know how well they are

performing in your class. It also rewards compliance with teachers' wishes. Examples: "I like the way Tom moves with the music when he sings" "I like it when you behave in class." "Thank you for doing what I asked you to do."

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2. Praise that compliments success. Examples: "Very good!" "That's great!" "Excellent!" "That was a lot better."

"Wonderful!" "Good job." "That's just perfect!". 3. Praise that focuses on students' good qualities or their appropriate behavior. Examples: "Chase, you are so smart!" "Look at the way Alice is sitting quietly in her chair." "What a good voice you have, Sandra!" "That was intelli­ gent! Good boy!" [The above section of this chapter is a description of a kindergarten-through-baccalaureate-college school that is intended to result in suboptimal, human-antagonistic educa­ tion. A comparison of this school's organization with the human bodymind processing, self development, and verbal/nonverbal communication skills that were presented in Chapters 2 through 8, plus the following sections of this chapter, reveals the antagonisms.]

Human-Compatible Education Several groups of parents and educators are asked to reflect on what they hope their children-students will be like after they have left their direct influence. Do they de­ scribe people who are excellent at scholastic pursuits? Do parents want their grown-up children to always, for the rest of their lives, do what they are told without question?

Do educators want to prepare their students to be excellent at answering right-wrong-television-game-show type ques­

tions, especially when they interview for employment or

raise their own children? No. Parents and teachers both describe people who are lifelong learners, have a strong self-identity, get along

with other people, communicate well, are creatively con­ structive and socially responsible (Kohn, 1996, pp. 60-77). A prominent model for parents and educators, however, is the adversarial controller and the dispenser of rewards for compliant behavior. A common goal of education is to instill the ability to give expected right answers to written test questions about academic disciplines and avoid "gray

area" life-questions. This chapter presents a point of view about family

and school learning that is intended to be compatible with the human neuropsychobiological processes that result in skilled, emotionally competent, self-reliant, self-expressive,

and socially empathic human beings. The point of view is based on an analysis of findings from the neuropsychobiological sciences. It proposes that families and communities of human beings who respect each other as unique human beings, (1) connect emotionally with each other and help each other when help is needed, (2) express agreements and differences confidently without threat of rejection, (3) come to terms with differences and resolve problems together, and (4) learn from each other. In a fam­

figuring out how to do this! Those that can't possibly help, be quiet"

You pick up a dart, face the target, place your feet, and assume an initial stance-a dynamic balance and alignment of your body (vestibular and visual senses). Your sensory attention becomes focused on the target and on your shoul­ der-arm-hand sensations. You raise the dart in front of

you and point it toward the target. Then, you make several aiming motions with your throwing arm-hand while sev­

referred to as learners. Schools may be referred to as com­ munity learning centers (Jennings, 1993). Within a community of learners, learning experiences are tailored to: 1. the tiers and levels of the various cognitive-emo­ tional-behavioral capabilities of unique learners as those ca­ pabilities "come on-line" in the nervous system (Fischer & Rose, 1994, 1996), including innate temperament propensi­ ties (Arcus, 1994; Kagen, 1994);

eral calculations, projections, plans, and anticipations ap­ pear to be simultaneously formulated (preparatory set, see Chapter 8 and Fuster). You visually calculate the distance to the bull's-eye and plan an hypothetical trajectory. Kinesthetically, you calculate the weight of the dart and the de­ gree of firmness with which it needs to be held (parietal and temporal association cortices). You project the amount of thrust-force that will be needed to propel it to the bull'seye, the degree of arch that will be needed to account for gravity, and plan the dynamic, bodywide motor coordina­ tions that will be needed to perform the whole act (supple­ mentary and premotor cortices and subcortical motor se­ quencing areas). The limbic-frontal areas are "tuned" into an anticipatory set of possible mastery of this skill. All of

2. the extent to which various capabilities already have been converted into abilities (see Chapters 7 and 8); and 3. the optimum development of on-line capabilities into abilities by both learners and senior learners.

this is a kind of pathfinding behavior, and nearly all of these pathfinding details occur outside of conscious aware­ ness. Then you let the dart fly (primary motor cortices, sub­

ily or community of real human beings, various people will perform leadership or facilitator roles and will learn many skills and a great deal about themselves and other

people in the process. Leaders may be referred to as senior

learners. Those who are not in leadership roles may be

Optimal Support for Learning: Mistakes, Errors, and Failure Do Not Exist, Never Have, Never Will Imagine playing a game of darts.

On a wall, there is a target with outside borders and successively smaller circles on it that end with the smallest

circle, the target's bull's-eye. You have chosen to attempt landing a dart inside the bull's-eye, or as close as possible to it. As you get ready to throw your first dart, an array of

areas within your left and right prefrontal cortices begin to activate and then entrain the possible neural networks that may be needed to carry out this task, and also to inhibit neural networks that certainly will not be needed (Fuster, 1997, pp. 3-5, 209-227). It is as though these prefrontal areas say to the rest of the brain, Any of you networks that

may be able to help with this task, light up and let's start

cortical motor areas, and selected motor neuron networks of the brainstem, spinal cord, and peripheral nervous sys­ tem). During the dart throw, and after it landed, everything

that actually happened during the event are formed in im­ mediate bodymind working memory (selected sensory neu­ ron networks of the peripheral nervous system, spinal cord, brainstem, and sensorimotor, parietal association, and pre­ frontal cortices). A huge percentage of the event's details are formed in implicit memory, outside of conscious aware­

ness, and a "sense" of what happened is in conscious aware­ ness. Immediate memories are quickly reviewed, most of them implicitly. The actual dynamic balance and alignment

shifts that your body performed before and during the event

are compared to the planned shifts. The dart's actual trajec­ tory is compared with the planned, ideal trajectory in the

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visual, visual association, and visual-frontal areas. The ac­ tual kinesthetic and visual events (augmented by auditory reception of the sounds of the dart being thrown, traveling,

highly intricate webs of new abilities that become a vast

array of habitual perceptual, value-emotive, conceptual, and behavioral patterns. Typically, habitual, automatic patterns

and hitting the target) are compared to the anticipated ki­

are enacted by neural networks outside the prefrontal cor­

nesthetic and visual sensations. Based on past history, the limbic-frontal areas compare the anticipatory set of pos­ sible mastery of this skill to the degree of actual success and create a "feeling tag" for the event.

tex, especially by subcortical networks such as the two

If you had beginner's luck, you may have hit the bull's-

eye immediately, but will you hit it the next time, or the next, or...? So, you missed the whole target and hit the wall. The people around you laugh and make snide remarks about your dart-throwing ability and you are embarrassed. You have several decision options. You can decide that God or nature gave you a defective dart throwing gene, so that you have no "talent" for dart throwing, and you can choose to

amygdalae, cerebellum, basal ganglia, brainstem, and so on (Jog, et al., 1999). The details of habitual patterns are acti­ vated outside conscious awareness. In habitual, automatic patterns, the prefrontal cortex activates only to "turn on" complex subcortical routines when needed. For instance, raise one of your arms so that it extends away from your body. If you did so, about 150 muscles in your body had to contract in particular sequences and with different degrees of intensity. Did you consciously control the sequences and intensities for each muscle? Of course not. After you decoded the movement-describing

give up dart throwing for the rest of your life and there is

words above, areas within your prefrontal cortices activated

no use trying. Or, you can pick up another dart, go through the same pathfinding process, throw it, feedback yourself, then throw another and another and another, and so on. After X num­

and "decided" whether or not to do the moves. If the deci­ sion was a go, then other frontal areas activated the sub­ cortical automatic movement patterns for that task and your arm went up.

ber of dart-throwings and varied missings of the bull's-eye,

If we become aware that one or some of our habitual cognitive-emotional-behavioral patterns are not in our best interest (the first step in change processes), then we can de­ cide to alter them. How? We bring new targets and bull'seyes into conscious awareness, directly experience them, con­ trast them with the old pattern, and pathfind for a new

you notice that the accuracy of your dart throwing is in­ creasing. That means that (1) your prefrontal cortices have narrowed down which networks are needed for accurate dart throwing, and (2) inhibitory neuron groups within your dart throwing networks have strengthened their inhibition of muscle groups that are unnecessary for this task and were interfering with it (Fuster, 1997, pp. 3-5, 209-227). But at the same time, synaptic connectivity within the necessary

neural networks were strengthened (long-term potentiation, see Buchel, et al., 1999). BRAINS LEARN BY TAKING TARGET PRACTICE, and BODYMINDS HAVE TO MISS BULL’S-EYES IN ORDER TO FIND THEM. Our bodyminds engage in pathfinding and target practice behaviors throughout our lives as we have experiences and evolve our perceptual, value-emotive, con­ ceptual, and behavioral abilities. That's how we learned to walk and to talk. We began developing those abilities even before we were born (see Book IV, Chapter 1) and our ca­

template pattern (Jog, et al., 1999). Then, we take target prac­ tice and observe the increasing benefits of our improving ability (process described in Chapter 7). The synaptic con­ nectivity of the neuron groups that activate the new skill elements will gradually become stronger (long-term poten­ tiation; see Chapter 3). The unhelpful synaptic patterns in

the neural networks will begin to be inhibited from firing (inhibitory control in the prefrontal cortices) and their syn­ aptic connectivity gradually will become weaker (long-term depression). Building or altering complex physio chemical networks

pabilities for learning them expanded during genetically trig­

takes time. A "critical mass" of neuronal networking must be formed by target practice experiences. The learning tends to be slow at first, but then it tends to "blossom". Desired

gered bodymind growth cycles (see Chapter 8). During many episodes of target practice over our life-spans, we evolve

novel abilities, and changes in habitual abilities, evolve in geometric plateaus rather than in slowly progressing arith­ metic sequences. Instead of a slow, laborious learning pro­

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gression like 1,2,5,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, interesting conscious learn­ ing is more like 1, 2, 5, 5, 8,13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144. Notice that the geometric progression begins slowly at first (arithmeti­

cally). A stunning implication of "brains learn by taking tar­ get practice" is that, when people are learning new patterns of thinking, feeling, or behaving, or are altering habitual

patterns, THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS MISTAKES, ER­ RORS, AND FAILURE. They do not exist. Those nominalizations represent concepts that human being in­

terpreters "made up" millennia ago and are universally used today. The essential consequence of the concepts mistake, error, and failure is that they enable us human beings re­ hearse over and over again how inadequate we are. Nothing could be further from the truth (see Chapter 2)! Human capabilities for learning are vast, beyond conscious comprehension. Even though there are changes in the ease with which we learn some things over our life-span, our capabilities are enormous. If that conceptual reframing about mistakes startles you, you might say, "Now, that's going too far. If you're trying to sing a particular melody and you miss two of the pitches, that's two errors or mistakes. A mistake is not doing what you are supposed to do. Music teachers and conduc­ tors have to learn how to hear pitch errors and other mu­ sical mistakes so that learners can be told what they've done wrong. How else will learner mistakes and errors be cor­ rected? If we allow them to continue to make music wrong, then we fail them." Strong argument. In the spirit of respectful debate, consider the following alternative point of view. What we label as a mistake or an error is just a brain missing a go at a bull's-eye. We human beings now know enough about

bodyminds to realize that when targeted bull's-eyes are missed, the brain is just taking target practice on an ability, and it must miss bull's-eyes in order to figure out how to get to them consistently. In addition, complex abilities are

activated by billions of neurons and trillions of patterned

synaptic connections. Will every single one of them acti­ vate in exactly the same patterned way every time they are

"called on"? Perhaps acceptance and awe-filled wonder about our human nature can include a celebration of "imperfec­

tions" as well as massive capability?

There are two ways that human beings learn novel skills and cognitive-emotional processes: (1) observe other people who enact their versions of the skills and then imi­ tate and explore them implicitly and explicitly on one's own, and (2) obtain guidance from senior learners who evoke

conscious awareness of goals and point learners toward pathways to those goals. When changing well established habitual skills, conscious awareness of the difference be­ tween the habitual processes and the alternative processes is necessary. Target-practicing brains are helped, therefore, when they have a clear "sense" of the outside limits of the target, and a clear sense of "where" the bull's-eye is. But brains will learn constructively only when the people who own them feel safe, and the pleasure of personal mastery or personal self-expression is likely. When learners do not have a sense of "where targets and their bull's-eyes are", and they are told that they made a mistake or error, or they did it wrong, incorrectly, im­

properly, or badly, then a threat appraisal is inevitable, along with an unpleasant feeling-state and memory tag. A self­ imposed sense of inadequacy or incompetence may then be filed away in memory, or a vague sense of unfairness may be felt. When learners do have a sense of where targets and their bull's-eyes are, and some ways to get there, they usually perceive very quickly when a bull's-eye has not been hit. Do they then need an outside person to help them rehearse how inadequate or incompetent their performance was? "You sang that rhythm wrong", "You made two pitch errors", "You're singing sharp", "Your tone is breathy", and so on. Episodic memories are formed with sensory, tempo­ ral, and feeling-state contexts. Any aspect of an episodic memory can trigger recall of the whole memory, including the feeling state(s) that occurred during the original experi­ ence (see Chapter 7). If the general orientation of episodes share the same or similar sensory and feeling-state con­ texts, then neural linking of those memories will produce generalization of, and habituation to, the experiences. For

example, learning experiences in a school setting will in­ clude people, place, thing, sights, sounds, sensations, and daily time-frame contexts. If the accumulated feeling-state contexts for learning experiences are more frequently un­ pleasant than pleasant, then preparatory or anticipatory sets

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in the prefrontal cortices will have learned an unpleasant feeling bias (see Chapter 8). The words that people say during life's episodes are

auditory elements of episodic memories. If certain words

are used frequently during similar experiential episodes, and the words have participated in producing unpleasant feel­ ing states, then, eventually, just saying those words can produce a degree of the feeling state that was triggered dur­ ing earlier episodic experiences. For most music perfor­ mance and music education majors in colleges and univer­ sities, hearing just one word will illustrate this principle— JURY. During childhood, if parents, teachers, other adults, and peers frequently use such evaluation words as bad, wrong, incorrect, improper, not right, mistake, error, not good enough, and failure, and those words: 1. are spoken with disapproving nonverbal prosody

fer to trigger constructive reactions rather than protective ones, then we can choose alternative words that perform the same

semantic function but do not have historical emotional baggage attached. Such words and phrases as accurate, inac­ curate, getting closer to the bull's-eye, missed the bull's-eye, just outside the bull's-eye, just inside the bull's-eye but not in the middle yet, and bull's-eye! are much less likely to have such a history, but they can if used in an accusatory way. Bull's-eyes that lead to pleasant mastery may be of vary­ ing sizes, and their size can be increased or decreased de­ pending on various circumstances. When learning a com­ pletely novel skill, bull's-eyes can almost be the same size

as the whole target because any attempt at the bull's-eye goal will be progress, (see Figure I-9-1). Pathfinder expe­

riences can help brains develop a sense of what the outside

limits of life's targets are and where the bull's-eyes are. If parents do not allow infant crawling, but frequently stand

and gestural communications; 2. trigger unpleasant feeling states that are threatening

their child up and move their legs in a walking fashion beginning at the age of four months, will pleasant mastery

to the human needs for relatedness, autonomy, and safe well being; and 3. become part of a conceptual self-identity that doubts personal competence...

of walking be enhanced?

...then those words are likely to trigger protective re­

actions of avoidance, withdrawal, demobilization, or counter-threat in any episodic context throughout life (Bugental, et al., 1970; Higgins, 1996). In common terms, those words become laden with hurtful emotional baggage. Words are just combinations of noises and tones. They take on semantic and feeling meaning only because of a history of contextual use. Those evaluation words tend to trigger protective reactions only when there is a history of use in contexts of relative threat. If we know that these words are likely to have such a history, and we would pre­

Figure I-9-1:

Targets with different-sized bullseyes for learners with different

background experiences.

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Perfectionists begin with the target on the right.

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Bull's-eyes that enhance mastery are not the size of

pinpoints. Only perfectionists have learned to make their targets that way (see Figure I-9-1). Pinpoint-sized bull'seyes ensure that mistakes and failing during the exploration of mastery are likely in the extreme, and very unpleasant feelings and anxiety are almost guaranteed after repeated rehearsals of inadequacy. When these orientations are present in parenting, schooling, or voice education, they will almost always contribute to an emotional disconnec­

tion between people, places, things, and events.

The most helpful pathfinders can be mastered by learn­ ers within a few trials. They enable the learners' bodyminds to focus conscious attention solely on a single bull's-eye. The parts of human beings that process conscious aware­ ness have limited processing capacity compared to the parts that process outside conscious awareness. Over several at­ tempts to accomplish the bull's-eye (target practice), focus­ ing on one bull's-eye makes it possible for brains to evolve desired inhibitory and excitatory combinations in the neu­ ral networks that initiate the desired categorizations and coordinations. Initial attempts need to be simple and fairly slow to enable the conscious processes to consider many movement possibilities and receive a wide array of sensory feedback.

For example, before singing a simple pitch pattern,

suppose learners are asked to notice sensations in their neck­ throat areas while they imitate a mezzo-forte vocal sound­ making pattern like /shhhhhhh+uhhhhhhhhhh/. Suppose they then are guided through an experience in which they make that pattern with intentional excess effort in their neck­

throat area (neuromuscular inefficiency), and then make the

same sound at the same volume with as little effort as pos­ sible (neuromuscular efficiency). Suppose they then are asked to invite that same "easy" neck-throat sensation to happen when they say "shhhhh+uhhhh+ffle cards" (shuffle). When they have experienced and "bull's-eyed" that skill, suppose they are asked to invite that same "easy" sensation to hap­ pen when they sing the 5-4-3-2-1 pitches of a major scale,

comfortable pitch range, mezzo-forte, same words, with the first three pitches on the /uh/vowel. A senior learner can then ask questions such as, "Did you notice differences in your neck-throat sensations as you progressed from sound-making to speech-making to singing?" "Did you notice any differences in the sound of your voice?" "Do them again and observe. Use the feed­ back" "How close can you come to making the sung pat­

tern just as easy as the sound-making pattern? Do them

again and again. Slow progress may happen at first, and wonder how soon the surprise of a plateau may happen."

[More voice skill pathfinding patterns may be found in most chapters of Book II, and in Book V, Chapters 2 and 5.] After the learner has made various discoveries, then a senior learner can provide science-based information about

vocal efficiency that confirms the learner's discoveries and demonstrates a connection between the new skill and voice

health and longevity (reduction of vocal fatigue rates and vocal fold impact and shearing forces; see Book III, Chapter 1). After sufficient opportunities to take target practice on that new skill, a template coordination becomes estab­ lished in memory (see Chapter 7 for more details). When senior learners: (1) coordinate a learning expe­ rience so that conscious attention is guided to a target and its bull's-eye, and (2) ask questions that engage the pattern detecting capabilities of learners' brains toward sensing the bull's-eye and using their self-perceived feedback abilities, then repeated target practice can elaborate early template coordinations into more and more complex musical or speech settings. Feedback also is used for deciding when to

change the size of bull's-eyes or when to take on new tar­ gets. In this way, goal-setting, feedback, and assessment by

both senior learner and learner are inherently integrated

into the learning process (more details later). “Learning Styles”: Unique CognitiveEmotional-Behavioral Learning Patterns The genetically inherited capabilities of each human

being have unique variations, and the unique abilities that each human being develops spring from the unique, multiply-

webbed experiences that they undergo over a life-span. Consequently, each human being has a unique array of perceptual, value-emotive, conceptual, and behavioral abili­ ties. Some cognitive neuroscientists and educational theo­ rists have proposed that, over their lifespans, all human beings evolve unique learning-mode profiles. These pro­ files have been labeled cognitive styles or learning styles (Dunn, et al., 1982, 1989; Dunn & Dunn, 1992a,b; Galaburda, et al., 1990). Because of advantaged genetic-epigenetic capabilities, or unique features of their life-experiences, or both, some people perceive their world more frequently through one or two of their senses than the other(s) (Dilts, 1983, pp. 1623; Dilts, et al., 1980, pp. 60-88; Galin & Ornstein, 1974; Kinsbourne, 1972; Kocel, et al., 1972; Oliver, 1993, pp. 131144). A more prominently used sensory mode, therefore, will be processed through a richer array of neural networks, and will be more globally mapped to value-emotive, con­ ceptual, and sensorimotor networks.

Prominent visual processors perceive life's people, places, things, and events in richer visual detail than promi­

nent auditory or kinesthetic processors do. They frequently

"think" in "mental pictures" and "see pictures in their heads" and talk about them. They will be more attracted by the spatial and color composition of a place or thing than to

the sounds that are present or any bodily sensations that might occur. They will more readily form and remember value-emotive and conceptual relationships when they are

in the presence of spatial-visual representations of people, places, things, and events. They also will talk about their world with more visual language, such as "I see where you're coming from" or "The shadows that those purple moun­ tains make at sunset are just elegant, aren't they?". When

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conversing, visual processors frequently use their arms-

hands-fingers to "draw pictures" of what they are talking about. Their eyes will look upward more frequently than downward or straight-ahead-left-right

guage, such as "I feel where you're coming from" or "Let's hike over to that mountain tomorrow and we can camp out along the way" When conversing, kinesthetic proces­

sors may stretch their hands-arms-shoulders-legs or rub

Prominent auditory processors perceive life's people,

their legs-arms-hands-fingers, or they may display a "weigh­

places, things, and events in richer aural detail than promi­

is initially processed through the auditory sense, and audiation is its "governor", primary auditory processors are

ing" gesture with up-down movements of their palms-up hands, but the movements will not be timed with their spo­ ken words. Their eyes will look downward to the right more frequently than upward or straight-ahead-left-right.

almost always very skilled in their native language and they

All human beings who have normal neuroanatomy,

"think" in words, of course. If they have had relevant past experiences, they also will be more responsive to the tonal patterns and voice qualities of speech, and to music. They will be more attracted by the sound characteristics of a place or thing than to the scenes that are present or any bodily

neurophysiology, and biochemistry have two global con­ ceptual capabilities. One can be referred to as an analytic,

nent visual or kinesthetic processors do. Because language

sensations that might occur. They will more readily form

and remember value-emotive and conceptual relationships in the presence of detailed linguistic representations of people, places, things, and events. They also will talk about their world with more auditory language, such as "I hear where you're coming from" or "The echoes that those mountains create are just fascinating, aren't they?". When conversing, auditory processors frequently time their arm-hand-finger gestures with the accented syllables of their words or move a hand onto or about their mouth, chin, jaw, or ears. Their

eyes will look straight-ahead-left-right or down to the left more frequently than upward or down to the right. Be­

cause language is a predominant means of social discourse, and because it is the predominant symbolic mode in school­ ing experiences, more people in Western cultures are promi­ nent auditory processors compared to the other two sen­ sory modes. Prominent kinesthetic processors perceive life's people, places, things, and events in richer detail through physical sensations than prominent visual or auditory pro­ cessors do. They frequently "think" in terms of "doing some­ thing" and "mental movement", along with associated sen­ sations. They will be more attracted by the interoceptive

and proprioceptive sensations of a place, thing, or event than to visual scenes or the sounds that are present. They will more readily form and remember value-emotive and conceptual relationships when they physically interact with the people, places, things, and events of their world. They also will talk about their world with more kinesthetic lan­

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sequentially branched, logically interpretative, detail ori­ ented, verbal explanatory capability. This global concep­ tual capability is associated mostly with left hemisphere pro­ cessing and underpins each person's "interpreter mecha­ nism" (see Chapter 7). People who use this capability fre­ quently are likely to develop and enjoy an ability to (1) analyze experienced phenomena into its "component parts", and (2) use denotative language and mathematics symbol systems. When engaged with music, they like to analyze its component parts and history, and to attend to the details of music-making techniques. Prototype concepts and conceptual frameworks are correlated "bigger picture" categories that are subdivisible into many conceptual category levels or component con­ cepts (see Chapter 7). Nouns and nominalizations provide linguistic "frames of reference" for prototype, conceptual framework, and component concepts. For example, music performance is a prototype concept. Conceptual framework categories that are related to music performance could be pitch, time, volume, tone quality, articulation, phrasing, and style. Each of those conceptual framework categories can be sub­ divided into more detailed component concepts such as intonation, rhythm, pianissimo, breathy, vowels, crescendo, jazz, rock 'n' roll, "classical", and so forth. Cascades of progressively more detailed component concept levels exist.

Another global conceptual capability of normal human beings is an integrative, whole pattern, global, clusterbranched, feeling-based, nonverbal, literal observation capability. This capability is associated mostly with right hemisphere processing and underpins each person's "literal observer mechanism" (see Chapter 7). People who use this

capability frequently are likely to develop and enjoy an

ability to (1) take in whole perceptual, value-emotive, con­

ceptual, behavioral experiences that have a beginning, a development, and a closure, but do so with minimal or no analysis, (2) use connotative, metaphoric, and story lan­ guage, and (3) express global feeling states through the sym­ bolic modes of one or more of the arts. When engaged with music, they respond to global tone and rhythm pat­ terns that are symbolically expressive of feeling-intensity increases, peaks, decreases, and closures. They are not likely to enjoy analyzing music's component parts and history, or attending to the details of music-making techniques­

unless they are a means for increasing the expressive value

of music. In people whose corpus callosums have been severed

for medical reasons, so that neuronal interaction between their right and left hemispheres is almost nil, these two con­

ceptual capability-ability clusters can be observed rather clearly (Chapter 7 has details). In people with intact brains,

the two capability-ability clusters interact with each other. One may activate more prominently than the other in vary­ ing degrees. Both of the capabilities are experience-expectant

(see Chapter 8). Neural capacities for converting these innate capabili­ ties into abilities are increased as the progressive tiers and levels of genetically triggered brain growth patterns occur, especially in the frontal lobes (see Chapter 8). Right hemi­ sphere processing capabilities tend to be more developed at birth than left hemisphere capabilities (Chiron, et al., 1997; Spreen, et al., 1995, pp. 75, 84). But the conversion of those capabilities into actual abilities will occur only to the extent that experiences with people, places, things, and events in­ stantiate them into complex, electro-physio chemical, neuropsychobiological networks. Conversion of these emerging capabilities into abilities, therefore, is experience­ dependent. Optimal support for development of both capabilities

into abilities would result in people who would tend to enjoy: (1) taking in whole perceptual, value-emotive, con­ ceptual, behavioral experiences, consciously analyzing their component parts, and then reexperiencing the whole phe­ nomenon with even greater mastery and satisfaction, and (2) using denotative-language symbol systems, mathemati­

cal symbols, and connotative-paralinguistic and metaphoric language symbols, and the symbolic modes called the arts.

"Temperamental constructs are defined, ideally, by inher­ ited coherences of physiological and psychological processes that emerge early in development....(M)embership in a tem­

peramental category simply implies a slight initial bias that favors certain affects and actions....(T)he physiology merely affects the probabilities that certain states and behaviors will occur in particular rearing environments (Kagen, 1994,

p. 35; italics added). Kagen (1994) has assembled neuropsychobiological evidence for two genetically inher­ ited, but modifiable, human temperament types, (1) inhib­ ited type and (2) uninhibited type. Physiological and behav­ ioral characteristics of infant research subjects were used to define these two genetic propensities (Kagen, 1994, pp. 170189). Evidence for differential activation sensitivities in their amygdalae and the sympathetic division of their autonomic nervous systems were correlated with well defined behav­ ioral profiles. The basolateral and central nuclei of the amygdalae have extensive effects on feeling states and emo­ tional behavior. They have direct access to the hypotha­ lamic and brainstem areas that are primary activators of the autonomic nervous system (emotional motor system; see Chapter 7). Four months postbirth and two years postbirth were

regarded as landmark ages for comparing the subjects' early temperament characteristics with later childhood and ado­

lescent behavioral profiles. Physiological and behavioral profiles did change as genetically induced brain growth tiers and levels occurred (Fischer & Rose, 1994, 1996) but were modifiable by life experiences (Kagen, 1994, pp. 265-266). At four months, infants were classified as the inhibited tem­ perament type when they displayed high reactivity or irri­ tability upon encountering unfamiliar stimulations. Frequent flexing and extending of limbs, movement spasticity, arch­ ing of back, and crying were part of the high reactivity be­ havioral profile. The basolateral and central areas of their

amygdalae were highly excitable and sympathetic nervous system tone was high (anatomy is reviewed in Chapters 3 and 7). Only Caucasian children happened to be subjects

in the studies on which these findings were based, and about 2O% of them were classified as inhibited types. At two years, children who retained these characteristics were observed to be shy with strangers, timid when challenged to interact or perform, tense in their musculature, and fearful. By the

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age of two years, only about 10% to 15% of the two-yearold subjects retained the inhibited characteristics (Kagen, 1994, p. 265). Infants who were classified as the uninhibited tem­ perament type displayed low reactivity when they encoun­ tered unfamiliar stimulations, that is, low levels of motor activity and minimal irritability. The basolateral and cen­ tral areas of their amygdalae were minimally excitable and sympathetic nervous system tone was low. At two years, children who retained these characteristics were observed to be sociable with strangers, bold when challenged to in­ teract or perform, relaxed in their musculature, and fear­ lessly outgoing. About 4O% of Caucasian two-year-olds

retained the uninhibited profile (Kagen, 1994, p. 261). Unin­ hibited children who learn emotional self-regulation skills from consistent and human-compatible parent modeling and parent-child interaction (see Chapter 8) are likely to become successful leaders in the life-careers that they choose (Kagen, 1994, p. 240, 252). If, instead, uninhibited preschool children live in environments where disrespectful language and aggressive or criminal behavior are common, and who have no opportunity to learn how to restrain any yelling, disrespectful, aggressive, property destroying tendencies that they may have, may be candidates for becoming "...chroni­

cally asocial or delinquent adolescents" The inhibited and uninhibited temperament types are most accurately understood as dispositions or proclivities that are subject to genetic and learned variations. For ex­ ample, some four-month-old children have more excitable central amygdala areas but minimally excitable basolateral areas, and display frequent crying but relatively minimal motor activity. Other children have more excitable basolateral areas but minimally excitable central amygdala areas, and display frequent motor activity but minimal cry­

ing. These genetic characteristics vary in degrees, but the life-experiences of children can increase or decrease the de­ grees of excitability in their nervous systems and, thus, their behavioral profiles. For example, the "conscience" or "moral reasoning" characteristics of children who retained inhibited charac­ teristics at two years, and were evaluated again at 8-10 years, differed according to the disciplinary style of their mothers (Kochanska, 1991). The children of mothers who had de­ manded compliance and obedience during the raising of

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their inhibited two-year-olds, revealed uncertainty in their sense of right and wrong. The children of mothers who had used reasoning during the raising of their inhibited two-

year-olds, revealed a clear sense of right and wrong. Unin­ hibited children appeared to be relatively unaffected by ei­ ther of the two types of mother-child interactions. Arcus (1994) noted an elevated tendency toward fearfulness in highreactive (inhibited) one-year-olds whose mothers imposed strict compliance and obedience, while low-reactive oneyear-olds were not fearful. An inhibited child might display at age ten only one of the many features that are potential derivatives of the inhibited type, such as shyness with strangers, timidity to­ ward physical challenge, excessive worry over school grades, preoccupation with the health of a parent, minimal sponta­ neous affect, a phobia of animals, a tense musculature, or a guarded style of interaction. The last two features are the most common in older children who had been inhibited at age two but were no longer exceedingly shy or fearful." (Kagen, 1994, p. 266)

Kagen relates "tense musculature" to laryngeal func­ tion by tracing the neural pathways from the amygdalae to the anterior cingulate cortex, and from both of them to the

central gray area of the brainstem (periaqueductal gray; see Chapter 3, brainstem section). These neuron groups project

to the nucleus ambiguus of the medulla oblongata from which sympathetic neurons are projected into the tenth cra­ nial nerve (the vagus). Two branches of the vagus inner­ vate the larynx (see Chapter 3; Table I-7-1, Chapter 7; Book II, Chapter 7). Within these neural routings are neuron net­ works that initiate distress cries in inhibited infants. Unin­ hibited children tend to talk frequently, boldly, and often loudly. The implication is that people with inhibited tem­

perament characteristics may display inhibited vocal capa­ bilities such as soft spoken-ness, limited pitch and volume ranges, and pressed-edgy voice qualities when attempting to produce higher vocal volume (see Book II, Chapter 10). Bastian has developed vocal "underdoer" and "overdoer" voice disorder syndromes that are related to inhibited and

uninhibited temperaments and behavioral profiles (see Book III, Chapters 1 and 11; U. Scherer, et al., 1980). An unpleasant emotional temperament type has been proposed that may be related to greater reactivity in certain areas of the right frontal lobe (Cloninger, et al., 1993;

Davidson, 1994a,b; Denham, 1998, p. 164). Perceived threats

elty to people and animals, fighting, and display of weap­

to well being trigger built-in protective bodymind reactions (summarized in Chapter 2). When under threat, well docu­

ons in threatening contexts (Spreen, et al., 1995, p. 515;

mented physio chemical states occur inside our bodies that are quite different from the states that are triggered by safe sense-making and mastery. Threat produces focused atten­ tion and heightened "energy" level, and produces feeling states

that may range from minimally to intensely unpleasant. Protective behavioral reactions then follow. These experi­ ences also form implicit and explicit bodymind memories (somatic markers), but they decrease the probability that human beings will choose to reexperience the people, places, things, and events that were part of the original experience. When threatening experiences occur frequently, they tend

to point most people toward (1) anxiety, (2) emotional sup­ pression (the autonomic nervous system's "vagal brake" is engaged; see Chapter 8), (3) "burnout" (depression), (4) tense bodies, and (5) a reluctance to deliberately encounter new experiences and learnings, except for new ways to protect oneself. These are conditions that support optimal learn­ ing of protective ability patterns. The threat-benefit ap­ praisal characteristics of inhibited temperament children will be quite sensitive to threatening interactions with other people. When we human beings make sense and gain mas­ tery in a world that is predominantly threatening to per­

sonal well being, we are more likely to display behaviors that can range from: passive, reticent, withdrawn, helpless, disin­ terested, untrusting, discouraged, and dependent; to tense, anxious, afraid, immobilized, and frozen; to uncooperative, disruptive, disre­ spectful, imposing, and counter-controlling; to resistant, belligerent, rebellious, smart-mouthed, manipulative, and cynical; to angry, coun­ terattacking, and violent. These are learned protective ability patterns (see Chapters 2, 7, and 8 for more details). When we human beings frequently behave in these ways, we are said to have either a vulnerable or a hardened self-identity, low self-esteem, and to be self-focused, self-conscious, self­ denying, self-defeating, defensive, antisocial, or destructive. Inhibited temperament children will tend toward immobi­ lization or withdrawal. Uninhibited temperament children will tend toward counter-threat and counter control. Psy­

chologists label children as having serious conduct disorders when they have persistent problems with stealing, running away, lying, fire-setting, truancy, property violations, cru­

Rasmussen, et al., 1990; Swaab, 1989; Tucker, 1990). A pleasant emotional temperament type also has been proposed that may be related to greater reactivity in certain areas of the left frontal lobe (Denham, 1998, p. 164). When we human beings experience predominantly famil­ iar and safe surroundings, our inborn tendency will be to explore those surroundings, expressively interact with other people, and imitate (try out) their behaviors in order to make sense and gain mastery of our world and of ourselves in it (see Chapter 8). When those explorations have re­ sulted in frequent, nonthreatening perceptual and concep­ tual categorizations, we commonly experience a range of pleasant feeling states. Those states point our attentional and motor systems toward the development of self-mas­ tery behaviors. These are conditions that support optimal learning of constructive ability patterns (see Chapters 2, 7, and 8 for more details). Those patterns can be described as: productive, cooperative, purposeful, alert, attention-focused, com­ petent, involved, emotionally connected, respectful, empathic, expres­ sively communicative, humorous, divergent thinking, creative, inno­ vative, resourceful, self-starting. During constructive learning experiences, bodyminds form implicit and explicit bodymind memories (somatic markers) that increase the probability that we will choose to reexperiences the people, places, things, and events that were part of the original experience. When we act in con­ structive ways most of the time, we are said to have a strong self-identity, high self-esteem, self-confidence, self-reliance, and self-realization. Such experiences increase the likeli­ hood that we will: (1) risk experiences with unfamiliar people, places, things, and events, (2) seek new experiences

and new learnings, and (3) overcome challenges creatively.

Vigilance by parents and senior learners in continually pro­ viding optimal support for learning is important. Even when

optimal abilities have been learned, if suboptimal condi­ tions for learning occur or reoccur, previously learned abili­ ties may revert to a more functional level (Fischer & Rose, 1996). Some educators use learning style classification sys­ tems that have been developed by educators or psycholo­ gists. Some of the systems emphasize cognitive processing and do not explicitly include feeling-state influences on human-compatible

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human learning (emotional self-regulation abilities, for in­

The Meyers-Briggs personality type dimensions are

stance). One labeling system by which learners may be classified, Gregorc's Mind Styles™, uses the polar descriptive

four pairs of categorically opposite terms. A continuum is formed between them: Extravert-Introvert, Sensor-Intui­

terms concrete and abstract, combined with sequential and ran­

tive, Thinker-Feeler, and Judger-Perceiver.

dom, to categorize people according to which cognitive ca-

selected items on a questionnaire about their personality ten­

pabilities-abilities they use most frequently (Gregorc, 1982).

dencies. Based on their answers, a numerical score is calcu­

People are categorized, therefore, as Concrete-Sequential (CS),

lated and they are labeled according to the four continua. Voice and education researchers are assessing whether or

Concrete-Random (CR), Abstract-Sequential (AS), and Ab­ stract-Random (AR).

Concrete characterizes people who conceive their

world in a more literal, actual, analytic, categorical, repre­ sentational, convergent, unambiguous, and either-or man­ ner and behave accordingly. They learn more readily when they first have direct experiences of their world and then add labels, rather than just hearing a linguistically presented conceptual framework about the world. Abstract charac­ terizes people who conceive their world in a more interpre­ tative, global, metaphoric, hypothetical, intuitive, ambigu­ ous, divergent, and alternative-possibilities manner and behave accordingly. They learn more readily when they first experience a whole conceptual framework about their world and then directly experience it. Sequential characterizes people who interact with their world in a more serial, orderly, regularized, predictable, planned, controlled manner and frequently use serially or­ dered symbolic systems in their interactions (denotative lan­ guage and mathematics). Presumably, these people have comparatively less global mapping between prefrontal ar­ eas and the rest of the brain. Random characterizes people who interact with their world in a more interrelational, mul­ tiply-branched, network-like, cross-categorical, irregular, un­ predictable, spontaneous manner and frequently use multi­ ply-associated symbol systems and modes in their interac­ tions (metaphoric language, the arts). Presumably, these people have comparatively extensive global mapping be­ tween prefrontal areas and the rest of the brain. The Meyers-Briggs personality type classification system is used by some psychologists and educators to categorize the cog­ nitive-emotional learning styles of human beings (Meyers, 1987; Meyers, et al., 1993; Meyers & Kirby, 1994; Provost & Anchors, 1987 ). It emerged from the earlier 20th century work of Carl Jung, a dissenting student of Sigmund Freud (see Chapter 1).

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People answer

not these personality dimensions are related to efficient or inefficient voice use (Andrews & Schmidt, 1995; Schmidt, et al., 1999). Extravert (E) people experience more personal satis­ faction when they interact with other people as a "public person". Introvert (I) people experience more personal sat­ isfaction when they are alone and indulging in the "inner

world of thoughts and ideas" as a "private person". Sensor (S) people are more comfortable when they attend to facts, details, and the literal meanings of words. They are sensible people who develop beliefs from direct experience and are tuned in to the here-and-now. They would rather use a skill that they know well, and they can use such skills repeatedly without boredom. Intuitive (N) people are more comfortable when they attend to connected relationships, implications, "big pictures", and the underly­ ing meanings of words. They are imaginative and creative people who trust their "gut instinct" and imagine how the here-and-now will affect future events. They may become bored with a new skill after they have mastered it. Thinker (T) people are described as logical and ana­ lytical and are persuaded into action by logical argument. They make decisions rationally and being truthful is more important to them than being tactful (even if someone's feelings are hurt). They regard being tough as a greater personal compliment than being tender. Feeler (F) people

are described as sensitive and empathic and are persuaded into action more by an emotional appeal. They make deci­ sions by assessing how they feel about the circumstances or how a decision will affect other people. Being tactful is more important to them than always being absolutely truthful (even if that results in telling occasional "white lies"). They regard being tender as a greater personal compliment than being tough.

Judger (J) people usually make decisions quickly eas­

goal setting with feedback are the most common forms of

ily and confidently and prefer to have issues settled and decided. Being in control of most situations is very impor­ tant for them. They are very conscious of time, are always punctual, and generally are very organized. They prefer to get work or chores done before relaxing. Perceiver (P) people usually are anxious or unsure about the decisions they face and prefer to delay making decisions while op­ tions are left open in case unexpected opportunities arise. They are comfortable letting other people "call the shots" and do not feel that they have to be in control of all situa­ tions. They frequently are late for everyday occasions and find that time frequently slips away from them during com­

implicit and explicit learning between human parents and

mon activities. Keeping the details of personal life orga­ nized is very challenging for them and they can often find

compelling reasons to put a task off until a later time. When senior learners attune themselves to learners'

cognitive-emotional-behavioral patterns and dispositions, as briefly described above, they can (1) more readily estab­ lish respectful rapport with individual learners by using the principle of matching in nonverbal communication (inter­ actional synchrony, see Chapter 8), (2) more effectively help learners develop personal competencies and self-reliant autonomy, and (3) enhance the development of a comfort­ able, interactive, collaborative community among all learn­

ers. Educational Goals, Standards, and Learning Experiences In order to survive, societies of people evolve many interdependent activities. These activities are given word labels such as parenting, hunting, farming, building, repairing, history-keeping, philosophizing, collective decision-making, policing, doctoring, nursing, conversing, reading, writing, music-making, and teaching. In order to participate in the various activities, people convert a variety of perceptual, value-emotive, con­ ceptual, and behavioral capabilities into the abilities that are necessary for social participation. More experienced people help the less experienced people learn these abilities. Teaching-learning processes have always occurred among mammals, including homo habilis, homo erectus, homo

sapiens, and homo sapiens sapiens. Parent-offspring interac­ tions are the oldest and most pervasive processes through which teaching-learning take place. Modeling and conscious

children. The non-parent tutor-apprentice relationship was an early form of teaching-learning. The wise-person-guide (Latin: educator = teacher who draws out), interacting with multiple disciples (Latin:

discipulus = follower who learns), has been practiced in many cultures. Socrates posed questions and then guided subse­ quent dialogue with more questions. In Western cultures, his way of teaching Plato and his other students is still re­ ferred to as the Socratic method. In an outlying area of Ath­ ens, Plato taught in a place called akademia, where people gathered to interact and debate. In the Roman Empire, a wise man with a unique point of view, and his followers, were referred to as a schola. Today we still use such expres­ sions as "the behaviorist school of psychology". Before printing made books available for mass read­ ing in Western societies, books and education were restricted to male royalty and males with official standing in the Ro­ man Church. The training of church officials and royalty, therefore, resulted in the telling or lecturing method while

students passively listened. With the rise of the scientific method, mass printing, the reduction of Roman Church re­

strictions, and more democratic forms of government came adversarial debate and increased delineation of bodies of knowledge and practice. Defined knowledge-ability clus­ ters, such as mathematics, languages, and physics, came to be referred to as disciplines. Academies and schools, oper­ ated by churches and governments, came to be established and are still organized around the various academic disci­ plines. Adversarial debate has grown into high-stakes, re­ search-publish-prestige competition among scientists and academicians. In most of the world's cultures and subcultures, schools are the primary social organizations by which children ex­ pand their symbolic abilities and learn their culture's prac­ tices and mores. School experiences often are categorized as curricular activities and extracurricular activities. Among educational theo­ rists, the curricular disciplines are sometimes referred to as knowledge content domains, such as history, language(s), mathematics, music, and so on. In order to participate in the activities of a content domain, many subsets of percep­ tual, value-emotive, conceptual, and behavioral abilities must human-compatible

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be mastered. Standard educational practice is to organize curricula so that the disciplines or content domains are com­ partmentalized and decontextualized from non-school, real life experiences. In other words, they are experienced as still-water swimming pools of human experience that are walled off from the great flowing river of real life. Within the United States, recent political dialogue about education has used such expressions as, "Educational stan­ dards in our schools are not high enough" or "We need

human beings will interact differently with the people, places, things, and events of their world after they have undergone learning experiences. Content and achievement standards, however, do not

world class standards in our schools and we need to hold schools and teachers accountable for making sure that stu­ dents meet or exceed them." Recent political dialogue about school accountability has contributed to the adoption of new nominalizations. One recent nominalization is con­ tent standard, and it is a substitute for an academic curricu­ lum goal, objective, or outcome (see Consortium of National Arts Education Associations, National Standards for Arts Edu­ cation, 1994). Content standards are large-scope, bigger-picture written goals for converting capabilities into abilities within content domains (knowledge-ability clusters; see Table

is determined, or criteria by which "basic accuracy" of pitch,

I-9-3 for an example). Within a content domain, an achievement standard is a substitute nominalization for instructional goal, objective, or outcome. Achievement standards once were referred to as behavioral objectives. They are written goals that describe knowledge-ability clusters that learners are expected to achieve within a specified time frame (see Table I-9-3 for an example). They also circumscribe a general direction for the planning and initiation of learning experiences by se­ nior learners. An example would be, At the conclusion of today's learning experience(s), learners will have increased their ability to sing consecutive pitches with legato soundflow, and thus with greater vocal efficiency".

specify what senior learners and learners will actually do to

fulfill the standard, nor do they specify how the senior learn­ ers and learners will interact with each other in specific learn­ ing experiences. For example, in Table I-9-3, there is no specification of criteria by which "varied-ness" of repertoire rhythm, and word enunciation is determined, or what spe­

cific songs will be experienced, or how the senior learner will arrange the learning experiences and interact with the learners as they fulfill the standard. These are the truly crucial aspects of educating human beings. By contrast,

there is evidence that "performance standards" tend to trig­

ger more intense coercive control behaviors in teachers (Deci, et al., 1982; Kamii, et al., 1994). Currently, standards are inextricably tied to assump­

tions of mind-body duality and the existence of separable cognitive, psychomotor, and affective mental processes. They also are tied to the pervasively cognitive academic disci­ pline concept. The result is that final-product academic curriculum goals and standards are given great attention in

political circles, and those blinders prevent people with passionate hearts from doing all of what really needs to be done in the education of human beings. Instead of focusing solely on academic content do­ mains, what about focusing on the human beings that are being educated? When human-compatible learning goals

and learning experiences are being considered, the follow­ ing questions are a good place to start (adapted from Kohn, 1996, pp. xv, 10): 1. What do human beings need in order to flourish,

tional goal statements are almost always outgrowths of "mind-sets" that are imbued with the biases of cultural his­ tory and the past experiences of the goal-makers. Typically, content and achievement standards are written before learn­

to become curious, communicative, creative, productive, life­ long learners, and to be altruistic toward their fellow hu­ man beings, constructively competent, and socially respon­ sible participants in a democratic society over their life­ span? 2. How can teacher-people help their fellow human

ing experiences occur and are an attempt to describe how

beings meet those needs?

perceptual, value-emotive, conceptual, and behavioral abili­ ties are intended to be different in learners, after one-to-many learning experiences. They are an attempt to predict how

Answering those questions requires citizens, educa­ tors, and elected decision-makers to go considerably be­

Educational goals and standards. A goal is a de­ scription of a desired or intended state of affairs. Educa­

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yond the well known knowledge-ability clusters that are

called academic disciplines. Chapters 7 and 8, and the re­ mainder of this chapter, present a bigger picture from which

answers to the above questions may derive. How are written educational goals (content and achievement standards) transformed into the goals that are actually spoken and undertaken by senior learners when they coordinate learning experiences with learners? The skeletal bones that hold knowledge-ability clusters together are re­ ferred to as conceptual frameworks-broad, word-labeled, conceptual categories and related fundamental abilities (see Chapter 7). The details that are held together in a knowl­ edge-ability framework are the word-labeled component concepts and ability refinements. Educational goals can be formulated to take advan­ tage of the ways that bodyminds internally categorize ex­ perience, so one type of goal that senior learners can speak out loud is a goal-set. Most goal-sets focus attention on one conceptual and/or skill category within a larger frame­

work of related categories. Think of the ribcage as one element of a conceptual framework, and each of the ribs, their muscles, nerves, and so on, as component concepts (see Table I-9-3; following page). "Let's get our expressive phrasing down in the Dawson piece," would be an example of a goal-set. Spoken goal-sets also can help learners' pre­

frontal cortices bring related sensorimotor, episodic, semantic,

and emotional memory items into working memory and inhibit possible competing memories. Senior learners and learners use increasingly detailed pinpoint goals (component concepts, ability refinements) to elaborate the component concepts and ability refinements of a goal-set. Usually, pinpoint goals are spoken to learners after they have had a global exploratory experience, and initial feedback has occurred. For example, the first verse of "There is a Balm in Gilead", arranged by William Dawson, is sung by a SATB choir, after which the conductor says, "Is there something we can do differently that would make the

Table I-9-3. Examples of Written Content Standards, Achievement Standards, Goal-Sets, and Pinpoint Goals Content Standard (written music curriculum goal): Learners will be able to expressively sing a varied repertoire of songs with basic accuracy ofpitches, rhythms, word enunciation, and musical style.

Achievement Standard (written learning goal): By the conclusion of today's learning experiences, learners will have increased their ability to use varied crescendi and decrescendi to sing musical phrases more expressively Goal-set (spoken to define a range of learning-experience goals):

"What do singers actually do when they sing expressively?" Pinpoint Goal (spoken to define a specific learning experience goal): "I'm going to sing that phrase two different ways, [demonstration modeling] "Now, you sing the phrase both ways and notice how they feel to you!' [singing] Which one strikes you as being the most expres­ sive?" [interactions] Pinpoint goals within the goal-set that include learners in the goal-setting process: "I'm going to speak the words of the next musical phrase six different ways. Each time, after I speak the words, you speak them the way I speak them, and lets see if we can learn something about expressive

singing!' [Senior learner speaks the same phrase from the folksong "Down By

the Sally Gardens": "She bade me take life easy...!' It is spoken leisurely six times by the senior learner, followed by the learner, with about a 5-second pause between each pair for reflection. The first time accentuates the first word only, the next time the second word only, and so on! "Did anything happen inside you as we emphasized the different words?" [responses and interactions! "So, some of the words had more feeling meaning to you than the other words?" [responses! If you had to choose one word that had the most feeling meaning, which one would it be your personal choice?" [interactions! How was your word more meaningful to you than the other words? Any ideas?" [all responses respected, senior learner genuinely wants to observe how the singers respond! "Just out of curiosity, how many of you preferred the first word? ... Second word? ..!' [and so on; plurality favors "easy"! "I'm going to sing that phrase two different ways, [one phrase is sung with no phrasing dynamics and the other phrase is sung with a steady, subtle crescendo that peaks at the accented syllable of "easy", followed by a subtle decrescendo to the end of the phrase! "Did you hear a difference between the two phrases?" [responses and interactions! "You sing the phrase both ways, just for the fun of it!' [they sing! "How was that?" "Now, how could we sing the next phrase,...!'

music even more expressive than it was?" [that's the goal­

feedback] "This time, sing with that steady breathflow and

set; several learner responses occur, including "seemed like we were landing on each note rather than flowing them

steady soundflow, but sing a separate /loo/ for each eighth

together"; the conductor selects that as the next pinpoint

goal] "Just to find out what happens, sing the first phrase with a steady breathflow and a continuous-flow /z/ sound, like this: [demonstrates]." [experience happens followed by

note of time, so that you would sing two /loo/s during each quarter note, and four of them during each half note,

like this: [demonstrates]. Got it?" [experience happens fol­

lowed by feedback] "Now, how close can you come to singing that phrase with its words, and continue that same human-compatible

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steady breathflow-into-soundflow expression?" (see Table

As leaders of learning experiences, senior learners estab­

lish social conditions that learners interpret as physically

I-9-3) Goal-sets are most useful with less experienced learn­

and emotionally safe. They also prepare a setting that op­

ers so that conceptual frameworks and template coordina­ tions can be clearly established. Subsequent component

timizes attention focus and has minimal or no attention distractors. They channel learners toward intrinsically reward­ ing, interesting, adventurous, and challenging learning ex­ periences so that expectation of same is consistently present.

concepts and abilities can then be experienced and catego­ rized (making sense and gaining mastery). Pinpoint goals, then, would be selected that would relate only to the fo­ cused goal-set. After somewhat extensive detailing of mul­

Learning experiences are created that establish emotionally

ponent details of several fleshed-out skeletal parts. After

connected human relationships and provide many oppor­ tunities for development of respectful verbal and nonver­ bal communication skills, competence, and self-reliance (Andersen & Andersen, 1982). As a result of the senior learner and learner interac­

"Balm in Gilead" has been rehearsed in detail and is sung

tions presented in Table I-9-3, the learners verbally described

without using printed scores, its conceptual and motor "body" will be prominently in place and automatic. When the learners in Table I-9-3 heard the senior learner's spoken accentuations, and the vocal volume dif­ ferences in the two different sung versions, internal percep­ tual categorizations occurred. Deciding which word in the phrase had the most feeling meaning and evaluating which

results of their perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual

tiple conceptual framework "bones", a more "fleshed-out body" develops. Scattered pinpoint goals, unrelated to a goal-set, can be used to "put finishing touches" on the com­

phrase was the most expressive were predominantly inter­

nal value-emotive experiences. Internal conceptual categoriza­ tions occurred when the senior learner's spoken words were encoded into (1) denotative language meanings and (2) connotative (prosodic) feeling meanings. Conceptual cat­ egorizations also occurred when (3) the musical phrases were compared and differences between them were discrimi­ nated. All three internal processes were elaborated during discussions that were initiated by senior learner questions. Did the perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual processes always occur in a 1 - 2 - 3 discrete succession or did they occur nearly simultaneously? Did any learners sense the operations of their nervous and endocrine systems when the categorizing occurred? Learning experiences. Learning occurs when hu­ man beings change (adapt) their explicit or implicit patterns

categorizations, and then sang the phrase two different ways. Their adaptive changes in spoken language, singing, and paralinguistic communications were behavioral expressions of their internal processings. In formal and informal educational situations, senior learners lead learners through at least three types of implicit and explicit learning experiences. Imitative learning expe­ riences take advantage of the innate human capability for observing the behavior of other people and then "trying out" that behavior (spoken language, singing, facial expres­ sions, complex social-emotional behaviors, and so forth). Exploratory-discovery learning experiences take advan­ tage of the innate human capability for exploring surround­

ings to make sense of them (detect patterns, categorize them,

of:

correlate them) and gain mastery of "the world" and of self in it (convert perceptual, value-emotive, conceptual, and be­ havioral capabilities into productive abilities (see Chapter 8). Explicit goal-focused learning experiences typically emerge as a result of imitative and exploratory-discovery experiences (searching for the missing ball so that further pleasure can be experienced when rolling it back and forth on the floor with dad, figuring out how something works, inventing a game, telling a story, solving a problem posed

1. perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual catego­ rization of their world, and

by two seemingly different perceptions, and so on). Both exploratory-discovery and explicit goal-focused

2. behavioral interaction with the people, places, things,

learning experiences can be: (1) internally initiated and sus­ tained, (2) externally initiated and sustained by one or more other people [parent(s), teacher(s), peer(s)], or (3) collaboratively initiated and sustained. They also can be

and events that are encountered.

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externally coerced in many subtle and obvious ways. In any

contexts such as noncompetitive but interactive games, solv­

case, the degree to which a learner sustains involvement

ing a problem that is related to something they are already interested in, building a set for a play, appreciating the feel­

with a learning experience will be determined by the physio chemical feeling states and the value-emotive cat­

egorizations that occur inside individual learners. This prin­

ciple applies equally to self-initiated and other-initiated learn­ ing experiences.

Developmental capabilities and learning experi­ ences. Learning experiences can be arranged by senior learn­ ers so that they mesh well with the emerging developmen­

tal capabilities of learners and with their already developed abilities. For instance, in order for learning experiences to be of optimal benefit during later childhood, Greenspan

ings of other people, and so forth. They are capable of vastly extending their: 1. perceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual catego­

rization abilities; 2. analytic, sequentially branched, logically interpre­ tative, detail oriented, verbal explanatory abilities (includ­ ing semantic vocabulary, syntactic sequencing, hypothesiz­ ing, logical interpretation, and number operations such as addition, subtraction, division, multiplication, fractions, and so on); 3. integrative, whole pattern, global, cluster-branched,

(1997; see Chapter 8) identified four global abilities that chil­ dren can master by the age of about four years postbirth.

feeling-based, nonverbal, literal observation abilities (en­ abling literal linguistic description, detecting big picture per­

These abilities are the foundations upon which future opti­ mum learning are built. Without them, optimum learning is

ceptual, value-emotive, conceptual, and behavioral patterns

likely to be diminished in some way. They are: 1. the ability to categorize more and more details of the experienced world with the visual, auditory, and kines­ thetic senses (all heavily influenced by feeling states); 2. the ability to regulate attention (heavily influenced by feeling states); 3. the ability to develop and maintain strong human

relationships (heavily influenced by feeling states); and 4. the ability to communicate increasingly complex

ideas verbally and nonverbally to other people, and to ap­ preciate some of the basic interrelatedness of those ideas (heavily influenced by feeling states).

in other people, places, things, events); 4. evaluative and decision-making abilities, and pro­ jection of future consequences; 5. self-expression abilities in language(s) and the arts; 6. emotional self-regulation and self-direction abili­ ties;

7. respectful and courteous social communication abili­ ties;

8. finer-tuned motor abilities; 9. sense of humor abilities; and.... Later childhood learning experiences can be oriented toward, "What is it like to do what a writer of history does?" or "What is it like to do what a scientist does?" or "What is

The representational tier of frontal lobe regulatory ca­ pabilities comes on-line from 4 years through about 10 or 11 years (see Chapter 8 and Fischer & Rose, 1994, 1996). During this time learners can become more adept at: (1) figuring out sequential ordering such as time lines, (2) figur­

it like to do what a singer does?" or "What is it like to do what an actor does?" or "What is it like to do what a re­

ing out relatively clear cause and effect relationships, (3)

warding intrinsic attachment to the activities.

repeated practice of skills (as long as elements of novelty are frequently introduced and the experiences lead to in­ trinsic and self-mastery rewards), and (4) either-or choices with minimal "gray areas". They will be able to perform these abilities with greater emotional connection if the con­

Integrated Thematic Instruction© (Kovalik, 1997) is one model for arranging learning experiences that make pos­

spectful, caring person does?" These experiences would be intended to help children try out different human activities and optimize the chances that they will experience a re­

sible the development of all the abilities listed above, in

age-chronological, K-6 graded schools. Eventually, arranged learning experiences can take the form of (1) learner-created

crete experiences are embedded within global experiential

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proposals for learning projects, and (2) collaborative for­ mulation of understandings regarding the tasks involved in

completing the projects.

As the abstract tier of frontal lobe regulatory capabili­

ties come on-line, usually beginning at about age 12, learn­ ers become capable of developing more complex concep­

tual and behavioral abilities with much greater elaboration and breadth (see Chapter 8). At this age, their analytic, sequen­ tially branched, logically interpretative, detail oriented, verbal explana­ tory capabilities and their integrative, whole pattern, global, clusterbranched, feeling-based, nonverbal, literal observation capabilities be­ gin detailed expansion all the way through late adolescence and into early adulthood. Problem-solving, alternative thinking (sometimes called critical thinking), and possibility thinking are embedded in the method of science. Evolution of those abilities involves having a wide­ based knowledge store and refined observational, compara­ tive-evaluative, wondering, planning, estimating, expecting,

and projecting abilities. Purposeful, constructive action typi­ cally results, followed by additional observations, evalua­ tions, and so on. These processes include intricate combi­ nations of higher order perceptual, value-emotive, and con­ ceptual recategorizations (Damasio, et al., 1995; Edelman, 1989, pp. 54-57). They lead to sharpened sensory-inputseeking and pattern detection processes that lead to

bodymind behavioral changes and the self-building plea­ sures of exploration, discovery, and mastery. Integrated The­ matic Instruction© has been adapted to mesh with these blos­ soming adolescent capabilities (Olsen, 1993; Ross & Olsen,

under the guidance of a teacher. The other group just learned the skill. No candy was ever given. After the children in both groups had suc­ cessfully learned the skill, they went to a free-play area and researchers observed how frequently the children from the two groups used the skill spontaneously. A high percentage of the no-candy children used the skill frequently. The children who received the candy seldom used it (based on research reported in Ross, 1975). The researchers suggested that the candy group did not use the skill as often because the reason for using it was

to get the candy reward, and no candy reward was avail­ able during free-play. The learning of the skill was encoded in memory with the pleasant feeling states that were trig­ gered by the sweet taste and the elevated arousal that was produced by ingesting a high concentration of sucrose and

fat. The other group used the skill more often, they sug­ gested, because performing the skill was rewarding in and of itself (intrinsic reward; see Csikszentmihalyi, 1975;

Gottfried, 1986). The learning of the skill was related to

constructive self-mastery in a safe, supportive social set­ ting. The internally generated pleasant feeling states were encoded with the memory of learning and performing the skill. Usually, human beings want or choose to engage in an activity when (1) the activity was experienced before (or

one like it), and (2) there was something about the activity that attracted and then sustained their engagement with it, and (3) doing the activity resulted in aroused pleasant feel­ ing-states in their bodyminds. In other words, the pleasant

feelings of the experience alone became the reward for en­

Intrinsic/Extrinsic reward and interest What hap­ pens when human beings want to engage in an activity;

gaging in the experience. That is intrinsic reward. Along with the pleasant feeling-states, the people, places, things, and events of the experience were encoded in memory. So, intrinsic reward feeling-states are experienced in the body when human beings make sense of and master their "world", and themselves in it. Examples of intrinsic reward would be singing any song and experiencing the human emotions that it expresses, singing songs with other people, singing your own made-up song for the first time, or final mastery

when they freely choose it?

of a new skill that enables music to be sung even more

Two groups of children were engaged in learning how to per­ form a skill that could easily be integrated into play activities. The learning experience necessitated attention to the details of the skill. One group was given candy each time they finished attempting the skill

expressively than before, or creating an engaging interpre­ tation of a song without help from anyone.

1995). With the advent of reproductive capability and surges of transmitter molecule production that intensify emotional affiliations with the opposite sex, emotional self-regulation

in social settings becomes extremely challenging, and espe­ cially so if parent-child relatedness is impaired and there is no empathic, non-judgmental adult guide.

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When people are then provided an opportunity to en­

gage in the activity again, they are highly likely to want to

do so or choose to do so (Newby & Alter, 1989; Zuckerman, et al., 1978). Psychologists refer to the wanting and the choos­ ing as an internal locus of causality (see Chapter 8). When people continue their attention to, and their engagement with, an intrinsically rewarding experience over time, they

are said to have intrinsic interest in it. The feelings that individual human beings have when an ability is mastered, or the feelings that groups of people have when they par­ ticipate with others in the planning, design, creation, and performance of an experience, are sometimes referred to as ownership, pride of ownership, or pride of achievement. Required (coerced) participation in an activity-coercion-is an external locus of causality. So is the granting of external, non-intrinsic rewards. Extrinsic reward refers to pleasant feeling reactions that people have when they receive a reward that has its own value (the sweet taste of the candy in the above story), but it has no connection with the pleasant feeling-states that may be generated by an ex­ perience itself. In fact, extrinsic rewards tend to distract receivers away from noticing the intrinsic reward feeling states. Examples of extrinsic reward would be singing a made-up song for the first time, after which a teacher gives praise and places a smiley-face sticker on the student's hand, or mastery of a new skill in order to complete a required assignment and get a good grade, or singing a song to get a high rating in a singing contest. The pleasant feeling reactions that derive from extrin­ sic reward also increase the probability that people will choose to repeat that experience, but only as long as they continue to receive, or anticipate receiving, more extrinsic rewards. Sustained engagement with an experience in an­ ticipation of receiving an extrinsic reward is referred to as extrinsic interest. Typically, when the extrinsic rewards no longer occur, participation in the experience diminishes and

eventually ends. Also, even after intrinsic interest has been established, frequent presentation of extrinsic rewards tends to di­ minish the beneficial effects of intrinsic reward and intrinsic inter­ est. A well known chain of pizza restaurants devised a marketing

program that intended to increase children's interest in reading books. Children who could document that they had read a certain number of books within a calendar month would be rewarded with a free pizza party Many children participated enthusiastically Much favorable publicity and many compliments were given to the company

The results? More children read more books. Successful pro­ gram? For marketing, yes. For reading? Well, a very large majority of the children sought out shorter and shorter books, and books with a minimal amount of thoughtful, reflective, expressive content. When the program ended, the frequency with which the participating children read books returned to near preprogram levels. Research studies have provided strong evidence that extrinsic rewards frequently: 1. increase the quantity and speed of performance tasks, temporarily, IF the tasks are relatively simple and easy to perform (Jenkins, 1986; Kohn, 1993a, pp. 43, 44, 124; Schwartz, 1982); 2. decrease the quality and creativity of those perfor­ mance tasks that require sustained attention, analysis, and creative problem solving or creative self-expression (Amabile,

1979, 1982; Amabile, et al., 1986; Condry, 1977; Loveland & Olley, 1972); 3. decrease cooperativeness and generosity in the people who are carrying out performance tasks, compared to those who received no extrinsic rewards at all (Fabes, et al., 1989; Grusec, 1991; Kohn, 1990, pp. 202-203); 4. rupture human-to-human relatedness when they are dispensed by people who use them to (a) exert superior control over rewardees, (b) single out favored rewardees so that peer relationships are ruptured (favoritism, unequal treatment, competitive rivalries) (Bachrach, et al., 1984, p. 23; Kohn, 1993a, pp. 54-59, 1992, chapters 6 and 7);

5. interfere with a sense of security, development of collaborative communication skills, and constructive group community (Zeldow, 1976); 6. are used to induce compliance that meets the im­

mediate preferences of parent(s), caregiver(s), teacher(s), workplace supervisor(s) and distract them away from the

actual, more subtle, "deeper reasons" behind inattention, emotional disconnection, and suboptimal learning and per­ formance (Kohn, 1993a, pp. 59-62); 7. delimit learner attention to environmental contexts and focus attention on tasks that will bring more extrinsic rewards, and thus discourage risk-taking (Kohn, 1993a, pp. 62-67; Schwartz, 1982); 8. are used to manipulate other people into tempo­ rary compliant behavior, and often have the same or simi­

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lar effect as punishment, especially when they are promised in advance of an experience and then withheld (Kohn, 1993a, pp. 50-54)

interest? Novel, unexpected, or surprising experiences trig­ ger physio chemical arousal, conscious attention, and memory formation, and they commonly lead to adaptive

9. diminish or eliminate intrinsic interest in, and emo­

learning (Pribram, 1998). A novelty effect occurs (1) when

tional connection with, activities that are candidates for longer-term interest and emotional connection (Birch, et al.,

human beings experience people, places, things, and events for the first time (new patterns to detect), (2) when pleasant

1984; Deci, 1971; Kohn, 1993a, pp. 68-95; Lepper, 1983, pp. 308, 309; Lepper, et al., 1973, 1975; Ryan & Stiller, 1991). Two singing students go to separate practice rooms. After about 15 minutes, one student leaves, hears the other student repeating pitch patterns, song phrases, and songs and says to a passing fellow student, "I just don't get it. That guy stays in that practice room every night and sings for an hour. I am bored to tears after 15 or 20 minutes and can't stand it any more. How does he do it?" Perhaps the bored student has experienced practice room singing as a coerced requirement that he has to fulfill in order to please his teacher and get a good grade in ap­ plied voice so he can get into a good graduate school. Per­ haps the "dedicated" student has experienced practice room singing as a time to be fascinated with subtle masteries of efficient voice skills so that (1) more amount of vocal sound leaves his vocal tract with less effort during stronger sing­

familiarity is established first, and then the experience is repeated but some of its elements are rearranged, or (3) when an experience is repeated, but in a different context. If in­

ing, (2) a greater consistency of voice quality occurs in his upper pitch range, (3) soft singing becomes clear while re­ taining appropriate fullness or breadth of tone quality, and (4)

all of these skills are used in the expressive phrasing of "Die Mainacht" by Brahms and "Lebe wohl" by Wolf. In one singer, the locus of causality for singing was

internal. The rewards were intrinsic, that is, pleasant feeling states were experienced when he mastered subtle skills. Those skills increased the probability that he would sing songs more expressively than he had before with resultant gut­ felt feelings and goosebumps. In the other singer, the locus of causality for singing was external to his self and had been imposed by others. The rewards for singing were extrinsic, that is, not connected to personal voice skill mas­ tery and self-expressive music making (read Punished by Re­ wards by Alfie Kohn, 1993). Optimizing sustained engagement with learning

experiences. When guiding learners through learning ex­ periences, how can senior learners use their goal-setting and

guiding language to optimize the probability of intrinsic

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trinsic reward occurs, then a desire to repeat it again will be likely. What is experienced and how the learning experience is sequenced will be important, of course, but what if an interesting experience is introduced with these words: "I

want you to be quiet while I tell you what to do next. You three kids

have to go to that side of the room. The rest ofyou...Don't talk! You've got to be quiet!...The rest of you have to stay here. You have to hum 'Michael Row the Boat Ashore'....You'd better zip it shut, Sam! I mean it.... You keep on repeating it until the game is over. Each of you three

have to sing with the voice qualities that I whisper in your ear. You hummers, then, must guess which three voice qualities they are singing with. Sing correctly, but try hard to really sing out for me. Hummers ready? Three, four, sing!" Did you notice a feeling reaction in yourself as you read those words? Pleasant? Unpleasant? Compare that introduction of the experience with the one that follows (certain prior experiences are assumed). "This is a game called, 'Name That Voice Quality'. Let's review: What are the basic voice qualities called? [answers: breathy, clear and mel­ low, pressed-edgy overdark, overbright, and balanced] Are voice quali­ ties always only one of those? [answer: some of them can be mixed] OK, to begin playing this game, three singers are on this side of the room. They will sing a song with those voice qualities, and the rest of you get to say what you think the qualities are. Who wants to sing? All right, you three this time, and another three singers can sing the next time we play the game. Now, everybody else? We'll hum 'Michael Row the Boat Ashore' softly, and each time you come to the end of the song, start over at the beginning, and keep repeating it 'til all three singers have sung. Got it? Who wants to start us hummers? OK Fred, start us. [humming starts] Now, close your eyes. Here's how we play. One after the other, these three singers are going to sing one verse of 'Michael'. They will pick one or more of the six voice qualities and sing one whole verse with it. Afterwards, how close can you come to naming the voice qualities that they used. Continue humming softly and listen closely.

First singer, start singing when the hummed melody starts over'.' Notice differences in the "feeling meanings" that are embedded in the two languages? Table I-9-4 compares com­ mon adversarial goal-setting language with an alternative language.

Table I-9-4. Comparing an Adversarial Language of External Coercion, Control, and Dependency with a Language of Respectful Collaboration, Exploration, and Discovery Try/Try hard/Try harder... Work harder to...

I want you to... Don't... You need to...

You must... You've got to... Why don't you... Why can't you... You really should... You have to... You ought to... This is the sound I want... If I were you, I'd... You'd better...

Give it a go. Let's explore the... Let's experiment with... How close can you come to... Observe... Notice whether or not... What would happen if...

Give me... Sing for me...

Imagine... I wonder how soon you will be able to... You may be surprised at how soon... Notice what happens when... Listen to what happens when... Listen closely to your voice when... See what happens when... Feel what happens when... Pay Attention to.../Focus on... We can.../Our goal is to... Invite your voice to come out and play. What does the music need in order to.... Voices can do that if they... Can you sing this in such a way that... What is the human "feeling-stuff' in this

Sing it right...

piece? How can we sing this to bring out its

Sing correctly...

expressive...? How can you say these lines to bring

I want to... I want you to... I need you to... Do this for me:...

Sing properly... Maintain/Retain/Keep/Hold

out...? Play out the details...

Continue to...

'As I see it, my job is to help you become even more skilled and expressive human beings than you already are!' As I see it, one of your jobs is to help me become an even more skilled teacher than I already am!' [to a singer] "If you were an actor, and these were lines that your character speaks, how would you say them to express out their feeling meanings?" "If the thought of doing vocal exercises brings unpleasant feelings to your gut related to boring, repetitious work, then you are forbidden to ever do vocal exercises again for the rest of your life. IF, however, you would like to discover new possibilities in your voice and develop even more refined expressive skills, well then, there just may be some sound patterns or pitch patterns or musical phrase-letts to help you begin the adventure. And you can do those whenever you like!' "How many ways can we sing this phrase? Any suggestions? [trials] Did any of those ways 'get to you' more than the others?" "(Sopranos, Altos, Tenors, Basses) how could you sing that phrase so that the section's tone quality matches even more closely the feelings being expressed?"

Competitive situations and extrinsic/intrinsic reward. A group of boys were in training to become performing members of a

boychoir. One of the skills they were studying was sight-singing. Their

regular teacher used a competitive sight-singing game to help them

elaborate their skills. Two teams of boys competed while one boy kept score on a chalkboard. Each boy had a book of patterned numbers that represented pitches on a musical scale (1-2-3-2-l-3-l,for example). The teacher would designate a pitch pattern to be read and a member of team 1 would attempt it. If he made no errors, his team was awarded one point. If he made even one mistake, a boy from team 2 would attempt the pattern. If he made no errors, team 2 was awarded the point, but if he did make an error, the attempt reverted back to the next boy on team 1. The boys who earned points were cheered only by teammates. When notes were missed, the other team would deride the boy who made the mistake. Some boys were better at this game than others, partly because of differences in prior experiences with pitch dis­ crimination and production, and prior associations between pitches and musical notation. On the way to the room where they met, nearly all of the boys would plead with the teacher to let them be the scorekeeper that day. Hmmmm. One day, the regular teacher was ill, and an assistant substi­ tuted. On the way to the room, the boys clamored to be appointed scorekeeper. The assistant said, "We won't need a scorekeeper today. We're going to do something different." A series of pitch patterns were placed on the chalkboard, but these patterns were deliberately sequenced from easy to progressively more challenging, and there were elements in the simpler ones that prepared singers for the more challenging ones. All of the boys sang the first few easy ones together. Then the senior learner asked dffferent boys to sing the simpler ones alone, espe­ cially including the boys who had a history of low success. After each boy sang, that boy was asked whether or not he had sung the pattern accurately. If he said, No", then he was asked to give it another go. Eventually, the boys were asked to sing the more challenging patterns with the same format of singing the pattern until all of the pitches were accurate. If a pattern was sung inaccurately, the boy was asked to sing earlier patterns that tutored him for the pattern that he had missed, and then he was asked to sing the original pattern again. All of the boys got a turn. The more experienced boys were able to sing more of the patterns before they sang an inaccurate pitch or two. The less experienced boys sang more patterns accurately than they had before. Soon into the process, the boys started cheering for each other, especially for the boys who struggled and finally got it. Hmmmm.

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A rather large body of research has been carried out on how competitive situations affect human learning and

performance. Deci & Ryan (1985), Johnson & Johnson (1989), and Kohn (1992) have written reviews of the re­ search. Overwhelmingly, the results show that the process of converting perceptual, value-emotive, conceptual, and be­

havioral capabilities into abilities is impeded by competitive

situations. Measures of skilled performance, creative qual­ ity, intrapersonal self-identity, and interpersonal relatedness

also are diminished by competition (Amabile, 1982; Ames, 1978,1979,1981; Austin, 1990; Barnett, etal., 1979; Baumeister, 1984; Boggiano, et al., 1991; Bonime, 1986; Butler, 1988; Campbell, 1974; Clifford, 1972; Combs, 1957; Crockenberg,

etal., 1976; Deci, etal., 1981; Dunn & Goldman, 1966; Johnson & Johnson, 1991; Lerch & Rubensal, 1983; Nicholls, 1989; Pepitone, 1980; Spence & Helmreich, 1983; Tjosvold, et al., 1984; Vallerand, et al., 1986; Whittemore, 1924; Wilder & Shapiro, 1989; Wolpaw, et al., 1991; Workie, 1974). Competition has been described as constructive or destructive (Culbertson, 1985). In competitive situations, the object is for one person to do something better than

another person, or for a group of people to cooperate to­ gether to do something better than another group of people. When competitors focus predominantly on personal and

group ability development, and its intrinsic rewards, and the better-than-you outcome of the competition is of pass­ ing importance, then competition can be described as con­ structive. But when competitors focus on the better-than-you or winning outcome of the competition, then competition can become increasingly destructive. In nearly all competi­

Western societal practices and structures commonly

operate with a competitive essence. Some systems of justice are organized to intentionally place human beings in adversarial relationships that are said to optimize truth­ finding. Adversarial relationships are common between manager/administrator human beings and employee hu­

man beings, and between teachers and students. Competitive sports are widely popular in Western cultures. Some sports players find that the intrinsic gratifi­ cation that occurs by just playing their game and becoming

more and more skilled as a player is enough to richly sus­ tain their interest during long hours of hard work. For

some sports athletes, however, the extrinsic rewards of ap­ plause, winning, trophies, awards, notoriety, scholarships, special privileges, large amounts of money, purchasing power for material things, and celebrity status are the prime incentives for hard work. War is the ultimate competition between groups of human beings. People and their cultures, are killed (Grossman, 1995; Sipes, 1973). Sports and war metaphors become very common in the language of cultures where wars have occurred frequently and where competition is a foundation of human-to-human and group-to-group in­ teraction (Sherry, 1995; Thornburg, 1995). War metaphors in sports are extremely common (battle, fight, warrior, and so forth), and they occur regularly in many societal enter­ prises. We form task forces, create a hierarchical chain of command, assemble the troops, develop new weapons in the fight against..., become soldiers in the fight against..., fight

tive situations, numerical points are awarded for certain

a culture war or a war on drugs, draw the battle lines, fight the good fight, develop attack ads, defeat our enemies, kill the competition, and even write killer resumes.

accomplishments, and whoever accumulates the most points

Non-sports competitive situations, with high-profile

wins the competition (extrinsic reward). The person or group who wins is regarded as better than the opponent person or group. Human relationships, therefore, are placed in an adversarial, me-against-you, us-against-them context. Those contexts have the potential for becoming a better-than-you, put-them-down-by-putting-ourselves-up, we're-numberone, win-at-all-cost behavior pattern. Human beings are

extrinsic rewards, abound in schools. Some physical edu­ cation curricula are based on playing competitive games rather than helping human beings develop their consider­

then categorized and interacted with as winners, losers, in­ group , out-group, good, bad, good enough, not good enough, popular, unpopular, cool, uncool, and so on.

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able physical coordination capabilities into a large array of abilities. Tests and other academic production (written pa­ pers) are graded on a variety of numerical point systems or on subjective judgments that are then converted into course letter grades that are then converted into a cumulative grade­ point system by which competitive academic rankings are determined.

Visual and performing arts contests are sometimes driven by subjective ratings that are received from human judges in a competition to determine who paints or sings at superior, excellent, average, or poor grades of skill. Why sing? "So we can get a superior at the contest." Would that

in the right and left visual cortices, only certain neuron groups process border features, others only process colors,

campfire and said: "Let's invent something to do, so that we

and others process tracked movement, and so on. At the same time, neuron groups within the right and left amygdalae initiate an evaluation of the significance of the sensory ex­ periences. This process is referred to as experiential differ­ entiation (Tononi & Edelman, 1998).

can do it in front of other people who then tell us who does it better than somebody else. Hey, what about making

tures and significance evaluations are "reassembled" in the

pitched and rhythmic sounds with our voices? We could

association areas of the right and left parietal, temporal and

call it making vocal music"? Did that meeting take place? Some people appear to thrive in competitive situa­ tions, seek them out, and derive pleasure from the intense arousal that they induce. Typically, their experiential his­ tory is laden with optimal support for the development of

frontal lobes. In these areas, a number of cortical convergence zones activate concurrently and coherently to form neural

competitive abilities. Many people interpret competitive situations as threatening to their well being and react with

pocampal areas create an integrated index for the repre­ sented experiences (Damasio, 1989; Helmuth, 1999; Schacter, 1996, p. 87; Teyler & DiScenna, 1986). Typically, the linked neuron networks that produce an integrated representation of an experience become in­ stantiated in a bodymind's nervous system and is likely to become linked to activation of the endocrine and immune systems as well. Instantiation (Latin: instantia = immediate presence) means that correlated electro-physio-chemical activation patterns have been generated within a bodymind, and once these patterns have been generated, they exhibit some degree of longevity. Synaptogenesis and long-term potentiation (LTP) are two electro-physio-chemical instantiation processes (re­ viewed in Chapter 3). Synaptogenesis and LTP include the initiation of such processes as: (1) growth of new teloden-

imply that prehistoric human beings gathered around a

one or more learned protective behaviors (withdraw, im­ mobilize, counter-threat, counterattack). Regardless of a person's prior history, optimal, "in-the-zone" displays of ability are commonly inhibited by competitive situations. The sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system

(ANS) prepares the body's neuromuscular systems to es­ cape sources of threat or stand and fight them. If the con­ sequences of either reaction to a threatening situation are even more threatening than remaining in the threat's pres­ ence, then muscle tone will intensify and inhibit attempts to display learned abilities (see Chapters 2 and 7). The so-

called "mental" aspects of competitive games refers to at­

tempts to overcome protective sympathetic ANS effects. This reality affects amateur and professional sports athletes as well as "vocal athletes". Were the arts invented so that we can determine who does them better than someone else? Or so we can find out who can overcome competitive threat effects better when singing? Explicit/Implicit memory and learning. As noted in Chapter 6, when sensory experiences occur, particular features of the external and/or internal environments stimu­ late particular neuron groups within the visual, auditory,

and somatosensory networks that are specialized for pro­ cessing only certain details of those features. For example,

After differentiation, the separated environmental fea­

"representations" of whole perceived experiences (see Chapter 7; Damasio, 1990,1998; Damasio & Damasio, 1994; Schacter, 1996, p. 55). This process is referred to as experiential inte­ gration (Tononi & Edelman, 1998). The right and left hip­

dria and terminal boutons, (2) growth of new dendrites and

dendrite spines in neurons of the activated networks, (3) formation of new synapses, (4) increased turgidity of cell walls, myelin, and synaptic connection tissues, (5) increased production of transmitter and modulatory molecules within the neurons of the networks, and (6) increased propensity for reactivation when triggered in the future. So, the greater the intensity of electro-physio-chemical activation during an initial experience, the greater the synaptogenesis and the stronger the LTP. Psychologists refer to the concurrent and coherent

activation of multiple neural networks ("representations" of human-compatible

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an experience), and the induction of LTP in them, as inte­

grative memory encoding. Encoding is a constructive pro­ cess in the brain. Precise accuracy in the encoding of every aspect of perceptual experiences is relatively rare, so that encoding inaccuracies are somewhat common. Integrative learning refers to a memoried adaptation to interactions with the people, places, things, and events that are encountered. [Memory of deep green grass and the sound of the wind in the Austrian Alps is not a learned adaptation.] The degree of strength in the LTP encoding of memo­

ries (indelibility, longevity) is referred to by psychologists

as memory consolidation. If the intensity of initial encod­ ing was minimal, then consolidation longevity will be rela­ tively short, after which they will dissipate. If the intensity

of their induction was moderate, then their consolidation

longevity is likely to remain in a relatively stable state for a moderate period of time. If the intensity of their induction was high, then their consolidation longevity is likely to re­

main in a relatively stable state for a long period of time. When an encoded experience is repeated with some or many variations, or the experience is internally reviewed, more of the differentiated details are likely to become instantiated into the integrated neural representation of the experience. Thus, synaptogenesis and LTP are proliferated within the representation's networks. Psychologists refer to this pro­ cess as elaborative memory encoding. Increased elaborative encoding results in stronger consolidation.

right inferior prefrontal cortex activates more intensely when whole-pattern knowledge becomes engaged during elabo­ rative encoding (whole faces and the sounds of melodic contours and whole musical compositions, for example). If you attend a social gathering and are introduced to someone that you have never met before, and you hear their name and see them and then immediately resume a previous conversation with the introducer, little or no elabo­

rative encoding will have occurred. Very likely, you will not be able to recall their name within a minute or so. If the introducer mentions the stranger's home town, their occu­ pation, and an activity that is mutually interesting, and then the previous conversation is resumed, a degree of elabora­ tive encoding will have taken place. There is a greater like­ lihood that you will remember the stranger's name for the duration of the gathering. If, however, you ask the stranger questions about their occupation and the mutually inter­

esting activity, and the two of you converse for three or four minutes before the earlier conversation is resumed, then deeper elaborative encoding will have taken place. More than likely, you will be able to recall that person's name for the next several days if presented with appropriate cues. Further contact with that person will increase the depth of

processing effect, also referred to as levels of processing effect (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Kapur, et al., 1994; Schacter, 1996, pp. 43-46). The extent to which pleasant or unpleasant affective-

Elaborately encoded memories are assembled when

emotional-feeling states are generated during an experience

experiences are repeated over time and experiential details

is the most pervasive influence on attentional focus, memory encoding and consolidation, and on memoried learning.

are commonly brought into conscious awareness (Gardiner & Java, 1993). As more and more details of the people, places, things, and events are experienced and become in­ stantiated in the relevant neural networks, then those de­ tails commonly become associated, interconnected, and contextualized with previously instantiated memories and learnings (global mapping of multiple neuron groups and networks, see Chapters 3 and 7). In other words, neural representation of current integrated experiences become in­ tegrated with other integrated network representations. For example, the left inferior prefrontal cortex activates intensely when semantic and categorical knowledge associations be­ come engaged during elaborative encoding (Demb, et al., 1995; Kapur, et al., 1994; Schacter, 1996, pp. 52-56). The

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When experiences are interpreted as literally or potentially threatening to safety and well being, physicochemical

changes will occur in the body that are referred to as un­ pleasant feeling states. These states serve as somatic mark­

ers for our memoried experiences (see Chapters 2 and 7 for

reviews). When experiences are interpreted as literally or potentially beneficial to safety and constructive well being, physicochemical changes will occur in the body that are referred to as pleasant feeling states. These sensed bodily states, and the neuroendocrine processes that induced them, will be instantiated (co-encoded) in the nervous system along with the perceptual, conceptual, and behavioral events that occurred at the same time. The basolateral nuclei of the

right and left amygdalae are key processors of affective states. Their reentrant connections with the hippocampal areas, several brainstem nuclei, areas of the neocortex, and so on, serve as feeling-state modulators of memory encoding and consolidation. In other words, they evaluate the relative importance of an experience, and can intensify either un­ pleasant or pleasant emotional memory "tags".

An undergraduate music major and theatre minor was pas­ sionate about singing and acting. In his junior year, he took his one required math course and experienced such "useless" assignments as solving problems in number bases other than 10. Over four years, he made A's in nearly all of his music classes. He made a Din the math class. Intense or indelible memory consolidation occurs when: 1. elaborative encoding is optimally extensive and occurs in pleasantly constructive situations; and/or 2. an experience is of high value-emotive importance to the experiencing person (Abel, et al., 1995; Cahill, et al.,

1996; Schacter, 1996, pp. 44-46, 81-83).

Spotty was a friendly dog. When I was five years old and in first grade, he used to walk with me to school. Kids would pet him outside the school's front door. I can still see the principal of my school holding Spotty up by his ears with one hand, while he used a paddle in his other hand to beat him, so he would stop lingering outside the door. I can still hear the whacks and Spotty's yelps of pain. At the age of 59, myface still expresses my distress when I recall that event. I was standing inside the red-brick school's front doors. They were painted brown. The principal wore a blue suit that day, and I'll never forget his face. His name was Roy Smith. When an experience, or part of an experience, engages high-intensity feeling states or is interpreted to be unusu­ ally novel or highly distinctive, an unusually high discharge peak can be recorded in electroencephalographic (EEG) sig­ nals. The peak is referred to as an event-related potential (ERP) and it occurs about 300 milliseconds after exposure to the experience. It is referred to, therefore, as a P300 EEG spike. When P300 ERPs occur in relevant neural networks during memory encoding, the encoding is more strongly consolidated and recall can occur much more readily (Fabiani & Donchin, 1995). So, the higher the intensity of

Table I-9-5. Ideas for Elaborative Encoding and Memory Consolidation of Theatre Scripts and/or Vocal-Choral Singing 1.

Read script/text/lyrics aloud several times with a variety of expres­

sive nuances. What is the person like who is saying these lines or singing this song? To whom or about whom are the lines or lyrics being spoken or sung? 4. What is the situation in which lines/songs are being spoken/sungplace, things, context? 5. Create internal visualization of people, scenes, objects, events. 6. Is this scene/song a monologue, a dialogue, or a soliloquy? 7. What human "experience-stuff' is being expressed in this scene/song? 8. What is the essential "feeling sense" of this scene/song? 9. Create word metaphors for the feeling sense of the song (courage, uncertainty, anguish). 10. Which words in each phrase are the most feeling charged? (See Table 2. 3.

1-9-14. 11. How can the sounds of the words be used to paint a picture of their feeling meaning? 12. What choices did the composer make about the feeling meaning of the text/lyrics, and what is in the music that reveals the composer's choices? 13. How can the words be spoken or the music be sung so that the expressive energy of the feeling-charged words/music will be expressed? 14. Create metaphoric gestures for efficient vocal skills, timing, phrasing, voice qualities [both visual and kinesthetic senses are included in the elaborative encoding.

intense the sensory and attentional processes will be acti­

vated, the more indelibly and detailed both the memory and the learning will be instantiated in the nervous system, and the fewer repetitions will be necessary to produce the instantiation (see Chapters 2 and 7). A relatively high de­ gree of elaborative encoding is likely to be automatic dur­ ing high-intensity feeling states, and only one high intensity value-emotive experience can produce indelible, lifelong, explicit-implicit episodic memory and learning. In 1967, I was selected as a member of the Cleveland Orches­

tra Chamber Chorus for its final performance with conductor Robert Shaw, before he went to the Atlanta Symphony. The rehearsals of

Bach's Mass in B-Minor were loaded with many self-expressive moments and rich learning. From the perspective of my back riser­ row, right side, fourth-from-the-end chair, I still can see Mr. Shaw's phenomenally expressive, perspiration-streaked face during the final performance in Severance Hall. And I can still hear Bach's incredibly expressive music, sung with incredible expressiveness, and I indelibly remember my deeply transcendent feelings. During the contralto's sing­

pleasant or unpleasant value-emotive processing, the more

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ing of the Agnus Dei (to me, the most beautiful music ever written), I thought to myself, "I can die now Because if there's a heaven, it can't possibly be any better than this." When single, mild-intensity, value-emotive experiences occur, then sensory, attentional, and working memory pro­

conscious awareness) and some will be encoded as implicit

memories and learnings (not in conscious awareness; Graf & Gallie, 1992). During experiences that produce explicit learning and memory, the bodymind systems that produce implicit learning and memory are activated simultaneously

cesses do not encode detailed, long-term memories. Re­

(explanations in Chapter 7). In other words, when bodymind

peated mild-intensity value-emotive learning experiences, however, will produce an accumulation of implicit/proce-

perceptual, value-emotive, conceptual, and behavioral abili­ ties are engaged enough times in nearly the same ways, both explicit and implicit memory-learning are consolidated. Implicit memory for learned conceptual-semantic relation­

dural memories for salient features of the repeated experi­ ences and their pleasant-unpleasant somatic markers. With each repeat, more details can be elaboratively encoded.

Repeated mild-intensity pleasant feeling states increase the probability that experiencers will (1) continue their degree of sensory, attentional, and working memory engagement with

an experience, and (2) choose to have the experience again. Mildintensity unpleasant feeling states increase the probability that experiencers will diminish their degree of sensory, attentional, and working memory engagement, and choose not to have

the experience again. A skilled high school band rehearsed an unfamiliar musical selection, conducted by a conductor who was unfamiliar to them. As part of an experiment, this conductor disapproved of as many mis­ takes as he could perceive, and never approved anything that the band performed well. The next day, another unfamiliar conductor rehearsed the band in an unfamiliar musical selection that was prejudged to be of the same technical difficulty as the previous rehearsal's selection. This conductor only approved of what the students did well as their performance improved. The judged performance level reached in 33 minutes with 100% disapproval, was reached in 19 minutes with 100% approval (cited in Murray, 1975). So, what we remember and learn is mostly determined

by: • the intensity of the pleasant-unpleasant feeling states that occur in our bodies during an experience (somatic mark­ ers);

• the number of times we engage in similar experiences with mild pleasant-unpleasant feeling-state intensities; • the extent to which we explore and discover the branched details of an experience; and • the extent to which we connect an experience with various related perceptual and conceptual associations (deeper elaborative encoding, see Tables I-9-5, 7, and 8). During memory encoding, some experiential features will be encoded as explicit memories and learnings (in

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ships, physical sensations, and motor coordinations is a singular capability-ability in all human beings whose rel­

evant neural processes are intact.

For example, when a person's eventual goal is explicit memory of a list, a poem, lines in a play, or the pitches-

rhythms-words of a selection of vocal music, considerable memory consolidation occurs while viewing, reviewing, and repeating the object of memorization. When any of those items (or a segment of same) are spoken or sung aloud, say,

three consecutive times (1) in a constructive, intrinsically pleasant-feeling situation with focused attention, and (2)

associated visual, auditory, and/or kinesthetic experiences have been imagined, but (3) without consciously attempting to memorize anything, a considerable amount of implicit memory will have been instantiated in the prefrontal cortex's work­ ing memory areas. So, this consolidation occurs implicitly before conscious awareness of "memorization" has occurred, especially if some degree of elaborative encoding has oc­ curred along with the reviewing and repeating (Noice & Noice, 1996). After speaking the lines out loud or singing the song several times, speak or sing without looking at the words or music, and observe how much was retained. One caution: A threat response can be produced in a person if they are coerced to perform an ability that they are not

consciously aware has been learned (see story at end of this section). The collegefestival choir and its conductor (Axel Theimer, DMA,

St. John's University, Collegeville, Minnesota) rehearsed for two days. A concert was performed in the evening of the second day. On the first day, the concert's opening a cappella selection was rehearsed. The pitches for the opening harmony were given and the selection was sung its entirety. Then, the conductor addressed the first goal for rehearsing the music, told them to begin singing the opening phrase, and just cued them to begin. Several of the singers hurriedly raised their hands

to ask for the pitch, but it was too late. The choir had already started singing, and they were exactly in key After several such events, the conductor brought to the singers' attention the fact that no pitches had been given before any of their rehearsal trials, except at the very beginning of the rehearsal of that piece. Yet they had always sung the music in the key in which it was written. He described implicit (procedural) memory for them. He explained that when we have similar experiences repeatedly, memories are formed and abilities are learned outside of our conscious awareness. Even when there is no deliberate attempt to consciously "memorize" the music that we sing, we are still learning the music implicitly. We then know "how to do things", but we don't con­ sciously know that we know how to do them. All of the singers had rehearsed the selection a number of times (elaborative encoding), and nearly all of them had learned to be habitually dependent on receiv­ ing their pitch before beginning to sing. He explained that, sometimes, part of the dependence is the implicit threat of singing the "wrong pitch", thus "making a mistake" and being shown to be "inadequate". Several hours before the concert, the opening selection was re­ hearsed for about 10 minutes. At the conclusion of the final rehearsal, the singers were dismissed for dinner and pre-concert preparation. Sev­ eral hours later, at the concert, neither the singers nor the host choir conductors knew what the guest conductor planned to do. The choir walked in, then the conductor. Both received enthusiastic applause. No pitch for the concert's first a cappella selection was given backstage or on-stage. The conductor turned to the choir, steadied his arms, and cued the choir to begin singing. They did. After three hours. Right in key. The stronger the instantiated LTP is instantiated within representational neural networks, there is an increased prob­ ability that the networks will partially or substantially reac­ tivate when some aspect of the initiating experience is en­ countered again. This reactivation is referred to by psy­ chologists as memory retrieval. Reactivation can be cued by similar external events or by internal processing of as­ sociated memories. During encoding, when various ele­ ments of an experience are instantiated with some depth, those elements can serve as cues for retrieval of the whole memory or some degree of it. "...(T)he specific manner in which we encode an event determines what retrieval cues will later help us remember it" (Schacter, 1996, p. 114) Explicit memory of an unfamiliar person who is met briefly at the beginning of a reception line of thirty-five

unfamiliar people may be retained for seconds at the most

(immediate explicit memory), unless the experience of that person is elaborated in some way. People who park their car at work each day in a different location within a large

parking garage, will consciously attend to visually perceived features of that location so that, about 8 or 9 hours later, they can retrieve a memory of where they parked their car.

Relatively brief elaboration consolidates recent explicit

memories (short-term) that can last about one day. Long­ term explicit memories can be available to working memory

in time periods of hours to months. Long-lasting memo­ ries can be retrieved over a lifetime (see Chapter 7). With increased elaborative encoding, additional situ­ ational cues for retrieval of memory and learning are em­ bedded in the neural representations of experiences. This process is referred to as the encoding specificity principle or cue-dependent memory retrieval (Kapur, et al., 1995; Schacter, 1996, pp. 60-64; Tulving & Thompson, 1973). State­

dependent memories can only be retrieved, or more com­ pletely retrieved, when the physicochemical state of the body is nearly the same as when the original experience occurred (Eich, 1989). When an element of knowledge that was pre­ viously learned, or part of a prior experience is mentioned to a person and they then recall the whole experience, then the memory is said to have been primed (Schacter, 1996, pp. 166-169). Ten and 14-month-old infants were shown a puppet and had a very pleasant experience when learning how to use it. Their behavior with the puppet was examined several months later and on a few occasions, at several-months-long intervals, over a 50-month span (just over four years). During this time, their language abilities devel­ oped and infantile amnesia occurred. The children were about five years old at their last examination. The researchers observed almost no verbally expressed recall of prior episodes with the puppet. Yet, when compared with children who had never seen the puppet, these children clearly showed more interest in it and used it more familiarly. The researchers concluded that the toy primed implicit memories of the puppet and its use (Myers, et al., 1994). Associative retrieval occurs when a memory has been encoded with associated sensory perceptions, conceptualsemantic information, and/or feeling states. These associa­ tions cue the hippocampal index to perform retrievals more readily. Hearing a particular song cues a memory of a past

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human relationship and its feeling states, for example. Effortful or strategic retrieval is a slow "trying to remem­ ber" process that involves areas of the prefrontal cortex, particularly in the right frontal lobe (Moscovitch, 1994).

During episodic memory retrieval, specific areas in the right prefrontal cortex are more activated than the same areas of left prefrontal cortex (Tulving, et al., 1994). These searches of our "memory banks" can be referred to as transderivational searches.

are memory squashers and can be frustration boosters. In music rehearsals, unexpectedly stopping the music in the middle of phrases interrupts both implicit and explicit memory encoding and retrieval, increases unpleasant feel­ ing states, and diminishes the accuracy of future retrievals. The longer the time span between newly attended experience(s), the fewer details remain in recent memory,

and the more experiential repetition will be needed to achieve reliable, detailed long-term consolidation, unless high inten­

Memories that have been elaborated with semantic

sity feeling states occurred with the experiences. For ex­

associations can be retrieved more readily when they are encoded within relatively clear conceptual framework cat­ egories. Component concept subcategories can be more strongly consolidated because of the framework associa­ tions (Damasio, 1990; Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Lakoff, 1987). Early instantiation of relatively clear framework categories prevent confusion when later brain growth cycles come on­

ample, when school choral singers are learning unfamiliar music in daily one-hour school periods, and the singers then go to a science or history class, their recent working

memory functions do not have very much time to consoli­ date the stimulated long-term potentiation processing into

longer-term memory for future detailed retrieval. Intrinsic reward and interest, constructive productivity, pleasant feel­

line and formerly separated categories are seen to actually

ing states, and clear use of goal-sets and related pinpoint goals

overlap with other formerly separated categories. For ex­ ample, clearly distinguishing the vocal fold shortener-length-

are some of the conditions that optimize memory consoli­ dation and retrieval. Blocked practice learning experiences involve repeat­ edly taking conscious target practice on the same complex ability (see Chapter 7). Blocked practice results in faster acquisition and stabilization of an ability and is appropri­ ate when acquiring and stabilizing (1) new perceptual, value-

ener functions makes it easier to understand their overlap­ ping, synergistic influences on pitch and on the voice quali­ ties known as vocal registers (see Book II, Chapters 7 through 11). While memory encoding is a constructive process in

the brain, memory retrieval is a reconstructive process (see Chapter 7; Damasio, 1989; Damasio & Damasio, 1994; Schacter, 1996, p. 66). When a memory is reconstructed, some of the neuron groups within the memory's neural networks are not likely to activate in the same way they activated during encoding. Some features of the memory, therefore, may be incomplete or missing. Subsequent re­ trievals may then include distortions (Schacter, et al., 1995). Memory research indicates that when people have an

experience and then immediately become refocused onto one or more other experiences, or the experience was inter­ rupted, then detailed retrieval of the original experience is diminished (Keppel, 1984). If high intensity feeling states occurred during the original experience, recall may be im­ proved. So, the more distractions there are in an experien­ tial process, the more repetitions will be necessary to create reliable, detailed memory encoding and retrieval. In school settings, loud bell ringing to signal the end of class periods, and non-emergency public address system announcements,

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emotive, conceptual, and neuromuscular coordination abili­

ties, or (2) altering habitual abilities. Appropriate use of goal-sets and related pinpoint goals facilitate establishment and consolidation of conceptual frameworks component con­ cepts, and elaboration of complex skills. Goal-sets and pin­ point goals take advantage of the fact that, when learning

novel abilities, or altering habitual skills, conscious bodymind processing can be successful only when one activity is un­ dertaken at one time. Random practice learning experiences involve mix­ ing the abilities that are repeated. Random practice results

in increased retention of complex abilities and in and trans­ fer of abilities to a variety of contexts. Scattered pinpoint goals are useful during random practice. With increased repetition of complex physical coor­ dination abilities, their operation is increasingly transferred

to subcortical routines in the brain and greater speed and automaticity appear when the abilities are engaged. They are then examples of procedural memory and learning. Does

"practice make perfect"? What about "repeated target practice makes abilities more permanent" (habitual)?

6. interruptions of attention-tracking during whole experiences or defined experience chunks;

In summary, enhanced reliability of detailed memories can

7. shifts of attention to other experiences or memories

be accomplished by providing: 1. intrinsically interesting, intriguing, delighting, en­

before consolidation has occurred; 8. insufficient number of repetitions of learning expe­

gaging, desirable learning experiences;

riences and little or no elaborative encoding so that memory consolidation is sporadic or is "hard work".

2. "first experiences" that occur in constructive situa­

tions that are likely to induce focused attention and pleas­ ant-feeling physio chemical states, and are presented as de­ sirable self-mastery adventures that are just beyond the current abilities of the learners; 3. whole experiences, or defined experience chunks, during which there are no interruptions (almost always experience music in whole phrases, periods, sections, or compositions); 4. minimal or no shifts of attention to other experi­ ences or memories while a goal-set is underway (sustained attention with no distractions); 5. higher intensities of pleasant-feeling or unpleasantfeeling bodymind states and attentional focus; 6. an appropriate number of repetitions of learning experiences during which deeper and deeper elaborative

encoding for memory consolidation occurs (see Tables I-9-

3, 5, 7, and 8) and future interconnections with other similar experiences are prepared (transfer of learning).

Diminished remember-ability can be accomplished by arranging: 1. experiences that have little or no intrinsic reward or cannot be related to pleasant past memory and learning;

2. externally imposed, forced-choice experiences in which the rememberer has no "ownership"; 3. threat-laden situations that are likely to induce un­

pleasant-feeling physio chemical states and protective be­ haviors; 4. "first experiences" that are presented to learners as conscious "hard work", with deadline pressures and mini­ mal expectation of intrinsic reward: 5. minimal or confused conceptual frameworks into which component concepts seem not to fit, thus diminish­ ing the elaboration of perceptual, value-emotive, concep­ tual, and behavioral abilities:

Feedback and Assessment Integrated Within Learning Experiences During active learning experiences, each bodymind tracks and evaluates (explicitly and implicitly) (1) external

events that occur both during and after each experience

(visual, aural, and tactile exteroception of the event and its consequences), and (2) the bodily internal events that oc­ cur at the same time (visceral interoception and kinesthetic proprioception; see Chapter 3). Both the internal and exter­ nal events are thus "fed back" to a bodymind's physio chemical networks that produced the sensory en­ gagement and behavioral action in the first place. These

fed-back external and internal events have come to be termed feedback.

External feedback (exteroceptive senses) is perceived from external sources such as borders of a car in relation to painted lines on a road, acoustic reverberations when sing­ ing in an enclosed space (or minimizing of same), or where a dart landed in relation to the circles on a target. Nonver­

bal or verbal reaction to a behavioral event by another person (or by groups of people) counts as external feed­ back. During the development of voice skills, any post­ vocalization analysis, presented by another person or group is an example of external feedback (a teacher or an audi­

ence, for example). In learning situations that include large

proportions of external evaluation, learners can become de­ pendent on it and never fully develop their own indepen­ dent evaluative capabilities (more later).

Knowledge of results (Bilodeau, et al., 1959) is a term that is used in research on goal-oriented motor movement. It is external feedback that provides information about the extent to which a person has accomplished or has deviated from a particular physical coordination goal. Did the dart

land further from or closer to the target's bull's-eye, inside the bull's-eye, in the middle of the bull's-eye? When knowl­ edge of the results of a physical coordination is clearly ap­ human-compatible

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parent (hitting or missing a basketball free throw, pitch is

sustained or not sustained), then knowledge of perfor­ mance (Young, 1988) can be provided about wrist action by a coach, or about vocal breathflow and soundflow by a voice educator. Internal feedback is processed within each bodymind so that the interoceptive and/or proprioceptive senses are activated. Internal feedback occurs during an unfolding event or by reviewing memory of the event after it has

concluded. Much internal feedback is processed outside conscious awareness. Examples of internal feedback dur­ ing the development of voice skills would be: 1. vibratory sensations of one's own voice during speaking or singing; 2. kinesthetic sensations of one's own vocal coordi­ nations during speaking or singing; 3. interoceptive visceral sensations that occur because of pleasant-to-unpleasant physio chemical feeling-states; and 4. post-vocalization self-analysis or sense-making of auditory and kinesthetic feedback of one's own voice after speaking or singing, including feeling states.

Proprioceptive or kinesthetic feedback results when

muscles-tendons contract and release or are stretched. Some proprioceptive sensation can be reported to conscious

awareness, but much is not, especially in the larynx (see Book II, Chapter 7). Proprioceptive feedback that is not reported to conscious awareness is used to guide ongoing and future physical coordinations. Interoceptive sensations include tactile feedback, that is, epithelial or skin surfaces

are moved in some way, such as touch or vibrations. Pain feedback (nociception) is another form of internal feed­ back. When neuro-physiochemical state changes occur

within the body's torso, interoceptive sensations produce value-emotive feedback. These state changes are called feelings, feeling states, affective states, or emotions. Physio chemical state changes in the torso's viscera are detected by sensory nerves (mostly branches of the vagus nerve) and are trans­ mitted initially to the brainstem and limbic areas of the brain (see Chapter 3). Subtle changes in the viscera may or may not be transmitted to the higher-order cortical areas that process conscious attention. Billions of elements of internal and external feedback are summated within the nervous system and are available 222 bodymind & voice

to those neural networks that guide action and reaction. Thus, perceptual, value-emotive, conceptual, and behavioral categorizations and recategorizations have begun and are instantiated at very high speed into immediate working memory, recent memory, and possibly, long-term memory (see Chapter 7). As a guide for ongoing and future action, feedback is most valuable when it is available during or soon after a learning experience. After an experience, much of "what happened" can be explicitly accessed and appraised

in such conceptual continuum terms as wide-narrow, highlow, close-distant, curved-straight, thick-thin, bright-dark, loud-soft, heavy-light, rough-smooth, same-different, accurate-inaccurate, famil­ iar-unfamiliar, pleasant-unpleasant, simple-complex, and so forth. The capability for sensitivity to subtle internal feeling states, and their associations with people, places, things, and events in the external world, can be converted into many beneficial abilities. Collectively, they can be referred to as a social-emotional capability-ability cluster. The devel­ opment of these abilities, however, is experience-dependent (see Chapter 8). Higher-order language areas might label value-emotive criteria-not-met feedback signals as unfa­ miliar, uneasy, incomplete, inaccurate, uninteresting, puzzling, doesn't feel quite right, unsatisfying, negative impression, apprehensive, poten­ tially threatening to well being, or that person is not "connected" with me, or not attracted to me. Higher-order language areas might label criteria-met feedback signals as familiar, com­ plete, accurate, successful, interesting, satisfying, fulfilling, positive impression, potentially beneficial to well being, or that person is connected with me or is attracted to me (Chapter 8). The ability to attend to one's own pleasant-unpleas­ ant feelings and use them as feedback that guides action is a prime element of autonomous self-identity (Gardner's term: intrapersonal intelligence). Internal "feelings of knowing", intu­ ition, hunches, "feels right" or does not, are examples. The ability to "sense what another person is feeling", or "know what another person is going through" can be used as feed­ back that guides human-to-human interaction (Brothers, 1995, 1997, pp. 49-62). Those abilities are referred to as empathy, and empathy is a primary foundation for the development of social-emotional self-regulation

(Gardner's term: interpersonal intelligence). The goal of effective senior learners is to help learners increase and refine their self-perceived feedback. Self-per­ ceived feedback only occurs when (1) a learner's attentional

processes are engaged and focused on a learning experi­ ence, (2) when unscripted sense-making, pattern detection,

and self-mastery are at hand, and (3) when intrinsic reward and interest are most likely to occur. Senior learners can

assist learners in the development of their self-perceived feedback in at least three ways: 1. ask constructively worded questions about what happened;

2. repeat a learner's response to questions, or summa­ rize it, often in the form of a question; 3. describe their own perceptions of what the learner(s) did, in order to provide a model of constructive feedback vocabulary that learners may use for the self-perceived feed­

back that they can provide for themselves and other people.

Constructive questions. Constructively worded ques­ tions can engage bodymind attention and a learner's sense­ making, pattern detection, and self-mastery of perceptual,

value-emotive, conceptual, and behavioral abilities. Analysis of teacher-student interaction by Amidon & Hunter (1967), Bellack, et al. (1966), Flanders (1970), and Hough (1970) in­ dicated that when teachers used such "indirect verbal be­ haviors" as asking questions, accepting and using student ideas, encouraging student efforts, and accepting student feelings, then (1) student responses and involvement in­ creased, (2) students rated those teachers as more desirable to have as a teacher, and (3) rated them as more effective in "motivation" and "fairness". When teachers used such "di­ rect verbal behaviors" as lecturing, giving directions or com­ mands, giving criticism or corrective feedback, and justify­ ing their authority over students, then student responses

person, a place, a thing, a word or phrase, a fact, or a contextualized time-course event (episodic memory). Closed questions generate memory retrieval. Open questions also generate memory retrieval, but they also en­ gage conceptual processes in a "figuring out" of deeper, more defined understandings and possible solutions to problems, and so on. These processes are commonly referred to as critical thinking. When assisting learners in the development of their own self-perceived feedback abilities, Langness suggests beginning with imitative or exploratory learning experiences

and general, open, nonspecific questions first. As goal-fo­ cused learning experiences occur, then gradually more spe­ cific questions may be valuable to learners (Personal com­ munication, Anna Langness, Ph.D., Boulder Valley Public Schools, Boulder, Colorado; see also Langness, 1992; Tenenberg, 1988; and Langness' Chapter 6 in Book V). For example, an exploratory learning experience has

just concluded, or part of one, and a teacher asks, "Did you notice a difference that time?" or "How did you do that?" or "What did you do to make that /t/ sound?" or Are there moments in this song that are most special to you?" or "What did you like about how you sang this piece of mu­ sic?" or "Is there anything you would like to do differently to make the music even more expressive?" Follow-up ques­ tions that elicit more detailed observations might be, "What did your tongue do when you made the 'Bugs Bunny' sound?" or "What happens to your breathflow when you make a /t/ sound?" or "Was the open-feel in your throat

motivation and fairness. Amidon and Hunter (1970) distinguished two types of questions in teacher-student interaction. Broader or open questions elicit internal observing, comparing, correlating, estimating, evaluating, refining, alternative reasoning, con­

closer to the bull's-eye, about the same, or further away?" or "In this phrase, is there a particular word that is the most feeling-charged word to you?" When a goal-set has been announced before a series of learning experiences, then perceptual, value-emotive, con­ ceptual, and behavioral attention is focused on a circum­ scribed range of experience. Feedback questions, therefore, would be about phenomena that were prescribed by the goal-set (see Table I-9-7). For example, after a basic orien­

templation, and imagining. Open questions send bodyminds

tation to vocal registers has been experienced and a learn­

on brainwide transderivational searches for immediate, re­ cent, or long-term memory patterns to analyze and sym­

ing experience is focused on observations of register transi­ tions, an open feedback question might be, "How did your

bolize (see Chapter 7). Narrower, or closed questions elicit

register transition go that time?" A narrower, more specific,

retrieval of specific information such as recognition of a

or closed question might be, "What register are we starting

and involvement decreased and students rated those teach­

ers as undesirable to have as a teacher, and as ineffective in

out in?" human-compatible

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That was closer to the bull's-eye that time. Do it again, (assumes a goal is clearly understood)

Table I-9-6. Examples of a Language of Collaborative Assessment, Self-Reliance, and Mutual Respect Questions that facilitate self-perceived feedback: How did that seem to you? Did you notice a difference that time? Was that closer to the bull's-eye, about the same, or further away? How did you do that? How did that feel? How did that sound? How did that look? Did that seem breathy, pressed-edgy, or firm-clear-mellow-warm to you? Did you hear more of a Ten-Foot-Giant sound, a Bugs Bunny sound, or balanced resonance? What happened when...? Did you see/hear/feel a difference when you...? What changed when you...? Did you feel what I felt?

What did your throat feel like when you sang that time? (answer) Now do (suggest different approach to voice use). (sing same passage) "Did you notice a difference?" "How would you describe the difference?" "What did your throat feel like that time?" "Was there a difference in the sound of your voice?" "Was there a difference in the feel of your voice?"

Feedback that describes what a senior learner observed when learners have missed a bull's-eye and may not have the vocabulary to describe sounds and sensations of their own voices (includes some "I" messages and some goal statements): The old "reach up and squeeze" habit got in there again that time. Did you feel it? That sounded a little pressed-edgy to me. Did you notice it by any chance? I heard some inaccurate pitches/rhythms that time, (avoids wrong, bad, and incorrect)

I heard the rhythm being just behind the beat. Vowels "speak" on the rhythm? Check it. I saw some ceiling breathing that time. Check your body and let your midsection breathe you. I noticed repeated surges of sound in that phrase. How close can you come to "steady-flow singing"? The music didn't really move me that time. What can we do to make it more expressive? I heard some pitches going flat in the bass section. Did you hear that basses? What can we do?

That was just inside the bull's-eye that time. What can you do to move it more to the middle? Bull's-eye!!

Your upper register is getting stronger. Your lower register is lightening more and more as you go higher in pitch. Your upper/lower register transition is very well blended now. That flute/falsetto register of yours is just soaring. There were a lot more accurate pitches that time. You started singing, noticed that your larynx pulled up, stopped, and changed it right away. Yes! I heard a smoother, more flowing musical phrase. That was a goosebump experience.

Senior learner questions can be worded in such a way that a "right answer" is given to learners so that their percep­ tual, memory, and learning processes are not engaged at all. For example, whether a learner sensed overly effortful voice use when singing high pitches or not, the following ques­ tion gives them the right answer: "Did you notice that your throat was tight when you sang those high notes?" or "Did you hear the pressed-edgy quality in the tenor section that

time?" Those kinds of questions deny learners an opportu­ nity for self-perceived feedback, stop curiosity, and elicit "right-answer" and "please the teacher" orientations. They

deliver the senior learner's perceptions and implicit goals without engaging the pattern-detecting and sense-making

capabilities of learners. In truly human-compatible education settings, feed­ back is not a means by which senior learners can demon­ strate their own mastery of knowledge-ability clusters. Feed­ back is an opportunity to help learners develop their ability for self-perceived feedback, and multiple-variable, criteria-

based judgments. Senior learners demonstrate competence as teacher-guides when we become less and less necessary as a source of feedback. That means that the learners are becoming competent and self-reliant, that is, more and more

accurate as observers and more and more adept at gather­ [References to pitch inaccuracies tend to focus attention on conscious control of pitch, and frequently result in unnecessary larynx muscle involvement. The most common contributors to out-of-tune singing are (1) inefficient vocal coordinations that sometimes are induced by intense bodymind concentration over time, (2) underconditioning of larynx muscles and vocal fold tissues, (3) dehydrated or swollen vocal folds, (4) general bodymind fatigue, and (5) emotional disengagement from singing.]

Feedback that describes what a senior learner observed when learners have gotten closer to a bull's-eye or hit it (learners are gaining mastery or being competent), or feedback that celebrates emerging competence:

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ing feedback for themselves. Those are lifetime skills.

Repeating or summarizing a learner's response to a question. Repeating or summarizing learners' responses gives them an opportunity to consider refinements of their observations and skills or to branch them into more de­

tails. A senior learner may ask, "What did you do to make that /t/ sound?" and a learner may respond, "My tongue goes to the roof of my mouth" Senior learner: "Your tongue

goes to the roof of your mouth..?" Learner: "Well, it's the tip of my tongue...and it touches just above my front teeth" Praise versus description as feedback.

Senior learn­

ers lead learners either through (1) novel cognitive-emo­

tional-behavioral patterns, or (2) an alteration of habitual cognitive-emotional-behavioral patterns. When learners are not experienced enough to respond accurately to questions about new patterns, or when they have an underdeveloped vocabulary, then descriptive or informational feedback from senior learners can be valuable as a model for learners' own eventual self-perceived feedback (Pittman, et al., 1980). Praise feedback can be worded in ways that: (1) enhance learner dependence on external, non-self sources for feed­ back about personal competence, (2) appear positive but actually compliment incomplete competence as though it was full competence, (3) provide no useful feedback infor­ mation, and (4) create embarrassment and a degree of iso­ lation among learners (see Table I-9-2 for examples). Teacher-approval praise has the appearance of posi­ tivity, but it reinforces the importance of pleasing the teacher or conductor. In other words, obtaining the approving judg­ ment of others may become more important than gaining personal competence. Examples: "I like the way you opened your mouth more that time" "I heard good things in your singing today" "You sang the way I want you to sing" "That's

the sound I want". This type of praise may increase depen­ dence on others for self-identity rather than increasing one's

own autonomous competence. The result may be a person who passively follows directions very well, but waits to find out what others think before they venture a guess about their own degree of mastery. The learner who asks, "Did I do that right?" or "Is that what you want?" may not yet have learned how to perceive and use feedback for themselves.

Apprehension may be an emotional characteristic of those learners, and a hesitant orientation may prevail in learning and expressive situations. The determination of self-reli­ ance and self-identity, therefore, may be inhibited by a steady diet of this type of praise. Gratuitous, unwarranted praise is emotionally posi­ tive, appears to be constructive, and is delivered by senior learners whose "hearts are in the right place". Typically, this type of praise is considerably overstated and often is used

in a context where learner skill has improved, but has not

Examples: "Good job", "Yes", "Good", "That was better", "That's correct singing", "Very good!", "That's great!", "Excellent!", "Wonderful!", "That's just perfect!". This

yet been mastered.

type of praise provides no accurate or helpful information about what learners did to produce the praise. More than likely, it is not related to goal-set or pinpoint goals. In group settings, it also approves the behaviors of all learners as though everyone did exactly the same "wonderful" be­ havior. Lack of mastery, therefore, is described as mastery for some learners. One result may be that learners will continue to repeat the same less-than-skilled behavior pat­ tern in the future under similar circumstances and conceive of the behavior as being competent. This way of praising is

sometimes used habitually, and eventually may become a distracting mannerism or an empty compliment that may

be perceived as fake by learners. Those interpretations may generate an uneasy feeling about the teacher's competence and credibility. Two exceptions: (1) If one pinpoint goal has been clearly stated, has been tried, and was achieved very well, then "Yes!" or "Bull's-eye!" will clearly infer mutual recogni­ tion that the goal was accomplished. (2) Sometimes, ex­

pressions like "Yes!", or "Oh, my! That moved me," are cel­ ebrations of achievement, or of goose-bump expressive

moments during a rehearsal or performance. Nonverbal feedback can be even more powerful, such as, the auto­ matic, spontaneous facial expression(s) that occur when expressive moments are experienced, or stillness followed by an affirmative nodding of the head. That contextual feedback is a celebration of mutually shared moments and enhances a sense of bonded community. Special status praise appears to support self-esteem and confidence, but it may have the opposite effect on some learners. This type of praise draws attention to personal qualities of one learner or a subgroup of learners, rather than to a description of specific competencies ("You are so smart!" "What a good voice you have!" "You sing better than any of my other students!" "The tenors sang better than any of the other sections today!"). The praise of one learner or subgroup of learners can imply a negative evaluation of the unpraised learner(s). Compliments are uncomfortable for many people and embarrassing for some. Sometimes, the

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unpraised learners may take on a facial and vocal expres­ sion of derision that can have a "depressing" effect on the

praised person. So, being singled out for praise in front of peers can actually put the praised person's self-confidence at risk. Even resentment toward the praise-giver can occur.

On the other hand, some learners may develop a sense of obligation or even an obsession to be praiseworthy

Manipulative, controlling praise is a form of control by extrinsic reward (see examples in Table I-9-1). It is intended to induce obedience to, and compliance or conformity with, a school's or a teacher's imposed rules or expectations. It reinforces an adversarial, external locus of cognitive-emo­ tional-behavioral causality rather than helping learners de­ velop a collaborative internal locus of cognitive-emotionalbehavioral causality (see earlier section and Chapter 8). Implicit, constructive praise is just a description of what a senior learner heard or saw or felt as one human being to another. Senior learners hold up a verbal and nonverbal

mirror so that learners may "see a reflection of themselves

in it" (see Tables I-9-5 and 6 for examples). According to Bennett (1988), constructive praise confirms and substanti­ ates the competence, increasing skill, and constructive self­ identity of learners. Examples: "Every sound of every word came out clearly. Yes!", "Your ears and voices are really cooperating today", or "When you opened your mouth more on those so-called high notes, I/we heard your voice re­

lease even more sound than before. How did it seem to you?" [Examples of a language of collaborative assess­ ment, self-reliance, and mutual respect are found in Table

I-9-6.1 This kind of praise gives (1) constructive information, (2) accurate vocabulary and knowledge of performance to learners in order to help them make sense of their world and gain mastery of it, and (3) serves as a model to the learners of how to express their own self-perceived feed­ back. It confirms the reality that the learner did the sense­ making and is gaining in mastery. It implies that the teacher

Table I-9-7. Comparison of Two Goal Setting and Two Feedback Languages used by Two Choral Conductors During Rehearsal Learning Experiences In rehearsal, a chorus begins singing a musical selection in which the first word is "Down". The following scenarios represent verbal and some nonverbal communica­ tions that could be used by two different conductors, and some possible choir responses. Scenario #1: Thats not acceptable. You're starting late. Now do it again and start the music right on time. [They sing it and the entrance improves but still is not together.] [spoken in an irritated tone of voice] No, no. You're still not right on time. Your/d/s are all over the place. Now look, when my conducting hand hits its lowest point, thats when all of your /d/s should sound precisely together. Now watch me and do it. [They try it again but the entrance is more uneven than the time before.] [increased irritation] You're not concentrating enough. This is simple and easy. Just do it. [After three more trials, the entrance is precise. Actually, the less skilled singers dropped out and did not sing their /d/s. The first word is now exaggerated in volume and the initiation of the music's "expressive flow" is distorted. Also, the vocal tone quality has become more pressededgy and overbright (see Book II, Chapters 10 and 12).] Scenario #2: When the singing starts, I hear a kind of tattered entrance. There are about 10 /d/ sounds instead of one. [This language describes what the conductor heard and establishes the bull's-eye of a target] Just for the fun of it, sing the pitches you have on the word 'Down" and really make the entrance sloppy on purpose. I mean big time. [Establishes the outside limits of the target and introduces alerting, focused attention, and pleasant-feeling humor.] Now, on purpose, can you make your entrance just a little off-time, but not very much? [Establishes competence to get closer to the bull'seye.] This time, lightly tap the fingers of one hand on the back of your other hand like this. [Model how to do that while modeling the tempo of the music at the same time.] Join me. [Do that for about 5 to 10 seconds.] Now, do four taps in a row, and on the fifth one say the word "Down", [do that] When would be the most helpful time to start breathing before saying the word? [explorations, observations, judgments, conclusions] Tap and breathe and sing the first chord on "Down", [do that] "Was the /d/ on time?" [Repeat that several times for memory consolidation. This process establishes a template coordination (see Chapter 7) that uses the visual,

auditory, and kinesthetic senses for more extensive memory consolida­ tion. That template memory can be used to guide timing coordinations in increasingly complex future singing situations.] Now, let's sing the whole first phrase. This is the big moment! Without tapping your hands, how close can we come to starting the music right together? I'll start my conducting pattern; you start singing as though all of you were one person, [do that] How close was it? Do you think you can get even closer? [In subsequent not-together and together entrances, singers could be asked, "How was that first entrance?" or "Would you like to do that first entrance again?" or "Was the first entrance together or not as together as it could be?"]

did not teach that to the learner from the teacher's pre­

detected patterns and/or masteries, but that the senior learner's greater experience was used to arrange circum­ stances in such a way that sense-making and mastery by the

learner was likely. In learners, that type of feedback activates the pleasant-feeling processes of the brain so that teacher­ approval praise is superfluous and unnecessary.

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Pointing out learner mistakes, errors, and failures has been a fundamental staple of teaching-learning situations for millennia of time. On a spelling test of ten words, eight are spelled accurately and two are spelled inaccurately. Next

to which words do teachers place a read mark? "You are not paying attention" or "You are singing under the pitch" are examples of you-messages that have the emotional flavor of an accusation of inadequacy (see Table I-9-2). Each pointed-out mistake triggers an unpleasant feeling state in

mouthed remarks that criticize what the teacher is doing,

compare them unfavorably to a favored teacher, withhold cooperation, frequently interrupt with meaningless ques­ tions or comments, and so on. Remember the story of Bret trying to get on his rock­ ing horse (Chapter 8)? What do you suppose would have

the bodymind that becomes a memoried somatic marker for the person, place, thing, or event that was part of the

happened inside Bret, and to his rocking horse behavior, if

experience. Each such marker may be referred to as an emotional ouch (Seminar study with Eric Oliver, M.A., Psy­ chologist, MetaSystems, Ltd., Canton, Michigan). Who in­ terprets whether or not an emotional ouch has been deliv­ ered, the receiver or the deliverer?

his father had moved his leg over the horse for him? When human beings autonomously master a skill, a pleasant-feel­ ing physio chemical state occurs and is sensed in the bodymind. That state is intrinsic reward and is instantiated in memory with any person, place, thing, event that was

What is the likely effect on emotional memory and learning when a teacher focuses mostly on pointing out

part of the experience. It becomes a memoried somatic marker for those associations (see Chapter 7). When mas­ tery of a skill has been observed and acknowledged, ver­ bally or nonverbally, by someone with whom valued re­ latedness has been established, then the intensity of pleasant feeling states may become amplified. Verbal acknowledg­ ment could take the form of a description of a learner's mastery, not inaccurate or overstated praise. Each such somatic marker may be referred to as an emotional lift, or an emotional float. The affective result of many such events between senior learners and learners is the accumulation of two-way respectful emotional connec­ tion and attachment. Other constructive behavior patterns also accumulate, including social-emotional self-regulation, strong self-identity (intrapersonal intelligence), empathic relatedness with other human beings (interpersonal intelligence), and intrin­ sic interest in shared experiences. Usually, a single emotional lift or float produces relatively minimal feeling intensity. As

what is "wrong" even if the justification is to help the chil­ dren learn? More often than not, teacher or conductor feed­ back that is presented as "good-bad", "right-wrong" "cor­ rect-incorrect", or "proper-improper" produces emotional ouches, and over time, a degree of emotional desensitiza­

tion. The affective result of many such emotional ouches, delivered by teachers, is that students rehearse over and over again how inadequate they are and emotional dis­ tancing between student and teacher grows. Emotional

ouches result in avoidance of potential ouches, some degree of immobilization when they are possible, and a tendency toward ouching-back or counter-ouching (see Chapters 2 and 7). They also enhance protective reactions that inhibit bodyminds from carrying out their innate drives to make constructive sense and gain constructive mastery. A popu­ lar student avoidance strategy is to only give right answers to teachers, and to keep quiet if a right answer is not known with certainty. ing intensity. As more ouches are delivered, however, the

lifts accumulate over time, however, emotional connection with people, places, things, and events becomes more in­ tense. The probability of increased attentional focus, in­ trinsic interest and involvement, and constructive behavior

unpleasant feeling states can become more intense, and the probability of counter-ouching grows. In other words, re­

patterns increases. In other words, repeated emotional lifts and floats can grow into emotional highs, emotional tick­

peated emotional ouches can intensify into emotional hits, stabs, and slashes. Emotional hits, stabs, and slashes may include teachers (or peers) making fun of students, teasing and laughing at them (often without malicious intent), and

les, emotional caresses, emotional massages, and emo­ tional ecstasies [Author's Note: Emotional tickles was created by Steven Szalaj, music educator, Crystal Lake, Illinois, at the 1997 VoiceCare Network continuing course].

making sarcastic remarks to them. When teachers regularly deliver emotional ouches, students deliver them more fre­ quently to other students. Students also may make smart­

Do children read books outside of school for the plea­

A single emotional ouch only produces minimal feel­

sure of using their visual, auditory, kinesthetic, and em­ pathic imaginations while reading stories? Or is reading an

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activity that is done only during school hours because it is required to complete worksheet assignments, pass tests, and get a grade? What do their voices sound like when they read aloud? Do their prosodic inflections express perfunc­ tory boredom or do they express the emotional flavors of the story and its characters? Do they read because it is enjoyable and satisfying in and of itself, and will they choose, therefore, to read throughout their life-span? Are children provided opportunities to learn clear, expressive voice skills

for conversation or informational presentations in front of

other people or for portrayals of human beings in plays? Do learners sing because they have mastered expres­ sive vocal abilities and because singing is enjoyable and fulfilling in and of itself? Will they continue to sing after they are no longer with us? Will all of the elementary school children that we have led, choose to become members of a junior high/middle school singing group (see the Fore­ Words)? Will the junior high/middle school learners choose to become members of a high school singing group? Will they then go on to college, community, or religious singing groups, study solo singing or speaking skills, or choose to become voice educators themselves? Assessment In school education circles, standard­ ized assessments of academic aptitude, intelligence (IQ), and achievement are administered to students. Aptitude and IQ tests were devised and began to be used in the early 20th century in an attempt to measure intellectual traits that were assumed to be genetically inherited. The tests predomi­ nantly used, and still use, analytic reasoning, activation and

alteration of selected internal sensory images, and linguistic and mathematical symbol systems, mostly learned in aca­ demic settings, as a way of gauging degrees of intelligence, assessing past academic achievement, and predicting future academic success. The tests are structured so that student responses can easily be converted into one or more num­ bers that serve as an index of general aptitude or intelli­ gence. Because hundreds of thousands of students have taken the tests, students can be placed into percentile ranks. In the past few decades, the traditional concepts of aptitude, intelligence, and achievement, along with their meth­ ods of measurement, have been questioned and significantly discredited (Ceci, 1996; Deacon, 1997; Gardner, 1991a,b; Gardner, et al., 1996; Gould, 1995; Hatch & Gardner, 1986;

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Owen, 1985, Popham, 1999a, Sternberg, 1985, 1998; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997). The line between innate, genetically provided capabilities (potential for learning) and experien­ tially learned abilities has never been clearly drawn (Gor­ don, 1999), and their overlapping developmental nature may make clear demarcation impossible.

Results of these tests can influence the formation of explicit or implicit teacher expectations that are communi­

cated nonverbally (implicitly) by teachers to students, and the students interpret the nonverbally communicated ex­ pectations, and respond to them outside their conscious awareness. These teacher expectations can affect the achieve­ ment of some students beneficially, but can constrict the achievement of others (Conn, et al., 1968; Gould, 1995; Lemann, 1999; Owen, 1985; Pelletier & Vallerand, 1989; Rosenthal, 1971). Pygmalion in the Classroom (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1992) describes an experiment in which teachers were told that their new "average performing" students had been tested and found to be on the verge of blossoming intellectually, when, in fact, no such finding had been deter­ Over the course of the ensuing school year, the students' academic performance improved significantly. The only change had been the teachers' expectation that the stu­ dents would "blossom intellectually". Typically, aptitude and IQ are determined by a one­ time, high-stress test. During the test-taking, the test-takers use learned abilities to demonstrate "innate intelligence", and the cultural learning bias of the test makers result in lower IQs for people who were not raised in the test-maker's cul­ ture. Aptitude and IQ scores can be raised by as much as 10 to 15 points by a favorable ability-learning environ­ ment. Typical academic achievement tests assess learned academic abilities that are decontextualized from, and some­ times irrelevant to, real world situations (Sternberg, 1998). Yet, standardized aptitude, IQ, and achievement tests con­ tinue to be the most common means by which children mined.

and adults are labeled as more or less intelligent, and as having higher or lower aptitude or achievement. In schools, students may be tested on recently cov­

ered knowledge through unexpected pop quizzes or endof-the-week tests. Other tests may assess achievement over

longer time frames such as a quarter or half of a year, or a series of years. Teachers must grade numerous tests, often on their "own time" away from school, so a major criterion

for test construction is ease of scoring. The result is com­

semantic memory and fact-based knowledge. How to use

mon use of right-wrong multiple-choice, item matching, fill-

semantic and fact-based knowledge in real world contexts

in-the-blank, or true-false tests. Correct responses are con­

tends to be ignored. Gardner (1993) uses the word under­

verted into a number and a range of numbers determines what letter grade will be assigned (A, B, C, D, F). All test

standing as a reference to the use of learned knowledge in evaluating, "brainstorming", planning, and solving real world

grades are averaged in some way to determine a single letter grade for an entire course. Course letter grades are then converted into numbers (A = 4, B = 3, C = 2, and D = 1) to create cumulative grade-point averages (GPAs) over several academic years and members of each graduating class are ranked according their GPAs. Class ranking is a major cri­ terion for admission to higher education and for employ­ ment.

problems.

Most primary and secondary school students are re­ quired to take standardized achievement tests one or more times before graduation. Standardized assessment refers to a process by which cumulative student achievement in one academic discipline (or more) is supposed to be objectively determined. Predominantly, achievement is assessed when student knowledge is examined through the use of ques­ tions or problems (exams or tests) that are presented in written language or mathematics symbols. These tests also are structured so that student responses can easily be con­ verted into numbers and student scores can be placed into percentile ranks. Standardized tests purport to measure the academic knowledge-ability of individual test-takers in a single span of time on one day or a few consecutive days, and then compare individuals' test scores to norms that are derived from thousands of test-takers over a span of years. Criticism of traditional forms of assessment used in classrooms are legion (Gardner, 1991; Gould, 1995; Hatch & Gardner, 1986; Gifford & O'Connor, 1991; Kohn, 1993, pp. 142-159, 198-227; Lemann, 1999; Neill & Medina, 1989; Popham, 1999a,b). Tests assess a somewhat limited range of learner abilities, they become competitive and threaten­ ing to well being, the ability of many test-takers to perform

well is decreased as is intrinsic interest in whatever is being evaluated (Harackiewicz & Manderlink, 1984; Harackiewicz, et al., 1987). At test-taking time, learning stops and a "decontextualized" event occurs. Real world work is as­ sessed in the context of goals and accomplishment of actual work tasks. It is almost never assessed by stopping work and taking a written test. Classroom instruction tends to be

tailored to the nature of the tests and becomes a test of

Parents and other taxpayers deserve an accounting of how children are progressing in their school learning. Accountability assumes that parents, other taxpayers, and school personnel have mutually clear concepts of what is

valuable for learners to experience and learn, and that the

means of assessment is valid. But what if parents and other taxpayers assume that current children's schooling and as­ sessment ought to be very similar to that which they expe­ rienced 10 to 40 years earlier (familiar), and school person­ nel have changed how both schooling and assessment are

done (unfamiliar)? What if school personnel: (1) have learned important details about how human bodyminds learn to love detailed learning, (2) have chosen to educate for

a wide range of human capabilities-abilities (Deacon, 1997; Gardner, 1990; Gifford & O’Connor, 1991; Popham, 1999b; Sternberg, 1998), (3) are aware of the effects of significant cultural changes (global communication and travel, com­ puters, news and entertainment media influences, and so on), and, as a result, (4) have made significant changes in what is experienced in schools, how, and when, and (5) have selected methods of assessment that provide evidence of truly significant learning? A teacher of singing at a small college kept an ongoing spread­ sheet journal of each student's lesson dates, a brief description of the

events that occurred in each lesson, of progress made, and a list of voice and musical skill goals that were set in each lesson. Each student used the same spreadsheet to keep their own journal. At the midpoint and endpoint of each semester, the teacher would complete an assessment form for each student, and each student would use the same form to assess themselves. The teacher had created a fundamental voice skills evaluation form. The form listed 32 funda­ mental voice skills that were allocated in five categories: (1) arrange­ ment and flexibility of skeleton, (2) breathflow, (3) voice quality (lar­ ynx), (4) voice quality (vocal tract), and (5) vowel and consonant for­ mation. Under each category, several specific skills were listed. The progressive mastery of each specific skill was described in four catego­ ries: (1) Not Observed (NO), (2) Observed Infrequently (OI), (3) Ob­ served Frequently (OF), and (4) Habitual (H). Zero points reflected the human-compatible

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NO category, one point reflected the OI category, two reflected the OF

vation of progressive accomplishment of each fundamen­

category, and three reflected the H category Students could follow their progress toward mastery of each skill, and, by adding all of the num­ bers on the form, a numerical index of fundamental voice skill mas­ tery was determined. When all of the skills became habitual, the points would total 96. The only requirement was that the index number become higher with each assessment. This practice allowed for illnesses or other hu­ man circumstances that could affect the progress of learning. Because the college required the teacher to submit a letter grade for each student, each student would propose a grade on their assessment form. At an appropriate time, the teacher and each student would compare their assessments and their journals, discuss any differences, arrive at a con­ sensus on the index number, and mutually decide on a letter grade. At the end of each semester, the college's music department re­ quired each student to perform on their major instrument before a jury of the entire faculty. During the freshman and sophomore years, sing­ ing students were not required to sing five memorized songs, because doing so would (1) further consolidate their habitual vocal inefficien­ cies and slow down their progress toward vocal efficiency, and (2) teach them that singing was something you did for external evaluation, rather than for expressive communication with fellow human beings. They were asked to prepare a presentation in which they (1) described the skills that they had focused on during the past semester, and (2) demonstrated both their beginning-of-term and end-of-term skill levels by singing the pitch patterns, song phrases, or unmemorized songs that they had experienced during the term. If they became ready to memorize songs before their junior year, they would do so. Assessment of achievement can be embedded within

tal skill (NO, OI, OF, H), and summative assessment, that is, observation of collective accomplishment of all funda­ mental skills (the index number). Dialogue during comparison of journals and assess­ ment forms provide an opportunity for development of a

learning experiences as they are unfolding. In other words, assessment itself can be a learning experience that is inte­ grated within the context of goal-sets and pinpoint goals. Collaborative assessment includes both senior learners and learners in human-to-human communication. Both groups learn in a cooperative, constructive context (S. Kagen, 1991). In the above account, the journal recording of lesson expe­

riences can help learners focus their attention on voice skill goals and observe their ongoing progress in accomplishing the goals. Journaling also can deepen elaborative encoding and memory consolidation. The assessment form can help learners categorize singing skills into a relatively clear con­

ceptual framework with related component concepts and skills. It also enables formative assessment, that is, obser­

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collaborative relatedness between senior learner and learner

and for assessment of self-perceived feedback and self-evalu­ ation skills. The assessment process also is contextualized. The jury presentation is itself a learning experience. The learners' analytic, sequentially branched, logically interpre­ tative, detail oriented, verbal explanatory capabilities and their integrative, whole pattern, global, cluster-branched, feeling-based, nonverbal, literal observation capabilities are used to elaborate their self-expressive abilities. [For more ideas about embedded assessment in music and choral edu­ cation, see Gates, 1995; Keenan-Takagi, 2000; Larkin, 1985; and a report by the New York Classroom Music Commit­ tee.] The principles that underlie collaborative assessment have been used successfully at the elementary, junior high/

middle, high school, and college/university settings by mem­

bers of The VoiceCare Network. These and other forms of assessment have become known as authentic assessment. Prod­ ucts of thematic projects, audio and video records of per­ formance, and portfolios are examples. These forms of assessment are more compatible with the neuropsychobiological nature of human bodyminds, and are more practical in learning the abilities that are used in the real post-schooling world. Coordination of Learning Cycles by Senior Learners Research into teaching-learning processes, initiated in

the 1960s and 1970s, identified a teacher-controlled, threestep cycle that was labeled a teaching unit or a teaching cycle. The three steps were: (1) teacher presentation, (2) student response, (3) teacher feedback (Becker, et al., 1976; Brophy, 1979; Gage & Needels, 1989; Jellison & Wolfe, 1987; Yarbrough & Price, 1989). Learning cycles is a more com­ prehensive concept, and includes the learning processes that occur in both senior learners and learners.

Elementary school students in a typical U.S. classroom have learned how to perform single-digit multiplication problems and have learned their "multiplication tables". Their typical American teacher then tells her students how to solve double-digit multiplication prob­ lems (38X 53, for instance) while she demonstrates the number opera­ tions on a dry-board. She then places a series of problems on the board and asks students to come to the board and attempt to follow the same procedure to solve them. She corrects those students who make mis­ takes and compliments those who solve their problems correctly. She then assigns homework: read the math textbook's chapter on double­ digit multiplication and solve on paper the problems at the end of the chapter. The homework is checked the next day for right and wrong answers and scores or grades are given. Eventually right-answer ex­ aminations are presented, scored, and graded. There is no need for teachers to exchange ideas about how to teach this way more effectively, and there is no need for in-service teacher education in how to improve it. In a typical Japanese elementary school, when students are ready for double-digit multiplication problems, the teacher will place a prob­ lem on the board, 38 X 53 = ?, and ask them if they can figure out how to solve it. She waits in silence for a very long time while the individual students contemplate possible solutions and attempt vari­ ous strategies on their own. The teacher then asks for their ideas and coordinates discussions about various proposed strategies and ration­ ales. She only asks clarifying questions, summarizes students' points of view, asks about relationships to previously learned procedures (ad­ dition, subtraction, single-digit multiplication), and neither proposes a solution nor guides the students toward a single solution. When students propose clearly unworkable solutions, they are respected, rea­ soned through, and the students determine how the solution was un­ workable among themselves. Eventually, collaborative consensus is developed according to what "makes sense" so far. As this type of problem is revisited over a school year, refinements may be added to the earlier solution(s). Japanese teachers observe the Edwards Deming principle that complex constructive processes cannot be improved only by inspecting the products of the processes. The constructive processes themselves have to be evaluated and refined. So, Japanese educators are constantly experimenting with refinements of the learning experiences that they lead. What helps children figure out their world for themselves in the most elegant ways? Teachers observe their students very closely, have daily meetings to share observations and ideas, visit the classrooms of fellow teachers to learn from them, and, as a profession, publish thou­

sands of articles on method refinements. [These contrasting teach­ ing styles are described in Diamond & Hopson, 1998, pp. 270-272; see also Stigler & Stevenson, 1991.] In which teaching style might the students feel most

threatened with exposure as an inadequate solver of math problems? How might threatened students regard math problem solving in the future? In which teaching style might

teacher-student relatedness be more jeopardized? In which teaching style are innate capabilities for making sense and gaining intrinsic mastery of one's world and one's self most likely to flourish? In which teaching style would learners' prefrontal cortices be activated to initiate transderivational searches through a range of number-op eration and pro­ portional memories, probabilistic evaluation of alternative possibilities, creation of possible solutions, comparison and assessment of possible solutions, and probability-based solutions? Which student responses are most like the way mathematicians behave in the real world? A class of American fourth graders was taught a com­ mon math concept in the Japanese way, and another fourth grade class was taught the same concept in the U.S. way.

Both groups were then given new problems to solve and were assessed on the extent to which they understood the concept. Both groups of children were equally able to op­ erate on the numbers to solve the problems. The children who were taught in the Japanese way, however, were able to quickly detect and reject "blind alley" paths to solving the problems, but the children who were taught in the Ameri­ can way could not. The researchers' conclusion? Japanese-

style teaching involved thinking, that is, reasoned estima­ tion, probabilistic calculation, projecting, comparing, evalu­ ating evidence, and making probabilistic decisions. American-style teaching only included memorizing and guessing

with little or no thought. [This experiment was described in a lecture by James Stigler, Ph.D, Department of Psychol­ ogy, University of California, October 12, 1995; cited in Dia­ mond & Hopson, 1998, p. 271] A formerly common way to "increase reading skills" in United States elementary schools was to seat the students in rows and consecu­ tively take turns reading a paragraph or two until the story was fin­ ished. Then the teacher would ask right-answer questions about the story's content, and then give a written right-answer test about it. Next story.

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In the mid-1980s, about half of a fourth grade teacher's stu­

dents were struggling with reading comprehension and retention when taught that way. The Springfield, Illinois, teacher became aware of a different way to teach reading and started it right away Her students were formed into small-group, autonomous "literature circles". They were given a section of a story or book to read, then they collaborated to summarize the progress of the story to each other, to wonder "out loud" what the characters may be feeling or thinking, to create questions about them and the events they were experiencing, to express the gist of the story so far, and to speculate about where the story will go from there. At the next reading time, they read the next section of the story and did the same things, fitting the new information into the old and comparing their speculations to what actually happened in the story. This process was repeated until the story was finished, and then a class-wide summary and discussion was held. [Author's Note: This teacher was described in Diamond & Hopson, 1998, pp. 265, 281. The different way of teaching is called reciprocal teaching (Palinscar & Brown, 1984). It is used in a number of school districts in the United States, and dramatic in­ creases in reading comprehension, retention, and interest

have always been reported.] In addition to questions of emotional safety, and en­ gagement of innate cognitive sense-making and personal mastery, one may ask: Which method of increasing read­ ing skills is most likely to produce (1) elaborative memory encoding, (2) intrinsic reward and interest in reading (own­

ership), (3) use of immediate, recent, long-term, and work­ ing memory processes, (4) local and global mapping of neu­ ron networks, and (5) optimum building of useful knowl­

edge-ability clusters? Collaborative interaction between learners and senior learners is a prominent feature of the

Japanese-style of teaching and of reciprocal teaching. The people involved are doing what learners and senior learners do (see Tables I-9-8 and 9). From the perspective of senior learners, learning cycles in­ clude at least the following phases (see Tables I-9-7 and 8 for examples). 1. Before they initiate learning cycles, senior learners "brainstorm", anticipate, and plan learning experiences that

are intended to evoke learner attention to selected goal-sets and anticipated pinpoint goals (targets with bull's-eyes) within one or more knowledge-ability clusters, that, in turn,

accomplish the written goals of the learners and a learning center. 232

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Table I-9-8. A Learning Cycle Sequence that Matches the Way Human Bodyminds Learn I. Senior learners organize and engage learners in an exploratory­ discovery experience that evokes as many of the senses as possible (sights, sounds, physical sensations) from which one or more perceptual, value-

emotive, conceptual, and behavioral abilities can be engaged for elaboration. II. After the experience, senior learners ask questions and share feedback that focuses conscious attention on several perceptual, valueemotive, conceptual, and behavioral abilities that can be elaborated upon. From the ensuing interactions, pinpoint goals for ability elaboration emerge. The interactions and a few repeats of the experience can be described as selecting a target and focusing conscious attention on it. III. The experience is then repeated to provide opportunities for the elaboration to be actualized in the physiochemical systems of the learners. When conscious awareness is engaged in elaborating abilities, only one ability can be successfully focused on at one time. A template model of that one ability begins to be defined as the bull's-eye of a target. IV Each repetition of an experience (with refinements) can be followed by questions and observations that facilitate self-perceived feedback, consolidation of new template abilities in memory, further pinpoint goal selection, and eventual elaboration of template abilities into increasing complexity by using them in more and more varied situations (transfer of learning).

2. Before enactment of learning cycles, senior learners anticipate and plan how to enact learning cycles, such as,

sequences of events within the learning experiences (selec­ tion of targets to "go for", outside limits of the targets, where

the bull's-eyes are, and their size), how the goal-sets, pin­ point goals, and feedback questions or descriptions could be worded to the learners, what gestural and prosodic non­ verbal communications might be employed, and so on (see Chapter 8 and Hudson & Blane, 1985). 3. Senior learners initiate and coordinate the planned learning cycles (learners experience the outside limits of tar­ gets, take target practice in search of bull's-eyes, perceive internal and external feedback). Learner and senior learner self-perceived feedback are coordinated with mutual respect in the formation and implementation of goal-sets and pin­

point goals. 4. During the learning cycles, senior learners experi­ ence their own self-perceived internal and external feed­

back as they evaluate their own coordination of the cycles

and learners' verbal and nonverbal responses. 5. Also during the learning cycles, senior learners use their own self-perceived feedback to engage learners in co­ operative elaborations and refinements of the planned learn-

Table I-9-9. Sample of Exploratory-Discovery Learning Cycles for Young, Inexperienced Vocalists Written Goal-Set (achievement standard): Explore auditory and kinesthetic sensations during upper and lower vocal register coordina­ tions and register transitions, and develop appropriate language labeling and descriptive vocabulary (see Book II, Chapter 11, on vocal registers). Written Exploratory-Discovery Learning Experience: Senior

learner demonstrates a slow sigh-glide that begins in a "high-ish" upper register pitch and glides downward to a "low-ish" lower register pitch. Learners are asked to do the same task about three times and discuss their observations. Spoken Pinpoint Goal: "How close can you come to doing this with your voice?" [demonstrates an upper register to lower register sigh­ glide! "Go near the bottom end of your voice. Got it? Do it with me!'/ "Do it without me!' Senior Learner:"Did you notice anything change in your voice as you slid from higher to low?" Learner(s): "Yes!'

SL: "What was that like? Can you describe it?" L: "Well, my voice kind of made a funny sound." "Mine did, tool' "Mine didn't make a funny sound but it sure did something different about half way down!' SL: "So, some of you noticed a funny sound during the sigh-glide. Connie, could you tell us more about what youro voice did?" L: "Hmmm. Okay, well, I think my voice kind of flip-flopped to another sound!' SL: "My voice can flip-flop, too!' [teacher demonstrates] "Connie, would you be willing to do the glide again and show us how your voice flip-flops? L: [does it] SL: "Let's all do the glide again. How close can you all come to flip-flopping your voice the way Connie's and mine did?" L: [everyone does that] SL: 'Annie, you said that your voice didn't flip-flop, but it did "something different'. Is that right? L: "Yes, it got kind of bigger!' SL: "Would you show us what your voice did on the glide?" L: [does it] SL: "Did anyone hear a change in Annie's voice during her pitch glide?"

L: "Yes!' SL: Annie's voice didn't flip-flop, so how would you describe what Annie's voice sounded like when it changed?" L: "Well, it just did something else!' SL: "Would it be accurate to say that her upper voice kind of melted into her lower voice?" L: "Yeah. That's what it sounded like to me!' SL: "My upper and lower voices can melt, too!' [teacher demon­ strates] "Let's all do the glide again. How close can you all come to melting your upper and lower voices together the way Annie's and mine did?" L: [everyone gives that a go several times, an some still flip-flop! SL: "Wonder what will happen if you (gestures) float your upper voices lower, lower, lower than you usually do. Will you find a place where it melts on its own? Give it a go. L: [they do it, and more learners notice the melting!

SL: Annie, do the glide again and notice if you feel your voice change in your throat? L: [she does the glide! "Yes! Something happens in my throat!' SL: "Float your upper voices lower and lower and see if you find a place where you feel it melt on its own into your lower voice ? Give it a go­

ing cycles. They may "intuitively" respond to evolving, unpredictably branching learner interests and improvise un­ planned, alternative learning cycles that focus on goals that may or may not be related to a preplanned goal-set, but may be related to such general learning center goals as sharp­ ening of sensory discrimination, empathic emotion regula­ tion, general concept formation, and refinement of motor skills. 6. When time allows, senior learners review, analyze, and reflect on the memoried feedback from learning experi­

ences in order to more richly evaluate senior learner-learner

interactions and the direction(s) that learning is taking. 7. Senior learners then use the reflected-upon feed­ back to conceive, anticipate, and plan upcoming learning

experiences that grow out of the context of previous learn­ ing experiences. They also may adjust or reconceive the just-completed learning experiences, and how they enacted them, to benefit future enactment versions.

From the perspective of learners, learning cycles include at least the following features (see Table I-9-7 for examples). 1. Learners respond to the verbal and nonverbal com­ munications of senior learners as exploratory-discovery and expressive learning experiences are initiated and coordi­ nated (attention, cognitive-emotional reactions, and behav­ ior).

2. Learners conceive possible targets and their bull'seyes, take target practice, and evolve their knowledge-abil­ ity clusters.

3. During the learning experience(s), learners self-perceive their own external and internal feedback and form or

elaborate their internal perceptual, value-emotive, concep­ tual, and behavioral abilities. When something "doesn't make sense" or a "bull's-eye is missed", and learners experience a slight "uneasy" feeling state, they may seek clarification by asking a question or they may undertake or request a reex­

periencing of the immediate learning experience. 4. During or after learning cycles, learners also re­ spond to senior learner questions or feedback that are in­ tended to facilitate learner review and analysis of evolving knowledge-ability clusters, so that upcoming target practice is more likely to produce increased mastery of goal-set abili­

ties.

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5. Learners then participate in cooperative elabora­

1. current (a) cultural, (b) family, and (c) school con­

tions and refinements of the planned learning cycles or in improvised, unplanned, alternative learning cycles. 6. After a period or day's learning cycles are com­ pleted, learners engage immediate or recent memories of the learning experiences for self-review, self-analysis, reflection,

texts that influence the cognitive-emotional-behavioral de­ velopment of younger people who eventually become adults; 2. a brief description of leadership actions, undertaken

and self-initiated target practice on the evolving knowledge­ ability clusters.

ciplinary" modes of behavioral control; and 3. a brief description of leadership actions, undertaken

“Discipline” and Compliant Behavior Versus Collaborative Leadership and Empathic Self-Reliance

by many senior learners, that enable learners to evolve in­ ternal, respectful, attentive, self-reliant, emotionally con­ nected, empathic, collaborative, and intrinsically rewarding modes of human living.

Discipline is a giant dilemma for both parents and teach­ ers. In schools, classroom management is a more euphemistic term. How do parents "set limits" on the behavior of their children and "deal with behavior problems"? How do teach­ ers "maintain order in the classroom" and "keep students on-task"? This part of this chapter cannot possibly address the enormous complexities of this topic. Every human being who raises a child-and every child-has a unique genetic,

epigenetic, and experiential history. The same goes for ev­ ery person who is called teacher and every one of the 15 to

35 or more persons who are called student in a "classroom" setting. How human beings interact with each other in par­ ent-caregiver-and-child, teacher-and-student, and peer-to-

peer situations is always unique. The socioeconomic cir­ cumstances in which people grow up also are unique. As a

result, people bring to educational settings different pat­ terns of social-emotional self-regulation and different ra­ tios of protective versus constructive behavior patterns. The following paragraphs, tables, and real-world ex­ periences will present a perspective that is substantiated by research findings from the human being sciences (neuropsychobiology). To a lesser degree, the perspective is formed by the experiences of colleagues who are parents, senior learners, and learners, and on my own personal ex­ periences as a learner and senior learner, but there is just no way to address even a small percent of the unique circum­ stances that human beings can and do encounter. This per­

spective presents:

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by many teachers, that impose external, coercive, accusa­ tory, punitive, emotionally distancing or disconnecting, "dis­

Brief Context: Social-Cultural Influences on Learning How is it that human beings form interdependent

social groups? How is it that some groups of people be­ come antagonistic toward other groups of people? The neuropsychobiological nature of human beings and a so­ cial-historical perspective may be helpful when contem­ plating these questions. Human beings have a high-speed brain system that produces immediate feeling-state reactions to novel or unfa­ miliar experiences of people, places, things, events (see Chap­ ter 7). The amygdalae, the hypothalamus-pituitary com­ plex, and the autonomic nervous system trigger immediate

increases in heartrate and blood pressure, and tensional changes in the visceral organs of the torso. At the least, these changes produce an internal neuropsychobiological state that may be described as potentially threatening to well being so that heightened arousal and attention occur (vigi­ lance and wariness). In other words, a tense or portentous

feeling-state or impression is experienced (see Chapter 8). The

greater the perceived differences between human beings (unfamiliarities), the more intense their initial appraisal. Unpleasant feeling states are then likely to be more intense and unfavorable impressions are more likely to be encoded in memory. If the differences are considerable, then interpre­ tations of potential threat to well being may occur. Human interpreter mechanisms then are likely to produce nonver­ bal and verbal concepts that justify protective behaviors toward people who are different, such as depersonalized, objectifying nominalizations (see Chapter 7).

Human beings also are born with empathic capabili­ ties, of course. People who share familiar physical charac­ teristics, have undergone familiar and unfamiliar experi­ ences together, have fulfilled each other's needs, and have evolved similar self-identities, tend to form feeling-state somatic markers that are referred to as emotional affiliation. People who are emotionally connected, therefore, tend to inter­ act with each other frequently, constructively, and interdependently to form self-verifying opportunity structures or life-style enclaves (Bellah, et al., 1985; Swann, 1999, pp. 83-87). These

enclaves of human beings may affiliate because of similari­ ties in their threat-protect or benefit-construct histories. If innate empathic capabilities-abilities are not desensitized by threat-laden experiences, then differences and conflicts be­ tween human beings can be mediated and resolved before threat-interpretation intensities escalate to the point of emo­ tional disconnection. So, in the presence of people who have unfamiliar physical characteristics and modes of dress, who have not undergone familiar and unfamiliar experiences with us, have not fulfilled mutual needs, and have evolved dissimilar self­ identities, the emotional motor system is more likely to trigger nonverbal distancing signals or withdrawal or immobiliza­ tion. If an interpretation of threat is or becomes intense enough, human beings may communicate nonverbal warn­

ing signals. Some encounters may escalate into verbal at­ tacks, explicit threats, or physical attacks against others. The feeling-states then become instantiated in neural networks as somatic markers for unpleasant explicit and/or implicit memories and learned avoidant or hostile reactions. Neuropsychobiological survival capabilities, therefore, are the major source of cultural or group distinctions, differ­ ences, biases, prejudices, polarizations, conflicts, "siege men­ talities", revenge attacks, and so forth. As a result of these inherent social-emotional capa­ bilities, large human populations that share the same land mass have gravitated into relatively diverse subpopulations. Each subpopulation evolves constructive and interdepen­

dent relationships and behavioral roles. These delineated, interdependent subpopulations of human beings are re­ ferred to as cultures or societies of people. Over time, the people who make up larger cultures or societies further delineate their unique preferences and attachments and form

into subcultures or subsocieties. Subcultures form into increas­ ingly smaller associational groups and subgroups, based on family ties and mutual interests (Billig & Tajfel, 1973). In addition, members of different cultures and subcultures that live in a single land mass tend to intermix, to some extent. Also, members of cultures from other land masses may undertake exploratory migration, or coercive domination (war), or members of one culture may force members of another culture into forced servitude (slavery). So, within a single land mass, there may be several cultures, each with multiple subcultures, groups, and subgroups. For example, the land masses that are now known as Canada, Mexico, and the United States of America were origi­ nally populated by human beings who are now referred to as the native peoples. The native peoples had become differ­ entiated into multiple native cultures and subcultures that are sometimes referred to as tribes. Subcultures of Caucasian peoples from Europe migrated to these land masses and established colonies. Eventually, the Europeans coerced the native peoples into relinquishing the land mass on which they lived and, eventually, the three bordered nation-states were formed. Peoples from subcultures within Africa were forcibly captured, transported mostly to the United States, and were sold as free-labor slaves, especially to people who populated the southern area of that nation and the Carib­ bean area. In the present day, people from those three countries are thought of as being from the Canadian, Mexican, and American cultures. Within the American culture, there are many subcultures including the native peoples, French Ca­ nadians, English Canadians, African Americans, AngloSaxon-Irish-Scot-Welsh Americans, Chinese Americans, Hmong Americans, Hungarian Americans, Italian Ameri­

cans, Japanese Americans, Lebanese Americans, Mexican Americans, Polish Americans, Russian Americans, Somali Americans, Ukranian Americans, and so forth. In its broadest denotative meaning, culture is a nominalization that refers to all interactions, multi-influ­ ences, and created productions that are enacted by and be­ tween people who are members of an identifiable culture or society. Each culture, subculture, group, and subgroup tends to evolve similar interactional behaviors, modes of communication, customs, practices, mores, and so forth. For

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example, male and female human beings may be said to form two delineated subcultures within every culture (Brody, 1996; Garbarino, 1999; Jordan, 1995; Kindlon & Thomp­ son, 1999; Pipher, 1994). In this case, both genetic-epige­ netic influences and cultural learnings interact to create these delineations (Kimura, 1999). Differential effects of the sex­ distinction hormones on the neural organization of prena­ tal and early childhood males and females result in differ­ ences in their value-emotive and conceptual categorization patterns. As a result, males and females often behave dif­ ferently and solve problems differently. When children go

lation, and human-to-human relationships are placed un­ der considerably greater stress. Tannen (1998) has proposed that an "adversarial argument culture" has amplified hu­ man social polarization, and it pervades political discourse, print and broadcast news media, entertainment media, and

to schools, the total school population is formed into groups such as grade-classes, and subgroups that are sometimes delineated by ethnic origin, by shared characteristics and preferences, or by perceived status. These groups and sub­ groups are sometimes referred to as the in-groups, the out­ groups, nerds, winners-losers, cliques, teams, clubs, and so on. The innate exploratory-discovery and self-expressive capabilities of human beings (see Chapter 8) inevitably re­ sult in evolutions of products and social interactions. Dur­ ing only the last seven decades, production and mass avail­

pregnancy rates, antisocial behavior, suicides, murders; re­

ability of technological inventions have enabled (1) high­

speed travel over wider geographic areas that now include the entire world, and the culture-to-culture interactions that result, (2) instant communication with people who live al­ most anywhere on Earth, (3) instant observation of people and things that exist, and events that occur, in distant places on Earth and beyond it, and (4) information storage, shar­ ing, and manipulation that is revolutionarily vast. Motor­ ized vehicles, passenger jet airplanes, cable and satellite tele­ phones, radio, commercial and cable television, super-com­ puters, personal computers, and the internet are some of the technologies that have dramatically changed how hu­ man beings from many cultures and subcultures live and interact with each other. These technologies, and many others, have produced

vast increases in the experiential opportunities, options, and

social expectations that are available to human beings. The distressful and eustressful demands on the neuropsychobiological systems of human beings, therefore, have increased manyfold. (Cantor, 1996; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Centers for Disease Control and Preven­ tion, 1998; Dietz, 1993; DuRant, etal., 1994; Grossman, 1995; Hawkins, et al., 1999). Self-identity, personal emotion regu­ 236

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so on (also see Fallows, 1996; Jamieson, 1992; Klein, et al.,

1993; Rudman, 1996; Sherry, 1995; Tomasello, et al., 1993;

Williams, 1986). The social statistics of the past several decades are interesting. There have been well known increases in: fam­

ily disconnections; reported "domestic violence"; adolescent ported rapes, mass killings, and so on.

Production and

mass availability of destructive technologies such as bodymind-maiming chemical compounds and more effi­ cient ways of killing more human beings in belligerent con­ flicts also have occurred. Wide-field-rapid-fire automatic weapons, and large-explosive materials are some of the tech­ nologies that are now available, to say nothing about bio­ logical, atomic, and hydrogen weapons of mass destruc­ tion.

Wars. Assassinations of public figures. Race riots, burning, and looting. Terrorist mass murders. Culture wars. Get-even revenge shootings. Spousal and family shootings. Random mass shootings. Drive-by shootings. Rising teen suicide rate. Ruby Ridge, Idaho. Waco, Texas. Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Dunblane, Scotland. Paducah, Kentucky. Pearl, Mississippi. Jonesboro, Arkansas. Springfield, Or­ egon. Littleton, Colorado. Conyers, Georgia. Fort Worth, Texas. Et cetera. Self-determination during childhood and adoles­ cence. Some cultural patterns of behavior and social inter­ action are presented to each generation with explicit guid­ ance by other persons such as parents, other primary

caregivers, peers, and teachers. Most cultural behavior pat­

terns are implicitly modeled to each generation by those same people in their everyday behavior. Those patterns are im­ plicitly learned, that is, without explicit guidance by an­ other person and without conscious deliberation. For ex­ ample, no one has to deliberately say to children, "Those

people are of a lower class than we are, are not very smart, and are potentially threatening to our well being" When

certain categories of people are nearly always observed in low-paid servant-like roles and other family members be­

have toward them with physical and emotional distancing, and sometimes speak disparagingly of them, but only in front of close family members, then observing children will learn a version of those same cultural patterns.

Children are born into an immediate social milieu. Nuclear and extended families are one such milieu. Begin­ ning with their innate immitative, exploratory-discovery, and expressive abilities, children engage in massive num­ bers of interactions over time with immediate caregivers, siblings, and peers. Layers upon many layers of nonverbal and verbal learnings are thus elaborated implicitly and ex­ plicitly and are neurochemically instantiated within each bodymind. As these experiences accumulate, each bodymind evolves a unique, differentiated self-identity. Children also are embedded within a larger social culture that shares substantially similar mores and verbalnonverbal communicative symbol systems. Cultural learn­ ing is produced by such means as peer-to-peer experiences, observed modes of dress and appearance, religious orien­ tations, school experiences, economic process experiences, interaction in organized associations, entertainment events, and interactions with cultural organizations such as gov­ ernments, businesses, and the print and electronic commu­ nications media such as newspapers, books, musics, radio, television, the internet and so forth. The news and entertainment media have become a pervasive presence in "developed" cultures. In democratic societies, those media are profit-making corporate conglomerates. Commercial U.S. television, for example, is able to present "free" programs to millions of viewers because they charge very high fees for showing product advertisements. Those

fees raise the price that people pay for the advertised prod­ ucts, and businesses can deduct all advertising fees from their federal taxes. If people were not influenced by adver­ tising to go out and buy the products, then businesses would not advertise. Commercial advertisements create a pleas­ ant-feeling state about products by presenting deliberately planned visual-auditory images which surround the product(s) and make them optimally appealing. Explicit and implicit memories are then created, that frequently re­ sult in buying behavior. According to David Walsh, Ph.D. (Director, National Institute on Media and the Family, Minneapolis, Minne­

sota), for-profit television corporations compete with each

other to "deliver as many eyeballs as possible to TV sets" so that they can charge advertisers higher fees and thus in­ crease company revenues and stockholder profits. In order to attract and hold viewers, TV programs must elicit rela­ tively intense feeling-state arousal and the sensory atten­ tion that follows. Television businessmen have known for

some time that (1) good-guy-bad-guy fighting and killing, (2) "sex", (3) us-against-them competition, (4) humor, or (5) any combination of the above, are the best ways to get and keep eyeballs. When viewers become habituated to the type of humor and the degree of competition, violence, and "sex"

then the type of humor must be changed and the intensity of the competition, violence, and "sex" must be increased in order to keep the eyeballs coming back for more. For ex­ ample, the producers of the Jerry Springer "talk show" fre­ quently select guests who are in personal conflict with each

other and "set them up" to express anger and disrespect. Often, they physically attack each other. Apparently, a suf­ ficient number of eyeballs are delivered to satisfy the show's

advertisers. In the United States, television news programs chronicle a high percentage of "hard news" social malaise events such as wars, murders, rapes, assaults, natural disasters, fires, diseases, vehicle accidents, and human conflict and contro­ versy. A television media "sweeps week" occurs every April and November. During those weeks, the extent to which the public watches national and local television programs are rated. The pricing of TV ads are set according to those ratings, so eyeball attraction is of utmost importance. Tele­ vision news producers tend to highlight spectacle stories about crime, "sex" disease, and corruption during sweeps weeks. "Soft news" events have to be extraordinarily en­ gaging to be on the air, such as rare surgeries and star enter­ tainer appearances. The daily struggles of ordinary human

beings who are overcoming life's obstacles are rare and are regarded as "fluff pieces". Consumer fraud stories about heavy advertisers are never investigated. Those stories may get news reporters fired. Children's television programming often follows similar pat­ terns of good-guy-bad-guy, competitive fighting, settle-differences-byviolent-means, and humor patterns. Remember the "made for TV experiment" by the National Institute on Media and the

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Family that was briefly described in Chapter 8? A group of preschool children watched an episode of the children's TV program "Barney", in which empathic, cooperative behav­ ior was portrayed and expressed through action, talking, and singing. Free play time then occurred and the children were videotaped playing quietly, empathically, and coop­ eratively. One day later, the same children watched "Power Rangers", a children's TV program in which the "hero" char­ acters use a version of martial arts to violently subdue ob­ viously "bad people". During the subsequent free play, both boy and girl children confronted each other with loud voices, and they kicked at, pushed, and hit at each other in imita­ tion of the behaviors that they had just observed (also see Nelson, et al., 1969). Increasingly, television is used to occupy children while adults attend to other matters. A study of 527 randomly

identity as very distinct from the perceived identity of par­ ents, and of society's "establishment" or "the system" (Bleich, et al., 1991; Davis, 1981; Frith, 1981). Frith (1981) suggested

that many young people form social groups around pre­ ferred popular music styles and performing groups. He proposed that "...all adolescents use music as a badge..." that communicates to others their particular "values, attitudes, and opinions". In 1985, Davis calculated that adolescents averaged 10,500 hours of elected listening to their preferred style(s) of music and watching music videos. Heavy metal, punk, al­ ternative, rap, hip hop, and other styles, emerged from a conflicted, in-your-face, defiance of external controllers, a me-against-you and us-against-them, and a violenceagainst-women orientation to life (Hansen & Hansen, 1991; St. Lawrence & Joyner, 1991). In 1994, U.S. sales of popular

selected families across the United States (Gentile & Walsh, 1999), with children ages 2 through 17 years, indicates that:

music recordings and music videos totaled over $12-billion

1. on average, children watch TV for 25 hours each

identity and group-identity of adolescents are expressed, in part, through their preferred music (North & Hargreaves,

week, play computer or video games for 7 hours, and ac­ cess the internet from home for 4 hours; 2. 40% of families watch TV programs during meals either "always" or "often", and those children tend to per­ form more poorly in school; 3. 20% of 2-to-7 year-olds, 39% of 8-to-12 year-olds,

and 56% of 13-to-17 year-olds have television sets in their bedrooms; those that do, watch 5.5 hours more TV than those who do not have sets in their bedrooms, and they, on average, perform even more poorly in school; 4. the less TV watching occurs (especially during meals or in their bedrooms), and the more children see their par­

ents reading, read more frequently themselves, and engage more often in family activities, the more likely they are to perform well in school. [The American Academy of Pediat­ rics recommends that children watch "no more than 1 to 2 hours per day" of television (Charren, et al., 1994; Hawkins, et al., 1999)].

For decades now, popular music has been increas­ ingly commercialized and marketed worldwide (Frith, 1987). In a 1972 survey, Lyle and Hoffman found that over 5O% of teenaged subjects listened to popular music 3 to 4 hours per day. Rock 'n' roll was rooted in a definition of self­

(Geter & Streisand, 1995). In other words, the current self­

1999; Setterlund, et al., 1993). Waite and colleagues (1992)

have used withdrawal of music video viewing as part of psychotherapy and have noticed cognitive-emotional-be­ havioral changes away from aggressive, self-destructive behavior. The same eyeball-delivery ethic that the television in­ dustry uses, is used by the movie-making industry. Escala­

tions of realistic violence, brutality, "sex", horror, and fatal­ ism (Titanic©) have occurred over the past two decades. The same explicit and implicit learnings that occur when viewing television advertisements, also occur when the por­ trayal of violence and inappropriate sexual interactions are shown in an emotionally neutral or positive context. In the movie Basketball Diaries©, a student wearing a long black coat enters a classroom and murders several of his class­ mates with a shotgun. The scene is very similar to some of the recent school killings by teens in the U.S. Even socalled "professional" wrestling has attracted a larger and larger following by escalating simulated and real violent behavior and in-your-face, confrontational language.

Video games are pervasively used entertainment toys among five to eighteen year-old youngsters (Funk, 1983), and their technological sophistication is astounding. The creators of the games are in business to sell products, of

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course. The same attract-and-keep methods that the televi­ sion, music, and film media use, are used by some makers of video games (not all). Holding a simulated handgun and slaughtering "invading" human beings in combat-like set­ tings is a common theme. Most early and middle adoles­ cent children know about video games called Doom©, Duke Nukem©, and others. They are very realistic and especially

popular among males. One of the more recent versions of Duke Nukem includes the realistic murder of a female strip­

dancer (violence and sex combined). Current videos in­ clude Kingpin: Life of Crime© (a "multiplayer deathmatch") and Rogue Spear© (multiplayer commandos kill terrorists in an opera house!). Today s adults were not raised with video games and, in the United States, parents are often unaware of their content. They were proposed as an influence in recent killings of school students by students. Some soci­ etal commentators have proposed that video games influ­ enced the recent killing of school students by students. During World War II, only about 15% to 2O% of U.S. combat riflemen fired their weapons at enemy soldiers during battle (Marshall, 1978). So, after World War II, the U.S. armed services gradually developed effective methods of desensi­ tizing combat soldiers to the act of killing (Grossman, 1995, pp. 249-261; see Chapter 7 for context on sensitization and desensitization). Operant conditioning methods came to be

used in 100% controlled environments. Soldiers were placed in warlike settings and human-image, pop-up targets ap­ peared in order to condition quick-reaction shooting. Movies that depicted horror killings by enemy soldiers were

shown to assassins and snipers in training (Watson, 1978), and video simulation games were used with combat sol­ diers. The strategy worked. Desensitization occurred. By the Vietnam war, 9O% to 95% of combat riflemen fired their weapons at enemy soldiers during battle (Marshall, 1978).

Does a culture's media cause increases in violence and inappropriate sexual interactions among school-age chil­ dren? If children see/hear a TV program, video game, or CD that demonstrates killing, will they then go out and kill

people? Conclusive scientific validity for a direct causal effect does not exist with absolute certainty, and likely will never exist. Direct cause-effect studies, however, do not assess the implicit learning that influences behavior over time. The

studies that do assess implicit learning over time have indi­ cated that the nature of entertainment media clearly play a role in the formation of "mind-sets" and behavioral ten­ dencies of people (Singer & Singer, 1981; Williams, 1986; Gortmaker, et al., 1990; Charren, et al., 1994; Minnow & LeMay, 1995; Strasburger, 1995; Walsh, 1995; Walsh, in prepa­ ration). On average, by the time American children graduate from high school, they will have seen over 200,000 violent acts and 40,000 dramatized murders on television alone (Huston, et al., 1992). Does desensitization occur? A ran­

domized analysis of almost 1,000 scientific studies of the effects of media violence (there have been over 3,500 since 1950), a correlation was found between higher exposure to media violence and increases of aggressive behavior in chil­ dren and adolescents in all of the studies except 18 (cited by Grossman & DeGaetano, 1999, p. 24, and Committee on Public Education, American Academy of Pediatrics, 1999). Twelve of the 18 studies were funded by the television in­ dustry. The 14-year old boy who killed three fellow students

and wounded others in his Paducah, Kentucky, school, had

never fired a real handgun before. He fired eight shots at eight children and hit every one of them; five in the head and three in the upper torso. Lieutenant Colonel (retired), and psychologist, Dave Grossman (1999, p. 4) concludes that the shot pattern displays expert marksmanship. Michael Carneal repeatedly played point-and-shoot video games with a simulated handgun, killing images of "enemy" hu­

man beings. The simulation videos that were prepared for the military were converted into commercial video games and marketed to children and adolescents for increased prof­ its. So, what role does violence, us-against-them, and "sex" in the media play in the development of human selves? David Walsh, Ph.D., President of the National Institute on Media and the Family, proposes that the trends in the news and entertainment media implicitly invest within young people a "culture of disrespect" for other human beings,

and do so at a time when the contextual interpretation abili­ ties of youngsters may not be fully elaborated (David Walsh, opinion letter to print media, May 24, 1999). Desensitiza­ tion to one's own self-feelings and to empathic feelings for

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other human beings are likely to occur (particularly among males), along with sensitization to territoriality, domina­ tion, me-against-her/him/them, us-against-them, disrespect for other people, settling differences by violent means, and revenge for real or perceived wrongs.

Dr. Brandon Centerwall's words scream at us all. His 1992 report of international studies on the effects of media violence on people's violent behavior concluded that if "...television technology had never been developed, there would today be 10,000 fewer murders each year in the United States, 70,000 fewer rapes, and 700,000 fewer assaults." Military killing is always restricted by training and follows specific authority as to when and where it occurs. The only restrictions on aggressive or violent behavior in a

general society are those that are formed by an inherited temperament and appropriate cultural learning (families, educators, news and entertainment media, government per­ sonnel, and so on). "Technologies" for optimally constructive human-to-human interaction in child-rearing, schooling,

business and work, governing processes, and so forth, have been formulated, and they do take into account the stresses produced by cultural evolution. But they have not been "packaged" in universally recognized terms, mass availability has been considerably inconsistent, and they often are in­ troduced far too late in the lives of human beings. How and when can parents-to-be learn to raise their children in

a way that is optimally constructive for the children, even though it may be different from the way they themselves were raised by their parents (see DeGaetano & Bander, 1996)? Can child daycare become part of community learning cen­ ters and workplaces with trained infant and early child­

hood educators? Can all teachers, in their pre-service and in-service education, learn optimally constructive, humanto-human forms of verbal and nonverbal communication and human-compatible learning methods? Brief Context: Family-Caregiver Influences on Learning The father of a newborn infant must work long hours to pro­ vide for his family while his wife is on unpaid maternity leave. Dur­ ing the first three post-birth months, the mother does not know how to recognize the physiochemical imbalance that has occurred in her brain, producing postpartum depression and emotional disconnection from her child. She rarely interacts and plays with her baby and is dis­

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tressed by her emotional flatness. After her three-month maternity leave, she returns to employment, and her child is placed in daycare. As a result of these circumstances, the infant's parents provide com­ paratively few opportunities for sensory experiences and affectionate interaction, and the daycare provider is a babysitter for several infants rather than a trained early childhood educator. The baby's neuropsychobiological needfor secure attachment and empathic caregiver relatedness, therefore, are minimally met. During the child's early years, there continue to be compara­ tively minimal opportunities to form a secure emotional attachment with parents. There are frequent confrontations at meals and bedtime that result in accusatory communications and punitive actions by the parents and daycare providers. There are comparatively few interactive experiences that enable the child to learn how to focus and sustain attention, form intentions, interact with and "read" the nonverbal and verbal communications of others, express images and ideas symboli­ cally, or self-regulate emotional experiences. The child's neuropsychobiological need for relatedness, competence, and autonomy are subverted. In kindergarten and first grade, emotional explosions and be­ havioral conflicts are frequent. Accusatory and punitive interactions with teachers and peers are frequent. The pattern is likely to continue, until.... The innate, neuropsychobiological constitution of chil­ dren, who have normal anatomy and physiology, auto­ matically impels them to (1) make sense of their experi­ enced "world" (people, places, things, events); (2) protect themselves in a relative state of well being; and (3) gain mastery of the experienced world and of themselves in it (Hart, 1983, 1998). Within their cyclically progressive "on­ line" capabilities, therefore, children must explore the people, places, things, and events of their world, imitate what other people do, and interact with caregivers by way of nonver­ bal vocal and gestural communications. As they do so, an increasingly documented array of dynamic physio chemical states occur in their bodies and they have opportunities to make more sense and gain more mastery of their world and of themselves. Five of those physio chemical states may be referred to as: • heightened "energy" level (arousal, alertness); • focused sensory attention and perception (concen­ tration);

• value-emotive feeling states that may range from (1)

minimally unpleasant to rage and (2) mildly pleasant to ecstatic; • interrelational concept formation, memory, learning, and behavior patterns; • modification of past arousal and attention, percep­ tions, feeling states, conceptions, memories, learnings, and behaviors as ongoing experiences and reexperiences occur.

from experiences in which emotional responsivity is safe

and brings rewarding relatedness, especially with people who are important to them. Children whose innate tem­

perament leans them toward easy emotional expression or emotional displays or emotional venting may benefit from experiences in which emotional inhibition brings reward­ ing relatedness, especially with people who are important to them.

The innate feeling-emotional-affective responsivity of children is referred to as their temperament Experience­ expectant capabilities for such responsivity evolve over the

People's social-emotional experiences can tilt their learned emotion regulation "balancing act" toward either self-protection or constructive self-realization. For example,

human life-span as genetically triggered tiers and levels of brain growth occur (see Chapter 8). As children's

the emotion regulation patterns that parents-caregivers dis­ play become models for implicit learning by children (Denham, 1989; Denham & Grout, 1993). By observing parental-caregiver actions and words, children can learn to

neurobehavioral capabilities progressively come on-line,

they become increasingly capable of learning emotional self-regulation abilities (Bridges & Grolnick, 1994; Denham, 1998; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992; Salovey & Schluyter, 1997; Stroufe, 1996; Thompson, 1994; Tucker, et al., 1995). Tem­ perament capabilities and learned emotion regulation abili­ ties intersect when social interactions occur. The outcomes of accumulated social-emotional experiences (relatedness) are the foundation of a person's self-identity, verbal and nonverbal communication abilities, and the reactions that other people have to that person. Unique life learnings are the major determinants of

unique abilities (Kandel, 1991; Greenspan, 1997), and all of those differences are reflected in the current (but alterable) neuropsychobiological constitution of children. In other

words, the attentional focus-and-sustain and the higher order "interpreter mechanism" abilities of each human being (see Chapter 7) are considerably different from all other human beings (less so in identical twins). Some children will learn a higher proportion of protective abilities compared to con­ structive abilities, and some will learn more constructive than protective abilities (see Chapter 2). Denham (1998, pp. 150-169) suggests that construc­ tive emotion regulation is "...a pragmatically useful culmi­ nation of emotional expressiveness, (emotional) understand­ ing, and (emotional) socialization from all the important people.." in the lives of children (p. 169). Emotional regula­ tion involves balancing both activation of feelings-emotions and inhibition of feelings-emotions. Children whose

innate temperament leans them toward emotional inhibi­ tion (shyness, low emotional expressiveness) may benefit

suppress emotional processing and hide emotional expres­ sion, or they can learn to lash out at other people when they feel threatened (Karr-Morse & Wiley, 1997). Alterna­

tively, children can learn how to self-soothe in the absence of parents-caregivers, seek social support, and solve social problems respectfully and empathically on their own. When threatened or attacked, they may learn how to defend them­ selves in ways that increase human-to-human antagonism or in ways that optimize conflict resolution and human connectedness (Eisenberg, et al., 1997).

According to Denham (1998, pp. 150-169), there are three components of emotion regulation that often operate outside conscious awareness: (1) emotional expression and monitoring, (2) cognitive-perceptual appraisal (understand­ ing), and (3) behavioral coping (socialization). For example, children can learn to attend to a different toy if an infant

sibling takes hold of the one that they were playing with. Singing a familiar calming song after an emotional upset, or

a lullaby at bedtime, can lower emotional arousal. Pretend play is a common setting for rehearsal of emotion regula­ tion behaviors and can be a means by which children mod­ erate emotional distress (Barnett, 1984). In a distressful so­ cial situation, people can learn to pause, take a rich breath, and reflect on the situation before replying to a "you-message" accusation of inadequacy. When acting in a school play or speaking before a speech class, adolescents can learn to speak expressively and "rein in" their habitually exagger­ ated facial and arm-hand gestural expressions, body sway­ ing, and random pacing. human-compatible

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The most helpful time to learn constructive emotion

regulation abilities is during infancy and early childhood through interactions with parents. [Where do parents learn elegant parenting and communication skills?] Greenspan (1997) proposed three stages and six levels of self-develop­ ment that lay a strong foundation for developing lifelong cognitive-emotional-behavioral abilities (described in Chap­

ter 8; listed in Table I-8-3). Briefly they include the ability to: 1. attend (process sights, sounds, sensations); 2. engage emotionally with others (pleasure-displeasure, attachment, relatedness, empathy, assertiveness, anger, dis­ appointment, and so forth); 3. be intentional (indicate feeling-based needs and wants

purposefully); 4. form complex interactive intentional patterns (emotional regulation, connect one's own emotional signals with those of others regarding security-insecurity, acceptance-rejection, approval-disapproval, protective-constructive behaviors,

and so forth); 5. create images, symbols, and ideas (invest them with feel­ ing meanings; a primary foundation of reasoning and emo­ tional coping); 6. connect images and symbols (familiarity with one's own preferential feeling patterns, "read" the patterns of others,

4. primary caregivers are externally controlling in most caregiver-child interactions (accusative, punitive, coercive, dependency-producing) .

The most pervasively influential educators in the whole world are called parents, or guardians, or primary care-givers. Secure emotional attachment with parents-caregivers and optimal parent-caregiver support for learning emotional regulation abilities are necessary if children are to optimally develop them (see Chapter 8; also Greenspan, 1997; Kopp, 1989; Thompson 1994). Childhood and adolescent family connectedness has been identified as a significant factor in protecting children from future health risk behaviors such

as emotional distress, addictive substance use, unwanted

early pregnancy, suicide, and violence (Resnick, et al., 1997; Hawkins, et al., 1999). Parental leadership is crucial in providing an appro­ priate context for experiencing news and entertainment media (see previous section). What is experienced and how

much it is experienced are vitally important to the optimal development of perceptual, value-emotive, conceptual, and behavioral dispositions. Watching programs together and discussing them afterward can help children place disre­ spectful, sexual, and violent content into a perspective of empathic human understanding. Parents-caregivers and children can become partners in the development of emotional regulation (Denham, 1998,

reality testing, "emotional intelligence"; autonomy, infrastruc­ ture of psychological processes, and so forth), [adapted from Greenspan, 1997, pp. 108-109]

pp. 158-161). During the second and third years postbirth, while parents lead the development of emotion regulation,

Incomplete realization of Greenspan's six stages re­

toddlers can begin autonomous regulation such as (1) refo­ cusing attention away from or to another person, thing, or

sults in some degree of difficulty in cognitive-emotionalbehavioral processing and in empathic human interaction. For example, optimal degrees of secure attachment may not occur in caregiver settings when: 1. biological mother and/or father are not present at

all to raise their children due to death, placement for adop­ tion, or desertion; 2. primary caregivers are insufficiently available for caregiver-child interaction due to illness, economic neces­

sity, or job demands;

3. primary caregivers are in conflict, separated, or di­

vorced, and have not communicated about these matters appropriately and lovingly with their children;

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event, (2) self-soothing or self-stimulating, (3) approach or

retreat from a situation, and (4) use cognitive-symbolic means to alter emotional states, such as singing and pre­ tend play (Denham, 1998, p. 158; Kopp, 1989). During years three and four, perceptual, value-emo­ tive, conceptual, and behavioral categorizations related to emotion regulation enable children to evaluate the conse­ quences of their social-emotional regulation behaviors and make adjustments accordingly. Their adaptation to an ex­

panding range of social situations can include (1) altering the intensity of their emotional arousal (Folkman, 1991); (2) expressing out or venting their feelings; (3) avoidance of

distressing people, things, or situations; (4) expressing like/

dislike and approval/disapproval (Fabes and Eisenberg, 1992); (5) directing attention to pleasant aspects of a place

or an event rather than fixating on distressing aspects (Bridges & Grolnick, 1994); and (6) finding a new goal (Denham, 1998, p. 160). If parents-caregivers externally impose emo­ tion regulation, the consequences for children's social fu­ ture is very likely to be bleak, especially when they attend school (Greenspan, 1997).

Even though they may seem to not be listening, when adults talk about their own feelings in the presence of chil­ dren, the children are likely to be learning about how adults

think about and regulate feelings and how to apply that

learning to themselves (Denham, 1998, p. 166). Parents­ caregivers also use explicit verbal "coaching" to influence their children toward their own learned cultural and family norms. Some parents may say, "Stop that crying!" or "People who are large are human beings, too, just like you. Making

fun of them hurts their feelings, just like it would hurt you if someone made fun of you because of the way you look"

Taking time to use emotion language and explain the subtle­ ties of social-emotional interactions is a major way to help children develop their own emotion regulation and social

abilities (Denham, 1998, pp. 165-168; Kopp, 1989; Thomp­ son, 1994). Children who have experienced consistent emo­ tional coaching during their preschool years cope more pro­

ductively with their emotions and their social interactions in preschool (Denham, et al., 1992). When children express their distressed emotional states, parents who are consistently responsive, warm, accepting of emotional reactions; who help their children to cope ef­ fectively with their emotions (by asking questions that in­ vite their children to talk about their feelings, for instance), consistently raise children who are: (1) expressive and less

likely to become overaroused, (2) emotionally well regu­ lated, and (3) empathic, that is, responsive to the feelings of other people (Denham, 1998, p. 167; Eisenberg, et al., 1988;

Fabes, et al., 1990; Grolnick, et al., 1997). Parents who exer­ cise developmental leadership: (1) help their children be­

come aware of, and pay conscious attention to, their emo­ tional states, (2) provide reasonably predictable structure in daily activities, and (3) enable and allow their children to make emotion regulation attempts on their own. Those actions will provide optimal support for development of

On the other hand, when parents react to their

children's distressed emotional states in negative, accusa­ tive, overbearing, or punitive ways, they are modeling those reactions for their children to imitate when they observe people who are in emotional distress (implicit learning). When parents frequently react punitively to emotional ex­ pression, children tend to suppress their own feelings or hide their expression of them, rather than learn how to

regulate them. In research by Fabes and associates (1990), Eisenberg and Fabes (1994), and Morales and Bridges (1997), mothers reported their means of coping with their children's negative emotions. Their means of coping and the mea­ sured characteristics of their children can be described in four categories: 1. Children who were: (1) unlikely to openly express out their emotions, (2) likely to avoid anger situations, (3) likely to self-soothe, and (4) unlikely to ask their mothers for comfort or help with their emotion regulation, had

mothers who (1) minimized or belittled their children's dis­ tressing emotions and their expression of them, or (2) pun­ ished them for displaying them. For example, a mother might say, "Calm down, you're overreacting. It's not that important" or "If you start crying, you'll have to go to your room." 2. Mothers who verbally and nonverbally expressed distress when their children displayed emotionality, tended

to have children who: (1) did not vent their emotions, (2) showed less emotional intensity in anger situations but were assertive, (3) chose to deal with their distressful feelings on their own, without anyone's help, and (4) shielded others from the problem of dealing with their own emotion ex­ pression. For example, a mother might show distress fa­ cially, turn her head away, and say, "I wish you wouldn't act like that. It's very upsetting." Or when other people are

present, she might say, "I'm sorry you had to witness this. I hope it didn't make you too uncomfortable." 3. Some mothers preferred a problem-solution re­ sponse to their children's emotionality. They might say, "I suggest that they do something else" or "I show my child

how to see the problem in a different way" Explanations of the human context of situations were more frequently of­ fered. In anger situations, the children of these mothers

autonomy in children's social-emotional regulation. human-compatible

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were less likely to display high-intensity anger (tantrums) and were more likely to cope with a problem by removing themselves from it. They were more likely to deal with emotional situations in ways that defused their feelings, of­ ten indirectly, such as choosing another activity or toy. 4. Emotion-focused reactions to emotionality were

used by some parents, that is, their children's emotional needs were met. In the studies, exemplar parent responses were, "I comfort my child" or "I try to help my child feel bette." The children of these mothers were much less likely to display high-intensity anger or to vent their anger openly as a means of coping. They were more likely to just object verbally to a person or thing that caused them frustration.

They would sometimes ask about or talk through the con­ text of a conflict situation. In other words, they expressed

ated or self-chosen, thus there is a substantial "from-insideto-outside" direction to the play (internal locus of causation, see Chapter 8) followed by contextual feedback that is mostly implicit (outside conscious awareness). Interactive play, es­ pecially with peers, can engage a "dance" of interpersonal accommodation and emotional regulation abilities. More often than not, intrinsic interests in people, places, things, and events are developed during such experiences. Sub­ stantially self-directed and reciprocal interactions help chil­ dren evolve a self-mastery of their world and of themselves in that world. What happens when children go to a school? Teach­ ers are in the leadership role. In traditional school cultures,

child tendencies were significant even when the effects of

their prime challenge is to attract and sustain for several hours the attention of all of the 15 to 35 or more youngsters that they teach, all of whom have unique temperaments, accumulated social-emotional learnings, and cognitive "styles". That is a monumental task for one teacher-person to accomplish. Currently, the primary goal of schools and their teach­

inherited temperament were statistically accounted for.

ers is to lead students through a predetermined academic

Emotion-focused and problem-focused reactions by moth­

curriculum. The components of the traditional curriculum

ers were more likely to result in: (1) development of adap­

that are regarded as most important are the disciplines of native language, mathematics, the physical sciences, and so­ cial history. More and more, school and teacher account­ ability in accomplishing this goal is measured by the scores that their students achieve on benchmark, high-stakes, onetime-only, fact- and logic-based, right-answer, standard­

their frustrations and distressing emotions verbally rather than by ranting and raving. According to the researchers, most of these parent and

tive emotional coping by their children and (2) enhanced empathic relatedness, constructive competence, and self-re­ liant autonomy. Brief Context: Influences of “School Cultures” on Learning We call the "work" of preschool children play. Chil­ dren are always participants in the direction of play activity, whether they play alone, with a parent or other adult, or

with other children. They decide, or influence decisions about what to play, how, and when (subject to safety and family needs; see Book IV, Chapter 1 for more on children's play). During interactive play, such decisions are usually

arrived at collaboratively, sometimes cooperatively and sometimes antagonistically. When playing alone, children spontaneously display their primary repertoire of innate exploratory, imitative, and self-expressive abilities (see Chapter 8). These abilities are triggered by sensory perceptions or memories of people, places, things, and events. As play proceeds, exploratory, imitative, and self-expressive actions seem to be self-initi­ 244

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ized tests that purport to measure the students' achieve­ ment in those academic disciplines. In education circles, then, a prominent tendency is to organize school curricula and teaching methods so that students will pass those tests within a relatively limited time frame. Logically, the fastest and surest way to do that is to expose children to informa­ tion that has been accumulated in the past (pre-detected patterns) and give them practice tests that are modeled after the standardized tests. What happens, then, to the inborn exploratory-dis­ covery, imitative, and self-expressive capabilities that we hope children have been developing during their preschool lives? What happens to their innate "drives" to: (1) detect

and make sense of observed patterns in their "world" (per­ ceptual, value-emotive, and conceptual categorizations), (2) protect self in a relative state of well being, and (3) gain

mastery of world and self by divergently and creatively using internal processing abilities to evolve behavioral pat­ terns and solve real world problems? What happens when young bodyminds infrequently encounter interesting patterns to detect on their own, challenging real world problems to creatively solve, contextualized and relevant skills to mas­ ter, or opportunities for self-expression through a variety of symbolic modes?

Might the students experience a notable degree of unpleasant boredom or frustration in such a school set­ ting? Might they begin seeking alternative experiences that can provide the aroused attention and pleasant feeling states of intrinsic reward, interest, and self-mastery? And how

might the teachers' interpreter mechanisms react to the seek­ ing of "alternative experiences", that is, (1) off-task behav­ ior, (2) lack of self-discipline, (3) behavior that disrupts the curricular experience and the attentional focus of the "seri­ ous" students in the group, (4) disrespect for the teacher's authority, and (5) loss of teacher control? What will the teachers do to accomplish their primary academic curricu­

lum goal? The common reaction is to apply "discipline

techniques", that is, the use of coercion to regain student

compliance with what the teachers want them to do and obedience to what the teachers say, or the use of extrinsic reward techniques to achieve the same compliance. Do we educators talk about school learning as though it is something that is done to the people that we refer to as students. Common examples of educator language are: "I want to learn how to get and keep my students' attention", or "When my students start talking in class, I have to get them back 'on-task'", or "Motivating my students is my number one challenge", or "My goal is to instill in my stu­ dents a respect for (subject area)", or "When my students

misbehave, I have to discipline them, because if I don't, I'll lose their respect", or "Our program teaches students the

academic skills they need to get good jobs or to be success­ ful in college". Some educational consultants present teacher in-service training in motivation techniques and discipline strat­ egies. Teachers may say, "I need surefire techniques and strat­ egies "that work". One may ask, "'Work' to accomplish what?" Getting students to do what teachers tell them to do, with­ out any questions or any participation in the process?

Do we teachers use the nominalizations teacher, student,

teaching, learning, motivation, and discipline as though they re­

ferred to discrete, physical, material, concrete entities (nouns)?

Have we analyzed in some detail the complex, multi-pat­ terned, correlational, evolving-event realities that occur in­ side human beings when we say that they are motivated, have learned, or are disciplined? Does the nominalization stu­ dent make it easier for us to suppress our limbic systems' empathic abilities so that we treat the human beings who are called students more like objects on an assembly line and compartmentalize what we think and do about their vast human capabilities (see later section and Chapter 7)? A guest professor for a one-week summer course for educators

delivers a one-hour presentation of principles and practices of "human­ compatible learning". One of the course participants becomes frus­ trated, confronts the presenter, and says: "I really get angry when sup­ posed experts, who haven't taught in classrooms for years, come in here and tell us all of this "no discipline problems" stuff. I've tried it and it does not work. In the culture that I live in, talking and disrupting in school is what most students do, and the misbehaving kids keep the good kids from getting involved in what we're doing. I have to say, 'Be quiet and sit down!!' or they'll never pay any attention to me and we'll never get anything done. You have to be louder and stronger than they are and put punitive limits on their behavior or you'll have chaos." Response: "I clearly remember similarfrustrations when I taught in public schools. I yelled at kids, even cussed, and threw things on the floor when they didn't do what I wanted them to do. But now I'm wondering: When and how do children get to the point where they engage themselves in learning because they want to, because it's inter­ esting and rewarding to them, and because they respect their teachers and their peers as fellow human beings?" (pause) "I don't know" Curwen and Mendler (1988, pp. 2, 3) put it this way: "School is a battleground for too many participants, a place where major confrontations and minor skirmishes occur daily. Why must this be so? Teachers and students share the same space, time...and needs. They spend most of the day communicating with each other, thinking about each other, scheming against each other, and judging each other. When they are antagonistic, they expend as much if not more time and energy trying to outsmart each other and

win, or at least achieve a standoff. If things get bad enough, they have the power to ruin each others' lives....For most teachers and students, a main battleground revolves around

discipline." [Author's note: Notice the military and war meta­ phors?] human-compatible

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In traditional school cultures, discipline is about com­ pliance and obedience (Kohn, 1996). Three methods for inducing compliance and obedience are (1) coercion, (2) punishment, and (3) extrinsic rewards. Coercion takes many forms. Government laws coerce parents to see to it that their children go to school. Once they are there, teachers expect students to comply with and obey their dictates as they coerce predetermined activities that follow a predeter­ mined, coerced academic curriculum. Typically, textbooks, computer programs, and schoolwork materials are used as information resources. Coerced, formulaic, right-answer recall tasks, that are decontextualized from the real world, are predominantly provided. Social behavior follows pre­ determined rules that students must follow, such as sitting still in rows of chairs with assigned seats, being quiet, al­ ways listening to their teachers, always doing what teachers say to do, moving quietly from place to place in single-file lines, and always addressing teachers with Mr., Mrs., Miss, Ms., or Dr. titles that reassure teachers that students respect them (but how does one know, if it is coerced by a rule?). Substantial freedom from coercion occurs after school is dismissed and during free-play time (recess). When students do not comply or do not obey or meet expectations, then discipline techniques are applied,

such as some form of punishment (adverse consequence) or a threat of punishment. Common adverse consequences are physical pain (corporal punishment), emotional pain (verbally and nonverbally delivered accusations, and other emotional ouches, hits, slashes), "logical" consequences (more later), and withdrawal of rewarding experiences. An un­ pleasant-feeling somatic marker is then recorded in students'

Why is punishment still commonly used in school cultures? Kohn (pp. 30-32) presents eight possible reasons: 1. Punishment is a "quick and easy" way to obtain

compliance compared to the elaborated skills that are needed "to work with students to figure out how to solve a prob­ lem". 2. It results in temporary compliance which rewards punitive behavior in teachers "while its long-term harms"

are "harder to see". 3. Most teachers "were raised and taught in environ­ ments that were, to some degree, punitive, and we live what we know", and we have rarely, if ever, experienced an alter­ native way to interact and solve problems with learners. 4. Punishment is expected by the school culture, that is, colleagues, administrators, even some students. 5. It makes us feel competent, in control, or "power­ ful". 6. "It satisfies a desire for a primitive sort of justice", that is, "if you do something bad, something bad should happen to you-regardless of the long-term practical effects". 7. "...if students aren't punished" for disobeying rules, then "...they will think they 'got away with' something and will be inclined to do the same thing again-or worse".

8. "...until we have made the wrongdoer suffer, we haven't really taken any action....we've been permissive or 'soft'....Any attempt to get to the bottom of the problem by working with the student is therefore just a fancy version of doing nothing."

The use of extrinsic rewards is a third method of inducing in-the-moment and long-term compliance-obe­ dience. Praise, awards, and providing special privileges or

memories and protective abilities are engaged (withdrawal, demobilization, counter-ouching). Punishment and threat­

experiences are three types of extrinsic rewards that are

ened punishment, as Kohn indicates (1996, pp. 27-32):

have in ways that schools and teachers want them to be­ have (compliance), such as doing what the teacher says to do when the teacher says to do it (obedience), attending to academic tasks, making good grades. In that sense, these enticements function like bribes and can evolve a "what's in it for me" orientation. Whether the intent is manipulation

1. model the value-emotive categorization (learning) that the possession of power over others grants the capac­ ity to "make something bad happen" to others in order to

get one's own way-"Do this or here's what I'm going to do

to you"; 2. "...warp the relationship between the punisher and the punished"; 3. "...impede the process of ethical development"; and 4. "...tend to undermine good values by fostering a preoccupation with self-interest" (see also McCord, 1991). 246

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commonly used (Kohn, 1993). They entice students to be­

or not, regular use of extrinsic rewards tends to focus stu­

dents on developing strategies to obtain more rewards, rather than on developing an intrinsic love of one or more knowl­

edge-ability clusters (see previous section on extrinsic re­ ward effects).

Deci, et al. (1981), Ryan & Grolnick (1986), and Grolnick

& Ryan (1989) collected data from children whose parents

and teachers used controlling rewards and punishments to influence their behavior. The children reported a prepon­

derance of external influences on their own achievement. The teachers reported that these children were less "self­ motivated" and more likely to "act out" in the classroom. The parents and teachers of these children reported their belief that the best way to help children toward higher achievement was to use controlling rewards and punish­ ments. The studies' findings indicated that parent and teacher controlling actions actually interfered with the intrinsic pro­ cessing that could have produced greater empathic related­ ness, academic and social-emotional competence, and selfreliant autonomy. During students' first schooling experiences with "cur­

ricular play", the internal self-initiations and collaborative interactions of before-school play are not often allowed during "curricular play". When the innate abilities for imi­ tation, exploration, and self-expression do occur, teachers often teach the children how to be "ready to learn" that is, be quiet, sit still, and pay attention to the teacher. Forms of coercion, punishment, and extrinsic reward are the com­

mon methods used for obtaining compliance and obedi­

elaborated or subtle the adversarial interactions become. Do some students explore counter-control games with the teachers and form peer alliances to do so? Do they explore ways to distract teachers during class, to "test teachers" and "see how much they can get away with"? Might teachers then interpret these student actions as threatening to their

own well being, label them with the terms off-task or disrup­ tive or disrespectful and label repeat offenders as discipline problems or behavior problems? The neuropsychobiological evidence indicates that external-control, adversarial, accu­ sative, punitive "discipline" does not induce genuine human respect. It never enhances an emotional connection and constructive love for music or for voice educators. It never frees voices for more expressive speaking and singing. It only constrains them. Typically, then, threat interpretations and protective abilities are learned by both student- and teacher-people, that is, some combination of (1) avoidance of the source of threat, (2) relative immobilization (sometimes referred to as fear), or (3) counter-ouch, counter-control, and counterat­ tack. Teachers may tend to become either (1) doormats, wimps, walked-all-over, or (2) inconsistent in coercive-con­ trolling versus benevolent behavior, or (3) consistent in co­ ercive-controlling behavior, or (4) consistently domineer­

duce an implicitly learned adversarial "mind-set" that be­

ing and punitive. Students may tend to become either (1) submissive and dependent, (2) compliant but not necessar­

comes instantiated in teachers and in students (remember

ily cooperative, (3) exploiters of teacher weaknesses, or (4)

animals and aliens?). The mind-set predisposes both "sides" to learn overt or covert adversarial interactions. Adversarial interactions are the result of learned (in­ stantiated) protective abilities within human bodyminds so that the mind-sets are perpetuated and intensified. A teacher­ person who teaches in a school culture that fosters adversarial relationships is likely to learn a repertoire of coercive discipline techniques. Often, new teachers are not very skilled at playing the teachers' side of a domination­ control game, but from at least second grade on, many of their students are experienced players. Often, students are said to "walk all over" some inexperienced teachers and their "discipline skills" become suspect. The longer students and teachers have been in school, the more consolidated the mind-sets become and the more

uncooperative, smart-mouthed, belligerent, or rebellious.

ence. Over enough time, these interactions are likely to pro­

Sometimes teacher-student interactions may appear to be cooperative, but a covert game of teacher control and student "testing" reflects an undertone of emotional discon­ nection (animals and aliens again?). Teachers' "interpreter mechanisms" (see Chapter 7) can become ripe for making assumptions about the "ulterior motives" of students and "jump to the conclusion" that one or a group of students is "misbehaving" because he-she-they...." The true, complex sources of the misbehavior may never be explicitly known, especially by the teacher, because no one can truly know what is in the bodymind of another person. But the adversarial languages of coercion, control, dependency, and

accusative judgment (see Tables I-9-1 and 2) can intensify explicit-implicit protective abilities. An orientation toward

emotional disconnection between teachers and students and

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between students may occur, and (1) the places where the

interactions occur, and (2) any objects or events that are involved. So, an explicit or implicit domination-control game comes to be played between many teachers and their stu­ dents. It is induced by external controls that are imposed by schedules, curricula, and school personnel. For some students, the intensity and subtlety of counter-control games escalate over the years, including increased disruption of learning experiences. Some teachers, then, develop esca­ lated coercion strategies and punishment severities, and the extrinsic reward bribes may get bigger and more frequent, so that the withdrawal of rewards becomes a form of ma­ nipulative punishment. A continuum of classroom behav­

4. Those "mental" processes that are in conscious awareness, or easily can be, are the only ones that can be usefully addressed in a school setting. 5. "...(C)hildren born in the same year are sufficiently

similar in developmental attainment, (cognitive) capacities,...and level of visual, verbal, and manual skill to be taught...as a homogenous group by standardized meth­ ods" (Greenspan, 1997, p. 217); 6. "...(C)hildren can learn effectively through one-di­ rectional presentation of material in lectures, textbook read­ ing, drill, and rote memory" (Greenspan, 1997, p. 218);

The sources of power-control for teachers are (1) the author­

7. Written and read language(s) and mathematics are the only symbolic modes of communication that are useful and practical for young members of the culture to learn in detail. Nonverbal modes of communication (including all of the expressive arts) are related to feelings and emotions and are considerably outside conscious awareness, so there­ fore, they are not as important (see items 2 and 4 above). 8. Exposing students to the planned academic cur­ riculum content in the fastest way possible is the overriding

ity of a government, (2) social mores of parents and the greater society, (3) their innate self-protective capability, (4)

task of teachers, and "covering the material" requires com­ pliant attention by students to the "covering" process.

a dominating verbal and nonverbal communication style, and (5) greater physical size (in most cases). The power sources for students are (1) greater numbers, (2) granting or withhold­ ing of cooperation, (3) their innate self-protective capabil­ ity, and (4) greater physical size (in some teenage students). In schools, the historic, cultural, and organizational roots of the human being domination-control game and the adversarial mind-set are many. They are likely to be deeply imbedded in the implicit cultural learning of many school personnel who attended the culture's schools them­ selves. Nine implicit or hidden roots that can nurture the adversarial mind-set between teacher-people and student­ people are: 1. Human minds (psyche) are nonphysical entities that are separate from human bodies, inhabit them, perform reasoning and deciding (cognition), and direct bodily be­

9. School learners are compartmentalized, assigned

ior may be conceived that extends from complete external coer­ cive control of behavior on one end ("crack down hard on the first day"; "never smile before Christmas") to unrestrained be­ havioral anarchy on the other [anarchy is from Greek: an = without; arkhos = leadership].

havior. Schools educate minds.

2. Cognitive processes are separable from emotional processes. Schools educate cognitive processes.

3. "Emotional self-control" is learned by imposition of external controls or limits on behavior, through the use of coercive and punitive sanctions when necessary.

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nominalizations (labels), and are overgeneralized about, thus making it easier to interact with them as though they are depersonalized objects or units in an assembly-line mass (see Chapter 7).

As a result of those and other historical roots, the organizational processes of schools and school systems in

the "developed countries" have tended to: 1. devise curricula that emphasize scholarly, academic, discipline-based "mind pursuits" that are similar to schools ofthe 18th and 19th centuries; 2. devise curricula that are sequentially ordered ac­ cording to the class & grade assembly-line model of the 19th/20th century industrial revolution; 3. devise curricula and assessments of achievement

that are decontextualized from actual experiences of the real world; 4. frequently employ extrinsic rewards to attract and sustain student engagement with learning experiences rather

than create learning experiences from which intrinsic re­ wards and interest are likely to emerge;

5. use military-model, external, dominative, accusa­

1. Effective senior learners tune into each learner's own

tive, punitive sanctions to induce obedient-compliant-de­ pendent behavior, and to inhibit or control behavior that is

developmental level and facilitate their observing, learning, and assessing abilities, such as reading nonverbal signals and reflecting on and communicating one's own and oth­

interpreted to be off-task, disruptive, or disrespectful to­ ward teacher authority.

ers' ideas and feelings. These abilities are just as fundamen­ tal as language skills, factual information, operations on num­

Do these student-teacher interactions optimally sup­

port the conversion of human capabilities into abilities, that

is, the three core, constructive, neuropsychobiological needs of human beings (empathic relatedness, constructive com­ petence, self-reliant autonomy)? Do some school cultures implicitly expect students to

suppress their value-emotive categorization capabilities (feelings-affects-emotions) at the schoolhouse door, and only

develop their perceptual and conceptual categorization or "academic" capabilities during classes? Can students leave their human being social histories at home and not bring them to school? Are schools and teachers supposed to

have absolutely nothing to do with emotional self-devel­ opment and evolving self-identity? Are they supposed to

use coercive means to suppress these influences on stu­ dents, so that teachers can accomplish the more important mission of "covering the material" for academic achievement? Feelings, affects, and emotions are always co-processed with cognition and behavior. What we refer to as

perceiving, attending, categorizing, “concepting", remembering, learn­ ing, thinking, reasoning, logic, decision-making, interacting, and doing (cognition and behavior) are not separable from what we call feelings, affects, and emotions (value-emotive processing). To say that cognition and behavior are separate "mental processes" from feelings, affects, and emotions is like saying that an auto­ mobile can function as an automobile without its motor! The previous eight chapters have presented evidence from

the neuropsychobiological sciences that value-emotive pro­ cessing is the "motor" that "drives" perception, attention, conception, memory, and learning, and is a prime contributor

to health and disease. Value-emotive states are consider­ ably more influential than cognitive processing in the con­ version of human capabilities into abilities and in the ini­ tiation of both automatic and intentional human action. Greenspan suggests several principles of effective edu­ cation (adapted from Greenspan, 1997, pp. 221-230).

bers, fine motor skills, and so forth.

2. Effective senior learners present learners not just with information to assimilate, but with emotionally en­

gaging questions to answer and problems to solve through active initiative and participation such as hands-on tasks and experiments, field trips, debates, and creative-expres­ sive projects. 3. Effective senior learners take seriously each learner's inclinations and perspectives and use them as a means of broadening understanding and experience, and building bridges between knowledge-ability clusters that appear to

be very separate from other clusters (integrated learning). 4. Effective senior learners are leaders or coordinators of developmental learning experiences that are presented in ability-appropriate sequences and are consistent with learn­ ers' cognitive-emotional "styles". 5. To feel competent, learners must have relatively clear targets (goal-sets) with bull's-eyes (pinpoint goals) and op­ portunities to develop self-perceived feedback abilities so they can assess their own progress in learning new abilities or altering habitual ones. External-Control and Adversarial “Discipline Techniques” What are we talking about when we use the nominalizations discipline and classroom management? In the

context of school behavior, various dictionaries define disci­ pline as a state of social order that is based on (1) submis­ sion to, or compliance with a set of behavioral rules, and (2) the authority of teachers to punitively enforce these rules on students. Management is borrowed from the knowledge­ ability cluster that is referred to as business, and relates to controlling and directing employees. Both terms make it easier

to instantiate implicit mind-sets that objectify, depersonal­ ize, and nominalize human beings as students or employees and less so as human beings (see Chapter 7).

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When teachers attempt to engage and sustain the in­

terest of 15 to 35 or more unique individuals, their ingenu­ ity and verbal-nonverbal communication skills are taxed to the limits. In schools where spontaneous behavior must be inhibited and compliance-obedience must be achieved in order to engage in preplanned curricular experiences, how is it done? Some of the well known adversarial and punitive dis­ ciplinary methods in schools are: 1. spoken forms of address to school personnel (Mr., Miss, Mrs., Dr.), that are coerced and enforced; 2. formulation and announcement of behavioral rules and their punitive "logical consequences" and verbally de­ livered warnings to rule breakers (Dreikurs & Grey, 1968, pp. 71-77; Nelson, 1987, p.73; Albert, 1989, p. 79; Canter & Canter, 1992, p. 82); 3. corrective verbal statements delivered with a louder

ers (happy faces, cartoon characters), buttons, pins, certifi­ cates, plaques; 2. praising compliant behavior ("I like they way Pete is watching me when we sing", "You have been so good

today!"); 3. earning privileges with compliant behavior (field trips, being a hall or playground monitor, free time, ap­ pointment to a responsible position such as safety patrol, choir section leader, and so on).

Kohn (1996, pp. xi-77) analyzed recent, well publi­

cized, widely used discipline technique systems and placed them into two overlapping categories: (1) the Old School

of Discipline, and (2) the New School of Discipline (Kohn, p.

16).

The Old School of Discipline is described as auto­

cratic and based on a somewhat dim, pessimistic view of children and human nature (Kilpatrick, 1992, p. 92; Wynne,

1989, p. 25). In this view, many children (1) are assumed to

and higher-pitched voice and abrasive-sounding voice qual­ ity (stern, firm, accusing tone of voice), along with eye con­ tact and a stern or angry-looking facial expression; 4. rule-breaking students write their own names on a

be fundamentally self-centered (K. Ryan, 1989) and unrea­ sonably demanding of attention (Dreikurs & Cassel, 1972, p. 36), (2) are willful in their creation of behavior problems,

chalkboard or dryboard in front of the class, or write a moralism 100 times on paper;

(3) naturally "take the easy way out" in most situations (Kilpatrick, 1992, pp. 25, 249), (4) are manipulative (Albert,

5. extra homework;

6. coerce students to deliver an embarrassing com­ munication in front of peers (such as an apology, or singing

a song alone); 7. withdrawal of "privilege" activities; 8. public isolation or removal from usual surround­ ings and peers ("time out" sit next to teacher's desk or in front row of class, talking friends are separated, go to principal's office, and so on); 9. verbal emotional ouches and hits (humiliation, making fun of, sarcasm) delivered individually or in front of peers; 10. after-school incarceration ("detention");

11. parent-child-teacher-principal conference;

12. corporal punishment (painful paddlings); 13. short-term or long-term suspension from school. There are well known external-control discipline meth­ ods that predominantly use extrinsic rewards. Some of them are: 1. giving display awards for compliant behavior such

as name written on the board by a teacher, adhesive stick­

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1989, p. 47). The essence of old school discipline is that teachers must "...dictate, control, and threaten" in order to

"...get compliance", and it succeeds "...in forcing rebellious children to back down (e.g., Jones, 1979)" (Kohn, 1996, p. 56). "Once you encounter resistance, you'll know (your tech­ nique is) working" (Cline & Fay, 1990, p. 103). In other words, teachers must "...lay down the law with children and coerce them into compliance" (Kohn, 1996, p. xiii). The work of Rudolf Dreikurs (1968) and associates (Dreikurs & Cassel, 1972; Dreikurs & Grey, 1968; Dreikurs, Grunwald, & Pepper, 1982; Dinkmeyer & McKay, 1989) provided theoretical foundations for the old school. Dreikurs

and associates asserted that misbehavior is always to be blamed on the children, never on the practices of school cultures. Before students will stop their misbehaving, they must feel some kind of pain. Assertive Discipline is the label that Canter and Canter

(1992) use for their discipline system. It was introduced in the 1970s and was sharpened in subsequent years. Kohn regards it as a quintessential example of the old school. Lee

Canter has written that Assertive Discipline "is nothing new";

it is "simply a systematization" of common behavior modi­ fication methods. Behavior modification is an outgrowth of behaviorist psychology. Students who "...talk when asked to be quiet; who dawdle when asked to work; who argue and talk back when asked to follow directions..." can be dealt with effectively by an assertive teacher who "...tells students exactly what behavior is acceptable....No questions. No room for confusion.." (Canter and Canter, 1992, p. 27).

"...(N)on-disruptive off-task behavior is unacceptable and must be dealt with correctly" (p. 163). Thus, in Assertive Discipline, dominating teacher control and student compli­

child about the particulars of the alibi. Such wheedling or diversionary tactics have as their sole purpose derailing your

efforts to set a limit. If you do not bite the bait, you will

succeed. Shut up, get close, and wait. When the child runs out of hot air, say firmly, 'Sit up,' 'Turn around,' or 'Get to work.' As soon as the child caves in and complies, become warm and nurturant and say, 'Thank you.'"

Canter and Canter (1992) urge teachers to avoid ex­ amination of their teaching and disciplinary practices be­ cause doing so is likely to produce "...guilt, anxiety, and frus­ tration" instead of "...confident behavior management" (p.

subject for debate. If students resist in any way, they must

9). Kohn disagrees (1996, p. 21). "...(T)he curriculum is part of the larger classroom context from which any student's behavior, or misbehavior, emerges. An authentic response

be made to capitulate. "Whenever possible, simply ignore the covert hostility of a student. By ignoring the behavior you will diffuse [sic] the situation. Remember, what you really want is for the student to comply with your request.

to the behavior calls upon us to examine the whole of that context and consider changing it. The failure to do so amounts to blaming the student-which, in turn, gives rise to the familiar tactics of manipulation.." such as coercion,

Whether or not the student does it in an angry manner is not the issue. The student is still complying with your expectations" (Canter

punishment, and extrinsic rewards. Exemplars of the New School of Discipline under­ stand that old-style punishments create problems in school situations. Punishment, they say, is "ineffective for long­ term change" (Curwen & Mendler, 1988, p. 69), "provokes hostility and antagonism" (Albert, 1989, p. 79), and even a decision "to get even very soon" (Nelsen, 1987, p. 67). New

ance is the premise from which all else extends. It is not a

and Canter, 1992, p. 180; italics added). A core practice of Assertive Discipline is the commu­ nication, by teachers, of explicit rules with which students must comply, and explicit consequences (punishments) that will follow lack of compliance. Ideal rules and consequences are stated succinctly and they prescribe or proscribe spe­ cific behaviors. "Be respectful of other people" would not work, but a list of specific respectful behaviors would, such as "Keep your hands to yourself". Dabney, et al., cite one teacher's rules (1994, pp. 63, 64): •If Mrs. D_____ is talking, DON'T! •If assigned, do it (on time, with a smile)! •If you don't want to do it over, do it right the first

time! •If it's a school rule, follow it! •If you gripe about an assignment, be prepared to do extra! [I don't want to hear, "Golly, two pages. Do we have to write two pages? What if we...?" It's not "Let's Make a Deal" time here. I'll just say, "Gee, I think you can write three or four pages on yours"] When a student has been caught breaking a rule, teach­ ers must assume that an explanation is an "excuse" and avoid dialogue about it. Jones (1979, p. 29) says that teach­

ers must "...guard against...getting verbally engaged with the

School proponents encase their discipline theories in terms like motivation, responsibility, dignity, cooperation, and self-esteem. These discipline methods are labeled with qualifiers like Cooperative Discipline (Albert, 1989), Discipline with Dignity (Curwen & Mendler, 1988), Discipline with Love and Logic (Cline & Fay, 1990), Innovative Discipline (Dabney, et al., 1994), Posi­ tive Classroom Management (Collis & Dalton, 1990), Positive Dis­ cipline (Nelsen, et al., 1993), and 21st Century Discipline (Bluestein, 1988). Other qualifiers also are used, such as commonsense, creative, effective, gentle, judicious, stress-free, and without tears. While the Old School of Discipline might be characterized by "Sit down and shut up", the New School would rephrase it as, "Be seated and refrain from talking" (Kohn, 1996, pp. 56-60). The new school is an attempt to highlight the more positive methods of behavior modification techniques. Behaviorist psychology used a mixture of punishments and positive and negative reinforcements to change the behav­ ior of animals and, sometimes, human beings. New school proponents promote the establishment of behavioral rules human-compatible

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(expectations), but claim that their discipline techniques do not include punishments. They say that their methods teach "self-control", "hold students accountable" and make them "take responsibility for the actions that they choose".

iff" and is "...responsible for keeping the behavioral records" (Curwen & Mendler, 1988, p. 76).

Dreikurs' work also provided some foundations for the new school. According to Dreikurs, et al. (1982, p. 117),

offenders, is a logical consequence (Albert, 1989, p. 77).

when children are punished, they "...retaliate because they see no relationship between the punishment and the crime"

• When children misbehave and distract others from

class activity, then spending a "few uncomfortable moments" in an isolated time-out area, with longer times for repeat Uncomfortable moments can be made less uncomfortable by labeling the isolation area "the happy bench" (Nelsen, et al., 1993, p. 124).

His suggested alternative to punishment was "logical conse­

quences" that "fit the crime" (Dreikurs & Grey, 1968, pp. 73, 74). This orientation has been widely adopted by all new school discipline programs. Logical consequences are: (1) mo­ tivated by a desire to instruct, (2) reasonable and respectful in their application, (3) related to the act of the wrongdoer, (4) not harsh, and (5) delivered with a matter-of-fact tone of voice. Regardless of how they are packaged, logical conse­

quences are almost always described as an imposed, unpleas­ ant, aversive experience that happens after a student has misbehaved or has behaved inadequately. Kohn refers to new school consequences as "repackaged punishment" or punishment lite (1996, pp. 39-45). For example: • If a student fails to put away toys or materials that they enjoy working with, then denying them the use of the

toys or materials is a logical consequence (Dreikurs & Grey, 1968, p. 96). • If two students are caught laughing during seat-work

Choice is a premium concept among advocates of the new school of discipline. Giving children a choice between alternative consequences (usually only two) is said to help children "...learn about responsibility" (Canter, 1992, p. 72).

For example, "Do you want to sit down and be quiet right

now or do you want to cancel the movie this afternoon?" or "If you misbehave more than three times, that tells me that you are choosing to not be in choir. You'll be resched­ uled into a study hall because I only want people here who

show that they want to be here." These kinds of choices are not really choices. They are pseudochoices and their purpose is coercion of compli­ ance. Pseudochoices are a common new school discipline technique (Kohn, 1996, pp. 51, 52). They create the illusion of democratic involvement by students in decision-mak­ ing. Usually, the teacher alone determines the options so that the teacher's option is clearly the least aversive or most

time, a logical consequence might be to make them go to

attractive. One new-school program for parents (Cline &

the front of the class and tell everyone what was funny. Dreikurs and Grey (pp. 142, 143) would say that "Though the children were obviously embarrassed, it was a result of their own action and not a result of any arbitrary judgment

Fay, 1990, pp. 48, 91) suggests forcing children to make "de­

by the teachef • If a student throws a self-made spitball, a logical consequence would occur when the teacher forces that stu­ dent to make 500 spitballs without drinking any water, so that a parched throat results (Albert, 1989, p.34).

physical pain where they hurt from the outside in; italics in

• When a rule is repeatedly violated, a logical conse­ quence for the offending student is to write an essay on how he or she intends "...to stop breaking this rule" (Curwen & Mendler, 1988, pp. 72, 81); or offending students must "write (their) own name(s) on the blackboard, or have it written there by a student who has been elected class "sher­

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cisions" that will have non-dangerous aversive consequences so that they will learn appropriate "lessons". Their intent:

"We want our kids to hurt from the inside out" (contrasted with

the original). Perspectives on the Old and New Schools of Discipline In their heart of hearts, nearly all teachers have their students' best interests in mind. Always. And prospective teachers study education for altruistic reasons. They want to experience the thrill of helping young people learn valu­ able things, and grow into competent, happy, well adjusted people.

What happens when beginning teachers start their careers in a school culture that is populated by many learn­

ers that: (1) have not yet experienced all of the six develop­ mental levels described by Greenspan, (2) are of the same chronological age but not the same developmental age, (3) tend to form popular-unpopular and adversarial social subgroups, (4) have been extensively exposed to strong elec­ tronic media influences (enhances tendency to emotionally disconnect from and disrespect controller adults and other "outsiders"), (5) have not responded very often with intrin­ sic interest to schooling experiences, and (6) often bargain for extrinsic rewards for doing school work? Frequent frustration and disillusion, in many cases.

The job didn't turn out to be what they imagined it was

going to be. Some of the students overtly tested them right away and kept on doing so. The general culture (parents) and the school culture swamped them in conflicting self­ interests and administrivia and stifled their creative imagina­ tions. Approximately 4O% of U.S. teachers leave the profes­ sion within five years. Common observations are, "I spent more time doing 'police work' and 'paper work' than I spent actually teaching", or "I really enjoyed the teaching. All of that administrative and discipline stuff just made it an over­ whelmingly awful experience. I had to get out" In a column for the Washington Post (reprinted in the

Minneapolis Star Tribune, Section A2, Sunday, September 12, 1999), former teacher Natalie Chamberlain Reis wrote, "So when people ask me why I am not teaching this year, I tell them that I spent too much time as a disciplinarian and not

enough time teaching....I was tired of feeling like I was alone in battle...of trying to make parents see that their children needed help...of scrambling to get help when none was available...of leaving school every day feeling as though I had failed my students....It wasn't that I wanted to do so

much; it was that I never dreamed there would be so much I couldn't do" When I was a student in elementary, junior high, and high school, "doling out discipline" was how my teachers taught me and my classmates. Earlier in my teaching career, it was the only means I knew for getting and keeping "good discipline" among the human be­ ings in my choirs and classes. My adversarial mind-set was estab­ lished during my own schooling years and it lasted a long time. In

my early adult years, I added the model of the professional choral conductor. I had learned to be the servant of music by getting human beings to make it the way my past experiences had taught me was right. I used to yell, scream, cuss, and throw things in choir rehearsals when the student singers were not paying attention enough or they were not making the music the way I thought they should. I devised written rules, made the students and a parent/guardian sign them, and thought up logical consequences. I created an array of extrinsic rewards to manipulate student behavior, used the threat of their with­ drawal as a punishment, and I did withdraw them when provoked. I singled school-aged singers out for humiliating individual criticism, and threw singers out of the choir for bad behavior. I delivered corpo­ ral punishment to two boys once, for missing a choir performance. I did have some redeeming qualities. Honest. Adversarial, coercive, punitive, and manipulative ac­ tions by teachers produce temporary compliance with adult authority figures who use superior coercive power, granted by a government, to control the behavior of students. The modeling of this behavior can result in imitative implicit

learning that could be stated: "To be in control, you have to get and exercise superior force or power over other people" (see Kohn, 1996, pp. 22-32). The implicit communication behind predetermined "rules and consequences" expresses dictatorial social values: What teachers "ask" students to do, and how they ask it, are infallible and always the right way to do things. Students must comply and obey without question in order to avoid adverse consequences. In an effort to force this square block of autocratic values into the round hole of democratic values, Driekurs, et al., claimed (1982, p. 67), "It is autocratic to force, but democratic to induce compliance" (italics added). A U.S. public school system's administrators decided to do some­

thing about the high number of "discipline problems" that teachers were encountering. They felt, in general, that far too many of the students were on the verge of being "out of control". During the school year, they hired a well known "discipline consultant", who had pub­ lished a popular book on the subject, to provide in-service training on a method for regaining control of "student discipline". The superinten­ dent of schools announced to the teachers that the new methods were to be put into practice by the first school day of the next month (to allow time for assimilation and planning). During the interim time, when

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behavior problems arose, the teachers warned the students that a new

way of disciplining students was coming, and "just you wait..." On the appointed day, each teacher placed three behavior rules on the chalk­

board along with the aversive or punitive consequences for violation of the rules, and then spent time discussing each rule and consequence.

Did the student discipline problems go away, or sud­ denly reduce? No. Entrenched adversarial mind-sets and habitual patterns of behavior did not change much. Some students were ensnared by the new rules and became "ex­ amples" to other students, but the advance advertising had communicated to the students that they were left out of the process (no intrinsic ownership), and had given them time to explicitly or implicitly devise counter-domination-control game strategies. The externally imposed rules and adversepunitive consequences only enhanced the protective cogni­ tive, value-emotive, and behavior patterns of students, and drove some of them "underground". Control-domination game strategies were continued in more subtle forms or as acts of vandalism that were unlikely to be traced to "perpe­ trators". The evidence is rather massive that external-control, adversarial, accusative, punitive discipline only increases the compliant-submissive and distressful-protective reactions of people (Deci, et al., 1982; Hyman, 1990: Koestner, et al., 1984; Kohn, 1996; McCord, 1991; Miller, 1984; Render, et al., 1989; Straus, 1994; Watson, 1984). It never enhances an emotional connection with teachers or with a domain of learning, or with "loyalty" to the school that students at­ tend. Physicians who are identifying conditions that en­ hance health-risk and health-protective practices among ado­

lescents have indicated that school connectedness is a pro­

tective factor and school disconnectedness is a risk factor

(Resnick, et al., 1997; Hawkins, et al., 1999). Are sports team competitions and social activities the primary reasons for school connectedness? Groups of teachers are asked, "What are your long­ term goals for the students you work with?" "What would you like them to be-to be like-long after they've left you?" Rather than describing what kind of academic student they

their students, they describe them as "curious, creative, life­ long learners". None of their intellectual development goals mention the ability to solve algebra problems, name the capital cities of the world, or harmonically analyze a Bach chorale. How do those long-term teacher goals compare to what actually happens in schools? As Kohn describes it (1996, p. 61): "We want children to continue reading and thinking after school has ended, yet we focus their attention on grades, which have been shown to reduce interest in learning (Kohn, 1993a, 1994). We want them to be critical

thinkers, yet we feed them predigested facts and discrete skills-partly because of the pressure to pump up standard­ ized test scores. We act as though our goal is short-term retention of right answers rather than genuine understand­

ing.." that enables sophisticated action in the real world. Fourth grade students from a variety of schools and socioeconomic backgrounds were surveyed about what they thought their teachers most wanted them to do. Be courte­ ous and treat other people respectfully? Make reasoned decisions? Ask reflective questions? A majority of them said: "Be quiet," "don't fool around," and "get our work done on time" (LeCompte, 1978, p. 30). Second and sixth grade students were interviewed about their beliefs about what "behave well" means. The most frequent answer was about being quiet (Blumenfeld, et al., 1986). When asked to express long-term social goals for young people, very few parents or teachers ever say, "I want my kids to obey authority without question, to be compliant

and docile" (Kohn, 1996, p. 61). Yet, when seeking "disci­ pline techniques" from "discipline experts", many teachers and parents ask, "How can I get children to do what I want them to do?" (Kohn, 1996, p. xv)? The word discipline has deep cultural associations with the emotional ouches, hurts,

cuts, and slashes that are embedded in externally imposed, dominative, accusative, punitive actions by parents and

teachers. Student compliance and obedience in the service of the academic curriculum, or "well behaved children" that

reflect well on parents, may be sources of reliance on coer­

think they should be, they respond by describing their vi­

cion, threat, punishment-lite consequences, and extrinsic

sion of people who are altruistic toward their fellow human

rewards as means of forcing or bribing young people into

beings, constructively competent, and socially responsible in a democratic society (Kohn, 1996, pp. 60-77). When they

immediate, short-term compliance and obedience.

comment about the long-term "intellectual development" of

compliance and obedience, will they be likely to commit

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When young people are threatened or rewarded into

themselves to detailed ability development in the long-term? Will they want to develop deep knowledge, understanding, and skill in a knowledge-ability cluster? As Kohn (1996, p. 62) says, "...trying to keep control of the classroom and get compliance...is inimical to our ultimate objectives. What

we have to face is that the more we 'manage' students' behavior and try to make them do what we say the more difficult it is for them to become morally sophisticated people who think for themselves and care about others" (italics by Kohn) A common reaction to this perspective is, "So, stu­ dents should be allowed to do anything they please? No rules to control their behavior? They can attend class when they want to? They don't need to study? They can treat people anyway they like? Come on! You can't be serious." This argument is invoked frequently to defend the familiar­ ity of the status quo, but it assumes that teachers and par­ ents only have two choices: (1) "...putting up with behavior problems" and (2) "...being the big boss and stamping them out" (Nicholls & Hazzard, 1993, p. 56). Are specific rules with explicit consequences "the an­ swer"? Rules and consequences induce some young people to use their analytic abilities to become "lawyers" and look for technicalities, loopholes, and escape clauses. Teachers spend significant time on police, prosecutorial, and judge work rather than guiding learning. Punitive penalties usu­ ally follow rule violations, which means teachers are "...do­

ing things to students rather than working with them to solve

problems" (Kohn, 1996, p. 73). For example, when students are forced, by an externally imposed rule, to address teach­ ers as Mr., Mrs., Miss, Ms., or Dr., is that a sign that the students genuinely respect and "look up to" all of the teach­ ers? Is there a way that senior learners and learners can interact so that mutual respect is genuine and automatic, and is based on (1) mutual recognition of shared humanity and (2) assumption of vast capabilities to relate, create, col­ laborate, empathize, learn, establish self-reliant personhood boundaries, and be constructively altruistic? Internal Self-Reliance and Respectful, Collaborative Learning So, should young people be allowed to act disrespect­ fully, or any way they please? New question: Are young people capable of behav­ ing respectfully and collaboratively when a controlling teacher

is NOT present to enforce compliance with rules? If they are capable of behaving that way, how can that be achieved nearly

all of the time? When organizing a school, and planning how a school's learning experiences will be enacted, Kohn (1996, pp. xv, 10) suggests two key questions. They point senior learners in the direction of helping learners become like the people in the teachers' long-term visions that were mentioned earlier. 1. What do young people need in order to flourish, to become curious, communicative, creative, productive, lifelong learners, and to be empathically disposed toward fellow human beings, constructively competent, and socially responsible participants in a democratic soci­ ety over their lifespan? 2. How can we help them meet those needs? Will children need opportunities to learn how to: (1) establish and sustain close relationships with other human

beings, (2) self-regulate their emotions, (3) communicate competently in a variety of symbolic modes, (4) develop appropriate self-borders and become self-reliant, (5) col­ laborate constructively with other people to solve prob­ lems, (6) critically analyze their own needs and empathically assess the needs of others, (7) form opinions about the rela­ tionships and roles of people who are referred to with such labels as children, parents, siblings, students, teachers, principals, school administrators, citizens, representative legislators, judges, may­ ors, governors, prime ministers, presidents, employees, managers, ex­ ecutives, and stockholders, and (8) express their opinions con­ structively and through voting and financial investments, and so forth? Will those abilities be developed if young people are expected to do what they are told, and they are never in­ cluded in decision-making processes and result analyses; if they are coerced or cajoled into compliance with predeter­ mined modes of behavior by someone with superior au­ thority over them? Will lifelong curiosity and learning be

developed if they are bribed into compliance with prede­ termined learning experiences in which extrinsic rewards and punishments are delivered by well meaning parents or teachers? If we suspect not, what can be done by parents and teachers to help children develop those abilities that they need to survive and flourish?

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"Consider a rough syllogism. Major premise: chil­ dren misbehave when their basic needs have not been met

Minor premise: children (like adults) have a basic need to

experience themselves as 'origins' of their own behavior as

opposed to 'pawns' (de Charms, 1968, 1977). Conclusion: misbehavior will diminish when children feel less controlled.

Kids tend to be more respectful when their need to make decisions is respected; they are likely to be better behaved when there is no need for them to struggle to assert their

autonomy. Specifically, students are more likely to go along with a request, all things being equal, when they have some (real) choice about how to carry it out." (Kohn, 1966, p. 81-

2. "Commitment—the willingness to coexist—is crucial....Community...requires that we hang in there when the going gets a little rough." 3. "Decisions in genuine community are arrived at through consensus...." 4. "Realistic decisions...are more often guaranteed in community than in any other human environment....(A) community includes members with many different points of view and the freedom to express them, it comes to ap­ preciate the whole of a situation far better than an

individual... or ordinary group....With so many frames of ref­ erence, it approaches reality more and more closely" 5. "(A) community...examines itself....The essential goal

83)

In what kind of setting can children genuinely be in­

of contemplation is increased awareness of the world out­

cluded in real decision-making and have their assertions of

side oneself, the world inside oneself, and the relationship

self-reliant autonomy respected? Would that be possible in

between the two....The community-building process requires self-examination from the beginning"

a setting where the needs and wants of favored people su­ persede the needs and wants of less favored, perhaps less self-reliant people? Would that be possible in a setting where the needs and wants of all people within a group supersede the needs and wants of individual persons within the group, and group conformity is the desired social norm? What about a setting in which all individual persons within a group collaborate with each other, guided by a senior learner, to find balances between the needs and wants of individual persons and the welfare of everyone in the group? That means that individuals have opportunities to develop and elaborate their analytical, evaluative, decision­ making, and communicative abilities in the crucible of dif­ fering and shared perspectives, disagreements and agree­ ments, conflicts and resolutions, exchanges of solutions to problems, debates, and the like. That is the comparatively messy process called community. To Peck (1987, p. 59), a community of human beings is "...a group of individuals who have learned how to com­ municate honestly with each other, whose relationships go deeper than their masks of composure, and who have de­ veloped some significant commitment to 'rejoice together, mourn together' and to 'delight in each other, make each

others' conditions our own.'" He suggests six characteristics of a sense of community among human beings (pp. 6168). 1. "(C)ommunities are always relatively indusive....The great enemy of community is exclusivity'' 256

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6. Once a group has achieved community, the single most common thing members express is: 'I feel safe here'"

Truly democratic political processes are the seed­ ground in which communities of human beings can form

and thrive. Communities truly thrive when their members:

1. develop personal analytic and big picture skills that lead to reality-testable perspectives about the world as they have experienced it; 2. develop clear self-borders and a resilient self-iden­

tity; 3. learn how to differ with other people in a way that

communicates respect, kindness, fairness, and empathy for their needs and wants; 4. learn how to develop consensus within a group when possible; and 5. when not possible, learn how to respect the voted decision of the community.

That is how democratic communities can truly thrive. Can schools and classes within schools become com­ munities of senior learners and learners? Researchers at the Child Development Project studied how fifth and sixth grade children in 24 elementary schools in the United States were

affected by the presence or absence of a sense of community in their classrooms (Battistich, et al., 1995). The students who

reported a stronger sense of community also reported that they liked to go to school and saw learning as intrinsically

valuable. They also displayed more empathy for other people and were more skilled at conflict resolution. These trends were notably prominent in schools that had a high enrollment of low-income students. Children who felt like they were not part of a community reported opposite trends. These results are consistent with: 1. Piaget's (1965) perspectives on the moral develop­ ment of children (cooperative relatedness is the key); 2. the research of Battistich, et al., 1995, DeVries and Van (1994), and Koestner, et al. (1984); 3. the writings of Angell (1991), Bowers and Flinders (1990), Etzioni (1996), Kamii (1991), Sergiovanni (1994), Solomon, et al. (1992); and

4. the work of the Child Development Project (1994,

1996).

How do we create genuine communities (not pseudo communities) in places called schools? Can general music education classes become communities? Can choirs be­ come communities? In early Spring, a junior high/high school choir teacher from Nebraska traveled hundreds of miles to get therapeutic help for her vocal fold nodules. She wanted to sing well again and she loved teach­ ing. She had been told that she might have to find another career, and that was very distressing. She identified a number of distressful life circumstances that might have influenced her overly effortful, high collision-and-shearing-forces voice use. She was asked, "Is there any thing in your teach­ ing day that typically just drives you up the wall?" Without hesita­ tion she said, "Seventh grade choir! I can't get them to do what we need to do to get readyfor performances. They talk a lot, don't pay attention very well, and a few of them are really smart-mouths. I feel I have to talk loudly to stay in control. It's the most frustrating part of my day. If I didn't have seventh grade choir, teaching would be a pleasure." A plan for having a genuine, heart-to-heart talk with the choir members about her feelings was addressed. It included engaging the choir's singers in a process of writing up a description of "What It Means to Sing in a Choir: How the Conductor and the Singers Help Each Other". Among other items, the conductor would ask the singers for ideas about what choirs do, what the conductor can do to help the singers truly become even more skilled and expressive as singers in a

choir, and what the singers can do to help the conductor become even more skilled and expressive as a conductor. The idea was to implement this plan at the beginning of the next school year. She decided not to wait. At her next therapy session, she revealed that she implemented the plan immediately upon her return home. The result? The students became collaborators with her in a human adventure, and her whole teaching day had been a pleasure ever since. She implemented the same plan in all of the choirs, eliminated several nonpaying obligations from her social schedule, and decided to teach only a .75 load the next year. Her nodules resolved by midsummer. So, what did that teacher say to her students, and how did she say it? What did they say in response and how did they say it? How did they arrive at their description of "What It Means to Sing in a Choir: How the Conductor and

the Singers Help Each Other"? What was the dialogue like and how were decisions made? How did they relate to each other as they carried out what they had agreed upon? Did it carry over into the next Fall term, and if so, what was that like? Prerequisites for building a learning community. In order for a sense of community to grow within a group of people, the leader need(s) people skills (empathic so­ cial-emotional communication abilities). For senior learn­

ers that means having a deep respect for, and a fascination with, the phenomenal capabilities of learners regardless of their age and past experience, and an abiding belief that, at

their core, learners want to exercise their innate exploratory­ discovery and self-mastery capabilities, and they want to do so in a safe, emotionally connected setting. Genuinely listening to and respecting all of the points of view that learners express, while being aware of other group and in­

dividual needs, models empathic skills for the learners. Constructive verbal and nonverbal communica­ tion skills (see Chapter 8) are needed to facilitate a "coming together" of diverse needs and interests among a community's members, and to help members "work through" their dif­ ferences and disagreements to solve both learning and so­ cial-emotional problems (Christiansen, 1980; Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, 1987, 1990). Learners of all ages form feeling­ based impressions and "comfort levels" in response to the verbal and nonverbal communications of senior learners (see Chapter 8; Riggio & Friedman, 1986). Wording and in­

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flection of goal-setting and feedback language can contrib­

interactions". Greenspan (p. 220) also suggests that the real

ute to affective connection or disconnection (see Tables I-9-

basic skills of education are (1) engaged and sustained attention,

1, 2, 5,4 6, 7 9). Impression and comfort level judgments are

(2) strong relationships, and (3) communication. These abilities

influenced by a senior learner's voice quality (Addington, 1968; DePaulo & Coleman, 1987; O'Sullivan, et al., 1985;

highly correlated with the human neuropsychobiological

Phillis, 1970; Scherer, et al., 1991; Zaidel & Mehrabian, 1969). Vocally delivered nonverbal communication skills include (1) appropriately wide, but customarily meaningful, pitch and volume ranges (see Book V, Chapter 2), (2) an habitual voice quality that can be described as "firm and clear but mellow and warm" within the spoken pitch and volume ranges (see Book II, Chapter 10 and Book V, Chapter 2), and (3) genuine, expressive phrasing of conversational and read speech.

McLaughlin's research (1993) indicated that when all of the senior learners in a school are members of a col­ laborative network of senior learners (a community), they each will be much better able to engage the learners that they work with more deeply in their learning. Teachers who are isolated and left on their own, with no collabora­ tive support, tend to provide shallow, unimaginative expe­ riences for their students, hold cynical beliefs about chil­ dren, and value their privacy more than they value teach­ ing well. And finally, a prerequisite for building a sense of com­ munity is time and patience. People in a real community are not just casual acquaintances who meet together occa­ sionally for a common purpose. They are people who have come to know each other, respect each other, and trust each other, and that takes time. Building a sense of community is easier when there are smaller numbers of learners in a group.

make all other learning possible in the first place and are

needs for relatedness, competence, and autonomy. Developmental leaders (senior learners) plan and enact learning experiences that are highly likely to (1) en­ gage attention and be intrinsically interesting to bodyminds, (2) produce and enhance emotionally connected human re­ lationships, (3) enhance pleasant emotional well being, and (3) result in constructive competence (tailored to develop­ mental capabilities). Clearly, learning communities need structure, that is, ways of deciding and planning what will be done and when, and how all of the human beings that are involved will interact with each other. The questions are: What will be the nature of that structure? Who will

create it? How will it be created? Teachers can choose to impose the structure with coercive rules and manipulative extrinsic rewards. That adversarial "mind-set" and the result­ ing adversarial interactions produce a structure that induces protective reactions, diminishes intrinsic "motivation" and creativity, and reduces emotional connectedness (Koestner, et al., 1984). What if, instead of an adversarial, dominance-con­ trol-compliance mind-set, a collaborative "mind-set" be­

came the norm among learners and senior learners. This mind-set predisposes everyone to engage in mutually re­ spectful collaborative interactions that enhance empathic relatedness, constructive competence, and self-reliant au­ tonomy. Senior learners can lead or guide the establish­

The practice of representative democracy is one way to fa­ cilitate decision-making in some larger groups. Observing

ment of structure in collaboration with the people who are

learners as they navigate through the communications skills, responsibility fulfillment, and fairness issues of elected of­ fice can be an important part of the social-emotional, self­ regulation curriculum of a school.

of mutually respectful, self-reliant, cooperative human be­ ings who have an internal (from inside-out) "ownership"

A brief on building collaborative learning com­ munities. Greenspan (1997, pp. 211-213, 217-219) recom­ mends that educational methods be based "...not on tradi­ tion but on the best current insights into how children learn" His "key tenet" in a developmental model of education is:

intellectual learning shares common origins with emotional learning.

Both are unique in each child and "stem from early affective

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called students. The desired result would be a community

of, and sustained involvement with, detailed learning, sym­ boling, interacting, reflecting, creating, and producing (Ryan

& Powelson, 1991; Ryan, et al., 1985). A community rests

on the knowledge of, and connections among, the individuals who are part of it" (Kohn, 1996, p. 113) Kohn (1996, p. 106) suggests that senior learners ask themselves some important questions. For example: "How (will) the classroom system work (see Alshuler, 1980; Bow­

ers & Flinders, 1990)? Are students helped to develop a sense of responsibility for each other? By what means?

for members to be personally introduced and may lead

What happens if a child is reduced to tears by cruel taunts,

whole-group or small-group cooperation as members cre­ ate "performances" (see Ashton & Varga, 1993; Sher, 1995 for more ideas). For example, the senior learner may ask the whole group to form a circle and then say, "I'm going to make a sound with my hands, feet, or voice. Your mission, should

or by deliberate exclusion? What expectations, norms, and structures have been established to deal with such an incident-and to make it less likely to happen in the first place?" What would an observer "see and hear and feel" in a group of human beings who "truly deserved to be called a com­ munity"? and "What would be the most effective ways to prevent a sense of community from being developed in the first place or to destroy a community that is already formed?" In a learning community, senior learners interact with learners as real human beings. They are not controlled, emotionally distanced, "always right", role players. "A real person sometimes gets flustered or distracted or tired, says things without thinking and later regrets them, maintains interests outside of teaching and doesn't mind discussing

them....is vulnerable....remember(s) details about students' lives....thinks about how what they say sounds from the students' point of view....explain(s) what they are up to and

give(s) reasons for their requests...ask(s) students what they think, and then cares about the answers....listens

patiently...shows concern for someone he doesn't

know...apologizes for something he regrets having said...." (Kohn, 1996, pp. 111-113) The key element in building a learning community is the inclusion of learners in nearly all decision-making

processes. Learners of all school ages are quite capable of participating in discussions and decision-making about what

will be learned, how, and when and about empathic treatment of

people in social-emotional relationships. The community build­ ing process begins with sharing constructive, pleasant ex­ periences that builds an emotional connection and trust between all of the community's members. Senior learners and learners become emotionally connected with each other and the learners become connected with each other. When possible and appropriate, a morning-to-afternoon bond­ ing and learning picnic in a public park, or a weekend re­ treat away from school in a camp setting, provides an op­ portunity for enhancing group connection. Group-prepared meals, playing games, group discussions, and singing expe­

riences are possible events. Whether at a retreat or at the first class meeting, senior learners may enable novel ways

participatory games that involve emotionally enjoyable,

you choose to accept it, is to pass that same sound around the circle as fast as you can 'til it comes back to me, and then I'll do another one. We'll go to my left. Are you ready?" After two such sounds are passed around, mem­ bers of the group can be asked if they would like to start a sound. The senior learner may then ask the whole group to divide themselves into groups of five (or another appropri­ ate number). "Here's your mission: One person creates a vocal sound and a movement to go with it. The next per­ son connects with that person's sound and movement by making their own sound and movement. Eventually, ev­ erybody connects, so you all create a collection of sounds that has a beginning and then builds. And your final chal­ lenge is to find a way to create a noticeable closure to your...shall we call it a composition of sounds and silences? You have five minutes to get it together, and afterward we'll all get to see and hear what you've created. Five minutesgo! " Fun and laughter, of course, never happen during these games...? [The two games are borrowed from Patricia Feit and Elizabeth Grefsheim, senior learners for The

VoiceCare Network.] Ongoing group communication is necessary for build­ ing a sense of group connectedness. Whatever they come

to be called, discussions or meetings take place. What is addressed in the meetings will depend, in part, on what type of group is meeting. Discussions in a kindergarten class will be different from discussions in a second, fourth, sixth, eighth, tenth, or twelfth grade class. Meetings in a general music class that meets for 30 minutes two times per week will be different from a middle school choir that meets three times per week, or a high school choir that meets five times per week, or a college-university vocal pedagogy class

that meets twice each week for two hours. Meetings and discussions may take many forms and may take up many issues. As Kohn suggests (1996, pp. 8891), meetings can include a time for a voluntary sharing of human-compatible

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interesting or important events that have happened to group

move on to something else, but to use those events for

members over a weekend, or upcoming events. These are

learning how to acknowledge our human feelings and emo­ tions, how to deal with them when they arise, how to learn from them, how to understand events from other people's perspectives, how to resolve conflicts with other people, when possible, and how to preserve respect and empathy for our fellow human beings, even though we may differ with them.

not "show and tell" or "bring and brag" times, and "...the idea is to take pleasure in others' contributions (experiences and accomplishments) rather than trying to outdo them." But the main purpose of group or class meetings is for reflecting, deciding, and planning. Occasions for reflection, and what is reflected upon, can be initiated by the senior learner, a learner, or an event that has recently occurred and is of concern to the group. Any prominent event that has occurred in near or far proximity to the school, or an event that a member experienced, or an event that occurred be­ tween members, an upcoming event such as a visit by an outside person or a field trip may be reasons to have a reflective, deciding, and/or planning meeting.

Deciding and planning are usually connected. A sense of community (empathic relatedness), constructive compe­ tence, and self-reliant autonomy can be developed further when learners not only reflect on, but participate in deci­

sions about (1) arranging the learning environment, and (2) the most productive ways to carry out the learning experi­

Perspective taking is about developing empathy, so­

ences themselves. Ownership is the word. Examples of in­ cluding learners in nearly all deciding and planning pro­

cial judgment, "people skills", and so on. Child psycholo­

cesses would be: (1) How do we decorate the walls? (2)

gists indicate that it can help children develop perspectives about how other people think and feel and generosity to­

How do we arrange the classroom furniture? (3) What field trip would be both interesting and related to what is being

ward them, rather than wariness or walled-off protective­

studied? (4) Who will make arrangements for the trip and what do they need to get done? (5) How might we resolve personal conflicts? (6) Will learning happen better if we

ness (Feshbach, et al., 1983; Kohn, 1990). For example, a group thought experiment might be introduced this way: "'What if, some time this year, you found yourself acting in a way you weren't proud of? Suppose you hurt someone's feel­ ings, or did something even worse. How would you want (the rest of us) to help you then?' After everyone has re­ flected privately on this question, and perhaps discussed it, pose the follow-up question: 'What if someone else acted that way? How would we help that person?"' (Kohn, 1996, p. 115) Reflection and perspective taking do not result in co-dependency relationships if senior learners help the group

point in the direction of intrinsic interests, self-perceived feedback, and constructive competence. Developing and continuing one's personal self-identity borders is equally important. At the beginning of a school year, a senior learner may ask the learners to reflect on how human beings treat

each other in class and on the playground. Such questions may be considered as, "What can we do when we disagree, or when somebody says or does something unpleasant?" As conflicts and disagreements actually arise, the group can

study in groups or alone, or if we read aloud or silently? (6) Do we need to spend more time on math because some­ thing else that was really interesting caught our attention the past two days? (7) Which music do we need to spend more time rehearsing so we can really be ready for our concert? and (8) How do you feel about going to the choir contest this year? "Whether or not we acknowledge it, stu­ dents are curriculum theorists and critics of schooling. If they are drawn into the conversation about the purposes and practices of schooling, we may all learn useful lessons." (Nicholls & Hazzard, 1993, p. 8) Bringing the learners in on just about every decision

means that senior learners and learners are solving prob­ lems together. "Suppose a student does something hurtful or mean. Immediately we make a choice about how to construe what has happened and what ought to be done. Option One: 'He has done something bad; now something bad must be done to him.' Option 2: 'We have a problem here; how are we going to solve it together?"' (Kohn, 1996,

how we treat each other. As learners experience conflicts,

p. 121) These options reflect the difference between a "do­ ing to" and a "working with" orientation to education. For

the goal is not to shut them off quickly, stifle emotions, and

example, a teacher is going to miss three school days to

ask questions, discuss the particulars, and consider further

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attend a teacher's conference, and a substitute teacher has been hired. A "doing to" teacher would say something like, "Now, if the sub teacher tells me you misbehaved while I'm gone, you'll all have to (describes a punishment), but if I'm told you were good and worked hard on the assign­ ments I've left, then (describes an extrinsic reward)." That teacher might have a meeting with the entire class, tell them that a sub will be with them for three days, and have every­ one say out loud what the teacher expects them to do, and how they are to behave. A "working with" senior learner might have a meet­ ing with the entire class, say, two days before the sub comes in, and say, "We will have a guest in the room two days from now, while I will be away at a teachers' conference. His name is_____. Have any of you ever visited some­ where and you met a group of people that you had never met before, but they all knew each other? [responses, inter­

actions] How did you feel when you were going into the room to meet them? [responses, interactions] Some people would call Mr._____a substitute teacher, but he's really a person who will be our guest for a few days. What can we do to make Mr._____ feel welcome?" And then, the teacher might ask, "What do you think we need to accomplish in

reading, math, science, and music over the three days that I'll be gone? Any ideas?" A post-absence meeting could include a "...thoughtful discussion about how things went and how they might be improved the next time the teacher

Learners grow their social-emotional abilities and vari­ ous knowledge-ability clusters most completely when they "feel safe speaking their minds" with the senior learner. If a

learner becomes frustrated when learning a new ability, and speaks angrily and defensively to the teacher or another

learner, "a private conference is most likely to be productive if the student feels accepted by the adult." (p. 123) Reassur­ ance of that trust and caring "can strengthen the bond that

is necessary to work things out."

For example, in such a private conference, a senior learner might say, "Mickey, what you said felt hurtful to me as a human being, but I know you are really a good person. What happened inside you that made those words come out?" That interaction (1) describes the senior learner's honest

reaction to the learner's behavior, but (2) respectfully sepa­ rated the value of the person from the person's behavior, (3) gave the learner an opportunity to express his own feel­ ings out, and (4) opened a dialogue that can move the two toward deeper mutual respect and empathic relatedness. 2. The senior learner will need the empathic "people skills" described earlier in order to "help students learn to listen carefully, calm themselves, generate suggestions, imag­ ine someone else's point of view, and so on." (p. 123) A lot of "target practice" may be necessary for some children to learn these social-emotional skills (emotion regulation), and many children may not know what the targets and bull's-eyes are in the first place. "(I)f a student seems unre­

is absent." (adapted from Kohn, 1996, pp. 89, 90; also see,

sponsive when asked to take some responsibility for undo­

Child Development Project, 1996a, pp. 72-75, 94-96) In building a learning community, according to Kohn,

ing the damage he did, the reason may have less to do with

the "point of departure" is “How can we work with students to solve this problem? How can we turn this into a chance to help them learn?" Ten suggestions, paraphrased from Kohn (1996, pp. 121-129): 1. The foundation upon which human development and detailed learning are built is empathic relatedness be­ tween the person who is the leader of a learning community (senior learner) and each of the persons within the commu­ nity. Learners must know that their senior learner accepts

his attitude than with his lack of experience in figuring out

what to do" (p. 123) 3. In school situations, some type of governing body has given the senior learner the responsibility for guiding

the learning of other human beings, regardless of their age. In a learning community, the learners are invited to partici­ pate in decisions about how their community's members interact with each other to solve problems that are faced. The senior learner provides guidance-mainly with ques­

them and respects them as unique human beings, cares about

tions, not orders or rules-so that the learners can learn how to think through what is happening and figure out solu­

their individual value and welfare, and trusts them as ca­ pable people who are growing in personal competence and autonomy. When that happens, trust will become mutual.

tions. Doing that is really difficult when we are tired, under pressure, and our own "emotional buttons" have been pushed recently.

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When the same knowledge-ability bull's-eyes are missed over and over by a learner, or when communica­

tion or conflict problems arise among two or more learn­

ers, the senior learner's first concern is, "How can I help

(anyone involved) to learn how to help themselves in simi­ lar situations in the future?" The senior learner begins by gathering information in order to "diagnose...the underly­ ing reasons for a given behavior". Examples: (1)A learner may be "lazy" (there is no such thing; there is a personal history that has formed non-engaged behavior in school settings) because breakfast is never eaten (low blood glu­ cose level) and nutrition is inadequate for a body's needs. (2) A learner may emotionally lash out frequently with other people because parents are in serious conflict. (3) A learner may not speak very often because of genetically inherited shyness that has been deepened by peer teasing in the past.

do you think you (we) can do to accomplish this goal or solve this problem? Chenfield (1991) suggests "four easy nudges" for amplifying learning involvement.

a. "What else?...What else can we find out about the early settlers? What else can you share about your pet gerbil? What else can we think of for our spring program?

What else do we want to know about the Beatles?...There is always more to discover, to learn, to ask, to wonder about." b. "What if? Merely asking this question will auto­ matically trigger the imagination....What if we could trans­ late the songs of whales into English? What if we had ex­

perienced the great journey westward?...What if we began a story with its ending? What if the Founding Fathers had sung the Constitution?"

These are occasions for educational moments within a com­

c. "Show it!...Show an idea: demonstrate it in words, in pictures, in music, in dance, in sculpture, in graphs, in reports, in an interview, in a discussion, with a puppet, on a

munity of learners through the use of hypothetical situa­ tions in which everyone may "play detective" to find pos­ sible underlying reasons for specific behaviors. 4. Some serious internal angst can occur when we teachers wonder about our own, and our educator pro­

bulletin board, as a newspaper, in clay, in a play, in anyway that communicates." d. "Fake it! In the uptight, test-centered, anxiety-filled world of education, 'fake it' gives permission to try some­ thing new or different. Take a stab at it. Make believe you

fessions', habitual practices. Sometimes those wonderings can be quite threatening to our own well being and "sense

can do it....Hang loose. Stay cool. If you can't do something

perfectly, it's okay to try anyway. 'Fake it' invites participa­

of competence". After we have learned about the stifling

tion and encourages involvement. It draws a circle that

effects of coercive punishments, punishment threats, and extrinsic rewards, then we may wonder about our own habitual use of them to "motivate our students". For ex­ ample, what if a college singing student is practicing only about an hour before each weekly lesson and her progress on voice skill mastery shows it. The teacher can threaten

encompasses everyone. No one is ever left out....If you're unsure, fake it!" 6. Two learners are shouting angrily at each other and occa­ sionally shoving each other The group's senior learner hurries to them, shouts "Stop", places herself between the two learners, and then says, "Walk with me." They walk to a nearby area away from other people. During the walk, Bay reports to the senior learner that Dawn had called her an insulting name and that she just could not let it go. At this point, all the senior learner knows is that the two young women are angry and that Bay has stated that Dawn addressed a specific insulting term toward her and a shouting-shoving event happened. In their private talk, the senior learner asks Bay, "What happened?" As Bay's story unfolds, the senior learner asks follow-up questions to help her describe her perception of the event's sequence, what was said by whom, and how that made her feel. Then the senior learner says, "Is that what happened, Dawn?" Dawn then tells her perception of the event's sequence and who said what, and the senior learner asks ques­ tions about what Dawn's feelings were as the event transpired. [Those

"consequences" or give a low grade or otherwise coerce the student into compliance, or the teacher can meet privately with the student and make the student to work out a rigid

practice plan. Neither approach "asks the key question(s)": What is the student being asked to do? Is it intrinsically interesting to the student? How involved was the student in designing the learning experiences? These questions can help us reach beyond our current grasp, as the poet Browning might have said. 5. Maximize student involvement in deciding how to accomplish goals and solve problems. "With tongue partly in cheek, I will now reveal in four words how to become a better educator: Talk less, ask more" (p. 126) What

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follow-up questions are focused on exposing the two girls to each other's perspective and to their human feeling reac­ tions to the event] The senior learner keeps in mind that Bay's and Dawn's "inter­ preter mechanisms" (see Chapter 7) will possibly engage at some point to generate one or more self-justifying explanations and one or more statements of accusation or blame toward the other In order to avoid haggling over whose version is accurate or who is to blame, the senior learner just summarizes the two versions of events and how each of the two participants felt during and after it. As their cerebral cortices are able to "quiet" their limbic systems, under the influence of the senior learner's questions, the two learners begin to modify their "positions" toward a more literal observation of the events. At an appropriate point, the senior learner says, 'All of us hu­ man beings get frustrated and ticked off at times. I suspect that, deep down, neither of you really wants to carry on an "I'll-hurt-you-whenever-I-can contest from now on. I got into a few of those when I was younger, and they were such a waste of energy and time. So, what do you think we can do now? Is there a way to resolve this and rejoin the flow of our group?” At this point, the learners can suggest pro forma apolo­

gies, or bargain for a punishment lite consequence, or say something else that they believe the senior learner wants them to say The senior learner can mete out a punishment to them both or offer an extrinsic reward for good behav­ ior in the future. Or, the senior learner can guide the learn­

can be rewarding for everyone concerned. 9. When carrying out problem solutions or goal ac­ complishments, flexibility is important in logistics, what is said and done, how it is said and done, when it is done, and how long it takes. For example, several disruptions of group attention are initiated by one learner in a choral group re­ hearsal. Instead of stopping the rehearsal for a one-to-one or group meeting to deal with the problem right then, a senior learner may say, "Tyne, something just happened that

I would like to talk to you about at the end of this rehearsal. See me right here. Now, altos, how close can you come to..." The statement tags the disruptive event in Tyne's memory so that it can be referred to in the one-to-one meeting after rehearsal. Sometimes, a whole-group meeting will be the best way to solve problems, set goals, and make plans. On other occasions, a small group meeting or oneto-one meetings with individual learners may be the ticket. Asking for suggestions from colleagues or friends or stu­ dents may trigger a flash of insight. "In short, 'doing to'

responses can be scripted, but 'working with' responses of­ ten have to be improvised" (p. 128) 10. There may be times when the neuropsychobio­ logical state of a learner makes self-regulation extremely difficult if not impossible for them. Repeated interruptions of the other learners, for instance, are not fair to them. Under such special circumstances, temporarily separating the learner from the group can be a last-resort option. The senior

7. When one or a group of learners have said or done

learner might say, in a respectful, calm, but concerned voice, "Mel, I don't know why, but in the past five or 10 minutes, the concentration of your choirmates has been disrupted by your talking and elbowing. We need to get a lot of

something that is disrespectful or destructive-intentionally or through negligence-a senior learner might say, "If they

things done, here, and we'd like to have your voice making its contribution, so can you bring yourself into a flow with

had [said or done] that to you, what could they do to make it right with you?" or the senior learner could describe the

the rest of us? And let's talk this out after rehearsal. Meet me right here. OK?" [wait for a response] If the disruptions continue: "Mel, we really need to make this music go, here. So, for now, please go to my office and wait there for me, so we can talk this over" The point? Minimize the punitive impact of the one, two, or three last-resort actions that one takes per year (some options are addressed later). Teachers at all levels, from kindergarten through gradu­

ers toward constructing an authentic solution to their con­ flict, if they are not able to go there on their own. The goal is empathic relatedness.

damages and/or the painful feelings, and ask, "What can you do to repair this damage (or hurt)?" "A reasonable follow-up to a destructive action may be to try to restore, replace, repair, clean up, or apologize, as the situation may dictate", that is, "make restitution or reparations", (p. 127) 8. Senior learners, showing interest in the social-emo­ tional growth of learners, can check back later to observe how solutions or goals are working out. Additional guid­ ance may be needed but listening to a report of progress

ate school, are expected to cover a large range of experi­

ences in a fairly limited amount of time. Experienced edu­ cators are concerned that all of the time that would have to human-compatible

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be devoted to helping learners develop empathic related­ ness and self-reliant autonomy through community build­ ing, would mean that knowledge-ability learning (academ­ ics) would suffer too much. After all, schools in Western

to spend a lifetime doing what one is told and being pre­ pared to take an active role in a democratic society..." (Kohn, 1996, p. 73) Transition from external and punitive control to collaborative community. When students have substan­

cultures are held accountable for language, math, and sci­ ence test scores, not for the extent to which self-regulation

tially experienced external and punitive control from their

and social-emotional abilities are developed. "Taking time

teachers, then many learners are not likely to have much

to develop relationships with students sounds like teachers are trying to be their buddies. All these meetings and taking time to solve personal problems are just babying them, not getting them ready for the tough real world. Families and religions are supposed to take care of those things. Schools are for teaching academic skills for a successful future in the real world." [Notice an interpreter mechanism's use of nominalizations to overgeneralize, and compartmentalize human beings?] Do collaborative learning experiences take too much time? Taking time to help learners build personal and so­ cial abilities at the "front end" of schooling experiences mas­ sively reduces the time spent on "police work" and "disci­ pline" later on, and the unpleasant distresses that they bring to everyone concerned. Much more time can then be de­ voted to developing knowledge-ability clusters that can

experience in reflecting on social-emotional problems, com­ municating their own ideas, interacting empathically, and

bring the intrinsic rewards and interests that lead to a suc­ cessful future. Mutual trust and respect, ethical character, and moral judgment abilities are being developed (Kitchener, et al., 1993). In addition, learners "...learn to reason their way through problems, analyzing possibilities and negoti­

ating solutions....are less likely to be alienated" and more likely to "learn enthusiastically" as they develop construc­ tive competencies and self-reliant autonomy (see Kohn, 1996, p. 90, 91). When learners perceive that they have an accepted and respected "voice" in decisions about goal setting, plan­ ning and enacting learning experiences, problem-solving, and assessment, then intrinsic ownership of their learning is quite likely to take place. Emotional connection to senior

learners, fellow learners, and the knowledge-ability cluster(s)

at hand also are likely (see previous sections). "There are few educational contrasts so sharp and meaningful as that between students being told what the teacher expects of them, what they are and are not permitted to do, and stu­ dents coming together to reflect on how they can live and learn together. It is the difference between being prepared

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making collaborative decisions. Social-emotional self-regu­ lation is likely to take time and patient direction-pointing. A senior learner whose students were previously taught by someone who exerted tight, external, punitive control, or by an inconsistently punitive-then-friendly teacher, will face

very different challenges as compared to a teacher whose students were previously taught in a collaborative way. The

same challenges face substitute teachers. Kohn observed five former tightly controlled classrooms go through a tran­ sition toward becoming a collaborative community. He noted five common learner reactions (adapted from Kohn,

1996, pp. 96, 97) .

1. In acting out, a large store of suppressed emotional

ouches and hits emerged in student behavior (see previous section). In some cases exploded was the more accurate word. 2. Testing of the teacher appeared in many forms such as "outrageous suggestions" or even disrespectful talk. Sometimes, this behavior is interpreted by teachers as a sign that children were "asking for limits and discipline". Kohn suggested that teachers were tested "...to see whether you

mean what you say when you tell them their needs and preferences matter. They may be asking you to prove that you are not just a teacher who reassuringly declares, 'This is our classroom!...and then proceeds to.." make all of the "im­ portant decisions". 3. When teachers ask students what to do about a situation that has arisen, outright resistance may happen in a form such as, "I don't like this way of doing things. I don't want to think. Just tell us what to do and we'll do it" 4. Silence or one-to-three word rejection responses may occur, such as, "I don't care", or "Whatever". 5. Parroting means that students will say what they think the teacher wants them to say, that is, an obviously correct, please-the-teacher point of view.

One high school student, whose math teacher devel­

oped collaborative communities in his 45-minute classes, "...describe(d) how difficult this approach was for her ini­ tially, since she was someone who preferred to be told what to do. At first, she (said), 'I couldn't really deal with sitting in a circle and talking stuff to death,' but by the spring, 'I was, like, starting to take responsibility'" (Kohn, 1996, pp. 90, 91). When in doubt, bring the learners in on it.

Some Applications to Arts Educa­ tion, Music and Choral Education, and Private Voice Education

Principal: (chuckling) Well, I didn't think you'd do all of those things. But the fact is that singing in a choir is just not the same as studying an academic discipline. It's more like an extracurricular activity. I think you should be grateful that it's offered for any credit at all. Wonderings: Academic? Discipline? Textbooks? Homework? Tests? Exams? Grades? Credit? What do young people need in order to flourish, to become curious, communicative, creative, productive, lifelong learners, and to be empathically disposed toward fellow human beings, constructively competent, and socially responsible partici­ pants in a democratic society over their life-span? How can we help them meet those needs?

At least two graduates of those choirs became profes­

The 25-year-old high school choral music educator was pas­ sionate about expressive singing of significant, expressive music. A wide variety of musical styles were studied and performed, mostly "clas­ sical" music, and a multi-movement work was included in each year's repertoire. In rehearsals, he taught expressive musical skills and sight­ singing skills, and he provided historical contexts for much of the music that the choir performed. The choirs performed with reasonable frequency, hosted a local-area invitational choral festival each year, and developed quite a familial esprit de choir. One of the choirs toured Europe. Several of the academically inclined singers said, on several oc­ casions, that they did more work in choirs than they did in many of their academic courses, but only received one credit unit instead oftwoto-four. They felt that it wasn't fair. So, the teacher met with the school's principal and relayed their concerns. He detailed the academic type of work that being in a choir involved, and asked, "Is it possible to offer choir for more than one credit?" Principal: "Well, academic courses have textbooks and they give tests and final exams, and that doesn't happen in an activity course like choir or band, so I don't think that would be possible." The teacher wrote an 82-page book that explained, in simple terms, some musical acoustics, simple fundamentals of music theory, a basic approach to sight-singing, a brief orientation to music history, and some rudimentary understandings about voice skills. He occa­ sionally gave short written tests on the book content and a final exam that assessed book knowledge and knowledge of historical information about the music that was under rehearsal and its composers, sight­ singing skills, and the degree of memorization of the music that had been or was about to be performed. Several months later, he met with the principal again.

sional "classical music" singers with moderate careers in the United States and Europe. Several became music educators or teachers of other subject areas. One graduate organized and implemented the first women's athletic program in the school district of a large city in Indiana. As adults, some of the singers told the teacher that those intense and expres­ sive choir experiences were primary influences on the course that their lives had taken and had opened them up to the wider world around them. A dedicated, enthusiastic, elementary school music educator teaches eight half-hour classes in a row every morning, five days per week-with no break. She has a 30-minute lunch period (10 to 15 minutes of which are spent wrapping up the morning classes and setting up for the afternoon). She then resumes teaching five half-hour classes in a row-with no break. She asks the school principal for a schedule adjustment and is told, "I just can't do that. The classroom teachers need their preparation breaks." Over several months, the teacher experiences increased discom­ fort, then increasing pain, in her vaginal area, especially during urina­ tion. Her family practice physician diagnoses urethral stenosis. [In women, the urethra is the small, 3-cm. tube through which urine drains from the bladder. Stenosis (Greek: stenos = narrow; osis = condi­ tion) refers to an abnormally narrowed or constricted passageway or opening in a body structure.] The physician comments that he sees this condition somewhat frequently in teachers who have schedules like hers. It develops because the bladder-urethra muscles must close in­ tensely for long periods of time in order to retain large accumulations of urine in the bladder. In addition, the clarity and pitch range compass of the teacher's untrained soprano voice slowly deteriorates (she was a keyboard ma­ human-compatible

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jor), and eventually, she "loses her voice" (aphonia). A cooperative voice treatment team (ear-nose-throat physician, speech-voice patholo­ gist, and a specialist voice educator) observed moderate-sized vocal fold nodules, severe swelling, and considerable over-efforting by her larynx, pharynx, and neck muscles. She took a six-month leave of absence from her job. Medications, increased hydration, and immediate uri­ nations when needed are helping her nervous system normalize her bladder-urethra function. Several months of voice therapy are helping her vocal fold tissues heal and return efficient vocal function for speak­ ing and singing. Wonderings: Do school administrators and "regu­ lar" classroom teachers perceive arts educators as relief for the classroom teachers? Or are they perceived as specialist educators who help learners express themselves ever more richly through symbolic modes of human self-expression

that are as important as language and mathematics? When their students are meeting with an arts specialist, do class­ room teachers observe the class and then confer with the

music educator to follow up on the experiences of the mu­

sic class? Do music programs actually help learners ex­ press themselves through symbolic modes that are as im­ portant as language and mathematics? How significant can music programs be when elementary school children are exposed to music education about 24 hours per year or

integrate self-expression through the symbolic modes called the arts with general educational experiences. Typically, read­ ing a short story or one of Shakespeare's plays aloud in a secondary school English class does not include how to read or speak expressively. Thus, a core essential of the selfexpressive literary arts is missed. And classroom teachers rarely engage their students in expressive singing. [Most of them were scared spitless of music and singing by their experiences in a required undergraduate music course.] A standard perspective is that the really important symbolic systems are languages and mathematics, and, of course, "science" is the wave on which future high-paying jobs ride. So, another wondering: In an attempt to demon­ strate the current status of educational quality in schools and school systems, the scores on high-stakes standardized tests

in math, language, and science are published in local news­ papers along with reporters' comments. Standardized tests

in the arts have never been given and, thus, are never pub­ lished with the other scores. Does that mean that other

subjects are second- or third-class educational experiences? This state of affairs reflects a cultural perception of "the arts"

as peripheral to a "solid" education, so when budgets need trimming, arts education cuts have been a common source of financial savings. In the U.S., arts educators had to "raise

less? When music educators are treated the way the above teacher was treated, how long will they stay in the profes­ sion?

quite a ruckus" with politicians in order to get the arts in­

Typically, U.S. elementary music educators interact with all of the students in one-to-three different schools each week and are scheduled to see students in each classroom of each school for 30 minutes once or twice a week, some­ times three. Many music educators carry their equipment with them from classroom to classroom on a cart, and have

pers printed editorials suggesting that doing so was a waste of taxpayer money. Does "music education make kids smarter"? Does it "dramatically enhance children's abstract reasoning skills, the skills necessary for learning math and science"? Does it increase "general intelligence"? As noted earlier in this chapter, the nominalized concept of intelligence itself is in debate. Deacon (1997) described intelligence as "...originating, mo­

schedules that are similar to the teacher described above. Those that teach at multiple schools also drive to another school during lunchtime, eating in their car. Music educa­ tors may see a total of anywhere from 400 to 1,300 students per week! Apparently, a common perspective among many edu­ cators, taxpayers, and legislators is that experiences in the arts are important, but they are peripheral to educational "substance". To some, the arts seem to be about entertaining or distracting people away from life's more serious matters. Although there are exceptions, classroom educators rarely

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cluded in the Goals 2000 legislation. When the national

standards in the arts were first published, some newspa­

ment by moment, new, detailed, appropriate representations

[images, concepts, symbols, and so forth] of an ever-chang­ ing environment and spontaneously generating new, com­ plex, adaptive responses to that environment where none previously existed, generating useful information from scratch to fit in with and take advantage of..." unfamiliar

environments as they occur. Intelligence is reflected in "many levels of functioning" and in "highly robust regulatory flex­ ibility". It also is demonstrated in the ability to judge the

extent to which newly originated representations match "re­

(1982, 1983, 1991a, 1993, 1994) and other researchers (e.g.,

ality" and the extent to which new adaptive responses are appropriate to various situations that are encountered. Gardner (1999) has proposed eight intelligences. Sternberg (1996, 1998) described three ways of exhibiting successful intelligence-critical-analytic intelligence, creative-synthetic intelligence, and practical-contextual intelligence (see Chapter 8 for more). To what extent are those characteristics of "intelligence" enhanced by music education? Would their development

Foax, et al., 1995; Hodges, 1996) have taken important steps toward changing that reality.

depend on how music (arts) education is experienced? Are

the musical experiences that "enhance abstract reasoning" presented by all music teachers in all schools? What are those experiences, how do they accomplish that result, and how is it credibly assessed? Will publicizing those perspec­ tives help upgrade public perceptions about, and actions toward, music education? One study on which those claims are based showed that certain types of music listening and instruction caused a slight improvement in "spatial reason­ ing" test scores for some children that lasted for a short time. These lines of research are quite promising, actually,

but there are many variables that have not yet been fac­ tored, and it is far too early to use the findings as justifica­ tion for claims of increased development of "intelligence" because of music instruction. If music education does enable better math and sci­ ence learning, does that mean that parents should be encour­ aged to involve their children in music education because it helps them become better at math and science? Will learn­ ing music in order to get an advantage in other knowledge­ ability clusters increase the probability that young people

will choose to make music over their lifetimes? Or, when

the smarts have been obtained, will music-making then be dropped because there is no longer a reason to pursue it? Remember the effect that extrinsic rewards have on people? The circumstances described above strongly suggest that the arts education professions: (1) have not settled on a clear, no-doubt-about-it, way of communicating that the arts are deeply significant knowledge-ability clusters for hu­ man beings in any culture, and are not just a nice way of distracting and entertaining people away from the serious

concerns of life; and (2) have not developed a consistent, profession-wide perspective about learning and practice that is based on a wide array of significant findings within the neuropsychobiological sciences. Howard Gardner's work

Individual or grouped human beings, genuinely ex­ pressing out personal, real-life, feeling-laden, human per­

spectives, is the heart and soul of all the symbolic modes

that we call the arts (see the final section of Chapter 8). Yes, the neural network "sharpenings" that occur during repeated self-expressive experiences (the arts) are available for use when parts of those networks are used in other ability clus­ ters. Indeed, elaborated involvement with the arts can sensi­ tize ("sharpen") attention-focusing neural networks and re­ lated visual, auditory, and somatosensory networks. Sing­ ing songs, for example, can be a valuable aid in developing

language ability, the study of cultural and political events, and so on. But are these the intrinsic, from-inside-out reasons why human beings evolved drawing-painting-sculpting, music, dance, and theatre in the first place? When arts learning experiences engage all of the learners' senses in evaluative pattern detection (analytic and integrative) and in produc­ tive activities that are self-expressive and intrinsically re­ warding, then focused and sustained attention is almost

inevitable. An example would be learners composing songs that express their own feeling reactions from life-living and then guiding the rehearsal and performance of them. At the same time that expressive skills are being honed, self-deter­ mination and self-reliance are enhanced, and empathic mutual respect, productivity, group cohesion, and collabo­ rative community building can be amplified (Parks & Sanna, 1999, pp. 9-20, 61-77). In such a learning atmosphere, "dis­ cipline problems" are quite rare. How often does the personal expressing-out really happen in arts (music) education? May it increase.

Preparing to Be a Voice Education Senior Learner In order to accomplish the kinds of human-compat­ ible learning processes that are described in this chapter, the

pre-service education of comprehensive voice educators will need to include experiences that are currently not com­ mon. For example, candidate general music educators, choral conductors, singing teachers, speech teachers, and theatre directors need to learn: human-compatible

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1. Habitual efficient skills when using their own voices

for: (a) expressive up-close conversation, larger group in­

teractions, or rehearsal settings, (b) expressive reading, (c) expressive singing. 2. Deep knowledge about: (a) the neuropsychosocial biology of human be­ ings and their resultant behavioral expressions, (b) how voices are made, (c) how they function with optimum efficiency and with inefficiency, in both speaking and singing, (d) how voices can become disordered,

(e) how to prevent voice disorders, and (f) how to be an auxiliary member of cooperative voice treatment teams that help learners with disordered voices recover their vocal health. 3. Education in the verbal and nonverbal abilities that

are involved in: (a) planning, writing, and spoken delivery of goals, goal-sets, pinpoint goals that are intended to result in em­

pathic relatedness and group "sense of genuine commu­ nity", constructive competence in expressive vocal abilities, and self-reliant autonomy; (b) the enactment of learning experiences that opti­ mize the intrinsic rewards of efficient and expressive vocal sound-making, speech-making, and song-making; (c) the development of lifelong, intrinsic interest in self-expressive voicing;

(d) the art of asking questions that facilitate inclu­ sion of learners in reflective decision-making and planning,

elaborative memory encoding, consolidation, and retrieval (explicit and implicit), and in the enhancement of self-per­ ceived feedback by learners; (e) the delivery of descriptive feedback (implicit

praise); and

(f) embedded collaborative assessment processes. These abilities are extremely complex and cannot be

mastered in four years of a traditional baccalaureate degree in music, speech, or theatre education. What if the bacca­

laureate degree were to become a "pre-education" degree,

like it is in the medicine and law professions? What if it

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included foundational courses in the neuropsychosocial biological sciences and courses in a college of human self­ expression (languages and the verbal and nonverbal audi­ tory, bodily-kinesthetic, visual, and combination arts)? What if it were followed by a two- to three-year masters degree that finishes with at least a one-year internship with one or more master teachers in a "teaching school" (as in "teaching hospital" in medicine)?

Senior Learner Leadership that is Human-Compatible in General Music Education, Choral Music, and One-toOne Voice Education Context. In all music and voice education settings, what can senior learners do to optimize human-compat­ ible learning? What can senior learners do to optimize the chances that the learners they work with will love music,

their voices, and themselves over their entire life-spans, and will respect and interact collaboratively with fellow human beings? The neuropsychobiological sciences point us in at least three general directions. 1. Optimum realization of learning goals cannot hap­

pen unless both learners and senior learners can experience

emotional safety and empathic relatedness nearly all the time, that is, a "sense of community". Emotional safety and

empathic relatedness cannot be optimally established in a coercive, accusative, punitive, destructively competitive, stressful, disrespectful, or perfectionist atmosphere (see Wiggins, 1999). They can be established in a respectful, non­ verbal matching, collaborative, helpful, intrinsically reward­ ing, goal-oriented, productive atmosphere. So, the most im­ portant goal of senior learner leadership is to help learners culti­ vate emotional self-regulation and empathic social-emotional relationships in all of their life experiences. 2. Developing competence is the same as converting innate cognitive-emotional-behavioral capabilities into learned and increasingly elaborated abilities. Optimal con­ structive competence in vocal self-expression cannot happen in threat-prominent settings or in the absence of

emotional self-regulation and empathic social-emotional re­ lationships. Learning and refining abilities by "taking target practice on many bull's-eyes" also reduces or eliminates the threat of self-perceived personal inadequacy that stems

from the imaginary concepts of mistakes, errors, wrongs, incorrects, and failture. The verbal and nonverbal ways that senior learn­ ers facilitate goal-setting and feedback are crucially impor­ tant to learning constructive abilities. Choosing to involve one's self in skilled, vocally self-expressive experiences over a life­ time also depends on the extent to which intrinsic rewards were experienced when participating in those experiences earlier in life. Lifelong intrinsic interest in the expressive vocal arts evolves from repeated, intrinsically rewarding experi­ ences with them. Competent self-expressive abilities include all forms of verbal and nonverbal communication such as (1) ex­ pressive conversational speech, (2) expressive gesturing (pos­ tural, facial, arm-hand), (3) expressive reading, (4) expres­ sive portrayal, (5) expressive singing, and (6) consistently "on-target" interpretation of the communications that are presented by other people.

Competent physical coordi­

nation abilities for voice and speech make self-expres­ sive speaking and singing clearer, richer, and deeper (pre­

sented in Books II and V). Optimum learning of these abili­ ties necessitates frequent experiencing of expressive and well crafted exemplars of the expressive vocal arts (stories, songs, plays), and of other human beings displaying expressive abilities with optimum skill and "genuineness of heart". These experiencings are particularly important during the reflex, sensorimotor, and representational tiers of brain and cog­ nitive-emotional-behavioral development (prenatal through about age 10 years; see Chapter 8). To learn expressive singing abilities, for example, in­ trinsic reward and interest will be increased when learners frequently listen to and sing expressive and well crafted songs and choral music. Vocal music that has stood the test of long-term emotional appeal to children and adults (mainly folksongs) would be prime resources, as well as new songs that "have a feel of human connectedness". Songs that have been produced just for seasonal observance, commercial sales, or for teaching non-expressive concepts and abilities are not likely to be expressive or well crafted. During the abstract tier of development, children are capable of distin­

guishing the difference between expressive and inexpres­ sive music, but they are likely to need help from senior learners. 3. The development of self-reliant autonomy is con­ siderably enhanced by learning emotional self-regulation

abilities and establishment of strong self-borders, empathic social-emotional relationship abilities, and constructive com­

petence in verbal and nonverbal self-expression.

These

abilities are stifled in an external control, coercive-compli­

ance, "doing to", atmosphere. Autonomy is developed when

senior learners help learners take "target practice" in the per­ sonal creation of poetry and songs-improvised or notatedthat express their own real, experienced feeling states, and then rehearse, read, and/or sing them expressively and skill­ fully. Even though collaborative "working with" is rela­ tively "messy", it is the only way that senior learners can help learners take target practice on the ability to identify and solve problems for themselves, to set goals, plan solu­ tions and enact them, and to reflect on the results in human

terms. Do senior learners feel their own "pride of achieve­ ment" when learners are dependent on them for problem analysis, goal setting, plan-making, solution enactment, and

reflective assessment? What if senior learners' pride of achievement increases as they become less and less neces­ sary because the learners are "coming into their own"? Planning by senior learners is a form of perspective­ taking. Within the concepts of (a) cap ability-ability continua and (b) a collaborative mind-set, senior learners ex­ press intended directions for learning that they believe would be valuable for learners to attain. These learning directions (goals) must be constrained by the senior learners' knowl­ edge of (1) the on-line capabilities of the learners (related to tiers-levels of brain growth spurts), (2) the abilities that learn­ ers have developed in the past; (3) the amount of time that actually will be available for learning experiences, and so on. For example, some research indicates that in the better music education programs of U.S. elementary schools, chil­

dren are scheduled to receive about 24 hours per year of music education. What life-enhancing goals can be accom­

plished well by learners in 24 hours per year over six or seven years (about 144 hours out of about 7,200 hours of in-school time over six years). Learning a repertoire of truly expressive songs, learning how to sing and speak expressively with efficient vocal skill, and loving it, would be excellent core goals. Goals may be globally grouped according to the neuropsychobiological needs of human beings, that is, (1) empathic relatedness, (2) constructive competencies in so­ cial-emotional self-regulation and in vocal self-expression

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in speaking and singing, and (3) self-reliant autonomy.

questions and feedback, learner self-examination and self­

Longer-term goals, directions, or perspectives may

perceived feedback, collected evidence of formative learn­

be written in terms of what learners would be like, as vo­ cally self-expressive human beings, after they have com­ pleted all of their learning experiences at a school. What will youngsters be like who begin their schooling experi­ ences in a pre-kindergarten setting and progress through

ing such as portfolios, photographs, audiotape and video­ tape recordings, and so on. Summative assessments may be planned such as participation in public performances that are recorded, big-picture written self-assessments, and big-picture written assessments by the senior learner that are collaboratively discussed with learners for possible con­ sensus. Parents and community members can be brought into a learning experience/assessment process by inviting

grade 12 and become high school graduates? What will

learners be like after four years at a college, or two to five

years of graduate school? These "voice education program goals" are desirable, large, summative ability targets (con­ ceptual frameworks, for example) that can only be attained by mastering the perceptual, value-emotive, conceptual, and behavioral bull's-eyes of many smaller targets (component concepts, for example). Shorter-term goals, directions, or perspectives, related to the longer-term goals, may include the working goal-sets for a selected portion of each schooling year or course term. These goal-sets may be outlined in an anticipated sequenc­

ing of formative ability targets or goal-sets. Preparation for each day of learning experiences will include anticipated spoken or implied goal-sets and anticipated spoken pin­ point goals (bull's-eyes). Goal-sets and pinpoint goals are enmeshed with the planning of collaborative learning ex­ periences and the cycling of them with learners. What musics, movements, pitch patterns, singing games, and so on, might the learners be engaged with, in what sequence, and how will they be engaged with them? Will I include only well crafted expressive music, even for prekindergarten children? Will I include "functional" songs that are neither well crafted nor expressive? What will be the first experience of each class, rehearsal, or lesson that is intended to engage the attention of learners and be most likely to result in intrinsic reward? How might each learn­ ing experience continue so that intrinsic interest will be sus­

tained? How might each learning experience be ended so that a pleasant-feeling closure happens? These are some of the crucial questions to ask. Anticipated collaborative assessments of learning can be integrated with the planning of each day's goals and learning experiences, including how they will be embedded in the learning cycles. Daily formative assessments may be built into each learning experience, such as senior learner

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their participation in informances (a portion of performances that inform the public about what skilled, expressive sing­ ing really involves). Learners and senior learners may plan, rehearse, and demonstrate for family, friends, colleagues and members of the community, various aspects of the vocal self-expression abilities that learners are attaining in music, speech, or theatre.

How might human-compatible learning be realized by senior learners in general music education, choral mu­ sic, and one-to-one voice education? The remainder of this chapter suggests some possibilities. General music education. The introductory meeting of new senior learners, and the learners with whom they will be interacting, includes both verbal and nonverbal com­ munications. As learners are welcomed to music study, they read the arrangement of the senior learners' skeletons (posture), their facial expressions (especially pleasant-un­ pleasant, smile-no smile), their arm-hand gestures, and their voice qualities for initial feeling-based impressions accord­ ing to past experiences with people who are called music teachers. Being recognized as a unique human being among a group of human beings elicits empathic relatedness between the recognizer and the recognizee, and gives a pleasantfeeling boost to the recognizee. In traditional rectangular classroom seating, the eye-gaze patterns of teachers tend to move in a triangle that gradually spreads left and right from a straight-ahead gaze, and that is the zone of greatest stu­ dent attention and participation (Knapp & Hall, 1992, p 55). Commonly, that excludes students who are seated nearer the front and to the presenter's left and right. Eye contact that includes the whole group necessitates looking at all learners.

Start nearly every class by being constructively pro­ ductive. As suggested in Table I-9-10, always begin a class with voiceplaysm, that engages attention and constructive skill building in speaking, moving, and singing. Imitative vocal sound-making and speech-making, with efficiently produced vocal models from the senior learner, can pro­ vide practice for (1) efficient larynx coordinations in speech,

(2) vocal fold closure intensities (volume and quality varia-

Table I-9-10. Some Ways to Engage the Attention of Learners in the General Music Setting 1. Upon first meeting a group of learners, before doing anything else, raise your hand above your head as you walk among and around them with a pleasant look on your face and seek eye contact When they have become silent, clap a short, simple rhythm and say, "Can you do that together as a group? I'll clap it again, then you." Perform several rhythms before immediately moving into a next learning experience. Then, ask everyone to sit on the floor with you and introduce yourself with a sung pitch-pattern and ask each child to introduce herself or himself with that pattern or one that they have made up. Give each child full eye-contact attention with a pleasantly expectant, smiling facial expression, with no change if they sing a pattern's pitches inaccurately or in another key. Finish the session with one or more "ice-breaking" singing games. 2. In the next meeting of the learners, before doing anything else, raise your hand high above your head as you walk among or around them with a pleasant look on your face and seek eye contact. When they have become silent, ask, "If, at the beginning of every class, I raise my hand like this, what do you suppose that could mean?" [response: "time to become quiet and begin"] "Just for the fun of it, when you see my hand raised, you raise your hand too, and become silent, and when everyone has done so, we'll get going. Let's find out what that's like. Everybody start talking...[the experience occurs and other learning experiences follow] Then, anytime learners have been interacting among themselves, and group attention is needed, the same pattern can occur. 3. Other possibilities for interactive involvement: • Speak several short, simple, improvised phrases or sentences that vary vocal pitch, volume, quality, and duration (mix in some sound­ making patterns).

• Sing a short, simple, improvised pitch pattern or melody on non­ word syllables or on made-up word combinations. • Speak or sing a phrase from a story, poem, play, or song that is being studied. • Speak or sing phrases that contrast the presence or absence of a particular vocal or musical skill, and then ask questions about it (assumes prior experiences) • Model gestures that can serve as visual and kinesthetic metaphors for some aspect of spoken or sung vocal expressions (see Tkach Hibbard, 1994; Wis, 1993). • Ask individual learners to clap a rhythm, speak or sing a pattern or melody snippet, suggest and use metaphoric gestures, or demonstrate the presence or absence ofa vocal or musical ability. • Play a singing-movement game through which goal-sets and pinpoint goals are undertaken and collaborative assessments are made.

tions), (3) lower, upper, and even flute register coordina­

tions, (4) blended register transitions, (5) vocal tract adjust­

ments (mouth and throat parts). Voiceplaysm also can be part of (1) conditioning for larynx muscles and vocal fold cover tissues, and (2) a beginning of vocal warm-ups. Voice skill games can be played and invented and senior learners can ask follow-up questions to help learners develop audi­ tory, kinesthetic, tactile, and visual categorizations, and elabo­ rate their conceptual categorizations and behavioral abili­ ties. Learners can learn how to lead the games (Book IV, Chapter 3, presents research based underpinnings for the practical applications in Book V Chapter 6). Present a list of sentences that have contrasting "feel­ ing meanings", such as, "Each day is a grand adventure, that ends in quiet sleep" [from Andrews & Summers, 1988] Se­ nior learner: "Read the sentence silently two or three times to get a feel for what is being expressed. Do you see one or two meaning chunks in the sentence? [response] Say the first meaning chunk out loud. How would you say it if

you had just returned from travel to a way-over-the top interesting place, and were saying these words to a close friend? [response] How would you say it to express the high-powered grandness of that adventure?" Experiment with how the second meaning chunk might be spoken if the opposite of the intended feeling meanings were expressed, then speak it and express the intended meaning. Explore how many different ways each meaning chunk of the sen­ tence can be spoken to express different shadings of feeling meanings. With no introduction, read a short, expressive

poem inexpressively, and then expressively. Ask questions,

discuss, pass out copies so everyone can experiment with and demonstrate different shadings of feeling meaning. In nearly every music class, if the first song that is

sung is familiar or easily masterable expressive music, then the familiarity and constructive challenge are likely to result in emotional connectedness. During a class meeting at the beginning of a year, ask, "Can only a few especially talented people learn how to sing well?" Begin a dialogue or debate. Introduce the "continuum of development" concept and "your voice capability line" (see Figure I-8-1 in Chapter 8, Book IV, Chapter 3, and Book V, Chapter 6). Then ask,

"What would you like to be able to do with music, or your singing, or your voice?" A collaborative orientation may include: "What can you teach me about a piece of music human-compatible

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that you like?" or "I'll sing a song, and you help me with my

you could do that." She asked, "Do you guys know that song?" Nearly

voice skills" These types of interactions, and many others, can trigger mutual goal setting, that is, creating "targets" that

all of them said "Yes!" "Well, sing it with me," and off they went. After they sang it together, one guy said, "Do you know (name of another classic rhythm & blues song)?" and they tore into it. After singing several songs together, they talked for a few min­ utes about the experience and about music, and then she said, "Do any of you play or sing?" A few did, so she said, "Teach me a song that you know" As the class progressed over the next several weeks, they listened to and explored several related styles of music like blues and jazz, based on music gettin' to your soul. They looked at the places in songs that "really got to them", and touched on what the chord changes were and how the melody danced into and out of the chords. They listened to Bessie Smith, B.B. King, Billie Holliday, Duke Ellington, Joe Will­ iams, Ella Fitzgerald, and then Benny Goodman, Mel Torme, and George Gershwin. Eventually, without introduction, she asked them to close their eyes while she played a CD of a "special section" in Howard Hanson's Romantic Symphony, with high-quality speakers and at live-volume. "Did anywhere in the music 'get to you'?" she asked. Got it? Nonverbal matching. Self-Expressive music. Engaging learners with the intrinsic rewards of learning expe­ riences. Intrinsic interest. Respectful communication. Emo­ tional connection and relatedness. Engaged and sustained attention. Senior learners and learners. Competence. Au­ tonomy. Graham Welch's Chapter 3 in Book IV, and Anna

have "bull's-eyes". The principle of verbal and nonverbal matching (interactional synchrony or being "in sync" with other people) is a key element in the development of respectful emotional

connectedness between senior learners and learners (see Chapter 8).

An experienced female music educator in the City of New York Public Schools was assigned an evening class of about 15 dropout students who were returning to finish high school. They ranged in age from about 17 to 22 years, most of them were males, and all of them had an unsuccessful school history Nearly all of the students also had a cultural history that was considerably different from the teacher's history The planned course content covered "classical" music history and appreciation. The teacher's primary method was lecture and the play­ ing of recorded excerpts. A chronological sequence was followed that began in the Renaissance era. For the first two class meetings, the teacher wore traditional teacher attire, for example, a dark blue suit, white blouse, and low-heeled shoes. The students wore informal "street clothes" and sat in two rows offolding chairs. The students never took notes, nearly all heads were bowed nearly all the time so that the teacher's eyes were never met by any student. Her attempts at humor were met with silence, and no student ever asked a question or made a comment. In fact, no student ever spoke to her before or after class. Before class, they engaged in animated conversa­ tion among themselves in the hallway, then hurried in just before class started, then hurried out when class was dismissed for more animated conversation. They never talked about their in-class experiences while within earshot of the teacher. The teacher knew that "it wasn't happening" and that was ex­ tremely troubling to her. So she decided to become a senior learner. At the start time of the third class meeting, she walked in wear­ ing street clothes (jeans, shirt, sneakers), sat down at the piano and played and wailed out a classic rhythm & blues song in a "belted" voice quality. At first, the students were stunned into still silence as they stared at her. Soon, they stood up and began moving and clap­ ping to the music. When the song was finished, they applauded as they gathered around the piano and made comments like, "Oh, yeah!", "Whooo!", "That was hot!", "That was rockin'!", and "We didn't know

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bodymind

&

voice

Langness' Chapter 6 in Book V provide many suggestions