Ag summary of issues bonilla

The

E15

Initiative

Strengthening the multilateral trading system

Summary of Issues ICTSD-IPC Expert Group Process Geneva, 27-28 September 2012 Eugenio DĂ­az-Bonilla

Think piece for the E15 Expert Group on Agriculture and Food Security

Agricultural trade and food security: Summary of Issues from Group 2 Eugenio Díaz-Bonilla Visiting Senior Research Fellow, IFPRI ICTSD-IPC Expert Group Process Geneva, 27-28 September 2012

1. Focus of the Work According to the Concept Note prepared by ICTSD-IPC for “An Expert Group Dialogue Process on Agriculture and Food Security Challenges,” it seems important “to step away from the technical minutia of the Doha Round agricultural modalities” and “to determine whether a new intellectual framework is required for international food and agricultural trade policy, and if so, what such a framework should consist of, and to encourage consensus around key priorities.” The need for that work, according to the Concept Note, is based on the impasse in the Doha Development Round trade negotiations, and the facts that the agricultural sector remains heavily distorted to the detriment of agricultural producers in developing countries; that the global food system has undergone a number of changes, and is projected to go through further changes in the 21st century; that the commodity price spikes of recent years have brought food security to the forefront of policy agendas; and that there is a growing awareness and knowledge of both the impact of environmental constraints on and the environmental impacts of agricultural production.

In the first meeting of the Expert Group of 15 members (E-15), the work was divided into 3 groups. I was asked to act as coordinator of the discussions and rapporteur of Group 2 “Agricultural trade policy and food security: overcoming poverty and ensuring access to food” (the other two groups were on Trade and Rural Development, coordinated by Tim Josling, and Trade and Environment, coordinated by David Blanford).

Group 2 was asked to “explore…trends related to agricultural trade and food security, and identify options that policy-makers could pursue to address them…”

I thank the members of Group 2 for the very rich exchange. What follows is based on the work of Group 2, but includes also topics from the general discussion previous to the group work. It also draws on my own work on the topic (see for instance, Díaz-Bonilla and Ron, 2010, prepared for ICSTD). It is written like a paper covering the issues discussed so it can be more easily utilized as an input for the overall document rather than a transcription of a debate with attribution of opinions. I hope the members of the group can find the issues we discussed reflected in what follows.

2. Some Conceptual Issues First, it is important to start from a common definition of food security, such as the one adopted at the World Food Summit in 1996: “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. There are four main components of the concept: availability (which depends on domestic supply and trade); access (which is influenced by income, employment, and poverty patterns related to economic growth and development); utilization (which depends on the quality of food, but also on other factors such as health and sanitation infrastructure

and services, education, women empowerment, and good governance, among other things); and stability (the fact that physical and economic access should take place “at all times”).

Growth, Employment Distribution, Poverty

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The next Chart shows the different levels of channels through which trade (and other macroeconomic factors) may influence the components of food security. Domestic production and imports determine national availability. A growth pattern that generates broad employment and income opportunities is crucial for food access. The chart also includes the channel of governments revenues, which may be used to implement policies and investments that help with different components of food security. The Chart also emphasizes the fact that what counts, in the end, is the impact at the individual level (which in the Chart is labeled “nutrition security”).

To discuss the impact of “trade” on food security is important to consider the multiple channels through which the former affects the latter. But it is also important to define what is meant by “trade” and “trade policies.” Because the discussion was conducted in the context of the Doha Round, it was considered necessary to focus on trade disciplines related to the WTO agreements, and in particular the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). It was recognized that other issues related to industrial market access, IPR, SPS, and fisheries may also have implications for food security, but the discussion revolved around the AoA.

Even with this narrower focus, it is important to highlight two additional points, which make the analysis of the links between trade and food security more difficult.

First, the same trade policy may have different impacts depending on the interactions with other policies and structural factors. For instance, reduction of tariffs in agriculture will have a different impact depending on, for instance, whether this is done unilaterally by a country or is the result of a multilateral exercise, and on whether, that happens only in agricultural goods, or the reduction happens in industrial products as well. These examples can be multiplied several times, including not only other trade policies, but also macroeconomic factors, such as the exchange rate or the monetary policy. In the case of agriculture, other aspects, such as land distribution and rural infrastructure, will also be crucial to determine the effects of the same trade policy: reducing agricultural tariffs in a country with relatively equal land distribution and good infrastructure, is most likely be very different from the opposite case of unequal holdings and bad infrastructure.

Second, and related, trade is only one of several factors affecting food security. The best trade policy or the best WTO framework will not solve food security problems if other, and perhaps more crucial, factors are not in place (see the Chart).

3. Issue I: High Food Prices and Consumption One of the key questions, and a crucial difference from the situation when the Doha Round started, is whether the world has moved from a scenario of low food prices to another of high food prices.

Most of the simulations suggest a continuation of high prices. However, there are substantial uncertainties regarding projected growth for the world economy, given the impact of the current crisis and considering historical patterns of growth. The recent high growth was based on a supply side shock (a quadrupling of the global effective labor supply, influenced by changes in China, but going beyond that) that was accommodated on the demand side by the US, which led to the macroeconomic imbalances, and banking crisis, at the heart of the current global problems. It is not clear what growth pattern may replace the one that played out over the last two decades or so.

Another point to be noted is that nominal prices of commodities are correlated with the US dollar: when that currency strengthens vis-Ă -vis other currencies, the dollar price of commodities declines, and vice-versa. The next Chart shows the inverse relationship between the US dollar and the nominal index of food products.

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An implication is that if the value of food in nominal terms is measured in a basket of currencies, such as the Special Drawing Rights issued by the IMF, the recent price increase looks clearly lower (see next Chart).

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Food Index Nominal SDRs

The current price spike in nominal terms does not look as high or sustained as in the 1970s. If the data were presented in real terms (i.e. adjusted by the loss of purchasing power due to inflation during the last decades) the current situation would look even lower than during the 1970s.

Finally, it is also important to consider not only rice, wheat, and corn, but to look at other products whose prices may not be showing the same increases.

4. Issue II: High Food Prices and Energy Usually, the links between agriculture and energy have been considered in terms of production, processing, transportation, storage, and cooking costs. High prices of energy affect agriculture production and prices through those channels.

More recently, another channel has been established through the use of agricultural products as raw material for the production of biofuels. This link has been singled out as one of the factors behind the recent price spikes. This channel may be crucial going forward considering that the energy market is far larger than the food market. This can be seen by transforming into a common measure, such as joules, all non-food and food energy. The first is the energy needed for the functioning of the world except human beings, while food energy is the one required for the human beings. Estimates for 2006 (Diaz-Bonilla and Robinson, 2010) consider that food energy amounted to about 28 exajoules and non-food energy, some 460 exajoules, for a population of about 6400 million people. In other words, the market for non-food energy was about 16 times larger than the market for food energy, suggesting that demands from the first market may dominate and determine what happens in food markets. Projections going forward only increase the disparity: for instance, towards 2050 and with a population of about 9000/10000 million people food energy consumption may reach about 39/43 exajoules, while the non-food energy consumption can go up to 800/900 exajoules, or non-food energy market being 21 times bigger than the food energy market.

Finally, a second new linkage between energy and agriculture is the one operating through climate change. The high-energy intensification of agriculture of the recent decades, starting with the Green Revolution, may not be possible not only because the impact of higher costs of energy going forward, but also because of the significant levels of green house gas (GHG) emissions implied in such approach.

5. Issue III: Is food security a new concern?

Food security is not a new concern. During the Uruguay Round the issue was reflected in the Marrakesh Declaration and the establishment of the category of Net Food Importing Developing Countries (NFIDC). Also several developed countries claimed food security concerns during those negotiations to justify barriers to food imports and higher levels of domestic support.

Also during the Doha negotiations, the concept appeared in the request by several developing countries of a Food Security Box, with more options to maintain high levels of protection (evolving eventually into the Special Safeguard Mechanism). Developed countries included food security concerns in the notion of multifunctionality again to justify barriers to food imports and higher levels of domestic support.

Some research during the early 2000s showed a) developing countries would be better off in terms of food security (and other dimensions as well) if the money of the implicit tax from food protection (which was privately collected, mostly by larger producers) would have been utilized to support R&D in agriculture (Diaz Bonilla, Diao and Robinson, 2004); b) that no developed country fitted the profile of food insecure (Diaz Bonilla, Thomas, Robinson and Cattaneo, 2000); and c) if a country expanded agriculture on account of multifunctionality using protection and domestic support, other countries’ agriculture and their multifunctionality, would suffer (Diaz Bonilla and Tin, 2006).

While food security issues are not new in trade negotiations, what has changed is that before it was postulated in a context of low food prices and concerns about how those prices were affecting producers, while now it has reappeared against a background of high prices and volatility, and the current fears center on the potential impact on consumers.

However, whatever the contextual novelty, the policies advocated seem very similar as in the past, considering that in many countries the concern about high prices and volatility has led again to concepts about “self sufficiency” using import barriers and distorting domestic support, much as when food security concerns were postulated to help producers affected by low prices. In this line of thinking, trade is uncertain and stocks would not suffice to insure against volatility and price spikes; what was needed was to expand productive capacity reaching some level of “self sufficiency,” so to depend less on trade.

The right thing to implement this expansion of agricultural productive capacity (which may be certainly needed in many developing countries) is through measures that increase productivity, such as infrastructure, agricultural R&D, and the like. However, much of the current discussion about policy instruments continues to revolve around import barriers and distorting domestic support, which, as in the past, may prove to be a costly way to insure against price volatility. If import barriers are utilized, domestic prices will be kept at higher levels, which would affect the food security of the poor and vulnerable. If distorting domestic support is implemented, then other sectors in that country may have to contract to accommodate the larger use of resources by the artificially expanded agricultural sector (assuming that at least part of those resources are not unemployed), and agricultural production in the rest of the world may also decline, generating trade disputes.

Finally, considering that domestic production tends to be, for most countries, more volatile than global production, self sufficiency may increase volatility.

6. Issue IV: Typology of Food Security It is obvious that there are different profiles of food security across countries. Usually, the main distinction utilized is that between net food importers and net food exporters. However, a study using a cluster analysis of 167 countries (which included 155 WTO members, with 44 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and 18 NFIDCs) showed a more nuanced view. Countries were classified into 12 categories food (in)secure countries, applying three cluster methodologies (hierarchical, kmeans, and fuzzy) to five variables (calories per day per capita, proteins per day per capita (grams), food production per capita, total exports (merchandise and services) over food imports, and non agricultural population over total population).

That analysis was used to discuss whether the categories of countries under WTO rules (Developing, LDCs, NFIDC) were adequate for analyzing food security. The conclusions were: *The category of LDCs is better at identifying food insecure. But some food insecure not included and it includes some that were classified in intermediate categories of food security (that were called food neutral). *The category of NFIDCs was not as good as an indicator of food insecurity, considering that 1/3 of the countries appeared in the food neutral groups. *The category of developing countries was spread over all categories, except the top group among the most food secure countries. *Among food-insecure countries, profiles also differed: some were rural (mostly in Africa and South Asia) while others were urban (LAC and Eastern Europe); some were considered “consumption vulnerable” (because they showed low levels of consumption of calories and proteins per capita),

while others entered food insecure categories because they were “trade vulnerable” (manifested in the use of large percentages of their exports to buy food) *Developed countries were all in the food secure category, showing that food insecurity in poor countries cannot be mixed with trade concerns in developed countries claiming food security reasons.

The extension of that analysis to the new category of “Small and Vulnerable” (SV) considered in the Modalities also shows great variety of situations, with only 23 out of the 45 SV countries appearing in the food insecure groups.

The question then is whether it is necessary, or possible, to create new categories to accommodate food security concerns in the negotiations.

While so far it was discussed the variety of food (in)security situations at the country level (which is the appropriate focus for trade negotiations), it must be always be kept in mind that the relevant food insecurity issues emerge at the level of families and individuals, not countries, and that there is a large heterogeneity of food security situations at the household level. The problem is not “food prices” per se but Incomes (Wages Employment, or Prices multiplied by Quantity of goods and services sold by the poor) versus Cost of Basic Food Basket (Food prices multiplied by Minimum Household Food Requirements (MHFR)). And at that level, a typology of households must consider several dimensions, such as income (affected by labor and product markets; land and water distribution; infrastructure; ownership of livestock and other assets, and so on), the demand side (whether Urban (mostly net food buyers) versus Rural (net sellers, seasonal variation net seller/buyer, net buyer), and issues related to demographics and health (Female headed, Too young, too old, Diseases and incapacity).

7. Issue V: Trade and Food Security Most of the food consumed is produced domestically, which, in a sense, would make trade a secondary concern for food security. However, trade can provide the margin necessary to stabilize prices and quantities. Also, ratios differ by products and trade in agricultural and food products has been expanding, which means that some products and countries may show high import percentages of domestic consumption.

At a general level, trade may help with some aspects of food security. One aspect is the fact, already noted, that the variability of domestic consumption is lower than variability of domestic production (with international trade acting as a smoothing mechanism). If this is the case, an implication for “self sufficiency” as insurance is that it may increase rather than decrease vulnerability to fluctuations.

Another way in which trade has helped food access is that the food import bill as percentage of total exports has declined in general (see next Chart).

Food Imports as Percentage of Total Merchandise Exports 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05

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Net Food Importing Developing Countries + (Total) Low Income Food Deficit Countries + (Total) Least Developed Countries + (Total)

This reduction in the incidence of the food bill has happened not because food imports have declined in developing countries (in fact they have increased) but because all exports have expanded (and by more than food imports), thanks to expanded global trade.

8. Issue VI: WTO disciplines and FS The discussion in the group started with whether the exercise should be to try to help finish Doha, or to develop a new framework. An intermediate option would be to build on a “small package” of trade issues being discussed. This question was not resolved.

Whatever the answer, a more general question is whether WTO disciplines and special and differential treatment (SDT) linked to different categories of countries are adequate to address food security concerns. In particular, the questions would be: *Do they force/allow Industrialized Countries (IC) to follow “good” policies that help with global poverty reduction and food security and to avoid “bad” ones? *Do they force/allow Developing Countries (DC) to do the same?

The first question is related to whether allowed trade policies for IC may displace agricultural and food production in DC, denying employment and production opportunities that may help reduce poverty in the latter countries. This was not discussed because the topic mostly relates to the rural development aspects analyzed by the First Group.

The second question is usually framed as whether WTO disciplines allow enough “policy space” for DC. The discussion of what interventions should be allowed in this policy space as “good policies” to confront food security concerns, revolves usually around an unavoidable policy dilemma: what contributes more to generating food security, high prices for producers or low prices for consumers?

Those that take the perspective of poor producers prefer high prices, arguing that the multiplier effect of agriculture has important benefits for employment and poverty alleviation. Those that take the perspective of poor consumers emphasize low prices, considering the impact on urban and rural poverty and malnutrition.

The only way out of this policy dilemma is through interventions that increase production efficiency and reduce costs (mostly agricultural R&D, infrastructure, and related investments, all allowed in the Green Box), which increase profits for producers, while contributing to reduce prices for consumers.

In any case, the AoA includes a variety of policy interventions, not all of which may be the best way to get out of the high price/low price policy dilemma. The list would include: *Green box: food security stocks Annex 2 paragraph 1 *Green box: domestic food subsidies Annex 2 paragraph 4 *De minimis 10% *Article 6.2 and subsidies for poor producers. * Countervailing duties to subsidized exports. *The possibility of using the differences between bound and applied tariffs The Modalities of December 2008 added further instruments. Under the expanded Green Box there are more flexibilities for establishing stockholdings, supporting low income producers, implementing insurance programs for natural disasters, and offering regional payments.

For many of these instruments the main issue is availability of fiscal resources (rather than policy space), and the adequate design of the interventions. For example the operation of food stocks for stability and domestic food aid tends to be affected by the same high/low price dilemma: i.e. if the level at which prices are stabilized is too high it may help producers, but poor consumers, for whom it matters not only the stability of domestic prices but also the level at which they are stabilized, may suffer. Then there may be a trade-off for the poor between stability and level of prices. Here, as in other cases where food security concerns are invoked, the focus of the policy analysis should be on people rather than on crops or food products.

The Modalities include additional options to manage import protection, such as Special Products (Annex F list of criteria), the Special Safeguard Mechanism, and Sensitive Products.

The Modalities also establishes stricter disciplines on Food aid (Annex L), and creates a new category of Small and Vulnerable countries (which, as mentioned, only half are food insecure, under the metrics of the cluster analysis mentioned).

9. Issue VII: Disciplines on Export Measures.

This discussion can be divided into legal issues and economic issues.

Regarding legal issues, in the AoA, export prohibitions and restrictions are considered in Article 12.

According to that Article, Members that institute new export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs (following Article XI 2(a) of GATT 1994) must “give due consideration to the effects of such prohibition or restriction on importing Members’ food security” and must notify in writing, “as far in advance as practicable, to the Committee on Agriculture” explaining “the nature and the duration of such measure”.

The Member instituting the measure must consult, “upon request, with any other Member having a substantial interest as an importer” and must provide the latter with the requested information.

These obligations do not apply to developing country Members, “unless the measure is taken by a developing country Member which is a net-food exporter of the specific foodstuff concerned”.

In the Modalities disciplines on export restrictions are further tightened. Existing export prohibitions and restrictions in foodstuffs and feeds must be eliminated by the end of the first year of implementation of a potential Doha Round agreement. Regarding, new export prohibitions or restrictions they cannot “normally be longer than 12 months”, and can exceed 18 months only with the agreement of the affected importing Members. The obligations to consult, however, do not apply to least-developed and net food-importing developing countries. The Modalities document also expanded somewhat the obligations to notify, inform, and consult, by defining 90 days for the notification, and strengthened the surveillance role of the Committee of Agriculture in these matters.

Moving now to economic issues, there are some studies trying to determine the impact of export measures on domestic and global variables. For instance regarding export restrictions and volatility, Anderson and Martin (2011) calculated that 45% of the increase in rice and 30% of the increase in wheat in the 2008 price spike was due to trade measures. But in another work (Anderson et al, 2012) they also calculate that import measures, represented a not trivial percentage of those increases: 45% in the case of rice and 37% in the case of wheat, which, if applied at the impacts in Anderson and Martin (2011) would make the impact on prices related to export measures about 25% and 20% of the total increase in rice and wheat, respectively,1 with the difference of 75-80% caused by import measures (such as reducing import tariffs) or other (non-trade) factors.

Gouel and Jean (2012), showed, in a theoretical model of a small country, that an optimal combination of storage and trade policies (subsidizing imports and taxing exports) stabilizes domestic food prices. The optimal policy includes export restrictions, which may be “harmful to export partners, but to refrain from using them is costly and entails substantial transfers from consumers to producers.”

Bouët and Laborde (2010) in a global general equilibrium model also show a) that both import and export measures have an upward impact on world prices, and b) that exporters using export measures to stabilize domestic prices improve their welfare, but negatively affect net importers.

More of these studies may help to align the legal treatment with the economic impacts, considering that now there seems to be an asymmetric legal treatment of economic equivalents: Increasing export taxes/reducing import taxes; reducing export subsidies/increasing import subsidies; reducing production subsidies/increasing consumption subsidies; export tax differential

1

Of the total increase in the price of rice (45%), 55% were export measures and 45% import measures.

Therefore, the incidence of export measures on the price of rice was 45% multiplied by 0.55= 24.75% (rounded to 25% in the text above). For wheat the calculation is similar: 37% were import measures and 63% export measures; therefore, the impact of export measures was 30% multiplied by 0.67=20.1% (rounded to 20% in the text).

/import tax differential (tariff escalation); imposing export quota/eliminating import quota; export ban or anticipatory hoarding by importer.

In other words, even though all those measures that try to stabilize domestic prices may lead to increases in world prices, affecting other countries (and therefore, all being “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies), the discussion appears to have focused mostly on the export side.

Even if food price spike is a trade problem generated by export restrictions, a question would be whether the WTO the right place to try to solve it. A negative answer would point out that the WTO is too slow to react during a spike. There are strong incentives for governments to try to protect the inhabitants of that country (as shown in the simulations) and wait to be sued later, if that happens at all. Also, the process of notification and consultation within the Committee on Agriculture may be too slow. A positive answer, would argue that transparency and consultations may act as constraint; and that it is important to have disciplines on export bans and restrictions to avoid the doubts about the trading system that are leading to the re-emergence of “self sufficiency” approaches. The potential costs of those doubts and the inadequate policies they may generate, may well be larger than the ones identified in the studies mentioned above.

Whatever the WTO trade remedies to the problem of price spikes (and the contribution of export restrictions), it seems that other options non-WTO options may have to be explored as well. An option discussed by the group was longer term contracts (the case of Philippines was mentioned in this regard), with commercial sanctions to those countries/firms not fulfilling their obligations. Also it may help to have forecasting and early-warning systems of impending problems in crucial food products. Schemes to finance food imports during price spikes have also been discussed and utilized in the past (for instance, at the IMF). Different financial hedging approaches and global physical stocks have been also debated. All these trade and non-trade options merit further analysis.

10. Some Concluding Comments In these debates it is always useful to consider carefully the economic issues involved. The instinctive reaction of many policy makers and observers is to resort to protectionist measures, “self sufficiency” schemes, and the like. Regarding Green Box measures that are the real basis for competitiveness and productivity some people have argued that they “cost money and are difficult to administer,” with the implication that protection does not cost money and it is easier to implement.

But protectionism operates as a privately collected, and regressive, tax on food, whose costs are paid relatively more by poor consumers (given the incidence of food in their expenditures) and benefits large producers relatively more (considering that protection is a mark-up received per unit produced). Protection also increases prices of agricultural inputs to other sectors (primary and agroindustrial), affecting production and employment there. Higher costs of wage-goods may lead to higher salaries, affecting other export industries. Protection also tends to overvalue the real exchange rate, with negative implication for other tradable sectors. Also, protection does not seem to have positive effects over technological change, investments, and productivity.

The main conclusions from revising WTO trade disciplines are that AoA does not constrain good policies in DC to address poverty and food security issues (programs aimed at poor producers or

consumers, stocks for food security and domestic food aid for populations in need). DC can have well-defined programs for poverty, food safety and environmental protection. But AoA does not constrain much “bad” policies either, in IC particularly.

The most important constraints to design and implement adequate trade and non-trade policies to help with food security are financial and human resources and institutional capabilities in DC. It is also important to remember that poverty and hunger materialize at the household/individual level. Therefore, SDT defined at the national, crop, or even farmer level, may not focus on the main problem. Therefore, it is important to have well targeted safety nets for the poor. There is still a need for instruments to protect from import surges and unfair trade practices, and avoid drastic shocks that affect survival strategies of the poor, and worsen the welfare of poor and vulnerable countries.

The ideal would be a relatively neutral trade policy plus complementary investments and social policies for poverty alleviation and food security. In fact, food security is more than a trade issue, involving issues such as availability (domestic supply and trade), access (which requires broad-based development), and utilization (which depends on health and education investments, women empowerment, democracy).

A list of adequate domestic policies in this regard would include issues such as: *Investment in human capital, infrastructure *Technology *Management of natural resources *Land ownership by small producers and landless workers *Safety nets (CCT, school lunches, women and infant nutrition, food-for-work) *Women’s empowerment *Community organization and participation *Adequate functioning of product and factor markets *Macroeconomic stability *Good governance *Climate adaptation and mitigation

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Markets, Trade and Institutions Division. IFPRI.

Diaz-Bonilla, Eugenio and Jonathan Tin. 2006. That was Then but This is Now: Multifunctionality in Industry and Agriculture. In WTO Negotiations and Agricultural Trade Liberalization: The Effect of Developed’s Countries’ Policies on Developing Countries. Wallingford Oxfordshire, U.K.: CABI. Diaz-Bonilla E., X. Diao and S. Robinson. 2004. Thinking Inside the Boxes: Alternative Policies in the Development and Food Security Boxes. In: Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO. Where Are We Heading? G. Anania, M. Bohman, C. Carter and A. McCalla (eds.) Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Díaz-Bonilla, E., M. Thomas, A. Cattaneo, and S. Robinson. 2000. Food security and trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization: A cluster analysis of country groups. Trade and Macroeconomics discussion paper 59. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Diaz-Bonilla, Eugenio and Sherman Robinson. 2010. Macroeconomics, Macrosectoral Policies, and Agriculture in Developing Countries. In Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 3033-3211.

Burlington: Academic Press.

Diaz-Bonilla, Eugenio and Juan Ron (2011). “Food Security, Price Volatility and Trade: Some Reflections for Developing Countries” ICTSD Issue Paper No 28.

Gouel, Christophe & Jean, Sebastien, 2012. "Optimal food price stabilization in a small open developing country," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5943, The World Bank.