June 2013, Vol. 5 No. 1
Maid in Taiwan
RUNAWAY FILIPINO DOMESTIC WORKERS AND TAIWAN’S FOREIGN LABOR POLICY
Women in Okinawa
US MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA AND ITS IMPACT ON WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT
Chant of the Shaman SHAMANIC RITUALS IN CONTEMPORARY TAIWAN
BOOK REVIEW A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY
Fellow students, it is my pleasure to present, along with Jonathan, this edition of the Asia-Pacific Newsletter. For those who I have not yet had the pleasure to meet, my name is Leon, a first year student in the IDAS programme and a graduate from the IMICS programme at National Chengchi University. Many excellent writers from IDAS and IMAS have graciously contributed their articles to this edition, and I am delighted to have been a part of this. As you all know, many a change has flecked the last two semesters. First and foremost, it is with the deepest sadness that we pay our respects to John Schmeidel, a fellow IDAS
FROM THE EDITORS
student who recently passed away. Some words written in his memory have been included in this issue. Another change is
Leon van Jaarsvelt
that Dr. Evan Berman, who after many years of dedicated
Editor-in-Chief PhD Student, IDAS
service to the development of the IDAS programme is stepping down as director of IDAS. Dr. Berman will take up a prestigious position at the University of Wellington in New Zealand, and we would like to take this opportunity to wish him well. Dr. Kuan, the current director of IMAS and a long-time supporter of the program, will also be stepping down from his post. He will continue to work as a professor of sociology at NCCU. Another change is Dean Karelakas stepping down from the position as IDAS representative, one that he has held with the sole intent of aiding and assisting all IDAS students to the best of his very capable ability. Replacing him, by democratic vote, is Juan Uriburu Quintana, who has made clear his intent to continue on this track. But the strong growing IDAS programme demanded that Dean could not be replaced by just one individual, so now also on the IDAS committee are myself and Jonathan Spangler, equally committed to aiding and assisting in what ways we can. One of these is through performing the editing and designing
Jonathan Spangler Graphic Designer, Associate Editor PhD Student, IDAS
duties of this newsletter for which Dean has certainly set a high standard to follow. In doing this arduous task, it is our hope that we will continue to fulfil the standards set by Dean, and as always we welcome your submissions for future editions as well as your feedback. Amongst the articles, we especially value short and concise submissions,
Please send submissions and feedback to:
nccu.apn@gmail.com
travel reports, and papers that address ongoing issues in the Asia-Pacific region. We greatly look forward to working with you in the future.
Leon van Jaarsvelt
This issue’s cover photographs were generously provided by Piotr Kurczewski (left) and Wojtek Kusak (right), both students in IDAS. All other photographs used in this publication are used courtesy of the photographers, attributed appropriately, and licensed as indicated. The text of the Asia-Pacific Newsletter is a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA-licensed publication by the student body of the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. This is purely amateur and informal collaboration, and this is a strictly non-commercial publication that is not for sale under any circumstances. We do not derive advertising or sales revenue, or donations of any kind.
Contents
June 2013, Vol. 5 No. 1
11
25
29
35
5 7
29
9 11
Dean Karalekas
In Memoriam
John Christian Schmeidel David Blundell
Contemporary Triad Rituals
IDAS Research Expectations of John Schmeidel HUONG LE THU
Graduation Announcement
IDAS Celebrates its First Graduation Alex Wolfgram
Maid in Taiwan
Runaway Filipino Domestic Workers and Taiwan’s Foreign Labor Policy
15 21 23 25
Erick Gutierrez Macias
The Pinnacles Dispute
A Critical Retrospective Anson Park
Depressed Prospects
Conflicts on the South China Sea Dean Karalekas
Event
Victory at Paintball Phillip Klotz
Renminbi
33 35 41 45 49 51
Serafettin Yilmaz
Women in Okinawa
US Military Presence in Okinawa and its Impact on Women’s Development Janet Tan
Three-Spice Eggplant
The Latest Meal from the ASAP Cookbook Sabrina Habich
The Chant of the Shaman
Shamanic Rituals in Contemporary Taiwan Moises Lopes de Souza
The Taiwanese Yellow Emperor
Myth and Identity in Taiwan’s Politics Matthew Pal
Book Review
A Glimpse into the Future of the World Economy Moises Lopes de Souza
Trip Report
A Conference in India Hsiaping Lan
NPO Work Experience in Yilan Interning at the LWCC
Towards a Reserve Currency VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 2
Welcome to this edition of the Asia-Pacific Newsletter. I trust that you
FROM THE NEW DIRECTOR
will find this issue lively, stimulating and multifarious, reflecting at least a small part of the diversity of the IDAS program and the wider Taipei environment. A big vote of thanks, also, to the volunteer editing crew who put this splendid magazine together. As you all know, I’m sure, Professor Evan Berman is moving on to a prestigious chair professorship at the University of Wellington in New Zealand, and will be moving on from NCCU at the end of this academic year. Professor Berman has made a signal contribution not just to the structure and integrity of the IDAS program, but also to its international standing, and we all thank him and wish him well in his new position. Professor Berman will continue to be involved with IDAS as coordinator of an international conference on New Leadership in Asia, to be held at NCCU in October of this year. This brings me to my next point, which is to alert all of you to the opportunity to contribute a paper or organize a panel for the international conference. Space has been al-
Professor David Holm Director, International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies
located in the conference timetable for conference papers by IDAS students, as well as professors, and I would urge everyone to take advantage of this opportunity and submit an early proposal. Angel can advise you how to do this. It seems only yesterday that I was asked to take over as Director of IDAS, and there is still a great deal about the program that I have yet to learn about. I am having meetings with IDAS students on a one-to-one basis during my IDAS office hours on Monday and Friday afternoons (2:304:30), but there are many of you whom I have not yet met. Please feel free to drop in, or, if you find me busy, make an appointment with Angel. Also, if you have suggestions on any matter relating to the program, please don’t hesitate to tell us about them. I am sure I speak for all the academic and administrative support staff in saying that we will always welcome suggestions on how to make the program run more smoothly, or on how to make your experience of studying at NCCU happier and more productive.
With warm regards, David Holm
I trust that you will find this issue lively, stimulating and multifarious, reflecting at least a small part of the diversity of the IDAS program and the wider Taipei environment.
CHIEF EDITOR
Leon van Jaarsveldt ASSOCIATE EDITORS
Dean Karalekas Jonathan Spangler GRAPHIC DESIGNER
Jonathan Spangler PHOTOGRAPHER
Wojciech Kusak FINANCIAL COORDINATOR
Angel Li CONTRIBUTORS
Sabrina Habich David Holm Erick Gutierrez Macias Dean Karalekas Phillip Klotz Hsiaping Lan Moises Lopes de Souza
We need your talent for the next issue of the Asia-Pacific Newsletter! Send your articles, short essays, artwork, photography, or other creative work to: nccu.apn@gmail.com This is your newsletter. Contribute now!
Matthew Pal Anson Park Janet Tan Alex Wolfgram Serafettin Yilmaz
VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 4
In memory of
John Christian Schmeidel
5 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
The students of IDAS received a shock this week when we learned of the death of one of our own: John Christian Schmeidel. You may remember John as that quiet guy in class, who only spoke when he had something well-considered to say. He would rarely raise his hand, but I knew whenever I heard him begin to clear his throat softly, that he was ready to add to the class discussion, and I knew that whatever was coming would turn the conversation on its head, by deflating the escalation of lofty generalities through an injection of harsh reality and the unassailable assertion of lived experience. And when he did speak, people listened. This was the respect that he commanded: whether a function of age – both John and I were significantly older than the mean in most classrooms, even here at the PhD level, and he would often comment to me on the youth and energy on display at IDAS. Or perhaps it was his accomplished past: while John preferred not to talk about himself, many were vaguely aware that this was his second PhD; that he had studied at Cambridge; that he was a lawyer; and that he had authored a book. These factors contributed to his being an invaluable addition to our group, and to his being regarded as a man worth listening to. And yet very few of us really knew him. I was perhaps closer to him than anyone else in the program – again, probably because of our proximity in age – and still I couldn’t say with any certainty what the major events of his life were—or in what order—making me uniquely unqualified to write a piece honouring this life. But then, this is the life we live as expatriates. We leave our home countries to settle in a strange land, and we meet others whom we would never otherwise befriend, and they become a large part of our lives, especially in the absence of family and friends, and circles from our youth. And despite this importance that we have in one another’s lives, we often know very little about each other, and we are forced to rely on our gut instinct when taking the measure of a man. John knew this, having been an expat for much of his life, be it in England, or Germany where he researched the Stasi, or Tunisia, or here in Taiwan. Sometimes people leave home to look for adventure, and a learning experience. Sometimes they leave to escape something, either from their homes, or from themselves. I suspect it was the latter with John. Despite his great wit, and his encyclopaedic knowledge, there was a sadness in him: he seemed to intuit that he was closer to the end of his journey than to the beginning. As a fellow traveller, and perhaps eventually a friend, all you can do is to try
and make sure they do not face that journey alone. I could have been a better friend to John. While he was always invited to all of our excursions, and he often joined us at social occasions, I should have pushed him harder at the end: pushed him to socialize more, to spend more time in the company of others; to worry less about money and enjoy the time we have left. I should have asked him to contribute more—he was always volunteering to help in my projects, and to contribute to the changes that I wanted to make at IDAS. Perhaps if I had engaged him more. But I didn’t. And so I’m going to miss John: I’m going to miss his wry sense of humour, and his arcane knowledge of random facts. I’m going to miss his conversations: how he loved to get a rise out of people. He once told a group of predictably lefty academics that he was in Taiwan because he had decided to leave America after Obama was elected. He had staunchly conservative values, making him something of an oddity in the academic world. And this gave him great pleasure. Ultimately, all John wanted to do was serve: whether it was to serve his country—he told me once that he had worked with the US Marine Corps—or to serve his community—he had been trying to secure a position as a law-enforcement officer just last year. He worked previously as a prosecutor in his home state of Arizona, and I believe he wanted to return to that sort of life because he liked to see justice done, and to contribute to it. John knew that there are good guys and bad guys in this world. He was one of the good guys. And so, John reminds us in death of what’s most important in life, and it’s a lesson so obvious and oft-repeated, that it’s amazing we so often ignore it. That lesson is not to spend this time in our lives alone. As IDAS students, we are thrown into a group of individuals whom we haven’t chosen, and with whom we have little in common. And there is a tendency to look upon our task—the classes, the exams, the dissertations—as a solitary journey. But it’s not: we’re in it together, and only together can we achieve our individual goals, and more importantly, find meaning in the process. Together we are part of something: something nascent, yes; and fragile. But something that is greater than the sum of its parts. John knew this, as deep down I believe we all know it. John’s challenge to us as a community is how to move forward from here. How do we heal, and grow stronger through the healing? This is a challenge we must all undertake, and we can only undertake it together. This is how we must honour John’s life. - Dean Karalekas VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 6
IDAS Research Expectations of John Schmeidel: Contemporary Triad Rituals By David Blundell
Heritage is what we have now from the past: The goods that we inherit from our parents, the residues of toxic wastes, memories and artefacts that we cherish and retain, our genetic inheritance, and such culture as we have absorbed and made our own. Included in our cultural, intellectual, and professional heritage are the historical narratives we know and accept, and which help shape our sense of identity. - Michael Buckland 2004: 39
John Schmeidel came under my supervision for his anthropological dissertation research in the International Doctoral Program in AsiaPacific Studies (IDAS) during 2012. He carefully laid foundations to illuminate the interplay of police, politicians, and the triads (underground transnational crime organizations) in a single city, Taichung. He portrayed these three political actors as an organic unit. His source material was to be found in primary fieldwork in the form of interviews with police officers (sometimes thought to be triad employees), political figures serving and retired, and triad members themselves. Although the latter milieu is by its nature secretive, he established some contacts there. John made it plain to them that in no sense this would be a covert investigation masquerading as an academic project. His research was not to reveal any real names, or operational details that could endanger their livelihood or lay them open to prosecution. The quantitative element was not to be significant, other than filleting police statistics. He considered it was most unlikely the triads would open their books to him, such as to examine relative revenue flows from, for example, prostitution as opposed to loan sharking. Before John passed away, he was expecting to visit Hong Kong and China, as he thought gathering with those affiliated triads abroad would lead him to new introductions. From this vantage point he would have better connections among the Hong Kong police’s anti-triad section than in Tai7 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
wan. He anticipated contacting local Taiwan journalists knowledgeable in this field. The approach he envisioned was a blend of criminology and social anthropology, addressing the rich and little-explored area of triad internal culture. He observed much of the work to date had been impression-
istic and romantic, with the single exception of Haar (2000). His literature study revealed, the gold standard for work on Taiwan organized crime and politicians was found in Chin (2003). He expected to receive help from Frank Madsen (e.g., 2009), a Cambridge University professor who has written extensively on organized crime and was a former Danish and Interpol officer now serving in academia. A triad member’s commitment of allegiance through ritualization was John’s research study. Thirty-six oaths were required for entering the triad. John thought these requirements of allegiance were becoming abbreviated, yet other methods of showing commitment were emerging in the present generation. Triad rituals prevailed, yet in what form? John was attempting to open the discussion on the practice of the triad organization in central Taiwan and its extensive networks in Hong Kong and China. Before working on this second doctorate, John was already interested in police work and social anthropology. He was able to combine his established academic stature with day-to-day knowledge of syndications. And while giving care in his father’s last days, John developed an appreciation for the legacy of society at large and its future. His earlier studies in England at Cambridge, and in France and Germany, gave
him a worldview that begged for an East Asian component. John stitched the equation of East Asia, in the ever-spreading Asia Pacific region, into a holistic tapestry in order to understand better what the society has now as derived from the past – and projected to the future. The narratives that we use are (1) selected, (2) adopted, (3) rehearsed, and (4) adapted (Fentress and Wickham 1992). It’s an information legacy that we utilize, and influences what we do. The resulting consequences derive from past decisions about adoption and implementation of ideas that develop our cultural, intellectual, and professional repertoire. John anticipated
A triad member’s commitment of allegiance through ritualization was John’s research study. studying the richness of the East Asian triads endowed with systemic connectivity in politics, security, and economics. On April 13th, 2013, John wrote to me about guiding my financial investments, advising me not to invest in China. Before John became a lawyer, prosecutor, and policeman, he was an investment fund manager and a licensed stockbroker. John further elaborated in his email:
scam. In China you could never liquidate your position and get clear. It is what we call in the trade, a one-way market, like little Austria, but much worse … [When] War comes, they collapse in the eastern coast [of China]. Economy drops, urban unrest, state of emergency and military rule. That country just smells from an economist or business point of view. Not one multinational [company] has made serious money there for decades, despite rosy analyst reports. Smarter ones have discreetly left. John was looking not only for an academic, but also a personal future, based on his ethnography of the present socioeconomic trends in East Asia. His charter was to explore the ways and means of a region through practices and rituals from the perspective of the triad social order, as a worthy contribution to our understanding of this seldom examined field. The uniquely in-depth analysis John could have provided by the strength of his character and qualifications to flush out the interwoven threads of humanity, exhibited through social actors’ ritualized culture and their game of wealth, make his loss that much more keenly felt.
John was attempting to open the discussion on the practice of the triad organization in central Taiwan and its extensive networks in Hong Kong and China.
My nose tells me the mainland is one economic disaster just waiting to happen. No rule of law that protects foreign investors. Never pay in cash into China on so called stocks or bonds. They are bogus as the 19th century Gilded Age in America, when Wall Street was a well-heeled
References Buckland, Michael K. Histories, heritages, and the past: The case of Emanuel Goldberg. In The History and Heritage of Scientific and Technical Information Systems. W. B. Rayward and M. E. Bowden, eds. Medford, NJ: Information Today, 2004: 39-45. Chin, Ko-Lin. Heijin: Organized Crime, Business and Politics in Taiwan. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003. Fentress, James, and Chris Wickham. Social Memory. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. Haar, Barend J. ter. Ritual and Mythology of the Chinese Triads: Creating an Identity. Leiden, the Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, 2000. Madsen, Frank G. Transnational Organized Crime. London: Routledge, 2009. VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 8
THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTORAL PROGRAM IN ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES
CONGRATULATES
DR. HUONG LE THU on the successful completion of her phd and
WISHES HER LUCK on all of her future academic and professional envdeaors
9 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
When I started the IDAS program I made a consci ous decision, knowing the enrolled in a freshly cre challenges of being ated program. I was admi tted to other well-establis I chose IDAS, despite the hed PhD programs, but lack of institutional est ablishment. There were no can ask for advice of their senior fellows that you experience, there were not many courses to choose fro guidelines at times, and m, there were unclear of course there was no rec ord of graduation. On the the thrill of the unknow oth er hand, there was n and the eagerness of students and faculty to accomplishing this, we ha bu ild IDAS together. In d such initiatives as the Asia-Pacific Studies As International Conferenc sociation, the 1st IDAS e and Symposium, and others. I am very happy to make the graduation record tod ay and prove this program It did not come easily. De “graduate-able”. spite the fact that it was a con scious decision to enrol to many uncertainties an d frustration along the IDAS, there were way. Everyone comes to ferent attitudes and purpo a PhD program with dif ses, and everyone experien ces the process differently been a very personal journ . In my case, it has ey. Aside from intellectu al challenges, it has been overcoming my own lim a personal struggle of its. It has been a period of sel f-discovery in a challengin ing, way. g, but also fulfill Looking back now, I am happy with my decision aspects of the life of a fu . I am grateful for experi ll-time PhD student study encing many ing abroad. I did not rea which the process can be lize earlier the extent to intellectually and also emotionally demanding, tional students. I would especially for internan’t be able to be here today without senior colleagues’ Having them accompany and friends’ support. me at various stages of my journey has been the mo that I have taken from thi st rewarding thing s PhD experience. I would like to thank all of them ration, and encouragem for the insights, inspient they’ve given me. There are many professor s and colleagues I want to thank; but on the local Prof. Kuan Pin-Ying, Pr ground, especially of. Wu Linjun, Prof. Liu Fu kuo, and Wendy Fang ha supportive. Janet, Jimmy ve always been very , Michael, and also Dean have been the best classm Angel has been a true an ates one can ask for, and gel to all of us. Thank yo u all! I have enjoyed taking pa rt in creating a new pro gram. As the first cohort hands-on and contributed , we were very much to shaping the program as it is today. I’m very Prof. David Holm’s good pleased to see IDAS in hands and that there is a growing sense of com gram. I’m sure that soon munity within the prothere will be many of yo u joining me in creating an IDAS Alumni Club. Best of luck to you all,
Huong
VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 10
Maid in Taiwan
Runaway Filipino Domestic Household Workers and Taiwan’s Foreign Labor Policy By Alex Wolfgram
Migrant workers from the Philippines play a major role in Taiwanese society, where many earn their living by working in the construction industry, in factories, and in the homes of the nation as domestic household workers (DHWs). In the latter role, they provide treatment for Taiwan’s elderly, take care of Taiwan’s children, and perform many other tasks such as cooking and cleaning, all of which greatly benefits their Taiwanese employers. However, since the Republic of China (ROC) government first opened its doors to migrant workers in 1992, there have been many reported cases of runaway workers in the DHW sector. According to Taiwan’s National Immigration Agency (NIA), which releases statistics of runaway migrant workers in its yearly “Missing Status of Foreign Workers in Productive Industries and Social Welfare” report, the number of missing foreign workers performing undocumented work, has been rising in recent years. While the government has reported that the percentage of DHW runaways, in comparison with the amount of migrant workers coming to Taiwan, has been increasing over the years, it has remained silent on just what steps it plans to take to address the core issues that are causing these workers to flee. Understanding the history of government policy in connection with runaway workers can help reveal why they flee. This study focuses on the experience of
domestic workers from the Philippines, as they have the longest history of working in Taiwan compared to their counterparts from Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia.
migrant workers in the blue-collar sector. This serves to propagate the mistreatment of DHWs by their Taiwanese employers. Only through a frank acknowledgement of the conditions faced by DHWs, and hence their real reasons for fleeing, can the ROC government enact appropriate policy to solve the problems associated with the migrant worker industry in Taiwan. To understand why Filipinos started coming to Taiwan for work, one must briefly examine the recent economic and political history of both the Philippines and Taiwan. The Philippines experienced a period of growth from 1952 to 1969 and had a much stronger economy than other nations in the Asia Pacific. However, the country’s industrialization slowed, largely due to political corruption and internal conflict. The then government, of President Ferdinand Marcos, implemented an economic plan in the 1960s that depended heavily on the US War effort in Vietnam, leaving the economy ill-suited to local needs. The economic situation continued to deteriorate and an enormous foreign debt accrued. The Philippines started to systematically deploy Filipinos overseas for work during the mid1970s. This new wave of labor migration came at a time when there was a huge unemployment and underemployment crisis in the country. While the Marcos regime said that exporting Filipino labor was only a “stop-gap measure,” the chronic economic crisis continued, leaving much of the population in abject poverty. Successive regimes not only continued what Marcos had begun, but intensified and institutionalized the export of Filipino labor. Taiwan was largely composed of small and medium-size enterprises at that time, and they needed a way to compete in the global market by either relocating to China or Southeast Asian countries, or to replace Taiwanese workers—who were beginning to benefit from new wage laws—with low-paid foreign migrant workers. While Taiwan’s government has often resorted to economic diplomatic policy—
The government has remained silent on just what steps it plans to take to address the core issues that are causing these workers to flee.
11 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
The findings indicate that the phenomenon of runaway DHWs, is largely due to the lack of government policy towards
consolidating bilateral relations through to properly nurse the elderly. Furthermore, amount of anxiety and suspicion. increasing international trade and foreign according to so-called broker regulations, One representative of a brokerage was investment grounded on the island’s eco- migrant workers are charged a place- willing to come clean and reveal the methnomic power—most Taiwanese decided ment fee ranging from about US$2,500 to ods by which the agencies communicate to employ foreign workers in Taiwan. This US$3,700. In this way, brokers are able to with their Taiwan-based partners, and the was despite the 1994 “Go South” policy, earn a little extra in the way of “scarcity role that government plays therein. The pushed by then President Lee Teng-hui, rent” in the process of recruiting and plac- agent showed me a worker’s document that to encourage direct foreign investment in ing workers. highlighted the actual tasks expected of the Southeast Asia and establish political and Meanwhile, the workers are explained DHW, and compared it to the work details economic ties with countries in the As- the monetary consequences they face if stated in the official contract; the differsociation of Southeast Asian Nations they do not fulfill their contracts, which ences were staggering. (ASEAN). Factory owners considered it include a range of penalty fees that would On the outline, there can be anything easier and more convenient to bring work- be extremely difficult to pay off if they from teaching English, to preparing food, ers to Taiwan and have them adapt to the were to secure a job in the Philippines. The to grocery shopping, to doing laundry, on local lifestyle, rather than go abroad them- workers still go through with signing their top of attending to their main task, which selves to set up new factories and have to contracts, and completing training courses, is to take care of an elderly person (the adjust to life in another country. and then are later sent off to Taiwan where contract clearly states that the DHW’s sole Filipinos were largely sought out in the they are greeted either by a Taiwan-based role is to take care of one person). The early 1990s because they had a reputation broker, or the employer. broker explained to me that Taiwan- and for being willing to undertake the so-called This notion of private industries selling Filipino-based brokers promote DHWs as three-D (dirty, dangerous, and demean- labor and attaching strict monetary rules being able to undertake all these responsiing) jobs that Taiwanese don’t want. bilities, which inevitably makes the Moreover, workers from the Philipworkers more appealing. Unfortupines were more highly educated and nately, workers are left to pay the could generally speak better English price for this practice, which arguthan their Indonesian and Vietnamably amounts to false advertising in ese (as well as their Taiwanese) counwhich the brokers on both sides take terparts. This was seen as a plus by part. employers for issues of communiAdditionally, when a DHW enters cation, translation, and writing softher employer’s residence, she is faced ware manuals, as well as for helping with a situation in which she lives their businesses expand abroad, parand works in the same environment, ticularly in the information technolunder constant surveillance from her ogy (IT) sector (in the early to mid employer. Her work setting also be1990s, Taiwan was the third-largest comes a gamble on her well-being, computer hardware supplier in the as there are no labor standards laws world). that monitor workers under these Thus, a wave of Filipinos arconditions, and none that allow a rived in Taiwan thanks to the priworker to withdraw from their emvate brokers that were required by ployer unless they can prove physical ROC law. Once they arrived on the harm has been done to them—a noisland, many discovered that, in addition to is a major issue when examining runaway toriously difficult prospect in Taiwan. the work described in their contracts, their workers, for white-collar foreign workers Young women who find themselves in bosses expected them to take on extra-con- in Taiwan make on average about three an abusive or otherwise intolerable situtractual duties as well, often extending their or four times what blue-collar workers ation have very few choices: They can reworking hours to 12-hour working days, earn. This phenomenon prompted me to quest repatriation, in which case they are seven days a week. Worse, many suffered visit some brokers in Manila to address deemed to be in violation of contract and abuse at the hands of employers who were this issue, where I was treated with a large they or their family face piles of debt back neither educated nor informed home—debt they know they’ll of the laws pertaining to the never be able to repay. Or they hiring of a DHW. can flee. The law demands that, unSome workers have found like foreign white-collar emconnections to help them prove ployees, all blue-collar workers their cases of mistreatment from Southeast Asian nations, while on the job, but it is not including the Philippines, need easy. Most DHWs do not know to go through private agencies whom to ask or where to turn back in their country of origin in order to address the issue, to be admitted into Taiwan’s especially since they are often workforce. The agencies preforbidden from leaving an empare their clients with tasks they ployer’s household or having Watch the trailer for the upcoming documentary “I Have it Maid” at will encounter in Taiwan, which telephones. Moreover, employhttps://www.facebook.com/pages/I-Have-it-Maid/557151370985922 for DHWs usually include how ers take away the DHWs’ pass-
Filipinos were sought out because they had a reputation for being willing to undertake the so-called three-D (dirty, dangerous, and demeaning) jobs that Taiwanese don’t want.
VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 12
ports and even withhold salary until the end of their contract, in order to ensure that the DHW does not flee. Of course, all of these are illegal acts, which a lot of DHWs say their employers are guilty of. Neither the brokers nor the government have been effective in outlining guidelines for employers. These unfortunate circumstances have been allowed to continue since the early 1990s due to the persistent lack of employer guidelines as well as the government’s failure to implement clear and effective laws to protect foreign workers in the bluecollar sector. As a result, there has been no shortage of DHWs reporting abuse, both physically and mentally, all across Taiwan. Moreover, problems with human rights abuses, such as being forced to work long hours, seven days a week with no annual vacation, continue to be an issue in Taiwan. During my research, I often went to refugee centers and the offices of various non-governmental organizations (NGOs). At the Ugnayan Center, a Filipino cultural and refuge center in Taipei, I met Viki, a woman in her late 30s from Cebu, in the eastern Philippines. Viki
came to Taiwan’s eastern city of Hualien to earn money, because she had a baby and couldn’t find work in the Philippines. She said she knew there were other countries that followed the eight-hour-a-day work
sage parlors, which most likely would entail some form of prostitution. She chose to stay with her original employer for the stable income. Viki acknowledged that, according to the law, a DHW is supposed to take care of the number of people listed on the contract, which should be one. She was told by her broker that she would have to look after nine people, and that in addition, she would be expected to clean their houses, wash their clothes, and cook meals for the lot of them on a daily basis. What she didn’t know, was that once she arrived in Taiwan, she would also have to work at her employer’s hot pot restaurant every night, preparing food and washing dishes. Her work day ends at around 3 or 4 a.m., and the whole process starts all over again by 8 a.m. Viki survived this punishing schedule for about seven months before she fled. She described her employers as being kind people, but “work-wise, not so much.” According to her, the reason DHWs work so many hours is because of the brokers. “I think the brokers communicate to the employers that it is okay for us to work long hours. My contract said that there would
There are no labor standards laws that allow a worker to withdraw from their employer unless they can prove physical harm has been done to them—a notoriously difficult prospect in Taiwan.
13 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
schedule, but the salaries there are lower. She also has seen other opportunities for work, both with other employers as well as illegal employment, for example at mas-
be nine members in the family (which was stated on an outline and not on the official contract) and that I had responsibilities such as cooking and cleaning, but it didn’t stipulate the working hours or that I would be working in a restaurant as well. I didn’t get any extra pay for any of this. I asked my employer to give me a day off and I rarely got one. If they did allow me one then I would just sleep the whole day, but that rarely happened.” Viki later said she called the Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO), which is the de-facto Philippine Embassy in Taiwan, in the absence of official ties between the two countries. They told her to contact the labor affairs bureau in Hualien. She did so, and they picked her up and brought her to Taipei. However, in seeking redress through official channels, she discovered that she was the victim of a much larger scam than she had thought. Viki found out that, officially, her actual contract (the contract in is Chinese) was for a different employer altogether, and as a result she couldn’t ask the labor affairs bureau to contact the family for whom she had been working, lest she be found in breach of contract and hence liable to pay serious labor penalties for being an undocumented worker. Another runaway DHW I met with at the Ugnayan Center, Cathy, is in her mid 30s and hails from just outside Manila. Her previous employer was located in Chiayi, central Taiwan, and she elaborated that her relationship with her employer was one of abuse. “He was a strong man and use to throw things at my head. I always cried and eventually I told my agency that I wanted to transfer to another employer but they said there wasn’t a way unless I go back to the Philippines. But I had so many loans to pay so it wasn’t an option. My employer was also constantly shouting at me, even though I would wash their clothes and sheets so hard. The employer had me working from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. with only a half an hour break in between and I became so thin, so I sought refuge in this center.” These two women reflect the vast majority of problems faced by so many DHWs, and their experience illustrates the need to take private brokers out of the picture. Brokers act as private businesses that profit off the exchange of labor. They are active in falsely advertising often-illegal services. In Taiwan, the government could set up regulated units that connect with
private brokers in other countries to help train and arrange for workers to come to Taiwan. The government could also collect fees from employers as a rule to pay for mandatory classes that outline the working conditions and requirements that workers and employers have to submit to in order to ensure the rights of workers are respected and to promote a healthy relationship between the employer and employee. If private organizations can be done away with, migrant workers can be allowed to transfer employers upon mutual con-
a minimum amount of rest for domestic migrant workers. Government-mandated leave time is the minimum labor requirement for domestic migrant workers. The government is avoiding responsibility by condoning negotiations between the unequal parties of employer and employee, and this is causing disharmony in Taiwanese society. Migrant workers, just like the Taiwanese, need to be respected and protected, but that improvement needs to come along with some fundamental changes to Taipei’s policies and laws. These propositions are not ideal, but they are in accordance with international standards. Even the United Nations (UN) has gone so far as to attach the promotion of labor migration to the trade liberalization agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the lead-up to the 2005 WTO Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong, the UN declared, during its Ninetieth Session on October 21, 2005, that: “It is difficult to envisage a world where there is an increasingly free flow of capital, goods and services without the concomitant increase in the movement of people. Yet, as economies and labor markets are further integrated through the process of globalization, barriers to the movement of people continue to be cited as a major impediment to potential global welfare gains that would benefit developing countries, developed countries and individual migrants and their families.” While the Taiwanese government cannot control what the government in Manila allows agencies to do, Taiwan’s government can certainly regulate what it finds acceptable on its end. A labor standards law, that takes the needs of Taiwan’s foreign blue-collar employees into consideration, needs to be enacted; otherwise, the combination of workers not being protected by labor law, the lack of rights protections in Taiwan, and the inability to freely choose one’s own employers will be a poisonous brew that continues to ruin lives and give Taiwan a bad reputation in the international arena. APN
The combination of workers not being protected by labor law, the lack of rights protections in Taiwan, and the inability to freely choose one’s own employers is a poisonous brew that continues to ruin lives and give Taiwan a bad reputation in the international arena.
sent, so that the employment relationship would be based on reciprocal exchange, rather than what many NGOs call “personal slavery.” So far, the Labor Standards Law in Taiwan has not yet covered the protection of domestic workers in this regard. As of 2011, the law states that workers can find their own employer, but only after their contract is completed, or if certain conditions, as mentioned previously, occur. Such exclusion ignores the fact that private households have become a field of employment and management, and domestic workers are subject to the most intensive surveillance Alex Wolfgram graduated from the University of among all migrant Minnesota with a BA in Languages and Literature and from National Chengchi University in Taipei workers. with a MA in Asia-Pacific Studies. He is interested in The governpolicy-making and sociology and enjoys getting lost ment should estabin foreign countries. lish laws to protect
VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 14
A Critical Retrospective over the
Pinnacles Dispute
By Erick Gutierrez Macias
T
he Pinnacle Islands, better known as Diaoyutai in Mandarin and Senkaku in Japanese, are located in Nansei Shoto (Ryukyu Archipelago) Japan in the East China Sea. Together, the five islands and three small rocks have an estimated area of seven square kilometers. Currently, the Pinnacle Islands are administered by Japan through Ishigaki City in Okinawa Prefecture. However, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) in Ta iwan have been laying claim to these islands since the latter half of 1971. The persistent Pinnacle Islands controversy has often been discussed from several perspectives, such as territorial sovereignty prerogatives, maritime rights to conduct economic activities (exploitation of natural resourses), and strategic affairs. The importance of the dispute lies in the contextual necessities and interests of the governments from China, Japan, and Taiwan and how this issue will be stipulated in their domestic and foreign policies. Certainly, the Pinnacles dispute could jeopardize cooperation, economic ties, and regional security. Indeed, the possibility of armed conflict between the parties is considerable.
15 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
Competing Claims Both PRC and ROC claims to the Pinnacle Islands are practically the same, despite their own disagreements to share the natural resources involved; their statements are based on the historical records from Ming and Qing Dynasties’ emissaries. Chinese affirm that they first discovered the Pinnacles before the Japanese did. Since the sixteenth century Chinese sailors used the islands as navigation references when they were sailing to the former Ryukyu Kingdom. Chinese sailors described the Pinnacles as natural frontiers against the Japanese pirates. It is said that the Chinese emissaries fished in the Pinnacles’ surrounding waters. Furthermore, Taiwan affirmed to have deeds from three of the Pinnacle Islands (Chiwei Yu/Taisho Jima; Huangwei Yu/Kuba Jima; Diaoyu Dao/ Uotsuri Jima) by the Qing Dynasty’s Empress Cixi that were conceded to a Chinese noble, Sheng Xuanhuai who collected medical herbs from those islands. As an additional claim, China and Taiwan governments underline that the Pinnacle Islands are geologically and geographically connected to Taiwan. Lastly, the PRC and ROC insist that Japan took possession of the Pinnacles with the ratification of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, which symbolized the Japanese victory of the First Sino-Japanese War. Under this circumstance, China and Taiwan argue that later Japan accepted the conditions to limit its territory within the Potsdam Declaration of 1945; such conditions were planned previously in the Cairo Declaration of 1943. By their accounts, the Pinnacles should have been returned to Taiwan after the end of World War II through the Japanese Instrument of Surrender. The declarations and assumptions alleged by the PRC and the ROC governments seem to quite suspicious and contradictory. For first instance, it is important to remark that the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which concluded the First Sino-Japanese War, was signed on April 17th, 1895; three months after the Japanese officially incorporated the Pinnacles to their territory. In fact, the Shimonoseki Treaty did not contemplate the Pinnacle Islands. Apparently the interpretation of “Formosa” (Taiwan) and “The Pescadores” (Penghu) extension of sovereignty is ambiguous, because it is not well-defined which islands were related to Taiwan during its Japanese colonial period: “…those islands appertaining or belonging to Formosa” as mentioned in the treaty. However, given the geographic coordi-
nates there is no doubt that the Pinnacles were omitted in this accord “…all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude”, the Pinnacle Islands do not fall in those coordinates. What is more, the clause “those islands appertaining or belonging to Formosa” can be considered to refer to all areas under the jurisdiction of the Japan’s former Imperial Governor General of Taiwan. Hence, there should not be any uncertainty that the Pinnacle Islands were excluded from Taiwan’s sovereignty in this point as well, since the Pinnacles had been administrated by Okinawa Prefecture before and after the American occupation. Since 1895, the Pinnacle Islands have remained as a part of Okinawa in Nansei Shoto region, which were incorporated to Japanese sovereignty in April 1879. Therefore, it is evident that the Pinnacles were unrelated and excluded in the Shimonoseki Treaty. International Public Law affirms that in a particular case of uninhabited territories, geological and geographical evidence does not necessarily constitute a valid claim to sovereignty. In fact, international judicial and arbitral bodies have often based their resolution on “discovery along with occupation” to solve uninhabited territorial disputes. Furthermore, if a new Nation-State begins to exercise continuous and actual sovereignty, and the Discoverer State does not allege this claim, the entitlement by the State that exercises actual sovereignty over the territory is greater than the title based on simply discovery. In this sense, the discovery per se is not enough to declare sovereignty over a territory. A proper sovereign designation can be only achieved throughout an effective demonstration of intent to occupy a territory. The fact that the Chinese never established a human settlement or patrolled the Pinnacles does not support their apparent historical ownership claims. Curiously, based on China’s Imperial manuscripts, the Chinese ships were navigated by Ryukyuan sailors, which also served as interpreters. Taking this into account, even at that time China neither exercised an effective control over the Pinnacle Islands nor the complete title of discovery. China and Taiwan also emphasizes that in their historical records the Okinawa Trough, a geological depression under the East China Sea, was mentioned as the natural border between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom. For the same reason, the Chinese Imperial documents described that the Pinnacles were not part of Ryukyu. Thereby, the PRC and the ROC governments’ interpretation is that the Pinnacle Islands lies outside of the Okinawa Trough, thus excluded from Ryukyu. However, it is quite obvious that Pinnacles were not considered as a part of Ryukyu Kingdom at the time, simply because they were deserted, not even to mention that there was no port where boats could anchor. Nonetheless, this assumption does not necessarily mean that the west sea of Okinawa was considered Chinese
The declarations and assumptions alleged by the PRC and the ROC governments seem to be quite suspicious and contradictory.
VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 16
territory. If such a supposition was to be valid, then Ryukyuans could claim the entire East China Sea as theirs during that time, only because they navigated along it several centuries before the Chinese did. Furthermore, during that period there was no conception of maritime sovereignty as such, since it is a contemporary term. In fact, another determinant that International Public Law states is that claims based on geographical proximity are immaterial and that maritime sovereignty cannot be alleged to demand a territory. The PRC and the ROC governments often cite the “Map of the Three Kingdoms” made in 1783 by Shihei Hayashi, a Japanese military scholar from Sendai City. Both Chinese and Taiwanese governments use this map as a piece of evidence to prove that Japan admitted that the Pinnacle Islands were a part of China, only because in this map the Pinnacles were colored in pink, the same color as China. However, if one observes the whole picture, Taiwan is colored in yellow, a different color from Mainland China. At that time, Taiwan was partially ruled by the Qing Dynasty. In addition, Taiwan, Korea, and a part of Russia are in the same color (yellow), while Manchuria and Japan are both in green. Curiously the Pinnacles, China, Siberia (Russia), and the Ogasawara Islands (a part of Japan since 1675) are colored in pink as well. Therefore, it can be presumed that in this map the difference in colors did not intend to demonstrate the political divisions. In relation to the deed of the Empress Cixi dated in 1893, researchers found that the evidence was fabricated. First of all, the format of the deed, the type of paper, and the seals did not correspond to the Qing Dynasty’s pattern records. Second, Chiwei Yu/Taisho Jima is a barren rock so that nothing can grow on it. Third, at that time Huangwei Yu/Kuba Jima and Diaoyu Dao/ Uotsuri Jima were occupied and developed by a Japanese entrepreneur, Tatsushiro Koga and his employees. Also, there is no record of medical herbs production by Chinese on those islands. Moreover, there are at least six illustrated pieces of irrefutable evidence that prove both PRC and ROC governments’ explicit recognition of Japanese sovereignty over the Pinnacle Islands: The letter of gratitude from the Chinese Consul in Nagasaki (1920); the People’s
Geographical evidence does not necessarily constitute a valid claim to sovereignty. Daily newspaper article (January 8th, 1953); the World Atlas map issued by the Beijing Map Publishing Co. in 1960; the World Atlas, Vol. 1: The Nations of East Asia published jointly by the National Defense Studies Institute and the Chinese Institute for Geoscience (both located in Taiwan) in 1965; and the classified map made by the People’s Republic of China in 1969 (from the Washington Times, September 15th, 2010 edition). Finally, there are the Taiwanese geography books for junior high-schools (1970). In all those pieces of evidence, the Pinnacles are displayed with their Japanese name or/and located inside the Japan maritime territory. As a final point, it is paradoxical that neither the PRC nor the ROC objected to the status of the Pinnacles under Japanese ad-
17 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
ministration for 75 years (1895-1970). This action evidently points out that China and Taiwan initially did not consider the Pinnacle Islands as part of their territory, despite their historical claims. Oddly, in May of 1969, just when the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East announced the possibility of undersea oil and gas fields lying near the Pinnacles, and after the United States (U.S.) reverted Okinawa along with the Pinnacles to Japan; the Taiwanese government began on July 1st, 1971, to claim the Pinnacles as a part of their inherent territory. Subsequently, on December 30th, 1971, the Chinese government officially claimed the islands as well. In contrast, Japan primarily sustains that the Pinnacles were terra nullius, before it annexed them to its territory. Moreover, Japan’s government fostered economic activities on the islands by leasing them to the Koga family. In 1884, Tatsushiro Koga, a fisherman from Fukuoka, landed on Kuba Jima/Huangwei Yu. Koga started to develop a business using the albatross’ feathers and guano. The entrepreneur requested the local government of Okinawa to annex the islands to Japan in order to exploit them. However, the central government in Tokyo at that time denied Koga’s petition because it was not clear if the islets belonged to some other nation. Afterwards, Koga’s persistence attracted the Japanese government attention to the Pinnacles. In 1885, Japanese authorities sent a small delegation from Okinawa Prefecture to explore the Pinnacle Islands. There has been no evidence since of Chinese inhabitants or records confirming that China, or any other nation, ever controlled or administrated those islands. Therefore, the Pinnacle Islands were considered as terra nullius by the Japanese delegation. Consequently, on January 14th, 1895, the Japanese government then declared to incorporate the Pinnacles into Japan by peaceful means, and not military intervention, since the islands were deserted. Besides albatross feathers, the Pinnacles became a region to foster katsuobushi (dried fermented bonito fish flakes), which is a supplement to many Japanese dishes. About two hundred people, including fishermen and katsuobushi’s factory workers, lived in the Pinnacles. During that time, the Japanese government collected taxes from the commercial activity and property usage. Furthermore, the Japanese government conducted scientific surveys, it has patrolled the islands and enforced law on illegal fishing; it also built warehouses, a weather station and a heliport, among other infrastructure. At the outbreak of World War II, the Koga family and their employees were forced to leave the islands temporarily and move to Naha and Ishigaki (Okinawa). As a result, the Pinnacles were left uninhabited since the end of the war. Japan’s government also highlights that the Pinnacles were not included in the islands belonging to Taiwan and the Pescadores as stipulated in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which entered into force in May 1895. For that reason, the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not mention the Pinnacle Islands as a surrendered territory. Based on the provisions stated in the Article 3 of the same treaty, the Nansei Shoto Islands, along with the Pinnacles, were administrated by the U.S. military government. Effectively, the U.S. Navy paid an annual lease of $11,000 USD to Zenji Koga, Tatsushiro’s relative, to use the islands for military purposes. Even during the Ameri-
can occupation, the local government of Okinawa built markers declaring that the Pinnacles have been under Japanese jurisdiction since 1895. Likewise, the Koga family continued paying land taxes to the Okinawan government. Afterwards, the Kurihara family, who nowadays reside in Saitama City, purchased the Koga family’s islands.
Roles and Intentions Japan can be seen as the ‘defender’ of the territory in dispute. In the meantime, Taiwan prefers to achieve a certain consensus with both sides rather than confront them, while China is acting the role of the ‘counterbalance’ against the U.S. and its Asian allies. In essence, Beijing pursues Some historical Chinese-made maps refer to the islands by their Japanese name. (Gertz, 2010) the status quo change in the region. However, the close relationship between the U.S. and Japan has dissuaded China from using force to take the Pinnacles. Mean- rity Treaty was ratified in 1960, the U.S. government is obligated to while, the controversy between the parties concerned has stimu- defend the territory under Japanese administration. Thereby, the lated a certain hostile intensification over time, due to the strategic U.S. carries certain obligations in this dispute, especially concernand economic interests involved. Over the last two decades, China ing to the Pinnacle Islands’ territorial sovereignty. has improved its military capabilities and augmented its economic On September 30th, 1996, the U.S. State Department official power, as well as developed strategic alliances with some of its statement confirmed that the U.S. administration of the Pinnacle neighbors. In fact, China has rebuilt full diplomatic relations with Islands began in 1953 as a consequence of the 1951 Treaty of Peace North Korea, pointing to it as a fundamental ally in the area. Cur- with Japan (San Francisco Peace Treaty). This legal accord did not rently, Chinese foreign policy not only contemplates natu - mention the Pinnacles, but it referred to other islands that had ral resource interests in the Western Pacific Sea, but reverted to Chinese control or which China demanded after World also extends their economic interests along the Indian War II. These islands included Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Spratfrontier and the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, Aflys, and the Paracels. The Article 3 provided the U.S. sole powers rica as well as other regions of the world. of administration of “Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude.” Although the Pinnacle Islands’ controversy is held among China, Japan, and Taiwan; the U.S. still plays an important role as a ‘balancer of power’ in the East Asia region, as it has since the end of the World War II. Despite the fact that nowadays the U.S. supremacy in the world is declining, it still remains as the main power in this dispute, and yet it is the only actor that can deter the involved In 1953, the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus isparties from military intervention. Certainly, Washsued U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus Proclaington’s intention is to come back to East Asia, with mation number 27, which defined the delimitation of the purpose of safeguarding and maintaining “Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude” to its interests, with help of its major Asian include the Senkakus. At the time of the signing of ally, Japan. Since the Japan-U.S. Secuthe Okinawa Reversion Treaty, several State
Maritime sovereignty is a contemporary term.
VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 18
A Taiwanese geography textbook from 1970 refers to the islands by their Japanese name. (Maps Talk Ditu Hui Shuohua, 2008)
Department officials affirmed that following the signing of the Japan Peace Treaty, “Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude” was acknowledged by the U.S. and Japan to include the Senkaku Islands. Although the PRC and the ROC governments do not accept the Okinawa Reversion Treaty as a factual sovereignty transfer over the Pinnacles, the U.S. implication concerning the geographic delineation of the Ryukyu Islands, notably supports Japanese administration of the Pinnacles through Okinawa Prefecture. Nonetheless, despite the Washington’s legal implications and commitments, as a result of the dispute
ministration”, which technically includes the Pinnacle Islands.
Rising Tensions
In the Pinnacles dispute, several provocations among Chinese, Taiwanese, and Japanese nationalist groups took place during the 1990’s. In an attempt to calm down the tensions, the Japanese government has forbidden national citizens to visit the islets and opted for not establishing a physical presence on the Pinnacles since then. Despite this initiative, between 2003 and 2005, the Japanese media revealed numerous classified documents from Japan’s SelfDefense Forces confirming that Chinese aircrafts, submarines, and vessels infiltrated Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone. On April 10th, 2010, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force monitored ten Chinese warships fleeting 140 kilometers south of Okinawa across the Miyako Strait with the intention to Erick Gutierrez Macias received his undergraduate confront Japanese degree in International Studies with a minor in vessels. International Law from the University of Monterrey, Frictions over Mexico in 2008. He is a graduate of the International the Pinnacles’ conMaster’s Program of Asia-Pacific Studies (IMAS) at troversy escalated National Chengchi University.
The close relationship between the U.S. and Japan has dissuaded China from using force to take the Pinnacles. since 1972, the U.S. Department of State has opted for an impartial position towards China, Japan, and Taiwan claims over the Pinnacles. Pragmatically, even though the U.S. maintains neutrality in the controversy, Washington has agreed that the Okinawa Reversion Treaty is associated with the Article 5 of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In essence, this legal accord obligates the U.S. to safeguard territory under “Japanese ad-
19 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
on September 7th, 2010, when the Japanese authorities arrested Zhan Qixiong, the captain of the Chinese fishing boat Minjinyu 5179, after he deliberately rammed his boat against two Japanese coastguard vessels. His men were fishing in waters considered part of Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The Chinese captain was arrested, not for illegal finishing, but for the act of aggression. After a few days, Japan sent the Chinese boat back to China with the fourteen fishermen, none of whom were arrested, except for the captain who was in custody for only seventeen days. The release of the Chinese captain was probably the result of China’s diplomatic pressure: The postponement of China-Japan Parliamentary Exchange (September 13th, 2010); the cancelation of a Japanese pop music group (SMAP) concert in Shanghai, and the following revocation of thousand members from a Japanese youth exchange group to participate in the Shanghai World’s Expo (September 19th, 2010); the arrest of four Japanese workers from Fujita Corporation, which were supposed to undertake the removal of chemical weapons in China; and the suspension of corporate exchanges, among other arbitrary actions. Afterwards, the Japanese government deliberated whether it should send troops to Yonaguni Island, which is located southwest of the Pinnacle Islands. Tokyo’s new strategy is a deployment of partially armed personnel to supervise the war-craft exercises, and build new infrastructure with the collaboration of the U.S. Forces in Japan. The Japanese Defense Ministry has also pondered about sending troops to the islands of Miyako and Ishigaki located south of Pinnacle Islands to fortify border security in the next years. Although the stipulated deployment of the troops is not yet planned for any of the Pinnacles, this maneuver signifies the establishment of a buffer zone close to the disputed islands. This action will definitely increase the tension among the nations involved in the controversy. Nonetheless, every nation-state has the right to reinforce its boundaries if nec-
essary. In April 2012, the former Tokyo Mayor, Shintaro Ishihara, declared in Washington the intention of his government to acquire the Pinnacles under private ownership. Previously, the Kurihara family had reported that the Chinese government secretly offered them ten billions yen to obtain the islands in their possession. In August of the same year, Japanese authorities deported a group of Hong Kong activists who landed on the Pinnacles and resisted arrest. As a response, Japanese activists from “Ganbare Nippon”, a right-wing group, also landed on the islets and left after a few hours. On September 11th, 2012, the Japanese central government took the initiative, over the Tokyo local government plans to purchase the rest of the Pinnacles. This situation motivated numerous violent protests across China, during which Japanese nationals, firms, businesses, and even the Japanese Ambassador to China were attacked. On December 13th, 2012, PRC provocations took place once again, when a Chinese military aircraft did a flyover of the Pinnacle Islands. More recently, on January 30th, 2013, a Chinese warship followed and targeted a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force vessel, forcing a direct confrontation. When the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) retook power at the end of 2012, Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, affirmed a strong position towards the Pinnacles issue. However, he also called for a diplomatic dialogue with Beijing. Whereas, China affirmed that during the current year, it will conduct scientific surveys under the Pinnacles’ seabed in order to protect its economic interests in those waters.
Conclusions Chinese and Taiwanese claims, based on historical, geographical, and geological evidence to assert their sovereignty over the Pinnacles, do not have enough sustainability under International Public Law to support their positions objectively. For instance, the geographic and geologic notions held by China technically include its sovereignty not only over the Pinnacle Islands, but also over Taiwan. Curiously in this other case, China sustains a territorial dis-
None of the parties are much interested in the small islands’ terrain but instead in the natural resources surrounding them.
pute with a claimed territory of its own, as Taiwan has been pondering its own right to self-determination since 1949. In addition, geographic and geological claims are irrelevant to proclaim territorial sovereignty. If the geological structure were a substantial factor to solve territorial controversies, the sovereignty of several overseas territories and dependencies across the world would have to be transferred. Hypothetically speaking, Greenland would be Canadian territory and not Danish. Furthermore, sovereignty claims held by the PRC and the ROC governments have mostly depended on historical records, whose evidence lack of probative value. Arguing that Ming and Qing Dynasties’ sailors named and mapped the Pinnacles when they passed by during their voyages to the Ryukyu Kingdom is incoherent, because previous sovereign entitlements are not applicable to the current sovereignty of China or Taiwan. This supposition is as if the Old Portuguese Empire would have the right of sovereignty over Taiwan only because during the mid-sixteenth century they navigated through its waters and referred to it as “Formosa.” The fact is that the Ming and Qing Dynasty have passed, and with them their sovereignty and territorial boundaries. If the controversy were to be submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Japanese claims would possibly have a more substantial evidence to appeal, since Japan has legal possession of the islands. In addition, Japan’s government has effectively administrated and exercised sovereignty over the Pinnacles for a reasonable time. By contrast, neither the PRC nor ROC has ever exercised effective sovereign authority in the Pinnacles. It is quite illusive to establish sovereignty only by drawing maps and describing anecdotes. However, the controversy may not be solved throughout the ICJ, given the ICJ deficiency concerning the over-dependence on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimity powers, to which China is member. Another issue is
that Taiwan is no longer a member of the UN. Therefore, it cannot be represented as a legal party over the territorial controversy. Apparently, there is a latent hostile scenario clouding the final resolution to the question of the Pinnacles’ sovereignty, which will probably increase over the time since not only nationalism’ principles are at risk, but also oil and natural gas. Under these circumstances, likely none of the parties are much interested in the small islands’ terrain but instead in the natural resources surrounding them. This is because Japan’s energy shortages are increasing as a result of its nuclear dilemma, and China’s energy demand continues to rise due to its fast economic growth. Moreover, in a global economy where serious energy supply shortages will eventually take place; the benefits involved in the Pinnacles’ case might turn the controversy towards an escalating conflict for economic interests. Therefore, this controversy denotes a major challenge and questions the ability for the involved nations to achieve a consensus regarding their common strategic and economic interests, which is vital to maintaining security in the East Asia region, as well as in the international system. APN
VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 20
Depressed Prospects on the
South China Sea By Anson Park
Maritime disputes in Southeast Asia have increased, and the confrontation between the U.S. and China is the key point in these disputes.
al markets. This has further emphasized the economic importance of disputes in the South China Sea. The tough talk and even violent clashes in the South China Sea originate from such disputes. In the Johnson South Reef Skirmish of 1988, China clashed with Vietnam in a naval battle over the Spratly Islands, in which 70 Vietnamese sailors were killed. This was a follow-up to the 1975 Battle of the Paracel Islands, in which China wrested control from Vietnam of the islands in the Paracel group that it did not already control. The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan likewise claims many of the islands in the South China Sea. At the conclusion of World War II in 1945, the ROC—then still with a capital on mainland China—sent troops to these two archipelagos, resulting in a dispute first with Vietnam and the Philippines, and later also with Malaysia and Brunei.
China began its grab for natural resources in the 2000s, using mergers and acquisitions for energy companies as a tool for controlling resources. This was supplemented through the capturing of resource-wealthy territories in the South China Sea, all for the purpose of serving economic development. Many experts on the South China Sea estimate that it holds a great wealth of natural resources including oil, natural gas, and metals. The Energy Information Administration, an agency of the US government, released a brief analyWith the fall of the Soviet Union at the sis of the South China Sea that included end of Cold War in the late 1980s and early a conservative estimate of the sea’s oil re1990s, it seemed that war had ended and sources reaching 213 billion barrels, as well given way to an era of peace. Its end indeed as two quadrillion cubic feet of natural gas. brought a lasting peace between the counSuch a wealth of natural resources would tries of NATO and those of the former Sobe a boon to any country’s economic develviet bloc, resulting in no further clashes on opment by proving a stable supply of the the order of World Wars I and II, though lifeblood of the petroleum-based economy. the Korean and Vietnam wars were notable Moreover, the vague conditions surroundexceptions. Regardless, the type of global ing ownership and control over the various war envisioned and feared from the South China Sea islands made for an 1950s to the 1990s had been successattractive opportunity. fully avoided. In addition to natural resources, Cooperation between the However, the end of the Cold the importance of control over United States, Vietnam, and War didn’t signify the end to all conthe Sea Lines of Communication flict amongst nations. Issues such (SLOC) cannot be ignored. The Mathe Philippines has raised as terrorism and ethnic disputes lacca Strait is strategically located as a eyebrows among leaders in became part of the focus of global link between the South China Sea and politics, and territorial conflicts had the Indian Ocean, and is therefore Beijing, who are concerned become a classical subject, such as of enormous importance for Asian that US military dominance those between India and Pakistan and international trade. If any one of the region has not changed on the issue of Kashmir, as well as country controlled this trade chanthe ongoing border disputes between nel it would raise suspicion and fear since the 1950s. China and Russia, and China and amongst competitor nations who are India, which have been unresolved also dependent on this route. Thus, since the1960s. These moved on to in China’s view, securing this route is maritime tussles in the 1990s, which inThe question of territorial disputes has important for trade, as well as for military cluded conflicts over natural resources and principal as well as conditional answers. Ter- operations. China has signed agreements trade routes. Economic issues had assumed ritorial expansion is the result of growing with Myanmar and Sri Lanka on the use of top priority in statecraft, and been deemed national power, as seen throughout history ports as supply points, and has also secured essential as a means of establishing a last- in the Western World’s territorial expansion an oil route from the Middle East. In ading peace and sustainable development. through colonization, which in turn was the dition, China’s People’s Liberation Army This has been further complicated by the result of an increasing demand for natural Navy (PLAN) is already preparing for longrapid advancement of technology and the resources and manufactured goods. In the distance sea missions in order to secure this increasing speed of communications and late 20th century, despite the period of de- route for the shipment of natural resources transportation. To sustain present levels colonization engaged in by the Western from the Middle East to China. It is this of competition between nations, it has be- powers, this economic need for more terri- militaristic aim that is especially important come essential to control natural resources, tory has not changed, and the grabbing of for Southeast-Asian countries. the means of production, and the securing natural resources is still seen as essential to Various actors are involved in this area, of trade routes that provide access to glob- economic development. including the United States which plays the 21 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
roles of security guarantor in the region and mediator in some conflicts. This has led to confrontations between Beijing and Washington, resulting in complex politics in this region. Beginning in the early 1970s, Beijing has claimed that the South China Sea is “unchangeable territory and part of China.” It has identified the entire sea as being a core national interest. To bolster this claim, China built an airbase on Woody Island, resulting in furious disputes with those countries involved in the region. The negotiations over this dispute was partly compromised by an agreed-upon “code of conduct” about the peaceful use of the South China Sea. However, China’s continued efforts in building villages and increasing troop numbers in the South China Sea demonstrates its expansionist intent. In mid-June 2012, China established Sansha City on Woody Island to nominally administer the island groups and atolls in the South China Sea on behalf of Beijing. Negotiation had clearly been insufficient. Vietnam and the Philippines have thus far both failed to back down in the face of China’s strident claims. Vietnam was a close ally of the Soviet Union from the 1960s, and in response to the war with the United States, allowed the Soviets to lease Cam Ranh Bay rent-free for use as a naval base, strategically located on the way to Hainan Island and Hong Kong. After the collapse of Soviet Union, Vietnam responded to China’s aggression by opening bilateral discussions with its erstwhile enemy, the United States, on the military use of Cam Ranh Bay starting from 2010. The Philippines likewise opened a dialogue with the United States in the wake of Chinese aggressiveness, in this case on the return of their navy. Members of the US House of Representatives accompanied American military officers on a visit to Subic Bay to open the way for its military use in late 2011. In addition, the mutual cooperation treaty on preventing the expansion of communism signed in the 1950s by the Philippines and the United States remains in effect. On the basis of that treaty, Manila and Washington have agreements for military co-operation and increased diplomatic ties. This cooperation between the United States, Vietnam, and the Philippines has raised eyebrows among leaders in Beijing, who are concerned that US military dominance of the region has not changed since the 1950s. China’s expansion across the South China Sea can now only be controlled by the United States; the only superpower
involved in global politics with Vietnam and the Philippines. This also increases the dependency of these nations on Washington to protect international security. The 45th Annual Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2012 vividly demonstrated the split in cooperation of ASEAN members on the South China Sea dispute. Even though South China Sea issues have been dealt with through multilateral negotiation in ASEAN with China, it has not solved the problem, suggesting that bilateral negotiations are the preferred method. Vietnam and the Philippines first submitted a draft agreement on the issue that would have defined the South China Sea disputes with China as a purely multilateral issue to be handled between ASEAN and China, thus reducing the possibility of a Chinese military response.
This story will not have a happy ending.
power’s strategy has recently been adjusted to address the Asia-Pacific, however. The testimony to Congress of Defense Secretary Leon Panetta hinted that the United States will dedicate aircraft and other assets to the Asia-Pacific region. Hilary Clinton’s announcement on the Asia-Pacific further added to the value of US foreign policy in the region when, during the ministerial conference of 2012, she strongly supported the positions of Vietnam and the Philippines in their littoral disputes with China, further increasing Chinese concerns about continued US involvement in the region— involvement that has only increased, along with the region’s importance to the global economy and security. US efforts to expand cooperation now include new potential allies such as Myanmar, as well as long-time friends such as South Korea and Japan. The point of the game in the South China Sea seems to be to grab an island in competition, and China has expanded its territory day by day. China has established administrative regions throughout the South China Sea and elected legislative members on the islands to emphasize its claims of governance over these disputed areas. In addition, the United States and other countries in Southeast Asia have thus far failed to mount a united effort to counter China’s rapid expansion, instead only criticizes Beijing’s moves. In short: peaceful cooperation and sharing the resources of the South China Sea will not be possible unless and until China’s expansion is stopped. This story will not have a happy ending. Rather, it may result in small-scale military conflict between China and other claimant countries, similar to what occurred between China and Vietnam in the late 1980s over the Paracel Islands. China’s history of territorial expansion shows an assertive policy, and Beijing’s leadership shows a very limited initiative in military cooperation, which demonstrates their powerful capacity. To ensure the peaceful use of the region would require active US intervention. this possibility is less that certain, however, as it would risk weakening the US economy, which is overshadowed by the US financial debt and hence need for cooperation with China, especially on issues related to North Korea, Iran, and Syria. APN
These efforts failed, however, when host Cambodia withdrew from multilateral discussions due to Chinese pressure. The Chinese, through their Cambodian proxies, argued that the South China Sea is purely a bilateral issue which cannot be dealt with by the rule of ASEAN. The reason for this failure relates to an asymmetric perception: The South China Sea has a direct impact on the security and economies of Vietnam and the Philippines, while it hardly affects countries such as Thailand and Cambodia. Moreover, Cambodia has long-term investment and diplomatic relations with China, going back to the 1940s, and as such Phnom Penh has an interest in a stronger China. Such variation of interests over China is what led to ASEAN’s split response and the group’s failure to issue a summit communiqué for the first time in its 45-year history. Initially, the main focus of US foreign policy was Europe Anson Park was a negotiator for the Korea Internet and the Middle and Security Agency and has advised government about negotiation and research in the Greater China East, with their area. He is a graduate of the Department of Political forces deployed Science at National Chengchi University. He can be mostly in those rereached at inmyfaye@naver.com. gions. The super-
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23 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 24
: I B CY N N E I R NM VE CUR
EARDS A RESER R TOW After adopting an opening policy in 1978, China accelerated its economic growth massively. Over the last decade China’s economy grew at average annual rate of 11% and at an average rate of 9.6% between 1990 and 2010. Today in terms of GDP, China is the world’s second largest economy after the US, the largest trading nation and the largest holder of foreign currency reserves in the world. Its economic importance has led to a significant position in global economy. However, the recent financial crisis has shown the vulnerability of China’s financial position under the existing international monetary system. This system is primarily characterised by the dominance of the US dollar. The financial position of countries holding US dollar reserves is directly influenced by domestic US affairs. Particularly the recent financial crisis demonstrated that US policy aimed at crisis management has created strong externality to the rest of the world. China has economic weight and at the same time it is vulnerable to the international monetary system that dominated by the US dollar, however its currency- the Renminbi (RMB) is not a reserve currency as the US dollar and other currencies. The Chinese government has taken actions that are moving the Renminbi towards a reserve currency. The currency is already experiencing increased international use and China is gradually opening its capital account. China’s economic development and signals indicate that this process will continue to 25 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
move the Renminbi towards a reserve currency.
Reserve Currency
Two requirements have to be met for a currency to become a reserve currency. These aspects are distinct and not necessary or sufficient requirements for the other. However, both aspects are requirements for a currency to become a reserve currency. The first aspect is currency internationalisation, in short the international use of a currency. In the academic literature there are several frameworks that define and explain currency internationalisation. An international currency is one that is used and held internationally, that is beyond the borders of the country that issued the currency. Such a currency is used for transactions between the issuing countries residents and for transactions between non-residents. According to Chinn and Frankel an international currency should fulfil several functions. These are store of value, medium of exchange, and unit of account for both residents and non-residents of the currency issuing country. In other words, an international currency can be used for private purposes as a currency substitution, for invoicing and denominating investments and for trade and financial transactions. For public purposes an international currency can be used as a reserve, as a vehicle for foreign exchange intervention, and an anchor currency for currency pegging. The second aspect is capital-account
By Phillip Klotz
convertibility. It describes to which extent inflows and outflows of financial capital are restricted by the currency issuing country. Capital-account convertibility can reach from fully opened capital account to fully closed capital account. Fully opened means that there are no restrictions and fully closed the opposite.
Development of the RMB
When the two aforementioned requirements of internationalisation and capitalaccount convertibility are met, foreign countries have an incentive to hold the currency. A currency is regarded as reserve currency when foreign central banks are holding a large amount thereof as protection against balance of payments crises.
Internationalisation
As for public purposes, the renminbi is used as a vehicle currency in the bilateral swap arrangements (BSA) under the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) framework, a response to the Asian financial crisis. ASEAN+3 countries started to put more effort in the development of mechanisms to protect themselves from financial disruptions. They started to accumulate large amounts of foreign reserves on a national basis and pooled them as part of the CMI initiative. In 2009 the CMI was further extended through the signing of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), which took effect in 2010. The foreign currency form of swap agreements is used by the central banks to support their domestic
PHOTO O BY JAS O EY UPT N WESL
.0) Y-ND 2 N (CC B
currency by providing the foreign currency to domestic financial institutions. Central banks can use the foreign currency from swap agreements to directly intervene in exchange markets and hold domestic financial institutions away from foreign exchange markets. The effect is to stabilise the domestic currency, particularly it helps to avoid that the exchange rate of the domestic currency is driven down. Coming back to the terminology used in this papers framework, the use of the renminbi in the BSA means that it is used as a vehicle-currency by non-Chinese residents.
As of 2010 the People’s Bank (People’s Bank of China 2010) of China has set renminbi local swap arrangements with the Central Bank of Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Belarus, Indonesia, Argentina, Iceland and Singapore. Some of these arrangements were signed under the CMI. These arrangements use the renminbi rather than the US dollar in the currency swaps.
The renminbi is also used in trade settlement and bank loan business. Chinas rapid development of foreign trade has increased the circulation of the renminbi in China’s neighbouring countries significantly. For instance the renminbi is accepted in shops and restaurants. In some major foreign exchange markets in Mongolia, the renminbi and the US dollar are the foreign currencies with the highest transaction amount. In Vietnam, the renminbi can be exchanged via unofficial banking, and here the Vietnamese government has recently acknowledged its legitimacy. In Laos and Myanmar the renminbi is popular in some provinces bordering China. Cambodia and Nepal have announced that official renminbi circulation is welcome in their markets. In Hong Kong, the renminbi has already become the second largest exchange currency after the Hong Kong dollar. Since the renminbi is not fully convert-
ible, it is difficult to estimate the amount of renminbi circulation in neighbouring countries. In most of China’s neighbouring countries the renminbi cannot be deposited in the local banking system. Thus, the availability of data is very limited. However, since Hong Kong and China jointly launched the renminbi business, the Hong Kong banking system data on the circulation of the renminbi is available. The joint renminbi business was launched on 24 February 2004, when 32 licensed banks started offering renminbi deposit taking, currency exchange and remittance services. During April 2012 there were 32,866 renminbi remittance transactions from Hong Kong to Mainland China, amounting to 112,236 million RMB. At the end of April 2012, 2,652,185 renminbi demand and savings deposit accounts and 512,688 renminbi time deposit accounts were opened with authorized institutions in Hong Kong. During the same month 1,648,071 million RMB was converted into Hong Kong dollars and other currencies. An equivalent of 1,616,633 million RMB of Hong Kong dollars and other currencies was converted into renminbi through authorized institutions engaged in renminbi business. It shows that China’s actions to promote the international use of its currency are gaining traction. However, it is critical to use the data available from the banking system in Hong Kong to estimate the magnitude of renminbi circulation. There is a significant gap between the currency flows through the banking system and other means of currency exchange in Hong Kong. With the lack of precise data, quantifying the amount of renminbi circulation outside China, it is
PHOTO BY JASON WESLEY UPTON (CC BY-ND 2.0)
For private purposes the renminbi is used as denominating currency for bonds. The Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) Group launched at the end of 2004 the Asian Bond Fund 2 (ABF2). ABF2 funds invest in sovereign and quasi-sovereign domestic denominated bonds issued in eight EMEAP markets. These markets are China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The ABF2 fund consists of two components. The first component is the establishment of a Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF)
and the second on the facilitation of eight Single-market Funds. The objective of the ABF2 fund is to provide low-cost and efficient passively managed bond funds and to catalyse market and regulatory reforms at both regional and domestic levels. Under ABF1, initial investments in the Funds were made by EMEAP central banks. The issued bonds were only denominated in US dollar. ABF2 allowed bond issuances to denominate in local currencies of the eight EMEAP Group markets. The PAIF is now listed in Hong Kong and Japan. After the successful transition of the Single-market China Fund in China in 2011, all of the eight single-market Funds have completed the second phase implementation of ABF2.
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Internationalisation Measures
The renmbinbi is also increasingly used in cross-border trade transactions. In 1997 China officially permitted cross-border trade settlement with its neighbouring countries. In 2009 China launched a pilot scheme to expand the use of the renminbi in trade settlement. This scheme permitted cross-border renminbi trade settlement in five Chinese cities trading with Hong Kong Macau and ASEAN countries. The scheme was expanded to 20 provinces and cities covering over 90% of national exports and became open to all countries in 2010. In 2011 Chinese authorities announced a package of measures to accelerate renminbi internationalisation. This package included the extension of the renminbi trade settlement scheme on a nation-wide basis. At the end of 2010 renminbi-trade settlement was available to around 70,000 certified exporters. At the end of 2011, Japan and China announced an initiative that promotes the use of renminbi in settling trade between the two countries. At the end of May 2012 China and Japan started direct currency trading. Foreign exchange traders began swapping Japanese yen for the Chinese renminbi without having to use the US dollar as an intermediary currency as it was required up to that point in time. By directly trading the renminbi with the Japanese yen and not using the US dollar as intermediate currency, transaction costs and settlement risks at financial institutions can be reduced. Direct trading between the Chinese renminbi and Japanese yen will contribute to the formation of a
27 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
direct exchange rate between the two currencies. Both currencies, the Japanese yen and the renminbi, became more useful.
Capital-account Convertibility
Capital-account convertibility of the renminbi, which is China’s level of restrictions on inflows and outflows of financial capital, is still very limited. In other words, the capital account of China is not fully opened. Capital account liberalisation can be achieved in parallel with the process of renminbi internationalisation. In the past China gradually liberalised its capital account. The liberalisation of capital flows is generally beneficial, but it also poses tradeoffs. With the liberalisation of capital flows financial claims can be freely traded. It has the potential to reduce resource misallocations, increase investment and to reduce corruption. Additionally, it can promote cross border risk sharing, foster the development of domestic financial systems as a result of greater competition and enhance policy discipline. On the downside, capital-account liberalisation can increase macroeconomic volatility and vulnerability to crises particularly in emerging and developing countries. Furthermore, it can reduce the country’s ability to effectively pursue domestic objectives. However, the empirical evidence on the benefits of liberalising capital flows is mixed. For instance, Rodrik and Ostry both find no clear relationship between liberalised capital flows and economic growth. On the other hand Quinn and Toyoda found that countries with open capital market tend to grow faster. Up to date, China’s capital controls have
prohibited non-residents of China to obtain renminbi assets. The structure of the capital controls determines, to a large degree, through what channels and in what amount China’s currency can be obtained and used by both non-residents of China domestically and by residents of China externally. China’s strategy is characterised by liberalising long term flows before shortterm flows, liberalising direct flows before indirect flows, and protecting the states domestic sector from external competition and undesired external shocks. The control on direct investment has already been removed, but portfolio investment and short-term debt are still highly regulated by China. The intention of China on capital control is mainly determined by the direction of capital flow at current stage. For instance during the 1990s when China had limited foreign exchange reserves and was facing capital outflow pressure, the government adopted an easy in- difficult out strategy. During the 2000s when China had accumulated large foreign exchange reserves and it was facing a strong capital inflow it adopted an easy out- difficult in strategy. China’s counter-cyclical capital-account strategy demonstrates the countries effort to limit vast capital outflows and inflows. By the end of 2011, on a list of specific items under capital account transactions defined by the IMF, 12% had been fully opened, 20% had been basically opened, 43% had been partially opened, and 25% had not been opened yet.
RMB as a Reserve Currency
Several factors will influence the development of the renminbi towards a reserve currency. Prasad and Ye summarized five
PHOTO BY JASON WESLEY UPTON (CC BY-ND 2.0)
also difficult to estimate its potential impact on China’s monetary policy.
key factors. First, economic size and a countries share in trade and finance are important. China is an economic power, in terms of GDP the country is the world’s second largest economy after the US and the largest trading nation in the world. Second, China has to liberalise its capital account. It is necessary that the renminbi is easily tradable in global financial markets with no restrictions on capital flows. China has still a long way to go until it reaches full capital account convertibility. Third, generally reserve currencies are traded freely at market-determined exchange rates. China’s exchange rate is still strongly controlled. With an increasingly open capital account it will be harder for China to actively manage the exchange rate. Fourth, the development of the financial market is very important. China’s financial market must be broad (availability of a broad range of financial instruments), deep (availability of a large volume of financial instruments in specific markets), and liquid (high trading volume) so that international investors have access to a broad range of financial assets denominated in its currency. China’s financial market, particularly its government and corporate bond market is still underdeveloped and other types of securities as derivatives are still in their nascent stage. The following figure illustrates the amount of domestic debt securities in the financial, corporate and government sector among different countries in 2010. Although China is an economic power, this figure clearly shows how small its government and corporate bond market is in comparison to other economies. The amount of domestic debt outstanding from the US, Japan and Europe exceeds China by a much. Without a large debt market, the renbinbi has no potential to be used in international transactions. If the market for renminbi-denominated assets is not liquid, the currency will not be attractive to investors. Particularly, institutional investors and central banks will seek for renminbi-denominated government and corporate debt as a secure asset to their portfolio. A welldeveloped financial market would provide a safer investment. Exporters and importers are facing exchange rate risks. If there is no well-developed derivatives market they cannot sufficiently hedge against foreign exchange risk. Fifth, macroeconomic policies must be transparent and meaningful. A country
must commit to low level of inflation and a sustainable level of public debt. China’s debt to GDP ratio is still low, and the average inflation over the last decade moderate. From this perspective it is clear that China still has some hurdles to overcome, however it is moving towards a reserve currency.
Conclusion
It is undeniable that China is an economic power. In terms of GDP it is the world’s second largest economy after the US, the largest trading nation and the largest holder of foreign currency reserves in the world. The prospects for China’s future economic development are good. According to the general opinion of economists, China’s economy will continue to grow, not at two digits as it did in the past, but strongly. Its economic power has already led to a significant position in global economy. According to an IMF report, China is already the most central economy to global trade. This position supports the demand for the renminbi as settlement-currency for cross-border trade, which will enhance the internationalisation of the renminbi. Capital-account liberalisation of China is still very limited, but the opening process proceeds gradually. The idea of capital-account liberalisation was also put forward in China’s 12th five-year plan. China moves on cautiously, using Hong Kong as an effective platform for launching measures in an experimental manner without full currency internationalisation and capital-account opening. The World Bank stated in a recent paper on the new global economy that three future international currency scenarios between 2011 and 2025 could possibly emerge. First, the status quo remains unchanged. Second, a more multipolar currency system with the dollar, euro and the renminbi at its center, will emerge. Third, on the basis of multilateral agreements, a world currency system will emerge. Scenario two seems to be most likely. In this scenario capital account liberalisation will gradually progress and internationalisation of the renminbi will continue. The renminbi will become more important, wiping out the position of the US dollar as world’s dominant reserve currency. APN
Philipp Klotz is a PhD student at National Chengchi University conducting research into financial and commodity markets. He holds a Master’s degree in Business Administration with specialisation in Banking and Finance from the University of Innsbruck, Austria. VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 28
US Military Presence in Okinawa and Its Impacts on Women’s Development
PHOTO BY DAOINEMAITHE (CC BY-SA-ND 2.0)
By Serafettin Yilmaz
This study investigates the impact of the US military presence on women’s development in Okinawa. Although human development consists of more than a single component, this paper is particularly interested in women’s security. In this study, women’s security is examined in its physical and economic dimensions, even though one can further discuss other dimensions such as health, political or environmental security. It is argued that the US military presence on the Island of Okinawa brings about negative implications for women’s development, by denying them the capability to exercise freedoms and by exposing them to non-freedoms. To this end, this investigation employs a capability approach, in which human freedom is considered an inherent component of development. This approach addresses development not as a singularly economic notion, but as man’s overall capability to exercise freedoms in public and private life, without any fear of negative consequences. Hence, this study draws heavily on secondary sources such as governmental data, historical records, research conducted by NGOs, and newspaper reports and op-ed articles. The aim here is to add a new dimension to the existing discussion, in order to better understand the impact of US military presence on the Okinawan women’s development. The American presence in Okinawa is a legacy of the Second World War that ended in the unconditional surrender of the Japanese government on August 14, 1945. The island was the theater of the “Battle of Okinawa”, the bloodiest battle of the Pacific War, and the people suffered immensely during the conflict. The US invasion of Okinawa started in April 1, 1945, and ended with over 260,000 persons (both 29 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
civilian and military) killed, a figure that was much larger than the number of deaths from the two atomic bombs dropped over Japan. Okinawa gained independence much later than mainland Japan. As McCormack points out, the 1951 San Francisco Treaty restored Japan’s sovereignty, dividing the country into two zones: the US-controlled war state (Okinawa) and the demilitarized and pacified peace state (Japan). The 1960
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (a.k.a. AMPO) upheld this division. Hence, the presence of the US military in both Okinawa and the rest of Japan is based on this Treaty, which justified the terms imposed upon Japan by the allied nations in the San Francisco Treaty a decade before. However, AMPO came at the cost of the infringement of the Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which made a firm commitment to pacifism. As noted above, Okinawa continued to suffer the consequences of defeat long after mainland Japan gained independence in 1951. The return of Okinawa to Japan (henkan, giving back) and the end of de facto occupation took place in 1972. However even after the purchase of Okinawa (Japan paid $685 million to buy the islands from the US), the US kept almost all preindependence military assets and installations upon the request by the then Sato government. The thinking of the administration was that the retention of the US bases would provide the essential deterrent against the possible threats posed by third parties. As a matter of fact, during the time of reversion (or retention), the island was already being utilized in the daily bombing of Vietnam. Today, almost one-fifth of the land surface of Okinawa’s main island is occupied by US marine and air force facilities (almost 75% of all US forces stationed in Japan) -28,000 out of a total of 45,000 U.S. military personnel, including four battalions. This places a great burden on almost every aspect of the Okinawan’s lives, taking the form of reduced physical security, lack of economic opportunities and a degraded environment. However, a larger portion of this burden has been borne by the women. Indeed, even though the US military presence has had a negative impact on the society as a whole, it has been the Okinawan women that have been most adversely affected. For example, the women have often been subject to crimes such as assault, abduction, rape, gang rape and murder by the US military. Economically, too, women have been denied the right to have decent job and been forced into prostitution in the form of catering to the needs of the military personnel. Hence, it would be safe to state that the impacts of the militarization
of Okinawa have been gender biased and women are more adversely affected than men. This study aims to investigate the implications of the US military presence on the women of Okinawa and to re-define it not merely as a violation of basic rights of women, but also a serious impediment on the overall development of women as a public agent. To this end, it draws heavily on the seminal work by Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, in order to construct the Okinawan women’s situation within the perspective of capability approach, absence of which, according to Sen, leads to a lack of development. Sen defines development as a process of expanding freedoms and removing unfreedoms. This broad conceptualization calls for the creation of an environment in which human potential is fully realized. Development in this sense is the liberation of human potential from external threats and repressions. Hence empowering Okinawan women by recognizing their freedoms and providing the space for the exercise of those freedoms is a crucial aspect of gender and development. — O’Manique states that human freedom and development are convergent concepts. In his book, Development as Freedom, Sen defines his perspective of five closely linked and mutually inclusive freedoms, which altogether empower a person and facilitate his or her development: political freedoms that include elections and free speech; economic facilities that enable equal participation in the market place; social opportunities that enable protection of and access to the public goods such as education, health care, environment; transparency guarantees that involve free flow of and access to information; and protective security that provides protection from any type of encroachments on a person’s physical, social and psychological being. It is understood that development is the sum of freedoms expressed by an individual at different levels of public and private life. Yet, more specifically, development could be defined as a process whereby an individual/community actualizes what he/ she/them believe(s) to be good. It follows that any social reality that impinges upon the freedoms is seen as an impediment to development because freedoms are both means and ends to the realization of an individual’s perceived good. The UN Declaration on the Right to Development defines development broadly, by including economic, social, cultural
Empowering Okinawan women by recognizing their freedoms and providing the space for the exercise of those freedoms is a crucial aspect of gender and development. and political processes that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom. Hence, freedoms are seen instrumental in procuring and protecting rights, opportunities and entitlements. Unfreedoms are related to deprivation, destitution and oppression, and involve both old and new aspects: famine, sickness, under-nutrition, illiteracy, unemployment, limited access to health care, clean water, and safe housing as well as physical insecurity, no social rights, gender discrimination and lack of safe environment and public infrastructure. Consequently, rights (or, freedoms), as opposed to the way they are defined by the 18th century philosophers, could no longer be kept limited to the right to vote or to own property and, similarly, development could not be kept limited to GNP/per capita growth. This relationship between freedoms and development is no longer considered complimentary but mutually reinforcing. As Monique maintains, freedoms are not just aspects of development, but essential parts of it whereby development is made possible. Without a full exercise of freedoms, development remains exclusionary, limited, classed and unequal. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) determines five aspects of human development: Empowerment, cooperation, equity, sustainability and security. This study primarily focuses on the first and last aspects as they relate more closely to the subject matter at hand. Empowerment, also highly emphasized by Sen as a form of human capability, involves expanding men and women’s abilities and choices the way they desire to utilize them. Security primarily involves a person’s physical safety, that is, his or her livelihood. The relationship between security and development requires that the right to enjoy a full security is a basic freedom whereby the individual is able to utilize his or her capabilities. The concepts of empowerment and security as aspects of development are instrumental in comprehending the impact of the US military presence in Okinawa. Empowerment here is taken not merely as a form of authority to decide on the type of
rule/regime that one desires to live under, but, as a total control over one’s capabilities and alternatives within a system that would enable an individual to make free choices and, most importantly, to initiate structural changes in one’s public and private life when one wishes so. Security involves, in addition to more generally defined national security, protection from within as well as from outside. Empowerment arises as an important component of security, because security within a democratic system is maintained through civic action that empowerment provides and guarantees. As will be analyzed concisely in the next section, in the case of Okinawa the threat towards women’s security comes from within the democratically instituted system and it is the lack of empowerment on part of the women that exposes them to these threats. Institutions, in this regard, are instrumental in either facilitating or limiting freedoms. In Sen’s words, “Our opportunities and prospects depend crucially on what institutions exist and how they function”. In another words, individual freedoms are enhanced or reduced through institutional actions. Democratic institutions that increase freedoms enable people to enjoy lifestyles that they have reason to value, whereas institutions that limit or suppress freedoms pose a major obstacle to development. In the Okinawan context, whereas local institutions are mostly in support of the enhancement of freedoms by calling for the removal of the US bases, national institutions are reluctant to change or even to reform the status quo. Hence, in the case of Okinawa it could be argued that institutional empowerment varies between local and national structures and they do not necessarily function in harmony because of the fact that the preferences of the agencies vary. This observation could be verified by the fact that the popular dissent towards the US military presence often clashes with the interests and policies of the central governments, various bureaucracies and business groups. Another point that one needs to make is that Sen, by incorporating the freedom aspect into development studies, upgrades the whole area into a higher level where development is no longer equated with a VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 30
Okinawan women are left with no other choice but either to remain either unemployed or work in the sector that caters to the needs of the military, including prostitution. struggle towards Western style modernity. Rather, development under this new understanding emerges as a more personal and liberating concept. Empowerment becomes a tool for liberation and capability deprivation is seen as an equal, if not greater, injustice as income deprivation. Thus, capability bestows agency upon an agent. Agency is defined as the capacity of an agent to function in the world. When Sen talks about freedoms, he refers to capacity and/or capability. Capacity to act refers to the positive (desirable) aspects of freedom. This inherent interaction between women’s agency and freedom is important since it brings about empowerment that is required for development. As women have more powers over their lives in making free decisions, they suffer less from structured inequalities. The example of Okinawa makes it obvious that the lack of development is indeed the lack of capabilities and both negative and positive aspects of freedom play central role in reversing this trend. Lastly, Sen points out to the fact that freedoms are focused on the processes as well as outcomes This statement is important in addressing the arguments that US bases in Okinawa are for greater national interest. The negative implications brought about by the US military suggest that when freedoms are merely outcomeoriented, there is a likelihood that the way those outcomes are obtained is detrimental to the very idea of providing and sustaining freedoms. — The cases where the US military existence has a negative impact on the women of Okinawa are numerous. A scan of newspaper archives would reveal the stories of crime committed by the US military and, albeit to a lesser degree, civilian personnel. These cases range from physical assault to murder. Additionally, US presence affects women’s employment opportunities by denying them the right to enjoy diversified employment. Quite the contrary, women are left with no other choice but either to remain either unemployed or work in the sector that caters to the needs of the military, including prostitution. According to Takazato Suzuyo, the 2005 31 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, the traditional concept of security based on maintaining military that is supposed to protect the interest of all the nation’s people, is contradictory for the simple reason that “you understand [only] half the problem [when] you do not see that this case [US military bases in Okinawa] needs a woman’s viewpoint”. Thus, she emphasizes the absence of women’s perspective on this issue of national security, which is apparently a gendered area. For example, the Okinawan prefectural government does not even have a comprehensive data on crimes against women by US military servicemen. Takazato goes on to highlight three crucial points with respect to the US bases: First, US militarism on women involves sexual exploitation, physical and sexual violence as well as a growing number of child population called Amerasian, who often find themselves in a dire situations because of social contempt. Second, long after the Cold War is over, East Asia has been further militarized by the US despite of the fact that the security environment has improved. Finally, the concept of security has also been militarized, exposing women, children and the environment to its negative implications. Economically, too, as Inoue et al maintain, the US military domination has greatly destabilized the Okinawan economy during and after the occupation, creating a milieu that revolved around bars, prostitution and provision of other services for the US troops. Needless to say, most of these services are carried out by the women, who are left with no other choice than to further perpetuate the economic cycle. The fact is that the US presence has severely impacted the economic base of Okinawa, causing irreversible damages to the economy that has traditionally been based on agriculture and fishery. A report prepared by the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), quoting from a survey published by the US newspaper, the Dayton Daily News, states that “the U.S. bases in Japan come to the top in the world in terms of the number of sexual crimes by U.S. Navy servicemen and marines,” which undoubtedly, obstruct women’s right (freedom) to live in a physically secured environment, a foundational prerequisite for
development. According to the report, the number of criminal offenses since the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, committed by US soldiers, stand at about 5,000. Of them, atrocious crimes such as a murder, robbery and rape account for more than 10 percent. Furthermore, studies on sexual crime against women by the US military men reveal that many women that have suffered sexual violence at the hands of soldiers remain silent. Examples of violence are abundant: In 2005, a woman was beaten to death by a U.S. soldier that broke into her room in an apartment building in Ginowan City. In 2002, US army airman Timothy Woodland sexually assaulted a woman in the parking lot of a shopping mall. In 2008, an US marine was accused of raping a 14-year old girl on Okinawa (NYT, 2008). In 2006, an US civilian employee, Dag Thompson (36), at the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa was sentenced to nine years for raping two women. Perhaps the most infamous crime in Okinawa’s history, under modern era US military occupation, happened in September 1995 when three US soldiers abducted and gang-raped a twelve-year old schoolgirl. This act of violence briefly strained the relations between Japan and the US governments at the time, putting the Japanese government under heavy public criticism. As Angst maintains in her noteworthy article, The Sacrifice of a Schoolgirl, this incident highlighted the sacrifice of sovereignty and a daughter, both in a state of crisis in Okinawa. Angst highlights the fact that, “Rape represents the potential endangerment of all women in Okinawa from the presence of thousands of mostly young, unaccompanied men who train on a regular basis to fight and kill enemy forces. This threat is real. Since 1945, there have been thousands of examples of U.S. servicemen assaulting local women. In this sense, the rape of a female Okinawan forces us to appreciate the daily reality of all women in Okinawa.” (Angst, 2001: 254) Hence, being exposed to the dangers posed by a foreign and potentially violent military entity, the Okinawan women are declined the freedom of security from abduction, rape, battery, and murder. What is more intriguing is that this has been the case for the past six decades and little has been done in terms of bringing a solution to this infringement on basic human freedoms. Furthermore, the problem does not lay only on the high frequency of sexual crimes against women, but also the difficulty that the victims experience in accessing justice since, the SOFA favors US servicemen, granting them free movement out of
the bases. In many cases, U.S. personnel accused of crimes are found not guilty due to lack of evidence. This is largely due to the serious inaction and indifference of the Japanese governments toward the situation of the Okinawan women. Therefore, the crimes often go unpunished as they are placed under the US jurisdiction. As Chalmers Johnson puts in a Huffington Post article, “It is fair to say that the U.S. military has created a worldwide sexual playground for its personnel and protected them to a large extent from the consequences of their behavior.” Perhaps no other place fits in this picture more perfectly than Okinawa. Successive Japanese governments have not made any serious effort to revise the SOFA, so that a more secure environment could be created for women and children. In fact, it is obvious that Japanese governments lack the political will to force the US authorities to turn in the criminals after a crime has been committed. Once the personnel returns to their bases, after committing crimes, they are practically out of the reach of the Japanese authorities and officials. Consequently, women are also denied the right to receive justice even after a crime is committed and the perpetrator(s) are identified. The economic cost of hosting the US troops in Okinawa is also high as far as both male and female populations are concerned. However, women face the danger of being pushed into the sex industry against their will due to economic constraints that the US military presence imposes. At the height of the US war against Vietnam in 1969, over 7000 Okinawan women were working as prostitutes, according to the estimates. Furthermore, even after the reversion in 1972, there was no meaningful change in this situation. Today, especially in the areas near the US bases, the economy is skewed towards industries that provide services for the needs of the military personnel: These services range from repair shops to bars and prostitution. This is especially the case with relatively poor communities. Furthermore, the big picture involves various layers of society from the local governments to the local businesses. As Katharine H.S. Moon indicates, the repression of women under peace-time military arrangements involve[s] a complex “system” of central and local government policies, political repression, economic inequalities and oppression of the underclass, police corruption, debt bondage of women by bar owners, in addition to pervasive sexist norms and attitudes in both the U.S. military and the respective Asian society (Moon, 2009). Hence, in a sense women are denied
Access to freedoms is the precondition for human development, the absence of which has not only economic but also social and psychological consequences. their freedoms and capabilities to make choices about their lives in a complex web of interaction between the military establishment and local and national bureaucracies, and business owners. —
the society over its own safety and security has been continuously challenged and restrained. Furthermore, it is understood that, even after a tragic incident takes place, the Japanese authorities are unable to provide justice to the victims. When the Okinawan women are denied justice as well as protection, this leads to complete disempowerment. Against this backdrop, it is unrealistic to expect Okinawan women to express their potential fully and freely, hence the reason for lack of development. In the face of apathy and indifference on part of the Japanese government and disregard and contempt of the US forces, what the Okinawan women experience is a deep sense of powerlessness over their own bodies and lives. The cumulative effect of all these consequences is a state of a lack of freedoms and the presence of many unfreedoms, which altogether lead to the lack of development present. In order to break free from this procrastinated state of affairs, the Japanese government has the ultimate responsibility and accountability. It is practically impossible for the civilian population to engage, in Johnson’s words, “racially biased and predatory troops” and the encroachments over their lives unless the government takes charge. Civilian disobedience and mass protests mean little. In order for the Okinawan women to have a complete say on their lives and enjoy freedoms, the very structure of the US-Japan security alliance has to be questioned and reformed. Otherwise, the Okinawa militarized zone, with its huge civilian population and particularly the woman, will continue to be denied the right to exercise and realize their full potentials in a free environment. APN
This study finds that women’s development is negatively affected by the actions of the US military personnel stationed in the bases on the islands of Okinawa. These acts range from sexual assault to murder. In addition to this, the existence of the military bases impedes economic diversification and development, condemning Okinawan women to legal and illegal service sectors designed to cater the needs of the US servicemen. These implications place a tight grip on the development of women in Okinawa, taking away their freedoms and reducing their capabilities to regulate and improve their lives. Under the capability approach, it is stated that access to freedoms is the precondition for human development, the absence of which has not only economic but also social and psychological consequences. Freedoms involve both negative and positive aspects. Whereas positive freedoms (freedom to) enhance one’s state of doing, negative freedoms (freedom from) enhance his/her state of being. In this study it has been argued that the Okinawan women are denied both to varying degrees: For example, they lack the right to be employed in a decent job and they suffer the consequences of the absence of freedom from fear (of being abducted, raped or murdered). What adds to women’s deprivation of basic freedoms is the apathy on part of the Japanese governments in negotiating with the US to reevaluate the necessity of the existence of the bases. It may be inferred from the examples provided in the preceding pages that the choice of the society over the presence of a foreign military force and its numerous negative implications has been ignored Serafettin Yilmaz is a doctoral candidate in Asiaand rebuffed by Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University. His primary research interest is in the comparative study many Japanese govof East and West Asian regional development. He can ernments for the be reached at syilmaz1864@yandex.com. past six decades. Instead, the power of
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33 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
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The Chant of the Shaman: Shamanic Rituals in Contemporary Taiwan By Sabrina Habich
What is Shamanism?
PHOTO BY SABRINA HABICH
Shamanism is a set of tools and techniques used to interact with the spirit world. It is not a religion, nor does it have a specific pantheon of gods or attachment to a specific culture. Shamanism is one of the oldest known forms of spiritual practice that is constantly adapted to changes in its environment. Most people that have traditionally been practicing shamanism were, pastoralists ranging from reindeer cultures in Northern Siberia to the Mongol nomads and the Tibetan yak herders. Hunting has been important for many of these groups and was their primary means of subsistence until modern times. Based on this, many scholars of shamanism have assumed a connection between the religious practice of shamanism and hunting (Ellingson-Waugh 1974). Although shamanism seems to have mainly diffused in hunting cultures, more recent research suggests that even after these cultures abandoned hunting, shamanism was able to survive and even thrive. In Taiwan, shamanism is still widely practiced among the Austronesian people, most of whom also practiced hunting in earlier times. This paper focuses on the shamanism of the Puyuma – one of the indigenous peoples living in the southeast of Taiwan. They serve as a good example of how shamanistic traditions have been influenced by outside forces, such as economic and political modernization, and how these traditions have been able to adapt and prosper. Specifically, this paper focuses on the Puyuma ceremony of becoming a shaman, and the shamanistic chants sung during this ritual, as an example of how shamanic rituals are still practiced in contemporary Taiwan. 35 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
While practices of shamanism date back to the ancient Greeks, ‘shaman’ and ‘shamanism’ came into widespread use only in the eighteenth century. Although it is generally assumed that the word ‘shaman’ comes from the Evenk or Tungus of eastern Siberia, the practice was widespread in areas including central and northern Asia, which is why opposing claims have been made that argue the term to be derived from Sanskrit, Pali or Chinese. Regardless of the language from which the term originated, a similarity between shamanistic practices amongst American Indians and Siberian and central Asian peoples, was seen as a connection between them. Compared to Communism and Buddhism, which both refer to formalized belief systems, shamanism does not represent an ideology, but rather refers to the activities of the shaman, which can be found all over the world with great similarity despite variations of human culture. This is why the term “shamanism” is misleading in that its -ism suffix suggests the isolation of shamanic ideas and practices into an ideology or doctrine. Instead, shamanism exists together with more formalized belief systems and the worldview of the shaman adapts to local circumstances for meeting the needs of their communities. Compared to other religions, shamanism has no such as found in the Bible or the Koran. It does not have a single belief system or a single god, but there is only the experience of the shaman with the other worlds (heaven and underworld), in the service of others. This is why descriptions of shamanism do not explain what shamans believe, but instead what they do and what happens during their actions. Therefore, shamanism is about the personal experience of shamans and the
people of their cultures, rather than about the beliefs in their practices and spirits. Instead of being a belief or a faith, shamanism is a way of life with its practice constantly changing over time and space and its function remaining the same in different times and cultures. Scholars have published widely on these personal experiences. The major modern scholarly work on shamanism is Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy written by Mircea Eliade and published in 1951. According to him, shamanism is a technique of ecstasy that allows the shaman to experience trance during which his soul leaves his body and travels from the middle world where humanity is, to the sky or the underworld. In opposition to this state of ecstasy, Eliade distinguishes the state of possession, which according to him is the expression of a lower, “degenerate” or a historically later shamanism. While ecstasy is a state where the soul visits the world of the spirits, possession is a state where a spirit takes over the shaman’s body, disabling his/her ordinary mental faculties during the time of possession. He therefore clearly categorized shamanistic forms into two types, one being superior or more “genuine” than the other. Viveiros de Castro goes a step further and argues that: “[s]hamanism could be defined as the capacity evinced by certain humans deliberately to cross ontological boundaries and adopt the perspective of non-human subjectivities, in order to administer the relations between humans and non-humans. Being able to see non-humans as these beings see themselves (as humans), shamans are able to take on the role of active interlocutors in trans-specific dialogues, and, above all, are capable of returning to tell the tale, something which laypersons cannot do”. Eliade does not regard shamanism as a separate religion, but rather as a religious phenomenon that can be found in relation with different religions. In fact, for Eliade, the journey of the shaman’s soul to the upper world is “definitive of all true religion”. He regards it as a tradition of Central Asia and Siberia, and therefore argues that the
ness to enter into the sky or the underworld. These two worlds are made up of all aspects of our middle world, some of which are invisible to us such as emotional, spiritual and mental spheres. As soon as the shaman has entered one of the other invisible worlds, he or she is able to change the energy there, which in turn affects physical needs in our world such as healing, hunting or the weather. The shamans alter the state of energy through direct contact with spirits who themselves are energy patterns taking up different forms such as animals, plants, or ancestors. Scholars have not agreed upon the criteria that define the shaman other than their ability to enter into altered states of consciousness. According to Eliade, “spirit flight” or the socalled “journey” – a state of consciousness during which the shaman leaves his or her body to travel into another world – is the only proper shamanic state of trance. Other criteria that he includes in his definition of shamans are their mastery of fire, their experience of dismemberment and resurrection initiations, as well as their possession of animal guardians. The shaman focuses on the flow of energy and on whether or not it is flowing in a positive (i.e. life supporting) direction. While energy itself is neither positive nor negative, the intent behind the energy is either benevolent or malevolent. The latter is created by fear which is why the shaman, once he or she has discovered a malevolent nature of intent, attempts to dissolve the disharmony created by fear and to recreate a harmonious link between the PHOTO BY SABRINA HABICH middle and the other worlds. The shaman does so while future shaman, if he wants to prevent his being on his or her journey, or trance state. death. Fourth, there is an initiation process during which new shamans are trained by Shamanic Chants Shamanic chants are a type of chant other shamans so as to gain control over their spirits. Fifth, the shaman has special sung by shamans during shamanic rituequipment that is used during rituals and als. They represent a tool that is applied normally includes particular clothes, drums by shamans to enter into altered states of consciousness and embark on the journey and other objects. described above. Shamanic chants have two Shamans functions, while some of them are made up A shaman is a particular kind of healer in a way to invoke helping spirits, others who uses an alternate state of conscious- serve to balance the left and the right parts forms that shamanism takes in these regions should be regarded as the nature of shamanism in general. Winzeler summarized the core features of shamanism: First, shamanism is based on the belief in a cosmos with various spiritual beings that can influence humans in both positive and negative ways and some of whom can in turn be influenced by the shaman. Second, it is believed that humans have souls that leave the body during dreams, illnesses and is permanent at death, and that these souls can be returned by the shaman. Third, shamans are recruited, often involuntarily, by the spirits who call on them either through dreams or incurable physical or mental illnesses. This call has to be accepted by the
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of the brain, supporting the shaman in entering the trance. Chants and songs are applied in shamanic healing practices during which the singing of the chant is one way for the shaman to guide and transform energy. The singing is thus regarded as a tool to open the hearts and minds of the shamans to embody the spirits that are called upon. Most shamans have a personal song through which they gather and focus their souls in their hearts, minds and bodies. In some cultures chants are sung quietly to prevent them from being stolen by other shamans or sorcerers, in others they are chanted out loud. Shamans obtain their repertoire of chants both through their helping spirits, who teach their songs to the shamans during dreams and altered states of consciousness and through human teachers who pass on their own repertoire of songs to their students.
Shamanism in Taiwan
SOURCE: Ter Ellingson-Waugh (1974) “Musical Flight in Tibet,” Asian Music, 5:2, pp. 3-44.
Among the various kinds of practitioners that fall under the broad category of Chinese shamanism, are the spirit medi-
ums, spirit writers, and diviners of the spirit, together with other ritual practitioners referred to by various names: bi, tâng-ki, fugei, wu, and paq. Scholars do not agree upon the issue whether these individuals qualify as shamans in the “traPHOTO BY SABRINA HABICH ditional” Siberian sense, or whether they are spirit mediums. Within the Chinese cultural sphere, the terms “shaman” and “spirit medium” are used interchangeably. As with shamanism in other regions and cultures, Chinese shamanism is so diverse that it can be treated as a mixture of “shamanisms,” with each belief and practice sometimes being similar to, and sometimes differing from, the more “traditional” shamans in Siberia. Shamanism in Taiwan, with its focus on Austronesian shamanism, is introduced here and is not an organized religion, but a religious phenomenon or a spiritual practice that preceded established religion. With its own universal symbolism and cosmology it cuts across different faiths and has influenced religions in various ways and is capable of elastic adaptation and of responding to a variety of cultural and social circumstances. This is why in the Chinese cultural sphere shamanism has been influenced by, and has itself influenced, the religious tradition of Buddhism. Therefore, in order to understand the particularities of shamanism in Taiwan, it is necessary to first
37 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
look at the interactions of shamanism with Buddhism.
Shamanism and Buddhism
Buddhists believe that gods, ghosts and many other spirits exist, and that these dwell in upper and lower worlds. Most of them have the ability to move to the human realm where they can affect individuals. In the Canon of Theravada Buddhism, the good Buddhist householder is instructed to gain wealth by lawful means; to get along well with the people around him; to live a long life; and to obtain rebirth in heaven after death. In order to achieve these four desirable conditions, the householder has to foster family ties, achieve energetic balance after economic success, as well as worship ghosts and gods. Just as in shamanism, gods, ghosts and demons have to be taken seriously, if negative consequences are to be prevented. This is why Buddhists support the practice of shamans and their ability to become mediators between the supernatural and the human worlds. Lewis reports that when Buddhism spread through Asia, monastic leaders encouraged the adaptation of Buddhism to local societies and cultures, which is why Buddhist beliefs and local practices melted and shamanic practices were balanced with doctrinal norms. At the same time, the notion that Buddha is the greatest being in the cosmos was not sacrificed, and Buddhist morality was to take precedence over local practices such as animal sacrifice. There were, however, variations among the different Buddhist branches regarding their adaptation of shamanism. In the Theravada tradition, Buddhist monks have no involvement in shamanic practices and should not even witness exorcism, while in the Mahayana tradition spiritual masters have adopted shamanic elements in their spiritual practices in order to achieve enlightenment.
Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples
There are currently fourteen tribes officially recognized by Taiwan’s Council of Indigenous Peoples (CIP). These are the Ami, Atayal, Bunun, Kavalan, Paiwan, Puyuma, Rukai, Saisiyat, Tao, Thao, Tsou, Truku, Sakizaya, and Sediq. Although these groups have different stories regarding their origin and history on the island of Taiwan, scholarly research suggests their ancestors have moved to Taiwan before the island actually existed and was still part of the Asian continental landmass. Taiwanese aborigines are Austronesian peoples related with other Austronesian ethnic groups, The map at left shows the distribution of various shamanic chants throughout Asia.
the grade of full manhood. These societal characteristics are common among the indigenous peoples of Taiwan and have also been a feature of Puyuman life described below.
Puyuma Shamanism
The belief systems of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have been similarly affected by external, forces such as colonization and modernization. In addition, there always was, and still is, conflict between their traditional shamanic beliefs and Buddhism. Just like the conversion of Australasians and Oceanic peoples to Christianity in other regions, many Atayal and Puyuma’s in Taiwan were forced to adopt Buddhism, the religion of the colonizing Chinese. They had to do so either due to socioeconomic reasons, or because it was a part of the colonial assimilation policies of the Chinese. However, Buddhism is an eclectic religion, which is why the indigenous people managed to preserve their spirit worship as well as other practices, even after they became Buddhist. In Taiwan, shamanism is still widely practiced among the Austronesian people, known as the Puyuma. Their shamanism is a good example of how shamanistic traditions have been able to adapt and prosper. The Puyuma live in the southeast area of the island of Taiwan, and their Austrone-
sian language is divided in two dialectical groups: “born of a stone” and “born of a bamboo”. The former is spoken in eight villages and is also called the Katipul group, while the latter group is called the Puyuma, and spoken in only two villages– in Nanwang and Paosang. Religion is an important element in Puyuma society. The spiritual beings (birua) that shape ritual life among the Puyuma can be divided into three categories: First, there are the “homeless” birua, whose number and participation in rituals are limited. Most of them are ignored, and only men and shamans can intervene. Second, the Puyuma pay attention to spiritual beings that inhabit a space known as kaqisatan, literally “On High”. These birua live in a sphere above human beings that is also inaccessible to the latter. The identity of the spiritual beings, living “On High”, is defined by the territory they are connected with, their relations with nature, or their role as mythical ancestors. For example, there are birua of the natural order such as
PHOTO BY SABRINA HABICH
such as peoples of the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Madagascar, Polynesia, and Oceania. In the early seventeenth century, by the time of the Dutch arrival in Taiwan, the Austronesian people on Taiwan had already split up in several different language and cultural groups. While it is difficult to generalize about the culture and customs of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, there are some features they have in common. The first major description stems from Chen Di, a Chinese scholar who accompanied the Chinese imperial court on an anti-piracy mission to Taiwan in 1603. In his work Dong Fan Ji (An Account of the Easter Barbarians), he describes a tribe living in the area of contemporary Tainan who later became known as the Siraya. Chen Di explains that the society of the Siraya was characterized by wars with other rivaling ethnic groups in the area, as well as by a gendered division of labor. While the women were responsible for agricultural tasks, men used to live in special men’s-only houses where they learned the skills for hunting and war. One of the characteristics of these bellicose activities was headhunting, which is assumed to have not only been important in showing a man’s bravery, but it was also part of the system of age-grades through which every Siraya male had to pass through during his life. By capturing a head, a Sirayan male was able to advance to
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the “master of rivers”; birua of the social order such as “those who make the village”; or birua of everyday life such as the “muse of weaving”. Again, only men and shamans can intervene with this second category of birua. Third, there are birua that inhabit the so called “world of the spirits”, also known as “the Aulas” or kaqaulasan. In this place, shamans summon all the dead shamans and their electoral spirits. Only shamans, and no ordinary men or women, can intervene with these spirits.
Ritual functions, within Puyuma society, are taken up by soothsayers, shamans, and other religious practitioners. While soothsayers are all male and consult bamboo splinters for their work, male religious practitioners are responsible for the regular cyclical rites carried out to preserve unity between the cosmos and the society. In December, all the rites of the annual ceremonial cycle are preformed to restore harmony. Shamans within Puyuma society are mainly female. Compared to the religious practitioners, who are involved in pre-set rites serving the whole society and its harmony with the cosmos, shamans get involved on a daily basis and mainly serve the social relations between individuals. They act as therapists, exorcists and soothsayers, and perform shamanic rituals according to the current needs of the people. They mainly heal biological or sociological disorder, and in doing so hold important spiritual functions within Puyuma society. While they play no political role and have no economic power, they are the ones who restore order and 39 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
rectify mistakes. The rites that are conduced by the shamans can be divided in two categories. These are the everyday and ordinary rites, and the exceptional rites. The former are non-collective and are performed in cases of individual illness or social disorders. As for illnesses, while the doctor prescribes medicine and treats the patient’s body, the shaman is responsible for dealing with the patient’s soul. In doing so, the shaman has to deal with the spirits who are considered to be displeased, and have caused the illness of the patient. Everyday rites that address social disorders are mainly of prophylactic nature, such as protecting villages, houses and fields through cleansing, protection or separation ceremonies. As for exceptional rites, as the name already suggests, these are far less frequent and PHOTO BY SABRINA HABICH demand greater personal investment. They are performed, for example, when a husband has left his wife to live with another woman, or when somebody has died an improper death and the soul of that person needs to settle down.
Bu Lavat: Transformation
As mentioned above, most of the shamans in Puyuma society are women. They do not deliberately decide to become shamans, but instead are chosen by an electorspirit, who is one of her shaman ancestors and who will help her in her future work as a shaman. Once a spirit has elected a woman, she cannot refuse this call, but can only postpone her initiation by making offerings. The typical signs indicating selection by a shaman ancestor include dreams, visions, accidents, illnesses, or fertility problems of the chosen one. Although there is no average age of Puyuma women entering the shamanic profession, most of them are chosen either around the age of thirty or between forty and fifty. In Tamalakaw, once a woman has fallen ill for a prolonged period of time, senior shamans in the village will seek permission from the woman herself or her family to investigate her qualifications to become a shaman. First, the seniors identify what kind of illness the woman has and whether that illness is actually a “sign of transformation into a shaman”. Therefore, the woman has to seek advice in a hospital and make sure that her illness cannot be identi-
fied by ordinary medical means. After that, the senior shamans will further investigate the illness and the dreams of the woman. Once they have detected the signs of transformation, and the woman has agreed to go through the ritual of becoming a shaman, a date will be found on which the investiture is conducted. The ritual through which a woman becomes a shaman has four stages. First, spirits are informed about the beginning of the ritual. Second, spirits and deities are summoned and welcomed to take part in the ritual. This second part is a regular procedure in all rituals, during which ten to twelve spirits are summoned. Third, shamanic chants are sung through which spirits are summoned, who are ancestors of the woman and who have lived as shamans before. During this part of the ritual, the practitioners determine which ancestor the new candidate is succeeding in power. Fourth, the senior shamans make a special bag for the new shaman signifying her consecration. The investiture, which Cauquelin witnessed in Nanwang village, is slightly different from the one described above. In Nanwang village, the ritual spreads over a period of six days. On the first day, senior shamans come to the house of the new candidate to sing shamanic songs, during which time the soul leaves the future shaman’s body. During the second day, the site for the woman’s sanctuary is determined, which is to be purified on the following day. In the mean time, the men of the future shaman’s family gather the necessary materials for building the sanctuary. After the sanctuary has been erected, it is cleaned on the fourth day, and its protective spirit, represented by an areca nut, is placed in it on the following day. Finally, on the sixth day the proper investiture takes place in the newly set up sanctuary. First, the spirits are informed about the ritual and then the shaman community prepares the candidate’s ritual objects including the bag, a bell, and a rattle. The bag is placed on the novice’s left shoulder and her soul, which had left on the first day, returns to the woman’s body, settling in the top of her head. Finally, the ceremony ends with the woman being admitted into the group of shamans. During the whole ritual, two social categories are involved. On the one hand are the senior shamans, the novice’s future colleagues, who are responsible for communicating with the spirits and the main task of transform-
ing the novice into a shaman. The senior shamans also prepare the ritual objects necessary for the new shaman to do her future work. The bag is the one object turning the novice into a shaman, once placed on her left shoulder. The rattle is kept in the bag and allows the shaman to communicate with the spirits. The bag also contains a rope and a little bottle filled with lime, allowing the shaman to bind restless spirits. On the other hand, the family of the woman are involved in the investiture. Father, brothers and husbands play a supportive role in the ritual in that they build the shrine for the novice. The shrine is a sacred place where the shaman lives in harmony with her helping spirits and where she stores her cult objects. An important part of the transformation ritual, are the segments of shamanic chants sung during the investiture. In Tamalakaw three segments of chants are sung. The first two last for about fifteen minutes each, during which spirits and deities are summoned. Once the novice senses something extraordinary, it is a sign of the arrival of the spirits. Then the shamans can move on to the next segment of shamanic chants, which are used “to inform the spirits and comfort the new shaman”. These chants last for about three minutes. After confirming that all the spirits have arrived, a third segment of chants are sung, after which the bag can be bestowed upon the novice. In Tamalakaw, this ritual has to be repeated for five to seven days to allow the new shaman to get used to her predecessor, as well as to all related procedures. The three segments of shamanic chants have different tones and lyrics according to the different functions of the chants. In the first segment, the senior shamans chant to the birua who is going to pass its shamanic power to the novice. They walk to the place where the ritual of transformation is going to take place and, while doing so, they inform the spirit about the arrival of a new family member. The senior shamans express their sympathy for the spirit who had to search for a lengthy period of time before finding an appropriate successor. In the following passages, shamans sing about the special and everlasting connection between the shamans and the spirits, but also allow some space for the new shaman to practice and go a different path. This last part of the chant signifies a request to the spirit to depart. The lyrics of the chant suggest that in Puyuma culture, the spirits are treated
as ancestors to whom the relationship is as close as to other family members. The chant passes through three stages. First, the spirit is informed about the ritual and welcomed to take part. After that, direct communication between the shamans and the spirit takes place in that the senior shamans share emotions with the spirit and ask for help regarding how to proceed with the novice. Finally, the spirit is sent off again. The basic function of this ritual is for the novice to get in touch with the ancestor who is about to pass shamanic power on to her. It also allows the two sides to get used to each other. In the second and third segments of the shamanic chants, sung during the investiture, the tones of the chant are different from the first. The shamans express their sadness towards the deceased shaman and sing about how the novice is going through the ritual of transformation. Once the ritual is over, and the novice transformed into a shaman after the bag has been placed on her left shoulder, the woman is formally ready to perform rites herself. However, only by going through the investiture the new shaman has not yet learned the skills that a shaman needs. While there is no formal training or verbal instruction attached to the transformation, there is practical training in that the new shaman follows and imitates her instructor – the shaman who led the investiture and who sleeps in the novice’s bed for a month after the transformation. Cauquelin notes that during her field research in Nanwang Village, she observed that the new shaman made notes and drew pictures about the actions of her instructor, and she practiced shamanic songs by listening to them on her walkman.
Adaptations of Shamanism
Puyuma social organization and ritual practices were highly influenced by the different aspects of hunting. The animals that were captured were eaten in the men’s house and divided between their households. The male shaman was responsible for communicating with the spirits, called the “masters of the hunt”, to ensure that enough game could be captured throughout the year. Once a year, a ritual of “feeding the mountain” was performed in relation to the mountains in which the men hunted the game. The ritual served to thank the spirits and ensure their continued support of the hunters. After the abandoning of hunting, important rituals started to focus on the harvest and other agricultural activities and were dominated by women who were the ones responsible for farming. Although these changes reflect sociopolitical transformations in Taiwan and the influences that these transformations have had on Puyuma society, the Puyuma themselves do not explain these changes in shamanic practices in relation to these “real life” events. Instead, for every major change in their practices, there exists a myth or a legend to which the changes in shamanic practices can be traced. Thus, shamanic practices of contemporary Taiwan, while constantly adapting to changes in the social, economic and political environment, continue to be embedded in myths that themselves constantly evolve and ensure the integrity of the Puyuma shamanic belief system. As mentioned above, shamans do not follow their practices detached from society but instead serve society and individuals who ask for their help. Therefore, it is natural that as society evolves, shamanic practices adapt to this evolution. In August 2009, when the south of Taiwan was severely hit by Typhoon Morakot leaving 117 homes washed, in a village in Pingtung County, a shaman of the indigenous Paiwan tribe used traditional chants to comfort the villagers who had lost their homes. APN
Shamanism is a system of beliefs and practices that has no definite form. As a consequence, it is capable of elastic adaptation and of responding to a variety of cultural and social circumstances. In the case of the Puyuma, religious practices have also undergone several processes of change. Studies have shown that an initial change came about at the end of the nineteenth century when hunting was abandoned and rice growing became a primary activity in Puyuma society. This was also the time when women took up shamanic principles from men who were once the main religious Sabrina Habich is a doctoral student in Asia-Pacific practitioners in the Studies at National Chengchi University and a Visiting Junior Scholar at Academia Sinica. She can Puyuma shamanic be reached at sabrina.habich@gmail.com. hunting society. Before hunting was abandoned,
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The Taiwanese Yellow Myth and Identity in Taiwan’s Politics “People say that what we’re all seeking is a meaning for life. I think that what we’re seeking is an experience of being alive, so that our life experiences on the purely physical plane will have resonances within our own innermost being and reality, so that we actually feel the rapture of being alive. That’s what it’s all finally about, and that’s what these clues help us to find within ourselves.” The definition above of the concept of “myth”, made by the great mythologist Joseph Campbell, certainly has inspired people around the globe in the use of the myths as a means to satisfy their search for a sense of significance in life. However, that is exactly what some sectors of Taiwanese society and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) fear. In April 2012, President Ma Ying-Jeou, after taking the office for the second time since the 2008 Guomindang (KMT) electoral victory, personally presided over a ceremony in honor of one of the most important mythological figures in Chinese culture: The Yellow Emperor (Huangdi) the mythical ancestor of the Han Chinese. The following criticism is not without reason. As any myth, the Yellow Emperor represents plenty of symbols and values that are consciously, or not, internalized in people’s minds, becoming an important part of their concept of self-identity. In the case of the Yellow Emperor, it reinforces the very concept of what it means to be Han Chinese. Huangdi is considered the creator of Chinese medicine, as well as responsible for civilizing the rival tribes and developing the first elements of 41 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
Chinese writing, among many others achievements. All these components exert such profound impact over the Chinese population psyche that it has been subject of political manipulation throughout time. However, Ma Ying-Jeou was not the first prominent figure of the KMT to utilize the Yellow Emperor’s figure as a symbol of unity of the Chinese people. In 2005, the chairman of the pro-unification People’s First Party (PFP), James Soong, paid his respects at the mausoleum of the Yellow Emperor where he affirmed, “our culture and our bloodlines all come from the same origin.” Soong went further: “We descendants of the Yan and Yellow Emperors cannot forget our roots.” In fact, the figure of Yellow Emperor as the unifier of Chinese people was a political decision in a time that being Chinese was more a question than an affirmation. On the one side, his importance is almost axiomatic within the Chinese culture box, and on the other side, it remains the subject of profound debate in China, since the KMT had decided to elect it as the source of all Chinese people.
w Emperor By Moises Lopes de Souza The Myth
Huangdi, the Yellow emperor, is a cornerstone in mythical-historic narrative of Chinese nation. According to the myth, Huangdi had twenty-five sons, of whom the twelve feudal families of the Chou and Han period claim descent. His inventions and achievements are innumerable, all of them central to the Chinese character, value and beliefs and include such as the Lunar calendar, teaching people how to plant crops, creation of words, invention of musical instruments, and invention of a medical system of knowledge (supposedly he wrote the world’s oldest medical book, the basis of traditional Chinese medicine). At his request, even the first Chinese character writing system was developed. Also, as a typical mythological narrative history, Huangdi had to fight a decisive battle. According to the myth described by Joseph Campbell, his virtue brought the barbarians of the four frontiers to allegiance, some whom had holes in their chest, others with long arms, and yet more with deep-lying eyes. Also, he consulted with his sages while deliberating on the Bright Terrace, ordered musical pitch pipes to be made and to consist of twelve bells “to harmonize the five sounds”, and then he rode in an ivory chariot drawn by six dragons. As the myth goes, the wind-god ran ahead and swept; the rain-god sprinkled the road; tigers and wolves galloped before, and spirits spirited behind; serpents streaked along the ground, and phoenixes flew above. The myth of the “Yellow Emperor” that describes the birth of the Chinese nation is also extremely illustrative of the Chinese thoughts about the use of force or the use of violence. In another version, this battle is utilized as the basis of Chinese philosophical military mentality. In this version, Huangdi had to fight against two symbolic and contrasting figures. The first is described as the “Divine Farmer” (Shen Nong), characterized by its strong sense of pacifism and simplicity of life. The second, in complete opposition, was the “Warrior Emperor” or “Insane Emperor” (Chi Yan), a military figure by nature that created its own weapons to fight all kinds of battles. The differences of personality among the three enemies are not without reason. The farmer represents the utopian desire to live in a peaceful and secure world where violence, evil and war never take place. On the other hand, the Warrior Emperor represents the exact opposite, showing that reality is painted with sad colors, where violence, death and war will always be present. The victory of the Yellow Emperor is a demonstration of the necessity to find a balance for the desire for peace, without abandoning the willingness and strength to defend yourself and your motherland. VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 42
The Yellow Emperor as Social Cement
Such symbolism was not unnoticed by the Chinese political elite during the early days of Republic of China on the Mainland (19111949). In his 1924 lectures on minzuzhuyi, Sun Yat-Sen stressed that the revival of China’s unique cultural tradition was the key to restoring national self-confidence and unity. If the Chinese wanted to regain their “minzu spirit,” Sun argued, it was crucial to first “reawaken the learning as well as the traditional morality that we once possessed”. During all the 1930s, KMT officials and intellectuals closely kept with Sun’s definition as a “legacy of nationalism”, as the only valid interpretation. Thus republicans repeatedly calling for the arousal of “China’s lost “minzu consciousness” (minzu yizhi), advocating “minzu thought” (minzu sixiang), and stressing the urgent need for a new “minzu spirit” (minzu jingshen) in the
approach had to be conceived. Intellectuals sympathetic to Republic thesis elaborated a new historical approach by compiling massive amounts of research aimed at establishing a linear and moral lineage of the Han dynasty. These republican intellectuals utilized historical records organized by a Han dynasty court historian called Sima Quian, in the second century, which begins with Huangdi or Yellow Emperor and continues through the “Five Emperors” (Wudi) and “Three Dynasties” (Sandai) (considered the “Golden Age” of Chinese antiquity) to Quinshi Huangdi’s unification of all sons and daughters of the Yellow Emperor into a single state. This way, the myth of Yellow Emperor gained the status of a historical figure, as founding father of the Chinese nation. The Yellow Emperor was not only “the first ancestor of the Zhonghua minzu”, but also the creative genius behind the creation of the
The notion of shared descent possessed deep cultural meaning and widespread appeal for the Chinese masses with their strong tradition of ancestor worship and kinship bonds. quest for China’s “minzu liberation” (minzu jiefang)”. However, Chinese state and culture. He was confident that if only the varithe affirmation of Sun Yat-Sen left profound empty spaces in the ous peoples of China understood their direct racial and historical definition of what it really means to be Chinese. relationship with the Yellow Emperor, they would naturally unite Sun Yat-Sen’s ambiguous, and often contradictory, political into a single, indivisible body politic. According to one the most doctrine actually hampered the racial nationalists’ efforts to dem- important architects of this new approach, Shao Yuanchong: “If onstrate that, in accordance with Sun’s own definition of minzu, we want to cultivate a national spirit and glorious national culture,” all the people of China made up a single minzu. In 1924, during Shao wrote, “we must begin by fostering the glorious spirit of the a series of lectures on minzuzhuyi, Sun Yat-sen highlighted the Yellow Emperor; and to accomplish this, we must bear in mind importance of differentiating between minzu (race/nation) and that we must start by eulogizing and exalting the Yellow Emperor”. guojia (state). According to Sun’s definition, States were created Unlike the often convoluted and contradictory positioning of from man-made forces, while minzu developed out of natural the frontier minorities in Sun Yat-sen’s principle of minzuzhuyi, forces, such as common blood, livelihood, language, religion, and this notion of shared descent possessed deep cultural meaning and customs. Although, he admitted that the Mongols had a different widespread appeal for the Chinese masses, with their strong tradilifestyle than the Han people, and the Hui and Tibetans believed in tion of ancestor worship and kinship bonds. Building on the writa different religion than the Han, Sun Yat-sen defended that only ings of the late Qing anti-Manchuists, the Republican-era racial nain China has a “single state developed out of a single minzu, while tionalists transformed the ancient saying about the Chinese being foreign countries have developed many states from one minzu or the “children of the Yellow Emperor” (Huangdi zisun) into a syshave included many minzu within a single state”. The result, ac- tematic theory of the Zhonghua minzu’s antiquity and consanguincording to Sun Yat-sen was that Chinese constituted a homoge- ity. In honor of the Yellow Emperor’s birth, 4 April was declared nous guozu (race-state) in contrast to the kind of formation of the a national holiday, and party officials (from both the KMT and the nation-states of the West. It is interesting to note that Sun Yat-sen Chinese Communist Party (CCP)) regularly gathered at Huangling could not respond to the question about the existence of Mon- in Shaanxi province to pay their respects at what was thought to be gols, Tibetans, Manchurians and all other frontier people present in the tomb of the Yellow Emperor. There were no fewer than sixChinese society. His solution, as pointed by James Leiboldm, was teen elegiac addresses between 1911 and 1949 declaring the Yellow merely “numerical”: Emperor the “progenitor of the Zhonghua minzu” (Zhonghua “He dismissed them as numerically insignificant and evolu- minzu shizu), the “progenitor of the Chinese state” (wo kaiguo tionarily unfit, arguing that despite the less than ten million “non- shizu), and the “progenitor of human civilization” (renwen shizu), natives” (wailai), “we can say that the four with Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-Shek, and hundred million Chinese people are entirely Mao Zedong each offering their own homHanzu: sharing a common blood, common age to the Yellow Emperor. In its popular Huangdi has been language, common religion, and common propaganda, the racial nationalists stressed customs, a single, pure minzu” … “As for the linear and unbroken genealogy of utilized as symbol the frontier minorities, it was only a matZhonghua racial provenance, arguing that of respect in ter of time before they “smelted together all the peoples of the former Qing empire in the same oven” (rongye wei yilu) with could trace their ancestors back through the moments of political the Han majority to fashioning a new corvarious Chinese dynasties to the inhabitants embarrassment, to porate, yet equally pure, Zhonghua minzu.” of the ancient Three Dynasties, and then Among many disputes arguments, the ultimately through the Five Emperors to a reaffirm national element to unite all Chinese was conceived single, ancient founding father - the Yellow leadership, and to in establishment of consanguinity (once it Emperor. was considered by Sun Yat-sen as the most emphasize personal important element of all other four) as the desires of recognition linkage between all Chinese. Thus, a new 43 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
and prestige.
The Yellow Emperor as Political Actor
Once achieved, the “reconstruction” of the myth to attend the racial question of which the KMT was faced, it was utilized and manipulated according to the political conveniences in different moments of the contemporary history of China. Huangdi has been utilized as symbol of respect in moments of political embarrassment, to reaffirm national leadership, and to emphasize personal desires of recognition and prestige. In fact, the Yellow Emperor became the remedy for all kinds of ills in China. As previously described, the republicans were the first to make political use of the cult of Huangdi, and to make the visitations to its mausoleum as an element of propaganda in favor of their cause. Later, the revolutionary communists also understood the utility of myth to reinforce its messages into the consciousness of the Chinese masses. Sun Yat-Sen commemorated the Yellow Emperor in 1912, a year after the establishment of the first republican government in China. Similarly in 1937, Mao Zedong and Zhu De (general pioneer of CCP), representing the Communist government and the Red Army, made ritual offerings of fruits and flowers. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, as President of the Republic, wrote a calligraphic dedication, ‘Tomb of the Yellow Emperor’ (Huangdi Ling), in 1942 during the Sino-Japanese War. Later, other communist leaders, including Prime Minister Li Peng and the President Jiang Zemin, made commemorations to the Yellow Emperor in 1992 and 1993, following the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989, to restore their political power and increase their national and international reputation. The mausoleum located in Mont Quiao (Quiashan) Huaglin county, in Shaanxi, claimed to be the most authentic despite the many others with similar claims, has a diverse set of propaganda roles, including being the meeting point to those Chinese residents residing overseas. Many of these, unable to return home for decades, nostalgically regard the Mausoleum as a spiritual support linking them to their homeland and ancestral kin. This nostalgia is expressed through visiting ancestral burial grounds, which gives a sense of belonging to Confucian ancestor worship. Changing economic needs at home and investments demands from abroad have resulted in a spiritual attachment to the Yellow Emperor. Within this historical context, it is impossible not to see the actions of Ma Ying-Jeou as politically opportunistic. In modern times, as in the Three Dynasties, ancestor-worship is a political strategy. On the state level, the modern ancestral cult can be seen as the deliberate manipulation of a set of religious concepts derived from the early dynastic period. Deified ancestors have been created and used by the living to pursue political and economic objectives, while ancestral temples and gravesites have been used to make propaganda statements in support of the political legitimacy of elites. The cult of the Yellow Emperor, designated as the ancestor of ever-broader descent groups, is thus a historical product of a series of political movements. Thus placing this is in the context of Ma’s election victory, covered by a profound skepticism, along with the strength of support showed to the opposition party, the DPP, who consolidated itself as strong political force with 46% of the votes through their candidate Tsai Ying-wen, and the fact that Ma’s administration only enjoys about 19% of public approval, in a country where the question of identity and sovereignty has always been at stake, such support measurements indicate that the country no longer endorses Ma’s policies. President Ma is governing with the majority of votes, but seems to lack legitimacy from more than half of Taiwan’s citizens. This has already resulted in some intellectuals calling for his resignation, given that relations with China is by far the most important element in Taiwan’ politics, it is unbearable that this be conducted by a president that lacks the full support of his own people.
However, both Ma Ying-Jeou and the KMT are conscious of the necessity to cool down this frustration, and find a common element of political preferences that can put the government and the population on common ground. It is from this standpoint that Ma Ying-Jeou’s public homage to the Yellow Emperor needs to be understood. The Yellow Emperor is a symbolic idol that has been created, modified, and utilized, not only by the elites, but also by ordinary people who have been searching for a common ground to satisfy their spiritual, psychological, political and economic needs. If its simple figure is sufficient to create an atmosphere of respect and reverence, what if the president could determine that he is a Huangdi blood descendant? The historian, Mircea Eliade, argues that archaic societies used myths to express the absolute truth, because it narrates a sacred history. That is, a transhuman revelation which took place at the dawn of the Great Time, in the holy time of beginnings. He also argues that being real and sacred, the myth becomes exemplary, and consequently repeatable, for it serves as model, and by the same token as justification for all humans’ actions. In other words, a myth is a true history of what came to pass at the beginning of “Time”, and which provides the pattern for human behavior. In imitating the exemplary acts of a god or of mythic hero, or simply by recounting their adventure, the man of an archaic society detaches himself from profane time and magically re-enters the Great Time, the sacred time. If by the simple act of recount the myth the archaic man could elevate himself above the cruel reality that surrounds him, what about if a leader affirm to be descent of the myth himself ? Or, as Ma Ying-jeou said: “I am a descendant of the Yellow Emperor in blood and I identify with Taiwan in terms of my identity. I fight for Taiwan and I am Taiwanese,” Ma wrote on his Facebook page: “In nationality, I am a Republic of China [ROC] citizen and I am the president of the ROC.” The affirmation is a contradiction in itself. Being Taiwanese is hugely different from what the Yellow Emperor means in Chinese thought. As described, the Yellow Emperor is symbol of unification of all people over the Han Chinese umbrella. The myth and its social-political significance impose almost unbreakable ties with the values and beliefs from those that one day elevated it as China maximum symbol of national unity. Under this concept, if Taiwan considers itself, or if its leader does, part of the legacy of Huagdi, its separation from the mainland loses its symbolic justification. With this affirmation, Ma forgot his conditions as spokesperson of the nation that it is yet to be decided for independence or re-unification with Huangdi’s descendants on the other side of the Strait. Even with him highlighting his identification with Taiwan identity, between the lines the message is that there is something beyond ideological-political differences that ties the two sides of Taiwan Strait. He therefore joins the same ranks as his predecessors, and therefore endorses the values, ideals and beliefs that Sun Yat-Sen, Chiang Kai-Shek, Mao Zedong, Jiang Zemin and others, have confirmed in front of the Yellow Emperor that: We are Chinese. APN
Moises Lopes de Souza is a doctoral student in AsiaPacific Studies at National Chengchi University. He can be reached at moises.lpsouza@gmail.com.
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A Glimpse into the Future of the World Economy By Matthew Pal A recent viral internet video* exemplifies what has come to be the prevailing attitude in the press and among the public toward China’s economic and political rise. The year is 2030, and a professor in Beijing is lecturing on the fall of great empires to a group of affluent-looking Chinese students using futuristic technology. Among these fallen empires is the United States, which according to the professor succumbed to its debt load and is now forced, he notes with a smirk, to “work for us.” The hall erupts in sinister laughter. Wendy Dobson also looks to the year 2030 in her attempt to map out the path of China and India’s economic ascension
and in fact will lead to further prosperity for all. Dobson explains that China’s challenges begin with its changing demography. The combination of the one-child policy, an aging population, and the drying up of surplus rural labour will soon lead to a vastly diminished labour force—one that will demand better wages and a higher standard of living (a logic already borne out in the headlines as Chinese workers stage strikes at Honda and Foxconn plants). Once China’s industries have moved inland to take advantage of any leftover cheap labour, the workforce will need to increase its productivity lest firms move to neighbouring
China’s challenges begin with its changing demography. as well as the effects this “gravity shift” will have on the world economy. Her predictions, however, avoid the scaremongering that has characterized the topic and instead attempts to provide a realistic appraisal of the future of both countries, grounded in sound economic thinking. While acknowledging that China and India will come to play a much larger role in the global economy, Dobson puts forward what should be an obvious idea, but which has been drowned out by the doomsayers: that China and India’s success—and the extent of the coming gravity shift—will depend on the reform of their institutions and how effectively they tackle the very different problems facing their economies. However profound the gravity shift turns out to be, it will by no means overturn the world system
countries where labour is still in abundance. One way to increase productivity is through innovation, but China faces problems here as well. The near-absence of intellectual property rights in China hinders any innovation, and the firms most likely to innovate—small to mid-sized enterprises driven by entrepreneurial energy—are denied access to capital in China’s crony capitalist system, where banks are by and large state-owned and investment is directed by bureaucrats attempting to “pick winners” (a process that lends itself to quite easily to corruption). Reform of the finance sector, which privileges unproductive stateowned enterprises, is an essential first step if China’s economy is to mature. Dobson points out that China’s ability to make these changes depends to a large degree on how
it manages its precarious balance between authoritarian rule and its population’s desire for a greater voice and reduced corruption. The CPP must soften its grip in order to improve institutions, but doing so risks jeopardizing the ecosystem of patronage that sustains the party. India also suffers from human capital issues, albeit of a nature opposite to China’s. Dobson distinguishes between educated and globally competitive First India, that of Bangalore high-tech firms and innovative automakers, and illiterate and impoverished Second India, barely surviving in slums and villages. India’s principal challenge is employing Second India. Ninety percent of India’s labour is unorganized, leaving its workers subject to low wages, arbitrary treatment, and discrimination. One way to pull them out of these execrable conditions is education, but here too India faces a quandary: deeply unequal access to education has left the country with a literacy rate of only 61 percent (in contrast to China’s rate of 91 percent). Making the necessary changes to incorporate Second India into the economy will be especially difficult for India, burdened as it is by quasi-socialist labour policies, a sclerotic bureaucracy, and a fractious democracy. Dobson offers a host of prescriptions designed to make the country more competitive, but concludes that India’s ideology of incrementalism and “poor but pure” paternalism will continue to hinder growth and fail those of India’s citizens who suffer the most. Whether or not China and India are able to fully address the problems they face, the gravity shift has already begun, and Dobson goes on to examine what this movement will mean for the world economy. Fears of China and India “producing everything”
* The video can be found by searching for “Chinese Professor” on youtube.com. 45 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
are shown to be overblown; on the contrary, their growth will benefit the world’s developed economies through increased demand for commodities, enhanced intraindustry trade, and good returns on scarce capital. Rather than a contest of “us versus them,” the future will instead be a prime example of the economist’s ever-widening pie due to increased trade flows. A “G-2” world dominated by China and the United States gets only part of the picture right. There will indeed be a new focus on the east, but it will extend beyond China to include India and the rest of Asia. Dobson predicts that India and China will speak in unison as Asia’s voice and work together toward greater economic integration, perhaps signing a bilateral free trade agreement by 2030 that could grow to encompass other countries in the region. As for the fraught U.S.-China relationship, it will resolve itself as China’s growing need to boost domestic demand leads it to abandon the Yuan’s fixed exchange rate by 2020, softening the trade imbalance between the two nations. China will begin to park some of its foreign-exchange surplus in IMF-issued Special Drawing Rights, but will nevertheless continue to support the U.S. dollar through currency purchases, thereby preserving the stability of the U.S. economy and the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency. Instead of a new world order, then, the gravity shift will lead to a multi-polar world where China, India, and the United States are all “first among equals.” As Dobson points out, her book is an economic analysis, and geopolitics is beyond its scope. It would be captious to fault the book for its specific focuses were it not for the fact that the economies of India and China are uniquely dependent on their internal and external political situations. Both countries are simmering cauldrons of ethnic tension, religious persecution, violent nationalism, and profound inequality. Also, both have vast nuclear arsenals pointed at their neighbours. Dobson’s book rests on the premise that neither internal fragmentation nor external conflict will derail economic progress. Although she alludes to separatism in Kashmir and anti-Japanese jingoism in China, Dobson is never quite able to imagine the disastrous implications of these forces and incorporate them into her analysis. Likewise, Dobson assumes that the leaders of China and India will act rationally—that China’s rulers will gradually loosen control over the Yuan, for example, or that India and China’s diplomats will put aside territorial disputes in the interest of greater integration. Yet as Susan Shirk points out
Ninety percent of India’s labour is unorganized, leaving its workers subject to low wages, arbitrary treatment, and discrimination.
Seemingly simple economic truths are in short supply. VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | JUNE 2013 • 46
in her book China: Fragile Superpower, China’s leaders in particular are consistently tossed about in the sea of public opinion, forced to react to the vagaries of the mob rather than able to consciously direct policy
and mutually supportive world system in 2030 will certainly ring false to some readers, so it is surprising that Dobson never actually takes the time to lay out her vision of how the political challenges will be over-
Homegrown heavyweights like Huawei and Lenovo will continue to push China’s dominance of high-tech manufacturing forward, while emerging renewable energy firms like Suntech Solar are likely to be global leaders.
streams. China’s leaders are presiding over a powder-keg, and good economic stewards though they may be, the only method they seem to have found of defusing domestic discontent is to channel it toward external parties like Japan, the U.S., and even India, resulting in an often irrational foreign policy that if taken to its conclusion—a split with Japan over the Senkakus, conflict with the U.S. over Taiwan, or enmity with India over their border dispute—would severely undercut economic progress. India too, with its powerful interest groups throwing sabots into the gears of change, seems ill equipped to make the rational decisions that Dobson sees as a foregone conclusion.
come. Will the panacea of growth keep restive populations in order? Or will China and India’s economies simply be resilient enough to withstand the myriad conflicts that threaten to break out? The book does not say. In a volume this slim, it seems remiss to not have even one chapter considering how political circumstances in both countries may affect economic prospects. Aside from this analytical gap, Dobson’s book is very good at what it does. Particularly refreshing is its clear-headed take on what India and China’s rise will mean for the developed world. Where other commentators see a zero-sum game in which China and India are already moving up the
India may have found its niche in making cell phones and cars, once luxury goods, affordable enough for the developing world.
There is little to indicate that China or India will undertake any of the steps Dobson lays out aside from the fact that they make good economic sense—but since when did that guide political decision-making? Judging by her silence on the political issues facing India and China, it would seem that Dobson is not worried about them. Her sanguine portrayal of a cooperative
value-chain to produce goods and services traditionally the province of developed economies, Dobson reminds us of the logic of comparative advantage. Certainly, China and India will continue expanding into new economic niches—but so will the rest of the world, and all will be better for it. And as China and India grow, they will be increasingly reliant on the knowledge-based
economies of the developed world to guide that growth. These seemingly simple economic truths are nevertheless in short supply, and they offer a needed counterbalance to the rising tide of protectionism in the U.S. and elsewhere that is usually justified with reference to the canard of China and India “taking away our jobs.” Also welcome is the breadth of Dobson’s study, which touches on a variety of economic sectors that are sure to be the driving forces of future growth. Manufacturing, textiles, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, automobiles, business services, and green technology are all thoroughly analyzed. As difficult as it may be to predict exactly which firms will flourish, Dobson does an admirable job of highlighting where China and India are at their most dynamic. Homegrown heavyweights like Huawei and Lenovo will continue to push China’s dominance of high-tech manufacturing forward, while emerging renewable energy firms like Suntech Solar are likely to be global leaders. And India may have found its niche in making cell phones and cars, once luxury goods, affordable enough for the developing world. Dobson offers a fine road-map for the interesting directions in which China and India’s economies may be headed. Dobson’s discussion of the economic challenges facing the two countries will likely be the book’s most lasting contribution. Much has been written about the momentum of the Chinese and Indian economies by authors seemingly blind to the internal contradictions that are already hindering growth. So too have there been numerous publications on the problems both countries face, from China’s environmental degradation to India’s urban poor. Dobson’s talent is in taking problems like these and reframing them as economic issues: environmental exploitation fuels China’s growth just as it threatens to render that growth unsustainable, while India’s poor are untapped human resources that represent the best hope for India’s future growth. The upshot of Dobson’s argument is that it makes a good deal of seemingly intractable problems—the urban-rural divide, lack of innovation, the ongoing currency war between China and
Book Reviewed: Wendy Dobson. Gravity Shift: How Asia’s New Economic Powerhouse
47 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
the U.S.—appear surprisingly solvable. The book’s central thesis, that poor institutions are the root cause of so many of these problems, is to my knowledge unique. Dobson’s prescriptions for improving the institutions of both countries and solving their crises are well-considered and suggest a new avenue of inquiry that will hopefully be taken up by other students of India and China. As for the likelihood of Chinese and Indian policymakers heeding Dobson’s advice, I am, as I have indicated, less hopeful. In the end, Dobson’s book is a strong contribution to the field. It is concise, wellwritten, and peppered with fascinating anecdotes of individuals in China and India living the very changes Dobson discusses. Dobson fulfills the subtitle of her book by offering well-substantiated predictions on how China and India will shape the twenty-first century’s global economy. Alongside the United States, India and China will be the economic powerhouses, but the U.S. will remain the foremost military power and the dollar the currency of choice—a far more realistic scenario than those we are accustomed to seeing, where everyone in the west is speaking Chinese and spending Yuan. Dobson’s sanguine belief that political turmoil will not upset economic progress is questionable, but will hopefully provoke equally interesting responses. Whether Dobson’s optimism is proven right or fears of fragmentation are borne out, the next twenty years are sure to be eventful for all watchers of India, China, and the world economy. APN
Much has been written about the momentum of the Chinese and Indian economies by authors seemingly blind to the internal contradictions that are already hindering growth.
Matthew Pal holds an MA from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and was an exchange student at National Chengchi University. His primary research interests are in China’s economic policy and financial system. He can be reached at matthewpal@gmail.com.
es Will Shape the Twenty-First Century. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009.
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TRIP REPORT
PHOTOS AND TEXT BY MOISES Lopes DE SOUZA
49 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
A CONFERENCE IN
INDIA
Moises de Souza, Philippe Cachia, Greg Coutaz, and John Schmeidel attended the conference “India-Japan Relations: Transforming into Potential Partnership,” promoted by the Centre for Southeast Asian and Pacific Studies (CSEAPS), established at Sri Venkateswara University in Tirupati, Andhra Pradesh, India. November 7-9 December 2012.
Despite having spent only four days there, being in India was an astonishing experience. India is everything at once, and it is a remarkable feat that such a diverse nation could be able to organize itself under the umbrella of a single state. This diversity is the strength of that land and its landmarks. India is noisy, with animals on the streets and religion in every corner, loaded with a myriad of traditions and religions, as well as those from all different economic and social classes. Beyond this, there are cars. Millions of them honking without end and zooming around you all the time. At the same time, you are also surrounded by colors, smells, flavors, wealth, smiles, spirituality, mysteries, and history. And there are people. Hundreds of millions of people. In the end, you will have to decide which India you will keep in your mind. I decided to keep the good people of Tirupati as the most important element of my experience in the southern part of India. The warm reception made by the organizers of the conference “India-Japan Relations: Transforming into Potential Partnership” were touching, indeed. Their efforts, without a doubt, made our stay in Tirupati a joyful experience. Incredible India? No. Incredible Indian people!
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NPO Work Experience in Yilan Photos and text By Hsiaping Lan
“The miracle is not that we do this work, but that we are happy to do this work.” This is the story of the most valuable working experience I gained from a local nonprofit organization, Lanshin Women and Children Center (LWCC), in Yilan. The story begins at NCCU. 51 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
I met Linda in the cold spring of 2009, in the Research Methodology class of Social Science, and I was impressed by her energetic learning attitude and determination to experience aspects of public administration that she has never touched before. Before realizing that Linda is the Chief Executive Officer of LWCC, I thought she was just another scholar-type civil servant, and we always talked about the practical issues involved in how to be an efficient and effective manager in organization. I never thought she was trying to learn something to help the LWCC survive with fewer and fewer social resources. When Linda told me that were no human resources in Yilan to teach English to the local children of low-income families, I promised her to lead a student volunteer group in NCCU to organize an English Summer Camp in LWCC in the summer of 2011. That was the first time I realized that she dedicated her life for the betterment of social-welfare for the women and children in Yilan. With the NCCU student volunteer group, we drove through the endless verdant rice fields, under the golden sunshine and sapphire blue sky. I saw the pure natural beauty of Roton, Yilan. Local people also love to welcome travelers, just like the dark green local hills always embraced everyone who wants to get close it. We had fun with the children that summer, and they showed great progress in their English ability, through hundred and thousand of persuasive, communication, and negotiations to encourage them, with the added effect to make even their parents want to learn English. Therefore, Linda decided
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to keep the regular Summer English Camp every year, no matter whether or not she had the resources. I was cheered up by witnessing the establishment of a small sustainable education welfare mechanism in the LWCC, which might have a powerful impact on those children, and also learned a lot from the NCCU volunteer group, as well as the children and their parents. In 2012, I became one of the employees of LWCC. The LWCC was established in 1998, but Linda had already started the women and children service by 1990, since local women who suffered domestic violence at that time felt too ashamed to ask for help from the police, preferring to ask help from someone they trusted, just like Linda. For that reason, Linda decided to help them with all her ability. The start of the new comer training, is the division of Physical and Mental Disability Education and Career Training. I participated in all of the training units of this division, and learned how to be a good companion to disabled friends, in order to help them complete their career training, pass the career certification test, and find a job. There are four units of this division, including the Roton Bakery, Roton Coffee Shop, Roton Shop inside Roton Park, and all of the training units are located in the most beautiful sites around Roton Park. During the career training courses, observing our disabled friends improve their working skills with their limited abilities, I followed the rules, standard operational processes, and trainers’ education to push myself to do more in my job. I requested to participate in the other divisions in LWCC, to learn more and help more people. There are three other divisions, including the Division of Family Communication, Division of Prevention of Domestic Violation, and Division of Community Babysitter. All of the social workers have to offer professional service, be patient toward the violated women, introduce more social resources or linkages for the women, resolve the family conflicts, connect legal counseling, connect the psychological counseling, and help them to become economically independent. 53 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
After the systematic career training courses, I found my position as to facilitate LWCC to establish the complete administration institution, standard operation process, and communication or counseling platform with the knowledge background of Public Administration in NCCU. I also coordinated NCCU human resources to join the LWCC team, such as Janet Tan for fund raising lectures in LWCC that May, and Le Thu to be the lecturer to share the about women care in Vietnam. This was the first time I could use what I learned at NCCU, and really feel happy to do it well. This is my working experience in LWCC. I learned a lot from this NPO, and the most important lesson I got is that I am really happy to do this work. You are welcome to LWCC in Roton, Yilan, anytime, no matter whether you want to enjoy the beautiful sites, taste the Roton local food, or participate in the welfare work. I bet you will find the way to feel happy. APN
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What is IDAS? The International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at National Chengchi University, located in northern Taiwan, is the first to offer an English-taught doctoral program in Asia-Pacific Studies in Taiwan. The IDAS program brings an interdisciplinary understanding of the Asia-Pacific region and offers students courses and research related to many aspects of the region. We offer four tracks – political economy, socio-cultural research, public governance, and international relations – that take advantage of NCCU’s excellent academic talent as one of Asia’s top universities. This program focuses on training professionals and places an emphasis on the combination of theory and practical research. For students who want to broaden their horizons and stretch their boundaries, we offer a learning environment to equip students with well-rounded research skills and enhance their professional abilities. We are part of NCCU’s College of Social Sciences, and draw on English-speaking faculty throughout the campus. We also offer the opportunity for students to study abroad, and those who come to NCCU can also take advantage of our excellent language center for learning Mandarin. Our comprehensive, Asia-Pacific Studies program involves: • Taking a minimum of 30 credit hours • Completing the qualifying exam for the selected track • Publishing or presenting at least one academic paper in English in an approved peer-reviewed academic journal • Writing a dissertation consisting of original research • Completing all requirements within 7 years, excluding 2 years for an approved sabbatical
55 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER
To learn more about IDAS, IMAS – our sister master’s program – and the scholarships available visit:
asiapacific.nccu.edu.tw
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AN
PUBLICATION
www.asiapacific.nccu.edu.tw