Unknown agency by ieuanevans

UNKNOWN

AGENCY IEUAN EVANS

Occasionally we walk headlong into the unexpected. “Hello”, it calls out to us, and we gaze - fascinated - into its peculiar existence. In our otherwise predictable lives, we stop. We ask ourselves all sorts of ‘how’ and ‘why’ based questions, then we proceed, back into mundanity.

INTRODUCTION

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

THE SCHIZOPHRENIC / / SPATIAL SCHIZOPHRENIA

SPATIAL SCHIZOPHRENIA / / CHANCE AND PLACEMAKING

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

43 05

The objective of this essay is to explicate the science of pathology as a means to quantify spatial conditions regularly affecting the experience of architecture. Specifically, I will attempt to provide a psycho-spatial diagnosis of selected, everyday encounters occurring within my own architectural experiences. This diagnosis - which will be referred to as ‘spatial schizophrenia’ - hopes to identify the latent moments of creativity present within even the most mundane architectural endeavours, unlock further considerations for architectural design and grant responsibility to the unconscious decisions liable for the production of ‘chance phenomena’.1 The psychological diagnosis of space is a concept that recognises ’architecture [as] the product of a way of thinking’2 and if the conditions affecting architecture are to be traced to their roots, ‘then attention needs to be focussed on the thinking and considerations that inform its production.’.3 It is therefore my intention to pose a hypothesis exampling how the pathology of schizophrenia – a psychological condition - can be revealed as occurring in the genesis of architectural phenomena and thus manifest in the spatial conditions we encounter every day. In the first chapter, I will open my discussion by providing a comprehensive understanding of the pathology of schizophrenia. Defining the elements of the condition that I wish to extrapolate and expound upon, I will propose a synthesis between its pathology and the architectural phenomena documented in this essay. The objective of which will be to categorically define the condition of spatial schizophrenia so that it may act as a departure point for the philosophical questions posed in chapter two.

1. Manolopoulou, Y. (2013). Architectures of Chance. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 2. Leach, Neil. Rethinking Architecture. New York: Routledge, 1997. p. xviii. 3. Ibid. p. xviii.

In this second chapter, these questions will take the newly conceived condition of spatial schizophrenia and use it to query the importance of chance phenomena in architecture. Questioning how we experience chance and our apparent reluctance to embrace its unknown qualities, I will consider how chance can be seen to excite spaces and begin to inform the place-making process. What chance is and what it bestows upon our experience of the world is an open ended question that will conclude this essay.

Throughout this dissertation, I will use a collection of hybrid terminology to help discuss the pathology of schizophrenia within the context of architectural phenomena. This vocabulary, which contains both existing terminology and terminology which I have engineered for the purpose of this essay, will be defined. UNKNOWN-AGENCY Agency or ‘the sense of agency’4 is defined as the ‘sense of generating or being the wilful initiator of an action’.5 Distinct from the sense of ownership, agency grants us the proprioceptive understanding that it is ‘I’ who is responsible for my action.6 It is the aspect of self-consciousness that allows us to attribute our thoughts and actions to our self. The prefix ‘unknown’ now acknowledges the actions for which our sense of agency is not immediately obvious. A term which here serves as the binding instrument between the philosophy of the unknown and the science of psychology. Unknown agency will be used to categorically define moments of creativity unknowingly caught up within design processes and identify them as contributing to the phenomenon of Spatial Schizophrenia. SPACE-TIME Introduced in the second chapter of this dissertation; space-time is a popular topic in modern philosophy. Generally, there is an air of

4. de Vignemont, F. and Fourneret, P. (2004). The Sense of Agency: A philosophical and empirical review of the “Who” system. Consciousness and Cognition, 13(1), pp.1-19. 5. Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p.56. 6. de Vignemont, F. and Fourneret, P. (2004). The Sense of Agency: A philosophical and empirical review of the “Who” system. Consciousness and Cognition, 13(1), pp.1-19. p.4.

ambiguity that surrounds the space-time formula, however, in this essay the concept of space-time will be considered as delineated by philosopher Henri Bergson. The ‘Bergsonian’ exposition of spacetime is consistent with his theories of multiplicity and operates on the premise that ‘perceptual experience is a space-time composite - the combination of an objective spatiality that is given subjectivity in time.’.7 Broken down into separate entities, space is discontinuous and homogeneous - the quantitative elements of experience - whereas time is continuous yet heterogeneous - those that are qualitative.8 Together, these entities consist of numerous variations of the quantitative and qualitative elements that combine to form perceptual experience. In this dissertation Bergson’s definition of space-time will act as the key component in a theoretical framework that accommodates a middle ground between Bergsonism and Phenomenology. In keeping with a phenomenological stand point the architectural conditions documented are detailed as occurring in space.9 However, conducive with a Bergsonian approach ‘questions relating to subject and object, to their distinction and to their union, [will] be put in terms of time rather than space’.10 SPATIAL SCHIZOPHRENIA In its wake, we may discover a world of untold initiatives; leaping out of the unexpected they attempt to mark themselves as the outstanding moments in our lives, and we label them as chance. This short abstract aims to grant an overarching definition of the term Spatial Schizophrenia, the intricacies of which will be further detailed in the first chapter. In short, Spatial Schizophrenia is an acknowledgement of the unknown initiatives constantly affecting the materialisation of the built environment.11 In our experience of architecture we constantly observe incidents bearing this hallmark. Stairs from which stages are born, peculiar light qualities that can be seen to bounce off walls and fall through gaps in the floor, their subsequent shadows that lay out new boundaries and thresholds. These phenomena, whether obvious or discrete, impressive or unnoticed, are omnipresent in our experience of the architecture.

7. Clarke, M. (2002). The Space-Time Image: the Case of Bergson, Deleuze, and Memento. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 16(3), pp.167-181. p. 169. 8. Ibid. p.169. 9. Merleau-Ponty, M. (n.d.). Phenomenology of Perception. p.236. 10. Lawlor, L. (2003). The Challenge of Bergsonism. London: Continuum. p. ix. 11. Leatherbarrow, D. (2009). Architecture Oriented Otherwise. New York: Princeton Architectural Press. pp. 43-66.

Free from any conscious act, the origin of these phenomena is locked deep within the unknown and unconscious variables of the design process. They are moments that I will suggest liberate us from the conscious conception of our spaces and will invariably go on to inform the future of our practice. Manufactured in the genesis of built space, Spatial Schizophrenia is observed here as the spectacular unforeseen.

‘True physical life is full of the unforeseen. A thousand incidents arise, which seem to be cut off from those which precede them, and to be disconnected from those which follow. Discontinuous though they appear, however, in point of fact they stand out against the continuity of a background on which they are designed, and to which indeed they are the intervals that separate them; they are the beats of the drum which break forth here and there in the symphony. Our attention fixes on them because they interest it more, but each of them is borne by the fluid mass of our whole physical existence.’ - Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution12 The primary aim of this chapter will be to translate schizophrenia, from a condition of the mind - a substrate of the body - into a condition of the world in which the mind and body reside. At this point we may consider schizophrenia in its most generic sense. Often referred to as a ‘split personality disorder’, this definition is born from an observation of its affliction and comments on the manner which patients suffering from schizophrenia can regularly appear to perform acts which they seemingly do not feel accountable for. This affliction will now demonstrate the pathology of schizophrenia as a unique vehicle for distinguishing between the sense of ownership and the sense of agency. A concept that will in turn assist in developing the notion of ‘Unknown Agency’; the hybrid term used frequently in my defining of Spatial Schizophrenia. In order to do this, we must first understand that ‘In one’s immediate phenomenology during action, agency is not represented as separate from the action, but is an intrinsic property of action itself’,13 and it is

12. Bergson, H. and Mitchell, A. (1944). Creative Evolution. New York: Modern library. p.11. 13. Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p.176.

only the schizophrenic that is able to make them distinct. One account of this distinction, taken from Christopher Frith’s cognitive model as a disruption of basic self-monitoring processes, sees a patient describe how ‘The force moved my lips. I began to speak. The words were made for me.’,14 Shaun Gallagher provides the following elucidation on this quote, stating that ‘The motor action responsible for the speech is in fact the patient’s own motor action, and the patient acknowledges that they are his lips that are moved, but he makes an error of identification concerning who produced this motion. Here the sense of agency, rather than the sense of ownership, is disrupted.’.15 In failing to attribute his action to himself the schizophrenic is forced to denounce his intention. However, prior to realisation of the action, the intention must have existed. Without intention, how could the motor functions required to precede movement ever have existed? Frith’s analysis thus declares that what is missing, in the case of the schizophrenic, isn’t simply the ‘intention to act but an awareness of the intention to act’,16 which he defines as meta-representation: ‘the ability to reflect upon how we represent the world and our thoughts’.17 Without ‘the awareness of intention’18 the schizophrenic will ‘misattribute their own actions and interpret them by default as the result of an external source.’.19 This failing meta-representation results in thoughts and actions known as ‘unbidden - those for which we have no sense of agency’.20 It is therefore the pathological element responsible for removing the sense of agency and fielding the apparently unknowable actions that precede it. Acts of Unknown Agency. It is worth noting now that, while I have assumed a very objective role in my diagnosis of schizophrenia, as I attempt to translate the pathology of schizophrenia into a condition occurring within our perception of the world, I must become more subjective. As a study that finds its theoretical position part grounded in the discipline of phenomenology, we must remember that ‘Our own body is in the world as the heart is in the organism: it keeps the visible spectacle constantly alive,’.21 As the encounters documented here are after all, encounters of the world, they require a conscious understanding of not only their material construct, but also their effect on the embodied experience. So I digress, as we now understand how the reflective malfunction

14. Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p.176. 15. Ibid. p.175. 16. Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p.180. 17. Ibid. p.180. 18. de Vignemont, F. and Fourneret, P. (2004). The sense of agency: A philosophical and empirical review of the “Who” system. Consciousness and Cognition, 13(1), pp.1-19. p.7. 19. Ibid. p. 7. 20. Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p.180. 21. Merleau-Ponty, M. (n.d.). Phenomenology of Perception. p.235.

present in the mind of the schizophrenic reveals actions or thoughts to be imposing themselves as seemingly unconsidered or without intent - unbidden. I will begin to translate the pathology of schizophrenia by demonstrating how the moments documented in this essay have also occurred bearing the same misidentification . . .

It is not every day that I walk to university. On the days that I do, it is not always in the morning. On the mornings I do, the sun isnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t always shining - in fact the sun rarely shines in Plymouth at all. But, on those mornings of the days on which I decide to walk, in the unlikely event that the sun is shining, I am greeted by this phenomenon: serendipity.

This phenomenon, located within the Plymouth University campus, constitutes the light that reflects off the glass façade of the Portland Square building and thus happens to form a quite marvellous pattern on the wall of the opposing Davy Building. Now, the designers (whoever they might be) may recognise ownership of this phenomenon, but surely they cannot believe themselves to be its agent. If you were to ask them, they would - barring some bizarre esoteric motive - undoubtedly deny any consideration or intent. That said, you would have to question whether they have not considered the exact location and orientation of these buildings. It would also be necessary to ponder whether they have not considered the material nature of the Portland Square building’s reflective glass façade. In fact, every condition required to cause this event has, it seems, been meticulously considered. But apparently, the event itself, has not. The realisation of this phenomenon appears to require intentionality in the summation of all its parts, but without awareness, the architect, just as in the case of the schizophrenic, desperately denies their intention. The result of which is that each of these considerations now become acts of ‘Unknown Agency’. It is fortunate then, this particular phenomenon constitutes what I hope you will agree is a happy coincidence. For me personally, it activates this space by imparting a new and profound level of interest upon an otherwise mundane piece of construction. It is therefore also worth noting, with regard to an architectural position, that such coincidences do not always result in a happy ending. Such an antithesis I will now present in the form of 20 Fenchurch Street, London, otherwise known as the ‘Walkie Talkie’ building (shown right). Here, the curved glass façade built by architects Rafael Viñoly was the cause of much uproar when, upon its completion, the concentrated light that reflected off the building began melting cars and bicycles on a nearby street. Suddenly, in this circumstance, the nature of the unbidden phenomena became something of a nightmarish scenario for the architect. These two examples have been chosen for a variety of reasons. First, the light reflected onto the Davy Building façade exhibits my agenda as encountered in a personal situation and therefore gives further credence to the notion that these phenomena are omnipresent, occurring in the most daily rituals. Second, it also displays how the phenomenon of Unknown Agency may manifest itself in a diagnosis of Spatial Schizophrenia and how this condition can be seen to reveal the spectacular in the most banal of encounters. Finally, if the first example provides what is clearly an advocation for

such design considerations to be overlooked, the second reminds us why design considerations of this nature should ultimately always have existed. What these examples also clearly display is that ‘regardless of the process of making, the built project always escapes intention – it comes to determine its own existence, with its own purpose and its own history’,22 its own place in time. Following this, it is prudent to now re-introduce the concept of spacetime. Briefly mentioned in the glossary of terms, the space-time formula laid out by Henri Bergson acknowledges how in our perceptual experience, space is quantitative and discontinuous, whereas time is qualitative, continuous and heterogeneous. Further to this, in accordance with his theories of multiplicity, space and time combine - in varying and numerous degrees - to form our perceptual experience or the world. As we now begin to consider architecture’s place in time, their relationship is explained as part of what architectural theorist Jeremy Till describes as ‘Thick Time’.23 He states that ‘In it’s multiplicity, time presents a diversity that architecture has to accept - the linear, the cyclical, the personal, the instant explosion of the event’24. He goes on to suggest that architecture is ‘a framework that can accommodate the multiplicity of time’25 and that rather than oppose time ‘Architecture needs to be a setting that allows these diverse temporal conditions to coexist.’.26 Till therefore presents Thick Time as rejecting the instantaneous of the here and now to make way for an expanded present, one that ‘places architecture in a dynamic continuity, aware of the past [and] projecting to the future’.27 Simply, time - as part of the space-time formula - appears now as responsible for the ever changing nature in which we experience architecture. Logically, this now leaves space as responsible for the material construct consisting of these innumerable experiences. In accordance with this theory, I will now also simplify Bergson’s SpaceTime formula, reducing its components - space and time - to the instant and the continuous. How this reduction of space-time features in my defining of Spatial Schizophrenia will also now be briefly examined through the parallels in Herman Minkowski and Jean Baudrillard contrasting definitions of the schizophrenic. In their defining of the schizophrenic, Minkowski suggests ‘everything spontaneous, everything unforeseen, is excluded from his life [which] is transformed into a shapeless mosaic composed of logical precepts and scraps of

22. Corner, J. (1999). Recovering landscape. New York: Princeton Architectural Press. p.77. 23. Till, J. (2009). Architecture Depends. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. p.95-100. 24. Ibid. p.95. 25. Ibid. p.95. 26. Ibid. p.95. 27. Ibid. p.95.

thought’28 alternatively Baudrillard suggests that ‘The schizophrenic is not, as generally claimed, characterised by his loss of touch with reality, but by the absolute proximity to and total instantaneous with things. . . overexposure to the transparency of the world.’.29 Whether Minkowski or Baudrillard is correct is of little importance; what is of importance, is that in both cases the instant and continuous - space and time - are facets of experience that the schizophrenic is completely unable to separate. Just as the pathology of schizophrenia mercilessly forces its subject to consider the instantaneous as ever more indistinguishable from that which bears continuity, we can now understand how the conditions responsible for the fruition of Spatial Schizophrenia have been manufacturing in a similar nature. The architects responsible for the encounters which I have documented, appear to operate a design process that considers experience as occurring solely in the instant nature of space and, as a result, have made space completely indistinguishable from the second contributing factor to experience - time. The inadequacies of which are exposed here by an intervention that is as ritual as the rising and setting of the sun. As this chapter closes and I provide a final clarification of the term Spatial Schizophrenia, I refer back to the quotation with which it was opened. Spatial Schizophrenia as we have revealed is a condition that highlights what are considered to be discontinuous moments in the design process - moments of Unknown Agency - and allows them to stand out in the continuity of time through the production of chance phenomena. What remains is therefore a condition that sees the instantaneousness of space as an opportunity. One that can escape the otherwise overwhelming and unremitting vernacular - the veritable processes we artlessly contribute to - and celebrate the little white lines of unknowingness that spring from its otherwise dark and dreary canvas. We, as ‘mentally stable’ individuals, are at liberty to understand on which point these endeavours fall and, if it is suffice to say that the diagnosis of Spatial Schizophrenia can serve to inform or at least categorise our understanding of chance phenomena in architecture, then we enter the following chapter with one fundamental question. How might Spatial Schizophrenia begin to inform the place-making process?

28. Minkowski, E. (1970). Lived time. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. p.278. 29. Baudrillard, J. (2012). The Ecstasy of Communication. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e). p.30. 21

Up until now, the objective of this dissertation has been to detail a condition of chance, one that foregrounds the spectacular and frees us from the banality of our everyday. This condition is Spatial Schizophrenia. As we now begin to try and identify chance phenomena as tool for place making, we will resume a discussion introduced at the end of the previous chapter - Spatial Schizophrenia and the spacetime experience. As an architectural condition, Spatial Schizophrenia has been observed as occurring in the instant classification of space. However, as we begin to interrogate its capacity to inform the place-making process, we will - as intended by Henri Bergson - pose questions with regard to its experience in time. In this chapter we understand that, by its very nature, architecture is a practice occurring in space and, while we locate our experiences in space, we must accept that architecture is, and always will be, experienced through the continuity of time30. Conducive with Merleau-Ponty’s supposition ‘that the most primordial level of experience is embodied perception’,31 I will use the following encounter in order to demonstrate this notion. . .

30. Till, J. (2009). Architecture Depends. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. p.95-96. 31. Vasterling, V. (2003). Body and Language: Butler, Merleau-Ponty and Lyotard on the Speaking Embodied Subject. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 11(2), pp.205223. p.218.

Fergus Brown lives on the seventh floor of the Discovery Heights student flat complex, we are sat in the lounge area when the universally familiar shriek of a fire-alarm begins itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s incessant whine through every corner of the building. Heaving ourselves up from the sofa, I follow Fergus out of the kitchen. After five paces, we turn our attention to the front door, A brief pause, he opens it, and we turn left, into the corridor. . .

Fifteen meters down the corridor, we reach a set of double doors, Turning left, we head though them, into the corridor beyond. . .

At this point we are offered what was once an option, Enter the lift or take the stairs? We turn left, and head down the stairs. . .

At the foot of the stairs, only one option presents itself, Once more, we step through a door, and turn, left. . .

Mere steps down the corridor and a further door presents itself, We open it. Left or right? I have forgotten my bearings, But yet again, we turn left. . .

This avenue leads us into the atrium of the building, And we exit, right out of the front door. . .

Broken up into six separate stages, each spatial encounter documented in leaving Fergus Brown’s flat remains completely unremarkable. However, in their cumulative experience we recognise that in the event of a fire, in order to locate the exit to the Discovery Heights building - from a flat woven into its uppermost echelons - one must simply, turn left. Here, any conscious act of decision making has been removed and by complete co-incidence, these moments are given a new, collective identity. This encounter - as opposed to being the result of multiple circumstances that are instantly imparted upon one specific moment - appears to have emerged as a result of multiple instances located at various points within the continuity of time. How we experience Spatial Schizophrenia therefore accommodates a diversity that is only available in the multiplicity of space-time. Whilst this encounter has obviously been designed to illustrate this point - the diverse nature of the space-time experience - it also continues to evoke how Spatial Schizophrenia is clearly a phenomenon occurring by ‘chance’. As a psycho-spatial analysis of architecture, how chance phenomena can be seen arising as product of unconscious decisions in the design process - moments of unknown agency - is a point that will now be reiterated through the following parallel. . . ‘If the unconscious of the mind is a reservoir of socially suppressed ideas, so the unconscious of the building is a repository of suppressed architectural possibilities which can emerge for the inhabitants as opportunities beyond the architects intentions.’ - Yeoryia Manolopoulou, Architectures of Chance33 This statement reinforces the concept alluded to in the introduction to this dissertation, that ‘architecture is the product of a way of thinking’32 and for Yeoryia Manolopoulou, the ‘opportunities’ of chance are also born from the unconscious depths of the design process. It is therefore her theories surrounding chance that will now provide an umbrella for Spatial Schizophrenia as we try and develop it into a tool for place making. Within her writing Yeoryia Manolopoulou claims that ‘chance ‘charges’ the building, producing unique aesthetic experiences according to specific events and points of view’.34 What we now wish uncover, is

32. Manolopoulou, Y. (2013). Architectures of Chance. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited. p.44. 33. Leach, Neil. Rethinking Architecture. New York: Routledge, 1997. p. xviii. 34. Ibid. p.xvii.

how these phenomenon serve the place-making process? What do they offer? Certainly the encounters documented in chapter one can be seen to highlight the inadequacies of a practice whose thinking deals only in the immediacies of space, thus rejecting the possibility of chance. Further to this, all of the documented phenomena show us why we must forgive the unknown quantities of chance, for not only can they escape the almighty drone of the vernacular, but chance also centres our attention on that which is most essential in developing contingent architecture. Consideration for time. Jeremy Till is correct when he says that ‘we cannot oppose time’35 and philosopher Bruno Shulz urges us - somewhat emphatically - to ‘Keep off time, time is untouchable, one must not provoke it! Isn’t it enough for you to have space? Space is for human beings, you can swing about in space, turn somersaults, fall down, jump from star to star. But for goodness sake don’t tamper with time.’.36 This dissertation however remains resolute in its subscription to Henri Bergsons space-time concept and accepts that as we meddle in these conditions of space, we cannot leave time alone. That said, it does seem as though, despite our freedom to manipulate space, that in time we are, at best, limited to try and withstand its proverbial test. As we assume then that, for architecture, chance is a spatial condition occurring in time, and that we connotation resist time, then logically we cannot resist chance either. It seems then that we should begin to embrace chance and embrace time in the production of architecture. Instead of defending ourselves against the march of time, we should relish in the unknowable outcomes that will proceed our spatial interventions. To now make places out of chance. Indeed, such strategies have been attempted, and subsequently they have produced some of the most recognisable architecture of our time. Perhaps most notably, in Bernard Tschumi’s 1982 prize winning project for the Parc de la Villette in Paris (depicted across the following two pages). Here Tschumi utilises a layering system designed to experiment with the notion of chance. This system consists of the construction of follies (points evenly distributed across a rigid grid), pedestrian routes (established by lines crossing the grid) and finally surfaces (spaces within the grid on which activities such as sports can be enacted). These layers were then super-imposed onto the landscape to allow a juxtaposition of all the three autonomous systems and the results of their interaction - where they were to clash and combine was left entirely up to chance. . .

35. Till, J. (2009). Architecture Depends. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. p.95-100. 36. Schulz, B. (1987). Sanatorium under the Sign of the Hourglass, London: Picador. p.137.

Undoubtedly then, Tschumi’s Parc de la Villette does appear to accommodative chance, but here chance does not - as in the phenomenon of Spatial Schizophrenia - present itself on a strictly material level. Instead, Parc de la Villette utilises the unpredictable nature of its experience to expose issues of a much grander ilk. ‘Pledge but also wager, symbolic order and gamble: these red cubes are thrown like the dice of architecture. The throw not only programmes a strategy of events. . . it anticipates the architecture to come. It runs the risk and gives us the chance.’ - Neal Leach, Rethinking Architecture37 By presenting a scheme that - as described by Tschumi himself aimed to produce ‘an architecture that means nothing, an architecture of the signifier rather than the signified.’.38 Parc de la Villette promoted ‘neither theory, nor ethics, nor politics, nor narration’ 39, and as such, gave a place to them all. The inhabitant, granted their autonomy - an autonomy they always possessed - was left to redeem these notions and re-animate a setting apparently devoid of meaning. Here the inhabitant, charged with declaration of this place, became the element of chance. It is unfortunate then, that architecture like this is generally regarded as the work of exhibition and not as a precedent for design. In fact, in the modern age - the age of technology, fear and health and safety taboos - ‘the architectural profession persistently resists chance.’.40 On a functional level probability is relentlessly monitored as a ‘positivist tool in order to find ‘optimal’ solutions for structure, material and energy flows’41 and admittedly, with regard to function, this may be an acceptable approach. But this exactness is not limited to function, for the 21st century architect, indeterminism in any facet of design appears to share a boat with the unconsidered and naive. The architect must now conceive all and experience ‘must’ be pre-meditated in design, dictated by the building and adopted by the inhabitant accordingly. Furthermore, succeeding in this will apparently provide a ‘knowingness’, I am told - on the very first rung of my architectural education - ‘will’ make my architecture successful. To not know, is unthinkable.

37. Leach, Neil. Rethinking Architecture. New York: Routledge, 1997. p. 317. 38. Tschumi, B. (1989). Parc de la Villette, Paris, in Deconstruction, Papadakis, Cooke and Benjamin. London Academy Editions, p.181. 39. Leach, Neil. Rethinking Architecture. New York: Routledge, 1997. p. 317. 40. Manolopoulou, Y. (2013). Architectures of Chance. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited. p.xix. 41. Ibid. p.xix.

But we will never know! At least we will never know all, and we have proven this time and time again. Architecture will always be subject to the unforeseen element of chance, despite all the architect may try to choreograph and dictate it.42 We cannot pre-empt the chance elements of architecture, to do so would be to strip them of their title. On any level, material or experiential, to make place, we must await chance. So what if we, as architects, were to give up our resistance to chance? Relinquish our refusal of time and accept our naivety in space? How might Spatial Schizophrenia then inform the place making process? Possibly as an advocation that in architecture â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;The true measure of a buildings preparedness is its capacity to respond to both foreseen and unforeseen developments.â&#x20AC;&#x2122;?43 Following this, could the material phenomenon we diagnose here now stand to represent that shift in perspective, to re-make place so that buildings that survive chance stand out as purposeful in landscapes bred into a vernacular predictability. If we accept that Spatial Schizophrenia, while a veritable diagnosis of physical conditions occurring in architecture, cannot be premeditated, do also subscribe to the concept that architecture is performative? Should we therefore believe indeterminism to be our friend, and Spatial Schizophrenia a humbling truth that reveals a genuine appreciation for the arbitrary nature of the built environment? What I would suggest is that, as a tool for place-making, Spatial Schizophrenia encourages the architect to relinquish his control. To put down his tools. Allow for material situations that carry with them elements of the unknown, allow the unpredictability of certain design elements to be released, not constrained. Give the inhabitant cause for concern, and if it all goes wrong, then we can always put it down to chance.

42. Manolopoulou, Y. (2013). Architectures of Chance. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited. p.44. 43. Leatherbarrow, D. (2009). Architecture Oriented Otherwise. New York: Princeton Architectural Press. p.60.

This dissertation was introduced as an attempt to reveal how the science of pathology could be translated into a tool for quantifying conditions persistently effecting architectural experience. In order to do this, I chose to demonstrate how the pathology of schizophrenia could be seen to identify chance elements in the production of architecture, specifically those born from unconscious decisions made in the design process. The objective of which, was to define a condition I coined Spatial Schizophrenia. Upon defining Spatial Schizophrenia, this dissertation began to use this condition to provide further consideration for the experience of chance phenomena. In the second chapter, we then explored how chance could begin to inform the place-making process and questioned why the unknown qualities of experience are so often resisted in the production of architecture. In the conclusion to this essay, I will refrain from submitting these points to any additional interrogation. Instead, it is my intention to reflect upon these topics by offering the opportunity for new perspective. In order to do this, I now ask the reader to consider what chance - and therefore conditions like Spatial Schizophrenia - bestow upon their experience of architecture. Consider now, that throughout this dissertation, I have employed a psychoanalytical approach in understanding of chance. This methodology, where ‘mistakes and accidents are seen as meaningful signs for uncovering the unconscious.’.44 has as such identified the ‘mistakes and accidents’ occurring in architecture in a similar fashion, as ‘meaningful signs’. But as we reflect on these phenomena, we can ask ourselves,

44. Manolopoulou, Y. (2013). Architectures of Chance. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited. p.xix.

are they meaningful? Though my interpretation of these phenomena suggest they are, and remains unchanged, the divergent nature of perspective compels us to consider alternative interpretations. Heavily endorsed by major theorists such as Michel Foucault45, William James46 and Nelson Goodman47 is the concept that ‘we live alongside others, but in different worlds. . . we deal with the world using different sets of ideas, and therefore have different sets of experiences.’. 48 We, as individuals, ‘live on the diagonal, noticing some aspects of the world [and] neglecting others.’.49 It is therefore paramount to acknowledge that just as I have celebrated the encounters documented in this essay, such encounters will often go unnoticed or unremembered.50 How we experience chance, is therefore a point that assumes we have acknowledged its existence. It would therefore be sensible to suggest that if we fail to notice chance phenomena, then chance remains, mercilessly locked up in the unknown. As for the moments we come to acknowledge, the ones we grant freedom, what chance is, is for each of us directly proportional to its experience. Prior to its fruition, chance may be considered as remaining unknown. More conclusively it could be defined as the possibility of the unplanned, or an unfounded potential. Regardless, at this stage in its life, chance escapes perspective evaluation. However, as it discloses itself to our daily rituals, we may either marvel in or disregard its unprecedented introduction to the world. Chance may be spectacular, or it may be unexceptional. In a performative world, chance may go so far as to instigate a complete reprogramming of the systems from which it was born - anomaly turned subject. Conversely, it may be considered as undermining these systems and find itself removed from existence. Chance may be noticed as none other than a variable contributing to the vernacular constantly endure. For those who fail to observe the relevance of chance, they are at liberty to interpret such phenomena as nothing more than co-incidences, and not, as I claim, spectacular moments that free us from the banality of the everyday. For this dissertation however, I have presented a perspective that resolutely conforms to a notion that ‘Chance will

45. Foucault, M. and Miskowiec, J. (1986). Of Other Spaces. Diacritics. 46. James, W. (1910). A Pluralistic Universe. The American Journal of Psychology. 47. Goodman, N. (1978). Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co. 48. Menin, S. (2003). Constructing Place. London: Routledge. p.168 49. Ibid. p.168 50. Manolopoulou, Y. (2013). Architectures of Chance. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited. p.xvii.

eventually conquer design.â&#x20AC;&#x2122;,51 whether we resist it or not. In architecture, we know the building will always be subject to events that cannot be scripted52 and I believe that is a concept we can all accept as fact. So as we ruminate on the topic of chance, as we continue to follow its unknown tracery through experience after experience. Even if we fail to appreciate it, we will, at the very least, always, permit chance.

51. Manolopoulou, Y. (2013). Architectures of Chance. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited. p.225. 52. Leatherbarrow, D. (2009). Architecture Oriented Otherwise. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

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11. Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 12. Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical Conceptions of the Self: Implications for Cognitive Science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 13. Georgieff, N. and Jeannerod, M. (1998). Beyond Consciousness of External Reality: A â&#x20AC;&#x153;Whoâ&#x20AC;? System for Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 7(3), pp.465-477. 14. Goodman, N. (1978). Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co. 15. Heidegger, M. (2000). Introduction to Metaphysics. New Haven: Yale University Press. 16. James, W. (1910). A Pluralistic Universe. The American Journal of Psychology. 17. Lawlor, L. (2003). The Challenge of Bergsonism. London: Continuum. 18. Leatherbarrow, D. (2009). Architecture Oriented Otherwise. New York: Princeton Architectural Press. 19. Manolopoulou, Y. (2013). Architectures of Chance. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 20. Menin, S. (2003). Constructing Place. London: Routledge. 21. Merleau-Ponty, M. (n.d.). Phenomenology of Perception. 22. Minkowski, E. (1970). Lived Time. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 23. Mortimer, A. (1992). Phenomenology. Its Place in Schizophrenia Research. The British Journal of Psychiatry. 24. Sass, L. and Pienkos, E. (2013). Beyond Words: Linguistic Experience in Melancholia, Mania, and Schizophrenia. Phenom Cogn Sci. 25. Sass, L., Pienkos, E. (2013). IntrospectionIntrospection and Schizophrenia: A Comparative Investigation of Anomalous Self Experiences. Consciousness and Cognition.

26. Sass, L. and Pienkos, E. (2013). Space, Time, and Atmosphere: A Comparative Phenomenology of Melancholia, Mania, and Schizophrenia, Part II. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 27. Schulz, B. (1987). Sanatorium under the Sign of the Hourglass, London: Picador. 28. Squires, E. (1990). Conscious Mind in the Physical World. Bristol, England: A. Hilger. 29. Till, J. (2009). Architecture Depends. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 30.. Unamuno, M. (1954). Tragic Sense of Life. [New York]: Dover Publications. 31. Tschumi, B. (1989). Parc de la Villette, Paris, in Deconstruction, Papadakis, Cooke and Benjamin. London Academy Editions, 32. Vasterling, V. (2003). Body and Language: Butler, Merleau-Ponty and Lyotard on the Speaking Embodied Subject. International Journal of Philosophical Studies.

PHOTOGRAPHS (In order of appearance). 1. Plymouth University Davy Building, (2015). 2. Plymouth University Davy Building, (2015). 3. Plymouth University Davy Building, (2015). 4. Unknown, Walkie Talkie Building, (2013). http://www.mirror.co.uk/ news/uk-news/walkie-talkie-second-landmark-skyscraper-2251935 5. Discovery Heights Building, (2015). 6. Discovery Heights Building, (2015). 7. Discovery Heights Building, (2015). 8. Discovery Heights Building, (2015). 9. Discovery Heights Building, (2015). 10. Discovery Heights Building, (2015). 11. Mauss, P. Parc de la Villette, (2012). http://archleague.org/main/ wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Parc-de-la-Villette-ÂŠPeter-Mauss-ESTO.jpg

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