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United Kingdom, September 1996 PUBLISHER IFATCA. International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers· Associations. Sec bottom of page 2 for nmtact address.

EXECUTIVE BOARD OF IFATCA

Prcbcn Lauridsen President and Chief Executive Officer

Neil Vidler

Volume 35 N° 3

IN THIS ISSUE 3

FOREWORD

Executive Vice President Americas, Samuel Lampkin HUMAN

FACTORS ASPECTS JN CNS/ATM

The Deputy President's Presentation to ATCA. Sydney

Deputy President

Oliver Fariravi -xccutivc Vice-President Africa/Middle East .,amuel Lampkin Executive Vice-President Americas George Chao Pao Shu Executive Vice-President Asia/Pacific Gunter Melchert Executive Vice-President Europe John Redmond Executive Vice-President Finance Sandy Oppenheim Executive Vice-President Professional Chris Stock Executive Vice-President Technical Edge Green Executive Secretary Terrv Crowhurst Edit~r EDITOR

Terry Crowhurst 29 Herita!!e Lawn. Lai1!!shott. Harley. S~nTey.RH6 9XH. United Kingdom. Tel. +44 (0) I 293 784040 Fax +44 (0) 1293 771944 CompuServe:Terry Crowhurst. 100743.3372 I n1erne1:Terry.Crowhurst@srg.caa.co.uk ADVERTISING AND SALES OFFICE Ron Mahendran I 07 Drake Road. Rayners Lane. Harrow. Middlesex. HA2 9DZ. United Kingdom. Tel & Fax +44 (0) 181 868 7399 ACCOUNTS AND SUBSCRIPTIONS Tim MacKay ··Dunadry". Minshull Lane. Wettenhall. Winsforcl. Cheshire. CW7 4DU. United Kin!!clo111. Tel +44 (0) 1270 528363 ~ Fax +44 (0) 1270 528478 CONTRIBUTING EDITORS Patrick Schellin!! Ch. Sur k Moulin. 1261 Le Vaud, Swil,:erlancl. Tel +41 (0) 22366 2684 Fax +41 (0) 22366 4305

Philippe Domogala Merelstraat 5. NL 6176 EZ Spaubeek. The Netherlands Tel + 3 I (0)46 4433564 Fax + 3 I (0)43 366 I 541 PRINTING Mercury Press Unit I. Baird Close. Crawley. West Sussex. RH 10 2SY. United Kingdom. Tel +44 (0) 1293 523000 Fax +44 (0) 1293 529000

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

THE ROLE OF THE PILOT

Mike Freeman of IFALPA Addresses ATC '96 14

BOOK REVIEWS

Bert Ruitenberg Reviews New Releases NEW OSLO AREA CONTROL CENTRE

Philippe Domagala Reports from Norway GLOBAL

NAVCOM

Chris Stock Reports from Singapore SAFETY - THE BARRIER TO PROGRESS?

IFATCA Paper Presented to Global Navcom IFATCA 97 Registration Forms and Advance Information

HARMONISED

ATC

VALIDATION

Patrick Schelling Reports

CHARLIES

The Humour in Air Traffic Control

Advertisers in this issue British Airways. China Air Lines. Crimp. Eva Air. Miller Freeman Exhibitions. Norcontrol. Omnilife. Schmid Telecom. Wavionix. Wesson.

Photographs

T. Crowhurst. P. Domogala, P. Schellin!!. Cover

A Room with a View - Courtesy UK CAA Corporate Communications Department. Chai:lie Cartoon Ken Tully Copy Typing Dona Crowhurst

Proof Readers Lucy Leveson. Harry Cole

ISSUES APPEAR END OF MARCH, JUNE, SEPTEMBER, DECEMBER. CONTRIBUTORS ARE EXPRESSING THEIR PERSONAL POINTS OF VIEW AND OPINIONS, WHICH MAY NOT NECESSARILY COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS' ASSOCIATIONS, IFATCA. IFATCA DOES Nor ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR STATEMENTS MADE AND OPINIONS EXPRESSED, IT ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITY FOR PUBLISHING THESE CONTRIBUTIONS. CONTRIBUTIONS ARE WELCOME AS ARE COMMENTS AND CRITICISM. No PAYMENT CAN BE MADE FOR MANUSCRIPTS SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE CONTROLLER. THE EDITOR RESERVES THE RIGHT TO MAKE ANY EDITORIAL CHANGES IN MANUSCRIPTS, WHICH HE BELIEVES WILL IMPROVE THE MATERIAL WITHOUT ALTERING THE INTENDED MEANING. WRITTEN PERMISSION BY THE EDITOR IS NECESSARY FOR REPRINTING ANY PART OF THIS JOURNAL.

CORPORATE MEMBERS OF I FAT CA

ADACELPTY LTD. Canberra,Australia

IAI - MLMDIVISION Beer Yaakov,Israel

AIRTRAFFICANDNAVIGATIONAL SERVICES Co.Ltd. Johannesburg. Republicof SouthAfrica

IBM (UK) Feltham,UK

AIRWAYSCONSULTINGSERVICES Wellington,NewZealand

JEPPESEN& Co. GmbH Frankfurtam Main,Germany

ALCATELAIR NAVIGATIONSYSTEMS Stuttgart,Germany

JERRYTHOMPSON& ASSOCIATESInc. Kensington,MD. USA

ALEXANDERHOWDENAVIATION London,UK

KONGSBERGNORCONTROLSYSTEMS Horten,Norway

AMBIDJIGROUPPTY LTD Melbourne,Australia

MILLERFREEMANEXHIBITIONS Sidcup,UK

ARINCINCORPORATED Annapolis,MA, USA

NORTELDASA Friedrichshafen,Germany

ATS AEROSPACE St. Bruno,Canada CAE ELECTRONICSLtd. Saint-Lauran!,Canada CESELSA Madrid,Spain CELSIUSTECHSYSTEMS farfalla,Sweden COMPUTERRESOURCESINTERNATIONAL A/S Birkerbd,Denmark CRIMPA/S Allero,Denmark CORIS Le PlessisRobinson,France DENRO Gaithersburg,MD, USA

NORTHROPGRUMMAN Baltimore,MD, USA OMNILIFEOVERSEASINSURANCECo. Ltd. London,UK RAYTHEONCo. Marlborough,MA, USA SCHMIDTELECOMMUNICATION ZUrich,Switzerland SERCO-IAL Bath, UK SIEMENSPLESSEYSYSTEMS Chessington,UK SOCIETED'ETUDESET D'ENTREPRJSESELECTRIQUES Malakoff,France

DAIMLER-BENZAEROSPACEAG Ulm/Donau,Germany

SONYCOMPUTER Weybridge,UK

DICTAPHONECORPORATION Stratford,CT, USA

SWEDAVIAAB Norrkoping,Sweden

DIVERSIFIEDINTL SCIENCESCORP. Lanham,MD, USA

TELUBAB Solna,Sweden

GAREXAS Oslo, Norway

THOMSON-CSF,DivisionSDC Meudon-La-Foret,France

HUGHESAIRCRATTCOMPANY RichmondB.C.,Canada

VITROCISETS.p.A. Rome,Italy

HUGHESATC SIMULATIONTRAINING BurgessHill, UK

WAVIONIXSOTTWARE LTD Lausanne,Switzerland

Please note below new address and telephone number for the Executive Secretary and new address and telephone number of tbe Advertising and Sales Office on page one. The International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations would like to invite all corporations, organisations, and institutions interested in and concerned with the maintenance and promotion of safety in air traffic to join their organisation as Corporate Members. Corporate Members support the aims of the Federation by supplying the Federation with technical information and by means of an annual subscription. The Federations' international journal The Controller is offered as a platform for the discussion of technical and procedural developments in the field of air traffic control. For further information concerning Corporate Membership, or general IFATCA matters, please contact the IFATCA Executive Secretary:

E.G.H. Green O.B.E., 4 The Rookery, Peasemore, RG20 7JY, United Kingdom. Tel: +44 (0) 1635 247890 Fax: +44 (0) 1635 247891

__________________

FOREWORD __________________

Foreword 0 Samuel Lampkin, Executive Vice President Americas s aviation technology changes, so too our training mission, methods and programmes must change to be consistent with the new instructional requirements. The challenges ahead for civil aviation administrations in the line of training are considerable, as they work towards meeting the increased demand for adequately qualified personnel within the cross section of activities during the era of change. The designing of course materials for the new Communications, Navigation, Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ A TM) systems in which higher levels of automation are utilised, continues to present additional challenges in the training arena. All these changes are occurring at a time when financial austerity dictates more cost-effective management of training. Regional air planning processes carried out by the various !CAO Planning and Implementation Groups set forth in detail plans for the facilities, services to be provided and procedures necessary for international air navigation in the areas that fall within their area of responsibility. Although these planning and implementation processes considered training requirements, ii was only a short time ago that training in the broadest sense has received the level of attention it so rightly deserves. However, ICAO. through its Trainair Programme, has begun to address many of the training challenges with the hope that the evolutionary process will meet the future requirements of civil aviation training. In keeping with these initiatives, IFATCA, on the basis of its Charter of Convention and Objects has, therefore. a vital role to play at these Planning and Implementation fora. To make that contribution call for. apart from Federations policy

inputs from the various Member Associations to their Regional Vice Presidents. support teams and representatives as information within the Federation needs to be updated on a regular basis. In recognition of eminent changes in the global aviation scenario, IFA TCA was restructured to meet future organisational and administrative needs. The restructured Federation has ever since been under continuous scrutiny by the Executive Board so as to function in the best possible manner for the benefit of its members and the aviation community. The decision to afford a high priority to the establishment of a permanent office is but one way in which lFATCA will be better placed to deliver the service expected of it by its membership. Another is the Federation's involvement in the conduct of seminars and symposia with the intent of promoting and upholding a high standard of knowledge and professional efficiency amongst air traffic controllers. The activity of the Federation has indeed received the impetus required. There will now be IFATCA seminars/symposia on a regular basis within the regions of IFATCA. These seminars/symposia will not only cater for air traffic controllers but for all the players involved in technical. operational and training aspects of civil air navigation. The Federation plans to hold its next symposium in the Americas Region, Panama City. Panama. On October 16th and 17th. 1996,a distinguished panel of experts on CNS/ATM and other related areas will gather lo present valuable information and debate the issues which impact on the change processes that are at work on the current and future air navigation systems. It is therefore my wish to encourage your participation al this event.+

IFATCA ATC SYMPOSIUM IFATCA ATC Symposium "CNS/ATM - ATC in Transition 2000 and Beyond" is the third in a series of symposiawhich the International Federationof Air Traffic Controllers' Associationsis conductingworld-wide. The symposiumis scheduledto be held in PanamaCity, Panama,on Ocrober 16-17 1996,at the Hotel El Panama.The severalpanellistswith their expertiseand vast experienceon CNS/ATM subjectsand other relatedareaswill deliver paperson the most up-to-datedevelopmentsand issuesof concern. Registrationfeeshavebeensetat US$150.00per participant,accompanyingpersonspay US$ 75.00.Paymentsareacceptableon site. Upon registration.participantswill receive the initial symposiumdocumentationwhich will include the final programmeand other pertinent details. Texts of speechesand presentations(subminedto IFATCA) will be madeavailable after each sessionin the languageof origin, though there will be simultaneoustranslationsduring the speechesand presentations. The Hotel Panamarates for the symposiumare: StandardRoom - US$ 70.00 Single/Doubleoccupancy.Roomson the Executive Floor are US$ 136.00Single/Doubleoccupancy. Taxesand servicechargenot included,but generally is around 15%. Areason which presentationswill be madeare: • A Reviewof Demandand SystemCapacityin the America Region • GeneralOverview of CNS/ATM Developments • The EnablingTechnologies- The Controllers' Perspective • ATS RelatedHuman FactorsAspectsin CNS/ATM Systems • Air Traffic Flow Management

• Privatisationof ATC Services • Civil/Military Co-ordination • FreeFlight - The Holy Grail? • Accident/IncidentInvestigation- IFATCA Policy • Safety - The Need for Regulation

Forf11r1her i1(forma1ion,please comae/ The IFATCA Secrewrial, 4 The Rooke,y, Peasemore, RG20 7JY, United Kingdom. Phone: +44 1635 247890, Fax: +44 1635 247891 or Samuel Lampkin, IFATCA Executive Vice President Americas Region, 47 Mora Drive, Homeland Gardens, Cunupia, Trinidad and Tobago, Telefax: +I 809 665 38/7 (Residence) or Phone: +I 809 669 4852 (Work)

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

___________________

EDITORIAL __________________

Editorial 0 Terry Crowhurst - Editor The following story was submitted by our Contributing Editor, Patrick Schelling. ft is a good example of Human Factors requirements and perhaps reinforces the thoughts of the Deputy President that Air Traffic Management (ATM) should be placed ahead of the Co111111u11icatio11s Navigation Surveillance (CNS) requirements in the future global air Tern· Crou·l111rsr traffic system (see article 011page 5). For some more 011the ATM, I recommend you read the article delivered to ATC '96 by Mike Freeman of IFALPA - see page 8.

ATC DEL.W'?

t was a beautiful day in June. I had jL.1stfinished a week's workshop at the Eurocontrol Agency. in Haren. Brussels. on what will be the Operational Concept for the future European Air Traffic Management System (EATMS). A hard week trying to imagine what ATM will be like starting five years into the next century. One of those Fridays afternoons. where you have only one thing in mind - 10 forget capacity shortfalls and delays for the week-end. Everything looked good. The passengers were sitting and standing al the gate ready 10 board. There were three business man making last minute telephone calls - checking with the office? Through the large window overlooking the tarmac. one could observe the crew "at station" from the concourse they seemed ready to go too. Approximately I 5 minutes past scheduled departure time things got a little busier at the counter as a few phone calls

where exchanged. At last. someone decided that it was time to inform the passengers why on earth they were waiting. since everything looked so good! Then. finally the news broke ..." xxx airlines (all details are available ) is sorry 10 announce a further delay of about I 5 minutes (now hear this) ... due to the late arrival of the catering! Uff ... I thought it was one of those nasty ATC delays again. you know. the ones you don't know who to blame it on ... just say its ATC! Missing passengers.taking off luggage from the plane. late arrival or aircraft. technical problem - yes - but catering! Considering the immense operational and financial effort airlines make to be on time. incidents like this one seem disproportionate. Needless to say. we missed our CFMU Slot and finally pushed back nearly 40 minutes past our original departure time' ! While taxiing out. I could see several aircraft in front heading for departure. 1 counted eight and started to play my usual take-oil time game (number of a/c x 2.5 minutes is a good guess!). Then the captain came on and I thought ... "See if he's got the same result?" Nope. he won 1 Indeed he announced. "Due 10 our favourable slot (sic!) ... ATC has cleared us via a bipass taxiway and take-off will be in two minutes - flight attendants please be seated." And so we went and arrived at destination on time 1 ATC flexibility absorbed the catering delay! Thanks to our colleagues at Brussels Tower - good job! This "incident" re-enforced my thought that the future ATC (ATM) system will need to have this flexibility to cater for catering delays (or other exotic delays like the one caused by a missing stair lo deplane etc.). How much automation will be needed to make the same decision and communicate the result via data-link to the cockpit 9

THE CONTROLLER - REGIONAL SUB-EDITORS AFRICA MIDDLE EAST Mr Albert Aidoo Taylor P.O. Box 9181 Kotake International Airport Accra GHANA

Telephone: +233 2 I 773283 Fax: +233 21 773293

and Mr KhaleelKooli Telephone: +216 1755000 Aeroport Int. de Tunis-Carthage Fax: +216 I 782 106 CNA-2035 TUNISIA ASIA PACIFIC Mr John Wagstaff Telephone: +852 255 I 008 I ATMD,CAD Fax: +852 23628 IOI Hong Kong International Airport Kowloon Hong Kong

AMERICAS Liliana Rodriguez and RosannaBaru (ATCAU) Cipriano Payan 2988 Ap. 502 Pocitos Montevideo URUGUAY Neil Martin 67 Castle Rock Drive Richmond Hill, Ontario CANADA, L4C 5W3 EUROPE Mr Philippe Domogala Merelstraat 5 NL - 6176 EZ Spaubeek THE NETHERLANDS

Telephone: +598 2770299 Fax: +598 2770299

Telephone: + I 905 508 4771 (H) + 1 905 676 5228 (W) Fax: + I 905 676 3 I 2 I (W)

Telephone: + 31 46 4433564 Fax: +31433661541

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

_________________

HUMAN FACTORS ________________

HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS IN

CNS/ATM Thefollowing article is an exhYtctfrom the presentation deliveredby the Deputy President, Neil Vidler, to the Air Traffic ControlAssociation Conventio11held i11Sydney in May, 1996.

THE CNS/ATM SYSTEM

IFATCA's INVOLVEMENTIN THE

ll\lPLE\'1ENTATION OF CNS/ATM SYSTEI\IS.

he abbreviation CNS/ATM stands for ICAO's vision of how the global air traffic system will be for the next generation or two. It stands for Communication. Navigation. Surveillance/ Air Traffic Management. Note the slash between CNS and ATM. It probably wasn't intenclecl that way but it coulcl appear as though the slash clivicles what I'll call the 'high-tech' side and

I) Global: The CNS/ATM concept originated from the FANS Committee in which IFATCA was represented. Subsidiary Panels are the ADS Panel and the RGCS Panel. The Panels are to define how we are to use the CNS/ ATM System and both are still active and IFATCA is he 'human· or more procedural side. 0 Neil Vidler represented on both. Since the implementation The three parts of CNS are all based on computer of CNS/ATM constitutes a change in the global air traffic supported satellite technology. Communication will be via system that is bigger than when radar was introduced. the ICAO datalink or voice. both utilising satellite relay. Navigation will Council created a high level taskforce (CASITAF) to advise on be done almost totally by satellite derived position the implementation process. Again. IFATCA was invited to this information such as GPS or GLONASS. Although taskforce (albeit as an observer this time) and together with surveillance radar will remain in use. most areas that today IFALPA provided the only direct operational input. have no radar coverage. and that is most of the world. can 2) Regional: benefit from Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS). a One of CASITAF's recommendations was that f'unction in which aircraft automatically transmit. via a implementation of CNS/ATM is to be managed on a regional datalink. data derived from on-board navigation systems. This level and that !CAO HQ is to ensure that the work clone in one data is displayed to the controller on a screen that resembles a region is compatible with that in the next. radar screen but definitely is not a radar screen. The going For IFATCA. the world consists of four regions: Africa phrase for it now is ·pseudo radar·. I' II come back to this later. Middle East, the Americas. Asia Pacific and Europe. In each The other side of the slash. Air Traffic Management. region we are represented in one or more groups where comprises Air Traffic Services (ATS). of' which ATC is the contributions to CNS/ATM are being made. In the Pacific biggest component, Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) area. the first region where CNS/ A TM technology and related procedures are being implemented. we participate in the group and Airspace Management (ASM). ATS is the traditional driving this implementation ISPACG. the Informal South function. the other two are relatively new concepts. ATFM's Pacifie A TS Coordinating Group. ole is to structure the traffic llow in such a way that it can be Although ISPACG is informal by name. it is very much safely and efficiently handled by ATC avoiding excessive the focus of auention of the aviation community and to quote traffic peaks or overloads. The goal of ASM may be one ICAO officer: "This is the most important informal group summarised as the "flexible use or airspace" which can be in the Pacific, if not the world." achieved by redesigning airspace usage without having to IFATCA's involvement in all these areas continues to be consider geographical boundaries or special use areas such as based on our perceived need to ensure that the controllers' military restricted areas. interests are protected. One of the key objects of IFATCA that Earlier on I called CNS/ ATM ·'JCAO' s" vision or how the I listed earlier is the safeguarding of the ATC profession. global air tral'fic system will be for the next generation or In recent times !FA TCA has come to realise that just about two". It is important to remember that ICAO is not an entity the most critical means of safeguarding that profession is by as such but rather is an organisation of States that. just like ensuring that the human factors related aspects of ATC are as I FATCA. reaches its decisions in a highly structured they should be. democratic manner. So. by calling it ICAO's vision I'm really That brings me to the central theme of my address: Human Factors Aspects in CNS/ A TM Systems. saying that it is the agreed position of all States that are signatories to the 1944 Chicago Convention. Earlier I also mentioned that IFATCA participates in ICAO panels and ATC RELATED HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS working groups so we too are involved in creating that vision. IN CNS/ ATI\I SYSTEMS So we are actually accomplices. both before and after the fact. To the casual observer it may seem as if the realisation of I would like to now briefly explore IFATCA's full implementation of CNS/ ATM were a maner of weeks involvement in CNS/ATM implementation. rather than years. The satellites are up there and working. ►►

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

_________________

HUMAN FACTORS-----------------

►► airlines are equipping their aircraft with FANS I kits and

ATC authorities are having ADS screens delivered almost by the dozen. Yet. the casual observer would be wrong! Earlier on I pointed out the slash in CNS/ ATM, dividing the technology and the human sides. It is this slash that was missed by our casual observer. The equipment may be ready. the human operators are not. We may even query the readinessof the equipment . Imagine an aircraft manufacturer (let's call it Company X) who, in a bold attempt to respond to the perceived demands of its customers. decides to design, build and market a revolutionary new type of aircraft. Would you, as a paying customer, board that aircraft if you knew that Company X's test pilots had done only a few perfunctory flights to check subsystems not long before the aircraft had been delivered and if you knew that the pilot's knowledge of the aircraft was restricted to what they had read in a draft Operations ManuaJ? In other words. they had never really flown the aircraft under normal operating conditions. So should we adopt a different approach when it comes to the introduction of CNS/ A TM? So far, CNS/ATM implementation has been largely driven by IA TA, the International Air Transport Association, who consider themselves the users of the system. It could well be argued that A TC, whom IA TA consider a provider. also is a user and that the real providers are the satellite owners and telecommunications companies, but that is another issue. The point is that the airlines see possible cost savings in the order of many millions of dollars almost within reach and have invested heavily in airborne equipment to realise these savings. Having made these investments, the airlines legitimately expect to see returns in cost savings by more efficient routing, optimum flight levels and less delays. To this end, they are asking for, and receiving, the commitment of the civil aviation authorities to install the necessary equipment on the ground. It seems as though most of the efforts thus far have concentrated on the CNS side of the slash. Some work has been done with Airspace Management, for example the introduction of flex tracks, but it almost appears as if the ATM side is being taken for granted. And if there is one thing that should never be taken for granted, it is SAFETY. And safety is what ATC primarily is all about. Allow me to back up a little. Why would people be reluctant to fly in Company X's latest product? Maybe because they felt it hadn't been properly tested or validated before it was employed to transport passengerspaying for the privilege. If that didn't deter them perhaps the fact that the pilots had received no specialised training to fly the thing would make them think twice. If we apply this analogy to the implementation of CNS/ ATM we may see some interesting parallels as well as some differences. One obvious parallel is that there has been very little integral testing of lhe system. There have been some trials with datalink, and ADS tracking has been demonstrated. but in most cases this has happened in highly pre-conditioned environments where the pilots and controllers involved were part of the tests and knew exactly what would happen. To my knowledge there has been no extensive air traffic control conducted yet with live traffic using ADS and datalink to separate aircraft in a busy environment.

One of the inherent problems with new A TC systems is that the ultimate testing can only take place in an operational environment. A new aircraft can be flight tested in a quiet piece of sky, where it can perform exactly as it would in busy skies. but an ATC system needs a lot of traffic. with a lot of controllers interacting, for a full performance test. As a consequence, the introduction of new A TC systems usually involves a trial and error period in which both pilots and controllers will experience some confusion while mastering the system. It is fortunate that normally - and until now - new ATC systems have been introduced on a national level so the associated problems have been anticipated and relatively easy to contain. With CNS/ ATM, however. we are talking global systems and a completely different category of problems. On the Communications side, controller/pilot datalink will be introduced, enabling more dependable communications with aircraft operating in remote areas or serving as back up to existing voice communications. For pilots. this will mean more "heads down" time to read incoming messages and composing and transmitting replies. As most of these data link exchanges will occur during the cruise stage of the flight, submit that this will only add workload for the pilots at a time when they have the capacity to absorb it. So probably it won't be an inconvenience for them. For the controllers it will be a much different story. If the CNS/ A TM concept is successful (and everybody be!ieves it will be) more traffic can be accommodated in a given piece of airspace so it stands to reason that the controller working that airspace will have to communicate with and separate more aircraft in a certain time-frame than he does today. And even though that controller may have a 'window' on his screen to react.compose and transmit his messages.this will still require him to look away from his traffic picture to do so. But wouldn't you agree that his traffic monitoring and separating functions are made more important by the increase in numbers and the decreased separation minima that the new system has permitted? We should also bear in mind that having a traffic picture 'on-screen' is probably a new experience for the controller anyway. He used to work procedurally, obtaining position reports from aircraft by radio and using his flight progres. strips as an aid to visualise the traffic, applying separation standards in the order of 120 miles between flights at the same level. Now ADS presents him with a radar-like picture. But where radar shows the plotted position of a detected return of electronic energy, the ADS picture is a presentation of electronic position reports from on-board systems. ADS is really no more than an automated electronic version of the socalled "shrimp boats". Seeing that an aircraft is at a certain position on the display doesn't necessarily mean that the aircraft is actually exactly at that position. The difference is that ADS is just designed to be far more accurate than the shrimp boats. And it is that improved accuracy which is the basis for the application of lower separation minima giving our controller more traffic to handle in his airspace. , Furthermore, CNS/ATM will largely do away with today's system of fixed air routes. Satellite navigation will enable aircraft to fly virtually any track they like with a high degree of accuracy. This will negate the need to fly point to point between ground-based navigation aids but, at the same time, it will negate the controller's framework for his mental traffic ► ►

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

-----------------

HUMAN FACTORS-----------------

►► picture thus increasing his reliance on the picture on his screen

and confliction prediction capabilities of his automated system. Perhaps this would be an appropriate point to clarify one or two things. Despite what I have said so far or what may have been inferred, IFATCA endorses the CNS/ATM concept. Remember that I said earlier we have been involved in its design from the early stages and we continue that involvemelll with the implementation stage. But what motivates our involvement is our belief that the system above all should be workable for the human operators pilots and controllers alike. ICAO Human Factors Digest No. I I is called "Human Factors in CNS/ ATM Systems" and builds on the principles of human-centred automation as defined by Dr. Charles Billings. These principles, advocating building automated systems with the human operator in the centre rather than trying to exclude him, are fully compatible with IFATCA's policies on automation (so they must be good 1). Yet if we look at some of the datalink and ADS systems currently being installed, it seems as if the human operator's requirements have only been considered from an ergonomical point of view rather than from a systemic or operational point of view. In Digest No. 11 there is a quote from Prof. Earl Wiener that is very applicable here:

"There is an iron law that should never be ignored. To consider Human Factors properly at the design and certification stage is costly but the cost is paid only once. If the operator must compensate for incorrect design in his training programme. the price must be paid every day. And what is worse, we can never be sure that when the chips are down, the correct response will be made." So any shortfalls in the design of the datalink and ADS equipment also will have to be compensated for by training:

training in how to communicate by keyboard rather than voice, training in how to accommodate higher traffic levels without fixed air route networks; in short. training in how to operate in a totally different ATC environment. Such training takes time and that is exactly what IATA for example will be reluctant to accept. But looking positively at it, time could be to their advantage as well. Wiener's iron law mentions the price that operators have to pay. I don't intend to hazarda guesshere as to the sums involved in ATC CNS/ATM training but I am preuy certain where those costs will be financed from: user charges. for in today's world of corporatised ATC that must be where the income is generated. This could only mean that the airlines will be ultimately presentedwith the bill tomorrow for today's haste. The corollary is that the advantageof allowing for extra time for training would be that the existing designs for CNS/ATM system components can be scrutinised and/or reviewed. guided by Dr. Billings' principles. An improved design will require less training and therefore less in-built costs. But a far more important advantage is that by allowing time for a proper ATCO training and licensing process and an incremental implementation programme with regular evaluations and validations, air safety won't be compromised by the higher traffic numbers or a sudden change in operational procedures and working methods. To repeat:

Safety is in everybody's interest - don't take it for granted.

CONCLUSION Returning to the analogy of the new aircraft from Company X, the difference between the introduction of an aircraft and an ATC system of course is that the aircraft can be fully tested and ► ► tried in isolation of the aviation system, whereas the ATC pa~e 32

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IFALPA _____________

THE ROLE OF THE PILOT IN AN AGE OF DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS AND FAST PROCESSORS 0 Mike Freeman. IFALPA

This text is au edited versio11of the spoke11presentation given to ATC '96, in Maastricht, by Mike Free111a11, of the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations. The presentation raises many items of i11terestto the air traffic control fraternity.

he pilot's role brings with it responsibilities. but the one that concerns us above everything else is the safety and comfort of passengers and crew. People often say to me: "Don't you ever get worried about all those passengersbehind you and their safety?" My answer is: "Well if my neck comes down between my head and my body when we land. so does theirs". So. we look after ourselves. we look after the aeroplane and make things comfortable for us and the aeroplane. we fly the routine way and everybody arrives in safety and comfort. There are legal responsibilities. When we [pilots] get our licences, the legal responsibilities are implicit. They are laid down in black and white. they are covered by government acts - it is similar in every country - and we have very clearly defined responsibilities. They can be delegated: for example. we delegate things like correct loading on the aeroplane. we delegate the correct packaging of dangerous. flammable materials. we sign for things which we haven't actually seen - the company makes sure that things are alright. We trust them. we sign the documents. But when things go wrong. it comes straight back to us. And obviously. we have legal obligations in the air. We don't fly dangerously: it is illegal to fly dangerously. We also have commercial responsibilities to the company. And we have operational responsibilities. These are more directed at the company the pilot works for: it's what companies like to call 'proactive· - for example. if the weather is particularly gruesome. we still try to find a way of doing the journey. If the problem's en route. if the problem's with

industrial connict. within the airline. on the ground or at the destination. we find ways of getting round it. and these are operational responsibiIi ties. . We then have tasks, a subject which I will expand on later. It's the tasks which are going to cause discussion and I think are good grounds for liaison between pilots and anyone who has anything to do with the development of air traffic control, or in particular. with what goes on in the flight deck. Basic flights are an obvious task. We fly the aeroplane. we don't always fly autopilot as autopilots have been known to fail. There are weather conditions where the autopilot can't cope. This time of year (February 1996) is a very good time to illustrate that. especially in Europe. Standard use of equipment is another task. There is a certain way of using every bit of equipment on the aeroplane so you don't endanger the aeroplane. you don't abuse the system. you don't wear things out and so on. Communications - that is also a task. We talk to air traffic controllers. they talk to us. We talk to the company. we talk to each other in times of emergencies. I was involved in an emergency exactly a year ago in February and other aircraft in the air were a great help. so communication is a vital part of the way that we live in the aeroplane. Navigation - it goes without saying that is a task. We use navigation equipment. radio waves, identifying. cross checking. re-programming routes. managing the FMC. listening to navigation messages - these are tasks. And these tasks have been put on to us by people who designed the hardware. I will come back to this later. and some of

what l say will tie in exactly with what Preben Lauridsen spoke about. You put all this together. and that is the basic picture. that is the pilot's role. the heart of our job. and it cannot be changed. There are people who say what about pilot-less aircraft? Well fine. I think it's a myth. I think it's fanciful. and I only have to take somebody who thinks like that into an approach in extremely bad weather and they change their mind quite quickly. There was a pilot I used to lly with who had a lovely way of dealing with this. Passengers would come up on the flight deck and say: "Will there ever be planes without pilots?" and he would just nudge the button which disconnects the autopilot and red lights would flash. there would be noises and it would all look really scary to the passenger. The pi lot wou Id then say: "The aeroplane is now out of control because the autopilot's failed. and if I don't intervene. we're all going to die." That's one way of making the point. The other is far more subtle and he couldn't always do it. He would find some thunder storms on the weather radar. and on colour radar they loo pretty frightening - red centres. yellow rings and green patches and he would say: 'Those are thunder storms. you get vertical currents of air. going at 60-70 miles an hour. these could break an aeroplane." He would then add: "They might be thunder storms to you. but they're job security to me." We have to fly around weather so often that I think any system that tries to do this from the ground will find itself in great trouble. The roles aren't going to change. Responsibilities come with the job. There's no real way of changing them. but what I think you can do - and I'll come back to this again - is you can undermine them. You can make it very difficult for us pilots to meet our responsibilities. ►► page /0

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But back to tasks. as this is where the problems can arise. Tasks can be changed: I come back 10 hardware on the flight deck. and this hardware can make the pilot's life difficult. Some tasks are very distracting - use of FMC and use of keyboards involve a lot or what we call head-down activity. Anybody who's involved for a long time in trying 10 program any kind of computer equipment on the aeroplane is lost. he's out of the loop. There is an accident which very graphically illustrates what can happen. This was an aircraft crash al Kathmandu. While one pilot was trying to put a nonexistent waypoint into the system from this approach. he was out of the loop for so long that the aeroplane ended up flying into a hillside. There were other contributory factors. but had he not had a problem with the FMC. it wouldn't have happened. Routes - Let's suppose we're going to fly from Hong Kong to London. I've chosen Hong Kong because it is a long way away and it is at the encl or a route that causes an awful lot of discussion. This is the route from the Far East across India, and today we're going to go over Tehran, up through Europe. A take-off towards the North-West is weight-limited because of the high ground. The runway is not as long as we would like it to be and there are restrictions sometimes because of the temperature. A lightish wind. take-off towards the North-West and we now have weight restrictions. A flight I did recently was fifteen and three-quarter hours. nonstop. Fifteen and three-quarter hours in the air, and the maximum fuel load we could take in order 10 make it all the way to London was 172 tonnes. We landed with four tonnes of fuel. Four tonnes of fuel is about 20 minutes' flight. or less. So it was quite an operation to get ourselves back home. To do it. we had to leave some passengersbehind. We also had to leave some freight behind, and freight. we're told by the company. pays more than even the passenger. so leave the passenger rather than the freight 1 And the other warning we had was do not leave certain kinds of freight behind, becauseit would have cost us the contracl. So we're under pressure emotional pressure from people. emotional pressure from the company: the kind of pressure that makes us want

IFALPA _______________ to go home and not divert into Frankfurt and stay there for a night or two. So back to our Hong Kong flight. We're now on our way, we've got the fuel. we've left people and freight behind and we take off. we turn to the left a couple of times, climbing up towards Chinese airspace and our problems start while we're still in Hong Kong airspace. We have to radio ahead to China and tell them that we're coming. I don't know whether this is just a procedure they insist on. or whether liaison is not that good. but it is something that we always do. so while one pilot is talking to Hong Kong. the other is talking to China. This is a long. tortuous. very curvy route that covers a part of the world which we can fly through. It's not just lack of surveillance that makes us fly this way - it's actually political problems. We have problems over China. we have problems over Afghanistan. there's information from the Foreign and Commonwealth office that the very narrow corridor that we fly along where we cross Afghan airspace is not to be left under any circumstances. There's high ground there. and emergency flying over Afghanistan would be pretty dire, we cannot turn back. there's not enough room. It is dangerous. Someone on the ground has radar and SAMS and we're not allowed off their airway. They have found a safe bit for us to fly on. So things are fairly serious politically. So. let's take off from Hong Kong. We fly into Chinese airspace, we talk on VHF - that's fine. and as we come up to Myanmar we have to warn them in advance that we are coming. We talk on HF. I don't know if any of you have spoken on HF or heard about some of things we have to put up with. With HF. if you imagine three of you standing inside a tin shed. each of you has a partner outside and you're all shouting to your partners outside trying 10 communicate with them. and they're trying to understand you. As you are doing this, there are hailstones falling on the tin shed. That is what HF is like. Because when we speak to Myanmar we can hear Calcutta, we can also hear Madras and as we come across the Indian Ocean we can also hear Bombay. Colombo and Lahore. That's what it is like on HF. Messages - say a position report on VHF - take maybe 15 seconds.

I have actually taken 15 minutes to get a report ahead on HF to try and get clearance into Pakistani airspace. So let's carry on along the route: VHF. HF into Myanmar and now we come up towards Calcutta. Low traffic comes from Australia. Singapore and Bangkok. from all over the Far East. and people start funnelling in this very narrow passageover India. The problem that we have is that the ACC in Calcutta might know what is coming. but they don't know when it is coming. And the first warning I might get is on HF. So we've been struggling like crazy to get our level early on. and we're now trying to conserve fuel on a I5-hour flight - so we don't want to be too high and we don't want to be too low. We want to get it just right. As we come in towards Calcutta. the first thing that can happen 10 us is that because we went higher up to beat everyone else. we lost the gamble and they put us down; I've been clown as low as 24.000 ft and as the optimum is around 31,000 ft or so. this then is starting to be expensive in terms of fuel. So now we're really having 10 start thinking about whether we're going to have to divert en-route or not. and the bad news is that we are probably going 10 be stuck at 24.000 ft until we get near Turkey. because that is where they start to use secondary radar and separation becomes a lot less. Flying over India is fairly straightforward. We talk to Delhi on VHF: now we have to talk to Pakistan and get our clearance through Pakistani airspace. Pakistan is quite serious about this. I've heard several reports of people 1101 managing to get the message across. So again. HF 10 get the clearance. The longest it's taken me is 15 minutes. the charts say call 10 minutes ahead: I usually start at 20 because if you leave yourself only 10 minutes you might be up against the border with no clearance. And this is fairly unpleasant. Then you go across Tehran. They use VHF. but the quality of the VHF is particularly bad, the language is not particularly good. I mentioned an emergency we had last year: we diverted into Tehran with a 'freight on fire· warning. and I must say that they actually are very, very good. So when the pressure was on. and fortunately there was very little air traffic. they were ► ►

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

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very good. But supposing this had happened in an area where they were talking on HF. We had a major problem. Item one of the checklist: •freight on fire· warning. lane! at the nearest suitable airfield. So what would we have done? It would have involved linking up with other aircraft in the area on 121.5. the emergency frequency. and getting clearances to get in somewhere else. We wouldn't have known what was open the workload could have gone up very suddenly and in a very unpleasalll way. So there is a blackspot with this early HF communication - and political problems. Flight through Iranian airspace is OK, no problem. but we're still held clown because the separation is about I 0 minutes. \Ve come towards Turkey and then people start to branch off to other parts of Europe. Airspace empties out a little bit and then as we get towards Istanbul they start to pick us up on secondary radar. A few direct routings up across Bulgaria. Rumania. Hungary and so on and then we start to get our night levels. Only as we start to speak to the Austrians and the Germans on our way up to Ostend do we start to get the levels we want. We might have been held down for a very long time and it is only when we start to get our final levels that we can tell whether we need to go "en-route". On one particular night we took 15 and three-quarter hours. We used an operation called "en-route". It's an overhead diversion. We re-planned enroute: basically we "cheated'' the legal system (cheat in inverted commas. it's not illegal) - we actually said we were going to Frankfurt. But we didn't go there - the airport was London. So we went overhead Frankfurt without descending. We checked on the fuel to see if we had enough to divert to London. We diverted to London. and that's how we landed with four tonnes. It was a very marginal operation. it was proactive. it was commercially viable: it's legal. we do it. but you make calculations at a tremendous rate all the way along to make sure you don't do anything stupid. Landing in London. we now come onto the approach. On the approach everything's fine, we've got enough fuel. we come into land. Here I would like to throw a new problem at you ... Supposing

IFALPA _____________ you get a late runway change at London. on a 747-400. This involves the nonhandling pilot in 16 different operations to change from one runway to another. It involves disconnecting the autopilot. the flight directors. reprogramming the FMC. re-identifying the radio waves. reconnecting. re-arming and crosschecking everything. The reason I mention this is that no pilot would have designed such a system. I'll come back to this later on. We've got it. we use it. Last rime into Los Angeles we had three runway changes. I did 48 movements lo get us onto the runway. Very distracting. So. that's the route. Do pilots like it? No we don't like it. We fly for a living - you might think that one route looks like another. but it does not. We have anxieties. concerns. and pressures. commercial and otherwise: we have problems trying to talk on HF. and sometimes we have boredom to contend with. Any pilot who has clone that route and asks how would you make it better would say how about this'.' I call it "airspace for pilots" pretentious maybe but. it summarises what we feel. VHF contact. Yes. pilots want to communicate. but we want to do it easily. under surveillance all the way. We want to know who's around and we want people to know where we are.

Flying at or near the optimum level. Pilots take great professional pride in saving fuel. Shaving four or five minutes off a 15-hour tlight doesn't seem that much. but this could save four or five hundred kilos of fuel. If you do that every clay of your working life you save the company a lot of money. and it makes you feel good.

Flexibility to adjust flight levels and route. Sometimes we detect wind shifts and see weather buildups and large frontal disturbances. and so we want lo go a long way round and we want to adjust the route. As for adjusting tlight levels. temperature on the tlight to LA recently was - 78 degrees outside air temperature. We had fuel low temperature warnings and with a situation like that there is the possibility you have to descend just to keep the fuel warm. It is a consideration. The company had an airmiss with a Korean 747 coming up from Tokyo to London because they got so frightened

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

they descended without a proper clearance. So flexibility is the thing pilots really would like to see. We know changes are coming. We've heard them being talked about. Pilots' concerns There are systems in force and there are tests going on someone mentioned the PET AL trial. which I thought was very impressive. But hardware manufacturers can sell anything: it is up lo the people who design the cockpits to try to keep things off the flight deck that are dangerous from a human factors point of view. So we're worried about hard ware/so ft ware. Hu man-cent red versus technology-centred design has already been talked about comprehensively: I agree with everything that was said. Human-centred designs say: what is the problem. how will the human handle it and what will it give them to help them do thejob'l Technology-centred is what NASA has warned us about - someone comes along and says: 'Tve got this machine that does all this. look. its wonderful. stick it on the aeroplane and teach your guys to use it". The reason I mentioned the runway change at Heathrow is because that is exactly how this kind of thing happens. It's not user-friendly. and it's nor the kind of thing that we would like to see. Airspace - I'm taking a bit of a shot in the dark here. Because we don't really know how airspace is going to be organised. in the long term - we know what's happening now. we know what's happening around Europe. in the States and so on. but what's going to happen in a place like Africa? What's going to happen in the Far East? We look for political problems. financial problems and so on. I fly in Africa a lot. we go northsouth. we broadcast blind. using IATA procedures 1269. we effectively do our own separation. our own air traffic control. we know where we each are. You can fly up to four hours in African airspace without speaking to anybody on the ground. not through lack of trying: we try but there's no reply. there's nobody in. So sometimes. especially when the Hadj is on. small fly-by-night carriers appear. carrying pilgrims from west to east. They go towards Jeddah and fly through the night in African airspace ►►

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►► with the TCAS switched on. With all the

screen we can see traffic ahead of us going the same way maybe, but suddenly a set of lights will come across and we don't know who he is. we haven't heard from him, we won't hear from him and these are people who don't maybe know the rules and use paths from all over the world to fly old aeroplanes to make money while the Hadj is on. When the Hadj is finished the whole thing is disbanded. but they're a danger to us. How will they interact with what I call FANS airspace? We have these tunnels. we're all free-flying, it's wonderful for us, but have we got anything to worry about? If we have. how is it being handled?

Congestion

at funnelling

points.

There are funnelling points. If we are going to load the airspace up. how are we going to deal with tremendous concentrations of traffic? Not so much when things are going routinely well. but if there's an airfield down. for whatever reason. or a single runway airfield where there has been an accident. You might remember an Air China 747 that slid off the encl of the runway at Hong Kong. which is where we were coming in during a typhoon. We diverted, he was the next one in. he went too far, and he went in the sea. We went to Taipei and when we arrived the airfield was almost full. In order to get in we had to declare an emergency or they wouldn't have let us in. And this is why we have funnelling. What do pilots do when things go wrong? How do we handle it? How does it effect us when things go wrong? We love TCAS. it's wonderful - but I'd hate to think that it's something that is being used routinely. People say: "You're okay you've got TCAS 2". But I don't want that - TCAS is going to save my life. but I don't want it to be used routinely in everyday flight. Message security. Here's one to think about. There are three places in the world where we've been warned about radio amateurs - I call them cranks. They set themselves up and they pretend to be air traffic controllers. They send very convincing messagesand instructions up to the aircraft. We had one in the Newcastle area a short while back, there was one in Madras recently and there's a warning still in force in the Los Angeles area. And in certain situations, if we're

not happy with an instruction we have to confirm it with ATC - double confirm it. These people have got good radios. they have practiced what they're saying; you can buy these flight simulators for your home PC. which teach you how to be an air traffic controller. And they've probably heard things on their radios as they stand around the airports, because they're all aeroplane enthusiasts -but you only need one nutcase who wants to see what he can do to control an aeroplane. It is being done now and the point is, can it be done some other way? At the Westinghouse stand. at the exhibition, they've got CNS. as opposed to CNS/ A TM development over Russia and one of the captions says: "Direct aircraft control by uplink from the ground". There is a whole field for debate there. But if they're going to try that. how do we know that the messagescoming to us are coming from air traffic control centre? How do I know that some hacker hasn't got bored with trying to get into the defence computers in the United States and has decided he'd rather control aeroplanes7 And if there's not some way of encoding messages.if there's not some way of giving us some kind of safeguard. we're going to have the most tremendous resistance to this kind of thing from pilots. In addition to the fact that we like things to do, there's one other item - there are times when we really are fatigued. You try doing a four sector trip to Australia and back. Your body has gone 12 hours out in time and 12 hours back. you sit up in the night. it's dead quiet, there's nothing going on, fatigue plays a part and so does boredom. We don't need computer games on a flight deck to keep us busy and we don't want music or whatever - we want things to do. Pilots fly because pilots enjoy things to do with flying. So don't take everything away from us - if it's cheaper to let us do it. I want to end by giving you in a packet what pilots really feel. Just as air traffic controllers should be listened to. pilots should be listened to. Not all the time. you don't have to keep coming back and saying: "Hey. guys what do you think?" But at least we ought to have a door open so that if something comes across that pilots don't like they can nip out and say have you thought about the following ... You could acid to the costs.

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

and may ultimately jeopardise safety; it's the safety that we're worried about. It's these tasks - we don't want tasks that we can't perform. we don't want tasks that are going to be distracting, we don't want tasks that are going to undermine our responsibility. we don't want to have to clean up afterwards when we have problems in controlled airspace. Why not get it right to start with?

Pilots involved· with the development of FANS. I'll mention a couple of things a "disgruntled" IFALPA rep said about the !CAO ANS panel that he's on. "IFALPA was not invited to the pre co-ordination session held oft'-line. but our interest was served by our associate from IFATCA. who reportedly said at appropriate times "Yes, that's an interesting concept, but what does IFALPA say about it?". Another quote: "The ICAO ANS panel seems to have acquiesced to allow pilots the use of voice capability at times other than emergency or urgent non-safety related communications." Why do we have to fight to have ourselves heard on RT? Whoever came up with the idea of not having a voice communication? And the last quote. to me. indicates cynicism and a certain amount of panic and it smacks of the voice in the wilderness: somebody listen to me - it's a little bit hysterical.but the question is why 7 He says: "Where we cannot ensure I 00 per cent avoidance of traps embedded within the ANS A TC system. I believe that we at IFALPA must attempt to make the traps survivable." Sounds dramatic. and how did he get into that state? Basically, pilots want 10 work with the entire industry. We're involved with manufacture. we're involved with development of procedures and equipment within the company: I believe we ought to be involved in what's going on in ATC. And that way we really would create a safe, efficient and effective. flexible ATC framework in which we'll enjoy working and the operators of the airspace will enjoy operating, and the passengers will have tremendous confidence. with their safety assured. +

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BOOK REVIEWS ________________

THE PROFESSIONAL BOOKSHELF 0 Reviewed by Bert Ruitenberg

Human Factors in Air Traffic Control - V. David Hopkin This book's author. V. David Hopkin. has been a household-name for years when it comes to discussing the subject of Human Factors in Air Traffic Control. He has published numerous papers and articles on various aspects or the topic. and also participated in the work of the ICAO Flight Safety and Human Factors Study Group. As such. he almost singlehandedly was responsible for the contents of the well-known !CAO HF Digest #8. It will. therefore. come as no surprise that Dr. Hopkin. by writing this book. has produced what I would call "the ultimate reference book" on Human Factors (HF) in ATC. In the 442 pages of the book, Hopkin comprehensively covers almost every conceivable aspect of the title subject. To mention just a few of the chapters: a historical introduction: human cognitive capabilities and limitations: ATC jobs and tasks: controller selection and training: displays and input devices: common HF implications of computer assistance: conditions of eniployment: research and development. In total there are 2 I chapters. all subdivided in multiple sections to describe the many associated aspectsof each topic. In being so impressively comprehensive. the book strongly reminds me of an encyclopaedia - and. paradoxically. this is one of its most negative attributes at the same time: it is about as exciting to read as an encyclopaedia. The facts are all there. presented in a totally logical format allowing easy access - but it's not easy to read it from cover to cover. Furthermore. l was left with the impression that in the descriptive parts of the book. especially when dealing with technology and organisation. the author was slightly biased by his experience with the UK ATC system and that of the USA. Since these systems in their present form are not the world's most advanced ATC systems. some of Dr. Hopkin's observations appear a little outdated. (For example: CNS/ATM and ADS are not mentioned in the book at all. datalink is only mentioned in passing. and

privatisation of ATC is seen as a future development). This also applies for the choice or the photographic illustrations. At the encl of the book are two lists that I think provide good added value: the first is a "list of sources" of Human Factors work on A TC. or other relevant papers: the second is an impressive 22page list of references. Yet it struck me as somewhat strange that IFATCA is not mentioned in either or them..... V. David Hopkin (1995). Human Factors in Air Traffic Control. London (UK): Taylor & Francis Ltd. Hardback: ISBN O 85066 823 9 (£59.95), paperback: ISBN O7484 0357 4 (£29.95).

Beyond Aviation Factors - Maurino, Johnston and Lee

Human Reason,

Of a totally different calibre is the second book under review in this article. a book "intended to provide a bridge from the academic knowledge gained fro111 research. to the needs of practitioners in aviation". Its authors are as well-known in their respective fields as Dr. Hopkin: Dan Maurino (whom some of you may remember from the Professional Panel at the 1994 IFATCA Conference in Ottawa) is the Co-ordinator of ICAO's Flight Safety and Human Factors Programme. James Reason is a Professor of Psychology at Manchester University and

the creator or the Reason Model (for the analysis or accident causation in complex systems). Neil Johnston is an Aer Lingus pilot (A330 captain) and a very accomplished HF practitioner as well as theorist. and Dr. Rob Lee is the Director of Australia's Bureau or Air Safety Investigation (BASI). I 11this book the authors present 4 casestudies: real-life examples of (what are called) organisational accidents in aviation. that are analysed in detail to arrive at far-reaching recommendations for improving syste111-safelyin each case. The 4 case-studies are on: Mt. Erebus. the Dryden FK28. the BAC 1-11 windscreen accident and the Australian ainniss study. (With the possible exception of the latter. all these cases are so well-known in HF circles that as little reference as given here suffices to identify them.) These 4 casestucl ies are ably put in context in the opening chapter of the book. while the last chapter "suggests different ways to apply the Reason Model as a prevention tool" to enhance organisational effectiveness. In stark contrast to Dr. Hopkin's book, this book makes fascinating reading J'ro111 the first page to the last. Even though it is non-fiction. it reads almost like a novel - a thriller. I would say. And I sub111itthat for ATC readers the chapter on the Australian airmiss study contains numerous identifiable facts and stale111e11ts. even though it is not about the A TC organisation of which such readersare part. The foreword of the book is written by the Hon. Mr. Justice Virgil P. Moshansky. who was in charge of the investigation into the FK28 crash in Dryden. Ontario (one of the cases described in the book) an investigation widely recognised as the first to look for systemic factors behind the accident rather than stop at the conclusion "pilot error". Therefore this foreword certainly also comprises "aclclecl value" to a book that I consider a must for any aviation practitioner who has an interest in Human Factors. Highly recommended! Maurino. Reason. Johnston and Lee ( 1995). Beyond Aviation Human Factors. Aldershot, Hanis (UK): Avebury Aviation. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Hardback: ISBN 0 291 39822 7 (£29.50).

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

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THE NEW OSLO AREA CONTROL CENTRE 0 Contributing Editor, Philippe Domogala orway finally transferred the Oslo Area Control Centre (ACC), which controls the South East part of Norway. from the old Fornebu airport building to brand new facilities near Royken, 25 Km West of Oslo. The new Centre is built inside a mountain, initially to resist a direct nuclear bomb hit ( the plans were started well before the Berlin wall fell) in very nice surroundings. although the nearest village (and p(1b) is 4km away. The Centre is oversized for its present use. The bunker builders have even planned further extensions and dug the hole in the mountain big enough to accommodate two other similar operations rooms. The holes are nicknamed by the controllers as "The Trondheim FIR" in order to tease their colleagues from the North a little.

STAFFING At the moment the Oslo Centre operates four ACC sectors and two Approach (APP) sectors. Additionally, one working position coordinates and handles fighter activities. (ln Norway, all ATS is civil, even that provided to the military.) Becauseof lack of staff, sectors are manned by a single controller, but receive help from a Flight Data Assistant, who pe1forms some 'planning duties' in addition to the flight plan processing. The current staffing is 41 ACC controllers. 20 Approach Controllers (2 part time). and 33 Flight Data Assistants. Six controller trainees are also currently working in the last stage·of their training. The number of movements controlled is between 250.000 and 300.000 per year.

DELAYS The Centre was due to open in 1992. This date was revised clue to various problems and finally set for March 1995. Then for technical and operational reasons the date was "definitively set up for 11 November 1995." Official invitations were sent for the Opening Ceremony on that date. Unfortunately, becauseof lack of available qualified personnel, the elatecould not be met. It was during that time that a compromise was reached with the controllers to work the sectors with a single controller and rely heavily on ovenime in order to open the new ACC. This finally took place on 30 March 1996.

SYSTEM Listening to the controllers working the system, the conclusion is clear; while most controllers recognise that the

new system is generally better than the old one, certainly with radar coverage and data presentation using the new Sony 2000 colour screens, they all complain that the system is not flexible enough, and over specification has made the system too complex to operate. The system, for instance, only recognises IFR traffic and still has difficulty in accepting VFR traffic. It is also very inflexible as far as changes are concerned. As one Supervisor put it: "The system is excellent as long as the aircraft are flying along the routes filed in their flight plans. But as soon as bad weather hits the airpo1t, and aircraft start to hold or divert. the system simply cannot cope. and starts cancelling correlation. At these times you wish you could pack the flight plan processing system into boxes and send them back to the US." On the other hand, the radar tracking system is praised by the controllers and the supervisors are also very pleased with their new feature called CMD (Control and Monitoring displays) which allow them many possibilities, not only to monitor the various activities, but also to perform all kinds of reconfigurations. The presenceof a technical watch supervisor in the operations room, beside the operational supervisor, was also seen as a positive move, since the reaction to failures is faster and understanding by technicians of what controllers do, appears to be increasing. Generally. the system is judged too complex by the controllers with far too many functions. They think the philosophy was too ambitious with an over emphasis of trying to achieve automation in almost every aspect. In practice, this resulted in too many "possibilities" available. In reality, today ACC Controllers only use 20 to 25% of the system capability. while APP Controllers only use a mere 2 or 3 %. An example of this is the Flight Plan Processing Display (next to the Radar display). It is so complex to read that controllers only use it to check if the automatic OLID Coordinations are passedcon-ectly to the next Centre(s). Also, some 'vital' functions are missing, for instance, the system is still unable to present to the approach controller the departing sequence made by the Tower (now 25Km away). An "in-house" solution was found by placing a video camera above the departing strip bay at the ground control position in the Tower. The picture is sent, every 2 seconds, to a screen above the consoles of the APP Departure Controller at the Centre. From time to time, you can see a hand appearing in slow motion updating the strips on the screens...Not really high-tech, but very effective... ►►

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

---------------

NEW CONTROL CENTRE ______________

►► THE ENVIRONMENT

for the majority. it has But the biggest surprise decreased. or remained the when visiting the ACC is same. The decision to have definitively not to be found in the new Operations Room in a the system. It is the way the •!!9°":.._• bunker without windows is. humans are being treated. The on the other hand. widely Norwegian CM seems to have condemned by the controllers. understood that, although the Systemwise. I believe all of us technical aspects are fine, it is have something to learn from the humans that run the system the Norwegian experience. and if humans are given nice First of all. that new complex working environments they ACC systems are generally can perform better. It starts =-...lL.lw_ ______ __.__ delayed (Oslo was not the with a well lit, modern outside Bjarne NILSSEN. former Regional Vice President Europe West first one and will certainly not building with large windows ( 1978-/982) at the controls of the new console be the last to be delayed - in and co1Tidors,containing a very attractive canteen, offering very this case 4 years in total!). Secondly. if we give too much good breakfast and meals at subsidised prices. and a large freedom to non-operationally qualified people to write the number of hotel style rooms (with bathroom, TV. telephone and specifications and the requirements. we generally end up with bed sheets changed every morning) available for all controllers something far in excess of what controllers want. It is true that on night duty, visitors. and trainees. Some seven or eight large for the Oslo ATCC. the specification group consisted of both rooms are decorated with modern Scandinavian furniture. dry controllers and engineers. Nevertheless. it appears that even if flowers. plants, television sets. videos. library. etc. for the many good ideas emerged. even the controllers of that group relaxation of all staff. Even a small museum area. showing got carried away by the possibilities offered by the new former ATC equipment is there, due to be extended with old technology. Over fonctionality means over complexity, means equipment from Fornebu. longer training phases and more failure possibilities. The general engineering syndromes, "If it is available. let's have it". THE CONCLUSION. and "If it is possible, let's do it " when combined with today's Seen from the Norwegian controllers' point of view. the technology. often ends up in an unstable system with situation in the new ACC is better than in the old one. For a controllers finally only using less than half the system few, the distance to drive to the new location has increased. but capabilities. +

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GLOBAL NAVCOM ________________

GLOBAL NAVCOM '96

SINGAPORE

::I Chris Stock. EVP Technical

irst it was Seal\le. then Geneva and Montreal. and now this year Global Navcom was held in Singapore on 4-6 June. Also. the move into the Asia Pacific region signalled a change or emphasis for the symposium. Whilst the previous events had concentrated on the global implementation ofCNS/ATM. this year. Global Navcom turned its attention to regional implementation achievements and recognising the progress that has been made in the transition from the planning stage to the initial establishment of the CNS/ATM concept. The programme for Global Navcom 96 included keynote speeches from Dr Assael Kotaite. President of the ICAO Council. Pierre Jeanniot. Director General of IATA. Dr Choong Kong Cheong. Chairman SIA. Mr Liong Woon Wong. Director General CAAS. and Mr Richard Stirling Director General OAA. These were followed by a FANS I demonstration which was conducted jointly by Captain Wayne Aleshire (United Airlines) and Paul Radford (Airways Corporation NZ) who highlighted the various aspects from the pilot and controller viewpoints. The symposium programme then considered the progress of FANS within the Asia Pacific region. then other regions. and finally. two sessions devoted to the wider implications of CNS/ATM implementation. First Air Traffic Management. in which the IFATCA paper was presented and second. Building Blocks for Transition. In a programme which incorporated nearly 40 presentations. it is not possible to do justice 10 the conlenls in a short article however it is possible to identify the themes 1ha1 were most prominent. Many speakers identified safety as a major issue. indeed the IFATCA paper was dedicated to the subject. Pierre Jeanniot said that IA TA put safety first. where it must always remain and stated that IAT A have an objective to reduce the annual hull loss by 50% by the year 2004. Dr Kotaite emphasised that Air Traffic Management was the major key to

safety. regularity. erriciency and economy in international civil aviation. Other speakers made similar points about safety including Mr Geoff Burtenshaw (UK) who looked at certi rication issues from both the ground and airborne components in the CNS/ATM environment. The need for co-operation amongst all stakeholders is essential it" the full benefits of CNS/ATM are to be realised. Pierre .lcanniot put it succinctly by saying that the key is a partnership approach and that increased safety must be the universally stated aim. Although the emphasis or the symposium was focused 011 the Asia Pacific region. it was clear that the need for co-ordination and harmonization was fundamental to assure inter-operability of CNS/ATM systems in the global environment. For example. plans to introduce FANS routes between South East Asia and Europe must take into account the effect of increased traffic in other regions and to avoid moving choke points to other areas. Another important theme was the identification of realistic benefits continuing to be the catalyst for implementation. Training was recognised as a high priority issue to ensure successful implementation. Significantly, an issue which has 1101 been covered before is the cost of transition from the existing systems to FANS CNS/ATM.

Global Navcom 96 was a well organized and efficiently run symposium and all credit must be given the organisers. It continues to be one or the most important events in the aviation calendar because or its ability to chart the progress of CNS/ATM implementation. The change of emphasis from the global approach to concentration on regional progress is welcomed provided that the final objective of a global ATM system is not obscured. Also. as the CNS element is maturing and being introduced into operation. the focus of Global Navcom should be increasingly directed 10 th development of ATM particularly in view of the Free Flight concept which is commanding so much attention. It remains a disappointing feature of the Global Navcom series or symposia that there is a marked lack or operational personnel such as airline pilots and controllers whose presence would benefit the discussions by introducing the robust arguments of the workplace. Global Navcom 97 will be held al Cancun. Mexico in June 1997 and will concentrate on the Latin American and Caribbean regions. +

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THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

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________________

SAFETY

GLOBAL NAVCQM _______________

THE BARRIER TO PROGRESS? 0 Chris Stock, Executive Vice President Technical

Text of paper deliveredby Chris Stock to the Global Navcom audience in Singapore,on 6 June 1996 l\"TROIH C.TIO\"

he definition and implementation of the CNS/ ATM concept has created an infrastructure in which fundamental changes must be made about how the provision of Air Traffic Services are to be undertaken in the future. From what was a little known specialisation of aviation in the post war years. air traffic control has become a focal point of the air transport system in the expanded role of air traffic management. This metamorphosis has encouraged a plethora of experts. consultants, engineers and system planners to examine and dissect all aspects of the A TC system and propose numerous solutions to the real and perceived problems. Throughout these processes and whatever the motivations and objectives of all the parties involved. it is axiomatic that the bottom line must be the safety of the ATM system. The final FANS II report stated clearly that future systems must be as safe as or, if not, safer than the current ATC system. Other international organisations such as IA TA identify safety as their prime objective. IFATCA regards safety as our most important priority. So, if this the accepted position of all these organisations and of the individuals who work within them, why do we consider the possibility that safety represents a barrier to the implementation of CNS/ATM systems?

OBJECTIVE The aim of this paper is to give an overview of our concerns, as a front end user of the CNS/ATM system. about safety issues and suggest routes to avoid obstructions to progress.

PERCEPTIONS OF SAl<'ETY Listening to everyday conversations in the aviation world, it is not uncommon

to hear sweeping statements about various issues which reflect the prejudices and opinions of the individual. These attitudes may be extreme but when directed towards safety. they identify the underlying issue which is central to the problem and that is the differing perceptions of safety that are held by organisations and individuals. To avoid an obvious semantic trap. it is necessary to state clearly what element of safety I am talking about - It is ATM safety: not airworthiness; not maintenance; nor airline operations. All these are vitally important to the overall safety of the air transport system. but 1 am focusing on one aspect,- ATM safety. A commonly quoted statement about safety is a good example of the confusion that can exist when discussing it.

Although the world airline accident rate is very low, it has effectively reached a plateau. If the rate does not change, and the projected increases in air traffic occur as predicted, then early in the next century, the number of airline accidents will increase to a level which will completely unacceptable to the travelling public approximately one hull-loss every fortnight. ( Freeman and Si111111011,1990) We understand what is being said but it is not clear in this context whether it refers to mid-air collisions. technical failures or what. I have not read the full text which undoubtedly explains the author's logic and argument so I have quoted out of context and it makes a strong point if I so wish. I do, but not basedon that quote.

If we consider the development of the CNS/ ATM concept, it is clear that the priority was directed at the CNS segment which was to be planned and developed before the ATM element could be incorporated. CNS design and development was, and is, basically technology lead and that the approach to safety was rational and systematic and, arguably, not specifically concerned about the human factors input which is critically important for a dynamic and flexible ATM system. In the early days of the conceptual design and development of CNS, the front-end users were muted in their response to the safety issues through a lack o transparency. Now the CNS element is maturing and priority being transferred to A TM. the front encl users such as the pilots and controllers have become more vocal in their concerns about safety, much to the frustration of the system designers and planners. Some of this has arisen because the system designers introduce functions or system requirements that have no obvious part in an operational concept that the practitioners are aware of. By not embracing the practitioners, suspicions are raised. Why has this become an issue? Part of the answer lies in the perception of safety by pilots and controllers in contrast to that of the system designer and engineer. Safety is an every day fact of life for controllers, separating and sequencing traffic. in that the standards that they comply with are legal minima below which they cannot go. Otherwise they are answerable for a loss of separation incident or worse. The consequence of such a failing may be disciplinary action or retraining. This scenario induces a totally different culture to that of the objective approach of the engineer or designer. It is a far more subjective approach, based on operational experience and judgement, implementing these minima and it inculcates a rather more conservative approach to the application of safety standards. As a result of the existence of these differing viewpoints, even cultures, it is not difficult to identify the potential ►►

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

_________________ ►► for

a breakdown in communication between the involved parties - and ultimately. a loss of confidence in the system by the front-end users. These processesmay have started already in the high level international forums.

OTHERSAFETYISSUES If the differences in the perception of safety were the only issue then the problem could be addressedin relatively simple manner. However there are a number of issues complicating the situation that have to be considered and are likely to have a direct bearing on ATM safety. These can be summarised as follows: a. The global approach to safety: national responsibilities b. The privatisation/corporatisation of A TS providers c. Conduct of trials and evaluations d. Technology and automation e. Loss of pilot and controller confidence The Global Approach The reliance of CNS/ATM on satellite systems emphasises the global element; however, the responsibility for safety still remains with the national administrations. It is evident from our own experience that the application of safety standards and the means to regulate them vary considerably from country to country. Although ICAO has set in train a safety oversight programme, it will take some time for the results to permeate through the system and even then, it will only be applicable only to those States who wish to participate. Equally, whilst differences exist nationally this is also reflected on a regional basis. As efforts are made to implement CNS/ATM on a regional basis, it can be argued that the harmonisation of safety standards and regulation should be considered in a regional context. Therefore. if the procedures and the separation standards are to applied regionally then the controllers and pilots should have confidence in the knowledge that common safety standards are in place with expectation that regional harmonisation will ultimately be incorporated on a global basis. It should be recognised that differences in the national cultures and attitudes of the partners involved may slow down the

GLOBAL NAVCOM ________________

process of regional, and ultimately. global integration and harmonisation. Privatisation of A TS Providers The crises of the late 70's and 80's which brought about the disastrous fall in the fortunes of the airlines also introduced a new realism in the costing of the provisio1,1of ATS. The airline industry has demanded a more efficient and cost effective ATM system with a much more business oriented approach, the main objective of which is to reinvest the revenue from route and other related charges in the modernisation of the system. The response of some A TS Providers has been to corporatise or. even privatise their service. a concept

that is gaining ground in many parts of the world. Those national administrations that have allowed their ATS to follow the path of corporatisation will have observed a radical change in the culture of the ATS Provider organisation. The provision of ATS is very much more commercial and business-like in its dealings both externally and internally. One consequenceof these changes is that information about their business is now considered to be commercially confidential. which is understandable. but introduces a new factor when the subject of safety critical information is raised. The potential problem with this situation is that commercial ATS providers may be reluctant to release safety information which would be of benefit to the whole A TM community. on the grounds that it may affect their commercial reputation. That would be a retrograde step if it were to happen. For controllers, a further consequence of this privatisation process is that the controller is seen in the narrow context of being an operational tool whose only role is controlling, which has to be used

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

for optimum efficiency. In other words. the controllers are kept in the operational environment and their expertise is not being used in the planning. design. and safety processes. To counteract this loss of expertise. consultants are employed from outside who may have many qualifications but lack the operational experience of a specific control environment. The long term effect of this process is to divorce the operator from having a say in the development of the ATM system. Conduct of Trials In the transition to the full CNS/ATM system. there is a major and essential requirement that equipment, procedures and separation standards be verified. where necessary, tried out. evaluated. and finally validated. Part of these processescan be modelled and simulated but the final test must be in the live environment with operational pilots and controllers. Recent history has created an element of distrust in the manner in which such trials are conducted particularly, if the introduction of TCAS is examined. There has to be a transparency between all parties in order to reconcile differences. It cannot be acceptable that live trials be conducted with public transport, particularly those involving reduced separations, unless risk analyses and hazard assessments have been satisfactorily completed. The evolution of the Free Flight philosophy and its migration to an operationalprocessindicatesa requirement for a considerable number of trials in different parts of the world. Unless there is a defined and harmonised approach to the conduct of trials, the potential for a conflict between planners and operators remainsa distinct possibility. Additionally, all controllers and aircrew involved with the trial must be appropriately trained and the parameters for the trial must be clearly defined, with contingency procedures in place in the event of the untoward happening. Technology and Automation Automation is a valuable tool but it must enable or assist the controller to carry out his task, not reduce him to the situation of being just an add-on. Ideally, the role of automation should be to enhance controller performance which would bring consequential benefits of ►► page 22

________________

►► increased

safety. capacity. and efficiency. Of course. the downside is when the automation. for whatever reason. actually reduces hu111a11 perfor111ance. The continuing advances in the technological applications for ATlVI 011 the ground ancl on the rlighl deck have consequential effects 011the controller task ancl for the pilot/controller relationship. For example. the use of FMC information gives the pilot considerable flexibility by which he can vary his aircrart !light profile. However. the constraints of the present ATC system prevent this flexibility being used. As a result. the flight profile is input i 11lo the FMC to fol low the expected route. However. any tactical changes asked for by the controller inevitably cause difficulties for the crew because the FMC tries lo reco111posc what is lel'l of the profile. Sometimes the crew have to resort to basic skills to comply with ATC and take over from the FMC. The question posed by this example is. did anyone ask how the FMC should be designed to fit into the ATC systc111'? In the CNS/ATM system. a key concept is to integrate airborne systems with ground based systems.. Al the same time. it is a problem of system design and integration that the separate component parts may operate satisfactorily to high specification but when they all come together. a simple fault in one can bring the whole system down - in ways that nobody anticipated. The integration process. and in particular. the interfaces that are created. is a major safety issue that has to be addressed. One step to improve matters could be to expand the design team to take account of the ground based A TM element The introduction of auto111ationand other tools to assist the controller in his task has been covered by other speakers but the safety issue remains clearly to the forefront. The CNS/ A TM concept is human ccntrcd with automated tools to support the decision making responsibility of the controller. However. the possibility of syste111failure must be considered. Therefore, manual reversion techniques and procedures 111ustbe available to the controller with the appropriate safeguards in place so that the process can be achieved safely.

GLOBAL NAVCOM _______________

i111plementation taking place globally demand independent safety regulation. Equally necessary is that the responsibility for safety regulation should be totally divorced from the provision of ATS. It no longer re111ai11s an option for the ATS Provider to be a regulator at the same time. The corn111ercial elements of ATS are not necessarily compatible with safety requirements therefore an independent State authority must assume the role of Loss of Pilot/Controller Confidence safety regulator. The difference in the approaches to There are various ways of applying safety wc1\: cliscusscclpreviously and this safety regulation and it is not the i11tention has particular bearing on the safety issues 10 look in detail at the various methods. above because. ii' the differences However it is essential. whatever systems manifest themselves in these areas. then of safety regulation are adopted by states it would be surprising if there were not a in any particular region. that they are loss or confidence in the CNS/ATM harmonised because the effectiveness of system implementation process. The one system will interact with the others reaction to this scenario would be a and any weakness in one will impact breakdown in communication between throughout the region. The ultimate planners and operators which would objective is to achieve global hinder essential progress. particularly in harmonisation of safety regulation. sensitive areas such as reduction of The need for integrated safety separation standards. Controllers feel regulation is important for two that they own the system as much as any fundamental reasons. First: new other participant so ii" they are not technologies and operating systems can involved or are isolated. then the natural impact. as single integral systems. on all hu111a11 reaction is lo resist change. 11· aspects of the provision of ATM. such a reaction occurred and was not Second: failures in safety 111anage111e11t addressed with urgency then I believe and in human factors represent a high that the issue of ··Safety" would indeed proportion of the pri111ccausal factors in become a "Barrier to Progress". aviation accidents and incidents. Such I believe that this situation is already failures, and the associated chain of beginning lo occur in certain areas. events that lead to them. are rarely IFATCA believes it is not irrecoverable li111iteclto a single aspect of air transport. but. with renewed and fresh thinking With few notable exceptions. few about ATM safety. there are solutions al states regulate the safety of their A TM hand. What follows are the IFATCA services and where they do. such safety suggestions: we are open 111indedon the regulatory functions arc small in size. subject and certainly do not believe that limited in scope and at an early stage of we have a 111onopoly011the subject of development. The previously mentioned ATM safety. !CAO safety oversight progra111111e is a welcome step in the right direction. POSSIBLESOLUTIONS However. what proportion of its contents S<!{etyRegulation is directed at ATM safety? It is our The changing nature of the present belief that resources should be directed ATM system involves many facets towards establishing a robust and ranging from the status of the A TS independent safety regulation which Providers to the reduction of separation encompasses A TM equipment. standards. However. there is one procedures. and personnel. conswnt in the process and that is safety and the need to establish a com111on Safety Sta11dards baseline from which standards can be Sai"ety standards must be clearly applied. At the same ti111e. the defined at an international level ((CAO) application of safery standards 111ustbe and be adopted on a regional basis. That clear to all parties so that confidence is is already happening to the established created. standards. However the CN SI A TM The many diverse processes or concept challenges these existing ►►

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

_________________

GLOBAL NAVCOM ________________

► ► standards with the objective or increasing

ATM capacity and flexibility. Whilst undue delay caused by bureaucratic machinations is not acceptable. neither is it acceptable to force through changes with minimal data. little consideration of other operating environments. poor training and so on. Where possible. the process of establishing safety standards should be expedited but not at the expense of insufficient evaluation and validation. The involvement of all parties is an important requisite for the acceptance of any safety standard. The establishment of any safety standard is predicated on the successful cornpletion of verification. evaluation. and validation. The objective of these processes is 10 produce satisfactory data and results to support the proposed safety standard. As the development of safety standards is increasingly a global exercise. there is a corresponding requirement to define guidelines on the conduct of trials. and this is particularly relevant when discussing live trials. It is important that the front end users/operators involved in such trials are fully aware of the trial objectives. the safeguards that are in place. and contingency arrangernents for an unexpected failure. Equally. that appropriate training for pilots and controllers is undertaken and that the parameters for the trial are clearly established. For example: trials involving datalink may well encounter problerns of communication saturation. Therefore. it is of paramount irnponance that the personnel involved are fully aware of what is happening and that they arc well versed in manual reversion procedures. System Integration and Design Recent aircraft accidents have highlighted possible problems with pilots placing undue reliance on their automated systerns on the flight deck and the difficulty of reverting to their basic skills and understanding or an unusual situation. Although the degree or automation provided for controllers is not al a similar level. automated tools 10 assist the controller in his task are being developed. The FANS philosophy clearly states that the responsibility for separation remains with the ground-based organisation and that the hurnan remains in command within the control loop. Therefore, at the forefront of the system designers· planning should be the integration of the

111ajoroutage on the satellite system which affects large areas of the world'.1 Whilst the answer may not be forthcoming i111mecliatelyfor a variety of reasons. including ..it will never happen... the front encl user would draw some confidence from the knowledge that the problem was being addressee! and that acceptable contingency procedures were in place before the terrestrial aids were withdrawn. human with both the ground-based and air-based systems. Failure to resolve the interface and integration problems of these systems will be a safety critical issue. As a complete unclerstanclingof the complex control process would seern to be a prerequisite for a system designer. it would appear logical lo incorporate the various disciplines within that design team. System designers who aim lo harmonise the human and machine elements of the system really must consider the human as a system component. and 1101 as an ..add on ... As one set of researchers into the nature of high reliability organisations observed: "The controllers don't just watch the technology. they are the technology." I r the controller and pi lot are to be able to detect the errors that will occur in the machine. because of software bugs. or encountering operating conditions or silllations that were not considered in the engineering design. then it is necessary for the comroller or pilot to unclerstanclwhat is going 011 to be able to take recovery action.

Restoration of Confidence The potemial loss of confidence in the system by pilots and controllers can be arrested by the involvement with the safety processes and the implementation of transparent safety procedures such as a robust safety regulation regime. At the same ti rne. confidence is based on trust which is supported by the integrity and reliability of the systems in use. The nature of the human in the system is to ask the ..what if"' questions and expect answers. As system failures often occur in the unexpected or not foreseen category. so the ··what if questions .. follow a similar pallern and seek logical answers. For example: as the CNS/A TM systems move inexorably to 'satellite navigation and communication. sole means' status and the separation standards reduce accordingly. what ir there is a

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

CO:'IICLUSIONS Challenges lo S((/ety The conjunction or the factors discussed here require all or the air transport industry stakeholders to examine. seriously and funclamenwlly. their understanding of what safety means in ATM. Safety is naturally emotive. and IFATCA brings the issue to this forum reluctantly. however with the belief that the equilibriu111 that has thus far been maintained. safety in ATM is seriously threatened unless we all address three questions: a. What does safety mean in the A TM systern wday') b. How will the future CNS/ATM clevclopmcnls impinge on safely') c. What can be clone to preserve or enhance the levels of safety the travelling public expect. and which they have entrusted the industry 10 maintain? The very nature of the A TM system is changing. This. in part. stems from the new institutional arrangements that exist in the provision of A TS services: in pan. by the competitive environment the aircraft operator now operates under: and. in part. the potential or emergent technologies. It is prudcnl therefore to ask if safety itself has changed as a result. and if the answer is "yes" then the industry rnust understand the nature or these changes. realign itself to what is required to make good the avowed intent of all stakeholders to maimain system safety. The Future A TM System The resolution of the sarety issues will have a bearing on the ruture ATM system and optimistically. there is light at the end of the tunnel. However when asked to describe my personal vision of the future ATC system. I am hard pressed to come up with a definitive statement. sirnply ►► page ]2

NEWS __________________

[UROPEAN U~IO:\ PROGR..\:\L\IE

(Ellt

SET CPA S.HETY O\'ERSIGHT

Following Ihe Crash or a Boeing 757 in Ihe Dominican Republic last February. in which nearly 200 German tourists died. and 10 follow whal the FAA in Ihe USA is currently doing. the EU wants to start a programme to check Ihc safety standardsor all airlines serving the EU Sta1es.They would like 10 make sure Ihe aircraft. whether regisIered in the EU or not and whether sub-chartered or not. as long as carrying passengersto or from the EU States. have the same maintenance and safety sIandards 10 those aircraft registered in the EU. However. this scheme will be diflicuh to put in place as it directly conllicts with the EU Statesown National Certilkation Authorities.

ASSOCIATI0:--1 OF EUWPEAI\ .\TC AG...\I:\

AIRLl:\ES L..\EA) BL\i\lE

In 1heir last yearbook 96. once again 1he AEA is blaming ATC for the delays their Airlines encounter. They say that 18.3 'le of its member airlines llight departures were delayed more than 15 minutes. during the lirst 3 months or 1996. This compares with 14.0 % for the same period in 1995. They bhlme the delays in general and the increase in particular. on "airport and air traflic related reasons.." Our friends the pilots are no belier treated. Commenting on the recent Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) proposed rules for flight crews rest and duty times. the AEA condemned.. a concerted campaign by crew unions to sIeer the debate away from its objective or harmonising differing national rules. and instead achieve improvemems in working conditions by claiming that safety would be jeop,irdised if additional limitations were not incorporated ...

rT,\LY BECO;\IES \IE.\IBER OF EUWCO:\TROL lialy became the 21st Member or Eurocontrol on April I. 1996. It took over 3 years for the halian Parliament to ratify the decision to join. taken in 1993. Croatia. Spain. Romania and the Slovak Republic arc expected to become Member Statessoon.

EUROPEA:'JTIUFFIC STILL RISI!\(; Air traflic rose by an average or 8 'le in the lirst 3 months or 1996 compared to I 995. Some Stateseven saw a much greater increase. ( + 16 '7r for Austria.+ 15 '7cin Greece ..) causing the Cemral Flow Management Unit (CFMU) system to impose even more restrictions. Currently. it is not uncommon to haw over 100 different restrictions being enforced in a single day by the CFMU.

GER.\1.\1\Y Dusseldorr Airpon·s Main Terminal was destroyed by fire on 11 April. and unfortunately. several people lost their lives. The ATC Tower was also affected by Ihe toxic fumes and had to be evacuated for some days (luckily. no controller was injured). The toxic fumes remained in 1hemain building and it is now feared that it will take 2 to 3 years to restore complete facilities. In the meamime tents are being used. later to be replaced by two light weight construction hangars of I 0.000 sq.111 each. During Ihc fire and in the days after the fire. Cologne airport (only 50 Km away). was the maio alternate airport where hundreds or aircraft suddenly poured in wi1hout much notice. The second runway was used as parking. and the controllers should be praised for their work during these difficuh days.

Updating

ATIS-VOLMET?

FRA'.\JCE The French govcrnmcm has chosen a site for the possible Ihird Paris Airport. The proposed location is 80km South west of Paris. aI Santcuil. near Chartre. Ahhough no final decision has been made as to whether the airport will be needed. the government will be buying the required land.

,\BL' DHABI

CRIMP has the solution to remove the heavy work load: Fully Automated ATISNOLMET Eliminates all recording tasks

The Abu Dhabi Department or Civil Aviation is planning an expansion programme for Al Ain International Airport worth USS I 00 million. When completed. the expansion will increase the present capacity threefold.

HONG KO'.'lG The government of China and the United Kingdom have reached agreement for a second runway to be built at the new Hong Kong Airport or Chck Lap Kok. The new runway will give the airport the capacity to handle 6 I million passengersa year. Ii is expected that the runway will become operational a few months af1er the scheduled opening of the airport in April 1998.

SI~GAPORE Singapore has commenced a land reclamation programme with the intention of building a third runway at Changi Airport. The airport intends to build a third terminal early next century to meet a passenger demand or 64 million per ye,1r. The third runway is currently predicted for the year 2020.

EGYPT After having taken an important pan in the modernisation or the Egyptian ATC systems. Sofreavia is presently proceeding to the comple1e renovation and modernisation of Cairo International Control Tower. The 1ask will include the replacement and re-equipment of Ihe tower cab on top of the existing 200 foot tower shaft. Additionally. Sofreavia is currently implementing in Egypt its Integrated Aeronautical Information System (ATALIS) which will connect all the major Egyptian aiqiorts to the central AIS. located in Cairo.

•

Consistent speed and quality secure clear broadcasts to pilots

•

Long experience and many operational systems worldwide ensure the functionality required by the users

•

Commercial Off The Shelf product

CRIMP

CRIMPNS Solvang 30, Liller0d DK-3450 Aller0d tel.: +45 48 100 500 fax: +45 48 1oo550

Selected for Hong Kong New Airport at Chek Lap Kok

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC Secretariat Use Only

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Reg. No. ___

March 17-21, 1997 TAIPEI

REGISTRATION FORM *Please use block letters or print to complete this form.

PARTICIPANT Fainily Nan1e:.................................................................

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AFTN: .........................................................................

. Fax: .............................................................................

Preferred Name on Name Badge: ..........................................................................................................................

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FUNCTION AT CONFERENCE

r: D

Directors

D Deputy Directors

0 Officer of IFATCA D Corporate Member D Delegate Member

Full Members of Member Associations Must Register as One of the Above.

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An Observer/Speaker is a person attending conference by invitation or approval of the Executive Board.

ACCOMPANYING PERSON Family Name:................................................................

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(US$ 70) (US$ 70)

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(US$ 80) (US$ 80)

(US$ 80) (US$ 120) SUB TOTAL (A): US$ .........................................................................................................................................

ACCOMPANYING PERSONS' PROGRAMME TOUR

DATE

FEE (ADULT/CHILD':')

AMOUNT

D AP-1 Window on China

Mar. 18

US$ 30/15

........................

□ AP-2 Taipei City Tour

Mar 19.

free

........................

D AP-3 Hualien Taroko Gorge Tour

Mar. 20

US$ 80/40

················"······

'''Children 1111der12 years old may have 50% discount to participate in the Accompanying

Persons· programme

SUB-TOTAL (B): US$ .........................................................................................................................................

GRAND TOTAL (A+B)=US$ ..............................................................................................................................

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THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC

Secretariat Use Only

CONTROLLERS' ASSOCIATION 36TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE & EXHIBITION

Reg. No. ___

March 17-21, 1997 TAIPEI

HOTEL RESERVATION FORM '''Please use block letters or print to complete this form.

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HOTELS I. ASIA WORLD PLAZA HOTEL TAIPEI

(US$ 110/ per night/single or twin)

2. MAGNOLIA HOTEL

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3. LEO FOO HOTEL

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* Please indicate hotel preferences (hotel numbers only): __ _ ''' Room Type: D Single D Twin - Sharing with ________________ * Flight details: Check In

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PLEASE NOTE: I. All the prices are inclusive of 5% VAT government tax and 10% service charge. Breakfast is not included. 2. Shuttle buses are arranged for all participants from and to the hotels and conference & exhibition venue Taipei International Convention Centre. It is 15 - 20 minutes by car to reach the destination. 3. In the event of no show, you will be subject to one night's room charge. 4. The above special rates will not be guaranteed after February l, 1997. 5. In case of hotel cancellation, written notification should be sent directly to the Secretariat. Until February I, 1997, the deposit for one night's room charge will be refunded. There will be no refund hereafter.

Please return this form to the Conference Secretariat by fax. Thank you for you co-operation. Conference Secretariat: GENERAL INNOVATION SERVICE (GIS) 6F I., 400, Sec. l, Kee Lung Rd., Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. Tel: +886-2-722-1227 Fax: +886-2-723-4187

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

_______________

IFATCA '97 ______________

IFATCA'97 ADVANCECONFERENCEINFORMATION CO'.'IFERE'.'ICE \'Et\UE Taipei InternationalConventionCenter(TICC) I. Hsin Yi RoadSec.5, Taipei, Taiwan.R.O.C. Tel: +886-2-723-2535

REGISTR.\TIOI\' FEES FUNCTION AT CONFERENCE Officer of IFATCA

I. ·written notification received before RATESUS$ 80

OFFICI.\L L\\Gl'AGE English

.::DC-'i:..::rec.::.c:..::to""rs'-----------___]Q_ DeputyDirectors 70 Dele0 ate Member 80 CorporateMember 80 120 Observer AccompanyingPerson 80 Full membersof MemberAssociationsmust registerasoneof above. An observeris a personattendingthe conference by invitation or approvalof the ExecutiveBoard.

l\\'ITATIO'.'i LETl'ERS An official invitation letler from the conference organizing committee will be provided upon request. This invitation does not imply commitment 10 the payment of any expenses. Requests should be sent to the conference secretariat.

THE REGISTR.\TIO!'i FEE INCl.l'DES: • Allendanceof conferencemeetings • Openingceremony& welcomereception • Lunchesanddinners • Coffee breaks • Transportationto andfrom the airportto thehotel

E:\IIIBITION A commercial exhibition will be held in conjunctionwith the conferenceat the conference site, Taipei International Convention Center (TICC). Interestedfirms areadvisedto contactthe conference secretariat for booth reservation as early as possible.

:\CCO'.\IPA'ffl.\G PERSON'S REGISTIUTI0:--1 FEE INCLLDES: • Openingceremony& welcomereception • Lunchesanddinners • Transportation to and from the airport to the hotel • Taipei City Tour

OFFICIAL CARRIERS China Airlines. Eva Air and Mandarin are the conferenceofficial carriers. Pleasecontact your MemberAssociationor the ConferenceSecretariat (GIS) to obtain authorisationforms for the ID75 discountand visa applicationinformation.Please

.\PPLIC.\TIO\/ Those who wish to attend the conferenceshould fill out the registrationform and return it with full paymentto the secretariat.

CO\'FERE'.'\CE DATE March 17-21.1997 CONFERE1\CE SECRET.-\RI.\T GeneralInnovationService(GIS) 6F, 400, Kee Lung RoadSec. I, Taipei,Taiwan, R.O.C. Tel: +886-2-722-1227 Fax:+886-2-723-4187

note that, to qualify for the discounts and obtain visas, the completedforms need to be returnedto the GIS Secretariatno later than 60 dayspriorto conference. IIEADQL'ARTERSHOTEL AsiaworldPlazaHotel.Taipei 100. Tun Hwa North Road, Taipei, Taiwan. R.O.C. Tel: +886-2-715-0077 Fax: +886-2-713-4148 A sufficient numberof roomshavebeenreserved at Asiaworld PlazaHotel Taipei - the conference headquartershotel. A special rate will be offered to conferenceparticipantswho reservethroughthe secretariatby Feb. I. I 997.

'.\IETHOU OF I'.\ DIE7'T PaymenL of registrationandother feescan be paid by credit cards. Acceptablecredit cards include Visa. MasterCard and AmericanExpress.

Februaryl, 1997:50%refund 2. Writtennotificationreceivedafter February 2, 1997:no refund HOTEL .\CCmI'.\IODA TION Reservationsshould be made by completing and returning the application form. indicating the name of the hotel and the number of rooms desiredto the secretariatno later than FebruaryI. 1997. Special rates will not be guaranteedafter February I. I 997. No reservation will be confirmed in the absence of a deposit. Hotel assignmentwill be made on a first-come. firstservedbasis.

HOTELS ROOM RATES (Singleor Twin) Asiaworld PlazaHotelTaipei I 10US$ Magnolia Hotel 90 US$ LeeFoo Hotel 70 US$ • All the pricesare inclusiveof 5% VAT governmellltax and I 0% servicecharge. • Roomratesdo not includebreakfast. • In the event of no show. you will be subject to onenight'sroom charge. • In caseof hotel cancellation.written notification should be sent directly to the secretariat.Until February I. I 997. the deposit for one night's room chargewill be refunded.There will be no refundthereafter. .\PPLICHI0:--1 .\\/D CONFIR'.\IATIO.'i For hotel reservation's.pleasecompletethe hotel reservation form and return it with one night's depositto the secretariatno later than FebruaryI. I997.The reservationwill be valid uponreceiptof a confirmationletter from the hotel.

CO\FIR'.\l:\ TJ()'.'i Application for registration will only become valid upon receipt of a confirmation letter from the conferencesecretariat:

'.\IETIIOD or P,\ ntE:\T Depositcan be paid by credit cards. Acceptablecredit cardsinclude Visa. MasterCard and AmericanExpress.

C:\.'iCELL\TIO!\ Cancellationsshould be made in writing to the secretariat.The amountof refund will dependon the dateof cancellation,as follows:

E\CII \(\(;E R.\TE As at mid-1996, the referenceexchangerate is: New Taiwan Dollar (NTD): United StatesDollar (USO) =27:1)

It pays to advertisein The Controlleris read by over 60,000 Controllers& AviationRelatedPersonnel in 170 countriesall over the world. THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

----------

AGENDA

ATC VALIDATION ________

IN SEARCH OFA HARMO

SEPTEMBER 30 - 18 Oct Airspace & Air Route Planning & Design Workshop, Singapore Aviation Academy. Contact - Carol New Phone +65 540 6216 Fax +65 542 9890

OCTOBER 15 - 17 Inter Airport Atlanta Georgia International Convention Center, Contact - Mack Brooks Exhibitions Ltd Phone +44 1707275641 Fax +44 1707 275544

16 - 17 IFATCA ATC Symposium. Panama,Contact - EVP Americas. Samuel Lampkin Phone + I 809 66S 3817 Fax +I 809 665 3817 18 - 21 lFATCA Executive Board Meeting, Panama,Contact Executive Secretary,Edge Green. Phone +44 l635 247890 Fax +44 1635 247891

NOVEMBER 2 - 3 Asia Pacific Regional Meeting Brisbane, Australia Contact - Suzie Dunn Phone +61 3 9348 1899 Fax +6 l 3 9348 1846 3 - 6 9th Civil Air Australia Biennial Convention Brisbane. Australia Contact - Suzie Dunn Phone +61 3 9348 1899 Fax +61 3 9348 1846

9 - 10European Regional Meeting Vienna, Austria, Contact Organising Committee Phone +43 I 79798 2012 Fax +43 I 79798 2006 22 - 23 Americas Regional Meeting, Guyana, Contact - EVP Americas Phone + I 809 665 3817 Fax +l 809 664 3817

TBN Africa Middle East Regional Meeting, Dakar. Contact - EVP Africa Middle East, Oliver Farirayi. Phone +263 4 575187 Fax +263 4 575163

JANUARY 1997

29 - 30 IFATCA Symposium Harare, Contact - EVP Africa Middle East, Oliver Farirayi Phone +263 4 575187 Fax +263 4 575163

0 Patrick Schell an A TC procedureor syste111 to be declared safe for operational use". This process focuses on the provision of el'idence. Validation must bt! carried out to an appropriate standard. consistent with best practice.This consistencycan be achievedby conducting validation using a pre-defined validationmethodology. Before embarkingon the definition of a How valid is valid') It all staned when harmonised validation methodology. the the ECAC/APATSI Steering-Groupon New study group set about gaining knowledgeof Procedures and Control Techniques was current validation practice. A survey was tasked with the production of new launched within ECAC Member Statesbut operational procedures meant to enhance also included Australia. Canada. New capacity at European airports. explains Zealand and the USA. Francis Schubert. Chairman of the above The results showed that. whilst most steeringgroup during his introduction at the States undenake validation, they do not in workshop. In the courseof their work. the general follow a documented validation membersof the Steering-Grouprepeatedly methodology. The researchersalso found faced the questionof the validation of ATC liule evidence of docu111cnting the validation procedures. It rapidly appeared that the programme in advance. using a detailedand validation issue was a key factor in the auditable validation plan. This is particularly development of new procedures. and the case for ATC procedure validation. probably in the very successof the APATSI Other findings were that. although programmeitself. The absenceof a common safety is accordedthe highestpriority. there harmonisedvalidation methodology was at is interest in considering improved. 111ore the origin of the decision to undenake the structured methods for safety management ECAC/APATSI study on the validation of including attempts to quantify the risks ATC proceduresand systems. associated with the procedure or system.in A mandate was given to Praxis pie. a order to make safety 111ore 111easurable and British consulting company. to study the demonstrable. issuesof validation. The product is a repon Also. ATC Procedure validaIion is in which becamethe basic document for the Geneva Workshop. Prior to this. the latter many States frequently carried out as an was circulated a111ong the ECAC Member informal process.conductedon a case-bycasebasiswith the effon scaledaccordingto Statesand updatedaccordingly. size. novelty and scope of the particula1 The objective of the workshop was to creaIe the opportunity to ask questionsand procedure.The outcome is often basedon a give feedbackon !he proposedmethodand its consensusof experts. sometimessupported or trials data. The implementationstrategy.Group discussions by modelling. si111ulation were held to exploreparticularaspectsof the use of prototyping and si111ulationduring ATC procedure validation is seen as 111ethodologysuch as validation criteria. impor1ant. safety and management aspecIs. The A range of attitudesexists with respect Workshop was attended by 58 delegates to proceduresdeveloped by ICAO. Some representing 17 States and international States adopted ICAO procedures without organisations such as EUROCONTROL. IATA. ACI andAECMA. further validation whilst others re-validated In order to understandthe relationship the procedure fully. In some States. of the Validation Methodology to other procedures are adopted only if ICAO has developedthem. initiatives. invited speakers gave presentations on the EATCHIP safety There is a well recognised need to domain, and the EC-sponsored ASCIVAL. include controllers and other usersearly in GENOVA. and VAPORETO projects. the validation process. This is to ensure acceptability of the procedureand to assist Defining validation was one of the first tasks the study group had to accomplish.It in identifying appropriate validation wasformulatedas " the processwhich enables techniques.

Reportfrom the ECAC/APATSI Workshop011 ATC Validationwhich washeld in Geneva,Switzerland, from 15-17April 1996.The Workshop wasorganisedby the ECACAii71orts Bureauand Praxisplc 011 behalfof the APATSIProjectBoard.

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

_________

ATC VALIDATION---------

AGENDA

:EDVALIDATION METHOD 1997

,ntributing Editor :\C.-1'1\'ITIES

l>C>Cl1;\1Ei\TATION"

\'al1d;1111mT,1..1..

().:-..\·nptmn ..

The validation case su111marises the results of the validation and provides a reco111mendation on whether the item being validated meets its requirements and will be safe for operational use. In order to produce the validation case. it is necessaryto identify the purpose of the validation. plan the detailed validation activities and collect evidence of these validation activities to justify the recommendations made.

Whilst the proposed methodology incorporates a full suite of validation \',dii.l,1ti1•11 E\ id\'lt."I.' .mLI R\•..1111 .. documentation. it must be stressed that this does not 111ean that a large volume of new material will always need to be written.In bringing the evidence together in the validation case. the results and findings can often be provided by reference to the validation activity reports and other existing Apptt1\,: lh,• \',1liJ,1tiPn C.1•1• documentation. It will also include the additional activity that demonstrates fitness This diagram illustrates the.proposed validation for operational use including compatibility methodology showing all the potential validation activities and the associated documentation. with the existing infrastructure. environmental acceptability and commercial viability. The above findings are just a few ATC Procedures are defined as the examples of the outcome of the survey. operational processes used by air traffic Generally the study provided valuable controllers to carry out their task. Similarly. insight into current validation practice. It ATC Systems are defined as the equipment. revealed that validation is regarded as an including hardware and software. which i111porlant subject with safety given the highest priority. The need for validation is directly supports the air traffic controllers and the A TC procedures they use. widely accepted. However it also conl1nned Validation is critical to the successful that there are a nu111beror shorteo111ingsin introduction or every operational ATC the (current) approach taken to validation: procedure and system and must ensure ''' There is a wide variety of techniques safety requirements and standards have been tnd processesused and these are 1101always achieved. However. validation will assess applied consistent!y. ''' Despite apparently thorough other aspects such as functional capability and performance. in assessing fitness for validation being undertaken. the results are not always well documented. operational use. ''' Whilst a high priority is accorded to It is essential that validation work is safety there is a general lack of visibility of carried out in such a manner that complete safety assurance. often ste111111ing fro111a confidence can be placed in the final results lack of formal safety record keeping. and conclusions that can he combined. for ''' It is difficult for one State to gain the example the validation requirements. required eonlidence in the validation results validation plan and task description could all prepared by another. be combined into a single report. It is anticipated that these shortcomings The report from which the above will be overco111eby the introduction of a diagram is taken describes each step in harmonised validation methodology.The detail. The same document also contains an har111onised validation methodology is example or the application to an ATC outlined in the diagram above. Each activity procedure. provides docu111entation of its output as To conclude. the Workshop shown. The principal documentation fro111 sanctioned a validation methodology. It the validation process is the validation case. ►► page 32

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

31 - 3 Feb IFATCA Executive Board Meeting, Harare. Contact - Executive Secretary, Edge Green Phone +44 1635 24 7890 Fax +44 1635 247891

FEBRUARY

25 - 27 ATC'97 Maastricht, The Netherlands, Contact Donna Bushell. Miller Freeman Phone +44 181 302 8585 Fax +44 181 302 7205

MARCH

14 - 15 IFATCA Executive Board Meeting, Taipei, Taiwan, Contact Executive Secretary, Edge Green. Phone +44 1635 247890 Fax +44 1635 247891 17 - 21 36th IFATCA Conference, Taipei. Taiwan. Contact - Conference Secretariat GIS. Phone +886 2 722 1227 Fax +866 2 723 4187 22 IFATCA Executive Board Meeting, Taipei. Taiwan, Contact Executive Secretary, Edge Green. Phone +44 1635 247890 Fax +44 1635 247891

APRIL

23 - 25 Inter Airport Singapore, Contact - Mack Brooks Exhibitions Ltd Phone +44 1707 175641 Fax +44 1707 275544

AUGUST

27 - 29 International Aviation Safety Conference, Rotterdam. The Netherlands, Contact Mr Hans M Soekkha Phone + 3 I 182 572046 Fax +31 182 572046

SEPTEMBER

23 - 26 Inter Airport Frankfurt Contact - Mack Brooks Exhibitions Ltd Phone +44 1707 27564 I Fax +44 1707 275544

DECEMBER 10 - 11 ATC'97 Asia Pacific, Bali, Indonesia. Contact - Donna Bushell, Miller Freeman, Phone +44 181 302 8585 Fax +44 18 I 302 7205

-------------~~OLUMN

NEW MANAGEMENTTITLES You will have noticed that almost everywhere the old "Director of Personnel" has been replaced by a new "Director of Human Resources". They probably all had the same course in innovative management techniques. So we are no longer "Personnel" but "Resources". Nice to know, but as, generally, it is the same guy who was Director of Personnel who moved to Human Resources, it is much the same. I wonder if they are all the Directors' titles in the future ... Here are 0ooino .:, to chancre • 0 a few examples of what they could become: Director Maintenance: Director Potential Failures. Director Finances: Director Trivial Matters Secretary: Manager Paper Resources Director General: Our Inspired Leader Controller: Separation Assurance Manager... The phraseology has also changed. You do not fire people any longer, you tell them, "We are sorry to let you go .. ", inducing the idea that you are now •'free" to do what you secretly wanted all along - nothing... You might even be persuaded to think the managementare, after all, doing you a favour, and it is not uncommon to have the poor person being fired leaving the office saying. "Thank you..".

ENGLISHIN AVIATION English is supposed to be the international language in aviation because it is simple and unequivocal, although ICAO is more prudent and talks about an "International Aviation Language based on the English Language, to be used until such a time when something better can be found". 1 wish them a lot of luck, but, in the meantime, a Tower controller with a runway 02/20 to manage can be confronted with the following: Controller: Cleared Runway 02.... Pilot 1,just landing: Runway 2 about to be Cleared... Pilot 2, waiting to take off: Are we Cleared to enter two? Controller: ls two cleared? Pilot 3, waiting to cross runway: Are we cleared to cross too? Pilot l: Two is cleared. Pilot 4, waiting for clearance: Cleared to where? Pilot 2: Who is cleared? You can make the exchange even more interesting if the call sion of one aircraft is NP2 and of another MGA02. 0 P.S. - Do not write to me explaining that the term " Runway vacated" should be used as per ICAO, not all pilots use it in practice ...". Both Boeing and Airbus claimed high and loud that their "double-triplicate " systems in their aircraft will never allow total failures, and used these arguments to push ETO'.S operations. This was supported by the fact that hundreds of thousands of flights had made it across the oceans on twin engines, without too many problems so far. However, on 28 May 1996, a Boeing 767-300 of Dutch charter airline, Martinair, en route from Amsterdam to Orlando, made an emergency landing in Boston. They had lost all electrical power and found themselves without computers, instruments, flaps, spoilers, anti-skid, engine reverses, etc..(all these are electrically operated). The 767 actually touched down at 195 Kts (45Kts more than normal) and all main tyres exploded due to heavy braking by the crew to keep the aircraft

_____________

from overrunning the runway. The Captain ( he won my respect) had to follow headings given by ATC on a small simple magnetic compass and could not switch off the engines which remained on "Flight Idle" while on the ground..etc..etc.. Boeing is reported to have said they could not understand what happened. The 767 has 3 main electric generators ( I per engine and the APU ); each one able to give sufficient power if the other two fail. Then, the aircraft has a hydraulic driven generatoras stand by; if that fails too, they have a ram-air turbine that can be extended, and batteries on board to last 30 minutes.. (but those are not much use in the middle of the Atlantic!). Why all this apparently failed is cu1Tentlybeing investigated. Why I am telling you all this is because, in ATC, we often hear the engineers claiming "This will never happen". But deep inside ourselves we know that one day it might. It is nice to hear that Boeing retained 3 old mechanical instruments in the 767/757 series.. A magnetic compass, a speed indicator and an altimeter. This is exactly what the crew of the 767 used to bring the aircraft safely down to the ground. I wonder what redundancy equipment we will be able to keep in our new ATC wonder-machinesin the very near future?

CONFUSIONAT THE TOP: While ICAO FANS is gaining worldwide acceptance and satellite based navigation is poised to help increase capacity and reduce costs over the next 25 years, by decommissioning expensive navigation ground aids, China seems to be going the other way. They have just ordered over 750 millions US$ worth O f oround navioation aids, in order to, I quote, "reduce o o separation standards between aircraft and increase traffic volume..." Do the Chinese know something we don't?

HISTORICALFACT:PRIVATISATION EQUALSMORE DISCIPLINE! The Romans, 2000 years ago knew the real benefits of privatisation . They claimed that the first benefit will be, "discipline" of the workforce, as this photograph of a Roman mosaic, taken from the Bardo Museum in Tunis (photo taken durino the last IFATCA Conference) .. So now we know the 0 . real reasons behind this wave of privatisation of ATC .. It has its roots in history ... The top managers in New Zealand and Germany ( the 2 first ones to apply the concept) had a degree in Roman history and wanted to apply it to modem times...

THE CONTROLLER/SEPTEMBER 1996

-------------~tOLUMN

____________

OVERHEARDON THE FREQUENCY This time taken from our Dutch controller magazine "De Guildebrief" Controller: British 423 Radio Check ?.. Pilot : 2000 feet per minute, British 423 ... Controller: British 423 I mean radio check .... Pilot: Say again, please? ..... Controller: A radio check, please ! ... Pilot: Oh ! I see - Well, obviously not very good

,'t,J

"Th

HHII ,,~ ••• n

~ W"""'.

TCA$ Hltft,-0 11,oiii,,9 ullo,,,

-~---~;·-~

GULFSTREAMPREPARESFOR FREEFLIGHT; In a recent advertisement campaign, Gulfstream makes sure its aircraft are able to bank 45 degrees at Mach .80 at 51,000 feet... ( see full text in advertisement). This is, very probably in order to react to on board anti-collision systems that wi II be used for the Free FIight concept.. You know how Americans love roller coasters ..but I wonder how the other passengers will like it... Maybe they will all raise their arms and all shout: " Whoowwww !!! ! ..." when the aircraft suddenly follows a TCAS Resolution Advisory ... And, as the Gulfstream advert says: "And that's just the beginning!"

1·· i7

"-"7' 11 lff\\ ;\, '1

I. ->. ;,1. . •

LETTERSTo THE EDITORARE ENCOURAGED AND APPRECIATED

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► /)(/~/'7 Ill \/ \ \ I H /IIR\

system cannot. Thererore. when a new A TC system or Ihe magni1udeof CNS/ ATM is to be in1roduced. great care should be taken 10 ensure that all componellls of the system are as ready as can be. In CNS/ATM the technical side appears lo be usable today. although not all components arc optimal yet. but the procedural and human side definitely requires more lime 10 accommodate the changes. To emphasise the importance of this side. the industry should perhaps consider ihe adoption of a slight. but subtle. name change for the system as was first suggestedduring the ICAO Special EUR RAN meeting in September. 1994: the ATM/CNS system. thus. for us at kast. pulling first things first. It is significant to note that the ICAO Air Navigation Commission in June 1995 adopted a comprehensive A TM program with the aim to define standards for ATM requirements. The first results of this program arc expected in 1999 which means that ICAO itself has realised that more time is necessary for a balanced implementation of both sides of the slash. A f'urther noteworthy

ract is that Ihe

original ambitious implementation schedule for the Pacific has had 10 be severely readjusted. not the least !'or some of the reasons mentioned here. The participating countries were successful in introducing llex

concepts within CNS/A TM paran'.eters. As we are unable to take the 'clean piece or paper' method and have 10 adopt an evolutionary approach. objectives arc blurred and compromised by operational experience which is not necessarily a bad thing - thus it becomes very dirricult to encapsulate the vision in detail. However. it is possible to take a qualitative approach and describe how IFATCA visualises the requirements of a successful future ATM system in macro terms and that is a safe and co-operative system. The rrend towards making the controller (or the role of the human) an addon 10 the control process must be reversed. The controller. as a stakeholder. must own the syste111. O1herwise. the natural reaction is 10 resist change. Automation is an accepted ele111e111of the future ATM sys1e111. and its true role is the enhancement of human performance. The crucial and central role of the controller in the ATM system is. in the final analysis. to ensure adequate levels of safety and this can be achieved by the hu111aninstilling nexibi lily and rcsiliell(;e which raises the level of error

we control air traffic are progressive developments in the evolution of the air transport industry. To realise them however will require co-operation. Co-operation in the form of consultation with the encl users who have the operational knowledge with which to turn the capabilities of technology into a service. co-operation with other system users to make it happen. and realise their goals. and co-operation with the system itsell'. at the level or the workstation on the ground and in the cockpit. for it is only by mutual cooperation with the systems and tools that will support ATM conrrol activities that a control service can be provided. with safety. and efficiency. and provide the experience to grow in the future. Given that level of appropriate support and user friendly tools. con1rollers welcome the challenge of the future CNS/ATM system. Controllers. once the have the confidence and trust in the system, are flexible and adaptive to change. Consequently they will make the A TM system work.

► /lllt:l'

:9 ATC \' \/II!. 1//11\

tolerance. The alternative or a highly complex. technological advanced syste111. which assumes the role of the human as the decision maker. is

was agreed that the adop1io11of a harmonised

tracks 011target. but the similarly targeted full provision of ADS. CPDLC and Inter-Facility Operability will now not be realised until at least late 1997. I have singled out IATA a couple of

to create a potentially unstable environment in which the magnitude of complexity is too great for a controller to comprehend: therefore any failure imposes a major safety hazard. In the drive to maximise the finite airspace resources

of previous work and that there is a need for

times and it could perhaps be construed that my commcllls arc meant as criticism of their activities. This is 1101the case. !'or it is recognised that IATA has a legitimate charter to pursue and it is probably largely due 10 their efforts that we have made the substantial and necessary changes that have been

available 10mankind. concepts of operation are being developed that give controllers concern. This is not simply the operators of the system being conservative or Luddite. It is out of a concern for the realities and practicalities of providing a safe and eflicient air traffic control. (now air traffic management) service.

accomplished. However. when we have a strong driving rorce. it is prudent not to allow

Resilience to the complex and tightly coupled nature of ATC in the past has been achieved by the active involvement of the human in the system. Will the human be able still to have that role - will the system allow the human to be able to understand all that is

that force unfellered head and 10 apply some gentle braking now and then. regardless of the quality and strength of the engine. I hope that my comments will be accepted as just such a brake to reduce the speed of change a liule to a pace that can be kept up with by all the runners in the interest of the overall team result: a safe and efficient global air traffic system.

because we are in a state of transition which requires the present A TC system to keep operating efficiently and increase capacity within the present constraints at the same time as the introduction of new Icchnology and

happening? The optimistic. essentially human. view is that these issues will be resolved in a cooperative manner. If by chance this is not achieved. then the objective of ATM safety being maintained al or improved on current levels will not be met and effectively. it will be reduced below present clay standards. Many view the concerns of controllers when voiced as being barriers to progress. The advances which the enabling technologie~ in CNS can bring in the way

validation methodology would lead to common standards. easier interchange of validation information. cost savings through greater reuse absolute transparency in ATC validation. Initially a number of pilot projects should be put in place and a supporting infrastn1<.:lllrc developed. This would consist of an ECAC Validation Manual. common training courses and a Central Index of Validation Activity.The cry was for an early implementation or the methodology. focusing on practical action t get results

as quickly

as possible

participants suggestedthat the proposed ECAC ATC Validation Manual should be developed as soon as possible. Co-ordination of future work

with

EATCHIP

and EU

Framework IV activities was considered highly desirable. particularly in the safety area.The proposed harmonised validation methodology was considered to have potential for wide applicability Therefore.

outside

the ECAC

States.

it should be put forward

for

consideration by !CAO as soon as practicable.

References:• ECAC/APATSI Processes

in ATC.

study on Validation A

Proposal

for

Hannonised Validation Methodology.Praxis. January 16. 1996. ECAC/APATSI

Validation

Workshop Report. Praxis. June 18. 1996

Study.

THE CONTROLLER/MARCH 1996

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