IFATCA The Controller - 1st quarter 2001

THECONTROLLER JOURNAL

OF

AlR

TRAFFlC

CONTROL

1961

40 years of

CPDLC A Controllers Viewpoint

Training Issues in Africa

90's - A period of Change

ATC in the Freezer

l /2001 l<;t quarter 2001 volume 40 I\C,l\J00l0 -B07 {

1961 Board of Officers (Executive Board)

President 1 st Vice -Pre sident 2nd V ice- President H o n ar ary Secretary Tr easurer Ed itor

L N Tekstra M Cerf R Sadet H W Thau H Thrane W H Endlich

(Netherlan ds) (Fra nc e) (Belgiu m ) (Germany) (Denmark) (Germany)

Founder Associations

A u stria Belgium Denmark Finland France

(F. R.) Germany

Iceland Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands

Norw ay Switzerland

PUBLISHER I FATCA, Int ernation al Federation of Air Traffic Controll ers' Assoc iations .

THECONTROLLER

EXECUTIVE BOARD OF IFATCA

JOURNAL

0 F

AlR

TR AF FIC

CONTROL

Samuel Lampkin President and Ch ief Executive Officer

Paul Robinson Deputy President

ln This lssue

United Kingdom , March 2001 Volu me 40 No 1

Jean Robert Dumfries Execut ive V ice Presid ent Am ericas

4

What is an Aldis Lamp, Dad? Phil Parker

s

Editorial Chris Stock

6

CPDLC - A Con troller's Martin Cole

10

Let's Re-Think our Priorities Ralph Thompson

12

Safety in Air Traffic Management Daniel Casanova

16

Arctic Operations Phillipe Domagala

18

Controller Training Problems Albert Taylor

24

The Story of IFATCA

26

The 90's - A period of Change Chr is Stock

30

Book Reviews Bert Ruitenberg

32

Charlie's Colum n

34

Cont roll ers and Aircraft Phil Parker

Albert Taylor Exec ut ive Vi ce-Preside nt Africa/ M iddle East

Phlllp Parker Executive V ice- President As ia/Pac ific

Marc Baumgartner Executive V ice-President Europe

View

Steph Simmonds Execut ive Vice-P resident Finance

Doug Churchlll Exe cut ive V ice-Pres ident Professi o nal

Andrew Beadle Executi v e Vice -President Techn ical

Terry Crowhurst Executive Board Secret ary/

Conference Man age r

EDITOR Chris Stoc k,

in East Green land

in Africa

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3

Foreword What is an Aldis Lamp, Dad? Phil Parker EVP Asia Pacific This is IFATCA 's 40 th Anniversary year and it's probably a good time to reflect on the change s in Air Traffic Control, to our profession and to our industry over tha t time. I have been privileged to work in ATC for 33 of those 40 years. What has changed is the subject of this forward . Rather than just give my point of view, I carried out a mini survey amongst my " older co lleagues" . We have a dive rse group of control lers in Hong Kong, including some from Austra lia and New Zealand, Europe and North America, which allowed me to get a feel for t he changes in ATC from a fairly wide perspective. I was struck by the similarity of the ir answers to my questions .

There are 2 m ain areas of change.

Technica l of course, and profess ional / social. Let us start with the technical. 40 y ears ago, a large pe rcentage of AT C aroun d the world was procedural control usi ng strips only. If ther e w as radar, it was generally primitive primary displays only . Th e controller had to know his equ ipment intimately as all of the main controls for the rada r were either side of the display and the sort of picture you had was dependent on how y ou set it up . Ther e were no labe ls on t he screen and on a few systems t he re was a very pr imitiv e SSR. W ithout labels o n the screen, strip s were extreme ly important as that was how you ke pt the picture of w hich blip was which and what each aircraft was doing .

Cont rast t hat with today wit h 2K x 2K colour displays p lu s mult i-ra dar tra cki ng, fu ll label lin g with gro und speed , aircraft type, category , level, climb and descent arrows, in fact, almost anything you want .

We have electro nic flight strips, w eather radar or t he ab ility to put wea t her on the radar scree n , flow control assistan ce, confl ict ale rt, se paration prob es and electro nic information systems with NOTAMS, weather, maps , SIDs, STARs , and approach plates . In fact you can be overw helmed w it h infor mation . The net resu lt of t hi s is t hat we have become so dependant on our modern disp lays, that when t hey fa il , we are lost . There was a ti me when contro llers cou ld recover from a loss of radar. Not any more . It has just become too busy. Even if we st ill had the old basic sk ill s, t he current traff ic leve ls wou ld mak e it near im possible to cope except for treat ing it as an emergency and do ing t he best you can . So we have lost t he o ld ski lls and ga ined some new ones .

4

The Tower is no different . The first tower I worked in had an ASI for the QNH, an outside air temperature thermometer, anemomet er, of course, radios and a signal lamp . (When was the last time anyone used a signal lamp?) We had no ATIS. Today in Hong Kong Tower we have not radios as such but Speech Processing Equipment ( including multiple frequencies, intercom , land lines, telephone links, etc .), computer displays of METARs, Forecasts, Notams and anything else you may want, electronic aerodrome lighting switching, Surface Movement Radar with aircraft callsign labelling, Doppler Weather Radar, Windshear and Turbulence Warning System, computer display of wind, (instant ,

... we have become so dependent on our modern displays that when they fail, we are lost.

2 minute average, crosswind, tailwind) and RVR readings . We have automatic strip printers and electronic voice synthesized ATIS . The latest piece of equipment is for Datalink for sending pre-departure clearanc es. Last, but not least, we still have a signal lamp, which I have not seen used in y ears.

Let us not for get the air craft we control. 40 years ago, most of the aircraft we controlled were still prop eller types, both turbine and pisto n. Th ere were still large numb ers of non - pressurized types such as the DC3 and DC4 . Speeds, climb rates and descent rates were all slower . The navigation aids they carried were primitive by today's standards as pro gressively over the years they have advanced from NDBs, VORs and DME , through the early INS and OMEGA syste ms to IRS, and now GPS, inco rp or ate d into sophisticated Flight Management Systems . 40 years ago, navigators were still carried on long over water flights acro ss the Pacific.

Modern aircraft syste ms have advanced so quickly t hat the ATC syste ms to control t hese aircraft are having tro uble keeping up. Th e ot her big change over the years, start ing w it h t he introductio n of the B747 ,

is th e popularity of flying with the public, leading to the sheer numbers of aircraft we have in the skies today. The latest major change, as far as ATC is concerned, is the now huge increase in regional type jets at the expense of turbine types, increasing pressure for the higher flight levels .

With the improvement of navigational accuracy, we have, progressively over the years, been reducing our separation standards, while at the same time we are starting to provide more flexible tracking for suitably equipped aircraft . We are seeing the gradual introduction of RVSM .

ACAS has also had a big effect on the industry and the way we work . In the very near future we will have incorporated ADS and Datalink technologies associated with CNS/ ATM implementation .

What about the Professional / Social side?

There was virtually no such thing as corporatized, privatised or commercialised ATC 40 ye ars ago . If you were in ATC, you wer e a Civil Se rva nt or Government work er . Governments considered ATC to be part of the national infrastructure to be paid for out of tax . Contrast that with tod ay's rapid change to other forms of ATC structure outside of , but still overse en by Government.

40 years ago, Air Traffic Control , from Management all the way down to the lower operational positions, was staffed by peopl e who already had an operational background from the aviation industry.

Alternatively, they had been pilots, navigator s or radio operators who had served in air forces during WW 2 . A full 80 % of cadet controllers on my course had private or commercial pilot licences or had served in the Air Force or been a member of the Air Cadets. These day s, I would suggest, it's probably closer to 8%. I'm not saying th at thi s is a good or bad thing, just an observation of change .

On e result of t hi s, however , is the widening of the relationship betw een aircrew and ATC. I think that these day s there is less of an und ers tanding of ea ch others ' oper ational problems.

Th ere is less di scussio n ov er a beer in the bar and less co-operat ion from both sides.

On e of the biggest changes over the years, has be en the numb er of female co ntrol lers in t he job . 33 years ago , w hen I started ,

1 Hf CONTROLLER

Editorial Editorial Chris Stock, Editor This issue completes my first year as Editor and ironically, has been one of the hardest to compile . This has been mainly as a result of the need to recognise the 40 'h anniversary of IFATCA but also to retain other articles of interest . Additionally, I did not want to diminish the impact of Neil Vidler's book (see page 24) that celebrates the history of the Federation .

Looking ahead to the 40 th year, I want to focus on some of the major topics that are close to controllers' hearts and minds .

Safety, training, and controller shortages are some that immediately leap to prominence but there are others as well.

However, and it is a big however, I need a positive input from the MAs and individual members. I am minded to repeat my earlier pleas that contributions, large or small, are always welcome whether they are in the there were only 3 female controllers in the whole of Australia . Contrast that today with the percentage at your facility . To show how times have changed, we now, of course, have a female on the Executive Board of IFATCA. I think this has been good for ATC in that it has toned down the macho image and contributed to the professional outlook of our industry.

One positive change has come about due to research into ATC done over the years .

There has been a quantum leap in understanding Human Facto rs in our occupation. IFATCA can be proud of our contribution to this research. A general reduction in the blame cultur e associated w ith in cidents and a genuine need by investigators to find the under-lying reasons for incidents has helped controllers more easily come to terms with such incidents . Included in thi s are the programs in many facilities for st ress counselling for controllers involv ed in incid ents or witnessing accidents .

M anagement of ATC has changed a gre at deal over the years. We have gone fro m a management w hich bro ad ly has been made up of forme r controllers, w ith pl enty of oper at ional experi ence but no manage ment skills to a management w ith su pposedly management skills , but no op eration al skill s. I don 't know w hi ch is w orse . With regard t o Ai r Tr affic Contro l, broad ly speakin g, aft er 40 years, I still don't think we have got it right.

THE CONTROLLER

form of articles, letters, or even photographs . If you want to put your MA or your ATC facility, or even your ATS provider, in the public eye then the pages of this magazine are available .

I am looking forward to this Annual Conference not only to celebrate 40 years of IFATCA but also to hear some of interesting discussions on the numerous policy papers that are being presented. I have always felt that the quality of many papers has been lost when they are consigned to the archives after conference .

I believe that many deserve a wider circulation and maybe this magazine can help in the future . Also, I hope that we will continue to attract a plenty of observers from international organisations and other interested bodies and individuals to witness the depth and maturity of our What hasn't changed in the last 40 years?

Well, we are still short of staff world wide .

In general t erms, we are still not consulted about equipment or procedures or if we are con sulted, we ' re ignored . Working conditions in large parts of the world, especially Africa and parts of South America have shown virtually no improvement over the y ears . Many ATC facilities can only dream about the sort of equipment mentioned above.

We still have the problem that the cheapest way out for service providers wanting to increase airport or airspac e capacity is to make the controller s the y have wo r k harder, rather than train and recruit mo re, and then blame th em if the re are delays as a result . It's far cheaper to tell the indus try that there will be an inc rease in runway movem ent rate and t ell the cont ro lle r t o achieve it rather th an invest in a new runway .

What w ill ATC be like in 40 years tim e 7 I honestly don 't know . If th e last 40 years is anythin g to go by , t here will be major chang e. Te chnolog y w ill see to t hat .

Wh ethe r it will be in th e fo rm of free fl ight , w ith ATC carry ing out a moâ&#x20AC;˘ .. ,r ing ro le, only int erve ning w hen som et , ¡' ,g is about to go w ron g or just more of t he same with more too ls to help th e contro ller with the de cision mak ing process, only t ime w ill tell.

A ll I kn ow is at my age, unfort unate ly , I'm not lik ely to be around to see it

policy making process .

On a final note, please note the significa nt change that IATA have made in the implementation of CNS / ATM. Ralp h Thompson, who contributed this month, is now the Assistant Director AT M _c ns (Implementation) . The AT M _cns is not printing error but a deliberate reflection of where the emphasis should be. I think it is brilliant idea, visual as well as establishi ng the right priorities - just wished tha t I had thought of it first!

I look forward to meeting contributors as possible you see me approaching might not be fo r a drink Well. ... ... maybe .

as many pot enti al in Geneva - so if yo u in t he bar, it but for an art icl e!

Letter t o the Editor VERBOND DEUTSCHER FLUGLE ITER

DFS A Wasted Opportunity The Executive Board of the Germa n Air Traffic Controllers ' Assoc iati o n VDF wishes to point ou t t hat the above mentioned article should be seen as the author's very pe rsonal view of recent devel opments within DFS. As your edito r co rr ectly men t io ns , you r magaz ine is not the co rr ect platform to discuss internal natio nal diffe rences of opinion , the refo re we abstain from pointi ng ou t w here th ese diffe rences are . Nevertheless w e li ke to d raw you r attention t o t he fact , th at even when being co rr ect in most of th e statem ent s, j ust o ne w ro ng o r tenden t ious argument can make up t he diffe renc e of present ing a serio us st atem ent or co p ing wi th perso nal fru strat io n .

W ith best regards gez. Klaus Forme l Chai rman VDF i A. Veronika Worner VDF-Sek retary

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Datalink CPDLC - A Controller'sView Martin Cole US NATCA National Datalink Representative The re are four main areas that I would like t o t ouch on in my presentation today.

They are: W hy NATCA supports Data Link, The necessity to consider user input to HM I development, System automation to support (not hinder) th e controller , and SRM , or Sector Resource Management, and the effects of the introduction of CPDLC on the controller sector team.

I w ou ld like to start off by thanking FANSIS for the invitation to speak here today and by highlighting the extensive participation that NATCA has had in the Data Link program over the years . For t hose of you unfamiliar with NATCA, we are the National Air Traffic Controllers A ssoc iation and are the organization that represents Air Traffic Controllers in the US, both professionally and as the trade union. NATCA negotiates with the FAA reg arding matters that affect controllers and w e also have representatives working with t he FAA on most major technical and pro ced ur al programs .

NAT CA -US is also a member association of IFATCA wh ich represents Air Traffic Co ntrollers at the ICAO level.

A s fo r some of the history of NATCA's invo lvement with the US Data Link pro gram : NA TCA has been working with the FAA on Dat a Link since the late 1980's .

NA TCA cont roll ers were part of th e early A ir T raff ic Data Link Validation Team (ATD LVT) . NAT CA-selected controllers fr om Atl anta Center and New York Tracon part icipat ed in both the Enroute and Ter min al benefits studies for CPDLC and a NA T CA representative helped write the Aero naut ical Dat a Link concept, vision and Operat ional Requirem ents Docum ent s t hat are t he basis for the cu rre nt FAA Data Link progra m .

We selected our f irst Natio nal Represe nt ativ e fo r Data Link in ear ly 1995 and since t hen we have had a f ull-ti me represe nt at ive deta iled to part icipate in the Data Link impl ementatio n effo rt.

A NATCA co ntro ller , serving as an IFATCA re pr ese ntat iv e, was on t he !CAO ADS Panel (no w know n as t he O PLINK Pane l) w hen t hat gro up wrote the g lobal operat ional requ irem ents for ATC Data

6

Link.

Management .

So you can see that from the beginnings of the US Data Link program, NATCA has been supporting the concept, development and implementation of CPDLC.

CPDLC is also a key enabling technology for future technological enhancements that will allow us to progress towards any form of a Free Flight environment.

In its initial implementations, CPDLC will function primarily as a tool for controller and pilot initiated communications.

However, the CPDLC message set also includes pre-defined messages that could be used for various automation-to automation data exchanges, such as negotiations between a ground-based conflict detection and resolution system and the FMS in the aircraft . In such a scenario, the respective air and ground systems could arrive at the best route or routes that could then be presented to controllers and pilots for verification and approval. But without the initial work on controller -pilot Data Link, we will not have the chance to identify and correct any problems with the basic technology . This means that the human users of the system, in this case controllers and pilots, will not achieve a level of confidence in the technology that would be necessary to progress on to more advanced automated Data Link services.

Next I would like to touch on some of the reasons that NATCA has been a strong proponent for Data Link, specifically CPDLC, in the air traffic control environment.

Of course, the most vocalized concern today, in the overall aviation system, is that of system capacity and traffic delays .

We feel that CPDLC is the one technology that will provide the greatest near-term

... from the beginning of the US datalink program, NATCA has been supporting the concept , development and implementation of CPDLC benefit in the area of increasing sector capacity. Nothing else has the potential, within the next two to five years, to increase the number of aircraft that can be safely and efficiently added to the aviation system . As part of the Data Link Benefits Studies (both Enroute and Terminal), the FAA conducted high -fidelity simulations based on real traffic scenarios from some of the most cong ested US domestic airspace . These simulations allowed NATCA-selected controllers to experience first-hand some of the benefits of simply adding capability for CPDLC, and showed that the introduction of CPDLC allowed controllers to manage more aircraft in sectors that were considered saturated in a voice-only ATC environment.

The fact is that in many sectors today , voice radio congestion is a major limiting factor on controllers being able to accept more aircraft into those sectors, and thus increasing overall system capacity. There are several ways in which CPDLC can help controllers cope with this situation and I will highlight them as part of the discussion on Sector Resource

By far the biggest reason that NATCA supports the deployment of CPDLC is in the area of system safety. As controllers, we are frequently frustrated when we hear that safety is not a quantifiable financial benefit that can be figured into the cost and benefit analysis for new technologies .

Even given that safety is adequate in today's aviation system, we strongly feel that increasing levels of safety does indeed have a financial benefit for the overall aviation system. There are several ways in which CPDLC will help enhance the levels of system safety.

Data Link will provide the pilots with a written record of clearances , which should help reduce mis -communicated clearances .

Data Link will allow controllers to "retrieve" aircraft that end up tuned to the wrong voice frequency.

Data Link will allow controllers to continue to communicate with equipped aircr aft even in the event of a blocked voice radio frequency (stuck mic).

And when long or comple x re-route clearances are necessary , such as weath er or flow control swap routing , those aircr aft equ ipp ed with Data Link will not occupy

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Datalink valuable voice radio time while the controller and pilots clarify and often restate the new (and hence unfamiliar) route clearance to the aircraft.

One other point needs to be made concerning controller benefits from CPDLC. While most of the other groups involved in the deployment of ATC Data Link are not specifically concerned with controller workload and job stress, those topics are very much the concern of my union that represents air traffic controllers. Data Link will not affect the overall impact that controllers feel from the immense res~,onsibility of dealing on a daily basis with the safety of the flying public . One of the most stress-filled situations with which controllers are confronted on a regular basis is that of overloaded voice radio channels . When a controller is talking to so many aircraft that he or she only has enough time for absolutely essential transmissions, the feeling of operating right on the edge of one's capacity , or slightly over it, can be extremely stressful. CPDLC has the potential of allowing the other members of the sector team to carry some of the load of communicating with the aircraft, thus allowing the Radar, or Executive, controller to maintain a better awareness of the overall sector operation .

The second point I would like to discuss is user input to HMI development .

When it comes to designing the Human Machine Interface, especially in a safetycritical environment , common sense would seem to dictate that the humans who will be using that system would have a significant role in its development . And in the case of CPDLC, there is an even more compelling reason why the controllers and pilots must have major input into the HMI development.

As a controller , when my employer replaces a piece of technology then the old system soon disappears from my sector. When my hard -wired radio control sw itches were replaced with software control screens, the old buttons and knobs soon were gone . When my aging round radar screens were replaced with new DSR monitors, we only operat ed in "shadow" mode with the old screens for a very short time. But when we int ro duc e Data Link into th e ATC environmen t , there are NO foreseeable pl ans to remov e the voice radio capability.

This means that t he controller and pilot w ill have a choice of v oice or Data Link channels fo r any operational message.

Hav ing participated in several attempts to di v ide ATC messages int o tho se that can

THE CONTROLLER

be sent via Data Link versus those that should only be sent via voice, I'm confid ent in saying that the fluid ATC environment is incompatible with any unequivocal rules in this area. So if the Data Link HMI is not sufficiently userfriendly then the controllers will choose voice communications over Data Link and will continue to operate the ATC sectors in the same way, and at the same capacity, as today's voice-only environment .

One area of HMI development that could be designed in such a way as to be

... in designing the HumanMachine Interface, common sense would seem to indicate that the humans who will be using that system would have a significant role in its development. unacceptable to the human users is system automation . In any comple x system such as a digital communications system, one must accept at least some minimal level of automation. Some automation is necessary because the human operators cannot reasonably be expected to interact with technical sub-components in order to perform all the system control and management functions required of such a system. Since we can accept that there will be at least some automation in our Aeronautical Data Link, the question becomes what is the correct level of system automation to support the benefits that are expected from Data Link. We must keep in mind that there is a level of automation past which a system can impede, rather than support, the human ope rators.

I propose to start the discussion regarding automation by examining the two "reasonable" extremes of automation levels for an aeronautical Data Link. I use the term " reasonable" not to imply tha t either of these extremes will prove to be operationally acceptable in an ATC Data Link system. I use the t er m rather in the sense th at it is "un reasonable" t o expect the human operators to interact in th e machine language of bits and byt es, and it is unrea sonable to believe t hat w e w ill completely remove the hum ans from th e A TC system thus allo w ing comput ers to fly th e aircraft and to pe rf orm air tra ffic separation and control functi ons. So bet w een these t w o "un reason abl e" ext rem es lies vary ing degr ees of

automation that merit at least some consideration .

At the lowest "reasonable" level of automation, I submit that a Data Lin k system for controllers and pilots would be nearly a total "freete xt" system . A hypothetical CPDLC system built at this low level of automation would lack a precomposed message set and would perform no pairing of responses to the original messages . Since the ATN is already constructed beyond this low level of capability, I will forgo most of the discussion and only mention that t here are still aspects of the HMI that the SARPs leave to local implementation .

One of these local issues dea ls with updating of flight plan databases. In A T C systems where the controller is requi red to enter new and amended dat a int o a flight plan processing system , t he human actions taken to compose and send uplinked clearances should also upda t e the flight plan database without duplication of the inputs. An ATC Data Link system lacking this feat ure woul d almost certainly lead to an inc reased workload on the controllers. W hi le suc h a system could probably be int egrat ed int o the Air Traff ic sy stem , the result ing decrease in airspace capaci ty and inc rease in air traffic delays would be ge ner ally unacceptable .

So now w e w ill exa mi ne an A T C Data Lin k sy stem at the ot her end of t he "reasonable " cont inuu m . Remembe r I excluded as "un reason ab le" an Ai r T raff ic system left enti rely in t he hands of compute rs. I hav e heard present ations in several fo rums that suppo rt the id ea tha t we are rapidl y app roach ing the point tha t computer s alone coul d fly t he airc raft and deliv er air tr affi c contro l serv ices , all w ithou t any human involveme nt whatsoe v er . I will leave t hose sorts of discussion s t o t he "vi sio nary" ind iv idual s who can affo rd the lux ury of ign o ring toda y 's pro bl ems in favor of tomo rrow' s scienc e fic t ion.

So at the upp er end of th e automation leve ls w oul d be a system t hat reta in ed huma n operators as back-ups , or mon it o rs, fo r nearly f ully auto mated air traff ic serv ices. Such a syst em cou ld emplo y con fli ct detect ion and reso lut ion softwa re , autom ation-t o-aut omatio n (t hat is, FM S to gro und system ) Dat a Link communicat ion s, and a f ully int eg rated Flight Managemen t Syst em (FM S) in the cockpi t. On the gro und , confl ict detect ion and resolut ion systems, fed by survei llance data such as radar or ADS -B, w ould analyze air traff ic situ at ions for cu rr ent and f ut ure co nfli cts and deve lop an "op timized " reso lut ion scenar io . Thi s

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Datalink ground automation system would then use the Data Link capability to formulate and send ATC clearances to the aircraft, where the fully integrated FMS would analyze the clearance for aircraft profile acceptability and would then automatically execute the clearance through direct input to the flight controls.

The human s at either end of this system, the pilots and controllers, would either be inform ed by the automation when they are required to intervene or would have to exercise extraordinary access protocols in order t o override the automation systems.

There are two main reasons why I feel that a sy stem at this high level of automation would be unacceptable, at least from my "non-visionary" human perspective.

First, the situations in which the automation required the human operator t o int ervene would probably involve only t he most demanding circumstances, such as extremely high levels of traffic capacity or complexity, or in situations of extreme weather disruptions. Because the controllers and pilots in this scenario would have spent most of the time acting only as system monitors, they would almost certainly lack the skills necessary to perform in these highly demanding situations .

Second , in the area of human initiated int ervention, the controllers and pilots would be in what could only be described as a "no-win" situation . Because the airlines and air traffic service providers would have spent huge financial sums to imp lement these highly complex systems, those companies and organizations were obviously convinced of the performance and reliability of the systems. So when t he human operator chose to exercise the command option and intervene in a situation, and subseq uen tly failed to perf o rm the req ui red function (meaning a loss of separation occur re d) then the operato r made an error in judgement and should not have interfered with the automated system . On the other hand, by choos ing not to intervene in the syste m when t hey had been g iven the capability to do so, at any ti me when the automation fai led to perform the same required funct ion t hen t he human is again in error but for jus t t he opposite reason (that is, for accepting t he automated system solution) .

So it would appear that in th is highly auto mated ATC system , t he human operat ors wo ul d lack both the required skill s and any rea l incentiv e to perform as t he syste m back up .

Somewhere between t hese two

8

"debatable" but probably operationally unacceptable Data Link systems we must find a level of automation that would truly support the controllers and pilots in enhancing system safety and capacity .

While I do not purport to maintain that all the details are worked out for a fully certified implementation of ATC Data Link, there are a couple of guiding principles that have become benchmarks for pilots and controllers .

The first, and most important, principle is that no operational messages can be generated and sent without the direct consent of the human operator. As with most basic principles , this one requires some elaboration. Operational messages are those that would be equivalent in today's voice only environment to ATC

... most important principal is that no operational message can be generated and sent without the direct consent of the human operator. clearances, instructions and information from controllers and acknowledgements and requests from pilots . This operational category does not include the numerous system maintenance messages that must be exchanged both air-to-ground and ground-to-ground. These system-level messages include technical acknowledgements, message routing information, and control and delegation of authority to send Data Link communications between specific ground units and aircraft. The operational users of the system need only be informed when there is a failure in the exchange of these system level messages .

It is also important to note that the term "direct consent of the human operator" does not necessarily imply that the human will consent to each individual message, even of an operational nature . An example to illustrate this would be the capability to automatically uplink altimeter sett ing messages via the Data Link system . So long as the human operator has t he ab ility to activate or deactivate this capability, it should not be necessary fo r the controller to approve each altimeter message that is sent to each aircraft. Note t hat while t he controller will not necessarily approve each altimeter setting uplink message , it will be operationally necessary that the controller be informed of which altimeter sett ings are sent to eac h aircraft .

As I mentioned earlier while discussing HMI development, another important principle in deciding correct automation levels is that the controllers and pilots must retain the ability to select the appropriate medium, that is voice or Data Link communications, in any particular situation. For ex ample, in the case where the controller needs to uplink an altitude clearance, there will be times when it is appropriate to send that clearance over voice and times when it is better to send it over Data Link. Controllers will make these types of decisions based on the time criticality of the clearance and knowledge of expected delivery times over the voice and Data Link communications systems . An automation system that automatically sent specific types of messages only via Data Link or that attempted to place limitations on when the human might be allowed to utilize a particular communications method would not be acceptable to operational users in the field.

Which brings us to the last of the topics I would like to present to you, that of SRM, or Sector Resource Management. This is really the area wherein CPDLC will become either a benefit to controllers or an anchor weighing us down, and because of that it is also one of the most important areas that will determine whether CPDLC actually delivers benefits to the airspace users.

On the pilots' side, there has been considerable work done on CRM, or Cockpit Resource Management . There has been significantly less work on Sector Resource Management, and it is my hope that this area will see more attention and resources devoted to it in the futu re .

Du ri ng this discussion, I will be working from the FAA Enroute Center concept of sector teams. That is , a one, two, or three-person staff (depending on traffic levels) at each sector position . The positions are Radar Controller (RController), Associat e Controller (D Controller) and Handoff Controller (Tracker or L-Controller) . This model differs somewhat from the concept used generally in EUROCONTROL and European ATC systems, consisting of an Executive Controller and a Plannin g Controller. I have had the opportunity to work in simulations both at EUROCONTROL-Bretigny and at Par is North Ce nt re, and I am certain that the general di scussion of Sector Resource Management is just as v ital in these environments as it is in the US model.

Data Link, and especially CPDLC. wi ll radically change the way that controllers

THE:CONTROLLER

Datalink do their job, which is delivering Air Traffic Services to the airspace users . Some people may think that this is an excessively bold statement but I contend that just implementing CPDLC, without even any automation integration, will be as large a change as any Data Link implementation planned in the coming years. There are two main reasons that I say this.

First, CPDLC will force controllers to adopt "non-serial" communications with aircraft . As controllers, we are trained to complete each communication task before moving on to the next . In a voice environment, when the controller delivers a clearance to an aircraft we wait for some kind of acknowledgement from that aircrew before continuing on to the next task. This acknowledgement may not be the final response from the aircrew regarding that clearance, as in a "Standby" response, but there will be some acknowledgement that the aircrew has received the transmission . Controllers will not, except in unusual circumstances, continue giving several "unacknowledged" clearances in a row . Due to the time delay for transmission of Data Link messages, controllers will be forced into just that type of situation . Given extensive use of CPDLC, a controller will often have several outstanding, that is unanswered and unacknowledged, transmissions at any one time. The use of L-ACKs, or Logical Acknowledgements, will help with this situation but the fact remains that controllers will be forced to continue on with other tasks while waiting for the pilot response to CPDLC uplinks.

The second major change inherent in an implementation of CPDLC will be that all members of the sector team will now have the real capability of communicating independently with the aircraft. While most ATS systems give access to the radios from the various sector positions, for the most part it is the Radar or the Executive controller that does most or all of the direct communications with the aircraft in that sector. Now that there are independent paths from the sector to the aircraft (i.e., voice and Data Link), various members of the sector team can be communicating, even giving clearances, simultaneously to the aircraft.

I have had numerous controllers, on initial exposure to the concept of CPDLC, express that they intend to use Data Link exactly the way they do v oice radios today . These controllers contend that they will wait for a Data Link response before moving on to the next message and they will instruct other controllers on their sector team that no one except the Radar controller will communicate w ith "their" aircraft. After a number of years spent

f HE CONTROLL ER

working on Data Link, it is clear to me that controllers who maintain this way of thinking will not only fail to real ize, and provide, the benefits of a CPDLC system, rather they will also put themselves in a situation of increased, possibly crippling, workload.

If implemented correctly, Data Link will allow controller sector teams to redistribute the overall workload more evenly among members of the team . In today's Enroute environment, the entire task of communicating with the aircraft falls on only one member of the sector team, the Radar controller. This communication task is in addition to the Radar controller's other tasks of monitoring separation between the aircraft, communicating with controllers in surrounding facilities and sectors, ensuring that aircraft comply with restrictions and Letters of Agreement, and having overall responsibility for the management of that particular sector team. As the task of communicating with aircraft occupies a greater percentage of the Radar controller's time, and given that safe separation of aircraft must never be

Datalink, and especially CPDLC, will radically change

the way that controllers their job.

do

compromised, then the other tasks that ensure an efficient operation of the sector get pushed more and more to the side.

With Data Link, the sector team can distribute most of the routine communications to either the Associate or Handoff controller . These routine communications can be such things as transfer of radio communications, weather updates, and expected clearances and restrictions .

There is another important Data Link benefit in the area of efficient sector interaction . When the majority of the Radar controller's time is occupied with radio vo ice communication , there is little or no time left for the secto r team to strategize regarding more efficient sector operations. Data Link simulations have shown that as the amount of time the Radar controller spends on the voice radio is reduced, there is significantly more time available for coordination among membe rs of the sector team . When the entire sector team can operate in a pro-active rather than re-active mode, benefits derived from more eff icient operations are available to both t he aircraft traversing that sector as we ll as adjacent ATC sectors.

These sector efficiencies can compound into overall system wide benefits.

When it comes to fielding new technology, the old method within the FAA has been to develop a new component and then to teach the controllers only how to manipulate the various controls and to work the new displays. The technology was then thrown into the field and controllers were left, through trial and error, to discover the best ways to employ this bo x or system.

With the implementation of Data Link , through planned simulations we hope to develop a method, or more probably several methods, whereby CPDLC can be successfully int egrated into the Enroute sector teams . Then through specific targeted training, it can be demonst rated to controllers the best ways to adapt sector working methods to the implementation of a robust CPDLC technology. Because of the everincreasing traffic levels, today 's aviation system cannot accommodate the controller "learning curve" that accompanies the old method of fielding technology. Without studies into how Sector Resource Management is affected

by CPDLC, I fear that the deploymen t of even a potentially beneficial Data Link capability could turn into a disaste r, and hopefully only a figurative one.

So I have presented some of the imp ortant points, from a controller's v iewpoint. regarding the implementation of CPDLC. To a great extent, these principles appl y to other Data Lin k services such as ADS and ADS-B, but especially so to CPDLC. I commend the FAA for ext ensive coordination with controllers and pi lots in the development of the their CPDLC Program. For those of you representing other CAAs, privatiz ed ATS providers, or airlines , I urge yo u to includ e the system users, controllers , pilo ts and dispatcher s, in your respective dev elopm ents of ATC Data Lin k serv ices. If not from the v rew of good common sense, then because _ofthe point I raised earlier about t he coex rsten~e of voice and Data Link and t he ope rato rs ability to choose the appropria te comm uni cation pathway. Un less the needs of the syste m users are cons idered and met , contro llers and p ilot s w ill continue to choos e vo ice over CPDLC. and we will have untold million s of do llars worth of Data Link equ ipm ent sitting d usty , unus ed and useless in o ur ATC facilities

[Ed Note : Th is pape r w as pre sented to ATN 2000 sympos ium rn Lo ndo n on 26 Sept embe r 2000 )

9

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Let's ReThink our Priorities Ralph Thompson IATA Assistant Director ATM_cns (Implementation) Program Director FSG

In the w ords of IAT A's DG and CEO Pierre Jeanniot "creation of system capacity is now a top priority for our industry" .

The supporting strategy recognises the different regional operational requirements, whilst pursuing overall global harmony .

The solution undoubtedly lies with enhanced Air Traffic Management. This will necessitate certain supporting CNS system upg rades whi ch must be managed in a cost efficient man ner reflecting system user needs and enjoying broad industry consensus . All major expenditures must be supported by a sound business case, which;

It will be fuelled by the crisis that operators see facing them in terms of capacity constraints that restrict growth .

identifies current and future, (5 yrs, 10 yrs and 15 yrs) capacity constraints, gate to gate based on traffic forecasts, determines the optimum and sustainable ATM solutions, determines the CNS tools to support the ATM needs, leads ANS Providers to quickly respond and efficiently schedu le infrastruct ure improveme nts.

Many will remember how quickly 'the future' overtook the pioneering 'FANS ' acronym; displa ced by its less exotic component parts "CNS/ ATM". Digita l time marches on, however. Priorities change. Acronyms adapt.

Introd ucing a major Infrastructure Campaign in 2001 with the motto "One Sky .... global ATM", IATA is launching the idea of a change in em phasis including a reversal of our now fami liar "CNS/ ATM", to "ATM cns". This is not intended to contrad ict the essential CNS/ ATM work of ICAO, wh ich IATA wholeheartedly supports , but simply to highlight the user needs and place ATM under the spot ligh t w ith technology in a suppo rt ing role.

IAT A has redefined its Mission Statement to meet calls for renewed action, as follow s: Promote, harmonise development of a seamless, economic, g lobally harmonised system of air navigation services that will cope with world-w ide growth in air traffic demand while: Improving upon the presen t levels of safety perfo rmance ; Improving upon the present levels of regularity , Improv ing upon the over-a/I efficiency of airspace and airport operations , leading to increased capacity, Increasing capacity while respecting the environment.

Increasing the availability of user-prefer red flight schedule s and profiles , M inimi sing differing eq uipm ent carnage reqwrements between regions, Demand ing implementation expenditures be based upon sound business plans , reflectmg good business practices

10

Enhanced collaboration with ICAO, industry, and influential organisations such as CANSO and IFATCA remain cornerstones of the initiative.

A 32-Point Action Plan, brings renewed focus to the role of the annual IATA Global Navcom , as a forum to present strategies, gather industry feedback, and exchange new ideas. Progress on undertakings given

by Guenther Matschnigg, Vice President Operations and Infrastructure (O&I), during the Vancouver Global Navcom/ 2000, to take a more proactive leadership role in promoting CNS/ ATM implementation will be presented. The O&I division is responsible for management of IATA's CNS/ ATM activity which is now viewed more in 'project' terms that will enable better assessment of progress, identification of deliverable benefits, and fostering of appropriate levels of commitment from all sides of industry.

Taking the theme "Making ATM_cns Happen .... gate to gate", GNC 2001 convenes in Amman , 15-17 1" October, . hosted by Royal Jordanian airlines, and supported by an impressive 'Who's Who' of the industry . Setting the scene for the event will be His Royal Highness Prince Faisal Bin Al Hussein, Mr . P. Jeanniot - DG and CEO of IATA, Dr . A. Kotaite - President of ICAO Council, Mr . V . Aguado - DG Eurocontrol, Mr. N. Dahabi - President & CEO Royal Jordanian . Mr . D . Kaden - General Manager DFS and Chairman CANSO will make the Keynote address.

Already committed speakers and participants include; Mr . V. Zubkov (ICAO), Mr. G. Paulson (Eurocontrol), Mr . D .

Andrew (UK NATS), Smiths Indust ries, Airservice s Australia, Airsys ATM , Alenia Marconi , Atr axis, Lockheed Martin (Synchronetics), IFATCA , Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, CANSO, INMARSAT, NAV CANADA, SITA, ARINC, Citigroup, Latvijas Gaisa Satiksme, Unit ed Airlines , Boeing and Airbus.

Conference Associates include ICAO, Eurocontrol, CANSO, FANS Stake- holders Group (comprising ICCAIA, Air Transport Action Group, CANSO, ARINC , INMARSAT , SITA), Arab Air Carriers Organisation, Arab Civil Aviation Council , Europe Middle East ATM Bureau.

Conference and Exhibition Highlights : Provocative Panel discussions and a breakout Session on major issues of ATM_cns led by senior industry experts including key IATA and /CAO repr esentatives Concurrent conference Sessions on ATM_cns and Airport Development Recommendations for action by IATA and /CAO The pre stigious Smiths Indu stries Award for the most outstanding contributions to progress and under standin g.

Briefing s on the latest developments in g lobal standards.

Analysis of the real world issues from the FIT and FIG programs Analysis of Case Historie s and Success Stories.

Presentation and review of th e new IATA ATM_cns strategy including breakout deb ates and a Panel discussion A NS Commercialisation and Airport Privatisation Issues surrounding airpo rt capacity constraints and development An emphasis upon education and awareness Review and follow-up from Global Navcom

2000 Exhibition and supporting features will include; New product stage Technical Poster Wall (on e Poster percompany or delegate on a technical ATM_cn s issue). The Poster wall is not for sales and marketing literature .

Technical Workshops the day before on ATN, GNSS, Developing the ATM Business Case, Basics of CNS/A TM The IA TA biennial airline Middle East Regional Technical Conference (RTC) on18th Oct 2001 (for IATA members and Partners only) Spousal program and visits to the ancient city of Petra and the ever p opular Dead Sea This is truly a Global Aviation Event.

The refocused IATA Infrastructure Campaign emphasises the importance of improved ATM . The potential benefits to the aviation industry, and all that in turn rely on it or benefit from it, are too significant to ignore. It is vital that those involved in the development and provision of air navigation services wo rk together with the users .

Global Navcom 2001 will provide an ideal forum and opportuni t y to promote real progress .

THI' CONTROLLER

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IATA CONFERENCES AND EXHIBITIONS !11Coopera1io11wih .OAC/.Jr..

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Making ATM _cns Happen ...

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The Global Navcom 2001 Conference and Exhibition is a unique annual event focused on Air Traffic Management, Com m unication, Navigation and Surveillance (ATM_cns) . Global Navcom addresses the hard issues surrounding ATM_cn s implemen tation .

DIGNATARIES

PRE CONFERE N CE WORKSHOPS

INCLUDE

Overview of CNS/ATM (one day Workshop pr esented by FANS Information Services Ltd)

His Royal Highness Prince Faisal Bin Al Hussein Mr. P. Jeanniot - Director General & CEO, IATA

CNS/ATM Business Case (half day Workshop pr esented by /CAO)

Dr. A. Kotaite - President of /CAO Council

SATCOM (half day Workshop pr esented by INMARSAT)

Mr. V. Aguado - Director General , Eurocontrol

(All th e above w orkshops w ill be held on 14 October )

Mr . N. Dahabi - President & CEO, Royal Jordanian

IATA MID Regional Technical Confere nce (RTC) (18th October )

Mr. D. Kaden - Genera/ Manager DFS & Chairman CANSO

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A package price is availabl e for t he Workshops and the GNC2001 Conference. For mor e info rm ation contact : Ralph Thompso n: Tel.:+ 1 (514) 874 0202 , ext . 330 6 E-mail : thompsonr @ iata .org

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Europe Middle Eas t ATM Burea u

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For more information FAX BACK th e form below to Sue Snell at Fax: +44 (0) 20 8577 96 10 For furth er information call Jane Sessenwein at Tel. :+ 1 (514) 874 0202 ext. 3337 , E-mail: sessenwe iJ@iata .org or regi ster on line at www .iata online .com For sponsorship and exhibition opportunities contact Edw ard St od dart at Tel. : + 44 (0) 20 8607 6295 , E-ma il : stoddart e@iata .org Tit le:

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IATA

CONFERE N CES AND

EXHIBITIONS

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lnternational Colloquium Safety in Air Traffic Management Daniel Casanova Contributing Editor, Europe This colloquium washed in Toulouse on 22-23 November 2000.

The title of this colloquium - Safety in Air Traffic Management: increasing capacity and safety in European highdensity traffic - was used to present the European challenge in ATC. It was divided int o five items .

1 . VIEWPOINT OF DIR ECT EXPERIENCE Philip S. Griffith (UK) introduced the topic of Safety in Air Navigation Services . The ECAC Ministers of Transport met in June 1997 and, among other things, agreed to establish a fo rmal mechanism in Europe, separate from service provisions, for the multi late ral development and harmonisat ion of an ATM safety regulatory regi me within a total aviation safety system approa ch. It was also agreed that safety regulation of ATM would be co -ordinated at European level (involvin g all interested ECAC National Authorities) initially thr ough the EUROCONTROL Organisation. A Safety Regulation Commis sion (SRC) was therefore established within the EUROCONTROL Organisation.

The Role of SRC The fact that ATM servi ce provision within States has been becoming increasingly market -o rientated has led to an emerging need for Safety Regulation in the field of ATM, working in the public interest. The focal point for this, within ECA C, is the Safety Regulation Commission. The SRC's prime ro le is to achieve co-ordination and harmonisation within ECAC in the field of ATM Safety Regulation, while respe ctin g the sovereignty interests of States .

SRC contributi on to safety The princ ipal benef it to safety that SRC can bring is to prov id e a common forum for the sharing of knowledge and collective decision-making, and in which safety concerns and issues being addressed by indiv idual States can be tack led on a collective basis . SRC was, among other t hings , tasked to harmonise levels of ATM Safety across the ECAC area and to monitor , as well as improve , achieved levels of A TM safety across the

12

ECAC area . This task of measuring safety performance of the European ATM System is indeed essential at a time when significant operational, technical and institution al changes to the European ATM System are being contemplated . In addition, SRC stands as a key interlocutor to existing safety regulatory organisations, internationally and in Europe (such as the Joint Aviation Authorities), as it provides for a single ATM safety regulatory

SRC was ... tasked to harmonise levels of ATM safety across the ECAC area and to monitor, as well as improve, achieved levels of safety interface with whom to discuss and coordinate all aviation safety regulatory matters in a consistent manner .

SRC main achievements to date The SRC has been in existence for less than three years . A good deal of work has taken place on the development of harmonised EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirements (ESARRs). Two of these, namely "Safety occurrence reporting and investigation in ATM " and "Safety Management Systems in ATM", have already been approved and adopted by the Provisional Council and the Commission of EUROCONTROL. One major area of SRC's work arose from a review of ECAC safety performance undertaken in early 1999 . This revealed a fragme nted and apparently partial ap proach to the reporting and analysis of ATM-related safety occurrences and led to t he establishment of the EUROCONTROL Safety Measurement and Improvement Programme . The Programm e meets the fundamental need to ensure that States report safety data in a harmonised and consiste nt way , so that the national outputs can be used not only nationally but comb in ed to form an ECAC w ideperspective of ATM Safety Perfor mance.

The quality and consistency of national

safety data are essential to be in a position to draw conclusions on the level of ATM safety , but also on those areas of the aviation system which can benefit from ATM related safety improvement measures, either regulatory or not .

SRC challenges ahead The major challenges for the years ahead will clearly focus on four areas - the continued development of a harmonised framework for ATM safety regulation, its implementation at national level, the coordination of European safety regulatory views on the acceptability of EUROCONTROL EATMP programmes, and the development of formal interfaces within civil aviation .

Clearly, the effectiveness of EUROCONTROL's initiatives in the first area is dependent upon the effectiveness of their implementation at national level.

SRC therefore needs to concentrate further on the links between the SRC and safety regulation at the national level, in order to ensure that a real contribution to ATM safety can be made .

It is also essential that the effect on ATM safety of planned European developments is correctly assessed. SRC will produce a harmonised safety regulatory position on the acceptability of the proposed changes to the ATM System that the EUROCONTROL EATMP is co-ordinating.

A clear and essential objective will also be to continue the measurement ATM safety performance across the ECAC region, to be in a position to : Assess potential safety impacts of proposed changes to the ATM System and environment and advise of their accept ability ; Identify key risk areas in aviation and develop enhancement measures; Monitor safety levels and trends against other performance indicators such as capacity or delays and advise on potential actions.

2 ATM SAFETY MANAGEMENT DURING ATM CHANGES Is ATM as safe as we believe?

By EUROCONTRO L Safety Regulation Unit Martine Blaize and JOINT AVIAT/O/\/ AUTHORITIES Klaus Koplin

It CONTROLLER

lnternational Colloquium There is a large consensus across the aviation community that safety in aviation comes first. It is also agreed that the current safety levels in aviation and in Air Traffic Management shall be at least maintained and where possible, improved.

To do so, there is a need to have a baseline reference on the current achieved safety levels in aviation and in ATM in Europe (but also at national and local levels) , against which to assess future safety levels . There is a need, as a prerequisite, to identify to what extent the Aviation and more specifically the Air Traffic Management system is safe today in Europe.

The safety regulators have obviously their role to play by setting up safety regulatory minima in the public interest.

Complementary roles are to verify, over time, that these safety minima are being met as well as to assess if the proposed changes to the overall aviation and A TM System can be seen as acceptable from a safety perspective. The EUROCON-TROL Safety Regulation Commission (SRC) and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) play a key part in this , as together, they represent the European aviation safety regulatory community and as such, exist jointly to protect the public interest in term of safety in aviation .

The perceived situation both at political and operational levels which is put forward most of the time is that Air Traffic Management in Europe is safe . When asking safety professionals in Air Traffic Management about their perception of the ATM safety levels in their own country or organisation, the responses are somewhat less straightforward . Hence the question How safe is Air Traffic Management?

The trust one can place in the information used to draw any conclusion depends on the reliability of the sources of information being used. Even when assuming that traditional accident or serious incident reports do provide a reliable source of information from which to draw conclusions on the achieved ATM safety levels across Europe, they may only reveal the tip of the iceberg.

When attempting to measure the achieved ATM safety levels across the European airspace, we are soon challenged by a number of difficult questions :- When we talk about ATM contribution to accidents, what do we mean exactly? The identified ATM contribution to aircraft accident may not reflect the totality of the

'HE CONTROLLER

ATM involvement in past accidents and might not have fully enabled the identification of ATM precursors to accidents; Isn't it highly advisable to adopt a more thorough approach to safety performance measurement than by accident / serious incidents investigation, with a view to

It is widely recognised in the aviation community that investigations into accident occurences only provide a limited insight into flight operations safety ... developing more effective safety improvement initiatives and accident prevention measures? It is now widely recognised in the aviation community that investigations into accident occurrences only provide a limited insight into flight operations safety, in part because they represent a very narrow range from which to draw conclusions.

Are existing incident data collection and investigation schemes used across the European aviation community, and more specifically across the European ATM service providers, presently capable of providing ECAC-wide safety data and of populating any set of ATM safety indicators in a manner that can be trusted?

Based on our general assessme nt of the current availability , reliability and consistency of ATM national reporting systems across the ECAC area, it is not possible to form a statistically meanin gf ul picture of ATM safety performance in the ECAC area . If the measurement of achieved safety levels is limited to the outcome of accident investigations, we may give a positive image of the Europ ean Air Traffic Management System .

However, the lack of information on incidents and on where and how ATM failed or helped in acciden ts limits how much the ATM community can learn fro m past experience . Ther e is clearly a pot ential to become improve our knowledg e not only on ATM precursors to accidents but also on the ATM elemen ts w hich have proved to be effective in reducing the risk of acciden ts.

NEW TECHNIQUES Gerard Mc Auley (Eurocontrol) presented the RVSM programmes and Alison Ford the implementation of this prog ram in UK. CONTROLLER'S WORKLOAD Peter Majgard Norbjerg (Denmark ) introduced : Procedural and operationa l changes in the terminal area - How to bring them in line with Air Traffic Control Air travel today is among the safest means of transportation . This will hopefully still be the case in the years to come . W ith the projected increase in Air trave l - and thereby in Aircraft in the air - Air Traffic Control faces enormous challenges . Sinc e not much more airspace can be claimed , the challenge will be to hold mo re fl ight s safely in already congested areas of the sky .

This challenge will include everybod y Management, Air Traffic Controllers , Procedure and Soft and Hardware designers etc.

Guillaume Blandel (France) introduce d the point of view of the French Unio n SNCT A. He denounced the pseudo-solut ions like FUA , Free Flight and airport developments. He advoca t ed a new airspace management , new tools , air po rt development in acco rdanc e with environment and for pri ori ty t o civilian traffic over mili tary flights.

3. SAFETY AND COMPLEX TECHNICAL SYSTEMS David Hawk en (Oceanic Systems Integrity Manager , National Air Traffic Servic es Limited) int roduced: Ensur ing the safe ty of satellite-based CNS / ATM syste ms for use in Civil Aviatio n.

Satellite based systems are increasingly being proposed for use in Communicati ons , Navigation and Surveilla nce Air Traffic Managemen t (CNS/ ATM) app lic ations. Whils t satellite systems offer a number of potential benefits , we st ill need to have confidence th at t he safety of aircraft is maintained . The problem is that, as the comp lexity of syste ms inc reases and w e become mo re dependent on them. t he question "Is this system safe enough to use?" becomes more difficult to answer .

This item wi ll discuss how we can assure that satellite based CNS/ ATM systems are safe to use. Issues which wi ll be covered includ e : How safe Satellite based CNS systems need to be - the identificat ion of safety

13

lnternational Colloquium objectives.

How we can gain assurance that these systems meet their safety objectives How we can gain assurance that these systems can be introduced into operation safely How we gain assurance that these systems will be operated and maintained safely What is being done in practice?

Potential problems and possible solutions Th e futur e 4 . H UM A N FACTORS AND SAFETY MANA GEM ENT Sylvie Figarol (France/DGAC) presented an it em on helping ATCOs to manage the risk. Bertrand de Courville (Air France Captai n) int roduced the possibility to share t he experience both pilots and controllers to study the risks . Captain Hans-Ulrich Raulf (IFALPA) presented pilot's human factors training and traffic management .

Human Factors (HF) and Crew Resource Mana geme nt (CRM) History Compa red with other training areas in aviation, Human Factors training is a relatively yo ung subject. Its origins date back to th e Tene rife di saster in 1977 .

Despite the indisputable fact that more than 60% of all air traff ic accidents are attributed to human failures, no significant advan ces were made until the late Eighties whe n iCAO started its Human Factor Digest serie s and the FAA published the Advisory Circular on Human Factors.

Neverthe less, Human Facto rs education or tra ini ng is not a req uirement in most countri es around the world. It is estab lished only in a few airlines; it is not stand ard, and in most cases, it is only a one off event and not a recurrent training issue. Unde r the acro nym of CRM, it is aime d at self-recognition and selfexper ience of pers onal weaknesses and strengths. Science assures us that it is impossible to tra in or chang e individu al be haviour , especia lly und er stress. In Europe t he JAA took the initiative to mandate basic Human Fact ors education for pilot st uden ts with its JAR-FCL , and CRM tra inin g for pilots emp loyed in commerc ial aviation under JAR-OPS. The maj or d ifference between HF and CRM can be seen that HF is basic theory , focussed on the indi v idual pilot and his ro le and effect in a team , whi le CRM means know ledge and application of skills , d iffering from comp any to company ,

14

reflecting the culture of the operator.

However both JAR-FCL and JAR-OPS are not yet mature enough; JAR-OPS is currently undergoing NPA (Notice of Proposed Amendment) No 16 which hopefully will clarify and standardise training requirements in the JAA member states.

JAA initiative NPA 16 : NPA 16 mainly clarifies the "What and When" of training requirements.

For the first time world-wide, recurrent CRM training will be a legal requirement.

Its introduction will require time for the majority of airlines, as training programmes need

(situation awareness) it can be said that the ATM system is opaque to pilots to be developed , implemented and evaluated . Core Elements are defined as: (a) Human error and reliability, error chain, error prevention and detection (b) Company safety culture, SOPs, organisational factors (c) Stress , stress management , fatigue & vigilance (d) Information acquisition and processing situation awareness, workload management (e) Decision making (f) Communication and co-ordination inside and outside the cockpit (g) Leadership and team behaviour synergy (h) Automation, philosophy of the use of automation (if relevant to the type) (i) Specific type-related differences (j) Case based studies It can be seen easily that even these requirements refer only very vaguely to any interaction with people outside the airc raft, they still remain "cockpit or aircraft centred" .

Which of these elements do address ATM issues?

Human error an d reliability : Pilots are unable to identify human elements or human input s from automation generated inputs in the ATM system; in reverse, the same is true for ATCO s with regard to cockpit anomali es: What is a human erro r in a cockpit, and what is a technical failure?

Example : Altitude excursions, deviations

from a clearance. Current pilot training does not address any interface with ATC. Error chain, error prevention and detection: Today 's ATM systems can be regarded as single channel systems : Full knowledge and situational awareness are not shared between the controller and the pilot. In some cases the controller is supported by a surve illance system which gives him feedback on the implementation of his decisions. Where such feedback is available, the ATC system is more robust and flexible, but decision making and action is still single-channel. What is required in the future is the technical development of an independent redundant second channel. TCAS is only there to intervene and protect against collision should the active primary ATC-pilot channel fail. Pilots HF/ CRM training does not address this area at all.

Stress management, workload management : HF training is aimed at providing the best possible environment for possible emergencies, where human behaviour is unpredictable .

It emphasises recognition of symptoms of stress in yourself and in your crew, however reference to ATC is only anecdotal. Under normal workload situations pilots can contribute to the traffic system efficiency by complying w ith all adequate ATC instructions, without being put under stress. In an abnormal or emergency situation this changes drastically: acceptance of even minor ATC instructions may become impossible. Today, with our "old fashioned" VHF radio telephony system, we can easily identify symptoms of stress and high workload just by the tone of a voice, the speed of articulation etc . How will we do that in the future when using data-link systems?

Situation awareness : Different information is available to pilots and controllers: a modern radar display shows a lot of details; in contrast, the cockpit TCAS display shows only the appro x imate relative position and relative altitude . Th e basic difference is that the pilot does not know the intentions of the other aircraft: destination/route requested, requested altitude or speed (fli ght plan) It can be said that the A TM system is opaque to pilots.

Information acquisition and processing : Inside the cockpit ,

'II~

CONTROLLER

lnternational Colloquium situations "arise "; no pre-planning is possible compared to ATCOs who receive a flight plan and hand-over information from th e previou s sector . Pilots working airborne separation would have to do so with little foreknowledge in a mainly reactive mode .

Safe and efficient flow of traffic for ATC versus safety, economy, punctuality and comfort of an individual flight . Conflict of inte rests are the normal result, responsibility for decisions should remain with ATC, while the execution of instructions is the duty of the pilot .

Judgement and Decision making : The time difference means a radically different training requirement for ATCOs and pilots : ATC works strategically w ith long-term solutions, pilots need to make tactical, short term decisions.

Communication and co-ordination inside and outside the cockpit : In the past this was an area of d isciplin e only: Cor rect Radio Telephony procedures together with the use of an internationally understood language, read-back and hearback procedures and standardised terminology . The future influence of Datalink technology on communication still has to be evaluated .

Automation : This is a question of equipment : System improvements will depend on Legislat ive requirements to carry modern high tech equipment, not only in Europe but for all aircraft world wide that operate in our airspace .

Leadership and team behaviour : Here we see historically dev eloped roles : Other aircraft are seen as intruder, ATC as resource . Pilot 's training focuses on their isolated work within the cockpit or the aircraft . Training has to recognise that pilots themsel ves are resourc es. In a team with ATC, pilots share the responsibility for the global system safety .

Howev er both sides have diff erent t asks:

HF and CRM Future : CRM has developed from initially only Cockpit Resource Management v ia Crew Resource Management to Company Resource Management . There are no attempts so far to become GRM : Global Resource Management. The advantages of CRM can be found in the improvement of individual fl ight safe ty fo r a giv en fl ig ht through the avoidance or early detection of errors. Joint technic al training for pilots and ATCOs is the next logical step, joint

HF training is not yet on th e horizon .

Remembe r : HF is not a fi x for technica l short-com ings . The ATC system needs t o accommodate also those airspace user s which rece ive no HF t rainin g, or where national culture results in a radically different HF definition. Before we can expect any benefits from HF trainin g in terms of airspace capacity or coll ect ive system safety, we need a clear defin iti on of training requirements before the introduction of any new technolog y , modern equipment and new procedu res.

S. ROUND TABLE The last item was a round table ta lk ing on safety . For The Controller Ma gaz ine, I asked a question on the relatio nship between justice and ATC. Freedo m of information versus confidentiali ty in inc ident or accident investi gat ions .

All speake rs agree on the necessity t o maintain confidential it y when an AT CO reports an inciden t . The meet ing ho ped for the future impl ementat ion of an Europ ean Law in Civ il Avi ation .

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ATC the Freezer Arctic Operations in East Greenland Philippe Domagala

EuropeanEditor Plentyof fuel should also be planned to allow for a diversion to safer places.

East Gree nland is one of the most remote parts of the world is; less than 3000 people live in an area which spread along nearly 3000 Km of coastline .

A lthough Greenland was occupied by lnuits as long as 5000 years ago, only the South and t he Western parts really received attention. The Vikings landed there in 986A.D. and Eric the Red called the place "Greenland" as he thought with such an beautiful name it w ould attract settlers ( Marketing is not a new science .. ) The V ikings occupied the South and the We st unt il around 1400 , then these parts were 'red iscovered" and claimed by Den mark aro und 1600. But still nobody w ent to East Greenland. It was not until 1894 that the Danish decided to explore and build the first settlement on the East Coast. The City of Angmassalik was founded w ith a local population of 450 as a trad ing post. So the local lnuits had their first taste of western civilisation as lit tle as just over a 100 years ago. Th e fact that Angmassa lik can only be reached by boat during 2 mont hs of t he year ( when the sea ice allows) kept it a remote place until World War II. Th en aviation was brought into the picture and communication drast ically cha nged the lif e of the locals .

Today Taliisaq (the Inui t name for Angmassa lik) is indi rect ly "reachable" 6 days a week from t he outs id e wor ld .

Desp ite the fact t hat the area has only 3 Km of roads arou nd the town, ( and already has 3 tax is I ) , because t he local airport , Ku lusuk , is located on an island 15 Km away, t he loca l Helicopter is t he one that is v iewed around here with rea l respect .

A small Dan ish Operator , AIR A LPHA , prov ides t his service with a Bell 222 . It prov ides conn ect ions to t he A irport , bu t

16

also to the smaller settlements around the coast.

They have 2 helicopters based in East Greenland, one in Taliisaq, and the other further north in Constable Pynt , linking the local airport with the few settlements around it.

The company has 7 pilots working one month on , one month off, 6 days per week . They fly around 700 hours per year, not only linking the villages among

themselves on behalf of the Greenland Government , but also providing ad-hoe chart ers for expeditions, medical evacuations, search and rescue missions, etc. The helipad in Tassiilaq is just a square of tarmac and a windsock . W eathe r is the main problem affecting aviation in Greenland wi th winds exceeding 100Km / h on many occasions and the presence of very high mountains (exceeding 3000 metres) arou nd the coastline.

Th e helicopt ers' weat he r minima are very to lera nt and operations in all kinds of weat her is normally possible . But the main connect ion to the outs ide worid is through

Kulusuk airport . Kulusuk ( BGKK) is a 1200m gravel strip, initially built by the US navy in 1958 in order to build a large radar station that was part of the DEW line (Distant Early Warning) called DYE-4.

The DEW line was a line of "over the horizon" radars located all around the Arctic, aimed at early detection of Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic nuclear missiles; the main fear of Americans in the 1960's .

Four of them were located in Greenland .

Thy typical cold-war effort had a high impact on Greenland communities. At the peak of th eir Operations th e US had over 2000 troops based in Kulusuk alone, and that was more that the entire East Greenland population at th e time.

With the fall of the Soviet union and the rise of satellites, Early Warning Ground Based radars became obsolete and th e Americans left Greenl and altogether in 1991 (not wit hout leav ing some so uvenirs , see photo) . They turned ove r th e airport faciliti es to the Danish authorities which pro vi ded an A FIS service.

fHf CONTROLLER

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ATC1n the Freezer Today Kulusuk Airport has one AFIS operator, named Alf, working around 1500 movements a year, mostly Fokker 50s of Air Iceland ( 6 times a week ) and Dash 7s from Greenlandair ( 3 times a week) This provides roughly half of the

runway is very rough, with peaks in excess of 1000m all around . Attempts to land in Kulusuk ( or any other Greenland airport for that matter) in marginal weather should be left to the local pilots only.

Unfortunately numerous accidents are happening to remind us of the realities of the arctic.

In Kulusuk alone, on 29 July 99, a British registered Beech Baron on a flight from Reykjavik to Nuuk experienced severe icing above the ice cap and had to return, then diverted to Kulusuk, short on fuel. It missed the runway on its first attempt and pulled up but on the missed approach

procedure it hit a small mountain beside the runway . All on board perished.

If you intend to visit the area , it will be for many of you , the experience of a lifetime.

East Greenland is like no other place .

Nature , there, is at its hardest and the local people will definitively surprise you in many ways. There , you realise tha t , Nature does not need humans to exi st, and that if aviation has made tr ips easier , and if imported civilisation can be felt here and there , you will be a very smal l guest in this very hostile env ironment .

movements, the other half are helicopter operations . Occasionally a military C130 or a Governmental Gulfstream 3 visit the place.

The Airspace above the whole of Greenland is split at 20 ,000 feet. Above is controlled airsp ace provided by Reykjavik centre in Iceland ( see photo) .

Below 20,000 ft, it is uncontrolled airspace where Sondre, the largest airport in Greenland located on the west coast, prov ides information to IFR traffic, and where the local AFIS operators provide information to the VFR. Kulusuk , is open Monday to Saturday from 0800 to 1700 local, and on request at other times . The terrain around the

ATTEMPTING TO FLY YOURSELF TO ANY AIRPORT IN GREENLAND

Before considering reaching, let alone diverting to any Greenland airfield, a very good familiarisation w it h A rct ic we at her, local procedures, and unwritten local practices should be made . Plenty of fuel should also be planned to allow for a dive rsio n t o safe r places .

Currently Greenland has only 6 airports . Only 2 of them have long asphalt runways : Sond re Stromfjo rd ( Kangerlussuaq) w ith 2800x60m and Narsassuaq with 1800x30m. Both have weight restrictions in the summer . The othe r fou r are all aro und 1000 m (Constable Pynt 1000m gravel, Kulusuk 1200m gravel, Nuuk 950m asphalt and lllusiat 850m asphalt) .

Except for Sondre which has a local ATC control (TWR and APP), all other airports are AFIS operated . Hou rs of op erat ions for all Greenland airports are identical : Monday to Friday 0800 to 1700 local , closed Sunday and public holid ays. Other times on request.

Most airports are locat ed at the end of deep fjo rds surrounded by high t errain . Unl ess th ere are CAV O K cond it ions , pi lots without a good knowledge of the local topographical and meteorological local conditions would be advised not to make any attempts to approach those airfields through the fjords. For information, all the west coast airfields AFIS are on t he same freq uency, 119.100 , while the 2 eastern airports are on common frequency 118 .100 .

A word of caution : remember that the simple fact of filing a Greenland airport as a div ersio n in your fli ght plan w ill not alter the opening times of those fields. Also, beware that the w eather you receive on the weath er chart at ti me of departu re wi ll ve ry probably be completely different by the time you get there .

Recently the Greenland Governmen t decided to build 7 new regional airports in th e co ming years to replace exist ing th e hel iport in some commun ities . All the airfields will have a 800 m runwa y to make them suita ble fo r Dash 7 ope rations. They wi ll be located in Upernavik, Quaasut, Uummanaq, Aasisaat ,Sisimut , Maniisoq ,Paamiut and Qaqortoq .

THE CONTROLLER

17

Training lssues in Africa Controller Training Problems in Africa Albert Taylor EVP Africa and Middle East INTRODUCTION

ATC Licences are the following :

In 1920, a renown ed Ghanaian educationist, Dr . Kwegyir Aggrey stated that 'if you

Aerodrome Control Approach Control (Procedural) Approach Radar Control Area Control (Procedural) Area Radar Control

educa te a man y ou educate an individua l, but if y ou educate a woman you educate a nation'.

Permit me to borrow from this wise saying t o say that 'if you do not train a pilot properly

yo u risk the safety of one aircraft and its occupants , but if you do not train an air traffic contro ller properly you risk the safety of all aircraft in a given airspace and their occupants '.

Training in aviation is a key to maximizing utilisation of the technological infrastructure available to this dynamic and safety driven industry. Unfortunately, most Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) have tended to invest in the procurement of equipment but have hardly paid attention to the training needs of the human beings who must operate the equipment to achieve the purpo ses for which the expensive equipment has been acquired. Efficient traini ng is brought about by a number of related factors including : proper selection, well designe d courses, qualified and motivated instr uctor s, suitable training aids and an effective period of on-the-job t raining. Admittedly, training is not cheap; neither is safety. However, as has been said

by Human Factors experts, 'if you think safety is too expe nsive, try an accident', and by inference, if you think training is too expensive, try ignoran ce.

QUANTI TATIVE ASSESSMENTS ATC Training Needs The main areas of ATC training are the fo llow ing : Familiarisatio n tra inin g (attachment to ATC faci lity as Assistant, PPL, exposure in a flight simul ator , cockpit experience) Formal tra ini ng required for an ATC rating in Aerodrome, Approa ch or Area Control (This training involves classroom lectu res, simulator exerc ises and OJT) Refresher and recurre nt train ing for revalidation; A dvanced ATC or Specialised tra ining;

It should be noted that some ANSPs do not issue licences to their air traffic controllers .

IFATCA recommends that those who practice ATC should hold licences with the appropriate ratings of functions to be performed .

The following ATC Licensing Ratings are recommended by IFATCA and are now being discussed with ICAO. Aerodrome Radar Air Traffic Flow Management Automatic Dependent Surveillance ATC Instructor

Estimation of ATCOs who must be trained (Demand) There are 56 countries in Africa and each has at least one airport. Many countries like Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, South Afr ica and Tanzania have many aerodromes that

Estimation of existing capacity for ATC Training in Africa (Supply) ICAO has established standards for approved ATC training (!CAO Training Manual Part D-2) . Some variations in course content and training methods are inevitable depending upon regional and national requirements, but the basic standards of proficiency for Air Traffic Control remain. It must be noted that ICAO sets minimum standards to ensure efficient operations and uniformity of practices . It can be argued that any ATC training institution that is not approved by ICAO cannot be considered to be providing the approved ATC training .

ICAO Approved ATC Training Institutions in Africa Egypt: National Civil Aviation Training Organisation; Ethiopia : Civil Aviation Training Centre; Kenya : East African School of Aviation; Nigeria : College of Avi ation Technology;

ANSPs have tended to invest in the procurement of (expensive) equipment ... but have hardly paid any attention to the training needs of the human operators .â&#x20AC;˘. provide air traffic control service .

Aerodromes that provide a 24 hour service need a minimum of 12 Aerodrome Controller s to ensure smooth operations. !CAO has a list of over 300 aerodromes in Afric a.

Each aerodrome would require at least 10 Aerodrome or Aerodrome / App roach rated Controllers.

Management trai ning.

At least about 4000 ATCOs are needed to ensure smooth ATC operations in Africa.

ATC !Licensing Rat ings The fo rmal ATC Ratings recommended by ICA O and which lead to endorseme nt in

Appro ximately 2000 Controllers, th erefore , need refresher tra ining every year. This is based on t he premise that each controller

18

needs to have some refresher training for proficiency checks once every two years .

South Africa : ATNS College; Tanzania : Civil Aviation Training Centre; Zambia : Air Services Training Institute .

It is evident from the above that the French ATC training inst itutions in Africa have not been listed in the ICAO Training Directory as approved schools. It is known, however, that there are ATC t rai ning schools in Morocco, Niger and Tunisia . This implies that they are not !CAO approved ATC t raining institution s.

ASECNA has over 300 ATCOs with various Procedural ATC Ratings who are working in ATC units of its 16 member States.

However , ASECNA has only one formal training centre in Niger that is well equipped, manned by competent staff and has a maximum capacity of 20 students per cou rse. Th e Training School in Niger is complemented by Unit Training Cells that are established at th e various ASECNAmanaged aerodromes. The greatest handic ap of this Training School is the low proficiency of the inst ructo rs and trainees in the English language

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Training lssues in Africa The total capacity of these ICAO recommended ATC training institutions is less than 30% of the total training requirements of Africa.

How are the other training requirements met?

Some ANSPs attach trainees to working ATCOs on Self- Study basis. This approach is very unsuitable and limits the scope and understanding of the trainee. In addition it makes the training period unnecessarily long.

Many ANSPs are compelled to send their student ATCOs to foreign ATC training institut ions outside Africa, especially Europe, for their training . This approach has t he possibility of giving ATCOs better quality t raining than makeshift training institutions. This option is a source of many other problems for ANSPs and ATCOs. There is a global shortage of ATCOs, hence most of the ATC training institutions outside Africa are fully booked to train their own nationals to meet local training needs . Many ANSPs that would prefer training their ATCOs in such schools are unable to plan and implement effective training programmes for ATC operations. It has become difficult to train a reasonable num ber of ATCOs within timescales preferred by service providers .

There is pressure on these schools to increase capacity to meet foreign demands and also t o make more profit . The result is that some schools are increasing the number of students per class and / or redu cing the trai ning period.

The tra inin g fees keep increasing as a result of the increasing demand. ATNS of South Afr ica now charges US $ 8,348 for Approach Control Procedural and US $ 9,300 for Approach Radar training. SERCO (Bailbroo k Coll ege) in t he UK charges US $ 11,600 and US $ 10,200 for Aerodrome Control and Approach Radar courses respect ively.

ATCOs . There are cases where ATCOs working at the same ATC facility have been trained in different institutions with different standards . This approach leads to multiplicity of standards and does not facilitate uniformity of practice. The piecemeal approach to ATC training often leads to delayed promotion of ATCOs, who then become demoralised and demotivated, because other support staff whose routine promotions are not subject to successful completion of specific training , eventually become seniors to the ATCOs, thereby earning better salaries and privileges than the ATCOs. Many ANSPs who are unable to 'afford' the high cost of foreign ATC training have

The total capacity of these ICAO recommended ATC training institutions is less than 30% of the total training requirements of Africa instituted national or local ATC training schools to cater for their training needs.

These makeshift training institutions are not equipped properly, neither are the training staff properly trained. Most importantly , no independent assessments are made by any competent body to ascertain the suitability of these makeshift training institutions .

Ideally, ATC Simulator training must be done with separate sets of simulators for each course . However, most makeshift training centres cannot afford to acquire separate simulators for the different types of ATC ratings. This is because the cost of purchasing and maintaining different simulators is too high to justify the need for the training of a few ATCOs . This approach

therefore reduces the efficiency of these makeshift training units .

The large ATC Training Schools normally have different sets of simulators to run the different courses they offer . Current technology, however, provides the possibility of using different software on one simulator to run the different training programmes. This option reduces cost by allow training institutions to procure only one set of simulators to run the different training programmes . The biggest disadvantage of this approach is that it reduces the capacity to run different courses simultaneously.

It is important to note , however, that local ATC training schools are necessary for the training of ATCOs on new procedures, or, for other re-validation purposes.

Problems associated with ICAOapproved ATC training institutions Regional ATC schools in Africa were established with reasonable foreign financial support. ICAO provided some level of assistance and ensured that the necessary infrastructure, equipment, curriculum, personnel, etc. met ICAO standards at the time the training institutions were established. However, ICAO is unable to maintain audit responsibilities after the schools are handed over to national ANSPs .

The schools are often unable to maintain the standards established at their inception .

QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT ICAO has still no formal ratings for ATC Instructors. This implies that there are no standard requirements for an ATC instructor . This has created a situation where just anyone could be picked to train ATCOs , depending on the exigencies of the time. It has also been very difficult to motivate to instructors. The chronic poor working conditions make it impossible to retain a considerable number of suitable ones.

Many ANSPs are already finding it difficult to obta in govern ment approval to buy and maintain necessary ATC equipment listed in the Air Navigation Plan. In an environment w here training is not given highe r priority , against the backdrop of soc ial-eco nomic prob lems of govern ments, it has been almost imp ossible for many ANSPs to use scarce fore ign currency to carry out trai ning programmes. In addition, ATC man agers constitute a negligible percentage of tota l management staff of ANSPs. It has become extreme ly difficult , t herefore , to convince ot her management staff of t he importance of ATC train ing in order to allocate substantial amo unt during budgeting.

Thi s has resulted in piecemeal tra ining of

20

1 HE CONTROLLER

In the absence of qualified instructors, the chronic shortage of ATCOs has created a situation where training of a fresh student has become a predominant phenomenon. Therefore, most ATCOs become OJT Instructors soon after they complete their training, even though they may have very little experience.

Due to predominant shortage of ATCOs, it has been extremely difficult to carry out Refresher training, and, almost impossible to conduct Proficiency Checks.

The inability of ANSPs to prioritise ATC training during budgeting contributes to low safety standards. Decisions on ATC training are rarely based on obtaining the best, even though other non-safety related decisions are based on getting the best on the market.

Safety Regulation departments of ANSPs have either no regulations on ATC training or have been unable to enforce existing regulations. In most cases, there are no designated units with the legal authority to

The Shortage of ATCOs, inadequate training and exposure of ATC managers have limited the ability of ATC units to develop an efficient training culture. establish and monitor ATC standards.

The responsibilities for assessing the standards and quality of ATC schools, and for enforcing sanctions where necessary, have not been defined.

The high demand on the few ATC institutions is creating an environment where the desire to make maximum profit at the expense of a thorough training programme is affecting safety.

ATC instructors at some training schools are unable to maintain validity of their licences . There is a possibility of losing touch with some key operational scenarios and this impacts negatively on safety .

Africa generally has a submissive culture . In the absence of wellstructured training programmes, certain aspects of this submissive culture impact negatively on ATC training. This human relations barrier becomes more prevalent where lack of training objectives in some training units leads to norm referencing rather than criteria referencing.

OTHER FACTORS Availability of specific skills in certain non-operational ATC areas like Procedures Design, Airspace Management, ATS Planning , Manpower Development, Search and Rescue, Accident / Incident Investigation, Proficiency Checking, Critical Incident Stress Management, Safety Management, etc . are essential requirements of every efficient ATC unit . Unfortunately, many ATC service providers have not trained their staff to undertake these essential functions. There are many experienced ATCOs who have retired from active ATC service . The expertise of seasoned ATCOs is hardly utilised in the search to developed personnel to man the technical support areas listed above . It is common to see retired airline, military and Safety Regulation personnel being trained to man technical areas that ATCO s could be developed to occupy . This obstructs the opportunity to expand organisational structures in ATC and, more importantly, impede attempts to develop an adequate human resource base for ATC operations .

Training is a management funct ion. Many ATC units in Africa lack effective and efficient management support . The shortage of ATCOs, inadequate training and exposure of ATC managers have limited the ability of ATC units to develop an efficient training culture. In many countries, the needs of the Airports and Safety Regulations departments have been enhanced over the needs of Air Traffic Management. About 85% of top ATC managers never receive any training or practi ce prior to their appointment to this challenging management position . This is partly due to the shortage of air traffic controllers , absence of well-defined

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Selected for airports wo rldw ide including Oslo -Gardermoen , Kuala Lumpur International , Hong Kong Chek Lap Kok

Training lssues succession / manpower development plan and inadequate funding for training .

The use of military personnel and unqualified staff is seriously hampering ATC ope ration. In some countries, huge sums of monies are spent to train the military air traffi c controllers, w hilst excuses are made about inadequ ate funds to train their civilian cou nterpart s. In other cases, ANSPs are pressurized to employ military ATCOs, some of whom fall below the standards required. This is done as part of national emergency planning, but essenti ally, it serves as a counter to ATC indust ria l disp utes . However , in situations where the shortage of staff becomes critic al, and , where every ATCO on duty also automatically becomes an OJT Instructor, the standard of the ATC Unit becomes comprom ised . In a recent industrial dispute in Zimbabwe, most qualified ATCOs and experien ced OJT instructors were dismissed in an action in which Zimbabwean courts fau lted the govern ment . The government hur riedly employed new students who were rushed th rough 3 months trainin g to im prove the criti cal staff situation. This is similar to the case in Nigeria some years ago, where the military commander in charge of aviation decided to dismiss AT COs and replace them with univ ers ity graduates, w hom he felt were more knowle dgeable and , the refore, could be trained within 2 weeks to be q ualifi ed ATCOs . The IFALPA Regional V ice President for AFI West confront ed the officer and t hreatened to call for a bo yco tt un less the authorities solved th e ATC prob lem wit hin 3 days. Th e authorities had no option but to rescin d their decision . Thi s weird manner of addre ssing hum an factor s issues in aviation has a lon g-ter m effe ct on tra ining, and is a recipe for di saster. Ther e is enough evidence to conclude that some polit ical authorities are meddling in the tra ining process of ATCOs and the provis ion of ATC serv ices.

The practice where the ANSPs and the Safety Regulation Unit are managed by the same ad mini stratio n is a major contributing factor to t he tra ining probl ems encounte red

by ATCOs in Africa. There are no independent bodies to assess the training needs of ATC in order to formulate ru les to regu late ATC operati ons. Th e Submissive Cult ure of Afr icans is be ing unduly exp loit ed

by ANSPs and pol it ical authorities to suppress ATC operat io ns. There is urgent need for stakeho lders to sponsor the establishment of independen t reg ulatory bod ies w ho wo uld have the lega l authority and resources to reg ulate ATC operat ions and apply sanction s w hen necessary .

Int rinsic hindrances of ATC operations on ATC t raining Trad it ionally , ATCOs have been compared

22

â&#x20AC;˘

Africa

to pilots, just to put into perspective some professional and operational issues that are not easily understood by many managers and the public . However, piloting and ATC are unique in their own merits and have distinct differences.

In t he even t that an accident occurs as a result of inadequate tra ining , the pilot of an airplane risks losing his/ her life . This huge risk is enou gh for any pilot to demand the appropriate training despite any mitigatin g factors. Legally, the pilot can refuse to fly an airplane if he thinks its performance has been impaired to an extent that could compromise safety . Also, a pilot would naturally and legally refuse being 'forced' to fly an aircraft if he/ she is in doubt of his/ her proficiency .

On the contrary, air traffic controllers do not stand the risk of instant death in the event that an accident occurs as a result of

The Submissive culture of Africans is being unduly exploited by ANSP 's and political authorities to suppress ATC operations deficiencies in ATC training . Furthermore, air traffic controllers do not have the legal dispensation to refuse to perform ATC duties, if they consider that the capacity of the ATC facility has been reduced significantly. Curr ently , 15 ATCOs in the United States are facing disciplinary action for an alleg ed slowdown of traffic at O'Hare International Airport on 17'" July, 2000 , although, the incident was due to staff shortage. Last year, IFATCA had to help with the reinst atemen t of Slovenian ATCOs who were susp ended because they refused to work at ATC positions for w hich th ey did not have the requisi t e training.

The owner of an airplane risks losing it if he does not make sure the pilot is well trained.

An Air Traffi c Serv ice provider does not stand any risk of losing ownership of the ATC facility, or the airspace concerned, if an accident occurs as a result of inadequat e tra ining of air traffic controllers.

In commercial airline operations, the airline could face legal battles and payment of huge compensations in the event of an accident, if it is found that the airline reneged on its responsibility to provide th e appropriate trai ning to the crew or ensure serviceab ilit y of equ ipment.

There are no known cases where air traffic control service providers have been taken through the legal battles and payment of high compensations that airlines are saddled with, in the event of an accident .

Airplane and Avionics manufacturers have a direct interest in pilot training and should ensure that training regulat ions are religiously adhered to .

ATC equipment manufacturers have very little or no direct interest in the conduct and details of ATC training.

The Regulatory bodies in the State of aircraft registration police the crew to ensure that the proper training and the proficiency of the crew are maintained.

Regulatory authorities in most States, especially in Africa, are critically impotent exercising effective supervision of ATC operations , including ATC training.

An airline that is prone to accidents / incidents as a result of inadequate training or proficiency of its crew would lose customers instantly, and migh t collapse . Travellers and the public readily become aware of deficiencies of airline operations . Travellers would cheerfully applaud a pilot for a smooth landing, but may choose not to fly again with the airline if a hard landing is made . The media would quickly pick up the travellers and public concerns and this may bring pressure on the airline to remove any deficiencies reported .

ANSPs have not lost customers in cases where the ATC systems have been noted to be critically deficient . Airlines continue to make generous payments even if they continu e to encounter risks as a result of shortcomings in the ATC systems . The public is hardly informed about ATC operation s and, therefore, cannot hold service providers accountable for shortcomings.

Unlike piloting, the intrinsic hindrances in the practice of ATC limit the natural ability and legal propensity of ATCOs to demand th e appropriate training for the ATC job .

Additionally, ANSPs are not held fully accountable to their customers and th e public fo r their inability to provide efficient ATC service . Neither are they charge d with crimin al intent for reneging on the ir legal responsibility of ensuring safety of air transport .

WAY FORWARD The training of controllers on self-study bases must be condemned .

There is urge nt need to inc rease t he capacity for training ATCOs in Afric a. Th e

111f CONTROLLER

Training lssues existing training institutions should be expanded to absorb some of the excess training needs without lowering the required ATC training standards. The training institutions that have deteriorated by way of physical infrastructure and equipment should be rehabilitated and reequipped. Some of the makeshift training units could be upgraded into regional training centres .

We need to aggressively develop and motivate the human resource needs of instructors and the other training staff.

ICAO should establish ratings for ATC instructors for endorsement in ATC licences . The practice where just any ATCO who completes ATC training becomes an OJT instructor must be stopped. OJT instructors must be qualified and experienced ATCOs who are selected and trained in OJT techniques .

â&#x20AC;˘

Africa

... controllers in africa .. . are being victimised for the failures of political ~uthorities and management to provide a severe working environment equipment to the Tanzanian ATC School and sponsored an assessment of the needs of the school by a foreign consultant. It is recommended that other stakeholders can help by providing assistance to some of the ATC training institutes . This could be based on reports filed from missions to ATC training schools, by concerned partners in the industry.

IFATCA has tried in the past to help in the training of ATCOs and, therefore, initiated a pilot programme in Tanzania some years ago. The funding for the pilot programme was expected from the UNDP through ICAO . However, the Tanzania government had other priority needs at that time from the UNDP, and therefore, was not keen on the initiative from IFATCA . Notwithstanding this problem, IFATCA provided some

THE CONTROLLER

ICAO should conduct periodic audit of the existing ATC schools that are listed in the ICAO Training Directory to ensure that approved training standards are maintained .

A regional forum should be organised to educate appropriate authorities on how human factor issues of ATCOs, and, Africa's submissive culture and the meddling of some polit icians in ATC training, impacts negatively on ATC training.

CONCLUSION The international aviation community and the public have accepted the shortcom ings and deficiencies in Africa 's air traffic control infrastructure as one of the many woes of the continent .

Much effort is being dir ected towards development of contingency measures rather than demanding that ANSPs live up to their responsibilities. Airlines continue to invest in airborne equipment and also pay generous fees for services not rendered.

A programme of proficiency checking of operational ATCOs and ATC instructors should be introduced; its implementation monitored, and identified deficiencies published as part of the APIRG list of shortcomings.

Other stakeholders in the aviation industry should invest in ATC training. IATA for example, provides an array of training in many facets of the airline industry . I recommend to IATA to expand the scope of its training opportunities in the industry by investing in ATC training in Africa. The organisation is currently training 70 air traffic controllers from Zaire to acquire various ATC ratings .

The airlines should consider forming partnerships with other stakeholders to increase the caracity of ATC training in Africa . Air Canada plays a similar partnership role in the training of ATCOs in Canada . It would be a good idea for organisations like IAT A to offer some sponsorship for the training of ATCOs in areas where A TCOs are known to be lacking in proficiency, and also, for advanced ATC training. By this approach, airlines and other stakeholders like IAT A would ensure that training standards remain high.

training standards should form part of ICAO, IATA and other missions to ANSPs, and eventually, should serve as a prelude for the extension of the ICAO Safety Audit programme to ATS . The programme is expected to commence in November 2001 .

Establishment of autonomous ANSPs, either fully owned by governments or jointly with other public or private institutions, would enhance th e ability of ANSPs to plan and implement efficient training programmes for ATC. Until Ghana Civil Aviation became autonomous in 1986, it was extremely difficult to obtain government approval to train ATCOs in foreign ATC schools. The international community should support the initiative of some concerned organisations to convince African governments to establish autonomous ANSP with financial and legal authority.

Independent regulatory units with legal autonomy to sanction ANSPs and enforce Rules should be established at national levels. The drive towards globalisation requires that regional ATC schools should have acceptable regional standards to facilitate the harmonisation of ATC practices. A criterion for assessing .ATC proficiency should be developed so that ANSP could be held liable for causes of ATC incidents arising out of non-compliance with training standards. Assessment of

Enslaving worki ng conditions of air traffic controllers in Africa has been accepted as a norm without regard to the substantial revenue accruing from ATC services .

Ironically , air traffic controlle rs in Africa are also at the receiving end, and are being victimised for the failures of political authorities and management to provide a serene working environment.

Inadequate training of air traffic controllers in Africa is also being accepted as on e of the many woes and the norm.

The international community should not e that a demoralised air traffic controlle r, working with deficient equipment and inadequate tra ining is a recipe for d isaster .

The quest to reduce incidents / accidents , or avoid them , cannot be wished away. W e must play ou r roles to improv e safety in ATC operat ions in Africa .

[Ed Note : This pape r was presented to t he IFA LPA Afr ica and Mi ddl e East Seminar in Tunis on 10-11 Octobe r 2000 ]

23

The So

24

ATC

CONTROLL ER

The Story of lFATCA FOR SALE Under Control: the Story of IFATCA At the Geneva conference celebrating the Federation's 40th anniversary, the history of IFATCA will be released for sale.

'Under Control' contains more than 300 pages of facts and figures, information invaluable to every IFATCA member and of interest to the general reader . The book is a comprehensive

review of the mil estones and major events in the Federation 's history as it looks at the

formation and growth of IFATCA over forty years, its developing maturity and international invo lve ment , some of the key person alities who shaped the Federation and their, and its, commitment to the profession of air traffic control. The book examines the lowl ights as well as the highlights , some of the mor e contentious internal d isputes and the con ti nuing financial strugg les over four decad es.

If you have ever wondered why IFATCA operates as it does or why some international contacts are better than others , this book wi ll provide the background . It is essentially, though, a story of a life . From a 'g leam' in the eye, through its birth, infancy and adolescence, it traces t he orga nisation's path to th e mature adult we know today. Along the way, the narrative examines how the federation

progr essed

from a purely professional body to one vitally concerned with the social aspects of the controll er' s livelihood and ho w it conv inced the sceptics of the value of individual controller

expertise and input . Import ant 'peripheral'

matters such as the history of Th e Cont ro lle r

magazine , relations with other international organisations and its approach to advancing technologies all come unde r close scrutiny . It is essential reading .

If you cannot be in Geneva , make sure you ask your association 's delegat es to pick you up a copy .

The price? Just 20 CHF 'Under Control : the Story of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controll ers' Associat ions' is published by IFATCA and all proceeds will be retained by the Federation . If you miss out on obtaining you r copy at conference 2001, further issues will be availabl e at th e same price plus packaging and postage from the office in Montre al.

Extract from CHAPTER S The Second Decade of IFATCA 1971 - 1980 The first decade of IFATCA had ended with some internal controversy . Th e second comme nced in the shadow of continuin g and escalating industrial activity and thre atening politics . European air traffic controlle rs in particul ar were voi cing their disquie t ab ou t conditions and traffic demands via widespread

industrial disput es, Middle East pol iti cs seemed to intrude everywhe re and air piracy

bec ame rampant . Naturally, IFATCA was not immune from th ese events and any thoughts carried over from the sixties of insula t ion from these two problems were quickly d ispell ed and indeed, despit e its charter, th e Federat ion was forced to become heavi ly involve d. W ith industri al disputation widespread and increasing and int ern ational poli t ics th reatening and intrudi ng , there was little possibi lity of IFA TCA remainin g isol ated . The scene for a difficult d ecade was set .

For air traffic control , the sixt ies clo sed to a background of growing unr est with disputes featu ri ng in the USA, France, Germany and the Netherlands and IFATCA's second decad e had barely commenced when the y were confronted with the German 'Ope rat ion Safety'.

In

April, 1971 the VDF took action to "protect themselves against the det erior ating safety in the German ATC system caused by f urt her incr ease in lack of personn el, worsening

maintenance

of ATC equ ipm ent , intended red uction of the in itia l train ing period of newl y

appoint ed perso nn el and " ... because of the unwil lingn ess of the Germa n Ministry of Transport to even f urt her discuss urge nt changes within our present ATC system" . Stemm ing from this action, th e Germa n ministry even took st eps to prevent dele gates atte ndi ng th at year 's conference.

The VDF's action caused severe probl ems for their neighbours and the VDF had to mak e a ple a to t hei r co lleag ues for

under standing . The decade was not off t o a good start.

As th e seven ti es unfold ed, further serious disputes took place in France and Germany and , amo ngst ot her places, in A rge nt ina , Canada, Spain , Au stra lia, Mexico and Italy. In almost every one of t hese instances the disput e was centred on wha t co ul d be termed recognition".

"due

IFATCA was certainly being accepte d at int ernationa l forums but its constituent s w ere still fac ed w it h a ser ious strugg le fo r

recog nit ion at hom e and saw littl e alternative but to take action to achi eve somet imes even basic to ol s for t hei r profess io n and m inimal cond itions . And nor had the situat ion improved great ly by the end of the decade fo r Presiden t Henschler was forced to remark in 1979 "The last twelve mo nt hs has been a period of strugg le and uph eaval in ou r profess ion " _ He could well have noted "The last twelve years has been a period of strugg le" .

fHf- CONTROLLER

25

CNS/ATM The 90's - A Period of Change A personal view Chris Stock It all began with telephone calls. They would be at all times of the night and day and the excuse would be "sorry I forgot th e time change". The message was always the same - have you made your mind up about the Executive Vice President Technical position? Or words to that effect in a somewhat more colourful Australian vernacular! Yes, I was the target of concerted assault by the then .President, Charl es Stuart and yes, I agreed to take on the post at the 1992 conference in Bournemouth. Charles was, and still is, very persuasive when he sets his sights on his ta rget . It was the start of an eventful five years on the Executive Board. Even thoug h I may have acted like the reluctant bride at the time, I have to say that I have been privileged to act on behalf of IFATCA co-ordinating the technical activities during a momentous period in the history of air traff ic control or as it has become to be more commonly labelled, air traffic manage ment . In the next few paragraphs .

I would like to trace the role of IFATCA in the development and implementation of the CNS/ A TM concept

Recognizing the major and tradition breaking changes that satellite based systems would impose on the existing ATC systems, the FANS comm ittee concluded

the overriding principle for the Federation was that radical developments should be analysed and validated methodically to ensure that safety was not compromised ... that the future air navigation system would require global implementation.

Consequently in July 1989, the ICAO council established the FANS II committee or more congenially known as "Son of FANS". In September 1991, the 10 th Air Navigation Conference considered the work so far achieved in FANS II and agreed

ICAO had established a Special Committee on Future Air Navigation Systems (FANS) on the 28 / 29 November 198 3 . During the next five years, t he FANS committee held four fu ll meetings which culminated in the produ ction of a report to the President of the ICAO Council in October 1988. The committee had dec id ed t_hatthe shortcomings inherent in the communications navigation .. and surveillance (CNS) syste ms were not capable of supporting t he future needs of civil aviation . Furthermore it identified that satellit e technology offered the on ly v iable solution for the future Top Table at AFM Regional Meeting in Nairobi requirements of the internation al civil aviat ion com muni ty. IFATCA was recommendations covering the full represented on the FANS committee by spectrum of CNS/ A TM systems concept . such stalwarts as Lex Hend riks It could be argued at this juncture that the (Neth erlands), Philippe Domo ga la (EGATS) acronym, CNS/ ATM, should have been and Mike Dooling (CATCA) They had considered more carefully and re-arranged realised at an early stage that the to be ATM / CNS however that was techno logy on offer was a do ubl e-edged probably asking too much of the crystal weapon . Great benefits could be realised ball when advanced technology was however if t he technocrats were allowed to claimin g the commanding heights . Also, it take contro l t hen the human inp ut wou ld was an early indication of the difficulties be com promised to such an extent t hat the that faced IFATCA in establishing its safety of the AT M system wou ld be credentials in an increasin gly technological den igrated. T his d ichotomy has cont inu ed world . throug hou t t he history of FANS and has been t he core element of the IFATCA The fourth and final meeting of FANS II participat ion. was held in Mont real between 15

.....

26

September and 1 October 1993 . I attended this historic meeting in the company of Philippe Domogala . The committee presented a global co-ordinated plan to the aviation world and a comprehensive document entitled "The ICAO CNS/ATM Systems : Coping with Air Traffic Demand", It was, and remains, a huge programme which requires enormous investment and here was another area of contention when the issues of short, med ium and long term benefits were discussed in terms of priority and cost.

The global nature of the CNS/ ATM inevitably brought together people and thinking from different cultures ranging from the enthusiastic, entrepreneurial, approach of the free market countries to the more cautious, government service attitude. To some extent the IFATCA membership reflected this division however, the overriding principle for the Federation was that radical developments should be analysed and validated methodically to ensure that safety was not compromised but was maintained or preferably, improved upon .

During this hectic and exciting period, the IFATCA input to the many aspects of the developing CNS / ATM concept was through the ICAO Panels . Of the many aspects of the IFATCA technical effort, probably the most important was the work achieved by our representatives in the panels. It is worth noting that IFATCA was a welcome and major contributor to the Automatic Dependent Surveillance Panel (ADSP) , the Review of the General Concept of Separation Panel (RGCSP), All W eather Operations Panel (AWOP), Global navigation Satellite System Panel (GNSSP) , and the Secondary Surveillance Radar Improvements and Collision Avoidance Systems Panel (SICASP). The IFATCA input to these Panels and other Regional Committees and Working Groups plus further contributions to various international organisations and . conferences established IFATCA as a main player in the world aviation arena. Indeed in the early days, our position in many panels and groups was that of observer status but now more often than not IFATCA is a full, participating member.

FANS or the CNS/ A TM concept was the cornerstone of the technical work undertaken by the Federation during the nineties. However it was also in danger of

, CONTROLLER

CNS/ATM becoming a battleground as the various factions argued vociferously about the benefits of early implementation which included issues such as separation reductions, use ofTCAS for climb throughs, and FreeFlight. IFATCA was caught in the crossfire of these arguments and sometimes took a position which was considered reactionary by some of the technological progressives. That this situation should develop was unfortunate because all parties had the same, ultimate , objective of implementing CNS/ ATM systems however the cru x of the problem lay in the fast development of CNS which overshadowed the requirement to

AGENDA that TCAS could be included in the reduced separation calculations . IFATCA argued strenuously against these proposals and it was a relief that ICAO mandated that safety nets such as TCAS should remain independent of the ATM system. Other debates involved the use of datalink and direct voice communications, introduction of FANS 1 and the development of ATN, the removal of terrestrial aids leaving GNSS as the sole means of navigation, and the role of the human in an increasingly automated environment . Exciting concepts and even more interesting arguments which are still continuing!

2001 MARCH 19 -23 IFATCA A nnu al Confe rence Geneva Contact : IFATCA 2001 Organizing Committee email : ifatca2001@swisscontrol.com fax : +41 224 17 4500 IFATCA 2001 Homepage on IFATCA Webs ite www.l FATCA.org

24 IFATCA Executive Board Meeting, Geneva Contact - IFATCA Offic e Manager, Alyssa Blais Phone+ 1 514 866 7040

Fax

+15 148667612

Email: office@ifatca.org

Technology outstripped the development of ATM thereby creating an imbalance that is only now being redressed.

June 8 - 10 IFATCA Executive Board Meeting Accra Contact - IFATCA Office Manager, Alyssa Blais

establish a clear and viable ATM concept .

Technology outstripped the development of ATM thereby creating an imbalance that is only now being redressed . It was difficult for IFATCA and other organisations such as IFALPA to present the future air navigation system as a human centred decision making system.

Various strands of debate and ideas were developed. The potential of CNS/ ATM was seen by all but there were parties who wished to make progress as fast as possible in order to realise the promised cost benefits . The proponents of technology believed that the human element could be reduced to a monitoring role, an argument that IFATCA resisted with all the resources that it could muster.

Significantly, virtually all ATM projects in the 1990's have fallen behind their deadlines. Reasons for these delays are numerous but it is inescapable fact that the software development was unable to match the increasing demands of a dynamic ATM environment and it has been left to the human in the system to resolve many of the difficulties . The large investment required both in the airborne and ground equipment has had a dampening effect on the implementation of CNS/ ATM in the latter half of the nineties . Whilst the CNS/ ATM concept anticipates the role of the controller to migrate from control to traffic management, the change will be accomplished over a longer period than originally planned.

Other developments and associated innovative but flawed thinking materialised in the early nineties. Examples included the proposed uses of TCAS for other applications besides the last ditch safety net to avoid collision . The climb through technique has already been mentioned however another worry ing suggestion was

THE COll!TROLLER

An early example of the desire to grasp the potential of CNS technology was the formation of the Informal South Pacific ATS Co-ordinating Group (ISPACG). The Group consisted of Pacific Rim ATS providers, avionics industry, international organisations, and the airlines and one of its prime objectives was to realise early benefits of CNS . It had been obvious for while that the areas that had the most to benefit from the satellite based technology were those with sparse or no ground aids such as the large, low density, continental and oceanic areas. The Pacific was a prime target. Although IFATCA participated in ISPACG, it was not a comfortable relationship . This was primarily due to the culture of the group which approached its task in a very business orientated manner by setting objectives and milestones that had to be achieved within a certain timeframe.

These techniques were appl ied to various trials and in particular the development of FANS 1. This mindset was typified by the adoption of the IAT A proposal by ISPACG/ 5 in October 1993 that called for an aggressive and expedited implementation of CNS/ ATM in the South Pacific. The region had become identified as the major trials area for CNS/ ATM systems using no rmal scheduled passenger carrying aircraft, a questionable exercise unless rigorous safety safeg uards were in place. Not surprisingly this dynamic business approach was an alien culture to both the controllers and pilots who were used to a slower pace of working, gathering data, and analysing the results without the pressure of milestones.

Th e early frenetic pace of ISPACG slowed down and it is recogn ised that CNS/ ATM projects such as FANS 1 and separat ion reduct ion s were achieved as a result of its activity - but not wit hout some blood on t he floorl For IFATCA , t he spinoffs included a much tighter wo rking

Phone + 1 514 866 7040 Fax +151 486676 12 Email: office@ifatca.o rg September 19-20 ATC Asia Pacific 2001 Capacity Through Partnership Pan Pacific Hotel Singapore Contact - Tracy Bebbingt on Phone: +44 (0) 20 8987 7703 Fax: +44 (0)20 8995 2788 October 15 - 17 Global Navcom 2001 A mman Jordan Contact - Craig Mcewen Phone: +1 (514) 874 0202 Email: mcewen@iata.org 19 - 21 EUR Regional Meeting Zagreb Contact - IFATCA Office Manager, Alyssa Blais Phone + 1 514 866 7040 Fax

+1514866 7612

Email: office@ifatca .org 25 - 26 AFM Regional Me eting Accra Contact - IFATCA Office Manage r, Alyssa Blais Phone+ 1 514 866 7040 Fax

+15148667612

Email: office@ifatca .org November 7 - 8 ASP Regional Meetin g Kuala Lumpur Contact - IFATCA Office Manager, Alyssa Blais Phone+ 1 514 866 7040 Fax

+15148667612

Email: offi ce@ifatca.org

CNS/ATM relationship with IFALPA when it became apparent that our objectives for CNS/ ATM were mutually inclusive. The other important issue and most revealing was that, in the past IFATCA had always accepted standard separation minima without question but involvement in ISPACG lead us into the debate on redu ced separations through our over riding concern about safety.

Consequently, IFATCA became an enthusiastic participant in RGCSP. Aga inst this highly technological and, at times, theoretical backcloth, the Exe cutive Board decided that it had to take the message of CNS/ ATM to the MAs. After all, the concept was fully supported by IFATCA even if there were major diffe rences over the application . A series of regional CNS/ ATM seminars were organised by the Executive Board . The f irst one took place in Kuala Lumpur in 28 / 29 September 1994 with speakers from ICAO, IFAT CA, and other organisations.

This was followed by an ATFM orientated meeting in Fukuoka arranged to co-incide with opening of the new flow management centre in 14 / 15 February 1995 . A third seminar was held in Panama City in 1996 and the fourth took place in Harare in June 1997.

The other major project undertaken by the Executive Board was the production of a Vis ion Document. This publication crystal lised the IFATCA view on the implem entation of the ICAO CNS/ ATM system and t he effect that it wo uld have on t_hecontrollers who would be in the front line as the current system transitioned to the future ATM system. It clarified the IFAT CA position on the many aspects of t h_echanging ATM environment and was w idely distributed throughout the international aviation community. It was well-received and further enhanced IFATCA's reputation as a major contributor to t he CNS/ ATM implementation process .

Thrnughout this period of change, IFATCA polic y on many issues was being challe _nged to meet the new developments .

Standing Committee 1 was particularly act ive and produced many art icul ate and infor mative papers to t he annual conferences. A logical sequence w as established in that a paper on a particular subj ect - Automat ic Dependent Surve illance (ADS) for examp le - was produced as information material in wh ich all aspects were considered. Following on from t his discu ssion , a paper propos ing po licy on ADS was developed and this was t hen ref ined in Committee B. A number of lead ing edge paper s produced polic y t hat was adva nced for its t im e and was consulted by other organ isation s such as ICAO . A rev iew of t he po licy produced d uring the nineties and the papers that produced it revea l coge nt and articu late

28

thinking which is a credit to the authors in particular and to SC1 in general.

Additionally, it gave the representatives to the various panels and working groups a firm foundation to expound the IFATCA

Fukuoka Flow Managment Centre 15 February 1995 viewpoint.

An important aspect of IFATCA activities was, and is, its relationship with other organisations such as ICAO, IFALPA, IATA and the regional bodies. A fruitful partnership with ICAO ATM/SAR has developed over a period and it is significant that the section has recruited at

For IFATCA .. . a much tighter working relationship with IFALPA when it became apparent our objectives for CNS/ ATM were mutually inclusive least two prominent IFATCA personalities in the last five or six years. A strong bond between IFALPA and IFATCA has been cemented in our joint approach to many of the more contentious issues during the implementation of CNS/ ATM. A good example of this relationship is that IFALPA will represent IFATCA's views in the event of the latter's absence at a meeting and vice versa. Examples of successful cooperative exercises were the discussions in June 1995 on the reduced separations in the South Pacific and the handling of the delicate issues concerning Greek airspace in 1998 in the light of heavy media coverage. The IFATCA association with IATA presented a different co-operation because in the early days there was a mutual suspicion about each other's intentions . However one of the positive aspects of the CNS/ ATM implementation was that all stakeholders had to be involved. As an outward sign of the improving climate, IATA invited IFATCA to be a founder supporter of Global Navcom which became an annual event dedicated to the implementation of the CNS/ ATM concept . IFATCA has actively participated

in this forum since 1993 presented various papers and moderating sessions. It has been a beneficial and important activity that has exposed IFATCA to a wider international aviation industry audience.

The first paper that IFATCA presented must have had one of the longest titles in history - "The effect of automation of the ATM function and of the autonomous aircraft on ATC skills - The Controllers viewpoint"! It would be a matter of fact that some of these papers reflected a rather sceptical approach to some of the more fanciful ideas that were being floated at the time. Since then, we have seen a maturing of ideas and more realistic approach to the implementation processes to the extent that at Global Navcom 2000 the circle was completed and possibly IFATCA was vindicated when ICAO stated " .. for many reasons, our FANS forefathers did not describe in great detail, just how the new technologies would lead to a more effective ATM system" . It should have been ATM/CNS to start with!!

Although this has been an abbreviated review of the technical activities during the early nineties, I have not mentioned safety in any great detail however the Vision Document devotes the last four pages to "Safety - The Priority Issue" that is the right and proper description. The prime objective of the CNS/ ATM systems is "to maintain or increase the existing level of safety" which must be achieved against year on year increases in traffic levels.

This becomes a more demanding task as demand exceeds capacity in many parts of the globe therefore it is apposite to conclude with the Vision Document statement that "IFATCA believes that SAFETY is the absolute priority and that it takes precedence over every aspect of the current and future ATM system"

Postscript.

It would be remiss of me not mention those stalwart IFATCA representatives who gave much personal time and intellectual effort to achieve the technical reputation within the international aviation community. In no particular order then, I salute Philippe Domagala; Mike Dooling; Neil Vidler; Martin Cole; Paul Johnson; Dr Anthony Smoker ; John Levesley; Catherina de Dekker; Jane Spence; Alan Shaw; Chris Dalton; Kevin Broome; Hugh Lines; Clive Gell; Eddie Wall ace; Christine Ledou xLeca. I have not included the regional representatives as they come under the umbrella of the regional Vice presidents. If I have missed anyone out, my humblest apologies but I hope I have covered all the ICAO and ISPACG representatives during my tenure as EVPT 1992 - 1997.

Finally : I could not have succeeded without the tireless and huge support from Chairman SC1 - Dave Grace .

1 'it

CONTROLL ER

Corporate Members of lFATCA AEROTECH TELUB

JEPPESEN & Co. GmbH

Vaxjo, Sweden

Neu lsenburg , Germany

AIR TRAFFIC AND NAVIGATIONAL

SERVICES Co. Ltd.

LITTON DENRO

Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa

Gaithersburg , MD, USA

AIRSYS ATM LTD

MILLER FREEMAN EXH I BITIONS

Chessington , UK

London, UK

ALENIA MARCONI SYSTEMS

NAVIA AVIAT ION AS

Rome, Italy

Oslo, Norway

AMBIDJI GROUP PTY

NICE SYSTEMS Ltd

Melbourne, Australia

Tel Aviv, Israel

ARINC INCORPORATED

NORTHROP GRUMMA N

Annapolis , MA, USA

Baltimore, MD , USA

BAE SYSTEMS UK LTD

RAYTHEO N Co .

Bristol, UK

Marlborough, MA , USA

BREITLING SA

RAYTHEON SYSTEM S Ltd.

Grenchen, Switzerland

Burgess Hil l, UK

BRITISH AIRWAYS

SCHMID TELE COMMUN ICATION

London Heathrow Airport, UK

Zurich , Swit zerland

CELSIUSTECH SYSTEMS

SERCO-IAL

Jarfalla, Sweden

Bath, UK

CRIMP A / S

SOCI ETE D' ETUDES ET D 'ENTE RPRISES ELECTRIQUES

Allerod, Denmark

Mal akof , France

DIVERSIFIED INT'L SCIENCES CORP.

SWEDA VI A A B

Lanham, MD, USA

Norrk oping, Swe den

FLIGHT REFU ELLING Ltd

TE RM A ELEKTRONIK AS

Wimborne, UK

Birk erod , Denm ark

FREQUENTIS

VIT ROCISET S.p.A .

Vienna, Austria

Rome, Italy

INDRA

W AVION UX SOFTWARE LTD

Mad rid, Spain

Geneva, Sw itz erland

THE CONTROLLER

29

Air Traffic Control- Past, Present and Future. S. Mahalingam. (1999) Kaveri Books, New Delhi, India. ISBN 81-7479-021-7

Reviewed by Bert Ruitenberg The author of this book completed a distinguished career of 36 years in the aviation civil service system of India, during which he worked as an Air Traffic Controller and instructor at the international airports of Chennai (Madras), Mumbai (Bombay) and Calcutta. His last position was that of Director of Air-Routes and Aerodromes (Operations) at the Headquarters of the Airports Authority in New Delhi.

In the 140-page book Mr. Mahalingam presents a personal overview of the ATC system in India. The chapter "Art of the Controller" comprises a mathematical explanation of the principles of procedural control techniques.

In "Thrills and Throes of Air Traffic Control" there are many anecdotal descriptions of incidents and also accidents that happened during the career of the author. A separate chapter is dedicated to the 1996 "Mid-Air Collision over Charkhi-Dadri" in which a Saudi Airlines 8747 collided with an Air Kazakhstan IL76 near New Delhi.

Further chapters include the titles "Modernisation of Air Traffic Services Mumbai Delhi" and "Air Navigation System for Future".

The descriptions of the incidents and accidents make interesting reading for anyone who is familiar with today's incident/accident analysis methods based on the Reason model. Although the author does not provide a formal analysis of the events described, he displays an instinctive feeling for the importance of organisational aspects that contribute to the occurrence of incidents and accidents.

The same organisational aspects are also highlighted in the chapter on the Modernisation of ATS in Mumbai and Delhi.

An ambitious modernisation programme which ran over time and over budget - hardly anything new there. The author, however, presents several organisational, cultural and sociological reasons why this happened, which I thought rather interesting coming from the person who until

recently held the highest position an Air Traffic Controller could obtain in the Indian civil service system.

In the chapter "Air Navigation System for Future" Mr. Mahalingam quotes IFATCA's policy on automation.

This chapter is a high-level overview of the ICAO CNS/ATM system, focusing almost entirely on its technical aspects (i.e. the CNS part). By including the IFATCA policy the author indicates that he remains an operational Air Traffic Controller at heart. This sentiment also prevails in the final 5-page chapter of the book, called "Controller and His Job", in which the status of Air Traffic Controllers in the Indian civil service system is outlined.

The Indian ATC Guild over the years has obviously managed to improve this status, but it is evident that in the eyes of the author there still is a lot of work to do for them.

All in all an easily readable book for anyone interested in the past, present and future of ATC in India.

CANSO appoints a new Secretary General The Executive Committee of CANSO is pleased to announce the appointment of a new Secretary General, Mr. Alexander ter Kuile, to replace Mr. Derek McLauchlan.

Derek McLauchlan (67) has been the Secretary General of CANSO since its foundation in 1998. Over the last three years he has built the organisation into the global voice representing the Air Navigation Suppliers (ANS) industry. Mr. McLauchlan, previously Chief Executive of Britain's National Air Traffic Services (NATS), has contributed much to the ANS industry during his career in Air Traffic Management. He will retire on leaving CANSO. " I have been privileged to lead the development of CANSO over the past three years and thank our staff and all members for their unfailing support. I am very happy to hand over responsibility for the Organisation to Alexander, who will, I am sure, manage its continuing development successfully"

30

Alexander ter Kuile (44), until recently Director at the air transport consultancy SH&E in Amsterdam, has a broad experience in the air transport industry gained during his earlier career with KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Fokker Aircraft and the US based RAND Corporation.

I am delighted to take on the role of Secretary General of CANSO, particularly in this challenging period for the ANS industry. I look forward to extending CANSO's contribution to finding solutions to the many pressing issues facing our members. I will continue to build CANSO's relationships with the many international organisations airlines, manufacturers, and fellow aviation bodies that make up our industry Âť.

ÂŤ

represents 23 full members and 21 associate members, all stakeholders in the global aviation industry.

Full Members of CANSO Aerothai of Thailand, AENA Spain, ANS of the Czech Republic, Airservices Australia, ATNS South Africa, Airways Corporation of New Zealand, Austro Control, Belgocontrol, DFS Germany, Estonian ANS, Irish Aviation Authority, LGS Latvia, LPS Slovakia, LVNL The Netherlands, MoldATSA Moldova, NATS, NAV CANADA, NAV.EP Portugal, ROMATSA Romania, Serco Aerospace United Kingdom, Swisscontrol, Roberts Flight Information Region (Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea) and UkSATSE Ukraine.

CANSO (Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation) was founded in 1998 to represent all air navigation suppliers operating outside direct government control. The organisation is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, and currently

THE CONTROll..11..IER

Book Review Stress, Workload and Fatigue. Peter A. Hancock, Paula A. Desmond (Eds.) (2001) Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ, United States of America. ISBN 0-8058-3178-9 Reviewed by Bert Ruitenberg This is the newest title in the Erlbaum "Human Factors in Transportation" series .

Earlier titles in this series included "Aviation Automation : the Search for a Human Centered Approach"

by Dr. Charles Billings, that some readers of The Controller will be familiar with .

Each of the book's three sections is divided into four segments: theory, research, practice and commentary. Chapters in the theory segment offer general models that explain stress, workload or fatigue the three main topics of the book . Chapters in the practice segment offer "real-world" examples of how theory might be applied or where additional theory might be useful.

Chapters in the research segment form a transition from theory to practice . The commentaries attempt to integrate theory, research and practice.

Although the majority of the chapters in the book are about road traffic or "driving surface vehicles", there are a number of contributions from researchers who study the aviation domain, in general and Air Traffic Control, in particular . These researchers include familiar names such as Wickens, Parasuraman, Hillburn, and Jorna. In the next part of this review I'll mention a few highlights from the various chapters that I think have a particular relevance for IFATCA (and our Policies).

human error and new paths to system breakdown that didn't exist in simpler systems.

Brian Hillburn and Peter Jorna raise an interesting point in the conclusion to their chapter on "Workload and Air Traffic Control", and I quote : "In ATC, as in a number of other domains, the issue of fun must be taken seriously.

Air traffic controllers are highly skilled operators, and a large measure of their job satisfaction derives from handling challenging traffic situations. Exercising the creativity and intelligence that characterise Rasmussen's (1981) knowledge based level of behaviour is a genuine source of satisfaction for air traffic controllers . To deprive the operators of such complex systems of the opportunity to skilfully apply their craft runs a substantial risk of limiting user acceptance.

As in other domains , therefore, the goal of ATC system designers should be to develop systems capable of ensuring optimal , as opposed to simply low, workload."

Last, but not least , in the chapter on "Active and Passive Fatigue States " (Desmond and Hancock) reference is made

to research that indicates that most of the operational errors in ATC occur when the controllers were operating in conditions of low rather than high workload. (Notice how this ties in with the conclusion from Hillburn and Jorna!)

It is my considered opinion that t he texts in this book generally confirm and support the rationale behind IFATCA 's Policies related to stress, workload and fatigue , and derived topics, such as working hours and the use of automation in ATC. This book is not one that I expect wil l appeal to each and every ope rational A ir Traffic Controller, yet for those of us with an interest in the scientific background of our everyday functioning in a demand ing environment, it can be a valuable sou rce of information. Its price of jus t over UK ÂŁ100 for the hardcover version could be somewhat prohibitive though.

Bert Ruitenberg sitting on the Great Wall of China - This time in colour

In the chapter on "Stress in Ambulance Staff" (Glendon and Coles) there is a concise overview of Critical Incid ent Stress Debriefing including an evaluation of the technique, based on a literature review . To quote the final words of this evaluation: "Although this review indicates the problematic nature of CISD as a crisis intervention technique, it remains popular among high-risk professionals and is regularly asked for, and no strongly preferred alternative is generally available .

CISD appears to assist in people with returning to work, reduces sick leave , and assists in recovery from trauma."

The chapter " How Une xpected Events Produce an Escalation of Cognitiv e and Coordinative Demands" by David Woods and Emily Patterson contains a discussion on the effects of what is called "clumsy automation".

This phrase , originally concocted by Prof . Earl Wiener in 1989, is used to describe automation that was int ended to help the operator, but in reality creat es opportun ities for new kinds of

THE CONTROLLER

31

Charlie'sColumn A I R RAGE PACIFIC STYLE The following story was from one of my pilot fr iends: A f ew y ears, ago an Air Nauru B737-200 , w as flying into Bonriki airport on T arawa , an Atoll in the Central Pacific.

T he ru nw ay is crushed coral and locals live in houses mad e from leaves of trees t hat bo rde r the airstrip. There is no fence, secu rit y is non-e x istent , and the natives are fri en dly - except , perhaps, for one .

Th e 737 landed, parked at the Bonriki

near the threshold of 09 . Apparently on several occasions, the jet blast from the 737 turning to line up, had blown off the roof from his grass hut, and now this was the last straw - so to speak. That was when he decided to take matters in his own hand s .. .

Air Nauru amended its Ops manual to require that in future , all turns to line up at Bonriki, were to be away from grass houses .

EXPRESSING YOUR SELF IN A BAe 46 A North Amer ican B74 7 was in a hurry to make his slot and taxied quite fast down the parallel tax iway , in front of him was a small BAe 146 going rather slowly . The 747 had to slow down, and made a remark on the R/ T in the ground frequency " Hey, Mickey Mouse jet on taxiway C could you expedite a little, we are late fo r our slot .. " The captain on th e BAe 146 then opened his airbrakes ( 2 panels opening sideways under the tail of the aircraft ) and just replied : " Prrrruuuuttttt!! !!

OVERHEARD ADDRESS

ON THE PUBLIC

After a particul ar (very) hard landing, the passengers had very scary looks on their faces, the purser came on the PA : "Ladies and Gentlemen, please remain in your seats until we are at the gate, and once the tyre smoke has cleared and the warning bells are silenced, we'll open the doors and you can find your way through the wreckage to the terminal" Or after a rather slow movement of the passengers ex iting the plane "Last one off the plane must clean it term inal, an d th e airstai rs were lowered.

Custo ms, t he ref ueller , and othe rs, were gathered at t he foot of stai rs w hen sudden ly one of t he gro up shouted obs cenit ies and leapt up the stair s. He kno cked a start led ho st ess and bur st into the cockp it where both pilots were still strap ped, sett ing up way point s for the leg back to Nauru. He lashed out w ith his fists at the pilot s w ho wer e mom entaril y caught by the ir seat be lts. Fortun at ely a passenger got into t he act and g rabbing the pe rson by the neck, hauled him backw ard s into the ga lley area.

The pilots now unst rapped and afte r a fur io us braw l t he bl oke was flung back dow n the st airs. He hit th e tar mac , picke d up some sto nes and thr ew them at th e crew. A co up le of local po lice men arriv ed on the sce ne an led him away . Funn y t hing was, he was smilin g.

The capta in , nu rsing a b lac k eye, made an apologet ic PA saying th at t hi s was not t he norma l standar d of A ir Nauru in-fli g ht entertai nme nt, bu t not to w o rry, he w ould sort it. Event ually t he chi ef of po lice arrived on the scene and t he captain demanded to know w hy t he crazy guy had been allowed on t he tarmac. Mea nw hi le in the term in al, t he loca l sm iled q ui et ly to himse lf .

It was exp lain ed to t he capta in that t hi s chap was indeed slig htly deranged, but co nsidered harm less and allowed to wander around . He lived among t he trees

32

CONCORDE

STORY

Now with all the discuss ions around Conco rde , I was reminded of this wonderful R/ T exchange that took place in th e 1970 ,s at a time when BAW was still flying everyday the London-Bahrain route . This happened above Nicosia FIR, w here, once again Beirut FIR was suddenly closed due to the civil war there .

DECORATING CHRISTMAS

AIRCRAFT

FOR

A new rage has started among airlines in Europe : How to decorate your own aircraft for Christmas .

Most fligh t s had to be turned away 90 degrees left , t ransferred to Damascus FIR, etc . Complete chaos on th e frequency as usual.

Then this wonderful British voice : "Nicosia , Speedbird Concorde 00 3 , w ith you FL 550 at the boundary, minute 52, ov er " (they really spo ke li ke th at ) Nicosia controller replied : "Speedbi rd 00 3 , Beirut FIR is closed, descend to FL 370 , speed M .08 advi se Apollo of new rout ing. " BAW003 ; "Stan d by, wait a second" 2 minu t es pause .

BAW 003 : " Nico sia, be adv ised Beirut airspace clo sure does not affect Concorde Oper ations , I have my destination in sig ht, climbing FL620, going VFR above , have a good day ... "click ..."

Well , the Ryanair B737 that caught up with Santa Claus in mid flight ( see ph oto) was a real smashe r ! It made more th an one passenger smile, and stayed on the nose for over a month!

But t he f unniest, I t hi nk, goes to British Airways . With th e use of some balloons and roman the atre artefact s, th ey managed to get the best out of this 767 with typical Briti sh w eath er in th e background .

THE CONTROLL ER

Charlie's Colum The propeller is just a big fan in front of the plane used to keep the pilot cool.

When it stops, you can actually watch the pilot start sweating.

When in doubt, hold on to your altitude .

No one has ever collided with the sky.

A 'good' landing is one from which you can walk away. A 'great' landing is one after which they can use the plane again.

Learn from the mistakes of others .

You won't live long enough to make all of them yourself.

You know you've landed with the wheels up if it takes full power to taxi to the ramp.

The probability of survival is inversely proportional to the angle of arrival. Large angle of arrival, small probability of survival and vice versa.

Never let an aircraft take you somewhere your brain didn't get to five minutes earlier .

RULES OF THE AIR

Flying isn't dangerous.

Crashing is what's dangerous

Every takeoff is optional. Every landing is mandatory .

If you push the stick forward, the houses get bigger. If you pull the stick back, they get smaller. That is, unless you keep pulling the stick all the way back, then they get bigger again.

It's always better to be down here wishing you were up there than up there wishing you were down here.

The ONLY time you have too much fuel is when you're on fire .

Stay out of clouds.

The silver lining everyone keeps talking about might be another airplane going in the opposite direction.

Reliable sources also report that mountains have been known to hide out in clouds.

Always try to keep the number of landings you make equal to the number of take offs .

Add it ional co nt ribut ions from Edge Green and Dan iel Casanova

fHE CONTROLLER

33

Backward Controllers and Aircraft Performance Phil Parker

EVPAsia Pacific I had originally intended to write my first fon.vard for "The Controller" on the subject of the consultation process of equipment selection and design for ATC (or lack of it).

Howeve r, after reading two articles published in an earlier copy of "Kai Talk" , the in-house safety publication for Cathay Pacific Ain.vays, I changed my mind.

stated above, we as controllers can end up loading the pilot .

The first article was entitled "Advancing Aircraft Safety in the Asia Pacific Region", w hile the second was "Managing Techno logy with Modern Aircraft" They w ere based on researc h done by the Aust ral ian Bureau of Air Safety Invest igation . Both of these articles were followed by comment from one of Cathay's most senior pilots. With regard to the first article, the captain said that ATC should be made much more aware of loading up the pilot with too many changes, e .g . headings , speeds, levels etc. This was because the modern flight dec k, with normally two pilot operation and the inputs required into modern flight management systems, increased cockpit work load .

As the airlines are acutely aware, advance technology on new aircraft is very expensive. The airlines rightly want a return on their investment . I believe however, they can't expect the ATS providers worldwide, to completely change their systems and procedures at huge expense, just because the aircraft manufacturer has come up with new technology.

I am not talking about

The BASI report also states that controlle rs should be mor e aware of modern flight deck systems and aircraft pe rfor mance .

The report also goes on to state that "the d esign philosophy and aerodynamic cha ra cter istics of advanced technology aircraft have not always been considered by t he designers of ATC procedures". From an ATC perspective , this statement could just as eas ily be reversed. Manufacturers have not always considered ATC procedures and systems as t hey are now and are likely to be for many years to come . Unfortunately, manufacturers have designed new aircraft system s for an ATC structure as they would like it to be, rat her than how it is. It's t he old ch icken and egg argument.

The manufacturers hav e done a great job w ith new designs. Aircraft these days are very eff icient machines and if they can be flown e xa ctly wit hin the parameters designed into them by t he manufacturer, t he airlines , t he ir accountants and pilots will all be very happy . However, modern aircraft can on ly be flow n t he way the syste ms design ers had in mind when that aircr aft is t he only one in the sky. As soon as yo u have mor e t han one try ing to obtain t he sam e bit of airs pac e or t he sam e piece of co ncr ete at t he same t ime, advanced syste ms , w ithin the curre nt wor ld wide ATC syste m , become no more us ef ul than older aircraft types . In fact as t he Captain

34

Should our current ATC system under go wholesale design change to facilitate the design parameters of modern aircraft ?

What about the thousands of older designs still flying?

manufacturers have designed new aircraft systems for an ATC structure as they would like it to be, rather than how it is CNS/ ATM systems here, for which ATS providers are already committed . I'm talking about advanced flight management systems in the aircraft themselves . I know FMS designed approach and departure procedures are available at certain ATC Centres for certain operators, but there is not a lot of expertise around with an intimate knowledge of both modern Flight Management Systems and ATC systems and procedures .

What was needed, and now of course it's too late , was for the aircraft manufacturers to include ATS providers with a prerequisite ATC background, with the pilots and airlines in the design consultation process.

Another comment made in these reports was that " some controllers appear to be unfamiliar with the descent profiles of advanced technology aircraft".

On this point I agree, but I do have a question.

Whe re do we as controllers get this info rmat ion from ?

Our main so urce is exper ience gained on the job . Remember that there are an awful lot of different aircraft types out there and not all airline s and pilots operate the same

type of aircraft the same way . Are we also supposed to know the different profiles of not only different aircraft, but also know how each airline operates the same type of aircraft ?

About 5 years ago, I had a combination of traffic which allowed me to watch 3 B747400 aircraft, all from the same Asian Airline and all inbound from the East into Hong Kong within half an hour of each other.

There were no weather factors and I would suggest that the winds experienced would have been the same for all 3 . None of these aircraft were touched in any way with regard to descent point, descent speed or descent profile . Each one flew a different descent profile and totally different speeds at various points on the approach .

If the pilots can't get their own company profile right, how is ATC expected to?

Aviation awareness is very important to controllers.

Performance characteristics and aircraft profiles are part of this awareness, but you can't get this sort of relevant information just by reading aviation magazines. It's about time that manufactures of all aircraft types, from piston twins to business jets and major airline types, published and distributed performance information to all ATS providers, who in turn could furnish the information to the working controller as an easily accessible data base.

As I said before , this information should be relevant to ATC. Descent profiles , climb profiles, normal descent and climb speeds, maximum and minimum speeds in climb, descent and cruise . Climb rates at different levels. Flap extension speeds . All of this information should be in Knots or Mach number. Any particular limitations which may impact the ATC system should also be included . Manufacturers should also advise the differences in the subtypes . What are the different performance profiles between the A318 / 319 /32 0/ 321?

Is it harder for a pilot to ta xy a B777-300 as compared with a B777-200 because of its length ? Are there any pe rformance characteristics of the B757-300 ATC should be aware of?

If the airlines want ATC to be cognisant of their aircraft perform ance requirements, it is up to them to provide ATC the information, not for ATC to chase them for it.

THE CONTROLLER

Executive Board President & CEO Deputy President EVP Finance EVP Technical EVP Professional EVP Americas EVP Africa/MidEast EVP Asia Pacific EVP Europe EB Secretary

S Lampkin P Robinson S Simmonds A Beadle D Churchill J Dumfries A Taylor P Parker M Baumgartner T Crowhurst

Trindad & Tobago New Zealand United Kingdom Australia Canada Aruba Ghana Hong Kong Switzerland United Kingdom

Member Associations AFRICA / MIDDLE -EAST REGION - 35

AMERICAS REGION - 28

EUROPEAN REGION - 39

AS IA PACI FIC REGIO N - 13

Algeria Angola Benin Burkina Faso Cabo Verde Congo, DR of Cote d'ivoire Djibouti Egypt Eritrea Taiwan Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Guinea -Bissau Kenya Mali Mauritius Morocco Namibia Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone south Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Tchad Togo Tuni sia Uganda Yemen Zimbabwe

Antigua & Barbuda Argentina Aruba Bahamas Barbados Bermuda Bolivia Brazil Canada Chile

Albania Aus tria Belgium Bosnia & Herzegovina Bulgaria Channel Islands Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark

Aus tr alia Fiji Hong Ko ng Japan M acau M alaysia Mongo lia Nepal New Zealand ROCA TCA

Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Grenada Guatemala Guyana Jamaica Mexico Netherlands Antilles Panama Paraguay Peru Saint Lucia Suriname Trinidad & Tobago United States of America Uruguay

Estonia EGATS Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Kazakhstan Latvia Lithuania Luxem bourg Macedoni a, FYR of Malta The Netherlands Norway Poland Portu gal Russia Slovak Republic Slovenia Sweden Switze rland Turkey Ukra ine United Kingdom

Singap o re Sri Lanka Th ailand

Note : All Countries in red denote founder members

THE CONTROLLER

35