IFATCA The Controller - September 2006 by IFATCA

r 2006 volume 45 ISSN 00 I 0-8073

Editorial

Foreword from the Executive Board of IFATCA by Dave Grace, Executive Vice-President Technical

n this edition of The Controller magazine the focus is on automation.There are various articles from contributors who are involved in the development of what they believe will be the automated solution to all our problems and the way to reduce delays and cut costs. Much of this is based on good scientific logic and reason backed in some cases by empirical data. Others appear to be the extreme of where automation could end up "no controllers - no pilots". What will be certain is that automation is here for some and on its way for others. As this magazine is read by many "operational controllers" , their idea of what constitutes automation and what it will mean to them will differ from individual, from unit, from country and from region. It will also be viewed in terms of the level of automation anticipated. When one visits ATC units particularly ACCs, you wi ll see very differing ways of solving the same problem. One common element is that either directly from the basic paper stri p layout or indirectly through automated support systems, the human controller has the final arbitration on how that data wi ll be used. Controllers are very sceptical about any change - the simple reason being that history shows that what has been promised as a positive change that will make their task easier has often, despite intensive human factor developments, resulted in an other layer of prob lem-solving for the controller to enable the system to provide the required output. Despite rigorous requirements, sometimes these actions are the result of safety case mitigations, where additional procedures or reinforcement of procedures are applied to ensure safety and system operability. Often there are changes applied post-implementation as controllers discover inadequacies or failings not previously considered and what was the "work around" to overcome these, becomes normal

operations - not necessarily as designed. But it is not all doom and gloom, as there are many new automated systems that work well and assist the controller without him or her realising that an automated system is in use. What we find with these systems is that they are taking a stepped approach to evolution rather than "a big bang" approach. Good automation will exploit the strengths of the human by using the appropriate function between human and system - examining and delivering procedures for recovery from emergencies, so that the controller knows that all is not lost should the automated function fail. Irrespective of where we are in the ATC global community, there is an automated solution to a problem that we will have. It is important that we as controllers do not focus on the negative, but begin to look "outside the box" and embrace the inevitable change. Service-providers are now realising that to get the best out of any new system development, it has to be developed with current operational controllers. Within IFATCA, we "operational controllers" are working hard to ensure that the operational voice is heard from the highest level in !CAO - the Air Navigation Commission - through regional planning and implementation groups into regional activities. Our "expert" opinion is now sought in research and development (R&D) being conducted by the FAA and EUROCONTROL on integration of airborne systems, FMS, PRNAV capability and communications. Airborne

Separation Assistance Systems, data link and all its dimensions, four dimensional integrated solutions where aircraft and ground systems will communicate with each other through automated systems delivering solutions to problems that controllers could accept or reject, or maybe delegate to the system to resolve. This function allocation - i.e. automation and human allocation of functions is currently at the boundary - or crossroads of where we are at, and projects like ERASMUS seek to move across the crossroads in different directions. It is an exciting time, because we are at new thresholds of ways of doing our jobs and we are some ways bounded by pure imagination. The important point is that we must build integrated, holistic systems and not those that are piecemeal. This is an important key to success for the future. But it is not all R&D and theory. In the Pacific arena ADS is the "new kid on the block", which is part of the new surveillance concepts under development and in some cases deployment. What I find exciting is that we have an opportunity to shape and influence our future in a way never before experienced. When you read this edition and find that you are stimulated to get involved then get in touch through your MA, as your profession needs you. Automation will get it wrong on occasion, but that does not mean that it is a bad thing. After all to err is human and if we as controllers say we never get it wrong, we would be lying. So let us learn from the past and grasp the future with an open mind.

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Editorial

EDITORIAL Philippe Domagala, Editor

Should we fear automation? c. 0

n the middle of the last century, people feared automation because it meant job losses. The car manufacturing industry was the prime example in that period. Robots replaced low-skilled workers, who were often doing unchallenging, repetitive jobs along production belts. What we have learned from those times is that in the end, the robots do the repetitive tasks and the fewer humans remaining in the car production process are working less hours in a more interesting and skilled environment. In ATC, the decision process is the valuable and interesting part of the job. One does not particularly like to do massive verbal coordinations, position determinations, long R/T

Recent history has told us that those who refuse progress have generally all been set aside

exchanges in poor HF, writing and distributing strips and those sorts of things. Automation in ATC in the last 25 years brought us computerised ground data exchange between ATC units, eliminating the "estimates" and "revisions". Printing and delivering strips in each control position is also long since automated. I realise in saying this, that some of you are still operating in ATSunits where manual written strips, estimates and revisions are still the norm, but this technology is widely available and it is only a matter of time before it will reach you. A few years ago. flat screens and windows enabled the suppression of strips, replacing them with digital electronic information. The next step of course is air-ground data link. With that kind of automation, a lot of possibilities are opening. So far, in all the plans, the controller is still involved in the decision process and it is only the less challenging tasks that have been automated. But what will the next step bring, the so-called future automation? This is the purpose of this issue, and whether or not you will like what you wi ll read will probably be depending on your age. As you know, for many the fear of the futu re is

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often based on an over-glorified perception of the past. But there is no way to refuse progress. Recent history has told us that those who refuse progress have generally all been set aside. The best, and in fact the only way is to get involved in the changes. This is what IFATCA is doing and here are some of the ideas floating around. Whether the automation of the future will be as advanced as the IFATS vision of ONERA on page 12 is debatable. But their assumption is a correct one: if you want to totally automate ATC, there will also be no pilots anymore, as only computers can interface with computers. Too far stretched? You decide. Happy reading.

BREAKING NEWS:

CONTROLLERS IN IRAN PROSECUTED The two controllers in Iran that had the misfortune of talking to an aircraft that later crashed, will finally be prosecuted by an Iranian Court. After the crash of a Military Cl 30 Hercules in December 2005, (as briefly reported in our last issue) and despite an official report exonerating the controllers, the Court decided to prosecute. We learned that the APP controller will be prosecuted for having transferred the aircraft to the TWR frequency sooner than he should have and the TWR controller will be prosecuted for having cleared the aircraft to land and 'keeping quiet after this' . A resume of the crash report will be published in the next issue of The Controller.

NEW PRESIDENT FOR NATCA Our USA colleagues have elected a new President. Pat Forrey took 58% of the vote and wi ll start his duties on 1st September. He replaces John Carr. Pat works as a controller in Cleveland en route centre and was NATCA Great lakes region Vice-President.

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ATC Automation

A COLLOQUIA ON AIRCRAFT AND ATM AUTOMATION by Marc Baumgartner, President IFATCA

his meeting was held at the French National Air and Space Academy (ANAE) in Toulouse. Although it is an industryfunded organisation, where most members are retired engineers from the industry or the administration, ANAE is a great place to meet different stakeholders, and this colloquium was a good example. The colloquia was organised over two days and addressed various issues on the possible automation of the air transport system. All involved stakeholders were present and gave their views on the issues. Some new initiatives from research and development (R&D) were presented and the manufacturers from the airborne side indicated where industry is heading to. Governments and political bodies talked about the next generation transport system (NGA TS for the USA) and Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR for the European Union). /FA TCA was invited to the round-table discussion at the end of the colloquia. The President of the Council of /CAO Dr Kotaite addressed the meeting via video conference and insisted that technology should not be a goal in itself.

Why is automation needed? Mainly two drivers were highlighted, increase cost consciousness by the airlines and the foreseen air traffic increase in the future. Additional motivations were mentioned that had to do with the low technological or automated penetration in the ATM segment (ground infrastructure). The presenters highlighted the discrepancy between the fifth generation aircraft with regard to automation and the first generation ATC equipment and that in order to reduce costs for the overall system the ground infrastructure (ATM) needed to be catching up with investment. Everybody agreed though that technology should enable an increase in capacity and lower the costs for the users. Some of the presenters said that safety would be enhanced through technology to a level which is unknown currently: "Safety wi ll be driven by technology."

SESAR and NGATS. EUROCONTROL and the European Commission (EC) explained how SESAR has been created and asked questions if it would meet the Vision 2020. Th e Vision 2020 is a product of a group of high-level personalities who outlined th eir vision for the future transport system. The EC in the Aeronautical Council of Research for Europe (ACARE) outlined in the Strategic Research Agenda 2 (SRA2) what should be done to translate this vision into reality. Taking into account the EUROCONTROL Operational Concept document and the ICAO Global ATM Concept, SESAR should show a way in the form of a road map how to transpose it into a European ATM concept of the future. Problems that have been identified for SESAME are research objectives versus investment decision, transition period, challenges to growth and trade-offs between objectives in a system always close to its capacity and sufficient time for a solid validation of the proposed changes prior to the implementation. NGATS takes its motivation from operations which could become (or are) too costly and/or which could become (or are) socially not acceptable any longer. Therefore a transformation process has to be triggered, which replaces the evolutionary way forward. NGATS should be user-dominated, globally harmonised and environmentally compatible and mainly based on information that should be "tailored, responsive and secure" . Europe and the USA are discussing a

Safety will be driven by technology Memorandum of Understanding, in order to align both their future visions into a globally harmonised and ICAO compatible concept. Research and development (R&D) Due to the unsuccessful introduction of ATM automation projects around the globe, research institutions have started to look at different approaches. One of the interesting presentation was a fully automated futu re ATM system, which took as a working approach a concept called "attract" and subsequently found ou t that the mathematical solutions were too "complex for the pilots to monitor", because the resulting trajectories were formed of successive curves with large turn radius, without any straight line. Several new concepts/approaches are now being considered, but none appears to have the potential for an overall solution: â&#x20AC;˘ Centralised approaches may work in high density areas and are able to resolve conflicts with many aircraft (up to 30) in proximity, but at the expense of optimisation â&#x20AC;˘ Delegated/distributed approaches work in low density airspace only; also, there are problems of coordination and information sharing between participants. "Token

Ongoing concepts From a conceptual and high-level roadmaps point of view, the presentations focused on

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ATC Automation

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From a philosophical point of view, the human will continue to play a role in the future A TM system I

allocation" can overcome some of the issues, but requires an overall priority order allocation for the traffic involved. Few examples were presented that are currently ongoing with regard to R&D in Europe: â&#x20AC;˘ EMMA (A-SMGCS): European Airport Movement Management. All vehicles (ground and aircrah) are included in the surveillance, by using co-operative and/or independent sensors. Trials have been conducted in LFPG and EGLL, but not yet harmonised. Implementation is planned for LKPR, LIMC and LFBO. â&#x20AC;˘ K-ATM: (Kooperative Air Traffic Management). The key approach is to combine existing advanced capabilities (on-board 4D trajectory computation and aircrah performance given by the FMS, automatic weather reports, ground-based knowledge of traffic density and airport/runway condition). As an example, the real-time noise computation tool used to optimise 4D trajectory for noise abatement purposes (although such a tool was recently abandoned in FRA), was presented . Further a presentation was given on a "topdown " far term (year 2040) research program, which redesigns the entire air transport system: 0 IFATS (Innovative Future Air Traffic System, see a full description on page 12 of this issue)

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would be a gate-to-gate system with fully automated UAVs (no pilot), a worldwide automated flight planning (no controller), and continuous secure data-link air-ground communication. However, when detailing the functions of ground and air segments, we basically came back to the present system (the main function of the airborne segment is: "follow ground instructions"). except that pi lots and controllers are leh out as a "principle". Interesting enough: in case of "unknown failure" in flight, a ground expert team from the manufacturer will be supposed to find a solution! Do we need ATCOs and pilots in the midto long-term aviation system? Various presentations focussed on the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and the progress made in this domain. Whereas from a military point of view and to a certain extent for cargo operations, the UAV will certainly become a reality in the future in nonsegregated airspace, the current costs for these operations wi ll have to be brought down (too many crashes, too costly broadband links). in order to become commercia lly a viable option. The UAV community presenting their concepts did not address the issue of incompatibility

with the current !CAO provision and requirements (i.e. see and avoid). IFALPA presented the pilots view and highlighted the need for keeping the balance between automation level and the retention of the human control. As the automation in ATM has to do with a multitude of aircraft and not just one the solutions found for the airborne automation need ea refu lly to be elaborated. Conclusion From a philosophical point of view, the human will continue to play a role in the future ATM system, however from a research and technological point of view, many elements are nowadays available that will assist the ATCO in the future to reduce his workload (or increase the sector capacity). This shift will be an evolution and not a revolution in the author's view and will rely on a lot of sub-systems, which for the time being are not compatible and are not necessarily harmonised. Be it the satellite element, the datalink element, or the systemwide information element. The positive trends and the outcome of thi s symposium showed that all the currently involved actors have identified this and are starting to talk and work towards a standardisation and harmonisation. There is still 30% to 40% capacity to be gained in the current system if elements as low visibil ity and poor visibility conditions can be better controlled, if the airspace planning is done in a pdn-area and networking spirit and if some of the elementary datalink technology breaks through into the current environment. As the new concepts and visions presented will cost enormously to be implemented and the challenges to the future aviation transport system will be others than automation per se (like fuel prices, environment, sanitarian risks for example). the time to develop these future automated ATM system wi ll not be sufficient.

ATM Automation

ENABLING BETTER INFORMATION FLOW BETWEEN AIRCRAFT AND THE GROUND by Robin Garrity, Head of the ATM Group, QinetiQ sk many in the Air Traffic Management (ATM) world for a definition of "automation" and you'll get a wide variety of answers. These vary from the introduction of controller support tools into the existing concept of operations to an almost apocalyptic description of a fully-automatic, controller-free operation with autonomous aircraft with no hope of a fall-back mechanism. The truth, of course, lies somewhere in between and it is entirely possible for varying degrees of automation to co-exist effectively depending on each Air Navigation Service Provider's operational, geographic and financial requirements. One thing is for sure, and that is that any form of automation will require greater flows of digital information between the aircraft and the ground, and between aircraft. Various programmes are emerging that support this idea such as the USA NGATS programme and longer term EUROCONTROL concepts. To meet this challenge, as part of a collaborative programme between the FAA and EUROCONTROL, the Future Communications Study (FCS) has recently published an important report that addresses in detail both the operational requ irements and the transition roadmap for implementation of new concepts based on varying levels of automation. This document is the Communications Operating

Concept and Requirements for the Future Radio System, or COCR. The full document can be freely downloaded from the EUROCONTROL website at: www.eurocontrol.int/communications/public/ standard_page/com_future.html, but th is article will extract key points to enable the reader to understand the think ing behind the document, as well as some of the detail. I do not claim authorship of the material in

this article, but thank the EUROCONTROUFAA Future Communications Study Operational Concepts and Requirements Team for their hard work. Any errors in interpretation are my own. Fut ure communications study EUROCONTROL and the FAA have initiated a joint study under a Memorandum of Agreement through an Action Plan (AP 17) to identify potential future communications technologies to meet safety and regu larity of flight communications requirements i.e. those supporting Air Traffic Services (ATS) and safety related Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) communications. The FCS has two main activities to identify the: • Future requirements based on emerging global future ATM concepts taking into account the needs of civil aviation and State aircraft operating as General Air Traffic (GAT) • Most appropriate technologies to meet these communication requirements. The published document covers the first activity by identifying the future concepts and, from them, defines resulting Communication Operating Concepts and Requirements (COCR). The COCR will assist in the second activity by allowing key requirements to be matched against candidate technologies - existing or future. To achieve this goal, the COCR identifies the requirements placed on the communications that take place through the aircraft and ground radios. These are collectively referred to as the Future Radio System (FRS). In developing the

COCR, an approach was taken to make it technology-independent. The operationa l requirements drawn from the ATM and AOC operating concepts are to be implemented in the highest density airspace regions of the world to achieve the required capacity, safety and security. In particular, the !CAO Global ATM Operating Concept and the IATA ATM Roadmap were considered. Lower density regions of the world have also been considered, but the commu nication requirements for those regions may be less demanding and therefore these reg ions can continue to utilise current systems for a longer period of time. The two primary drivers for the FRS are: • To provide an appropriate communication infrastructure to support futu re air traffic growth • The need for a consistent global solution to support the goal of a seamless ATM system. Air/ground and air/a ir data communications for ATS are a relatively recent development and necessitate a complex end-to-end system involving interaction among humans, automation and Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) systems. Therefore many operational and technical questions need to be answered before contemplating full operations. The study considers two main phases in the evolu tion of com munications to support ATM: Phase 1 is based on existing or emerging

EUROCONTROL and the FAA have initiated a joint study(... ) to identify potential future communications technologies

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ATC Automation

There is scope for greater use of (data link) to support more advanced automation data link services which, for the purposes of this study, completes in around 2020; initial steps under this phase are starting in some regions of the world now. Phase 2 represents a new paradigm in the use of data communication where some new data link services are introduced and it is the main form of communication. This places greater reliance on the data communication system. The primary differences between the two phases are the highly integral nature of Phase 2 with the use of data communications inherent in the operating method, more automation in the aircraft and on the ground, and the advanced data link services that exploit this relationship. In Phase 2, the paradigm shift from a tactical "Management by Intervention" to a more strategic "Management by Planning and Intervention by Exception" philosophy has evolved. Analogue voice communications capabilities remain central to the provision of ATM during Phase 1. In Phase 2, voice is used for exceptional circumstances or areas that do not require extensive data link implementation. The FRS should be capable of supporting, at least. the data communications required through air/ground and air/air using broadcast, multicast and/or addressable modes such as point-to-point. Voice communication may be supported by the FRS provided it meets the requirements defined in detail in the COCR. States and regions will have differing needs and timeframes for the introduction of data link services to meet their requirements. Figure 1 illustrates the expected evolution of the phases based on the concept changes described in the COCR. In some regions of the world, data link services described under Phase 1 are already being introduced through trials or implementation programmes. Other regions may begin Phase 1 implementation at any time, or not at all, based on their ATM needs. Similarly the more advanced services described in Phase 2 may never be implemented in some regions for various reasons such as traffic density or lack of an adequate business case. Th is is depicted in Figure 1-1 by the dashed lines showing continued use of Phase 1 concepts in some regions, while others have implemented those defined under Phase 2. To determine the overall context for future communications, numerous concepts of operations, vision statements and plans being developed and circu lated by ANSPs around the

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commercial aviation, however. an FRS capable of supporting Phase 2 should be available in the 2020-2025 timeframe to support the most progressive early-adopters.

world were reviewed. The COCR presents performance requirements as follows: â&#x20AC;˘ A "snapshot" of what demands a full set of Phase 1 services anticipated to be in place in some regions around 2020 would place on the communications system â&#x20AC;˘ Those for Phase 2 represent the same for a fully matured set of services anticipated to be in place in some regions in the 2030 timeframe. Having defined the operational concepts for each of the two Phases, the ATS and AOC services necessary to achieve the concepts were defined. ANSPs are anticipating a large number of data link services, and the definitions of many are well underway. Around 26 operational services were defined in the COCR for full deployment under Phase 1, a number of which are expected to be effectively supported only by data. While most of the Phase 1 services remain available in Phase 2, instances of many of the 30 services in th is phase are dramatically reduced as 4D

Conclusion There seems little doubt that further automation will be introduced in ATM over the next decade or so. There is significant potential for use of aircraft-derived information both by ATM ground systems and between aircraft to give the airspace user more user-preferred tracks. Data link is already being implemented today and there is scope for greater use of this technology to support more advanced automation. To achieve a greater level of integration, more digital information will have to flow between all the parties involved. The COCR developed under the FAA/EUROCONTROL Future Communication Study contains one vision of the evolution of ATM and the role of automation and the communication. Whether some of the more fanciful automation concepts come to pass, only time will tell. ATM is historically a very conservative industry, but perhaps we are on the doorstep of radical changes?

Figure 1. Concept evolution over time - Phase 1 and 2

Phase 1

Phase 2 2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

trajectory negotiation via Common Trajectory Co-ordination (COTRAC) and "Management by Exception" becomes the rule. A total of 22 AOC data services are defined, but rather than sorting them into phases, it has been assumed all services would be available in each phase, with varying degrees of usage. Voice AOC services have been addressed superficially as it is considered that they will decline considerably over the next 10 to 20 years. Given the complexity of some the services in Phase 2, it is anticipated that many states will initiate the transition to Phase 2 only after the capacity or efficiency gains engendered by Phase 1 services become insufficient. Therefore the timeframes associated with Phase 2 will be both uniquely associated with the circumstances of each state's or region's needs and are difficult to forecast. Given the typical investment cycles of

ATC Automation

THE ERASMUS PROJECT: "A FRIENDLY WAY FOR BREAKING THE CAPACITY BARRIER" by Jacques Villiers, retired "lngenieur General de !'Aviation Civile" and member of the "Academie de l'Air et de l'Espace" in France he problem of capacity and efficiency in air traffic control is of deep concern throughout the world and is very much to the fore within the European Union. The European Commission has recently signed a contract to study the feasibility and the conditions of implementation of the En Route Air traffic Soft Management Ultimate System (ERASMUS) project. The project team is led by EUROCONTROL and is composed of DSNA/SDER (France), HONEYWELL (USA and Czech Republic). SITCA ( Italy) and the Universities of Linkoping (Sweden) and Zurich (Switzerland). A high level of automation has been introduced in the air segment over the last 50 years. The ATM system cou ld therefore seem "archaic". for not taking ful l advantage either of the available precision navigation, air/ground data-links or FMS, which are already used worldwide for other purposes. Most of the outside observers have difficulty in understanding why such potential, in terms of data accuracy and ground and airborne communication and computing capabilities, still remain quite so poorly used for

Except in the idealistic and improbable case of its full automation, the (ATC) system is, and will remain a manual system contributing to the ATM "modernisation". The ERASMUS project could open up an original path to circumvent the main obstacle of controller/computer cohabitation. Inaccessible " full automation" A fu ll automation of ATC would be irreversible, wou ld suppose simultaneous equipping of all aircraft with data-links and most modern FMS, and imply the previous, but unfeasible safety certification of all the involved processes and of the system as a whole. For these reasons, among many others. such an automation would call for a long period of transition during which manual and automated functions would have to coexist. During such a period, man and machine cohabitation would raise unsolvable problems. The current system has been Jacques Villiers organised and tailored for drawing the full benefit from the controllers' cognitive capabilities and resources. Major changes as " free flight", "free routes" or 40 deterministic navigation could lead to a more flexible and efficient system, but unfortunately would make the controllers' tasks more complex. Here lies a hidden paradox and the reason why none of these projects has even reached the

stage of an actual experimentation. Therefore, it must be understood that, except in the idealistic and improbable case of its full automation, the system is, and will remain, a manual system. Underst anding the controllers' work Cognitive and mnemonic capabilities of human beings are different from those of computers, but humans are nonetheless able to perform what sophisticated software can barely achieve. Controllers can handle quite dense traffic without any help of any advanced piece of software. How can they do this? Controllers' real time tasks are highly complex and "en route" control is far from being just an organised series of "conflict detections" followed by "conflict resolutions" one after the other as many imagine. Controllers must first detect every "problem" i.e. pairs of aircraft for which they cannot be guaranteed, ten or 15 minutes in advance, whether they are, or are not on safely separated paths. For so doing, they ca n rely only on fuzzy and incomplete data. Let's judge it. For making fu ll use of the Sn.m. separati on the ideal accuracy of the forecast positions ' should be of the order of 1n.m. (i.e. less than ten seconds of flight for an aircraft flying at cruising speed ). This is largely out of reach in an open loop process. And the same goes for climbing or descending profiles. It is too often forgotten that safety separations are ground referenced, while the flight is conducted according to horizontal and vertical airspeeds. The fuzziness of the position forecasts is resulting from the imprecise and incomplete knowledge of airspeed, wind, turbulences and windsheers ,climbing or descending rates and the mental extrapolation in the three dimensions. Therefore, each new "problem" detected by

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ATC Automation the controllers gives birth to a provisional separation assessment and is integrated into the set of pending problems, knowing that the forecast accuracy improved as the crossing moment approaches. It must be understood that no problem can be solved outside the context of all others. The controllers must therefore elaborate a " revisable strategy" and survey the evolution of the situation. The main constra int on the controllers is therefore to optimise the management of their own cognitive resources. It can then easily be understood that the actual capacity of the airspace is not limited by the airspace itself, but by the highly limited capabilities of the human brain to handle more than a given set of data in a given time. Respecting t he controllers' work Obviously, none of these brain processes can be known by the computer. thus preventing it to pretend participating actively in the controllers' work or making unsolicited suggestions. The first and imperative requirement behind any attempt to make computers participating in the control processes is to avoid perturbing or disturbing the already overburdened controllers. In a previous article, the author proposed a list of the "Ten Commandments" to be respected, in order to prevent the computer from becoming an added burden to controllers in attempting clumsily or tactlessly to help them. It must be understood that the respective roles of machine and controller must be such that each of them is doing what it (or he or she) is able to do better than the other, but without disturbing what th is other is left to do. In a real time environment, this sharing of roles and their respective coupling constitute quite a challenge, having strongly in mind the uniqueness of responsibility in any given part of the airspace. It must be also remembered that man and mach ine are provided with different data and co mputing abiliti es, this leading to different and incom patible conclusions and to different strategies. In fact. there is a barrier of incommunicability between computer and controllers unless the controllers become the computer's slaves or spend most of their time playing a questions and answers game. It is pure illusion to expect that a late taking in account of the "human factors" could make workable a previously machineoriented conception. The fact that the cognitive domains of air traffic controllers and computers are so mutually

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impenetrable, easily explains the present state of the art, but could lead to a desperate conclusion for the future of the system. An unnot iced no man's land: t he "subliminal cont rol " Fortunately there exists, even if unnoticed until recently, a no man's land between these two domains, which enables the computer's capabilities to be fully exploited without encroaching on the controllers' domain, infringing the controllers' independence or interfering with their non-sharable responsibilities. It is the fuzziness of the vision of the controllers that offers such an unexpected but so welcome opportunity: it opens to the computer a margin of action of a few knots on the speed of the aircraft (or an action on the rates of climb or descent) wh ich is: â&#x20AC;˘ Sufficient in a great number of cases for avoiding a problem to turn out into a conflict â&#x20AC;˘ But slight enough to be imperceptive by controllers whose work is therefore not influenced or perturbed. Such a computerised control is therefore "subliminal" as far as the controllers are concerned. Moreover, these slight actions on pairs of aircraft selected by the computer affect only the two aircraft in question, without any impact on the rest of the traffic or on the strategy, the freedom and the cognitive management of the controllers. As a consequence, the controllers will automatically benefit from a "miraculously fluid " aircraft flow, the computer informing them of all the aircraft pairs thus "deconflicted" . Mathematical models developed in the frame of the ongoing ERASMUS project lead to

The "ATC auto-pilot" would guarantee the safety of the responsibility assumed by the computer

The first A TC au to pilot?

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~ forecast that a very large majority of the conflicts could be automatically "dissolved". For doing so, a closed loop control has to be established between ground and airborne computers via a data-link providing, for the benefit of the controllers, what can be called an "ATC auto-pilot", playing to their benefit an equivalent role as the autopilot for the flyi ng crew. In fact, controllers are thus freely provided with what they surely wou ld do themselves, if only they had the necessary data and time for doing it. The computer could display to the controllers the status of each problem on an electronic agenda, which moreover could serve as an efficient communication support between them. The close loop control of the "ATC auto-pilot" would guarantee the safety of the responsibility assumed by the computer, which could be increased by the complementary safeguard resulting from a subdelegation to the concerned aircraft (ASAS). Such a system can provide a significant advantage even if a limited number of aircraft were equipped, and will become increasingly efficient as more and more airlines will consequently be encouraged to fit out their fleet. The problems of independence between controllers and computers would therefore be solved, thus providing the " missing link" for providing a smooth transition towards a more and more friendly and efficient system. The numerous controllers who have been already consulted have welcomed the ERASMUS approach. A large contribution is required from the controllers' community, in order to conduct this project in a realistic manner and to study the way they will "appropriate" to their own benefit the new potentialities which, at the end, they will be offered. Good luck to the ERASMUS team!

ATC Automation

INN OVATIVE FUTURE AIR TRANSPORT SYSTEM (IFATS) by Claude Le Tallec, ONERA (France) ow much automation should be introduced in the future air transport system (ATS)? This is the question that gave birth to the Innovative Future ATS (IFATS) project. The answer is difficult to get through studies starting from the current situation and trying to figure out the way forward. IFATS goes the other way around: defining a fully automated ATS (no pilots, no controllers, only people monitoring the system from the ground). Sharply speaking the basic hypothesis of IFATS is twofold: â&#x20AC;˘ There is no way to satisfy the future demand of traffic with the ATM sectors and voice messages organisation. â&#x20AC;˘ The human being is good at taking decisions with a limited number of parameters while most of the emergency cases in the ATS operations can only be understood through the processing and the interpretation of a large number of parameters with a severe time constraint. Regarding the first of these two assumptions, the sector constraint is removed in IFATS by producing an organised transport system based on planned flight plans managed through a highly automated network-centric architecture system. The !FATS ground segment is in charge of that task and it is constantly linked to all aircraft in flight by secured data links. Concerning the second issue, man is removed from the real time decision loop. The structure of the ATS is widely based on an automation of the

tasks of piloting aircraft and managing air traffic to a point where pilot and controller tasks are no longer separated and deeply changed - they are not front actors assisted by automatisms any more, they are supervisors monitoring the programmed behavior of a system. The management of the traffic is based on aircraft flying 4D trajectories (three dimensions of space and the time as a fourth one) that are resulting from a mutual agreement between the aircraft and the ground (called a 4D contract). The aircraft has to comply with the "contract" accepted before leaving the airport. So it has to be at the right place, at the right time within a given "freedom bubble" . In such a situation, conflict free flight is guaranteed as long as all aircraft respect their 4D contracts. The IFATS architecture is a "network centric" one, i.e. using all elements of the system, whatever they are, air segment elements (aircraft) or ground segment elements (ATM stations, AOC), as "sensors" to get the best knowledge of the system state, including accurate meteorological situation. This architecture is simple: all aircraft are sensors of the system; each of them is linked to the ground segment, either directly or via a satellite relay. Moreover. every single aircraft is

communicating with its neighbouring aircraft in a defined area. Within this network, the 4D contracts can be updated, either locally or on a wide scale to take into account any uncertainty in the weather forecast, change in the flight plans or to deal with emergency events. Functionalities of the system are flexibly distributed between the ground segment and the aircraft, relying on intensive data communication capabilities between aircraft, and between aircraft and the network of ground stations. Additional features are added, like direct assistance from the aircraft manufacturer for inflight aircraft diagnosis, remote maintenance and unexpected emergency situations. The anticipated outputs of the project are the identification of the difficulties to overcome to build such an ATS. This identification will be done in both the technical and cultural aspects, to find out an adequate level of automation for a future acceptable system. It will also analyse a procedure to migrate from the present situation to this future acceptable system taking into account the transition phase to be set up. Maybe the main problem is to deal with human reactions to such a change: pilots and controllers love their job and state that the aircraft illustrated aside may be a "no pilot" aircraft, but also a "no passenger" aircraft! Information, references and current resu lts concerning the IFATS are available on the

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ATC Automation

A NEW CONSOLE: A DESIGN MADE BY CONTROLLERS FOR CONTROLLERS by Philippe Domagala, Editor project website: www.ifats-project.org. nrique Suarez Carvajal is a Mexican air traffic controller since 1981, and actually works at the Monterrey Radar Approach Control Centre. Faced with bad ergonomics at work, he has the idea to change the typica l way of working in his control center by designing his own console. This was 11 years ago. He found out that workstations are actually designed by engineers. The design always has generally been very rigid and unmovable due to very heavy accessories it has often to include, like screens and processing equipment. Now with the big changes in t he available technology (like low-weight flat screens), there are ways to make a workstation much more user-friendly, and be able to apply a full ergonomic design. The result of what Enrique has been working on can be seen below. Thi s design mainly al lows the console three movements (x, y and z) as it is assembled around a single axis. This axis is supported by a pedestal than can be attached to the floor or to the ceiling. The console consists in three parts, one central box (to house the processing units)

and two "wings", left and right (to lodge the screens and the communications panels ). A typical sector suite consists of two positions and can be accommodated in a single workstation. Those two positions can be worked on the wing. Those "wings " can move independently back and forth about 23 degrees each. These "wings" can also be elevated about 20cm independently, and finally, the entire console can turn 180 degrees (or even more but 180 degrees is the maximum recommendable). This design allows reconfiguration at "controller's discretion" according the sectorisation at any given time. the entire console to avoid contaminants like noise from other positions and or lights reflections. The workstation is very effective in a control tower, as it allows the possibility to work standing up, and to move each position independently. Enrique is marketing his invention and in fact Mexico has ordered the first examples for its Monterrey Centre. If you are interested, please contact Enrique directly using his website: www.bediendesign.com. If you intend to copy his idea, Enrique told us that his This new design also includes a smal ler version for control towers with two screens in each position, breaking all the stereotypes known until now. The console allows: â&#x20AC;˘ Two controllers working different sectors to be in the same workstation without interference between them â&#x20AC;˘ One controller working in the two positions together to visualise several sectors under the same workstation (e.g. night configurations). In a control centre with many workstations. the controllers have the option of turning

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ATC Automation

SO WHAT ABOUT DATA LINK? by Alex Wandels, CASCADE Programme Manager, EUROCONTROL ontrollers and pilots have learned the hard way that the ATC voice communication channel is becoming overloaded. They are faced with the misunderstandings and repetitions that have become standard operating procedures in today's ATC world. Over the last 40 years, the introduction of various levels of automation and system support have allowed air traffic capacity to grow safely to levels that were previously thought unachievable. Today controllers handle more traffic than ever before, pilots operate in an environment that is busier than ever before, but one thing has not changed: the communication between pilots and controllers is still largely relying on a single VHF voice radio channel. If you would try to explain to a schoolboy that the only way pilots and controllers have to comm unicate is crackling VHF radio channel, you will have great difficulty to

convince him of your credibility. All his 12year-old friends do better: mobile phone, sms, GPRS, msn, email, POD-casting, you name it, they have it and they use it! Of cou rse none of their equipment needed regulatory approval: the user decides. Introducing new technology in ATC is a different matter. Various committees and bodies need to have their say. Admittedly, they often add a degree of stability that you do not find on the public communications market, but does it really have to take that long? In the late 90s, trials demonstrated that, even in the busiest environments, air-ground data link is a viable supplement for voice com munication. It overcomes many of the current problems of voice communication and that will allow air traffic capacity to grow safely beyond its current limits. One thing must be clear: we are not talking about

Introducing new technology in air traffic control (... ) does it really have to take that long?

replacing voice communication. Voice is immediate, does not requ ire visual attention and conveys emotion . These qualities can be essential in some situations. Controller pilot data link communications are ideally suited for routine and/or messages that do not require an instantaneous response, but whose content is important. Off-loading these messages onto data link increases the availability of the voice channel for essential tactical interventions. Controllers know that one pilot that remains silent at the right time can be the difference between remaining in control of the situation and running behind events. Today most of the ATC data link services in operati onal use in Europe are ACARS based. This analogue VHF data link technology was designed for airline operational communications as a means to convey operational information over the VHF band. Departure clearance, Digital ATIS and Oceanic Clearance Delivery are the first services that have started the use of ACARS for ATC purposes. These services are not time critical in the sense that there is enough time to check their validity over the voice channel in case of any doubt or malfunction. These services have allowed us to build up our experience with data link use. The feedback is overwhelmingly positive: pilots and controllers like the services and are asking for more of them . This should not be a surprise, havi ng a clear, readable, saved and retrievable message delivered in a timely and unobstrusive manner makes their jobs easier. EUROCONTROL's LINK 2000+ Programme has taken things one step fu rther by introducing controller pilot data link communications in the world of en-route ATC in the high traffic density area of Europe. EUROCONTROL's Maastricht centre is the first en-route centre in the world to provide CPDLC services on a daily operational basis on all its sectors. Between now and 2008, other en-route centres that provide services in Germany, France, Swi tzerland, Austria, Italy, Portugal and Spain wi ll follow and add their airspace to that of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Northern Germany controlled by Maastricht. En-route services have high performance requirements

THE CONTROLLER

ATC Automation and hence the LINK 2000+ services are using VDL (VHF Digital Link) Mode 2 and the Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN), ICAO standardised technologies. Pilot and controller reactions are positive again. One of the most remarkable statements comes from a Scandinavian Air Services (SAS) engineer: "The system works so fast that at first we thought it was faulty." The LINK Programme is co-ordinating the introduction of a European Commission imposed implementing rule making the carriage of CPDLC equipment mandatory in th e upper airspace of the "LINK" states by 2009 for new airframes and by 2014 for older aircraft. In the meantime, EUROCONTROL's CASCADE programme is preparing the introduction of more CPDLC services and of the first ADS-B applications. ADS-B Automatic Dependant Surveillance-Broadcast - will be introduced using the Mode S transponder's Extended Squitter (unsolicited broadcast) capability. Mode S is cu rrently being introduced in Europe and hence the system upgrade cost for airlines to start using ADS-B will be marginal. The same philosophy is adopted for CPDLC - CASCADE wi ll extend the use of the VDL Mode 2 infrastructu re deployed by the LINK 2000+ Programme, again minimising the installation cost for airlines and air navigation service providers alike. The CASCADE services and applications will be introduced in two waves, the first one starting in 2008, and a second one in 2011 . ADS-B consists of the continuous broadcast by th e aircraft of its identity, its positions and its velocity vector. This information can be captured on the ground and be used to enhance existing surveillance or to provide survei llance where this was impossible or too expensive before. It can also be ca ptured on board an aircraft and be used to enhance the crew's situational awareness. The most advanced application of th is technology that the CASCADE Programme intends to implement is In Trail Procedure, an oceanic application by which the pilot is allowed to change his level with due regard to surrounding traffic using the ADS-B signal of other aircraft. Thi s is a fi rst instance of a task delegation from the cont roller to the pilot. On th e CPDLC si de, CASCADE introduces airport-based services like Data link Taxi Cleara nce and Data link Operalional Terminal Information Service (the prov ision on request of ATIS and NOTAM information about a given

destination). The more advanced CPDLC services of CASCADE include a service that will allow controllers to uplink the route that the aircraft will follow in a given sector or centre. Again, the response from pilots and controllers is overall very positive. Surprisingly most questions are asked by professional meeting attendees who by thei r questions often reveal their limited understanding of ATC operations. " How can a controller decide whether to use data link or voice?" - politica lly incorrect, but correct reply: " How do you decide to use the telephone or email?" ; "What about the influence of CPDLC on pilot situational awareness?". The reply: "What is the situational awareness of a Japanese pilot in an airspace where half of the exchanges are done in French? "; " What are the operational benefits of introducing ADS-B in a non-radar airspace? " . Th e reply: "What are the benefits of procedural control?" Do not get me wrong: th ere are issues to be addressed, but th ey are seldom the ones that are brought up by a large group. The issues are detailed aspects of human factors or human machine interfaces. They are identified and solved through long preoperational implementation and use, not through board-room analysis. So, while operational enthusiasm on the

pilot and controller side is a constant element in the LINK 2000+ and CASCADE programmes, convincing the decision-makers in airlines and air navigation serviceproviders has not been a trivial affa ir. Business cases with real cost fi gures and proven benefits were not enough as the introduction of data link is a gradual process and early implementers will not enjoy the full benefits. LINK 2000+ has covered that gap by providing pioneer support consisting of a grant and extensive integration support to pioneer airlines. CASCADE intends to follow a similar path. By this approach, a critical mass of enthusiastic pilots, controllers and engineers is created that supports the implementation from within the companies and organisations, experience is gained and shared with fellow professionals, and myths are uprooted. Proof of concept. proof of technica l feasibili ty, and proof of operational benefit are all provi ded in one go. It was not and is not an easy ride for the programme teams nor for the pioneer airlines and pioneer en-route centres, but knowing that you have made a small contribut ion to help ATC to take the step from voice to data link communications is a huge reward in terms of professional satisfaction and it is why we like what we are doing.

Convincing the decision-makers in airlines and air navigation service-providers has not been a trivial affair

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ATC Automation

ASAS AND ADS-B - WHY ARE THE NAMES IMPORTANT? by Andrew Beadle, Former EVP Technical IFATCA irborne Separation Assistance System (ASAS) is often mentioned in the same context as Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-8), but ASAS and ADS-8 should not be confused (International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) ASAS Circular paragraph 2.2.3.). IFATCA supports ICAO's position that ASAS and ADS-B should not be confused. IFATCA is concerned that some ADS-B applications, in particular the use of ADS-B data by air traffic controllers are being incorrectly identified by groups outside ICAO as ASAS applications. IFATCA's concern is that incorrect use of the terms leads to misunderstanding of the issues related to the implementation of the systems. At the simplest level, this is the misuse of the endorsement of ADS-B as an implied endorsement of ASAS. ICAO defines ASAS as "an aircraft system based on airborne surveillance that provides assistance to the flight crew supporting the separation of their aircraft from other aircraft". The ICAO ASAS Circular has limited ASAS to separation from other aircraft, and states that other hazards, although important, are beyond the scope of ASAS. This is an understandable starting point, however when ASAS will be used for separation, solutions to separation from traffic will have to take into account all hazards (as defined under conflict management in the ICAO Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept - ICAO Doc 9854). ICAO defines ASAS as a function "that provides assistance to the flight crew". Clearly the use of surveillance by air traffic controllers is not included within the definition of ASAS. ADS-B is the "transmission of parameters, such as position and identification, via a broadcast mode data link for use by any air and/or ground users requiring it". (ICAO Doc 9694). Simply because ADS-B is currently seen as the major source of surveillance data for ASAS applications does not imply that all ADS-B applications must therefore also be considered ASAS applications. Consider the case that ADS-B may suddenly not be available for ASAS. For example, security concerns might seek to restrict information on aircraft position or malicious

IFATCA's concern is that incorrect use of the terms leads to misunderstanding of the issues related to the implementation of the systems transmission of false ADS-B information could occur. This should not invalidate work on ASAS. For example, a traffic information service with verified positions via a secure data link may become the source of surveillance for ASAS. ASAS does require surveillance data. ASAS however does not require a particular type of surveillance (for example ADS-8), but instead a particular quality (accuracy, etc) of surveillance for a particular function. It is important to concentrate on functional requirements of surveillance to achieve a particular application. The functional requirement of surveillance has been highlighted by the introduction of the use of ADS-B data by ATC. This has challenged the traditional use of term "radar", for it raised the question of when is a surveillance of such quality that it can be used for functions traditionally limited to "radar services". IFATCA has taken a very broad interpretation of surveillance. It defines surveillance as "the acquisition and monitoring of objects' positions and/or other relevant data for the purpose of air traffic management, such as identity, movement and intent." IFATCA also defines independent, dependent and automatic dependent surveillance. Some requirements are then developed under these surveillance types (rather than particular technology for surveillance). Examples of IFATCA policy are "global standards and procedures must address

requirements of what independent verification of position data is required before dependent position data is used for separation" and "to ensure integrity of system surveillance data (not just ATC surveillance), it is essential that the automatic transmission of erroneous dependent position data can be disabled or marked as inaccurate during all stages of flight". This approach is to include not only ADS, but also multilateration and new forms of surveillance. The IFATCA policy also recognises that it is system surveillance data (not just ATC surveillance data) as the surveillance information can also be used by pilots and systems (for example Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS)). See Figure 1 for the view of surveillance for ASAS from a controller's perspective. Information Airborne surveillance can provide pilots with information regarding traffic and hazards in relation to their flight. It will affect air traffic controllers in two main ways. First, information provided today will not have to be provided at

THE CONTROLLER

ATC Automation

ASAS is no longer called a "separation assurance system", but is instead a "separation assistance system" other traffic must always be in excess of the controller's separation standard for it is the controller who is still responsible for separation. all or will be provided in a different manner. An example is when a controller and a pilot both have a situational display of traffic, will the labels identifying the traffic be the same (for example, use standard abbreviation for airlines flight number call signs) and so traffic can be given using flight number call signs? Another example is how to deal with differences between the controller display and the pilot's display (which is possible when different surveillance methods or equipment are used). Secondly, controller and pilot behaviour will change due to increased situational awareness. This is much more subtle, but nevertheless very real. Even if the displays are identical for both the controller and pilot, there will be additional information not on the displays known only to the controller or only to the pilot (for example, that a military area is about to deactivate and so affect the controller's choice of traffic management). Instructions This is the use of airborne surveillance by the flight crew to comply with an ATC instruction. This can be compared with the instruction to fly a radar heading, where the pilot uses information available on board the aircraft in order to comply with the instruction and the controller remains responsible for separation. The instruction (like a radar heading or reach a level requirement) may be necessary for a separation standard to be achieved or maintained, however this does not mean that the airborne surveillance is classified under separation. The important point to note is that the airborne surveillance is being used by the flight crew to comply with an instruction, and the controller remains responsible for separation. An example of an instruction is a spacing instruction. For example an ATC instruction to maintain a set time or distance from other traffic may be a traffic synchronisation or workload management function. The displacement from the

THE CONTROLLER

Separation This is the use of airborne surveillance by the flight crew to separate themselves from one or more aircraft (or hazards). This may be delegation of separation responsibility from the controller to the pilot or a situation in which the pilot is already responsible for separation. The ICAO ASAS Circular splits separation into separation and self-separation, however for IFATCA policy all use of airborne surveillance for ASAS separation is considered under the one title of separation. The purpose of these three groups of airborne surveillance is to assist easy and quick understanding for controllers and pilots of their responsibility in a given situation. Information: No change to airways clearance or separation responsibilities. Instructions: Pilot shall comply with the instruction. Controller remains responsible for separation. Separation: Pilot responsible for separation, at least from some hazards. Consider the example of crossing traffic in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), where the current trajectories do not allow for a controller separation standard however ASAS permits electronic surveillance by the pilot. Information is not appropriate as a solution to the conflict is required. An instruction based on

ASAS information can be used, but the spacing instruction must allow a separation standard to be used by the controller. Alternatively separation could be delegated, however this would required the pilot to have a separation standard that they can use on their ASAS system - and the development of such standards at this stage seems difficult especially considering that models have not yet been developed for ATC separation using electronic surveillance. IFATCA provisional policy is that "IFATCA has no fundamental objection to the use of CDTI in areas where it is demonstrated to maintain and improve system safety" and so it participates in the development of ASAS applications. ASAS is no longer called a "separation assurance system" but is instead a "separation assistance system". This allows for the consideration of more than just separation (that is it also includes from the controllers' perspective "information" and "instructions"). IFATCA supports most of the view of ASAS as expressed in the ICAO ASAS circular. IFATCA also supports the work on new forms of surveillance, specifically ATC use of ADS-B and multilateration. It is expected that these systems wi ll provide cost-effective surveillance over large areas of the globe currently without any electronic surveillance by ATC. The development of new forms of surveillance and new surveillance applications will significantly affect the evolution of air traffic management. Correct use of terms, especially the clear identification of ADS-B applications that are not ASAS applications, is essential for correct understanding and identification of issues to be addressed for implementation of the systems.

Figure 1. Surveillance for ASAS from a controller's perspective Surveillance applications

Ground

Air

Information

Instructions

Separation

ATC Automation

ACAS RA DOWNLINK TO CONTROLLERS: ISTHIS FOR TOMORROW? A EUROCONTROL workshop in Brussels on 31 May by Philippe Domagala, Editor allowing the Ueberlingen collision and the near mid-air over Japan, it has

been suggested th at downlinking TCAS resolution advisories (RAs) to controllers might be the solution to prevent such events. The reasoning being that if controllers are aware t ha t a TCAS RA is in progress, they are less likely to issue contradictory clearances. The workshop addressed the technical feasibility of RA downlink and the problems we are likely t o have if this feature is mandated or introduced in the future (it is not the case at the moment). There are various possibilities to downlink RAs, but for different reasons, taking the RA

report via Mode S radar is the only costeffective way. Th e on ly other possibility is to have the so-called 1090 ES, but the airborne cost s t o have thi s only for the RA Downlink feature are proh ibitive. The other possibilities do not meet ATM requirements. Qinet iQ of the UK mad e a study on latency and found out th at for en-route environment above FL 215, the current verbal report takes on average 29.1 seconds for a contro ller to be aware of, and with mode S radar the average is 8.9 seconds. They conc luded that RA DL would be good for situation awareness of the controllers and helpful for preventing control ler intervention after an RA is issued.

They also said that their study shows that 50% of all RAs do not require deviation from ATC clearance, (but we know only in hindsight that RAs did not yield a deviation from cl earance). The subject of controll er intervention and contradictory clearance is not that evident. Th ere is also the problem of unclear responsibility in th e timeframe the controller is aware of an RA and the aircraft manoeuvres (or not). According t o the current and still unclear and conflicting ICAO documentation, the controller is still responsible and could/should issue instructions as long as the aircraft, or pilot, do not manoeuvre.

There are various possibilities to downlink RAs

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ATC Automation

TCAS-airborne installation

To complicate things, EUROCONTROL said that both the FARADS and RADE simulations showed that controllers' knowledge and training on TCAS is insufficient, (they recommend that controllers be recurrently trained on TCAS.) SOFREAVIA of France made a survey, based on the onboard recordings from four European airlines (two major, two commuters) between 2001 and 2004. A vast majority of pilot responses were between three to eight seconds but with 0,5 G. (manual says five sec and 0,25 G max). But on the overall, only 28% of the RAs were correctly followed by the pilots, and in 10% of the cases pilots chose not to follow the RA or acted opposite to it. It is estimated that in Europe today we have between 30 and 100 RAs every day, but full data is missing. In fact, we do not have a good picture of what is really happening due to lack of data. It is believed that there are also still many fa lse RAs and RAs that are broadcasted but not displayed in cockpit. Another interesting fact is that whatever the delay (and there is always a large one as the latency tests show), the controller is looking at events on his screen that have already passed. We have to make sure that downlinking RAs will not increase controller involvement. A French specialist from DSNA, their research centre (and the inventor of the RITA training widely used) said that based on their studies, if one day we decide to downlink RA, in no way should th e sense of the RA be displayed to the controller. Doing so wi ll induce a new form of incidents. Conclusions of the workshop It was obvious in the discussion that we lack knowledge of what is really happening regarding TCAS in Europe. Therefore we need more recorded data to be able to have a clear picture of the consequences of downlinking RAs. There are fears that downlinking RA would induce new problems. The consensus was to gather more input before a decision is proposed, and that EUROCONTROL will prepare a position paper, but before doing so will take into account safety, operational input from both contro llers' and pilots' associations, and involve as many specialists within EUROCONTROL as possible. There is a need to act quickly, as commercial systems offering RADL already

THE CONTROLLER

exists (one was bought by the German Air force recently) and there is a risk that we will be forced into a system or a standard by industry. One thing was certain that it is going to be controversial - we will never get a 100% safe situation, the aim is only to get a thing safer than it is now. But in a nutshell, RA downlink is still far away and if it is ever implemented, it must

demonstrate three things: safety benefits, to be technically feasible and to be operationally acceptable. There were offers from the EU to offer better legal protection than currently ICAO does through the SES legislation. It was a very well-organised workshop attended by a wide range of specialists that helped understanding the issues, if not resolve them.

We need more recorded data to be able to have a clear picture of the consequences of down-linking RAs

Iri on Corporate Members Kevin Salter

- Contributing Editor, Corporate Business Welcome to Corporate Members' feature 'Spotlight' Once more I am afraid that our new corporate member, NICE Systems were unable to support this issue's feature. Therefore, I am taking the opportunity to address all of IFATCA's CMs with the following open letter from IFATCA's President, Marc Baumgartner.

International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Association 1255 University Street Suite 408 Montreal Quebec H38 386 CANADA Tel:+ 1 514 866-7040 Fax: + 1 514 866-7612 Email: office@ifatca.org

Dear Corporate Member, I am writing to you to review your status as a corporate member of IFATCA and to remind you of the opportunities that your membership brings. As a valued corporate member of IFATCA, we can offer you the following partnership opportunities: • Exclusive access to the large network of professionals through Annual (one) and Regional Conferences (four) held by IFATCA. Our Annual Conference and Technical Exhibition will give you an opportunity to present your products and services. You will meet with the civil aviation officials of the host-country and conference directors and delegates. IFATCA's Technical Exhibitions give a

unique chance for the open discussion with air traffic controllers, end-users of the ATC equipment. Your company can make a spot assessment of the suitability of the equipment and/or services for the task intended • An extensive knowledge sharing platform with controllers worldwide • Exposure of your company through attendance at conferences and through our quarterly publication The Controller magazine, we can assure you a greater visibility of your company among the ATC community of the Federation. With further reference to our magazine, you may wish to use The Controller for the editorial and advertising purposes by sponsoring the issues of the magazine (approximate readership is 30,000 professionals, distribution numbers are 3,000 copies per issue). What are the costs of such a possible partnership opportunity? Generally speaking all prices are subject to further discussion and interest from your side. Please find below some quotes of possible prices: • IFATCA Corporate Membership: USS750 per year • Advertisement in The Controller magazine: US$2,500 per advert subject to size • Technical editorials in The Controller magazine: subject to discussion • Regional Meeting sponsoring: subject to discussion • Annual Conference sponsoring: subject to discussion • Placement of banners and publications on our website and in our regular publications: subject to discussion. We can also offer you free exposure when we make your company the focus of our

corporate members' article "Spot light". Many Corporate Members (Thales, Terma, Serco) have already been featured and a new CM, NICE Systems is planned to be "spot lighted" in our next edition. The feature is produced from your own company press releases making sure the information is current and up-todate. Whenever possible we also send you a copy of the article, prior to publication, to ensure you are happy with the content. IFATCA Regional Meetings Schedule 2006 • 04-07 September: Asia Pacific Regional Meeting: Ulaan-Bataar • 20-52 October: Americas Regional Meeting: Sao Paulo • 20-22 November: Africa and Middle East Regional Meeting: Johannesburg • 20-22 October: Europe Regional Meeting: Sofia, Bulgaria • IFATCA Annual Conference 2007: April: Istanbul, Turkey. If you would like to discuss any other aspects that you feel corporate membership involvement would benefit IFATCA, or require any further information, please contact IFATCA Office Manager, Tatiana at: office@ifatca.org. Further contact det ails: Ms. Tatiana lavorskaia, IFATCA 1255 University St., #408 Montreal, Quebec H3B 3B6 Canada Tel: 1 514866-7040 Fax: 1 514 866-7612 Sincerely yours,

Marc Baumgartner IFATCA President and CEO

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Spot g t

News from SENSIS Sensis Corporation to supply Advanced Surface Movement System to Australia's three busiest airports Sensis A-SMGCS to enhance operational efficiency and safety at Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney airports East Syracuse, New York - 5 July 2006 Sensis Corporation announced that Airservices Australia has selected the company to deploy and support Sensis ASMGCS (Advanced - Surface Movement Guidance and Control System) at Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney Airports. Approximately two-thirds of all passengers flying in Australia fly through one of these three airports - more than 61 million passengers in 2004-2005. Sensis A-SMGCS will provide air traffic controllers with a comprehensive view of the airport surface for enhanced operational efficiency and safety in all weather conditions. "With more than 50 airports worldwide deploying elements of Sensis A-SMGCS, we offer customers a superior. proven solution," said Marc Viggiano, President, Sensis Air Traffic Systems. "We have the capability to supply an all inclusive system thus ensuring seamless interfaces and complete customer support throughout the product life." Sensis A-SMGCS, the world's only fully integrated, tested and commissioned Level

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2 A-SMGCS features multiple surveillance sources for the highest quality data and coverage even in the most complex airport environment: high accuracy, one-second update rate multilateration; solid-state Xband radar with 16 channel frequency diversity for superior performance in inclement weather, and a cost-effective ADS-B vehicle tracking system. This sensor data is integrated by the system's robust Multi-Sensor Data Processor (MSDP), which leverages the strengths of each individual sensor for the most accurate indication of target location. The MSDP also incorporates advanced conflict detection and alerting functionality, providing audible and visual alerts for more than 30 potentially dangerous aircraft and surface vehicle situations. This data is presented as an integrated picture on a display that was developed in consultation with air traffic controllers. At Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney Airports, Sensis A-SMGCS will be integrated with the Australian national air traffic system and with airport gate allocation systems. In addition to the deployment of Sensis A-SMGCS, Sensis will establish a system support facility comprised of a test and evaluation system at Melbourne Airport. The facility will provide training for Airservices Australia maintenance technicians and air traffic controllers.

Sensis A-SMGCS is being deployed worldwide. In the USA, Sensis A-SMGCS is currently operational at seven and being deployed to a total of 35 airports. Sensis ASMGCS is also being deployed at Indira Gandhi International Airport in New Delhi, India. Further. Sensis' multilateration, a key component of its next-generation A-SMGCS is the most field-proven in the industry, with nine of the ten busiest airports in Europe relying on the technology for surface surveillance. This concludes this issue's feature and I would like to thank: Amanda Broderick, Public Relations Specialist Sensis Corporation for supporting Spotlight with her company's contribution. To our corporate membership readers, if you would like your company to be featured in Âˇspotlight'. and likewise to any reader, who would like further information, please do not hesitate to contact me: Kevin Salter IFATCA Contributing Editor Corporate Business Flugsicherungsakademie Am DFS-Campus 4 D-63225 Langen Tel: +49 (0)6103 707 5120 Fax: +49 (0)6103 707 5177 Email: kevin-john.salter@dfs.de or Email: kevinjsalter2008@aol.com

Human Factors

THE GOOD" AND THE BAD" CONTROLLER II

by Tom Laursen, Skyguide Switzerland fter having graduated with a Master's in Human Factors, I was asked to write an article on my thesis work on the implementation of a quasi-confidential occurrence reporting system. This would have required more space than is available here. Instead, I decided (triggered by the articles in the last edition of The Controller) to cover one of the obstacles to deriving meaningful information from incident reporting. The obstacle, and the largest one in my opinion, is the perceived connection between incidents and individual competency.

Individual competency In the last edition of The Controller, several articles described some of the problems that hamper t he implementation of reporting

systems. The legal aspect is a prominent one, considered and described by a lot of people within the industry. Philippe Domogala's article about a controller in Greece who was charged for not fulfilling his duty but decided to take the "case" to the highest European court, triggered me to write about "good" and "bad" controllers. The story about the Greek controller uncovers a lot of issues, but here I will point at something that we (the ATM community) can do to help the public understand the situation, and thereby achieve public support for not seeking a scapegoat when faced with undesirable outcomes like an accident or nearmisses. I was very close to a person who was involved in an accident and who had to face charges, and I found that I had completely underestimated the inherent feeling among so many professionals (ATCOs, Supervisors, Technicians, Managers) that there are "good" controllers and "bad" controllers and that they willingly use this notion as the explanation for incidents and accidents. (A few years ago I probably applied this notion too, and maybe it's still deep inside me.) You might think that this inherent

feeling is no longer the case, but take a look in your environment and look for labels like "ATCO error'', " com placency", "rule violation" or other motivational explanations for unwanted outcomes. What I found about "good" and "bad " controllers, told me that if we want the public to understand our business and if we don't want them to seek the easy solution, t hen we have to do something within our own community. Threats to reporting systems An additional important issue is the reporting systems that are renowned and asked for in our comm unity. Over the yea rs, reporting systems have been accepted as one of the best ways to receive information about what is going on within complex systems. In my experience, the main threat to reporting systems is the implicit and explicit connection that almost all stakeholders (ATCOs, Supervisors, Technicians, Managers) make between peopl e who were involved in incidents and operator competency. There are different reasons why th is connection comes about. For the ATCOs, it has to do with professional pride and wanting to isolate themselves from a system that failed. For managers, it largely has to do with tool s to control the system. Managers are often put in a position where they have very little support in controlling the system that they are supposed to control. This situation t hat managers find them selves in creates an acceptance of the appropriateness of using information from reporting systems to check the competency of individuals. This process is indirectly supported or at least not actively rejected by Eurocontrol, which states in ESARRS that

If we want the public to understand our business and if we don't want them to seek the easy solution, then we have to do something within our own community

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Human Factors the competence of ATCOs is in doubt, if they have been involved in incidents where the safety of aircraft has been compromised. The ESARR does not define what to do with the ATCOs after a certain time, so there is some doubt about how to handle this issue. The investigator Furthermore investigators of occurrences amplify and authorise the notion of "good" and "bad" in their way of describing incidents and accidents. Investigators of incidents withi n ANSPs and national aircraft accident investigation bureaus are usually more or less biased by the idea that operators who are involved in incidents have some kind of inherited capability to make more mistakes than others. This is in my opinion very wrong and is a very dangerous path to follow! The vast majority of scientists agree that success and failure are two sides of the same coin. ATCOs use patterns of working strategies to handle the traffic. They continuously revise their "picture" and if the signs are strong enough the pattern of solution will change. (For a recent comment on this, see Eurocontrols Hindsight nr.2 article by Sidney Dekker: www.eurocontrol.inUsafety/public/ standa rd_page/h indsight. htm I). ATCO s are in a constant conflict between efficiency and thoroughness (by Hollnagel called ETTO). Incidents do not happen because of individual competency problems, but much more because the environment changes too quickly and operators are not able to revise their "picture" and keep up with th e changing environment. The notion about "good" and "bad" is bizarre. There is some evidence that it is mostly the operators that are regarded as "good" that end up in accidents and "nasty" incidents, which coincide with fa ilure and success being two sides of the same coin. This hypothesis has yet to be verified by empirical studies, but my assumption is that the so-called "good" controllers are the operators that have developed exceptional skills in handling the conflicting goals of efficiency and thoroughness. In my opinion, operators have different kinds of performance and these different performances fit different kinds of situations. Meaning, the "good" operators will get into different types of trouble than the "bad". I wou ld even go as far as to say that that the operators that are considered by their peers as "good" get into much more trouble than the operators considered as "bad".

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Why use " good" or " bad"? How do ATCOs and other professionals get to the point where it is important to construct the terms "good" and "bad" operators? Where does the desire to judge performance come from? Part of the explanation is maybe connected to when the snake told Eve that the apple on this tree would bring her happiness and other positive feelings. History is part of us and we are part of history. In the western part of the world, societies are built on good and bad. We learn it at school and we are trained to judge between what is good and what is not. This is a construct that people carry with them and this is then amplified by the process that makes people experts. We have to judge novices, if they are good or bad, and this is a relentless process, where the novice is looking for a way through a complex assembly of people who do thei r job in many different ways. In the end, we all get used to judge situations. Conclusion There is no such thing as "good" and " bad " ATCOs. When we join and support the discussion about individual competence and the "good" and the "bad" controller, we have to know that we are: â&#x20AC;˘ Confirming the public opinion, whic h could create resistance among the people who are trying to enforce legal measures to help reporting systems â&#x20AC;˘ Taking the attention away from the "real" safety issues and fooling ourselves that it is fruitful to attribute unwanted outcomes to individual competence â&#x20AC;˘ Amplifying the process of drying up voluntary reporting. Instead we shou ld revise our way of producing information. We have to start looking for explanations of incidents and not causes. There is a difference between explaining an

incident and finding a cause. When you explain incidents, there is a fair chance that we understand what took place and thus we can start the search for reasonable countermeasu res. When we find a, to the environment, acceptable cause, which is known to be a very subjective process anyway, we try to find a countermeasure to the cause. This might look adequate but, finding a cause (maybe even the cause) is not the same as having understood why the incident happened. There are some dangers attached to "looking for causes " . One is that the countermeasures we use tend to be an exercise of having "done something", instead of addressing the real "tough" issues behind t he incident. Finding a superficial cause preserves the system and directs the attention towards better training or more awareness for the operators involved . Moreover. when we explain incidents in causes, we create the fundament for human shortcomings/human error as the cause of incidents and thereby confirms the myth that human error causes 75% of all accidents. If we want the public to help us redesign laws and public opinions in order to implemen t reporting syst ems where operators can report their adverse events without having to fear retribution, we have to be able to liberate ourselves from the mech an isms that ampli fy the notion of " good" and " bad ". It would be a shame if you have to learn about the " good" and the " bad" operator the way that I did. I hope this art icle can help you start th inki ng about your own reaction to occurrences and how you judge perform ance, and thereby help take a step towards growing success of reporting. Any comments on this article, should be forwarded to the author at: tom.laursen@skyguide.ch.

African Affairs

COMMERCIALISATION OF SERVICES: THE CASE FOR DEVELOPING AFRICAN COMMUNITIES by Albert Aidoo Taylor, IFATCA Executive Vice President, Africa and Middle East ommercialisation of civil aviation services has of late generated interesting discussions in industry circles and will continue to dominate the agenda of high level meetings for some time to come. In most instances, certain concepts have a different relevance, significance and benefits to different parts of the world. Factors such as political direction, and socio-economic focus have a unique impact on varying demographics and regional groupings. One such concept is privatisation and/or commercialisation of civil aviation services. This subject has been given various definitions and meanings by different industry groupings . The development of commercial aviation in North America, Europe and Asia has been that of an evolution following the use of aircraft during the world wars and the desire to conquer the world through industrialisation and trade. Most developed aviation communities therefore have clearly mapped out the role of air transport in their national development agenda. The drive of Europe to establish a Single European Sky has for instance, come out of a predetermined role of air transport in the continental agenda of Europe. There is allocation of adequate public resources and government commitment to the air transport sector, serving as enablers for its role in the national and regional agenda. On the contrary, civil aviation and its service sectors of air navigation and airports in developing aviation communities have not been adequately resourced under the civil service structure to enable them to grow substantially. There are few exceptions where airlines or civil aviation, airports and air navigations service provision have flourished under the aegis of governments. The success story of Ethiopian Airlines operating as a business organisation under a socialist government or United Arab Emirates where corporate governance approach weaves together CAA, airlines, airports and ANSP activities into a giant state business are excellent exceptions.

Background The decision to establish the airlines and associated civil aviation departments (DCAs), in most cases, were not made out of predetermined economic objectives. They were, in a majority of cases, part of the grand agenda of transforming existing colonial or protectorate administration establishments, into symbols of national pride. The DCAs were established as part of the mainstream Civil Service Administration operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Transport, Communications or Public Works. As part of the means of transportation, it was accorded the lowest priority among the other public modes of transportation. Road, rail and water transportation were easily accessible to the majority of the population and had to receive prior attention. Aviation was considered a luxurious and costly enterprise for the affluent or the privileged minority. The DCAs and national airlines did not have clear mandates from governments. It was not clear whether these institutions were to provide social services or operate as business entities. However, most of them had to satisfy "society" needs in complete obedience to the wishes of the appointing authority. It was therefore incumbent on governments to fund the operations of the DCAs and national airlines. Most African governments had to rely on colonial or protectorate governments to provide essential equipment and training: however this generosity could not be sustained. Since governments were the main source of funding, they also had to appoint the decisionmaking individuals (in some cases) to facilitate the implementation of political programmes rather than achieve efficiency and productivity. The need for an effective leadership, efficient management capacity for the efficient running of DCAs and input from clients was hardly considered a vital requirement. The fastest means of attacking the security of any state is by air. Most states therefore consider their airspace as a security risk and therefore

limit access to <t: its usage as far ::! ~ as possible. This 0 mindset Albe'}t Taylor c.........J1. -11J ~ therefore became a major obstacle to seeing the greater economic value that airspace provides as a natural resource. Current realities The aviation industry in developing economies cannot continue to operate as a charitable social service. Air transportation cannot continue to function under the shadow of other social and government programmes - it must assert itself and grow. The human resource and competitive management skills required for the commercial exploitation of airspace as a resource cannot be developed, motivated or retained from the civi l service structure and culture. The commercial dynamics of the industry cannot be managed competitively within the mainstream civil service framework. The legal, regulatory, quality, safety management challenges, financial and systems audit requirements in the industry makes it almost impossible to compete in the current global aviation market, while the key civil aviation services remains under the civil service. The need for vigorous research and development to realise the benefits of current technology and improved industry practices will be more feasible outside the mainstream civil service administrative processes. Looking ahead It is extremely important to change the mindset. attitudes, perceptions and understanding of current aviation industry dynamics. We need to adopt a business approach and a new industry culture in order to compete in the commercially focused global environment. The first challenge is to cultivate visionary leadership actions and associated aggressive rejuvenation attitudes. These leaders need to be

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African Affairs committed to a common well-defined purpose and associated actions need to be encouraged by specific performance goals. Leadership's immediate challenge will be to build work teams and/or project teams that will be able to solve complex problems and integrate the work of a variety of specialists in an expeditious and effective manner. Authorities should note that major transformations are not always associated with one highly visible or controversial individual - it stems from effective teamwork and true leadership. The first challenge is thus appointing the right leader! The second challenge is that of accepting the airspace as a natural resource just as we consider land and water as natural resources. There is the need for a national and regional commitment to exploit the potential of the airspace resource and maximise its usage. The Single European Sky or the Functional Block of Airspace initiative provides a good example in this scenario. The third challenge is the vital need to put in place an aggressive human resource development programme. There is a fundamental requirement to provide management with requisite skills to plan and exploit the airspace resource. There is also the urgent need to develop a skilled and sufficiently motivated workforce to implement any airspace exploitation programme. The most elaborate plans, comprehensive procedures and acquisition of the sophisticated equipment are of little benefit, unless they are implemented and operated by a motivated and skilled workforce who see themselves as part of the change agenda. As many developing aviation communities are planning to restructure the DCA into a commercially viable autonomous Civil Aviation

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The aviation industry in developing economies cannot continue to operate as a charitable social service Organisation, there could be a need to reduce existing number of employees under existing civil service structures. There would also be a need for additional competences in certain skilled professions such as law, accounting, finance, management, auditing, marketing to augment the human resource base of organisations currently operating under the civil service. DCAs that are planning to commercialise, therefore need to establish an employment forecast programme that provides information on the level of professional competences that would be required to restructure it into a viable organisation. Following from the above, we need to launch an aggressive human resource development programme to train some of the existing DCA staff to meet the required competences . This will reduce the need to retrench large numbers of "redundant staff" and afterwards embark on a wholesale employment of nonoperational or non-technical professionals and consultants from the competitive labour market. The need to augment existing manpower with other skilled professionals outside the industry is a critical necessity. The fourth challenge is to pass a national legislation that provides legal authority. The passing of national legislation should ideally be preceded by a public stakeholders' forum to bring on board the safety, commercial, legal, environmental concerns . The fifth challenge is for developing aviation communities to develop a Nati onal Aviation Master Plan that outlines the role of aviation in the overall national development programme. A comprehensive business plan should be developed for the industry. If aviation is to provide social services, then there should be the need to determine who pays for the cost of the social service and how to raise those funds without overburdening either

the taxpayer or the industry. The master plan should provide guidance for the development of micro-programmes and activities, which outlines the role of aviation in other key industries such as tourism, mining, commerce and industry, and agriculture. Aviation is not an isolated business, but also an important driver for the growth of other businesses and catalyst for accelerated development of states. A regional or sub-regional cooperative approach is extremely useful for commercialisation initiatives in developing communities to flourish. The underlying principle for cooperation should be optimum utilisation of resources, sharing of information/knowledge, group negotiation of market share and desire for increased transparency. This approach improves the industry culture and expands the frontiers of cooperation. Any attempt by an individual ANSP in a developing community to commercially negotiate or compete against the mighty of supra-natural power blocks such as Europe or America, would be foolhardy and comparable to tackling a mauling lion with one's bare hands. There is the need to establish appropriate benchmarks, milestones, performance management and rewards programmes to serve as key drivers in the implementation phase. Aviation is clearly no longer just a luxurious enterprise for the affluent, but has become both an important business enterprise that link activities of people in the global village, and a medium to real ise the potential of regiona l cooperation. Regional cooperation is imperative for the survival and growth of the aviation industry. However, regional cooperation should not be abused as a platform for promoting mediocrity and inefficiency. States that cede their airspace should not merely be concerned with security considerations but should also be interested in negotiating for the appropriate 'royalties'. This is necessary in order to maximise the revenue streams that are essential to fund the requirements of a world-class aviation standards. In Africa and many developing communities, the commercialisation of civil aviation is currently the only means by which the resources generated could be prudently used to improve service delivery and the welfare of many employees. The success of commercialisation would greatly depend on how well it is planned and implemented.

Book Review

COLLISION IN THE SKY by ARIANE PERRET

his book is the w hole Ueberlingen

collision tragedy as seen by an

independent journalist. It is written for the public, but by using sim ple wo rds, she

ARIANE PERRET

explains in a clear and implacable way the human mechani sms and the various failures that led to this disast er The collision broug ht separate tragedies: the collision itself, the families' distress and the murder of Peter Nielsen, the controller on

COLLISION

EN PLEJN CIEL

duty that night. The author begins the book by saying: "At the beginning of the research [to w rite this book], I was still convinced that Peter Nielsen has a share of responsibil ity in the crash . After mont hs of investigations to find out what really happened, I am no longer of this opinion." The book is extremely critical of Skyguide, the Swiss ANSP, and more particularly of it s top management. Lack of understanding of each other's cu ltures is a key factor all along and t hose cultural differences are very well explained in this book, as em otions and misunderstandings played a major role in the reasons behind Peter's cold-b looded murder. The large "ATC part" of the book is also a mind opener. It explains how a "modern " ANSP operates. According to a Skyg ui de

Professor Dekker made a special report on

the causes of the collision were systemic

engineer quoted in the book, t he company

the human factors aspects of this collision on

and that Skyguide did not accept this view

poli cy regarding cost reductions can be

the request of Skygu ide. Peter Niel sen contributed to this report before he was

and continued t o point the f inger to a

summarised as fo llows: •Ten years ago: safety at all costs

murdered. This report is sa id to be extremely

° Five years

well researched and apparently demonstrates

light on little known facts t hat help understanding t hi s double tragedy.

ago: safety at a correct cost

single indivi dual. A very well-written book, shedding some

• Today: safety at a minimum cost.

t hat the controller's actions that night were

What is also fascinating to read as a

logical. What is becoming disturbing is w hen

contro ller, is the part trying to understand

we learn that Professor Dekker was obliged

Peter's actions in relations to the events that

to sign a confidentiality agreement with

soon, as this is an extraordinary journey

took place that night.

Skyguide preventing him ta lking about hi s

into eve ry controller's night mare, and

It is hoped that thi s book will be t ra nslated and distribut ed into Eng lish

report. This report remains confidential and

everyone involved in ATC should read it,

Dekker cal ls "the tunnel effect that distorts

only known to a small group within Skyguide

top management included.

one's tim e perception i.e. the concentrati on

management. Even Pet er Nielsen himse lf was

on a problem to solve can reduce the ability

not allowed to read the f inal version.

The author explains what Professor Sidney

to fo llow passing time and distort the memory one has on elapsed t ime ''. Peter reported,

aher the event, that he spent only

What happened instead was that Skyguide top management tried t o portray Peter Nielsen as "a n employee that made an error

For those of you read ing French, t he references are: • COLLISION EN PLEIN CIE L by Aria ne Perret, Editi ons des Syrtes, Paris •May 2006. ISB N: 2-84545-118-0,

1.5minutes on t he telephone after he first

with enormous consequences" . What is

spoke to the Tu154 . In reality it was more

suggested in the book is that Skyg uide

• Website: www.collisionenpleinciel.com

than five minutes.

knew from Professor Dekker's report t hat

Reviewed by Philippe Domagala

270 pages, 20 Euros

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Short Story

SAY AGAIN .. by Ayman Mahmoud, EGATCA (Egypt) very year. or nearly every year. I go to the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations (IFATCA) conference. Last conference, when I went to Taiwan, I met a friend who I knew from my grade school days. I hadn't seen him in a while. It was a very long trip, so we passed the time chatting about the old days and exchanging stories. After a while he asked me about my job. I told him that I'm an air traffic controller and I was going to attend the annual conference of the IFATCA. He said, "So you are the person who stands at the airport waving the bats". I said "no" and told him that air traffic controllers maintain the safe and orderly movement of aircraft along major air routes and around airports by giving pilots instructions and advice as to height, speed and course. ::;< I told him that I am working at Cairo Air <! 0 Navigation Center (CANC), there are 25 0 .<: controllers on my "watch" and there are five

watches in all. Shift-work is a major aspect of the job and I work three shifts consecutively. One morning (0800-1400) followed by one afternoon (1400-2000) and one night shift (2000-0800). I then get two days off before beginning the cycle again. Assuming that I'm on a morning shift, I will start at 8am when I take over from the night shift. Initially I need to be briefed by the

A typical Egyptian controller as the world sees it

....

~ ....__~~~~..._~--

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controller I am taking over from. Typically, I will have around 15-35 aircraft on my radio frequency and my aim is to keep them safely separated, both vertically and horizontally. Anything can happen during my shift. On one occasion one of the aircraft under my control contacted me asking for priority landing at Cairo airport as a passenger had suffered a possible heart attack. I needed to act quickly and phoned through to the controller handling the next sector and eight minutes later the plane had landed. Weather can be a serious problem, particularly fog. and means constant changes of planning to divert planes to alternative airports. As you can see, things can change so quickly in this job, from hour to hour, which is why the job can never be described as boring. You need the ability to remain calm when under pressure, think logically and be able to do more than one thing at a time. He said "This job is unlike any other in terms of its variety, and coupled with good pay and a lot of time off, it is an excellent job if you have hobbies that you like to pursue. But. would you say again what exactly you are doing?"

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Asian Affairs

THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROBLEMS OF RVSM IN THE SOUTH CH INA SEA by

Bill Leung, President Hong Kong ATCA

n October 2002, all FIRs in the Western Pacific and South China Sea region, including Ho Chi Minh, Philippines. Sanya and Taipei, together with Hong Kong implemented the Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM). In Hong Kong, it starts from FL290 up to FL410 inclusively. Hong Kong adopts both the double alternate and the modified single alternate flight level orientation scheme (FLOS) to alleviate leve l congestion and also increase the airspace capacity. The traffic level was not very high at the time of implementati on and the transition to RVSM airspace was considered smooth and satisfactory. There are also special mechanisms to govern the RVSM operations within Hong Kong FIR. RVSM wi ll be suspended when there are pilot reports of severe turbulence. Under such circumstance, the vertical separation minimum between all aircraft wi ll be 2000ft. If an individual aircraft encounters an equipment problem that affects its performance in maintaining altitude accuracy, RVSM procedures will no longer apply to that aircraft. We have to separate that aircraft with others by 2000ft and bring the aircraft out of the RVSM stratum . The implementation of RVSM is definitely good news to both controllers and airline operators. From the controllers' point of view, with an increase of airspace capacity and additional levels available, the ATC system can efficiently handle the level of traffic within the areas ot responsibility and de-conflict traffic strategically over the major crossing points of an ATS route network more effectively. This is particularly crucial to controllers when they are dealing with traffic climbing and descending in a congested sector. Airline operators are also benefiting by getting more optimal cruising levels in terms of fuel efficiency as well as reduction of delays. Hong Kong had a quick recovery after the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003. The traffic in the

region maintained a steady growth rate of average 10% a year. Especially for the last two years, the rapid growth of traffic volume tied closely with the expansion of the economy. Hong Kong is still considered as a major gateway into China and we, therefore, not only deal with the increasing traffic originating from Chek Lap Kok and Macao International Airport, but also have to manage the escalating over-flying traffic bound to and from the mainland. The route structure within the Hong Kong FIRis becoming more complicated as the demand rises. Talking about the route structure, when Hong Kong first started implementing RVSM in 2002, there were not too many direct tracks across the FIR. As more carriers wish to enter the tremendous market of China and operate scheduled flights to major hubs such as Guangzhou, Shanghai and Beijing, new tracks from south to north have emerged. The airspace is becoming a spider-web like network. Controllers have to be extremely cautious and vigilant when dealing with all of these through area flights. Although the FLOS and the FLAS still provide a layer of protection, the layer is getting thinner. As a result of the above, just like the concept of "one country two systems", we have two systems of flying altitude within the Hong Kong FIR, i.e. the metric and imperial levels. It means that for traffic transiting our airspace into and out of the Guangzhou FIR where RVSM is not implemented, we are responsible to carry out two types of level transition: â&#x20AC;˘ Converting aircraft level from RVSM flight levels to semi-circular flight levels o Between imperial and metric system

(i.e. 2,000ft or 600m separation above FL290 or S0900 respectively). In fact, Hong Kong is not the only FIR in the region to perform transition between different FLOSs. For example, Taipei FIR also takes up the responsibility of converting single alternate (for traffic from NAHA and lncheon FIR) to double alternate (traffic downstream destined for the Hong Kong FIR) and semi-circular flight levels (for overfly traffic transiting Taipei FIR bound for Hong Kong FIR). To conclude, there is no doubt at all that the implementation of RVSM provides a favourable environment to both Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) and airline operators to optimise the airspace usage. However, individual FIRs have their own traffic mix and limitations. Different modes of RVSM operations between neighbouring FIRs bring additional workload to controllers, which may in turn constitute a possible hazard to flight safety. Therefore, the future for RVSM in the South China Sea and Western Pacific region is to harmonise different FLOS among various ANSPs. IFATCA, represented by EVPASP's David Cheung recently chaired a NEAT meeting on the subject of harmonisation at which, unfortunately, not a lot was achieved. ICAO needs to take the lead here via the regional office to resolve this rapidly deteriorating situation.

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African Affairs

AU OMATION IN AFRICA - THE SUCCESS STORY by MD Matale, AFM Regional Editor n a positive note, air navigation service providers and governments in the Africa and Middle East Region have made considerab le and commendable efforts towards modernisation of aeronautical telecommunication systems by way of automation. An exemplary case study on automation of the Tanzanian air traffic services facilities reveals a range of world class automated system like the Italian made Voice Communication and Control Data System (the VCCS). the French AEROVI EW Weather Display System manufactured by SOFREAVIA, the AFTN Data Transmission System commonly known as ATALIS II, The British Aerospace Approach and Area Radar System, The French BILTIS billing system and the VSAT system provided by HUGHES of the USA. Use of the latest world-class accredited technologies and automated systems has become an "in thing" across the sweep of the region . From Southern Africa through East Africa, West Africa up to North Africa and the Middle Ea st, there are very few countries if not portions of the regional or national airspace where flight planning and exchange of pertinent aeronautical data is not yet automated. In fact in some of the airspaces such as South Africa, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates to mention but a few, there is an ideal benchmark with the best ATC systems of the world with almost no distinction between their control room equipment and those of any other region of the world as far as automation is concerned. Nowadays Africa boasts unquestionably modern, up-to-date, safe and efficient technologies such as the American Raytheon technologies, Schmidt telecommunication, the Canadian UBITEX Weather System, Sun Micro

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The recent past has been adversely characterised by widespread outcry about everyday near misses the bureaucratic processes as before, and this also brings hope that other issues related to training, purchase of navigation equipment and professional management of human resources will also be improved accordingly. To be able to appreciate this level of improvement, we need to look back and get a clear picture of the platform over which efforts to develop aviation in Africa used to be tabled. The African continent has gone through many years of times of difficulty - as we all know, there were eras of colonisation, mass discrimination, cross border conflicts, genocides, civil wars, struggles for freedom. These long-term disorders lead the entire region into life-long socio-economic limitations, which unsurprisingly have had a significantly negative impact on aviation development as well. But in recent days the world has seen African states transiting to a new world of political and economic reforms. If the question of automation in the IFATCA Africa and Middle East region is anything to go by, then there is indeed high profile advancement in that regard and thus the need for all concerned parties to continue to give support, encouragement. appreciation and at times endeavour to give cred it where

Systems, AUTO CAT II, Automated Approach and Area Radar systems - the Iist is endless. In particular, introduction of VSAT has fought the toughest of all battles by ensuring uninterrupted coordination between ATC units within and across flight information regions. With this form of development, there is enough reason to believe that the upcoming implementation of Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) in the ICAO AFI region will also succeed with minimal shortfalls. What is most impressive is the fact that air navigation service providers have recogn ised the need and taken measures in the right direction. The recent past has been adversely characterised by widespread outcry about everyday near misses caused by poor communication and/or coordination between ATC units, airspace users like pilots and operators in most parts of the region. The complaints were mainly in the form of incident reports that signified poor standards of information exchange between the various flight credit is due. information regions. The ongoing ; : - - will automation be like this in the end? commercialisation processes seem to be coming up with much improved levels of vigilance and effectiveness, opening up a new phase of life in which there could possibly be hope for a better future. Critical issues concerning safety of flights seem to be no longer subjected to the same level of

â&#x20AC;˘

European Affairs

DATA LINK - EVERYTHING EASY? by Patrik Peters, European Editor ommunication is vital. Nobody knows

that better than air t raffic controllers. We realise every day how easily a

message can be misunderstood - and not only between you and you r partner at home - but more so in the safety-critical environment of our daily work . It can be corrupted, picked up by the w rong person,

Nothing is worse than if this one and only (communication) link between controllers on the ground and pilots in the air is not functioning

its content can be misinterpreted or not be understood. It can also arrive at inconvenient times or not arrive at all. Nothi ng is worse than if this one and only

and potential of data link in its different varieties. The workshop was held last April in Toulouse, France and dealt with Controller-

yea rs in the fi eld of data link with programs

link between controllers on the ground and pilots in the air is not functioning. On top of all these problems, we are - in core areas of Europe and ot her busy sectors around the

Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) and ADS-B in particular.

is to implement ADS-B an d CPD LC to allow for airborne and autonomous separation as

world - faced w ith congested frequencies,

Being a controller at the Maastricht UAC,

such as LINK 2000, later renamed LINK 2000+. The current CASCADE program 's aim

well as increased Air Traffic Situation

w here we at times cannot get a word in

w here data link in the framework of the

Awareness (ATSAW) and a more efficient

anymore. Th is is why we ca nnot close ou r

form er PETA L trials and now CPDLC is used on a daily basis, provides me w ith some limited expertise and therefore I w ill briefly

handlin g of traffic trajectories. CPDLC ha s the potential to take over routin e tasks in a

eyes, but must look into alternatives to support us and free frequency time for more important tasks. It was in this context that Eurocontrol invited stakeholders and experts to a twoday workshop discussing t he possibilities

explain w hat this is all about and where we, as IFATCA, see benefits and where we would like to raise our concerns. Eurocontrol has been active for many

more or less automated way. This woul d reduce the need for frequency use, w hich in return could increase efficiency and allow for higher capacities. What is ADS-B? Th is acronym stands for

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European Affairs Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast. The system wi ll transmit, without an operator having to perform any kind of input, position data derived from the GPS and the aircraft's FMS. The purpose of this being surveillance, available to anyone (Broadcast) having an appropriate receiver. Looking at this defi nition one can understand where a major weakness of the system is - the Global Positioning System, owned by the USA Department of Defense, made available for public use in the 1980s. This dependency makes any data link system based on GPS very vulnerable to a drop out or deliberate cut-off. GLONASS (the Russian equivalent) and GALILEO (European system) are supposed to back this up, but problems with system outage, reliability and compatibi lity still need to be solved. Rick Castaldo, representing the USA FAA, states that despite this problem, a comp lete avionics equipage is foreseen for 2020, which would then constitute the last step towards ADS-B use. Airservices Australia is much further advanced in this field. Greg Dunstone explained that ADS-B would be fully implemented in Australia by 2007. For the vast areas where there is no radar coverage, this will be a big step towards a modern ATS system. The whole continent can then be served with radar-like separation. Driving factors for this development was the need for replacement of current radar sites, improved coverage, easy maintenance and cheaper servicing. Following the success of the program, other Pacific states are now participating in international trials. The representative of the European Commission, Chris North, comments that ATC today is functioning the same way as two decades ago, but that we now are suffering from a capacity problem. The SESAR program shall be the enabler for a more customer/user-oriented European ATM structure. As part of this, 4D trajectory planning and self-separation of aircraft based on ADS-B will improve capacity. Airborne Separation Assurance System (ASAS) is a key word to AIRBUS Industries. ADS-B as a supportive tool to ASAS wi ll improve navigation and situational awareness (ATSAW). AIRBUS expects major benefits in reduced fuel burn as well as increased capacity through optimal trajectory. A more complete data link structure - from gate to gate - is needed and this is where 4D trajectory marks the finishing line.

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Paul Conroy, Eurocontrol Maastricht data link expert, introduced the audience to the work done in Maastricht. Following the PETAL trials in the '90s, CPDLC was implemented within the new OPS environment a few years ago. CPDLC has become an integral part of the ATCO's daily work. The fact that Maastricht already has used automated uplink of information for more than a year, like the SSR code change message, was new to most of the audience. Paul demonstrated the potential in saving R/T time by a small calculation: 450 code changes per 24 hours times 8 seconds per change result in 60min/day - that can be saved by Auto-CPDLC. Another presentation dealt with Data link Operational Terminal Information Service (DOTIS) trials at Brussels International Airport. NOTAM, VOLMET and ATIS are transmitted by data link, allowing for better timemanagement for the flight crew. Information can be collected at an early stage of the approach to an airport and provides increased situational awareness and less distraction of the crew during the final stages of the flight. As these presentations were all very much in favour of data link applications, it was not surprising that the end users, pilots and controllers, were a bit more criti cal in their approach. IFALPA, represented by Captain Bob Arnesen of SAS, and myself speaking on behalf of IFATCA, voiced very similar concerns. There was the strong point of requiring discrete frequencies solely assigned to the use of data link, i.e. not being used for other applications. Link security, transmission speed and system fallback are major issues, which need to be solved before we enter a

data li nk competition. Uniform protocols are, especially for long-haul flights, a very big problem. One cannot ask an airline to equip their airframes with a series of data link systems. This would quickly reduce possible financial benefits. Data link wi ll always have to be an add-on communication tool, as it will not be able to completely make voice communicati on redundant. Emergencies and other unforeseen occurrences will also sti ll requ ire an independent voice link. Safety has to be in the foreground, not the economical aspect. Alex Wandels, CASCADE program leader, provided us with an interesting program (see his article on pages 14-15). Two days of presentations from different regions of the world and with varying backgrounds set the scene for many discussions and a good information exchange. It became apparent that we are in the future going to deal with an increased amount of automation and technology. We have to be part of that evolution since we want to steer or at least influence the implementation of data link in order to have a better and safer life as ATCOs. No - it is not all easy. A lot is asked from us as controllers and data link operators. But we can make the difference. A continuous proactive involvement and constructive contributions will ensure that the development of data link remains focused on our requirements.

We are in the future going to deal with an increased amount of automation and technology

Philip Marien Feature

THE BIGGEST AIRCRAFT EVER BUILT by Philip Marien

ome 30 years ago (cue sentimental music). Legoâ&#x201E;˘ was one of my passions: endless hours of building and re-building things. the bigger and more spectacular, the better. After having tried various cars, trains and boats and approaching megalomania, I decided to try and recreate the biggest aircraft in the world. Soon I found out that it was an aircraft I had never heard of, let alone seen. What's more, it had a bizarre name which was strangely appealing to an eight year old: The Spruce Goose. The Spruce Goose is the nickname of the Hughes H-4 Hercules. It is the largest flying boat ever built and still holds the record of the aircraft with the largest wingspan of any aircraft in existence. During the Second World War, the USA was looking for ways to efficiently shuttle equipment and soldiers over to Europe. Due to the threat of German U-boats to All ied shipping across the Atlantic, flying seemed like a good alternative. It was decided to commission a large airplane, capa ble of transporting 700+ troops or a couple of Sherman tanks in one go ... The idea of a huge aircraft was that of the director of the Liberty ships

program, Henry J Kaiser. He turned to Howard R Hughes Jr for the actual design of the plane. Born in 1905, Hughes was an aviator, an engineer, an industrialist, a movie producer, a playboy, an eccentric and one of the wealth iest people in the world. He is remembered not only for setting multiple world air-speed records, but possibly even more so for his debilitating eccentric behaviour and drug addiction later in life. Because metal was in short supply due to

the war, the aircraft would be built mostly of wood: hence the Spruce Goose nickname, despite the fact it was mostly build of birch rather than spruce. Some critics, who believed an aircraft of this size simply would not fly, also referred to it as the Flying Lumberyard. While three aircraft were initially planned, only one was ever built. Development began in 1943, but plagued by various difficulties with the constru ction, the aircraft was not completed until well after the war was over. Needless to say, the project also went hugely over-budget. In 1947, Hughes was called to testify before the Senate War Investigating Committee over the usage of government funds for the aircraft. Seemingly to silence the critics in Congress, Hughes returned to California during a break in the hearings, ostensibly to run engine tests on the H-4. On 2 November 1947, with Hughes himsel f at the controls, he surprised not only the world, but probably his employees who built the aircraft: instead of revving up the engines and testing the handling in the water, the Spruce Goose took off from the wa ters off Long Beach. The aircraft travelled some 1.6km, never climbing above 20m. Groundspeed was some 130km/h.

It still holds the record of the aircrah with the largest wingspan of any aircrah in existence

The Goose's first flight

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Philip Marien Feature home in the Evergreen Aviation Museum in McMinnville, Oregon (about an hour Boeing 747-400 An-225 Mriya Length: 70.6 m Length: 84.0 m southwest of Span: 66.4 m Span: 88.4 m Portland) where it Height: 19.4 m Height: 18.1 m has been on display since. It's probably the only aircraft that ever travel led further via land and water than through the air ... By the mid-1990s, a Hollywood studio converted the former Hughes Aircraft hangars, including the one that held the Spruce Goose, into sound stages. Scenes from movies such as Titanic, What Alrbui: A380-800 - Wingspan 79.8 m Women Want. and An-225 Mrly11 - Wlngi: n 88.4 m End of Days have been filmed in the 29,000 mi airplane hangar where Howard Hughes created the legendary flying boat. Though the project was a failure, the H-4 Hercules paved the way for the massive transport aircraft of the late 20th century, such as the estimated one million USS per year! Despite the flight, the justification for Lockheed C-5 Galaxy and the Antonov An Incidentally, Howard also despised the name continued spending on the project was gone. 124 and An-225. The Spruce Goose Spruce Goose ... Congress ki lled the Spruce Goose project, demonstrated that the physical and In 1980, the plane was acquired by the and the aircraft never flew again. Eccentric aerodynamic principles that make flight California Aero Club, who successfully put Hughes however had it carefully kept in possible are not limited by the size of the aircra ft on display in a large dome flyi ng cond ition until he died in 1976, at an the aircraft. adjacent to the Queen Mary in Long Beach, California. In 1988, a take-over resulted in The Walt Disney Company becoming the It's owners of both the Queen Mary and the Spruce Goose. When plans for a Long Beach aircra~~t attraction park fell through, Disney started a rfil)lrth.~.r long search for someone to take the colossal , w~,t.er {tit~·;,,, aircraft off their hands. Eventually, the plane was acquired by the Evergreen Aviation Museum in 1993. They disassembled the aircraft and moved it by barge to its current Hughes H-4 "Spruce Goose " Length: 66.6 m Span: 97.5 m Height: 24.1 m

Airbus A380-800 Length: 73.0 m Span: 79.8 m Height: 24.1 m

probabty :the'.only

tbat .g,v,e_r t_ravelle.d ·via 1

l;Jnd and

:tbtoug'h if'fJe·:air

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CHARLIE'S OVERHEARD ON THE R/T During a long boring cruise: Pilot: " Errr, Control, for your information, the wind up here is 270 with 105kts." ATC: "Ah ... roger, for yours, the wi nd in here in t his ops room is calm." Dealing with low-cost carriers: ATC: "Ryanair 1234 to facilitate your arrival, descend now to FL330." Pilot: "Ah, negative. It's too uneconomical for us to begin descent now to FL330." ATC: " Roger sir, then descend uneconomically to FL330." During the football World Cup overhead Germany: "KLM1234 requesting FL350." Rhein radar: " Sorry, unable due to traffic, maintain FL280." KLM1234: "OK, but this evening we will win!" And over t he Atlantic during the BrazilFrance match: VARIG 123: "What is the score now? " Brest ACC: "I am afraid you lost the game, and you are out of the competition sir." VARIG 123: "Oh my God! " Brest ACC: "Do you wish to proceed as filed or return to Rio sir?" PILOT IN HEAVEN A priest dies and is waiting in line at the Pearly Gates. Ahead of him is a guy who's dressed in Ray-ban sunglasses. a loud shirt, leather jacket and jeans. Saint Peter addresses th is cool guy, "Who are you, so that I may know whether or not to admit you to the Kingdom of Heaven?" The guy replies, ''I'm Mike, retired airline pilot from Dallas." Saint Peter consults his list. He smiles and says to the pilot, "Take this silk robe and golden staff and enter the Kingdom. " The pilot goes into Heaven wi th his robe and staff. Next it's the priest's turn . He stands erect and booms out. " I am Father Bob, pastor of Saint Mary's in New York for the last 43 years." Saint Peter consults his list. He says to the priest. "Take this cotton robe and wooden staff and enter the Kingdom." "Just a minute," says the good father. "That man was a pilot and he gets a silken robe and a golden staff, and I get only cotton and wood. How can this be?"

" Up here we work by results," says Saint Peter, "while you preached - people slept; while he flew - people prayed." ATCO SONG As you know by now, it is customary for the Finnish delegation at regi onal meetings and at conference to produce and sing a typical song. After "No Delay " (sung to the Beatles' music "Yesterday"), this year we had the pleasure to hear ATCO sung to the Village People YMCA music. After many requests, here is finally the text of the song for future references and posterity: ATCO by Samuli Suokas (to YM CA by The Village People) Pilots, make it harder for you I said, pilots, who do not have a clue They have clearance, that they don't understand You must keep them under control Traffic, it can be a real mess I mean, if there, is broken down ILS And if also, weather gets really bad That's when you could get really mad It's fun to work as an A-T-C-0 It's fun to work as an A-T-C-0 You' re the one in control, pilots listen to you When you tell them what they must do...

COLU MN It's fun to work as an A-T-C-0 It's fun to work as an A-T-C-0 Every day every night, you control every flight A-T-C-Os can make it right... Approach, there are controllers too I said, approach, vectoring's what you do I said, approach, planes take orders from you When you're at the approach radar You're the one in control, pilots listen to you When you tell them what they must do ... It's fun to work as an A-T-C-0 It's fun to work as an A-T-C-0 Every day every night, you control every flight A-T-C-Os can make it right... AFRICAN RUNWAYS As you can see in the photo below, some runways in Africa are somewhat peculiar to say the least. As this issue of The Controller is on ATC automation, I wonder how you could either fit an ILS glide slope on this one, or make an auto-land. Humans are still far superior in many ways I would say. ANY PICTURES? Incidentally, if you have a (digital) photo of some particular airport of funny procedure, please send it to: ed@ifatca.org. We'd love to share them with others here.

Cessna in Africa

THE CONTROLLER

Chee o t what's in the next issue of

SPECIAL on AIRPORTS' CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT TOOLS FOCUS ON MONGOLIA ATC NEWS ABOUT THE ASIA PACIFIC REGIONAL MEETING FULL INFORMATION ABOUT THE 2007 IFATCA CONFERENCE IN ISTANBUL And much more...

STOP PRESS... Charlie informs us that apparently some of you took as a first degree the news reported in CHAR LIE 's Column of the March 2006 issue that the IFATCA EB were considering buying their own aircraft. There was a photo of a sma ll turboprop aircraft to prove it. Well, Charlie has to tell you that the EB did modify its plans in the meantime and is now considering buying another, slightly bigger and more comfortable aircraft. As you can see from the photo, this is the delivery of the aircraft to IFATCA and the person s on the top of the stairs are awa iting the IFATCA President who will receive the keys.

WANT TO ADVERTISE IN THE CONTROLLER? Contact Tatiana at: office@ifatca.org Closing date for advertisement for next issue: 1st October 2006

"'c:

w u.:

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