IFATCA The Controller - December 2007

THE

CONTROLLER December 2007

Journal of Air Traffic Control

4 Verdict from the Ueberlingen trial

INTER-

TION OF AIR TRAFF ERA IC C FED

LLERS’ ASSNS. TRO ON

4 Focus on Iceland & the North Atlantic

NATIO NAL

Also in this issue:

Welcome to Arusha Tanzania for the 47th IFATCA Annual Conference in March 2008

Welcome to the 47th IFATCA Annual Conference in Tanzania, the land of Kilimanjaro and Zanzibar.

On 10 to 14 March 2008, IFATCA will hold its 47th Annual Conference in Arusha Tanzania, hosted by the Tanzania Air Traffic Controllers’ Association.

Arusha is the safari capital of Tanzania, located at the center of the Great North Road running from Cape Town in South Africa to Cairo in Egypt. It is also known as “The Geneva of Africa.”

It is located in the northern highlands of Tanzania between the twin peaks of Mount Meru and Mount Kilimanjaro.

Built by Germans as a centre of colonial administration in the 20th Century, Arusha was a sleepy town with a few shops and a garrison stationed at the old Boma.

Recently the face of Arusha has changed and is rapidly continuing to change. Being one of the country’s most prosperous towns, it is the seat of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Rwanda genocide and the Headquarters of the East African Community comprising of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi.

Arusha is the gateway to Tanzania’s world famous National parks. Imagine 24% of the territory is dedicated to game reserves and national parks!!

To the west we have Lake Manyara, Tarangire, Ngorongoro Conservation area and Oldvai Gorge which reveals its prehistoric secrets. We have also Serengeti with its endless plain and vast numbers of Wildebeest, Zebra, Gazelles, Lions, Elephants, and other carnivores.

Towering over Arusha town is Mount Meru dusted with snow from November to January. To the East is Africa’s highest mountain the Kilimanjaro’s snow capped summit at a height of 19,340 ft.

Arusha city is the ideal place for the conference where we will do business at a holiday destination.

The venue; the Arusha International Conference Center (AICC) is surrounded with hotels such as Impala, Naura, Kibo Palace, New Safari and The Arusha hotel just to mention a few, so be assured of enough accommodation to suit your budget.

About 70% of visitors from abroad arrive in Arusha via Kilimanjaro International Airport which has been privatized leading to a marked improvement in Airport facilities.

Simon Kimiti Executive Chairman IFATCA 2008 Organising Committee

www.ifatca2008.com

Contents

THE

December 2007 4th quarter 2007 volume 46 ISSN 0010-8073

CONTROLLER THE

CONTROLLER December 2007

Journal of Air Traffic Control

Photo: Also in this issue: INTER-

NATIO NAL

TION OF AIR TRAFF ERA IC C FED

LLERS’ ASSNS. TRO ON

4 Focus on Iceland & North Atlantic 4 Verdict Ueberlingen trial

The new Tenerife Airport sign.

Photo credit: Montage with photo: Manfred Steinbach/ Dreamstime

PUBLISHER IFATCA, International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations.

EXECUTIVE BOARD OF IFATCA Marc Baumgartner President and Chief Executive Officer Alexis Brathwaite Deputy President Cedric Murrell Executive Vice-President Americas Henry Nkondokaya Executive Vice-President Africa/ Middle East John Wagstaff Executive Vice-President Asia/Pacific Patrik Peters Executive Vice-President Europe Dale Wright Executive Vice-President Finance Doug Churchill Executive Vice-President Professional Vacant Executive Vice-President Technical Jack van Delft Secretary/Conference Executive EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Philippe Domogala Editorial address:Westerwaldstrasse 9 D 56337 ARZBACH, Germany Tel: +492603 8682 email: ed@ifatca.org Residence: 24 Rue Hector Berlioz F 17100 LES GONDS, France CORPORATE AFFAIRS Kevin Salter (Germany/UK) WEB SITE AND EDITOR ASSISTANT Philip Marien (EGATS) REGIONAL EDITORS Moetapele D. Matale (Botswana) Al-Kadur Acosta (Dominican Republic) Phil Parker (Hong Kong) Patrik Peters (Europe) COPY EDITORS Paul Robinson, Stephen Broadbent and Brent Cash PRINTING-LAYOUT LITHO ART GmbH & Co. Druckvorlagen KG Friesenheimer Straße 6a D 68169 MANNHEIM, Germany Tel: +49 3 22 59 10 email: info@lithoart-ma.de

In this issue:

Foreword by Henry Nkondokaya .………….…………………… 4 Editorial by Philippe Domogala …………………………………… 5 Tenerife 1 Tenerife 30 Years Later by Philippe Domogala ………… 6 Tenerife 2 Interview: Controller on Duty …………………………………. 7 Tenerife 3 Investigations and Recommendations

by Philip Marien ………………………………….…….....………. 9 Tenerife 4 Lessons Learned from Tenerife?

by Doug Churchill, EVP Professional IFATCA ……………………… 11 Americas News 1 Brazil Update by Philippe Domogala …...………….…...…… 13 Human Factors Can We Define “Human Error”?

by Tom Laursen, Zurich ACC ……………………………..……… 14 Iceland 1 Focus on Iceland. Interview: Arni Gunnarsson, Managing Director Air Iceland ………………………………..…………... 16 Iceland 2 Visiting Reykjavik Oceanic Centre ……...………………………….…… 17 Iceland 3 Interview: Captain Jon H. Jonsson, Boeing 757 Icelandair ……………………...…………...….……….……… 18 Iceland 4 Nordic Controllers Discuss Overtime …..……………………..…..…… 19 Iceland 5 Keflavik Airport Director Interview ………………….…….………..……. 19 Iceland 6 Interview: Thorgeir Palsson, CEO ISAVIA …………………………... 20 Iceland 7 Icelandic Association Problems .…………………………….…...…… 21 Legal News Ueberlingen: The Verdict …..…..…….……….…………...……… 22 ICAO The ICAO Plan for Africa ………………………………...……..…….… 23 European News 1 Where are we going? by Patrik Peters ………………… 24 European News 2 Traffic Growth and Staff Shortages

by Helena Sjostrom ……………………………………… 25 Spotlight by Kevin Salter .…………………….…………………..……... 26 American News 2 by El Kadur Acosta …………….………..….….… 28 Asian News Asia Pacific Musings by Phil Parker ..…..………….. 29 African News Challenges for African ATC

by MD Matale …...…………………………...…. 30 Feature Target Destroyed!

by Philip Marien ….……………..……………… 38 Christmas Story by Lutz ………….………… 34 Charlie‘s Column …….……………… 35

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this magazine are those of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations (IFATCA) only when so indicated. Other views will be those of individual members or contributors concerned and will not necessarily be those of IFATCA, except where indicated. Whilst every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this publication is correct, IFATCA makes no warranty, express or implied, as to the nature or accuracy of the information. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or used in any form or by any means, without the specific prior written permission of IFATCA.

VISIT THE IFATCA WEB SITES:

www.ifatca.org and www.the-controller.net

Foreword Ph

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Foreword from the Executive Board

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Henry Nkondokaya, ^ by EVP Africa and Middle East

Language issues The 1977 collision between two jumbo jets on the runway at Tenerife is the special feature story for this issue of the Controller magazine.

While the occurrence still retains the record of being the most disastrous aircraft collision with more than 580 fatalities, it is also listed as one example of aircraft accidents in which misunderstanding between the pilot and the controller was a contributory factor.

Following other serious accidents and incidents attributed to language problems, ICAO developed new aviation language requirements leading, in particular, to that of Level 4 minimum competence, which becomes applicable worldwide on 5 March 2008.

Tragic as the Tenerife accident and subsequent ones are, many ICAO contracting States will not be ready by March 2008 despite the fact that ICAO has done all it had to do to facilitate States’ compliance - and in good time.

At the 32nd ICAO Assembly, more than a decade ago, Contracting States themselves initiated the process to address the language problem. Since then, ICAO has been involving States in developing the language proficiency SARPS at all stages. In 1999, the Proficiency in Common English Study Group (PRICESG), incorporating a number of States and international organizations (in-

cluding IFATCA) was established. In 2001, ICAO notified States on proposals to amend language proficiency provisions in Annexes 1, 6, 10 and 11. ICAO invited Contracting States and other relevant organizations to the first Aviation Language Symposium in September 2004.

A second Aviation Language symposium was hosted in Montreal in May 2007.

Several other aviation language seminars on the subject have either been conducted on a regional basis or are in the pipeline.

Also, to assist States in meeting the new SARPS, ICAO published the Manual on the Implementation of ICAO Language Proficiency requirements (Doc 9835).

IFATCA efforts On its part, IFATCA has complemented ICAO’s efforts by writing several letters to Civil Aviation Authorities, Air Navigation Service Providers and its Member Associations urging them to work together towards implementing the language proficiency requirements.

At the 36th ICAO Assembly (Montreal last September 2007, IFATCA presented a paper on language proficiency calling on States to seriously assume their full responsibilities in ensuring that English language provisions are complied with by 5 March 2008. Unfortunately, though ostensibly retaining the March deadline, the Assembly, bowing to pressure from unprepared

States, has in effect offered a grace period for non-compliance up to 2011!

In recent years, the aviation world has had the wisdom to explore and implement the proactive approach in dealing with safety critical matters. It is bad enough to have to learn from a mistake leading to an aviation disaster. But it is a lot worse NOT to learn from a terrible accident, such as the Tenerife collision.

As pointed out earlier, one of the contributory factors to the accident at Tenerife and a number of others was the language problem. If States are allowed to avoid their responsibilities in relation to the implementation of ICAO provisions designed to prevent just such accidents, then the people who perished in those accidents, unconsciously offering us the opportunity to avoid a repetition of their fate, would have died in vain!

Despite the Assembly’s softening of position, we air traffic controllers should impress upon the CAAs and ANSPs to continue with efforts to enable ATCOs and pilots become level 4 compliant as soon as possible.

This edition of the Controller is also the issue that precedes the IFATCA 2008 conference in Arusha, which will open just 5 days after the applicability date of the new language SARPS. As Executive Vice-President, Africa and Middle East whose MA happens to be the host of the 47th IFATCA Annual Conference, I say to all invitees: Welcome to Tanzania. Welcome to Arusha! ^ evpafm@ifatca.org

^ African skies.

It is bad enough to have to learn from a mistake leading to an aviation disaster. But it is a lot worse NOT to learn from a terrible accident, such as the Tenerife collision.

Photo: Raphael Reca

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Editorial

Editorial 30 years ago – Tenerife.

What have we learned?

Philippe Domogala, ^ by Editor DP

Ph o

We decided to come back to this accident, because 30 years later it is still the largest air accident after causing the deaths of nearly 600 people at once. There are still lessons to be learned from this accident.

Of course many things have changed since: ICAO revised the line up and take off phraseology, and we now have better cockpit CRM. But it is sad that many of the recommendations made in the final accident report are still an issue in 2007. : to

Many Points still an Issue today The lack of surface movement radar in many places, inadequate phraseologies still being used, a lack of situational awareness in low visibility, and an absence of identifying markers on runway entry and exits to name a few. Just remember Lexington last year (the Comair CRJ ), or Taipei in 2000 (the Singapore Airlines 747), or Milan Linate in 2001 (the SAS MD87 ) to understand my point.

Do we use better phraseologies today - yes definitely. But one still needs to be very careful still not to slip into poor routine and short-cuts.

Do “squeals” due to crossed transmissions still exist - yes, as a move towards anti-blocking devices (such as CONTRAN) proved to cost money, the “need” was abandoned and the technical solutions never mandated. Data link was supposed to replace completely R/T within 10 years anyway, at least in the mind of some engineers at the time. We know what the situation is with data link today - the article about CPDLC in the North Atlantic in this issue is very interesting in this respect.

member that this occurred in pre-CISM days. The military ruled ATC in Spain, similar to Brazil today. It is sad to see that there are a lot of parallels in the past and present.

Unique Interview

How true! Be careful down and up there,

To close this editorial, I would like to quote a former Deputy Director of the US National Transportation Safety Board, Gerald M. Bruggink, who wrote when remembering Tenerife: “The Tenerife shortcomings had all a common denominator: uncritical acceptance of easily verifiable assumptions. In that regard, no amount of technological progress in the new century can alter the role of the human factor in the aviation system.“

Thanks to USCA of Spain, you will find in this edition a rare interview with the controller on duty that day - a remarkable person with a very moving story. Re-

ed@ifatca.org

Could we have Surface movement radar like this one everywhere?

R/T Communications Much has been written about the misunderstandings in the R/T communications in this accident such as the infamous “we are at take off” (take off run or take off position?) followed by the reply “OK” which was accepted by the pilot as a confirmation that he was cleared for take off, while the controller understood it as a confirmation of the correctness of the read back of the pre-departure clearance, and the crossed transmission “squeal” that blocked vital information, etc.

Photo: Mark Brouwer/CCBYSA

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TENERIFE 30 YEARS LATER

4 The Pan Am 747 taken from a passenger of the KLM just before.

Photo: UNK

Photo: Airservices Australia

27 March 1977 Worst air disaster ever with 584 deaths.

by Philippe ^ Compiled Domogala, Editor Photo: UNK

4 Photo taken by a Pan Am passenger as he exited the plane just after the collision.

The facts in brief to refresh your memories:

A Bomb in Las Palmas The aircraft were two B747s - KLM (KL) from Amsterdam (AMS) to Las Palmas (LPA) and Pan American (PA) from Los Angeles (LAX) via New York (JFK) also bound to LPA. A bomb exploded in the LPA terminal, closing the airport. All inbounds to LPA were diverted to Tenerife, the largest of the seven Canary Islands in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Africa, which had only one airport at the time, TFN

(Los Rodeos). PA wanted to hold, but was directed to land at TFN.

Poor Visibility Due to the number of flights which had diverted to TFN, most of the taxiway had been used to park aircraft. When LPA later re-opened, it was necessary for aircraft to backtrack on the runway to line up for departure. The visibility was suddenly very poor, as in fog (in that airport, due to its location, it was actually passing clouds on the runway). At the time of the collision visibility was 300m in light rain and fog, but 10 minutes later the visibility was 7km. PA requested to taxi, but KL was blocking his path. PA had to wait for KL to finish refueling before he was able to move.

When KL was finally ready, the TWR controller cleared KL to backtrack on the runway to the take off position, and cleared PA to follow KL with an instruction to leave the runway for the parallel taxiway after the 3rd exit (there were no exit numbers at the time). To complicate things further, the runway centreline lights were out of service. The Tower controller could not see either aircraft. The PA crew failed to identify the 3rd exit, and were in fact going for the 4th one.

On arriving at the end of the runway, KL made a 180 and reported ready for take off and requesting his ATC clearance. The controller gave him his airways clearance. KL confirmed the clearance and added “We are now at take off …”. The controller replied “Okay… stand by for take off, I will call you.”

The Cross Transmission At exactly the same time PA also transmitted advising that he was still on the runway, but that simultaneous transmission resulted in a blocked “squeal “. The controller then asked PA to report clear of the runway, which was replied to and confirmed by the PA pilot.

But unknown to the controller and to PA, KL had already released its brakes and increased power 20 seconds earlier. There were no further RT communications between them.

There were no eyewitnesses to the collision.

The Misunderstanding The main cause of the accident was the fact that the KL pilot most probably misunderstood the pre-departure clearance for a take off clearance, as he had requested both in the same transmission. The KL crew used the words “We are at take off” meaning “we are taking off”, while the controller understood them as “we are at the take off position”.

The cross transmission blocked some essential messages.

The KL flight engineer questioned during the take off run if PA was still on the runway, but that was dismissed by the KL captain who continued the run. 700m before the collision the PA crew saw the landing lights moving towards them and attempted to veer their aircraft into the grass, and when KL pilot saw PA still on the runway he attempted to lift off, but the aircraft collided. ^

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4 Tenerife Relevant extracts from the RT exchange and both CVRs (*) 1705.44 KLM: The KLM4805 is now ready for take off and we are awaiting our ATC clearance 1705:54 TWR: KLM8705 you are clear to the P beacon, climb and maintain FL90, right turn after take off, proceed heading 140 until intercepting the 325 radial from LPA VOR. 1706:07 KLM CVR-1: Ja [Yes] 1706:09 KLM: Ah- Roger sir, we are cleared to the P beacon, FL90 until intercepting the 325. We are now at take off.

1706:11 KLM CVR: [sound of brake release] 1706:13 KLM CVR-1: We gaan. [We‘re going.]…Check trust 1706:18 TWR: Okay… (squeal starts…) … stand by for take off, I will call you.

1706:20.3 PAA: And we‘re still taxiing down the runway, the (… squeal stops) clipper one seven three six.

1706:25.TWR: Roger papa alpha one seven three six report when runway clear.

1706:29. PAA: OK, we‘ll report when we‘re clear.

1706:31. TWR: Thank you.

1706:32. KLM CVR-3: Is hij er niet af dan? [Is he not clear then?]

1706:34. KLM CVR-1: Wat zeg je? [What do you say?]

1706:34. KLM CVR-3: Is hij er niet af, die Pan American? [Is he not clear that Pan American?]

1706:35. KLM CVR -1: Jawel! [Oh yes!

– emphatic] 17:06:43 - KLM CVR 2: - Vee One

17:06:43 – PAA CVR 1: [intra cockpit] - There is... look at him [expletive] that… [expletive] is coming!

17:06 44: PAA CVR 2: - Get off! Get off!

1706:47. KLM CVR-1: Oh …! [Exclamation] 1706:49: collision ^ (*) Some non-relevant CVR transmissions have been intentionally left out. For a complete recording of the CVR go the ICAO website and research Circular 153-AN/56.

Interview: Controller on Duty USCA – ^ Courtesy ATC magazine Eighteen years after what still remains the world‘s worst accident in aviation, our colleagues from the Spanish ATC Magazine got in touch with Fernando Azcunaga Aransay, the controller on duty in the tower at Tenerife Los Rodeos airport at the time of the accident. They interviewed him in 1995, together with the head of Tenerife South Tower, Miguel Torrens. In the days after the accident, speculations and slanderous stories about the controller made it to the national and international press. They conveniently overlooked the fact that accidents such as these have a complex set of causes, which cannot be reconstructed within a few days.

Unfortunately, when the final report is published, press and public are usually no longer

The working conditions were atrocious in those days.

Photo: Agustin del Rio

interested and remember only those early speculations. Many of those stories still persist until this day. One example: The head of the terrorist group responsible for planting the bomb at Gran Canaria airport (which caused many aircraft, including the Pan Am and KLM Jumbos), to divert to the small airport of Tenerife) was allowed to claim in an interview on national Spanish television that the controller was watching a football match during the collision... He denied any role in the accident, placing the blaming squarely on the controllers‘ shoulder.

Fernando Azcunaga Aransay was and still is a well respected professional. Originally from the Basque region of Spain, he started his career as a controller in 1964. Most of his professional life, he worked in Tenerife. He is a strong man, of simple taste and strong character. Although he could have retired after the accident, he loved his job as a controller and wanted to continue until the day he was forced to retire.

Atrocious working Conditions Fernando recounts: “The working conditions were atrocious in those days: inadequate equipment, long shifts due to under-staff-

4 Fernando Azcunaga Aransay ing, etc.. Duties from 0800h to 2200h for instance were common...” Miguel Torrens adds: “In addition the weather in Los Rodeos adds to the stress.

There it can change dramatically in no time at all. What starts as a beautiful clear day can change to zero visibility in just a few minutes.”

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4 Tenerife Photo: UNK

I was left to do my own defence, as I didn’t have nor was I allowed any legal assistance.

Bad Communications Means

There was a constant conflict between wanting to provide a good service and what you were technically able to do.

“Stress levels were very high, with a large number of movements, bad communication equipment and just one single NDB navigation aid. What we did at Los Rodeos in those days is not even possible in a radar environment today...”

Fernando continues: “The communication equipment failed frequently and the tower wasn‘t even soundproof: we could clearly hear the cars on the motorway behind the airport. One the day of the accident, we didn‘t even have time to eat or anything. Even without the extra traffic, Sunday was the busiest day in Los Rodeos, with about three hundred movements. I never saw the accident. We heard a dry blow and assumed that it was a safety valve opening in the fuel depot behind us. An aircraft on the apron below the tower told me that he saw a fire and I immediately alerted the fire brigade.”

The Commission of Inquiry Photo: UNK

Under Military Rule “We parked aircraft on the taxiway, something a controller should never be forced to do whatever the circumstances.

But, as civil controllers under a military administration in those days - our direct superior was a colonel - we did what we were told to do. They would supervise everything. Even come and change a sequence, after we had set it up already for instance.”

Miguel Torrens: “I was in Las Palmas approach that day and we sent all traffic to Tenerife.

Exceptions were made for two IBERIA flights, because they could use their hangars to disembark the passengers rather than the terminal where the bomb went off. Why was it not possible to do that with other flights instead of sending them to Tenerife? I have no idea; normally, the ATC control room should also have been evacuated, but it wasn‘t, which shows they were improvising. Things are quite different today...”

A commission made of delegates from KLM, PANAM, Boeing and of the insurance companies was established. A Spanish military officer, who didn‘t speak English, was appointed as head of this commission. “Frankly, that was a disaster in itself since he didn‘t know how to conduct such an inquiry. I was left to do my own defence, as I didn‘t have nor was I allowed any legal assistance. They asked questions which I could not possibly know, such as ‘How long a Jumbo takes to turn 39 degrees?’

Worst of all were the insurance companies who subjected me to real third degree interrogations. Eventually, I just got up and left. The Cuban interpreter assigned to me even told me that that was the right thing to do...”

No one else was really interrogated by this commission. “They briefly spoke to the ground controller, responsible for the taxiway, but as there was zero visibility, they considered the responsibility was mine alone, as I was the approach controller. They wanted me to take the fall for the whole thing... Stories in the press were even worse: my wife was pregnant at the time and when the local radio announced the accident, they said the controller had thrown himself off the tower. Between the interviews by this commission and the press, that was an absolutely horrible week.”

and others) also took care of him. They found him an apartment in Gran Canaria, which protected him a little from the witch-hunt on Tenerife immediately after the accident.

How to Cope “At the end of that first week, after all that went on, my idea was: either I quit air traffic control forever, or I need to get back into it now. You shouldn‘t think about the past too much, otherwise anguish and fear would paralyse you. Immediately after the accident, I didn‘t know whether I was coming or going, but I managed to regain myself. I started working again but was not afraid. Fear never stopped me from controlling. Imagine if you constantly think about what happened and that it could happen again, whenever you take the frequency...” ^

4 Tenerife Los Rodeos Tower.

Photo: AG AENA

Colleagues Support “My colleagues were great support, as was the head of the unit, Commander Hidalgo.

He knew all the controllers personally and his mental support was incredible. He showed great sympathy and stood up for me, which is what I needed in those circumstances; whatever support I needed, he gave it to me.”

Fernando‘s colleagues (Miguel Torrens, Ramon Coffers, Pedro Iñarritu, Blas Domínguez

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4 Tenerife 4 Confusing runway markings.

Photo: ENAV

Investigations and Recommendations ^ by Philip Marien Outcome of the investigations There are in fact 3 investigation reports. One Spanish, the official one, is available as ICAO circular 153-AN/56. Another one is called “Final report and comments of the Netherlands Aviation safety Board“ (which contains 12 additional pages) and a more detailed one done by the Americans called Human Factors Report on Tenerife, published by US ALPA. All 3 reports made recommendations, and if most complement each other, they have sometimes different goals.

The Causal Factors While there is disagreement about their relative importance, the investigation concluded that the major causal factors of the accident were: • KLM took off without a take-off clearance.

• Pan Am continued to exit 4 instead of exiting at number 3 as instructed by ATC. • Squelched radio messages (two calls between the planes and the control tower in-

terfered with each other because they happened at precisely the same instant).

• Use of ambiguous non-standard phrases by the KLM co-pilot (“We‘re at take off”) and the Tenerife control tower (“O.K.”).

• The airport, designed to handle smaller aircraft like the Boeing 737, was (due to rerouting from the bomb threat) forced to accommodate a large number of larger aircraft, resulting in disruption of the normal use of taxiways.

Additional considerations • The KLM crew failed to confirm instructions from the tower. The flight was one of the captain‘s first after spending six months training new pilots on a flight simulator.

He may have suffered from “training syndrome“, having been in charge of everything at the simulator (including simulated ATC), and having been away from the real world of flying for extended periods.

• The KLM‘s flight engineer hesitated to further challenge the Captain, possibly not only because he was senior in rank, but also as he was one of the most able and experienced pilots

Runway markings were an important contributing factor in nearly all of the most recent major accidents involving Runway incursions. working for the airline. This led directly to Crew Resource Management being implemented, encouraging crews to cross-check and challenge each other, irrespective of rank.

• The possibility that the KLM crew was in a hurry to commence the delayed flight due to regulations on exceeding crew duty hours.

• ATC clearances were based entirely on crew reports, who also operated in near-zero visibility. This is inherintly unsafe and operations in these conditions should be assisted by the use of ground radar.

ATC Involment Bizarrely, the official Spanish investigation report doesn’t mention the situation the controller was in. Factors on the ATC side include: • Fatigue: two controllers were working from 0800 to 2200.

Without the additional traf-

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4 Tenerife fic, some 275 to 300 movements were foreseen. Some 30 aircraft, most of them with passengers on board, were at the airport at the time of the accident.

• Weather: the controllers were trying to cope with bad visibility operations. They wanted to provide a service but without suitable equipment to help them cope, it added greatly to the stress.

• Coordination: a lot of coordination was needed, even to simply deliver the ATC clearance. In combination with very complex taxi instructions (due to the limited visibility), this resulted in a very high workload.

• Frequencies: as stated in a NOTAM at the time, the frequencies, the only link between the tower and the aircraft, were officially ‘on test’.

• Political situation: a neighboring airport had just been targeted by a bomb by activists targeting State property.

Their airport could easily be a target as well.

• Language: having to work in a language other than your mother tongue in high stress situations adds even more stress.

The Recommendations Oficial Spanish Report: The official Spanish Investigation report only has 3 recommendations: • Placing of great emphasis on the importance of exact compliance with instructions and clearances.

• Use of standard, concise and unequivocal aeronautical language.

• Avoidance of the word “TAKE-OFF” in the ATC clearance and adequate time separation between the ATC clearance and the TAKE-OFF clearance.

Netherlands Report The Report made by the Netherlands has a part called “Considerations and conclusions of the Netherlands Aircraft Accident Inquiry board”. In this part several Recommendations are listed. The interesting ones are (extracts): It is desirable that regulations are issued stipulating that: 1. A pilot (if circumstances permit) does not request a taxi clearance until after he has requested, received and read back a departure instruction and/or en-route clearance.

2. A pilot never combines the request for take off clearance with any other message.

3. If practicable a departure instruction and/ or an en-route clearance and a take off clearance are issued on different radio frequencies.

4. The phrase “take off”: is used exclusively in the request, the issue and confirmation of a take off clearance.

5. Runways exits are provided with clearly distinguishable markings, whereby every marking corresponds with the layout maps used for taxiing.

Then the report says: It is recommended that: A. ATC has, besides radio communications, other systems at his disposal such as: ground radar, block safety systems, visual confirmation by means of lights and the so called data-link, in order to control by such means more effectively the traffic on take off and landing runways and when necessary on taxiways, during conditions of bad visibility.

B. In the CVR, a signal is incorporated appearing at regular intervals, for synchronization with the FDR.

US Alpa Report The US APA Human Factor Report has 10 main recommendations and 5 “additional” recommendations.

The 10 main ones are: (extracts) 1. All aeronautical communications should be conducted with precise standardized terminology. Rigid Standards should be applied to ensure that all personnel involved in commercial aeronautical communications are fluent in English with minimal accent.

2. Instructor pilots should fly the majority of their flight time in regular line operations 3. The words take off should never be used in an ATC clearance.

4. Means should be taken to avoid confusion of an ATC clearance with a take off clear-

KLM took off without a take-off clearance.

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4 Tenerife ance. This may involve changing the name ATC clearance so that it is clearly understood to be nothing more than a description of the route to be flown.

5. Ground radar should be installed at all carriers’ airports.

6. Commercial aircraft should not taxi at any airport in visibility conditions below 150 meters unless suitable taxi lighting and airport ground radar is available.

7. Landing lights should be on when an aircraft is moving.

8. Strobe anti-collision lights should be installed on all air carrier aircraft.

9. A redundant means should be approved to confirm take off clearance at all airports (such as the VICON, Visual Confirmation of Voice take off clearance) 10. The roles of each cockpit member should be researched by an appropriate institu-

tion to determine optimum crewmember interaction in order to minimize the probability of human error.

The preamble to the 5 “additional“ recommendations indicate that during the course of its investigation the members were hindered in their ability to obtain information.

The 5 additional recommendations deal with the negative effects of “fear of legal consequences“ preventing full disclosure of all factors in an accident. A mention is made to recommend the installation of “area microphones“ in ATC control rooms and TWRs.

Recommendations still valid Today?

One can see that some of those recommendations had been followed by appropriate legislation and ICOA procedures. A much

clearer phraseology for lining up and taking off has been devised.CRM (Crew resources Management) sessions are now part of every Airline pilot’s training. But some were not mandated. It is interesting to note that the recommendation concerning Runway markings was an important contributing factor in nearly all of the most recent major accidents involving Runway incursions. If 30 years later, some of these recommendations have been dealt with, some of them are still valid today.

It is not easy to enforce safety. ^ webmaster@the-controller.net

Lessons Learned from Tenerife? ^

by Doug Churchill, EVP Professional IFATCA

Chain of Events This accident occurred as a result of a chain of events, any one of which having not transpired, could have prevented the highest number of fatalities of any single accident in aviation history.

This catastrophe is a classic example of the Reason “Swiss Cheese Model” of system failure because we know that several un-related occurrences allowed a problem(s) to pass through a hole in the first layer, then the second, third, fourth and so on until the inevitable happened. At any point along the way a proper defence could (would?) have prevented this tragic outcome because it is reasonable to assume that the more defences put up, the better, and the fewer and smaller the holes, the more likely we are to stop errors from occurring. However if the layers are ‘set up’ with the holes already in alignment, this inherently flawed system is doomed to failure. We could say that this is the way it was on March 27, 1977 based on knowledge we have today, but it is perhaps unfair to compare then with now because huge advances in technology plus the sheer numbers

of aircraft fly4 Clear runway markings. ing the skies today make it a difficult comparison and even an irrelevant one.

There may not be many air traffic controllers who can recall the safety strategies and procedures that were practiced in Photo: Rob van Ringelesteijn aviation in 1977, but we are able to Communications readily recognize, albeit in hindsight, some Problems inconsistencies and negative influences that Communication is one human contributed to the Tenerife accident beelement that is receiving recause, regrettably we still see them playing newed attention. It has been a role in accidents and incidents in today’s clearly demonstrated that a aviation environment.

Regrettably we still see the negative influences that contributed to the Tenerife accident playing a role in accidents and incidents in today’s aviation environment.

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4 Tenerife 4 Runway occupied by vehicles.

very well remain unresolved in many jurisdictions until 2011 – 34 years after Tenerife!

Controller and Pilot Fatigue

Photo: Melbourne airport

majority of accidents and incidents were caused or contributed to by a lack of language proficiency on the part of pilots and/or air traffic controllers.

It has been said that sloppy and unprofessional ATC communications was a contributing factor to this accident. We all agree that there is a great deal of work to be done to improve our communications and therefore the initiative by ICAO to ensure States take measures that will require its pilots and controllers to be proficient in the English language by early 2008 (minimum level 4) is a welcome one. However, despite the existence of this requirement for several years now, and protestations from IFATCA and others, not enough action has been taken to improve the communication problem. Additionally, considering the ICAO 36th Assembly Resolutions regarding language proficiency we have a long way to go before all States are compliant - it could

Could fatigue have played a role? There has not been documented evidence that it played any part, but with the knowledge we have today on fatigue, work schemes and circadian rhythms it is not hard to imagine that fatigue could have had some influence on the flight crews and/ or controllers. For many years IFATCA policy has dictated that any procedures or situations that increase the fatigue factor, decrease sleep-time or promote a degradation of our performance should be avoided. In spite of this, in today’s world of unprecedented levels of traffic, staff shortages, anti-social rostering, inadequate rest periods and excessive use of over-time, fatigue remains a problem.

In the last 30 years we have learned a great deal about the causes and consequences of fatigue, but many times we insist on pushing the limits of our endurance and don’t really “practice what we preach”.

Runway Incursions Runway incursions have been a thorn in the side of aviation since the day vehicles, equipment and aircraft began to share the same environment. The vast majority of them remain “unpublicized” because they do no damage to life or property, but regardless of their severity, they will always constitute a major threat to aviation safety. With the predicted growth of air traffic, actual numbers of incursions are likely to rise unless held in check by preventative actions. States, Providers and international organizations have recognized this and have developed comprehensive runway incursion prevention plans but more needs to be done, bearing in mind that the use of advanced technology is not necessarily the “be-all-to-end-all”. Fancy, sophisticated equipment such the Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (SMGCS) and A- SMGCS (Advanced) designed to enhance ground movements in low visibility and re-

duce the potential for runway incursions, are leading-edge and their benefits are many but, at some airports this equipment is not operating to full potential and therefore not an entirely reliable tool. Yes, it is being perfected and improvements have been made in other key areas such as signage, lighting, and other airport markings, but the sheer volume of aircraft flying today along with increase in vehicular traffic on manoeuvring areas is causing congestion at airports like never before experienced.

Human Factors With mechanical failures featuring less prominently in aircraft accidents, more attention has been focused on understanding how various human factors can contribute to accidents. People are the core element representing both strengths and weaknesses in our system, evidenced by analysis of occurrence reports where we see the “human” factor as having caused or contributed to almost every incident and accident related to runway incursions. We believe accidents seldom result solely from errors by operational personnel or equipment failures, but they result from a series of failures and/or flaws already present in the system with the front-line operators the inheritors of these system defects. IFATCA has long been a proponent of a formal Human Factors plan that ensures HF considerations are incorporated into system design, and would further address human performance considerations in operations, maintenance and support. Human Factors issues have been gaining more notoriety in recent years and will continue to be a key ingredient in the success of the system of the future.

Our collective commitment to improving on runway incursion rates has gotten better over the years. We have made, and will continue to make improvements to our equipment, procedures, communication skills, reporting procedures and regulations. But, is the comparative rate of incidents actually improving?

It is difficult to say, but one thing is certain – it is no where near the level we would like it to be. Why, with all our great technological advances, more awareness and more preparedness to counter-act, do we still witness an unacceptable rate of runway incursions? ^ evpp@ifatca.org

IFATCA has long been a proponent of a formal Human Factors plan that ensures HF considerations are incorporated into system design.

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4 Americas News

Brazil Update “It’s a question of time before a new air accident occurs in Brazil” (Marc Baumgartner President IFATCA) Photo: Vinicius Tupinamba/Dreamstime

^

by Philippe Domogala, Editor

In the last 3 months the situation in Brazil got worse. IFATCA and ITF issued a joint press release on 28 September 2007 which attracted much attention in the country.

IFATCA ITF Joint Press Release Brazil failing to address aviation safety one year after midair collision As the 36th Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) concludes it marks one year since the tragic mid-air collision of a GOL Airlines passenger jet and a civilian executive jet over the Amazon jungle.

This accident in Brazilian airspace and a subsequent one at Sao Paulo‘s Congonhas airport last July dramatically illustrate a civil aviation system in a state of disrepair. We trust that deliberations at the ICAO assembly serve to remind us all of the seriousness of our commitment to the safety of the traveling public.

These regrettable incidents need not have happened. The reaction of Brazilian authorities, including the detention of pilots and prosecution of air traffic controllers, serves only to exacerbate the numerous problems of a system in chaos. The continued provision of air traffic services by unqualified personnel does little to demonstrate a commitment to internationally established standards.

We, as members of the aviation community, must insist that Brazil, as a Member State of ICAO, fulfils its obligations, which are of chief importance in air transport. Immediate action needs to be taken to address the very real problems inherent in Brazil’s aviation system.

Anything less will ensure that Brazilian airspace remains vulnerable, with the inevitable risk of continuous loss of lives.

Ingo Marowsky, Civil Aviation Section Secretary of the ITF (International Transport Workers‘ Federation) added: “Brazil‘s aviation sector is in crisis. Its skies are in danger of descending into chaos, yet no one in government seems to be listening. Action must be taken now before more lives are lost.”

President IFATCA BBC Interview Then Marc Baumgartner, gave an interview to the BBC Brazil. He said that the Aeronautica “invested a lot of energy in imprisoning and persecuting its own employees” but failed to correct the failures of their own ATC-system.

He further said: “it’s a question of time before a new air accident occurs in Brazil.”

This prompted a harsh reaction from the authorities. In an interview for 11 radio stations, the Brazil minister of Defense, Nelson Jobim said that the declaration is not exempt of interest and is part of “a political game supporting the controllers.” “This type of statement has a political objective by creating a favorable situation to resolve the salary issue.

The technical situation of the Brazilian ACCs is fine. The interests pursued are different” he said. The Minister declared that he will perform a complete audit of the air traffic control system (but did not say by whom).

that Brazil will be unable to comply with ICAO-mandated ATC English-proficiency level by next year.”

In 2006, the accident rate for Brazilian operators was 3.5 times higher than world average and 1.25 times higher than the regional rate for Latin American countries. IATA foresees that the crisis is ongoing and that the country may suffer impacts in tourism and, ultimately, in connectivity with the rest of the world…

So far, the reaction of the Brazilian authorities was that IATA did not understand the data presented to them. ^ ed@ifatca.org

(Info reported by Lorenna Rodrigues of Folha Online, in Brasília 03 October 2007).

Photo: Em

IATA Reactions We also learned that on 15 august, IATA has sent a very critical report on ATC to the Brazilian authorities. Although the report was not publicly released. Some Brazilian newspapers and internet blogs ran edited excerpts. (like the one of Joe Sharkey on www.joesharkey.com) The report said that Brazil ATC system is “unreliable, unsafe and inefficient,” with negative effects not only on basic transportation, but on “opportunities for economic growth.”

Given the government‘s failure to address political mismanagement of civilian aviation in Brazil. “The political crisis is expected to continue for some time, possibly causing further ATC problems in the near future.” Since the collision over the Amazon labor problems and other disruptions have “magnified the deficiencies of the ATC system” while costing airlines “more than $70 million” because of delays and airport problems.

“There is concern in the industry that appropriate training for air traffic controllers, airline and airport technical support is not being provided. For example, it is apparent

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braer

4 Human Factors

Can we Define “Human Error”?

This article is a reaction on what the editor of the Controller wrote in an earlier editorial: human errors are mostly at the root cause of accidents and that the percentage of human errors in accidents is still steady around 75-80%. In this commentary I will argue that this is a myth and it is about time that we look a little deeper into the rubble of accidents and incidents. Otherwise I fear that we continue to chase the human and thereby reinforce the idea that the systems we handle are all right if it wasn’t for the unreliable humans inside the system.

Humans in the middle of trouble When as mishap takes place it is quite normal to see humans in the middle of the trouble.

People take part in the processes and they initiate the actions that later leads to accidents or incidents. The human contribution to the accident is then judged to be the source of trouble as well. Many scientists have pointed out, that a cause is always a judgment made in hindsight and therefore benefits from the common malaise of “besserwissen”. We (the humans) actually go as far as believing that 75-80% of all problems emerge from what is called “human error”. But it is quite understandable that we find humans in the middle

of accidents and incidents. Humans are the ones that make the system work in the first place. It is the humans that build up the process that, besides leading to failure, very often leads to success. It is people, on all levels of an organization, who make the trade-offs between capacity and safety. And People do not come to work to use new strategies to achieve their goals. People go to work and use the strategies that have been constructed through training and experience. Incidents and accidents are not culpable situations that can be identified and avoided in the future. Rather incidents and accidents stem from normal people are doing normal work in normal organizations. Said with other words; failure and success is two sides of the same coin.

Photo: Michelle Marsan/dreamstime

^ by Tom Laursen, Zurich ACC

4 Where is human error located?

The failure mechanism or human error Many investigation boards use “human error” as a cause of accidents. They are ready to attribute mishaps to individuals that failed in one way or the other to do the right thing at the right moment. I get the impression somebody believe that humans have a “failure mechanism” that decides whether we do right thing or not. Try to imagine the consequences of this idea! Do humans have the ability to control this mechanism and is this mechanism, which we all silently accept exist, controllable? A paradox of the failure mechanism is that the mechanism itself works without malfunction! The failure mechanism is flawless and it only shows up when people are involved in mishaps, that’s bizarre.

What can substitute human error?

So, if it is not “human error” that causes trou-

ble, what is it then? This is a trickier question, where the answer probably lies in research and deeper understanding of the complex systems that we handle and probably the explanation also has to do with how we (the western society at least) build our models of life that governs our judicial systems and the models we build to understand the world.

But in this article I will concentrate on the issues that we (controllers) can influence.

First of all we should stop accepting “human error” as a cause of trouble. We have to object to investigations ending up with results that repeat that individual operator or managerial shortcomings were the source to trouble. What is called “human error” is a consequence rather than it is at the core of the incident or accident. We can start the discussion with our local investigation units and help them understand that repeating the human error theory will probably lead to a dead end, and to the illusion that the system

I get the impression somebody believe that humans have a “failure mechanism” that decides whether we do right thing or not.

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4 Human Factors

How to correct behavior?

Another problem that I have seen over and over again, is that organizations often use their incidents and reporting systems as a management tool for correcting human behavior. The systems are used as some kind of information about how individuals perform and as a tool that can be used to judge individual performance. This way managers/ organizations can show that they are doing something to make sure that people are up to standard. A lot of organizations, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, have even come to the conclusion that retraining of individuals is

4 Is there also an “animal error“?

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I am often asked whether I do not think that operators never make mistakes? My answer is that; of course do humans make mistakes, but when they were involved in the process that led to the accident or the incident they, for sure, thought they were doing the right thing. Besides that, connecting failure with something bad within the human doesn’t help us to improve the system that we control. It is my impression that we way to often accept human shortcomings as an explanation of the trouble we have experienced.

to: D

Operators never make mistakes?

“Fre a good way to improve the system that they if it edom is d control. They actually believe that sending to m oes n not w ake ot inc orth controllers to the simulator for a couple of mis h take lude th aving Mah days will improve system performance. This e fr s.“ a eed t om is weird! First of all I guess that most of the India ma Ga n p ndh ( 1 o 8 i people that are sent to the simulator will litic 69 194 al a nd 8) see it as if they are blamed for the mishap, spir itua and I won’t speculate what this does to l le ade the motivation for reporting next time. r But what is worse, how do they come to the point where they think that a couple of days in a simulator, that will not be unable to represent the “real world” completely, can help a controller that is doing his job everyday improve his performance? How can they think that this will help the individual change his long-standing ways of handling traffic?

Instead build reporting systems that cannot be used as tools for judging individual performance. Use the reporting systems for finding deeper trouble that can lead to improvement of working conditions.

David Woods, an American professor, favors the search for what he calls second stories.

Second stories are about constantly seeking out systemic vulnerabilities to help people and organizations develop and test new and more robust practices to enhance safety. If learning hinges on the ability to dig out systemic vulnerabilities, then reports and organizational encounters with reporters need to go beyond the “errors” or “violations” that may have served as the trigger of reporting.

Stop using the term “Human error”

Photo: Editorial /dreamstime

If we want to make progress on safety and we want to help the international community and ourselves, we have to engage in the discussion about what is too often called “human error” and how we construct this label. We should refrain from using the label “human error” at all. Mainly because it applies to the outcome of the event rather than tells us anything about the cause of trouble. We have to accept that human performance is variable and that people have to adapt to the cir-

Pho

is ok if it wasn’t for a few individuals within the system.

cumstances under which they work.

Furthermore we should step away from using our reporting system as management tools to identify where the people need more training. It is way to easy to accept human error as an explanation of trouble. We need to look deeper into the rubble and find where our systems are vulnerable to trouble.

This way we might be able to show that we know that people make mistakes, but that the solution to the problems is not to haunt “human errors” or individual shortcomings. But the strategy that we should use is to help the people overcome the systemic problems that everyone might be vulnerable to. ^ mettom14@mac.com

We should refrain from using the label “human error” at all.

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Interview Arni GUNNARSSON, Managing Director AIR ICELAND

4 One of Air Iceland‘s Fokker 50‘s

^ by Philippe Domogala Air Iceland is the Domestic Airline of Iceland operating 6 Fokker 50, 2 Dash8-100 and 2 Twin otters, they have 75 pilots and besides flying all over Iceland, serving nearly every community that has an airport there, they also operate regularly to Greenland and to the Faeroe islands.

Philippe: Has the privatization of ATS in Iceland changed something for your airline?

Arni Gunnarsson: No, the good cooperation we had with the old CAA did not change at all, with ISAVIA, the new company.

We see that ISAVIA seems to be more active than the old CAA around airports. Also they try to save money, proposing to replace ATC with AFIS is some

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smaller airports. We were also surprised to see that, probably because of some positions duplication, the CAA fees were raised by 25% this year. We clearly did not expect that.

Ph.: What are your expectations as an airline, from a privatized ATS provider?

AG: ISAVIA is only 9 months old and we need to see how it develops. We expect to see service contracts and more efficient service for the same fees. For instance we would like to see the current minima at our main airport in the north (Akureyri) reduced from the current 800 feet to something like 200 ft to increase the reliability on this route. Better equipment, like new ILS, better runway lights and even SSR radar would considerably improve the situation there.

Ph.: What are your expectations from ATC? AG: We operate to many very difficult destinations, and very accurate weather information is paramount. It is essential that things like latest weather change, winds, runway contamination, braking performance, etc. are passed on to us

rapidly, as, in those places they change drastically and very fast. It is important that controllers understand the importance of this.

Ph.: Do you have any plans for the eventual volcanic eruption of Mt Katla?

AG: No. We have a lot of volcanic eruptions in Iceland, so we have experience with that. If it turns out to be a big one, we will just ground our aircraft to prevent them for entering the ash clouds. If it is a small one, it can be good for us as we have increased business as a lot of people want to leave the area. ^

Photo: DP

Photo: DP

FOCUS ON ICELAND

4 Arni Gunnarsson THE

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4 Iceland

Visiting Reykjavik Oceanic Centre ^ by Philippe Domogala

stable communications with aircraft in periods of bad or overloaded HF conditions. The response times are usually within 60-90 seconds and that is fine for Oceanic operations.”

Photos: DP

New version coming up.

4 Sigmar Olafsson, working at the position When entering Reykjavik Oceanic centre one is surprised at the very low noise level. Could that be due to CPDLC replacing voice? (CPDLC is Data link communications between pilots and controllers.) Well, not exactly. As I found out, only 25% of the traffic crossing the North Atlantic in the summer of 2007 is CPDLC equipped.

This percentage rises to 45% in the winter. The main reason is that most of the co-ordination is done electronically and, for HF communications, a computerized system sends messages electronically in text form (like e-mail) to the radio operators that actually transmit the messages to aircraft. Those radio operators are located at Iceland Radio in another part of the town.

The final phase of CPDLC implementation in the NAT will take place on January 17th 2008.

Then we will have implemented all messages included in FANS 1/A except re-route clearances. We, along with some of the other NAT service providers, are however not implementing CPDLC route clearances for the time being because of issues associated with the automatic loading of route clearances into the FMS. The oceanic centres only specify the routing to the edge of the oceanic airspace. If the pilot uploads such a route into the FMS it would, in many cases, result in the rest of the route to destination being erased from the FMC. So until that problem is solved the CPDLC route clearances will not be implemented. One problem we have is coverage. We usually loose all CPDLC contact with aircraft north of 80N but most of the time we have pretty good HF conditions there. In remote airspace CPDLC messages are routed via communication satellites which only provide coverage up to 80N. With the significant increase in polar flights the lack of satellite coverage north of 80N becomes a problem.

CPDLC over the North Atlantic: Does it work?

The Track system

I wanted to ask what the experience with CPDLC is, and how do controllers work with it: “Well, CPDLC works a lot better than HF” says Sigmar Olafsson, a controller at Reykjavik centre and specialist in CPDLC. “Our system is still limited because we don´t support all messages but CPDLC is definitely a big improvement over HF because it provides relatively

The traffic over the North Atlantic is special in a sense that it is concentrated in areas depending on the weather: the so called Organized Track System means that flights can file for the best great circle routes depending on the wind conditions. Everyday the weather is assessed and the track system (a set of multiple parallels tracks) is moved north or south to accom-

play.

ion dis

4 A posit

modate the flows. The traffic is also diurnal in nature with the eastbound traffic from North America to Europe operating during the night for early morning arrivals in Europe, and the westbound traffic from Europe to North America flying during the day. There is a huge difference in traffic between summer and winter. For instance in February 2007 there were 5.700 oceanic crossings over Icelandic airspace, but in July it was 12.100.

Also this was a 16% increase of traffic compared to July 2006.

For the moment, the combined yearly increase of traffic over the North Atlantic for Reykjavik centre is around 10% over 2006.

Icelandic Airspace To complete our tour of the ACC, the airspace controlled by the Reykjavik centre extends from 61N to the North Pole and from the west coast of Norway to the east coast of Canada.

Traffic is procedurally separated except for the airspace over and around Iceland where radar separation is applied. Paper strips are gone, replaced by 4 View electronic displays and situation of the displays, automatically updated Centre Ops room. by position reports. ^

4 The “electronic strips“ display.

The CPDLC equipped aircraft have a box around their call sign.

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4 Iceland

4 Capt. Jonsson in his B757 at 35000 feet.

4 The future of Icelandair: The new B787.

Photo: Boeing Co.

t Pho o: D P

Interview Jon H. Jonsson, ICELANDAIR Boeing 757 Captain Philippe ^ by Domogala Philippe: What is your experience with the North Atlantic Track system?

Capt Jon Jonsson: Icelandair flights out of Keflavík Iceland are not part of the organized track system. However we often cross them. Most of the time we do get our requested routes and altitudes on the passengers flights but on our cargo flights which run opposite to the “normal“ passenger flow during the day we sometimes get stuck at FL280 for the trans-atlantic crossing. That results in high fuel penalties. When operating for Loftleidir, the Icelandair charter division we however fly NAT routes between UK and destinations in Canada and USA. I think

European airports have endless list of SIDs and STARs while in the USA traffic is controlled mainly by vectoring.

the system is very efficient, it reduces workload for aircrew and VHF frequency congestion is much less likely. It is also cost efficient for the airlines because the system is set up each day to maximize the effects of winds aloft.

Ph.: Do you have CPDLC and what is your experience with it? JJ: Our Aircraft are unfortunately not CPDLC equipped.

Ph.: Is the weather over the North Atlantic a problem for your operations?

JJ: Not really. We are used to “bad” weather in Iceland. One of the main problems we encounter is in winter over Greenland, where strong jet-streams crossing the glaciers frequently cause severe turbulence. This can result in re-routings and extra flight time.

Ph.: How would you rate ATC in general in this part of the world?

JJ: Working for Icelandair and the charter division Loftleidir takes us all over the world.

So we are used to different ATC systems. On a day to day basis when operating between Europe and USA the difference is quite noticeable. The phraseology is different and the way of controlling traffic, especially in the approach and departure sectors, is also different.

European airports have endless list of SIDs and STARs while in the USA traffic is controlled mainly by vectoring. In London Heathrow for instance, nearly all our flights end up in a 10 minutes holding. In Frankfurt you overfly

the airfield at 10.000 ft and still have some 85 track miles to go according to the STAR. Then frequently you get a vectoring for a shortcut so it can mess up your descent planning if you are not prepared. In USA it is endless long vectoring, and in Reykjavik, we are sometimes slowed down 500 miles out for spacing. But generally we hare happy with ATC. Ph.: Do you have any specific problems with Iceland ATC? JJ: No, we are quite happy and being the largest operator in Iceland means we are in close contact with ICAA. The aviation industry in Iceland is quite small and many of my friends are air traffic controllers. I once had the opportunity to invite my friend Einar Hilmarsson, an air traffic controller operating the oceanic sector, to a training session in the flight simulator. He told me later that it opened up his mind to see what pilots are facing when dealing with an emergency. Communication with ATC is not our top priority so air traffic controllers can expect to hear the word “standby” from aircrew in such cases. Icelandair had 10 level busts worldwide in 2006. When studying the cases it showed that 7 of them were altimeter reset errors. That is either forgetting to set altimeters to standard during climb through transition altitude or not setting the correct QNH when descending.

This was addressed to ICAA and we found it important that approach controllers should include the QNH when issuing the first clearance from a flight level to an altitude. ^

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Nordic Controllers Discuss Overtime ^

Excessive overtime and associated fatigue compromised flight safety.

4 Participants of the Nordic meeting waiting

by Philippe Domogala, Editor

Air traffic controllers associations from the 5 Nordic Countries (Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) met in Reykjavik last September and issued a common statement expressing deep concern on how overtime is being used by ANSPs as a tool to compensate for controllers shortage.

They sated that excessive overtime and associated fatigue compromised flight safety and the health of the controllers.They also asked that overtime be regulated and that ANSPs should structure their operations to cater for increase of traffic with the aim to eliminate the need for overtime in air traffic control.

for a bus with adequate provisions.

The following examples were given: in Denmark every controller has to work at least 17 extra working days until the end of 2008 to cater for chronic staff shortages.

Sweden is 100 controllers short, on a total of 650 controllers for the whole country. In Norway the staff situation is the lowest ever, and overtime is massively used to make the system work. ^ Photo: DP

Interview Bjorn Knutsson, Keflavik Airport Director Philippe ^ by Domogala, Editor Photo: DP

4 B. Knutsson Philippe: What is the current status of the airport?

Bjorn Knutsson: The current status of the airport (which is the main International airport in Iceland) is rather complex. The Americans suddenly left Iceland and the airport last year. Until then, the airport infrastructure was a joint military/airport company issue, but mainly funded by the U.S. Navy.

The Airport Authority reports to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs due to the former dual status of the operation. With the military gone, it will revert to the Ministry of Transport next year. The fact that ATC in the airport is a separate entity is also due to the former military status.

Ph.: What will happen to the APP and TWR controllers in Keflavik?

BK: It is not yet known if ISAVIA, the new privatised ATS company in Iceland, will take over or not the ATC part of the airport. For the moment the 31 controllers in Keflavik tower and approach are still part of our Airport and still belong to the Keflavik Airport Authority. A bill will be passed this winter in parliament hopefully clarifying this. Personally, I think that most likely the controllers will become part of ISAVIA. Ph.: What is your opinion of ATC in Keflavik?

BK: We have rather smooth operations here.

The controllers in Keflavik are doing well considering the equipment they have. Our radar

is 27 years old radar, the APP is still a dark room and our Tower is rather old. We plan to modernize both the tower and the controllers equipment.

Ph.: What are benefits of being a privatized company?

BK: We will not be privatized in the sense that the State still remains with 100% ownership.

But we will gain certain flexibility in operations and have access to funds and loans for better and quicker investments.

This is also a new trend that happens everywhere for better operation and service. ^

The controllers in Keflavik are doing well considering the equipment they have.

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4 Iceland

Interview Thorgeir Palsson, CEO ISAVIA

There are no plans for privatization neither of airport nor air navigation services.

^ Photo: isavia

4 T. Palsson, CEO ISAVIA

Photo: DP

Ph.: ISAVIA had a hectic start with the Reykjavik controllers, but everything seems to be much better today. Do you expect more difficulties in the future?

TP: You are correct in saying that everything seems to be much better today. I think that everyone has learned a lot from that experience and that relations in the aftermath have improved dramatically. After all we are a small community of people who are committed to supporting the air transport system that is so vital to Iceland and its population.

by Philippe Domogala, Editor Philippe: ISAVIA is the newest ANSP on the European map. Everybody wants to “privatize“ ATM today. Was the Icelandic move the result of a trend, or is there more be-

hind it?

Thorgeir Palsson: The development in Iceland is very much in line with the development in the other Nordic countries. This is one version of the European trend of separating regulation and authority functions from service provision. There are no plans for privatization neither of airport nor air navigation services. The transformation from a state agency to a corporate status will help ISAVIA conduct its business along commercial lines in the future. In particular the company will be able to base its revenues more on user charges and commercial income rather than allocations from the state budget. However, this will not happen overnight.

Ph.: What improvements does ISAVIA intend to bring to its customers, the airlines?

TP: ISAVIA is committed to providing excellent services that will allow the airlines and other customers to plan and conduct their operation over the North Atlantic or in domestic airspace with minimal constraints on routes and flight levels and to the highest level of safety. This we plan to achieve by new technology and highly trained and qualified staff in all aspects of operating and implementing our air traffic and navigation services.

Ph.: What will this mean for the Controllers in Iceland?

TP: The changes in technology have already had a significant impact on the work carried out by our controllers. More and more they are able to focus on management and actual control of air traffic as automation of routine tasks increases. They are also in greater numbers being brought into the planning and development work that draws on their expertise in the control of air traffic. This trend can only continue as our systems become more capable in providing the Controllers with better tools for decision making and communications.

Ph.: What are your plans to alleviate the current staff shortage in Iceland?

4 The Reykjavik ACC entrance.

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TP: In my opinion we have not suffered from staff shortage in the past few years in Iceland despite the need for moderate overtime work that is a part of our work culture. This is demonstrated by the fact that ATCO overtime has decreased significantly. On the other hand we are in the process of training new controllers in order to make up for attrition and the need for increased number of controllers to deal with increasing traffic. This training activity is currently carried out by the ISAVIA training facility at a rate that is sufficient to cope with the demand for new controllers. Recruitment of student controllers has not been a problem in Iceland.

Ph.: What will be, in your view, the future of the 31 Controllers in Keflavik Airport?

Would you accept them inside ISAVIA? TP: There is every reason to think that ISAVIA will in the near future take over the responsibility for air traffic services at Keflavik Airport.

The ATCO´s currently employed by the airport would in this case be integrated into the ISAVIA staff without any major difficulties.

Ph.: Is ISAVIA planning to enter the FAB contest? If so, which are your preferred partners?

TP: ISAVIA and its predecessor the ICAA is in the position of having had a FAB arrangement with Denmark over a period of thirty some years. This refers to the fact that ISAVIA has delegated responsibility for providing air traffic services over most of Greenland above flight level 195. Also ISAVIA has for decades provided these services over the sovereign airspace of the Fareo Islands. More recently ISAVIA has entered into a joint venture with the Irish Aviation Authority whereby aeronautical communications services are provided jointly in the Shanwick, Reykjavik and Sondrestrom FIR´s. Thus this is not a new business to ISAVIA that will be exploring other possibilities in this area with its partners in the North European ANSP Cooperation program. ^

4 Iceland

Icelandic Association Problems Philippe: Everybody remembers the bad situation you were in last year, with IFTATCA having to issue Press releases and offers to mediate. What happened?

ICEATCA: In the contract negotiations 2005 the management tried to negotiate a change to the shift system. In fact the negotiation teams had reached an agreement but the membership turned it down because of the proposed changes to the shift system. The clause about the changes were then taken out and the membership ratified the contract. Despite this the management decided to change the Shift system anyway. We referred the dispute to the labor court as a breach of contract on the grounds that the shift system did not meet the requirement for two consecutive days off per week as stipulated by the contract. ICEATCA´s position was that a “day” in this context was a calendar day from midnight to midnight. We lost the case, the court interpreted the term “day” as any 24 consecutive hours that could start at any time.

The court’s ruling did not make the controllers any happier. They decided to work no overtime until the matter was resolved. This caused great difficulties during the summer as nobody was prepared to work overtime to cover sickness and traffic load. Finally the minister of transport stepped in and proposed to get impartial mediators to try and find a solution. Two experts from Eurocontrol came and conducted a workshop with the aim to find a solution. After interesting discussions – brilliantly facilitated by the Eurocontrol experts and with input from Swedish and Danish guests – we reached a compromise, and from 1 Nov 2006, a new shift system took effect and the situation was calm again. The discussions at the workshop included also ways for a more constructive social dialogue between management and the controllers in the future.

Then came the new company (ISAVIA) which was to take over from ICAA on 1st January 2007. In the law on transfer it is categorically stated that dismissal of employees on the grounds of the transfer are not allowed. Nev-

ertheless the ICAA sent all relevant employees a letter of dismissal effective from 31 December 2006. At the same time ISAVIA sent these employees a letter offering them employment with the new company. Problem was that all controllers in Iceland were civil servants and members of the state pension fund. With ISAVIA the 4 The ICEATCA Board: Loftur and Dora talking to Philippe matter was different. the new company: a few decided ICEATCA had tried to get ISAVIA to negotito leave ATC, one went to Norate a compensation for the loss of pension way, another is going to Sweden, but it was not until the very end of December etc... So in fact we lost about 8% 2006 that they were willing to really talk to of our staff in the process. us. But on 31st December a settlement had not been reached although some progress had been made., and the majority of controlPh: Do you have confidence lers (ca 85%) had not signed a contract of with the new Company now? employment with ISAVIA. ICEATCA: Confidence in ISAOn 1st January ISAVIA started its first day of VIA?, yes, in principle. But our business with 5 operational controllers and present contract expires in Febabout 10 who had not been working for ruary 2008. Negotiations will years but had been through a few days of start this autumn and future reclassroom and simulator at the end of Delations between controllers and the new company will very much cember. A contingency plan was also put in effect with heavy restrictions. On 2nd January depend on the procedure and ICEATCA and ISAVIA reached an agreement outcome of those negotiations. on how to compensate all the loss occurring We’ll see what happens ^ due to the change of membership to the state pension fund. However ICEATCA could only sign the agreement with the proviso that it would have to be ratified at a union meeting. ISAVIA on the other hand insisted that we signed without any conditions. We could not 4 (Strong)winds do that so the meeting ended on a sour note of change in and no contract. However, in the end we manIceland ATC? aged to work our way around that problem and reason prevailed. The contract was signed on 3rd January and the controllers signed their contract of employment on the 4th.

Ph: How is the situation today?

ICEATCA: Relations with the ISAVIA management have much improved, but we are short on staff. After the lay off, not everyone joined

Photo: DP

Philippe ^ by Domogala, Editor

Photo: Christian Berge

On 1st January 2007 ISAVIA started its first day of business with 5 operational controllers and about 10 who had not been working for years.

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4 Legal News

Ueberlingen: The Verdict

Photo: Bora Ucak/dreamstime

The Verdict Own translation into English of extracts of the Declaration to the Media. (Medienmitteilung) made by the Court and issued on 4 Sept 07 by the Buelach Bezirksgericht.

On 4 September 2007, the Tribunal of the small city of Buelach, near Zurich Airport delivered its verdict:

The Sentences

Photo: Mette Brandt Nielsen

First, 3 management staff were found guilty of multiple accounts of negligence having caused death. They were the Head of ANS Zurich, the head of Zurich ACC and the Chief of Operations of Zurich ACC. All 3 were sentenced to 12 months prison, suspended sentence.

The interdisciplinary Project manager (responsible for the maintenance performed that night) was sentenced, also under suspended conditions, to 90 days @ 150 CHF each. (approximately 10.000 USD). The 4 other defendants, one technical worker, a system manager, a controller (on break) and

4 The late Peter Nielsen.

a shift leader (of the preceding shift) were discharged by the court.

have been prevented, and the accident would not have taken place.

Court Argumentation

Not Warning Adjacent Centres

The judges argument centered around the fact that at the time of the accident only one controller worked in the Ops room, while the second one was in the restroom, and the court said this was a longstanding practice by Skyguide. The court further said that planned technical work during the night made the work of the controller more complicated for instance the optical Short term conflict alert system was disabled.

They added that things were further complicating by the delayed arrival of an aircraft at Friedrichshafen airport and the undetected failure of the telephone system. This lead to an overload of the single controller so that he could not call back his colleague from the break. This high workload meant that he discovered the conflict between the two aircraft much too late.

The guilty verdict against the project manager was justified by the court on the grounds that he acted against the internal regulations of Skyguide by neglecting to inform the adjacent centers about the disconnection of the main telephone system and use of backup system, Rhein (Karlsruhe) ACC, which noticed the convergence of the 2 aircraft on their radar tried to reach Zurich ACC several times. But Rhein – not informed about the works- used the telephone number of the main system, without success. If the project manager had assured the notification of adjacent centers, Rhein could have reached the controller on the correct telephone number, to warn him and the accident could have been prevented.

Single Controller on Duty According the opinion of the court the fact that only one controller was working during the night violated the safety principles of ATC. They said that human errors and technical malfunctions are given, unmovable facts, which one has to count at any time. A correct manning in the Ops room might have counterbalanced these deficiencies.

According to the court, the 3 management staff found guilty had the responsibility to ensure that 2 controllers were working at the same time that night, even more because of technical constraints/difficulties and the STCA warning system not being operational.

If 2 controllers had been on duty that night, they could have shared the work and one could have supported the other. With 2 on duty, the excessive demand and lack of attention of the remaining controller would

No Charges for the Second Controller The main charge against the second controller was that he did not sufficiently inform himself about the technical activities and nevertheless went on a break. The court found that according internal regulations, it was the first controllers responsibility alone to allow the second one to go on break and therefore no charge could be made against the second controller.

The charges against the other technical staff and the shift leader were dropped by the court.

No Appeal In a Press release issued on 20 Sept, Skyguide announced that their 4 condemned employees will not appeal the court’s decision. Two of them will continue to work for Skyguide, but with new functions and new positions. The two others have retired in the meantime. The 4 acquitted will be reinstalled in their former positions. ^

During the reading of the Court‘s verdict at the Bezirkgericht court in Buelach (CH), the judges made a special mention about the late Peter Nielsen. According to persons present in the audience during the reading of the verdict, the court found that Peter had been put into a situation through no fault of his own, and fell victim to the circumstances. Unfortunately the full transcript of the verdict is not available for public or media use.

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4 ICAO

The ICAO Plan for Africa

Photo: ICAO

4 The ICAO assembly.

^

by Alexis Brathwaite, IFATCA Deputy President

Accidents Rate The rate of aviation accidents in Africa is not just higher than in any other region of the world. With ICAO ADREP data from 1990 to 2006 suggesting that 70% of accidents in the region are not reported, the 2002 to 2006 data show an aircraft accident rate that is more than eight times the world average resulting in passenger fatalities of more than eleven times the world average. Clearly this called for an inspired intervention.

The AFI Plan Following their 2006 visit to Africa, ICAO’s Air Navigation Commission developed a comprehensive regional implementation plan for aviation safety in Africa (the AFI Plan). The AFI Plan, approved by the Council in May, was the subject of a high-level meeting convened to coincide with the 36th Session of the ICAO assembly. IFATCA was among the 73 contracting states and 28 international organisations that provided 289 participants at this meeting on 17 September 2007. The stated purpose of the meeting was to provide a platform for a realistic assessment of the safety-related issues in the AFI region and to determine the way forward for the implementation of the plan. The meeting endorsed the plan and a number of States and international organisations pledged cash and technical assistance to be coordinated by ICAO to ensure proper utilization of the resources. In response, President of the Council of ICAO, Roberto Kobeh González said: “The AFI Plan represents the most coordinated and inclusive effort ever to deal with the very serious safety challenges facing the majority of African States. The positive response from States as well as donor organizations is very en-

couraging for the timely implementation of the Plan.”

Part of Global Safety Of course, there have been previous initiatives in Africa. Where the AFI plan will differ from past initiatives is that it integrates ICAO’s performance-based Global Aviation Safety Plan and the air transport industry’s new Global Aviation Safety Roadmap, both of which focus on activities with the highest return for improving safety. The result is a holistic and systemic approach based on a disciplined, programme management methodology. It includes specific key stakeholders, identification of risks, gap analyses, prioritized recommended actions and continuous monitoring and evaluation.

The Plan will stress clearly defined objectives, outputs, activities and performance measures, as well as transparency and accountability at every level. The Plan’s initial implementation phase is expected to cover a four-year period. The next step will be a special regional air navigation meeting in 2008, which will serve as a checkpoint for progress. A decision on the need to continue the Plan will be made by the ICAO Council after a three-year review. IFATCA was mentioned as a prominent supporter of the AFI Plan by Mr. Gonzales in his opening address to the high-level meeting and in ICAO’s subsequent press release. As the international representative of air traffic controllers in the AFI region, IFATCA can contribute to this plan by continually monitoring events in the region as well as the ongoing implementation of the plan. Mr. Gonzales also told participants: “The AFI Plan will only succeed with the political will of States and the enthusiastic, tangible support of industry and donors. In the end, this Plan is Africa’s Plan. It is your Plan. It was created with your help, to solve your problems, and will only work if you make it yours.” This issue of lack of political will has already been identified by

IFATCA as an important obstacle to achieving the targets for a seamless performance-based ATM system. IFATCA can help by continuing to draw to the attention of States, and not only those in the AFI region, where they are falling short. We can use our experience and influence to contribute our views on where we think resources may be best deployed. We can also bring the key players together so that through constructive dialogue mutual understanding may develop. Fortuitously, the IFATCA annual conference that follows the adoption of the AFI Plan will take place in our Africa Middle East region, in the East African city of Arusha, Tanzania.

The Executive Board has already decided that the IFATCA panel at this conference will address the AFI Plan. The resolution of the AFI plan was adopted by ICAO Assembly 36. for more info go to www.icao.int and www. ifatca.org ^ dp@ifatca.org

Data on Africa show an aircraft accident rate that is more than eight times the world average resulting in passenger fatalities of more than eleven times the world average

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4 European News

Where are we going?

Quo Vadis? A forum held in Prague in connection to the IFATCA European Regional Meeting about our future role and responsibilities.

^

“Quo Vadis” Air Traffic Controller?

This was the title of a one-day workshop organized by EVP Europe and held in conjunction with the European Regional Meeting 2007 in Prague. Nine presentations tried to shed light on complex initiatives like Single European Sky, SESAR and the creation of new Functional Airspace Blocks. How will our profession evolve? Will we drift more into a monitoring role?

What role will the ATCO play in the ATM system of tomorrow?

Back to the future Marc Baumgartner set the scene by “ageing” into the year 2030.

He presented himself as the president of the International Air Traffic Managers Lease Inc. (founded in 2013) holding a shareholder meeting for this globally active service provider.

The SESAR challenge The SESAR Consortium, represented by Hugues Subra de Salafa, gave an outline of the Photo: Terje

SESAR Definition Phase and the lately defined ATM Target Concept.

He explained that the estimated performance benefits require verification to ensure a safe deployment. This activity will be conducted within the SESAR Joint Undertaking, which requires the input of all stakeholders. Walter Eggert, IFATCA focal point for SESAR, talked about the future ATM concept and trajectory management. We will not any longer deal with flightplans as we know them but with business trajectories (BT), owned by airline operators. To re-route a particular flight due airspace constraints for example, we will engage in a collaborative decision making process, rather than issuing a re-routing.

A view from above

The industry approach

A view from below

Hugues Subra de Salafa showed us the Airbus vision of air traffic control. Starting with the changing role of the pilot – from hand flying to flight management – he elucidated on a new approach to automation. Hugues’ presentation drew a circle to SESAR and concluded with the challenging request to build on human vs. systems best capabilities.Bertrand Delepinois from THALES elaborated more on system possibilities and explained the chances and challenges new technology can deliver. In the next ten to fifteen years, we will see more changes than ever before and the operation of air traffic control can benefit from this if controllers take on an active role in setting the requirements and safeguard the human centered approach. Eurocontrol’s technical contribution to the future was presented by Predrag Terzioski. He illustrated FASTI - First ATC Support Tools Implementation, a program on future systems tailored to the requirements of air traffic controllers with the clear aim of providing optimum support. This medium term program includes tools like medium term conflict alert and System Supported Coordination (SYSCO), which will provide the first tangible steps of improving cross border interoperability of ACC systems. Predrag stressed the importance of working together towards an improved European network.

The last speaker of the day was Akos van der Plaat, chairman of IFATCAs Technical & Operations Committee. He talked about the need for close cooperation in order to meet the expectations of the ATM community.

This cooperation requires pragmatism and “enlightened self-interest”. Akos stressed the need for a shared vision, shared concepts and shared performance plans.

by Patrik Peters, IFATCA EVP Europe

Fiona McFadden, European Cockpit Association, showed us the birds eye view – how do pilots look at the future of air traffic control? Her presentation quoted IFALPA policy, which says that the current setup of controllers being responsible for providing separation is to be maintained. Luc Tytgat of the European Commission exemplified harmonization in a European context using the chances the Single Sky initiative is offering. Filippo Tomasello from EASA explained the extension of competence to ATM. His presentation highlighted EASAs harmonized approach to safety and environmental protection.

Quo vadis?

The subsequent discussion amongst ninety attending colleagues could not answer all question raised, but created interest and motivation aimed at continuous involvement of the federation in the development of modern air traffic control. It provided us with some guidance on where to go and certainly served as eye-opener for the participating delegates. ^

4 Qvo vadis poster forum evpeur@ifatca.org

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4 European News

to:

Pho

Traffic Growth and Staff Shortage Main concerns at European Regional Meeting in Prague

Photo: Bernhard

^

Increasing traffic After two days of discussions, exchanging ideas and information, it is clear that the most important issues in European Air Traffic Control today, are traffic growth and staff shortage.

The east-European countries have during the last couple of years seen an increase of traffic that seems unprecedented. E.g. Moldova, who in the month of February had a gigantic 62 percent traffic growth compared to 2006. The average traffic increase in Moldova during the first eight months of 2007 was 38.2 percent.

Other countries experienced a similar increase: Albania with growth between 20 and 40 percent, and Croatia with growth between 15 and 30 percent in the first six months of 2007.

Although traffic figures in Eastern Europe still do not reach the levels of Western Europe, the increase of traffic also has to be measured against the staffing situation and to the standard of technical equipment. That countries, centres and towers can have such immense traffic growth without any or very little increase of staff is almost unimaginable. As EVP Europe Patrik Peters said in his opening speech, “I seriously wonder how you can operate safely”.

Need for more controllers The staff shortage is also large in Eastern Europe. Warsaw FIR for example, is understaffed by 50 percent! All together Poland needs 160

THE

new controllers by 2010. Estonia is understaffed by 20 percent and this figure is increasing. However, the lack of controllers is even worse in the west. In Geneva, Switzerland, the TWR and some sectors at the ACC are lacking up to 30 percent of the required controllers. Schiphol TWR and Amsterdam ACC in the Netherlands have a similar situation, around a 20 percent shortage. Belgium is lacking ca 70 controllers and the situation is the same in the Scandinavian countries. Sweden and Norway need more than 100 new controllers each. The only countries who reported that they do not have a shortage of controllers are Lithuania, Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Belarus, France and Bulgaria. To cope with the shortage of controllers, more and more countries and ANSPs are opening up for conversion controllers.

When controllers move more over nation’s borders, the language issues become increasingly important. The ICAO English Language Proficiency requirements, with an implementation date of March 5th 2008, are rapidly approaching. During the Closed Session of the ERM, it became very clear that not enough ANSPs have advanced far enough with the training and testing of controllers. In addition to the English Language Proficiency requirements, which will apply to all controllers, some countries are implementing language requirements of the nation’s language at the same date and with the same required minimum level, which is level four.

Among those countries are for example Norway and Sweden. Unfortunately another issue, which can be linked to the staff shortage, is the tendency to raise the retirement age. The Netherlands have announced that they will do this and in Sweden, there is a proposal to raise the age from 60 to 61. This is something that cannot be accepted, especially in the light of the ever-increasing traffic.

by Helena Sjostrom, The Controller Correspondent

CONTROLLER

Among other topics of the ERM in Prague were Skybrary, a database for aeronautical safety information created on the initiative of Eurocontrol and ICAO, www.skybrary.aero and Point Merge, a new method under development by Eurocontrol.

Point Merge uses RNAV and P-RNAV to direct traffic on approach into altitude-separated arcs, which are positioned angular to the approach line.

From these arcs, flown on FMS, the controller with a very short command clears the acft direct to the merge point. This method has been tested in simulations with up to 38 landings an hour and would significantly reduce the number of instructions on the frequency. As in the past years, the ERM was well attended. Out of 44 European Member Associations, 34 were present and three more had given proxies. ^

helena.sjostrom@lfv.se

4 Prague city Photo: Terje

25

DP

SPOTLIGHT

Spotlight on Corporate Members ^ vin Ke

by Kevin Salter Contributing Editor, Corporate Affairs

led the traffic in our sectors based solely on the requirements to affect a safe and orderly traffic flow, says Mr Smout.”

Salter

Welcome to the final Spotlight feature of 2007. In this feature, in a change of focus, I have moved away from the usual technical and simulation service partners and focused on an air navigation service provider.

Airways New Zealand is a Corporate Member and one that celebrated their 20th Anniversary this year.

In the article you will read about their full commercial approach to providing an ATM service and you will read what their CEO, Ashley Smout, has to say about Airways’s future view of air navigation service provision.

Airways New Zealand has quite deservedly developed a reputation as a savvy commercial air navigation service provider.

One of the first air navigation service providers to go corporate back in the 1980’s, the ‘Airways model’ has been studied and observed by many around the globe who have perhaps shown a little more trepidation towards a fully commercial approach to air navigation services than the Kiwis.

Regardless, twenty years on, the New Zealand commercial ‘experiment’ has proven that a commercially-based air navigation service provider can and does work.

It works for its Government shareholder who regularly rings the till from Airways’ corporate dividends, and it is working for its customers, the airlines who fly the clear blue skies of New Zealand. Airways New Zealand has not raised its prices for nine straight years and has agreed to ‘freeze’ them for at least another two.

And if that wasn’t enough, over the last seven years it has returned some US$6

million back to its customers in the form of rebates under the Partnership Scheme it operates with them. It estimates it saves its customers around US$9 million each year in reduced fuel burn savings through efficient traffic handling and has led the industry with a number of technology enhancements such as User Preferred Routing and 30 x 30 nautical mile separation within its Oceanic FIR, which are improving capacity and reducing fuel burn emissions.

But perhaps what is most remarkable about Airways New Zealand are not the advancements it is making in technology – but in its thinking. Twenty years of commercialised service has produced some radical views on the place of air traffic management in the aviation world. Not content with a formalised partnership with its customer airlines, Airways has just commenced a number of new initiatives that redefine the traditional role of an ANSP and air traffic management - Airways New Zealand are calling it a paradigm shift, says Ashley Smout, Airways’ CEO.

^ Ashley Smout, CEO “Traditionally, it’s been the ‘control’ in air traffic control that has defined our industry.

Aircraft asked for clearance and then the ANS provider controlled every aspect of an aircraft’s departure, track and approach right down to when it landed. Our role was set by our view of the industry – we control-

“This evolved in the 1990’s to become what we now know as air traffic management. In addition to providing a safe and orderly traffic flow we embraced a new dimension to our role – that of providing an ‘expeditious’ and ‘efficient’ traffic flow. We began to realise that ANS providers didn’t exist in isolation of the air transport industry. As we watched the airlines reel under the impacts of terrorism and rising fuel costs our industry began to wake up to the fact that that we needed the airlines to be profitable and survive as much as they needed us to be efficient and cost-effective.”

“Since then we’ve seen the introduction of a range of ANS initiatives designed to improve the customer outcomes of the ANS industry. Improving our own cost efficiencies has been central to this, and several ANS providers embraced a more businesslike approach to service provision during this time. While regulatory change has been slow, many ANS providers are now measuring their cost efficiencies, productivity and cost per movement as key indicators of the level of performance they are providing to their customers.”

“As technology has progressed, so too have operational procedures which have allowed a more flexible, responsive and enhanced service offering to our customers.

Initiatives such as User Preferred Routes, Tailored Arrivals and traditional Collaborative Decision Making systems have formed the core of these in recent years. But even with these developments, the air navigation service provider has still called the shots and the customer has had to take what they are given in terms of service priorities, albeit with a little more knowledge and information about the process.”

Nevertheless, Smout says there is a limit to the number of efficiencies ANS providers can offer their customers because most of them are still operating in a paradigm of air traffic management.

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SPOTLIGHT

All photos: Airways New Zealand

“The next phase in the evolution of true customer-focused air navigation service delivery is a shift to air traffic enabling.

Rather than simply managing the aircraft that each airline throws up at us as best we can, we need to start engaging and communicating with our customers as we’ve never done before – and that’s going to take place on the ground.”

Smout says that if ANS providers are to excel as service companies, they are going to have to abdicate their traditional role of air traffic ‘control’ and stop dictating flow control terms to airlines.

“To shift from air traffic management to air traffic enabling, air navigation service providers are going to have to talk to their airline customers, find out what their problems are, what is it they don’t have time to solve, and look to solve these problems for them. Air traffic enabling is about giving more control to the airlines to interact with the ANS provider’s systems.”

Smout says that this approach is working well in New Zealand, where they discovered that network delays caused by bad weather or other disruptions were a big headache for their airline customers who wanted to know how Airways could help get their network back on track.

“Clearly technology will play a big part of any solution, but the biggest change was to get ourselves, the air navigation services provider, out of the way. In this instance, the result was a partnership approach to delivering a capacity management solution to our customers via a collaborative decision making system.”

The solution, a Collaborative Decision Making – Capacity Management System called the Airways Collaborative Arrivals Manager which, in addition to being developed collaboratively, embodies the new paradigm of ‘air traffic enabling’ in design as well as function.

As an air traffic enabling tool, the Airways Collaborative Arrivals system operates via an online tool to give airlines complete and transparent visibility into the progress of their flights from the time the flight plan is filed through to landing. Airline operators access the system through the internet, via their desktop computer and conventional internet browser.

As a real-time, ‘net-centric’ web-based application, the Collaborative Arrivals Manager enables airlines in New Zealand to jointly agree priority flights with their ANS provider and then enable airlines to re-schedule their services into the most cost-effective configuration they choose.

Smout says that the tool will potentially save the airlines significant sums in operating costs, including fuel burn, as well as helping them manage passenger expectations, and reduce emissions.

Airways New Zealand has also commenced an Optimised Arrival Trial into Auckland International Airport, the results of which will be fed back into the next development phase of Airways’ collaborative decision making capacity management system. The focus of this next phase of development will be minimising the footprint and emissions of aircraft once they are in flight, while maximising runway capacity at a specified airport.

“The purpose of the trial is to establish what the actual fuel burn is for an arriving flight where there is no requirement for any ATC intervention, and to gauge the potential fuel savings and associated emission reductions.”

With the Optimum Arrival Trial, Smout says Airways will be looking in detail at what constitutes an ‘optimum’ arrival, i.e. how much emphasis can be placed on chasing best fuel burn via an uninterrupted descent.

“From the trial we will be able to accurately gauge the impact this has on on-time performance and runway capacity and how accurately flights can arrive at an allocated time to provide for correct separation from other aircraft. More importantly, we want to gain an accurate assessment of the impact that a single optimised approach has on the fuel burn/emission reductions of all the traffic.”

Airways New Zealand is seeking to balance the complex dynamics of efficient fuel burn and reduced emissions with accurate, ontime-arrivals and an efficient utilisation of runway capacity at the destination.

Looking to the future, Smout says Airways New Zealand’s development of its Collaborative Arrivals Manager and the Optimised Arrivals trial are part of the ANSP’s commitment to its partnership with its customer airlines, and bringing its vision of a future air traffic enabling environment featuring improved safety, greater capacity,

27

SPOTLIGHT

and lower operating costs, a step closer to reality.

So with Ashley’s view of the future for Airways New Zealand, I will conclude the final Spotlight feature for 2007. I would like especially thank Ken Mitchell at Airways New Zealand for supporting Spotlight by providing his company’s contribution.

Finally, a very Happy and Productive New Year to all ‘Spotlight’ readers and, as I normal say, if any CM would like their company to be featured in ‘Spotlight’ in 2008, and likewise to any reader, who would like further information on any topic that was covered, please do not hesitate to contact me using the following address:

Kevin Salter IFATCA Contributing Editor Corporate Affairs Flugsicherungsakademie Am DFS-Campus 4 D-63225 Langen Tel: + 49 (0)6103 707 5202 Fax: + 49 (0)6103 707 5177 E-Mail: kevin-john.salter@dfs.de

4 Americas News

Americas News ^

El Kadur Acosta, Regional editor

Argentina Tensions between the government and controllers on one hand, and between the military establishment and the government on the other hand, are making the transition of ATC towards an independent Stateowned company difficult. This has been exacurbated by public exposure of corruption in the military-run operations today, and also because the military don‘t like losing their “ownership” of something as important as air traffic control.

Controllers in Argentina expect the situation to improve once the recent legal and administrative changes take effect, as the new government seems to be committed to carrying forward the proposed changes.

Chile The call for tender to build the new Santiago ACC has been suspended until further notice

by the Dirección General De Aeronáutica Civil (Chile’s CAA).

Dominican Republic After several months out of service, the radar system is operational again. Meanwhile the new Civil Aviation Director Mr. J.T. Pérez, who is a former presidential candidate, has met the Controllers’ Association (ADCA) and re-stated his commitment to ensuring that the necessary resources will be made available to run the ATC system properly. On October 20th, ADCA celebrated the International Day of the Air Traffic Controller. As part of these activities, a mass was held at one of the oldest churches in the country, led by a former controller who became a priest.

Peru Reflective of a similar situation 8 years ago, heavy smoke from forest fires is affecting the Cuzco region and traffic at the international airport has been suspended.

United States A mold/fungus (scopulariopsis) has been discovered in the control room at the country’s busiest air traffic control facility, Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Centre (ARTCC). According to NATCA representative Calvin Phillips, approximately half of the 300 controllers in the facility have suffered various degrees

of health problems over a prolonged period of time, caused by the airborne spores. The infestation has reached crisis proportions and has even led an outside contractor to pull its employees out of the building due to the serious health concerns.

4 A wall at the Atlanta ACC.

IFATCA’s Americas Regional Meeting in Aruba This year’s AMA Regional Meeting will be held in Aruba. Some of the items that will be discussed include: staffing; training; language proficiency; employment; ATFM; ATS/ATFM environment and airspace procedures; and quality management. Look for a full report in the next issue of The Controller! ^

elkaduracosta@i-atc.net

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Photo: NATCA

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4 Asia News

Asia Pacific Musings ^

by Phil Parker, ASP Regional Editor

This was supposed to be a page on Asia Pacific news, however this is difficult when requests by EVP ASP to provide MA news go unanswered. Instead I shall cover a couple of topics with an Asia Pacific connection.

The Airbus A379 The first was the visit to Hong Kong for 3 days during ‘Asian Aerospace 2007’, of the A379.

That’s correct, the A379. The A380 had sustained damage to one of its winglets during ground tow maneuvering in Bangkok just before flying to Hong Kong. To balance the look of the aircraft, the opposite winglet was removed. As it was not a whole aircraft anymore, we in ATC started calling it the A379, because it wasn’t all there. It must have been a great disappointment for Airbus as arrangements had been made to fly the aircraft down Hong Kong Harbour at 800’ to video and photograph it against the background of Hong Kong Island buildings, and I am sure that they would have preferred these taken as a complete aircraft.

We had a couple of controllers on this flight, including one in the cockpit and I was standing on a rooftop car park overlooking the harbour.

If there is one thing I would like to comment on, it’s how quiet the aircraft is. Similar comments were made by the controllers inside the aircraft. Another couple of things impressed me about this aircraft. One was how manoeuvrable it was both on the ground and in the air, and the other was how large the wing is in proportion to the rest of the aircraft.

Asian Aerospace 2007 As advised, the A380 was in Hong Kong for ‘Asian Aerospace 2007’. This exhibition was

formally held in Singapore. There were some ATC displays, including radar and tower simulators and other equipment, which made it worthwhile for controllers to visit and the Civil Aviation Department facilitated passes for those who wanted to attend.

Old Hong Kong Kai Tak Airport As I write this I am in Frankfurt on my way back from Hamburg to Hong Kong. Now you might think, what connection has this with Asia Pacific? Well I was actually invited there to give a talk about the old Kai Tak Airport in Hong Kong, which closed a little over 9 years ago. The venue was the Lufthansa Technik (LHT), Engine Maintenance. These people are Aero-engine engineers and to a very large degree know no more about ATC, flying and airport operations than the average person in the street. The talk started with a brief history of the airport from its early days in the 1920’s as a reclamation to its closing on 5 July 1998. The background also included Terminal, Apron and Runway developments over the years, especially the last 10 years when passenger numbers were increasing at over 10% per year. The last year of operation was 29.5 million, 4.5 million over its design capacity of 25 million. The most interest was in the incidents which occurred at Kai Tak associated with the curved IGS approach. Many people have seen videos of these incidents on YouTube and seen photographs on airliners.net. This naturally led to a description of how pilots from different operators got themselves into trouble flying the approach, whereas Cathay Pacific pilots did not. The presentation was concluded with operations on the last day, followed by a short video of landings and departures from runway 13 from the cockpit.

Fortunately the feed-back I received about my presentation was very positive. To finish off, could the Asia / Pacific Member Associations please forward any material Photo: Phil Parker which may be of interest to other controllers and forward it to EVP ASP for inclusion in future Controller articles. ^

4 Old IGS curved approach Chart.

Photo: HKCAA

The most interest was in the incidents which occurred at Kai Tak associated with the curved IGS approach.

Photo: Phil Parker

4 The A379 over Hong Kong.

4 Old Kai Tak airport.

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philatcinhk@netvigator.net

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4 Africa News

Challenges for African ATC ^

by MD Matale, AFM regional Editor

Photo: DP

This article refers to the presentation made by the author during the 2007 Aviation Safety and Security Africa conference. The conference was organized by the International Quality and Productivity Center (IQPC) and 4 MD Matale held last July at the Sandton Convention Center in Johannesburg-South Africa.

Obstacles to safety The presentation was tailor made to address the various obstacles that weigh down success in achieving optimal Safety and Efficiency in the provision of Air Traffic Control (ATC) Service in Africa. It was centered on implications of Human Factors on ATC Productivity (Safety and Efficiency).

The house was informed that the most worrisome depressant of optimal safety and efficiency in the African ATC is the inadequacy of attention to human factors as has been frequently reflected on more than 80% of aircraft incidents and accidents in the region.

Definition of Human factors

“This problem prevails contrary to ICAO procedures for air navigation services as detailed in the PANS ATM Doc 4444 which provides guidelines on ATC Safety Management System.” Great emphasis was made on definition of Human Factor Principles as defined therein. That is: “principles which apply to aeronautical design, certification, training, operations and maintenance and which seek safe interface between the human and other system components by proper consideration to human performance. The house was also enlightened on the fact that human performance refers to human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on the safety and efficiency of aeronautical operations.”

ICAO guidance “Most African states limit their professional practices to ICAO documentation and do not observe, utilize and/or benefit from ATC professional guidance provided by the ILO Recommendations of 1979 and the regularly revised IFATCA Professional and Technical Policy; lest the ICAO PANS ATM4444 which only came at the beginning of the new millennium, would not necessarily have been the only ATC professional document that service providers in the region base their actions on.“ The house was further informed that “African

Governments have a common tendency of prioritizing the purchase of expensive ATC systems without considering a balancing development of controllers/humans to ensure optimal safety and efficiency of the systems”.

Recruitment and training That the “the recruitment, training and maintenance of qualified and experienced air traffic controllers in the continent remains a major problem due to the inadequate recognition of the ATC profession in the Region”. It was ultimately suggested that African Governments should therefore be substantively sensitized on the scale of responsibility associated with the provision of Air Traffic Control services and be advised to give adequate and appropriate recognition to the Air Traffic Control profession.

The house was also informed that optimal Safety and Efficiency in the provision of Air Traffic Control in Africa is not being achieved due to the fact that revenues made from aviation services are being disbursed into other national priority developments and insufficient funds paid back into further development of the aviation services. That the African Departments of Civil Aviation experience problems associated with bureaucratic processes inherent in their Governments and therefore are characterized by late response to aviation safety and efficiency concerns. On a positive note the house was made aware of the fact that, where Civil Aviation Authorities have been established in Africa, there are positive signs of progress. ^ mdmatale@gmail.com

4 African airport Photo: Jeecis/dreamstime

“African Governments prioritize the purchase of expensive ATC systems without considering a balancing development of controllers/humans”.

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4 Philp Marien Feature

All photos credit: Wikipedia

Target Destroyed!

4 Computer rendering of Libyan Arab Airlines 727 and two F-4 fighters.

^

by Philip Marien

Following the 9/11 tragedies, intercepts of civil aircraft have become more commonplace again. Especially in times of high international tension, small errors have in the past lead to catastrophic decisions and human tragedy.

EL AL 402 One such unfortunate flight was El Al 402, a Lockheed L-049 Constellation pressurised four-engine prop-liner. After a scheduled stop in Vienna, on it‘s way from London to Tel Aviv on July 27, 1955, it strayed into Bulgarian airspace. Using NDB navigation, with thunderstorm activity in the area, the crew believed they were over the Skopje radio beacon, and turned off the Amber 10, thereby straying into Bulgarian airspace. It was intercepted by two MiG-15 fighters, who fired at the aircraft. Killing the 7 crew and 51 passengers, El Al 402 crashed north of the town of Petrich, Bulgaria, near the Yugoslav and Greek borders.

The Bulgarian government at first refused

to accept responsibility, blaming the Israeli airliner for penetrating its airspace without authorisation. Eventually they issued a formal apology, stating that the fighter pilots had been “too hasty” in shooting down the airliner, and agreed to pay compensation to the victims‘ families. The investigation recommended that more VOR stations be used on airway Amber 10, instead of just one at the time of the accident.

Lybian Arab 114 While the cold war and the iron curtain certainly played a role, the early seventies saw continued tensions in the middle east as the scene for the next incident. On February 21, 1973 Libyan Arab Airlines flight 114 was flying to Cairo, Egypt after a brief stop in Eastern Libya. The B727 had 113 people on board. While technically an IFR flight, geographic features usually offered a good backup. Unfortunately, a compass malfunction and a heavy sandstorm decided differently. While the crew suspected a navigation problem, they did not report anything to Cairo ATC, who issued a normal descent clearance. The aircraft however was a lot

further east, pushed by strong tailwinds and was in fact flying over the Suez Canal.

Although there was a cease fire agreement, Egypt and Israel were technically at war, and the Israeli Air Force was on high alert. They scrambled two F-4‘s, which intercepted the airliner minutes after it entered the contested airspace at 20,000 ft. Despite several attempts, the fighters could not convince the Libyan aircraft to follow the fighters to their airbase. The Israeli authorities concluded the aircraft posed a threat and ordered the use of force against the aircraft to get it to land.

Aiming at the Boeing‘s wing tips in order to cripple, but not destroy flight 114, short bursts with the F-4‘s guns were fired.

Unfortunately the 20mm shells severely damaged control surfaces, hydraulic systems, and

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4 Philip Marien Feature The personnel on board the USS Vincennes mistakenly identified the Iranian airliner as an attacking military F-14 Tomcat and fired a missile at it

4 In August 1988, Iran issued a stamp to commemorate the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes. the wing structure itself. Forced to make an emergency landing on uneven desert terrain, when it came to rest, 108 of the 113 passengers and crew were dead. Interestingly and probably quite different from what they would do today, the United States did not accept the reasoning given by Israel, and condemned the incident. Israel later issued a formal apology and agreed to pay some US$ 3 million in compensation to the victims‘ families.

departed Paris, France on course to Anchorage, Alaska. Flying past the Canadian Forces Station Alert, located 400 miles from the North Pole, it was supposed to turn toward Anchorage located at 149°53'W. Instead they turned in the opposite direction toward Murmansk at 33°5'E. The pilots failed to note the position of the sun, almost 180 degrees off from where it should have been. According to the official Korean explanation, the pilots used the wrong sign of magnetic declination when converting between magnetic and true headings.

This caused the plane to fly in an enormous right-turning arc, which brought it across Svalbard and the Barents Sea into Soviet airspace.

Easily mistaken for an RC-135 and, according to Soviet reports, repeatedly ignoring commands to follow the intercepting Su-15 fighters, the order was given to shoot down the aircraft. A single rocket damaged the left wing and punctured the fuselage and killing two of the 97 passengers. Embarrassingly, the Russian fighters then lost track of the aircraft when it made its‘ emergency descent. For almost 45 minutes, KAL902 flew at an altitude of several thousand feet across the snow-covered terrain, looking for a safe landing place.

After several aborted attempts to land, the

Korean 902

Russians finally located the aircraft again and forced it to land on the frozen Korpijärvi Lake, a few miles from the Finnish border. The passengers were released 2 days later, while the crew were held for investigation and released after they made a formal apology. Russia sent a bill for food and lodging to Korea of some US$ 100.000, which the Koreans refused to pay...

ITAVIA 870 On June 27, 1980 an Itavia (Aero Transporti Italiani) DC-9 a crashed into the Tyrrhenian Sea near the island of Ustica, about 80 miles southwest of Naples. All 81 persons aboard flight 870 were killed. Experts “agree” that the aircraft was damaged by an explosion, probably of external origin. Radar recordings released in 1997 reportedly show one or two Libyan MiG23 trying to evade detection by flying close to the airliner. The more exotic versions of the story report Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi was flying in the area that night, although he denies this... Still according to the radar recordings, three Italian F-104s, one U.S. Navy A-7 Corsair II and a French fighter pursued the Libyan MiG-23(s) and a battle ensued. The DC9 was hit by an air-to-air missile and crashed.

21 days after the crash, a MiG-23 was found in the Sila Mountains in Calabria, alledgedly shot down in the dogfight around flight 870.

In 1999, investigative magistrate Rosario Priore said in his concluding report that his investigation had been deliberately obstructed by the Italian military and members of the secret service, in compliance with NATO requests. If this seems an unlikely story, the fact remains that more than 25 years later, no official explanation for the Itavia crash exists.

Korean 007 Just over 5 years after KAL902, on September 1, 1983 Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was shot down by Soviet jet interceptors just west of Sakhalin island. 269 passengers and crew, including a US congressman, were aboard the B747; there were no survivors. The flight had left Anchorage, Alaska on it‘s way to Seoul, South Korea. According to an ICAO investigation, the autopilot had been set to heading hold after departing Anchorage, which the crew failed to notice. When attempts to contact the aircraft via radio and using visual signals failed, Soviet fighters fired 120 rounds.

The pilot of KAL 007 still failed to respond, though there‘s discussion on whether he could

While most people remember the Korean B747 shot down in 1983 - more on that later - fewer remember that 5 years earlier, another Korean aircraft nearly suffered the same fate.

On April 20, 1978 the B707

4 KAL Flight 902‘s flight plan and the actual flight path.

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4 Philip Marien Feature have seen these shots, as they contained no tracer ammunition. The order to shoot down the airliner was given as it was about to leave Soviet airspace for the second time after flying over Sakhalin Island, about 500 kilometres west of the planned track.

Unproven theories tell of an American spy plane in the area, which the Russians were chasing. Still today, a number of people believe the aircraft wasn‘t shot down, but was forced to land. They claim the passengers and crew are still being held by the Russians (see http://www.rescue007.org). Sadly, in cases like this, Occam‘s razor also applies: the simplest explanation is probably the correct one...

on its transponder and proceed over the Persian Gulf. The flight was assigned routinely to commercial air corridor Amber 59, a twentymile-wide lane on a direct line to Dubai airport. The short distance made for a simple flight pattern: climb to 14,000 feet, cruise for a short time, and descend into Dubai.

The personnel on board the Vincennes mistak4 A computer rendering of KAL007.

The shoot-down caused a big international enly identified the Iraniuproar. In combination with preparations an airliner as an attackUkrainian Air Defense Force for a big NATO exercise, code name Able ing military F-14 Tomcat and fired a missile during an exercise. The misArcher 83, tensions between east and west at it. The investigation ruled that had the sile was believed to have self rose at least as high as during the Cuban misCommanding officer relied on the full tactidestructed, but instead consile crisis of 1962. Experts now agree that a cal data displayed by the brand new Aegis tinued and hit the Siberian airnuclear war was never closer than at the end system, the incident would probably never craft, killing all 78 people on of 1983... One positive outcome was that have occurred. Instead, he relied on staff board. While intent was clearly President Reagan announced that the Gloreports who misinterpreted altitude, speed absent from this case, an interbal Positioning System (GPS) would be made and IFF data presented by the new system. esting piece of trivia connects available for civilian use once completed.

Additionally, psychological effects probably KAL007 and this flight: General made the crew subconsciously manipulated Iran Air 655 Vladimir Kamenski, Commandthe data to fit a pattern they learnt during While criticising the the Russians for shooter and Chief of Staff of Ukraincountless exercises. Tensions in the area ing down a civilian aeroplane, the Americans ian Defence Force was present were also extremely high due to the Iraq-Iran would suffer the same embarrassment some at the firing of the missile. Just war and several incidents involving American 4 years later, when the USS Vincennes shot 18 years earlier, he authorised/ ships days before the incident. down an Iranian Airbus 300 near the Strait of ordered to shoot down KAL Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. On July 3, 1988 007...

The U.S. government issued notes of regret Iran Air 655 left Bandar Abbas airport for what for the 290 lives lost but never admitted should have been a 28-minute flight to Dubai.

Over the years, conspiracy wrongdoing, accepted responsibility, nor After take-off, it was directed by ATC to turn theorists have blamed stray apologised for the incident. They compenmissiles for bringing down airsated the family of the liners, including TWA800 and victims, but have always MSR990. Terrorists with access refused to pay for the Airto surface-to-air missiles have bus. Officially, they blame damaged or brought down Iran for the tensions in the others in Iraq and Georgia for area leading up to the example. Keeping in mind that shoot-down. air travel has become much Siberia 1812 more complex since 9/11, it‘s Last one in this sad list good to realise that people is Siberia Airlines Flight do make mistakes and security 1812, which crashed over forces should account for this the Black Sea on October at all times. The cases above 4, 2001, en route from Tel seem to suggest that this is eveAviv (Israel) to Novosirything but self-evident...^ birsk (Russia). Less than one month after 9/11, terrorism was the most likely “While the crew suspectpath. But investigation ed a navigation problem, showed that the plane, a they did not report anySoviet-made Tupolev-154 was accidentally brought thing to Cairo ATC” down by a stray anti-aircraft missile, fired by the webmaster@the-controller.net 4 KAL007’s flight plan and the actual flight path.

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4 Chrismas Story

Chrismas Story 2007 Lutz, The Controller Magazine ^ by North Pole Reporter

Photo: Yvanovich/ dreamtime

Since that great and wondrous organisation ICAO has decided in all it‘s wisdom that it is imperative to the safety of air traffic control that we all manage a modicum of English, the annual Christmas trip is going to become somewhat of a bigger mission for Santa Clause starting 2007/8/9/10/?

According to the new directives Santa and his helpers will have to prove that they all have the required level of English proficiency required of an organisation that is aiming to become a global player. Now I‘m sure you all remember the Christmas stories from past issues of the Controller where Santa had some close run-ins with ATC as well as the CFMU, but this time he has assured this reporter that he and his elves will all be up to scratch well before the deadline.

A quick survey of Santa‘s elves

has shown the following ratio: • native English speakers: 24 • non native English speakers: 88 After the initial brainstorming it was decided that a kick-off meeting was required to get the ball rolling. The meeting, which lasted 5 days and involved 26 sub committees, finally agreed on a road-map and concluded that it was necessary to set up a new project.

The new project members would appraise the situation and in due time make recommendations to Santa as to what will be required to get all the elves up to a level 4 in English before the proverbial boom was lowered on them. During the following months the project members found out that there were many opinions and ideas as to how one would go about solving this rather complex problem. For instance the Gallic elf representative found the easiest solution would be an outright NO! It‘s been working for them since the first republic and everyone knows “if it ain‘t broke, don‘t fix it...” The Teutonic elf found that after consulting local labour laws, tax laws, inheritance laws and all other literature contained in his private library, he would need another 8-10 years before being able to make a decision. The input from the

Mediterranean elf was unavailable due to an extended siesta, while his neighbour thought the easiest way would be to offer the right official a bribe and, failing that, the official would be sent to “sleep with the fishes...”

Some older elves representing all Santa believers in the great former Soviet Union were waiting to hear back from their elf in Moscow. With the new long range bomber flights starting up again it seems doubtful whether any clearances, English speaking or not, will be issued... EfoaSFNUoR (Elves for a Santa Fearing Nation Under one Reindeer) representing the Americas had already lodged an official complaint with ICAO stating that the English spoken by all Santa fearing American elves was the only English worth speaking and so were all a level 7 by default. If not they would be prepared to defend their right with arms as granted to them by the 2nd amendment of the North Pole Constitution.

After lengthy meetings and consultations Santa has decided on the following strategy.

First, since all elves have been working in the global freight market for so long, by decree all will have at least a category 4 English Standard.

Second, should English tests ever become reality, delaying tactics will be used until the elves not meeting the standards have retired.

All new elves applying for a position of Santa’s elf will have to pass an English test.

Finally, as long as you can, ignore the new regulations, because with the exception of a few, that‘s what everyone else will be doing!

So happy flying and controlling for 2007 and Merry Christmas and a happy new year! ^ Your North Pole Reporter PS: (I Hope this article improves your English) Comments to: charlie@the-controller.net

The meeting, which lasted 5 days and involved 26 sub committees, finally agreed on a road-map and concluded that it was necessary to set up a new project.

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Charlie‘s Column

Ch a

4 It is behind my eyes …

rl

Photo: DP

s ‘ ie

r e n r Co

Overheard on the Frequency: Chicago O‘Hare airport on a busy day on the ground frequency:

Controller: “No problem sir, one day I will make a fool of myself and then we’ll be even!”

•••••••••••••••••••••• Airbus A340 pilot visiting the cockpit of a DC3 during a flight: A340 pilot: “And where is the flight director on this thing?”

DC3 pilot: “It’s located behind my eyes.”

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Goats Sacrificed to Fix Technical Problems on Boeing 757

Photo: Bikash Karki

Pilot: “Ground, American… Schhhhh...Chhhh Schhhhh….”.

Ground controller: „American calling Ground, I don‘t know who you are or where you are. Taxi approved, just don‘t hit anybody and stay out of the grass.“ ••••••••••••••••••••• Australian C172 bush pilot on his way home after his monthly visit to town: Pilot: “AB is ready” Controller: “AB, after a Shorts 360, line-up RWY 01.”

Pilot: “Ahh okay? After a short 360 line-up”.

The C172 completed a tight 360 degree turn at the holding point and proceeded to line-up in front of a very ugly aircraft on short final.

•••••••••••••••••••••• One night in Finland: A pilot failed to correctly read back the ATC clearance after 4 attempts. The last attempt was finally successful.

Pilot: “Ah…sorry for that sir.”

After the camel sacrifice in Istanbul last December (see Charlie’s corner in the March 2007 issue) another airline has been reported using a similar method. At Katmandu airport in Nepal last September, the national airline could not repair a recurring technical problem in one of its Boeing 757 aircraft, despite the best efforts of its engineering department.

It is reported that the airline’s Chief of Engineering found the root cause 4 Poor goats! of the problem

“The decision to sacrifice was made after our Chief engineering consulted with the top management this morning” in a dream - a God was angry at the airline.

So the airline agreed to worship that God and sacrificed two goats, one black and the other white (see photo), in order to fix the technical problem.

“The decision to sacrifice was made after our Chief engineering consulted with the top

management this morning” the airline reported. It was made to avoid any bad luck.

The story does not say if the problem was fixed, but a later news report mentioned that passengers were afraid to fly with the airline. Whether that was due to the goat sacrifices, or to the B757 technical problems, was not specified.

Virtual Flights In India, near Delhi, for $US 4 including taxes you can board an aircraft for one hour, be served drinks and look outside the window. The landscape is not moving, but noone seems to care and most passengers enjoy the ride. A retired Air India engineer bought the remains of an old Airbus A300 without a tail, he removed parts of the wings to “take less space”, and removed the old Indian Airlines logo and replaced it by his name: “Gupta Airlines”.

He then placed the hull near Delhi and advertised “virtual flights” for as low as $US 4. People queue up every Saturday to see what it is like to be in an airplane, even if it never takes off. Gupta plays the pilot, asking the passengers to sit and fasten their seat belts. They receive a safety demonstration from the flight attendants (among which is his wife) and even get some snacks and drinks. The passengers are all delighted and even the staff praise the idea. Some of the flight attendants hope to work for a real airline one day and regard this as training giving them a better chance of getting a job later. After the concept of virtual towers and virtual ACCs (remember CEATS?), now we have virtual aircraft. We live in a wonderful world! ^

charlie@the-controller.net

35

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