IFATCA The Controller - July 2011 by IFATCA

THE

CONTROLLER Journal of Air Trafﬁc Control

July 2011

4 ATC Global 2011

4 Cagliari Appeal Verdict

4 VAFORIT

INTER-

4 50th IFATCA Annual Conference

TION OF AIR TRAFF ERA IC C FED

LLERS’ ASSNS. TRO ON

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4 FATIGUE

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Contents

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July 2011 Volume 50 Issue 2 – ISSN 0010-8073

THE

CONTROLLER Journal of Air Traffic Control

July 2011

Cover photo: 4 FATIGUE Also in this Issue: 4 50th IFATCA Annual Conference

4 ATC Global 2011

4 Cagliari Appeal Verdict

4 VAFORIT

In this issue:

EXECUTIVE BOARD OF IFATCA Alexis Brathwaite President and Chief Executive Ofﬁcer Patrik Peters Deputy President

Patrick Forrey Executive Vice-President Technical

Scott Shallies Executive Vice-President Professional

Darrell Meachum Executive Vice-President Finance

Keziah Ogutu Executive Vice-President Africa and Middle East Ignacio Oliva Whiteley Executive Vice-President Americas

D. K. Behera Executive Vice-President Asia and Paciﬁc Željko Oreški Executive Vice-President Europe

Philippe Domogala Conference Executive

Adell Humphreys Secretary

The editorial team has endeavored to include all owner information, or at least source information for the images used in this issue. If you believe that an image was used without permission, please contact the editor via http:// www.the-controller.net

Foreword .......................................…………………………………. 4 Editorial .....................................……………………………………… 5 Fatigue Science-based fatigue mitigation .......………………..…... 6 Fatigue Resource Management .......……………..……….. 9 IFATCA Fatigue policies .......……………………………….. 10 Wake me when my Shift is over .......…………………...…. 12 European Flight Time Limitations .......………………….... 14 IFATCA Conference Introduction, Committees & Panel .......………....……….. 16 Flying VFR in Jordan .......………………………………………………………....... 21 ATC Global 2011 .......……………………………………………………………….... 22 New Zealand Earthquake .......………………………………………………………. 24 Europe Italy: Cagliari accident update .......……………………….. 26 Germany: VAFORIT introduction .......…………………….. 28 Operational use of Mode S .......…………………....….….. 30 th 50 Anniversary Update .......………………………………………………………… 31 Feature: the D.B. Cooper Story ............…………………………………………... 32 Charlie .......………………………………………………………………………...…. 34 PUBLISHER IFATCA, International Federation of Air Trafﬁc Controllers’ Associations 1255 University Street · Suite 408 Montreal, Quebec · H3B 3B6 · CANADA Phone: +1514 866 7040 Fax: +1514 866 7612 · Email: ofﬁce@ifatca.org EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Philip Marien Van Dijcklaan 31 B-3500 Hasselt, Belgium email: bm@the-controller.net DEPUTY EDITOR Philippe Domogala email: dp@the-controller.net CORPORATE AFFAIRS Vacant

REGIONAL EDITORS Americas: Doug Church (USA) Phil Parker (Hong Kong) Europe: Patrik Peters & David Guerin COPY EDITORS Paul Robinson, Helena Sjöström, Stephen Broadbent, Brent Cash, Andrew Robinson and David Guerin LAYOUT & PRINTING LITHO ART GmbH & Co. Druckvorlagen KG Friesenheimer Straße 6a D 68169 Mannheim GERMANY Tel: +49 (0)621 3 22 59 10 Fax: +49 (0)621 3 22 59 14 email: info@lithoart-ma.de

DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this magazine are those of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations (IFATCA) only when so indicated. Other views will be those of individual members or contributors concerned and will not necessarily be those of IFATCA, except where indicated. Whilst every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this publication is correct, IFATCA makes no warranty, express or implied, as to the nature or accuracy of the information. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or used in any form or by any means, without the specific prior written permission of IFATCA.

VISIT THE IFATCA WEB SITES:

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Foreword

JUST WHEN YOU LEARNED HOW TO PRONOUNCE EYJAFJALLAJÖKULL... Patrik Peters, ^ by IFATCA Deputy President gency plans since the last eruption in April 2010. The impact of Grímsvötn was not to be compared with last year’s, but proactive measures have certainly contributed to much smoother operations. Pro-active management is what we would like to see in the context of fatigue as well. Unfortunately, arguments about the cause vs. the contribution of fatigue to an incident or accident dominate the discussions. Several events, both on pilots’ as well as on controllers’ side, have recently caused a lot of media attention. Fatigue is an issue demanding our attention to better understand its effects regarding our professional and personal lives.

When I started drafting this foreword, I was cruising at 38.000 ft on my way to Iceland, only a few hours after the volcano Grímsvötn stopped erupting ash into the atmosphere which would have almost made my attendance at that meeting in Reykjavik impossible. During my stay I learned more about volcanoes and how one lives on this island of constant change. Potential dangers that do not tire or scare the people of Iceland but rather make them plan and live safely with it. They do that by adapting their building styles, by studying nature and its forces and by monitoring the developments, earthquakes, ruptures and cracks in the skull of their country. Airlines, service providers and advisory agencies have similarly learned (a bit) on how to coordinate actions and contin-

[Fatigue] is a very subjective experience with different consequences.

Fatigue influences our normal functioning and delays or impairs actions and reactions to the extent of not being able to responsibly and correctly carry out our professional obligations. Scientifically, fatigue is difficult to grasp or investigate. It is a very subjective experience with different consequences depending on the tasks you are to perform. Additionally, being tired makes it very hard to ascertain the level of fatigue you are currently experiencing and therefore takes away chances of counteracting your condition appropriately. As air traffic controllers or as pilots we are told to be conscious of our responsibilities when it comes to being fit for work. Fatigue management encompasses several contributing factors, such as interest in your job, environment, daily rhythm, physical fitness, diet and length and quality of sleep. The patterns we work are designed to allow for an adequate amount of rest and some quality time in-between shifts. But do these figures only look good on paper? Its time for a reality check: Even if you allow for 12 hrs between shifts, what’s left over as real rest time in the end? An example: You are on an afternoon shift, starting

your duty at 3pm. In the morning of that day you got up with your children, had breakfast at 7am and once they left the house, you worked on some e-mails, went shopping for groceries and just before lunch mowed the lawn as the weather was good for once. You had lunch and went to work, feeling a little tired – the after lunch dip. The shift went fine and you felt ok when you were on your 1hr drive back home after the 8hr shift. You arrived home just after midnight and could not directly find the ease to rest, so you started watching TV for a while or read a couple of pages in a book. When you finally rested your head on the pillow at 1:30, you knew that the alarm would wake you up again at 06:00 in the morning... Your shift starts at 11am. Net sleep time 4 hrs and 30 minutes. Taking responsibilities serious, one could report unfit for work – though in an efficient manpower-planning context, every person missing, reduces the break percentage for the remaining controllers on duty or – worst case for the employer – forces the flow management cell to impose restrictions to avoid overloads as necessary sectors cannot be opened. In the end – social pressure controls your actions. You enter the OPS room, knowing that you are tired. Fatigue might be more of a safety issue than we currently think. Knowing the contributing factors and acting on this proactively in a coordinated and communicative manner certainly helps. The people in Iceland know that one day the next volcano will erupt, be it Katla, Hekla, Herðubreið or some unpronounceable other name. It can be next month or next year or not anymore in their lifetime. Controllers too live in a world of constant change. Be prepared – be careful – you might be tired! ^

dp@ifatca.org

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Editorial

I‘M NOT ASLEEP... BUT THAT DOESN‘T MEAN I‘M AWAKE!

to: HM P ho

Philip Marien, ^ by Editor Welcome to another issue of The Controller. We originally had a different main theme for this issue, namely the relation between management and their controllers. This was inspired by recent events in Europe where negotiations escalated to a one-way mud flinging campaign via the national and international media. The controllers found themselves on the receiving end of this and in the more extreme cases have found themselves social pariahs as a result. Quite what any management is hoping to achieve through this is unclear, but it is sure to have a lasting effect: while it may save some money in the very short term, the longer term effects of having destroyed controllers’ motivation and dedication to the job will backfire (and eventually cost more than the initial savings). Short-term thinking and quick-wins seem to be the preferred management strategy these days… But then fatigue struck –fuelled again by sensational headlines in the USA and elsewhere: ‘suddenly’, controllers were reportedly dozing off left, right and centre. Our colleagues found themselves at the centre of a controversy on which even President Obama found it necessary to comment… Consensus in the media and with politicians, not hindered by learning all the facts first or listening to fatigue experts, was that controllers are not paid to nap on the job. In fact, rather than trying to find out why these things were happening, people were being ordered not to fall asleep… To me, telling people not to fall asleep and hoping this will cure the problem, is the same as telling people not to feel hungry and believing this will solve obesity… While there is an undeniable personal responsibility to show up fit for duty, reality is that people are not made to change their circadian rhythms for one day to the next. In a world were there are constantly

changing demands, constraints and expectations, one cannot expect shift rosters to go unchanged for years and years: rostering practices need to be constantly reviewed and adapted to reflect this. And this needs to be done on a scientific basis, not by accountants for whom a shift pattern is just a bunch of numbers on a spreadsheet.

Rostering practices need to be constantly reviewed and adapted.

So, look forward to a number of articles on fatigue in this issue, including a worrying development from Europe’s pilot community that is up against what looks like a bunch of accountants with spreadsheets. Also in this issue is an extensive report on IFATCA’s 50th annual conference, held in Amman, Jordan last April; and continuing are very worrying trends in Europe and the rest of the world: controllers on duty during a crash near Cagliari found their prison sentences confirmed by the Italian High Court. Anyone looking at Europe as an example of Just Culture will need to rethink this after reading the article… The next issue will be a special one, marking the 50th anniversary of our Federation (and indeed of the magazine). It’ll look to the past, present and future of IFATCA, as well as have a comprehensive overview of our Member Associations. Many members have already completed a short survey, which collects information for this overview. If you haven’t done this already, please do so as soon as possible (via the office, your regional VP or directly to ed@ the-controller.net) Enjoy this issue of The Controller – if it helps you stay awake during a particularly uneventful night shift, ask your management to arrange a subscription! ^

ed@the-controller.net

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4 Fatigue

SCIENCE-BASED FATIGUE MITIGATION FRUITS OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN NATCA AND THE FAA Peter F. Gimbrere, ^ by NATCA Attorney and Fatigue POC In April of 2007, in response to the August 27, 2006 crash of Comair flight 5191 in Lexington, KY, the NTSB issued recommendations to both the FAA and NATCA regarding the need to address the impact of fatigue on the performance of air traffic controllers. The safety recommendations urged the parties to work together to reduce the potential for controller fatigue by revising controller work-scheduling policies and practices to provide rest periods that are long enough for controllers to obtain sufficient restorative sleep; by modifying shift rotations to minimize disrupted sleep patterns; and to develop a fatigue awareness and countermeasures training program. During the years of the Bush Administration, despite a number of requests from NATCA to begin work on the issue and despite the NTSB’s request that the parties work together in a collaborative fashion, the Agency refused to fully engage with NATCA. Based upon the Agency’s unwillingness to work with us, NATCA decided to form its own fatigue

workgroup and develop its own fatigue risk management system. While NATCA was in the process of establishing the internal workgroup, the White House changed hands, and under the Obama Administration the Parties ultimately agreed to a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which included a commitment to jointly address the issue of fatigue.

The Workgroup’s Structure and Goals The CBA language required that the Parties establish a Joint Fatigue Workgroup. The Workgroup was tasked with developing a fatigue risk management system; identifying and mitigating workplace fatigue concerns; and referring recommendations to leadership of both organizations for action. The workgroup was formed in November of 2009, shortly after the new CBA was ratified and became effective. The overarching driver for the Workgroup was the reality that fatigue is a substantial hazard to both the National Airspace System (NAS) and the controller workforce. The Workgroup recognized that there was no formal, structured, overarching fatigue mitigation program or policy in place within the Agency. In order to address the hazards and operational risks caused by fatigue, it was therefore necessary for the Workgroup to develop formal mitigations that were not in existence. To do this, the group decided to focus on discovering the science and data that supported the safety

case for each possible mitigator. By developing recommendations grounded in science, the group was able to make progress without being distracted by the numerous and inevitable implementation issues. Accordingly, the Workgroup determined that their goals would be fourfold: to increase the safety of the NAS; to improve the health and well being of the workforce; to base any findings and recommendations on science and data, and to collaborate with internal and external organizations along the way. The workgroup’s philosophy of operations was premised upon complete collaboration between the Parties. This was not an easy path as the Workgroup was the first joint group formed under the new CBA and began its work prior to President Obama’s Executive Order that required Agencies and Unions to work more closely together. There was simply no roadmap available showing what true collaboration should look like in the new Administration. But by utilizing transparency, active participation, broad discovery, and the process of consensus, the parties were able to establish a working relationship with a basis in trust. The core membership of the workgroup consisted of four FAA members and six NATCA members. They were supported in their work by seven different components of the FAA, including Aerospace Medicine and CAMI scientists. External support included subject matter experts from NASA, the Air Force,

4 Des Moines Tower at night Photo: Kris Klop

During the years of the Bush Administration[…] the Agency refused to fully engage with NATCA. THE

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4 Fatigue MITRE, and others. In sixteen meetings held over fourteen months, the group utilized fatigue and sleep scientists, medical experts, and numerous other experts from the safety and aviation worlds to help in analyzing the numerous fatigue issues and developing viable recommendations. The fundamental questions that the workgroup started with were 1) how does fatigue happen and 2) how does fatigue compromise safety? It is well-established that “fatigue” refers to a physiological state in which there is a decreased capacity to perform cognitive tasks combined with an increased variability in performance. There is a clear cause and effect relationship between the two forces. Because of the high degree of variability and unpredictability, the challenge for the workgroup was to correlate the cause and effect. To do so, the group developed a multi-layered approach of mitigations that all interrelate. The impacts of fatigue are well-documented in many industries – from pipelines, trucking, rail, and shipping to the nuclear power industry. The physiological and cognitive impacts relate to one’s ability to stay on task as your accuracy and timing degrade, as you experience involuntary micro-sleeps, and as your attention wanes. The impacts to individual performance can be numerous – from a loss of situational awareness, to an increased risk of operational errors, to an overall decline in performance. The cost to productivity can be high in terms of both increased absenteeism and higher operational costs. Finally, the impact of fatigue on safety is clear: since 1993 over 14 accidents resulting in 263 fatalities had fatigue as a causal or contributing factor. It is well known that shift work contributes to cumulative fatigue, which equates to overall sleep debt. In the Air Traffic Control (ATC) environment, operational demands require shift work. Over 51 percent of federally-operated Terminal facilities and 100 percent of En Route facilities operate twenty-four hours a day/ seven days a week. Over 3,000 controllers are exposed to midnight shifts annu-

ally. When it comes to acute fatigue, which is all about the immediate effect, the reality is that anybody can be fatigued at any time of any day. The workgroup kept these hard realities in mind while developing fatigue mitigators.

The impact of fatigue on safety is clear.

What the Workgroup Ultimately Recommended After a thorough review of science and all available data, the workgroup developed twelve recommendations for consideration in six topical areas: recuperative breaks, scheduling, sleep apnea, personal fatigue management, education, and the Fatigue Risk Management System. The group followed science alone in developing the recommendations. None of the recommendations by itself is sufficient to adequately mitigate the fatigue risks currently inherent in ATC operations: to substantially diminish the existing fatigue risk to the NAS requires the implementation of all of the recommendations together, in a comprehensive, layered fashion. A summary of the recommendations reads as follows: 1. As fatigue can occur at any time and on any shift, the introduction of a recuperative break during a shift can mitigate the risk of reduced cognitive performance due to fatigue. Recommendation: Modify current policy and orders to permit recuperative breaks during relief periods. 2. Extensive scientific modeling clearly proves that introducing a recuperative break on the midnight shift can mitigate the identified risk of reduced cognitive performance due to fatigue. Re-entry time must be accounted for in all recuperative break planning, execution and management. Recommendation: Allow and schedule for a recuperative break of up to 2½ hours on the midnight shift. 3. Quick turns between evening and day shifts reduce opportunities for night time restorative sleep. Increasing the time between the second evening and the first day shift by one hour increases sleep opportunity

and cognitive performance. Recommendation: Schedule a minimum of nine (9) hours between evening and day shifts. 4. Scientific modeling shows that increasing night time sleep opportunity during the night prior to the second day shift and subsequent mid results in significant fatigue risk reduction during the mid-shift. However, the placement of the one hour from the reduced shift into a previous evening or

Photo: U96 / Nomuk / Dreamstime.com

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4 Fatigue Photo: Joeygil | Dreamstime.com

day shift has no effect on this risk reduction benefit. Recommendation: Reduce the day shift preceding the first midnight shift from eight to seven hours, and begin that shift one hour later, to provide the opportunity for an extra hour of restorative sleep at the end of the night time sleep period.

tion across respective lines of business. Recommendation: Ensure that FAA AAM remain current with state of the art in sleep medicine; utilize AAM standards and practices for SA risk factor identification, diagnosis and treatment standards; document the process for medical qualification for individuals at risk for sleep apnea; develop educational materials for the workforce and AAM staff; and educate AAM staff on SA.

5. According to FAA Aerospace Medicine (AAM), 2.2 percent of the ATC workforce has diagnosed sleep apnea (SA), and a minimum of an additional 1.8 percent may be undiagnosed. Perceived non-standardized processes, as well as a lack of awareness of sleep disorders and treatments, may result in financial disincentives and unreported SA in the ATC workforce. Recommendation: Create policies and procedures that encourage self-initiated evaluation, diagnosis and demonstration of initial treatment effectiveness of SA by removal or reduction of economic disincentives.

8. Controllers may not fully understand their responsibilities to minimize fatigue, and actions to be taken when they consider themselves too fatigued to safely perform their operational duties. Recommendation: Develop policy and education for employees defining responsibilities to minimize fatigue and report fit for duty, and action to be taken when they consider themselves too fatigued to safely perform their duties.

6. There is a gap in awareness and understanding of SA amongst the controller workforce. Raising awareness and understanding of sleep disorders will reduce the risk to the NAS. Recommendation: Use AAM-prepared SA education to build SA awareness in the ATO workforce. 7. The scope of the sleep apnea issue requires collabora-

9. Managers may not fully understand their responsibilities related to interacting with controllers who report that they are too fatigued to safely perform their duties. Recommendation: Develop policy and education for managers that incorporates emphasis on a non-punitive approach when an employee, in accordance with the developed policy, self-declares as too fatigued to safely perform operational duties. 10. Existing controller fatigue awareness training does not comprehensively capture current science, personalize fatigue mitigation strategies, or support practical operational needs. Recommendation: Update existing fatigue awareness training to reflect current science and to personalize the application of the training. 11. A formal Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) institutes a continuous, repeatable, collaborative process to identify, analyze

and mitigate fatigue risks. Recommendation: Design and implement an FRMS within the FAA operational ATC environment. 12. Retention of organizational knowledge supports a successful transition from the current Fatigue Workgroup to the implementation of an approved ATO FRM. Recommendation: Retain current Fatigue Workgroup members to help in the transition to a formal FRMS. In Conclusion: The Recommendationsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Potential Benefits If fully and comprehensively implemented, the recommendations equip the Agency to: 1. Systematically manage ATC fatigue risk; 2. Reduce acute and chronic sleep debt; 3. Improve opportunities for nighttime sleep; 4. Improve ability to obtain restorative sleep; 5. Allow for the self-declaration of fatigue; 6. Gather data to support fatigue analysis and mitigations; 7. Educate the workforce on personal and professional responsibilities in reducing fatigue; and 8. Support the ongoing adoption of a positive safety culture.

The recommendations flow from the systemic approach of a complementing, crosslayered set of prescriptive and non-prescriptive fatigue risk mitigations. The mitigations would evolve and be managed within the formal structure of the FRMS, which operationalizes fatigue risk into the FAA decision process and cultural fabric. The parties have begun the process of evaluating and analyzing the recommendations for their potential impacts on staffing, budget, policy, the CBA, and other areas. ^

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4 Fatigue

ICAO FATIGUE MANAGEMENT TAKING THE LEAD Michelle Millar PhD, ^ by FRMS Project Coordinator, ICAO

Cognisant of the benefits derived from both scientific principles and operational experience, ICAO has been working with scientists, the aviation industry, union representatives and aviation regulators around the world, to develop Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS) standards, recommended practices and guidance material, in order to continue to improve the safety record of a sector already recognised as “ultra-safe”.

What is FRMS? The FRMS approach is based on science. It aims to manage fatigue risks that are unique to a particular operational or organisational context through a dynamic, data-driven and systematic approach. The goal is to ensure that a satisfactory level of operational performance and safety is maintained. FRMS differs from prescriptive limitations, which offer a “one size fits all” solution, one that often has had as much to do with labour negotiations as identifying a “safety cut-off”. By contrast, FRMS uses the same principles as Safety Management Systems (SMS), focusing on risks related specifically to fatigue. The benefits of an FRMS approach relate not just to safety outcomes, but also to increased operational flexibility.

The FRMS Proposal The ICAO Council will consider the FRMS proposal in June. It relates only to flight and cabin crew on international commercial aeroplanes. In general, it proposes that:

• States shall provide fatigue management regulations. Flight and duty time limitation regulations are required. FRMS regulations are optional. • Where a State offers FRMS regulations, an operator shall manage its fatigue-related risks through compliance with FTLs, or by implementing FRMS throughout its entire operations, or by implementing FRMS in some parts of its operations and complying with FTLs in the remainder. The proposal is supported by detailed guidance manuals, one for regulators and one for operators. Both will be made available free of charge on the web.

A Broadening Focus So far, ICAO’s initiatives have focused on flight operations and there are valid reasons for this. Air operators were quick to realize the potential benefits of FRMS in terms of both safety outcomes and increased operational flexibility. In some places, operators have been using FRMS in the absence of any Standards. For their part, regulators needed assistance to provide the necessary oversight. Also, fatigue-related aviation accidents have generally been associated with pilot fatigue. The FRMS approach has broad applicability wherever shift workers undertake safetycritical work. It has been widely adopted in the rail and road transport industries in many countries. Air Traffic Control services would certainly benefit from the safety improvements afforded by FRMS.

FRMS uses the same principles as Safety Management Systems. FRMS Task Force membership. The FRMS Implementation Guide for Operators manual that has been developed will also be released as a joint ICAO-IATA-IFALPA collaboration. Any future ICAOIFATCA-CANSO collaboration could produce similar guidance for the air traffic control community. We recognise that, with appropriate oversight, FRMS offers both increased flexibility for the aviation industry and protection for frontline personnel in their normal duties. ^ MMillar@icao.int

Photo: Martindata | Dreamstime.com

It is an inescapable fact of life – increased sleepiness and associated changes in performance during the night are the consequence of normal human physiology. Such behaviour must 4 Michelle Millar human therefore be effectively PhD managed, especially in cases where shift workers are involved in safety-critical work. In the 24/7 world of international aviation, along with many other industries, the management of fatigue-related risks is essential.

The Big Picture Industrial negotiations may influence remuneration and how many hours people work, but they do not necessarily address safety. If improved safety outcomes are the goal, FRMS offers a real step in the right direction. Separating these considerations requires a strong relationship between the union, the operator (or service provider) and the regulator. The need for such a tripartite approach was reflected in our

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4 Fatigue

IFATCA on Fatigue RESPECT FOR THE KNOWN HUMAN PERFORMANCE LIMITATIONS Scott Shallies, ^ By IFATCA EVP Professional formed debate of the issue of fatigue within the aviation industry. “Sleep” events are an on going issue in all sectors of aviation. The USA examples weren’t the first and they wont be the last. They just achieved the most publicity!

Policy on Rostering

4 Scott Shallies,

IFATCA EVP Professional

The recent issues in the USA have highlighted the topic of “fatigue” amongst Air Traffic Controllers. The USA situation has received wide spread international press coverage, and has resulted in at least one high level FAA management ‘casualty”. It has also had an adverse impact on some individual Air Traffic Controllers. The FAA soon elected to decree “two person night shift staffing” in most affected units. Whilst this in itself can be seen as a beneficial outcome, it is a shame that it had to come as a ‘reactionary’ response to bad publicity rather than as a considered safety decision. If nothing else, the USA situation has sparked some in-

ATC hours are not regulated to the same degree that pilot and flight crew hours are.

IFATCA has professional policies on work and rest schemes, detailing, amongst other things, the amount of continuous console duty and break provisions a controller should be subject to. Of relevance to night shift operations, IFATCA has policy on the “Four Eyes Principle”, which says that controllers should also have another appropriately qualified controller working beside them as part of a safety net. Allied to this, we also have very clear policy that “Single Person Operations” are not acceptable, but if unavoidable, should only ever be temporary, with all impacts and risks to be appropriately mitigated.

Policy of Fatigue We also have policy on “fatigue in ATC” (and have had since 1988!). This details such things as the physical environment of the ops room and rest areas, roster design and night shift staffing, and includes education about fatigue and sleep management in basic and recurrent ATC training. This policy also includes: “The Regulator / Legislator should develop comprehensive hours of duty regulations for air traffic controllers, incorporating fatigue management principles; and require all air traffic service providers to maintain auditable fatigue management systems and establish this as a key element of a target level of safety.” These are two very important elements of our policy.

Role of the Regulator ATC hours are not regulated to the same degree that pilot and flight crew hours are. At an ICAO level, this is one area where IFATCA is working hard, with the aim of having ATC duty times and regulation seen in a similar light to that of pilots. It is obvious that the

fatigue and well being of an air traffic controller is no less important than that of aircrew. In many cases, ATC duty hours are not even subject to national regulation, but are left solely in the realm of local working or industrial agreements. They are frequently used as a ‘bargaining’ tool in agreement negotiations. With the current depth of scientific research and knowledge in the areas of human performance limitations, fatigue and sleep management, such an important issue shouldn’t just be left to such local agreements. A basic framework of ATC duty hours and limitations should be enshrined in national regulations.

FRMS The other important aspect of IFATCA fatigue policy is that of “Fatigue Management Systems” (commonly referred to as Fatigue Risk Management Systems, or FRMS). IFATCA policy is that the regulator or legislator should require ANSPs to maintain an auditable FRMS and that it should be an integral part of their Safety Management System (SMS). Too few ANSPs have actually implemented an effective FRMS. Again, there is considerable scientific research detailing what an FRMS should encompass to be truly effective. An FRMS is an excellent opportunity to have a dynamic tool that can be an integral part of an overall fatigue management system, that should ensure that not only ‘base’ duty hours and rosters, but also any extra hours or shifts are properly assessed for fatigue risk and managed accordingly. But sadly, we have known examples where an implemented FRMS is little more than a “box ticking exercise”, where base rosters are usually at the maximum permitted fatigue level, and where any extra hours inevitably push the individual above “acceptable” limits, but are nevertheless assessed as “safe” by a rudimentary measure of prior sleep and management “acceptance” of ‘residual’ risk. In this latter example, the FRMS is actually used by the ANSP to justify single person night shift staffing!

Ignoring Scientific Research Like any “tool”, an FRMS only works properly if it’s built properly and used properly. That is why IFATCA policy calls for an FRMS

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4 Fatigue Photo: Chun Hong Fok | Dreamstime.com

Fatigue management should be a part of the safety management system.

For all that scientific knowledge, the basic issue is SAFETY. Fatigue management is about safety of the individual and safety of the overall system operation. Any operational system is only as robust as its weakest link. For all the money and technology invested in ATC

infrastructure, is it acceptable that the weakest link in the system be a fatigued air traffic controller, alone in a tower or ATC unit, in the middle of the night, trying to keep his eyes open?

Staffing Impact However, we all understand that one of the basic motivations not to professionally address fatigue management issues in ATC is “staffing”. For many ANSPs they simply do not have enough qualified ATC staff to fully acquit base rosters, much less be able to handle the possible outcome demanded of a properly implemented FRMS. Whilst there is still a reliance on considerable amounts of overtime being worked to sustain operations in many ANSPs, fatigue management in unlikely to be adequately addressed.

Note: The summer 2011 issue of the Eurocontrol’s Hindsight publication focuses on the issue of fatigue, and I recommend it to you. It is available to download through Skybrary at: http://www.skybrary.aero/ bookshelf/books/1515.pdf). This edition has articles from our own Bert Ruitenburg, and also Dr Anne Isaac, and Professor Sidney Dekker, amongst many others.

Fatigue management in ATC, for all the complexities, can be seen as simply as respect for the known basic human performance limitations. Fatigue management should be a part of the safety management system, and, importantly, should be a part of the safety culture of the ANSP. It must not be seen as just an industrial issue. ^ evpp@ifatca.org

Photo: Gilles Decruyenaere | Dreamstime.com

to be auditable, by the regulator, thus be a measurable part of its safety management system. This latter part is important. Measuring, assessing and controlling fatigue levels of shift working staff should be an integral part of an ANSP’s SMS, and should be seen with the same importance as any other aspect of the ANSP’s operations that can impact upon safety. For a typical ANSP, basic technical specifications will usually demand redundant paths for data streams such as radar or ADS-B feeds, primary and secondary radios for a given frequency, and some form of backup display system if the primary air situation display should fail. But this same ANSP may also tolerate a controller working a solo night shift on a sector with significant traffic, on their 10h shift straight, with as little as 5 hours sleep in the previous 24 hours and 13 hours sleep in the previous 48 hours, and deem this to be ‘safe and acceptable’ (yes, this is a real example). There is simply too much scientific research available these days that details all aspects of sleep and fatigue management, and the resulting human performance limitations for shift workers, for this critical area to be left in the realm of local industrial agreements.

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4 Fatigue

WAKE ME WHEN MY SHIFT IS OVER

4 A real rattler has the reputation for doubling back and biting… Photo: Blair Bunting | Dreamstime.com

ON THE ”RATTLER“ SHIFT, IT’S A TOSS-UP WHO WILL CRASH FIRST. Thomas Anthony, director, Aviation Safety ^ by and Security Program, Viterbi School of

Engineering, University of Southern California

“The rattler” is the nickname for a work schedule used in U.S. air traffic control (ATC) facilities. I used to work the rattler shift as a controller in the 1980s. I learned that this shift earned its reputation for doubling back and biting those who worked it. My first reaction to learning about the rattler shift was, “Does anybody know we are doing this?” I figured the answer had to be “no,” since no one would intentionally schedule a controller to work live

Performance deteriorates to the point of being identical to someone who is legally drunk.

traffic with only three or four hours of sleep. I found out I was wrong. Not only was it done intentionally, but it occurred regularly in facilities around the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ATC system. Imagine my reaction after reading about the Comair Flight 5191 accident at Lexington, Kentucky — they’re still working the rattler. The idea behind the rattler is to compress your five eight-hour shifts closely together to maximize the time in your days off. Here is how it works: The first day of your workweek — we’ll call it Monday, but it could be any day — you start work at 4 p.m. and are off at midnight. Your second day, you work from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. Your third day, Wednesday, is from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. Your fourth day, Thursday, is from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. For your fifth day, you begin at either 10 p.m. or midnight on your fourth day, late Thursday night. You are off at either 6 a.m. or 8 a.m. Friday. Then you have until 4 p.m. on Monday before you have to come back. For someone wanting to maximize time away from work, this is an ideal shift. From the perspective of a responsible individual wanting to ensure air safety, it is irresponsible.

In the days following the Comair accident, the news media made a big deal of the fact that the controller only had two hours of sleep. My thought at the time was that the controller was fortunate that he had gotten that much sleep between a day shift and a midnight shift (mid). Two hours of sleep is not an anomaly when working the mid; it is a normal fact of life. The media failed to ask why the controller only got two hours. At the University of Southern California Aviation Safety and Security Program, among the topics we cover is human factors that contribute to aircraft accidents. In one course, Flight Surgeon Gregg Bendrick of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Dryden Flight Research Center, presents the science behind the decrease in function associated with sleep loss and fatigue. This includes loss of focus, attention and the ability to perform complex tasks. Bendrick teaches that there are three aspects to fatigue: circadian rhythm, acute sleep loss and chronic sleep loss. Circadian rhythm means that people have “low points” in their day in terms of alertness and functionality. A mild low point is normally in the mid- to late afternoon, whereas the other, more significant major low point is in the early morning — when one normally is sleeping. Moreover, circadian rhythm physiology makes it easier for humans to lengthen their day rather than to shorten it. Indeed, personal experience tells us it is easier to fly from the East Coast to the West Coast of the United States, rather than vice versa. But with the rattler, one is trying to force the body to do just the opposite — shorten the physiological day. Acute sleep loss refers to how many hours one has been continuously awake. The real

4 The Rattler is also a wooden rollercoaster in Six Flags Fiesta, San Antonio, TX – USA. Photo: Internet

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4 Fatigue problem comes in when the acute sleep loss overlaps the major low point in the circadian rhythm. At that point, performance deteriorates to the point of being identical to someone who is legally drunk. Admittedly, some of this effect can be counteracted with caffeine, cold air and auditory stimulation. However, chronic sleep loss — the difference between the number of hours slept and the number of hours of sleep required — over the preceding two weeks lessens the effects of the usual countermeasures. Hence, the triple whammy of circadian rhythm, plus acute and chronic sleep loss leads to a several-hour “valley of fatigue” during which one’s performance is really poor, whether or not the person realizes it. As the individual climbs out of the valley with the progression of the circadian rhythm, he or she may actually feel pretty good, as if having caught a “second wind.” It is possible to be lulled into a false sense of security.

never forget. Of course, the harder I tried to sleep, the more difficult it became. There is a flip side to the phenomenon. Amazingly, with an hour or two of quasi-sleep you feel pretty good and alert for the first two or three hours of your shift. Then there is about a three- to four-hour period when the air traffic demands are low, and you get into a “low and slow cruise” mode. You are able to handle about an hour of increased activity from 5 a.m. to 6 a.m. — or at least you think you can — but the last two hours of the shift are very hard. You hope there is enough staffing so that the supervisor can “bury” you on a low-activity position. Even at that, I remember that the effort to stay awake sometimes bordered on pain.

The effects of fatigue are shown in two graphs that compare performance degradation from hours of wakefulness and performance degradation associated with blood alcohol concentration (Figure 1). The two curves are strikingly similar.

The drive home after the last day of a rattler shift was no better. I would drive with the windows down, blasting the radio and biting my tongue to stay awake. I consider myself lucky that I got into only one wreck coming home from a rattler shift; the car was a total loss. At the time, I made no connection between the wreck and coming off a rattler shift.

My perspective on workplace fatigue is entirely more personal. It comes from years of working the rattler shift. I can remember lying in bed in the summer at 5 p.m. with all the shutters closed, trying my hardest to get some sleep before I had to get up and go to work at 9 p.m. Several of the neighbors had gathered on the sidewalk outside my bedroom window to talk, and their kids played up and down the sidewalk. It was not an environment conducive to sleep. If I got an hour’s real sleep I felt lucky. And the urgency of knowing that I had to get some sleep, but not being able to sleep, is something I will

So what is the answer? Air traffic managers must staff the midnight shift. Controllers cannot work a permanent midnight shift because their skills would erode. The U.S. Air Force in Vietnam was faced with a similar challenge of scheduling crews that would fly missions during the hours around midnight. They did so by scheduling three straight midnight shifts separated by days off on either side. This kind of schedule avoids the “double back” feature of the rattler shift. Alternatively, a schedule employing a week of straight mids every two months would be an option. The options may not be popular with the unions

4 The effects

of fatigue and alcohol are strikingly similar.

Photo: Miroslav Beneda | Dreamstime.com

because they result in less regular time off between shifts. Either option would, however, be the responsible choice. The science is clear. As Bendrick demonstrates in his course, one cannot change human physiology. When one tries, the result is truly impaired performance and myriad excuses to justify the current practice, with a search for a target of blame when something bad happens. But for me, it goes beyond science. It is a memory of being so sleep-impaired that at times it verged on pain. This is not a safety mindset, and it is not a characteristic of a safety culture. I must ask again: Isn’t it time to get rid of the rattler? This story is taken from an issue of Flight Safety Foundation’s journal, Aero Safety World. A free subscription to the digital version of that publication is available through the signup form on the Foundation’s Web site home page, www.flightsafety.org. Note 1. Dawson, D.; Reid, K. “Fatigue, Alcohol and Performance Impairment.” Nature Volume 388, July–August 1997. Acknowledgment Special thanks to Gregg A. Bendrick, M.D., M.P.H., chief medical officer and flight surgeon at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center for his contributions to this article. ^

The effort to stay awake sometimes bordered on pain. THE

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4 Fatigue

EUROPE NEEDS TO ”WAKE UP“ TO PILOT FATIGUE As the proposed changes to EU Flight Time Limitation rules are published, the British Airline Pilots’ Association (BALPA) together with the European Cockpit Association (ECA) have launched a campaign to establish scientifically robust FTLs across Europe. Proposed European rules on Flight Time Limitations (FTL) were published on 20th December 2010. As BALPA sus-

pected, if these are adopted in their current form, they pose a very real threat to flight safety to European pilots and indeed the travelling public. It is a fact that 1520% of all global fatal air accidents have pilot fatigue as a contributing factor. The United Kingdom, under our regulation CAP371, has the best air safety record in Europe – so why is the British regulator even entertaining moving to a weaker rule system? Our principal concern is that these new rules have been developed with little re-

gard for the science behind FTL calculation. The current UK Flight Time Limitation rules are based on 40 years of scientific research into fatigue, its impact on alertness and cognitive ability and therefore on transport safety. The new proposals were published without scientific or medical evaluation. The extremely worrying conclusion from this is that commercial forces to increase productivity have been put ahead of flight safety. The proposals are now going through a lengthy European consultation process, but the bottom line is that by the end of 2012 (with the current timeline) the European FTL rules will be in force and the current rules (CAP371) will be obsolete.

The deadly risk of pilot fatigue Pilot fatigue is widely accepted as a contributing factor in the Colgan Air crash near Buffalo NY in 2009 and the US Flight Time Limitations have been tightened as a result. We in the UK are therefore deeply disturbed that the EU proposals appear to be taking us in the opposite direction. It shouldn’t take a ‘Colgan’ to force the EU parliament to develop safe Flight Time Limitations for pilots.

What are we up against? The European Low Fares Airline Association (ELFA) and the Association of European Airlines (AEA), which collectively comprise every airline in the UK, have both released press statements that demonstrate support for these proposals. There is clearly a commercial interest that is being pushed ahead of flight safety. Our current government has done little to reassure us that they will fight for scientifically based regulations. While the UK government together with the CAA have registered objections to three areas of the proposals, we feel these do not go far enough and there is still a gulf between what they believe to be safe and what BALPA believes to be safe.

So what is BALPA doing? First and foremost, we have launched a campaign in conjunction with the European Cockpit Association (ECA) that will remain the number one priority for the Association over the coming months. BALPA is also conducting domestic lobbying and is working with the ECA to contribute to the vital lobbying of the EU processes. We’ve engaged members to write to their local politician and in turn put pressure on the British Government. In addition, our members were urged to put pressure on the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) who has written the

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4 Fatigue Colgan Air Crash A Bombardier DHC8 Q400 operating as Flight 3407 departed late from Newark, NJ (USA) on February 12, 2009, at 9:20 p.m. EST towards Buffalo, NY (USA). Shortly after the last communication by the flight crew with approach control at 10:17 p.m. (03:17, February 13 UTC), the plane stalled less than a mile northeast of the locator outer marker while on an ILS approach to Runway 23 and crashed into a house. A total of 50 people were killed including one person in the house

into which the plane crashed. The NTSB investigation found that the probable cause of this accident was the captainâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. Fatigue was identified as an important contributing factor: both pilots appear to have been at Newark airport overnight and all day prior to the 9:18 pm departure. The investigators compared the twenty years that fatigue has

proposals. Via the media, BALPA is trying to raise awareness of the issue with the general public. This is not about pilot working conditions; this is about flight safety. Finally, we have conducted academic study into the reality of fatigue in an effort to inject robust scientific evidence into the rule-making process. BALPA is not against harmonisation with the rest of Europe but what we are fighting for is science-based and safety-oriented FTL rules. We need the UK and EU stakeholders to wake up and realise that tired pilots risk lives. ^

4 The graph shows a

remained on the NTSBâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements (without getting substantial action on the matter from regulators) to the changes in tolerance for alcohol over the same time period, noting that the performance impacts of fatigue and alcohol were similar. ^

clear picture of the proposed changes on a single sector flight duty period versus CAP371, and both can be compared to an accepted scientifically based fatigue curve:

wakeup@balpa.org

Commercial forces to increase productivity have been put ahead of flight safety.

4 A summary of the key changes from the 244-page document, which details the new European Flight Time Limitation rules. THE

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4 IFATCA Conference

IFATCA’S 50TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE AMMAN, JORDAN Philippe Domogala, ^ by Deputy Editor and Conference Executive

Many former Executive Board members attended this 50th Conference. portant guests. You will find a report of this event a little further into this magazine. Many former Executive Board members attended this 50th Conference. They were too numerous to list them all, but worth mentioning are the past Presidents who made it all the way to Jordan: Jean-Daniel Monin, Harri Henschler, Charles Stuart, Preben Lauridsen, Sam Lampkin, and Marc Baumgartner.

4 IFATCA Delegates in plenary session Photo: Eurocontrol

The 50th anniversary-conference was held from the 9th to the 13th of April at the luxurious Le Royal Hotel in Amman, Jordan. Nearly 400 participants attended from a record 74 countries. With proxies, over 100 member associations were represented.

King Abdullah II was foreseen to open the Conference but at the last moment, he unfortunately could not attend and was represented by his Minister of Transport. The official anniversary catch phrase – one Sky, one Voice, since 1961 – was revealed during the opening ceremony. A special anniversary panel was held during the Conference, with various im-

The final farewell 50th anniversary party was held in a resort on the shores of the Dead Sea, well below sea level. Everyone got to wear the traditional Jordan headdress. I am sure that all those present went home with wonderful memories. Many thanks are due to the JATCA organizing committee for having worked very hard to make this Conference a success, sometimes in very difficult circumstances. Everyone in JATCA was involved and, in addition to their normal jobs, spent all their time off during those days working for the Conference. The 2012 Conference will be held in Kathmandu, Nepal from 12 to 16 March 2012, while Bali, Indonesia was selected to host the event in 2013.

4 Head table committee A:

Adell Humphreys, Albert Taylor, Patrik Peters & Zaki Maali Photo: JATCA

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4 IFATCA Conference Committee A – Administrative By Patrik Peters, IFATCA Vice-President This year’s committee A was chaired by Albert Taylor from Ghana, assisted by Zaki Maali (Jordan) as vice chairman, secretary Adell Humphreys (NATCA/USA) and Deputy President Patrik Peters (EGATS). With the ratification of membership applications from Pakistan, Sao Tome and the Cayman Islands and a replacement of representation from Madagascar, our federation now has one hundred and forty full professional members. Several generous MAs helped others with financial difficulties avoid suspension or even termination. In an attempt to improve output and efficiency, the Executive Board decided to split the function of EB Secretary and Conference Executive: it nominated Adell Humphreys as Secretary to the board and Philippe Domogala (EGATS) as Conference Executive. Office manager Tatiana Iavorskaia received a big round of applause and a small gift from the EB to celebrate her ten year anniversary with IFATCA. She continues to serve the Federation with dedication and professionalism. Through increased MA subscriptions and income from our collaboration with SESAR and EASA, the Federation is in good financial standing with increasing substantial reserves. The EB, foremost EVP Finance Darrell Meachum, in cooperation with the Financial Committee (FIC) achieved this by revising budget posts, applying new caps (for example 150USD/night for hotel reimbursement) and improving investment plans. Tord Gustavsson (SATCA/Sweden) ended his role as Chairman FIC after ten years of service. For his outstanding work and involvement of more than 25 years in IFATCA, he was awarded the Scroll of Honour, our highest award. The Controller magazine, edited by Philip Marien (EGATS), continued its improvements in quality and financial performance. Financial reserves cover more than one year’s operational budget at current expense level. Deputy Editor Philippe Domogala and the editorial team are preparing a special 50th anniversary issue. With the goal of enhancing our corporate identity, focus for the next year will be the modernization of the website, data handling through cloud based storage tools and streamlining of documentation and it’s appearance. Several Executive Board positions were up for election. The following recommendations were proposed to and confirmed at the final plenary: Deputy President – Patrik Peters (EGATS); EVP Technical – Patrick Forrey (USA); EVP Africa & Middle East – Keziah

Ogutu (Kenya); EVP Americas – Ignacio Oliva Whiteley (Argentina); EVP Asia Pacific – D.K. Behera (India). All appointments are for twoyear terms, except EVP Americas, who joined the EB mid-term. Sincere appreciation was expressed to all outgoing EB members; first and foremost to Andrew Beadle for many years of dedication and his work in establishing our position within ICAO in Montreal. He was awarded the Scroll of Honour at final plenary. Hisham Bazian, Alex Figuereo, Raymond Tse and Jack van Delft were thanked for their services. Jack was praised for his outstanding work in various positions including secretary, conference executive and many committees.

Sincere appreciation was expressed to all outgoing EB members.

4 New EVP Africa & Middle-East, Keziah Ogutu

Committee B – Technical By Bernhard Romanik, special reporter As usual, Committee B had their work set out for them. Under the chairmanship of Akos van der Plaat (NL), they reviewed reports from representatives on various panels, including Aerodrome; Aeronautical Surveillance; Air Traffic Management Requirement and Performance; OPLINK; and Separation and Airspace Safety. The bulk of the work consisted of studies prepared by the Technical and Operational Committee (TOC). Subjects here included environmental issues; SID and STAR design; en-route restrictions; definitions of “fly-by” and “fly-over”; Use of Aircraft Flight Management Systems; use of CCTV equipment in tower environments; and alpha-numeric call signs. In the majority of cases, IFATCA policy was introduced or amended. The following member associations were elected as TOC members: Bulgaria, The Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States of America. The committee will continue under the very able chairmanship of Matthijs Jongeneel (NL). Appreciation was also expressed to Catherina De Decker (Belgium) for serving as Committee B secretary for the past 11 conferences. Finding a replacement as dedicated and committed will be a tough challenge!

Committee C – Professional & Legal By Bernhard Romanik, special reporter Committee C discussed 4 reports and 5 work-studies as prepared by the Professional & Legal Committee (PLC). Of particular interest was the acceptance of a Just Culture paper as Guidance Material (same status as IFATCA Policy). This calls upon Member Associations to “consider entering discus-

4 New IFATCA

Secretary, Adell Humphreys

4 New EVP

Technical, Patrick Forrey

4 New EVP

Americas, Ignacio Oliva Whiteley

4 New EVP Asia

& Pacific, D.K. Behera

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4 IFATCA Conference 4 Head table Committee C:

Scott Shallies, Jez Pigden & Bert Ruitenberg

Photo: JATCA

For the first time, a full day at Conference was planned for a combined session of the technical and professional/legal committees. sions with ANSPs/ Regulators and Prosecuting Authorities on how to utilise domain expertise, to allow them to make better decisions.” It ties in with an initiative from the former IFATCA President Marc Baumgartner: together

with the legal department of Eurocontrol, he is developing a program to provide legal training to a selected group of experienced ATCOs, allowing them to be available as expert witnesses in court cases against controllers. The committee was also updated on the implementation of the English language proficiency requirements. The Committee elected 10 Member Associations out of 11

4 Farewell party was held near the Dead Sea Photo: DP

volunteers to comprise the Professional and Legal Committee (PLC) for the coming year. Ms Marjolein Hooijboer (NL) indicated that she is stepping down as chairman of the PLC after Conference. The Committee expressed its appreciation for the work done by Marjolein for PLC and elected Jez Pigden (UK/ GATCO) as the PLC’s new chairman.

Joint Committee B & C By Bernhard Romanik, special reporter For the first time, a full day at Conference was planned for a combined session of the technical and professional/legal committees. The joint Committees discussed 15 reports and 8 comprehensive work-studies, which resulted in the acceptance of 10 recommendations. This included policy on Runway Status Lights, Continuous Descent Operations (CDO), pilot impairment by hypoxia and Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management. IFATCA was invited to forward the latter to Montreal for integration into ICAO documentation. The lines of communication don’t get much shorter than that, which is a tribute to the relationship that has been fostered between IFATCA and ICAO over the last 50 years. It would appear that every year, there is an increasing overlap between Technical and Professional subjects. This would suggest the federation might want to review whether the current delineation between technical, operational, legal and professional subjects is still applicable. ^

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4 IFATCA Conference

50 ANNIVERSARY IFATCA PANEL TH

Bernhard Romanik, ^ by Special Reporter On Thursday afternoon during the 50th Annual IFATCA Conference, a panel presentation and discussion was held in the impressive ballroom of the Le Royal Hotel Amman. Ten armchairs filled the podium, setting the scene for a comfortable yet very animated discussion. IFATCA Conference Executive Philippe Domogala moderated the entire afternoon.

Presentations First speaker Preben Lauridsen, former IFATCA president (1994-1998), reflected on IFATCA’s past pointing out the evolution to a well-recognized and respected player in the global aviation industry. He also identified a downside to this: more financial and manpower support is needed from the member associations. He also noted that some member associations still ignore the federations’ advice and expertise: they still sell their souls for money by working long shifts and too much overtime. Marc Baumgartner, also former president of the federation (2002-2009) looked at the federation’s future, remarking that some of the current certainties would no longer apply in 15 years. He explored 5 scenarios for the federation: to become a union; a standardization body; to stay as it is; to become more professional; or to start from the scratch. All of these options require a lot of energy and dedication. But rather than fear the future, the federation and its members should accept the changes ahead. He presented a

SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) analysis of the different options. He concluded that dedication, friendship and passion would ensure a prosperous future for IFATCA. The next speaker was the Director General of EUROCONTROL, David McMillan who highlighted the long and intense cooperation between EUROCONTROL and IFATCA, who share the same philosophy – safety is always the overriding consideration. The role of the controller is vital in the system and that, with their involvement, IFATCA has a real influence on decisions. But he reminded that ATM is a complex system with many levels of decision making: “Controllers will never have a veto but if you commit time, energy and enthusiasm, you will have some real influence.” Graham Lake, Director General of CANSO since December 2009 noted that IFATCA’s strength is to bring people with common interests together. It can influence decisions at ICAO, EASA, EUROCONTROL and other levels, but to be credible, it needs to focus on professional aspects. Unlike airlines, no service provider has ever gone bankrupt. As complex industry, dominated by monopolist service providers with close ties to governments, this protection comes at a cost. Service interuptions to exert pressure are not acceptable. In this respect, our industry has a bad reputation. The future is hard to predict, but we are part of one global system, which needs

to be safe, efficient and seamless. IFATCA needs to strengthen cooperation and even more than today, think global! Steve Creamer, Director of the FAA's Europe, Africa and Middle East regional office, asked ATCOs to contribute actively to the innovation process and to challenge their ANSPs. IFATCA should facilitate an environment in which controllers can be actively in progressing change. When risks are identified, they must be addressed and voluntary reporting will be one of the key elements. While he doesn’t foresee machines taking over from controllers, he advocated taking advantage of new skills that today's kids are already used to. IFATCA should stay ahead of evolutions such as UAVs that will revolutionize our business. Deputy Director Vince Galotti of the ICAO Air Navigation Bureau recalled the support given to him by IFATCA during and after the PATCO crisis in the early 1980s. He was very grateful for the good relation between ICAO and IFATCA, which resulted in the federa-

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4 IFATCA Conference tion being involved in most of the important evolutions of the last decades. The upcoming ANC 12 meeting presents an opportunity to continue to work together. Captain Mohammad Hassoun, Director of Operations and Head Technical Middle East Airlines, urged to be prepared for the technical, economical and political changes ahead, which will both be rapid and frequent. Pilots and controllers must strengthen their partnership by become more familiar with each others’ issues.

Debate Following the presentations, IFATCA President Alexis Brathwaithe and Joe Magee, ITF’s Air Traffic Services adviser, joined the panel speakers for an open discussion with questions from the audience. Asked how working conditions could be improved without industrial actions as a stick behind the door, Graham Lake advocated that an appropriate and effective regulatory regime, with proper arbitration at national level, should be able to resolve those conflicts. Philippe raised the situation in Spain. Graham Lake stated that the Spanish situation was the result of both state and labour issues. More general, extremes

on both ends have to be eliminated but the same goes for illegal strikes. Joe Magee lamented the press campaigns used in Spain and other countries. These pulled things such as income out of context. Cooperation should lead to an environment where controllers do get the respect they earn. Service providers are calling for more flexibility, which will come, but the threat of relocation is frightening for controllers. David McMillan pointed out that politicians are questioning industrial relations and rigidity in ATM. Public perception is that there are enough controllers but they are not used efficiently. Graham Lake clarified that he didn’t suggest taking away the right to strike – but there’s an urgent need for consistency. The volcano crisis showed how vital ATM is in our society. Preben Lauridsen stressed the need for trust and respect from both sides. Marc Baumgartner remarked that public perception of a controller is still tainted by strikes from 25 – 40 years ago, which were ironically aimed at improving controller recognition and working conditions. Politicians often choose not to involve us, as professionals, to assess the impact of certain decisions. In Spain, this has resulted in significant deviations from ICAO standards. Working conditions are deteriorating again, which leads to tense relations within the ATM community. He suggested that the real agenda should be discussed before making conflicts public. Steve Creamer agreed, recalling the 1981 PATCO strike in the US where everybody lost. Politics play a big role, as airspace is always state-owned. Vince Galotti expressed his appreciation for the extraordinary per-

formance of controllers in recent crisis situations (e.g. Japan and Lybia). Philippe noted that IFATCA has failed to cash in on positive examples of our work. It shouldn’t be a surprise that recruitment is a problem: controller has become a dirty word. Steve Creamer added that the FAA has a very keen interest in defending the controllers. Europe should do the same. Protecting one’s controllers is the only way to improve efficiency. Joe Magee sees collaboration as best practice, while keeping the right to strike. Asked what is needed from IFATCA, David McMillan responded that it needs to be even more professional and informed, as well as realistic. Graham Lake added it takes more than passive membership: member associations have to participate actively to improve the tainted image of the controller. Steve Creamer said IFATCA should support ICAO in improving regional and global reporting of safety issues. Vince Galotti asked for involvement of the younger IFATCA generation in ICAO. Mohammed Hassoun urged the need to get ahead of the other players and to shape the future before others do and to focus on technical issues rather than on industrial ones. Joe Magee would like to see closer cooperation at all times, not only when problems arise. Moderator Philippe Domogala summed up that IFATCA’s presence is important and that it probably needs to be more professional in the future . He warned however that there would be financial implications in doing so. For the next 50 years, we need to choose whether to be a fire brigade, or a big lobby association. Lastly, consensus between all players is a key requirement for the future. ^

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4 Jordan

FLYING VFR IN JORDAN Philippe Domogala, ^ by Deputy Editor

“Elevation” of the Dead Sea is 1400 ft below sea level. It was a dream of mine to be able to fly below sea level: to get an instruction: “cleared below 1000 ft“ and take a photo of the altimeter to prove it. Trying to arrange a local VFR flight proved easier than expected. There are 2 main flying schools in Amman and one flying club, which even has gliders. Unfortunately the club only flies on Fridays (rest day in most Islamic countries) and public holidays. Fortunately Ziad from the Jordan ATCA had (very) good contacts with one of the flying schools and arranged a 1 hour flight in a PA28 with an instructor from the Royal Jordanian Flight Academy. The flight school and the club are all located in the old Amman airport (OJAM) in the middle of the city. It is unfortunately also a military airfield, so security to enter is extremely tight. To get a permit to enter took a while and the entrance was guarded with heavily armed vehicles and staff. Once inside the natural Jordan friendliness took over as usual. I was shown around the facilities including the control tower full of young and enthusiast controllers. My instructor for the flight, Malek, was an exJordanian Air Force F-5 pilot. The pre-flight briefing showed the limitations of flying VFR in Jordan: the whole airspace is military. Flying was restricted to 2 areas and one route: above the airport and the city; a small training zone some 20 miles to the east over the desert; and a single CVFR route towards the south to Aqaba. That’s it. All the VFR fights are controlled and must follow ATC instructions. Even for small altitude changes clearances have to be obtained. The whole area of the Dead Sea is a no fly zone, as it is too close to the Israeli border. That was the end of my dream to fly below sea level! The border to the north with Syria and Israel are also off-limits. So we took off for a local flight above the city, which turned out to be very instructive and pleasant.

extra power. Best climb rates we got was 200-300 ft/min. OJAM is high (2500ft) and was hot (25° C) – not the best combination. So it took a while to get up to 4500ft, our cleared altitude. SSR was on and we were radar controlled. Proceeding on the runway heading brought us above the city centre, which is massive. The buildings are the same colour as the surroundings. There are very few green patches. We were then authorized to make circuits to the west of the airport, which is still right above the city and gave us exceptional sights. Flying back was a bit unusual: despite the lack of traffic, we got instructions all the way, just like an IFR flight. Landing could have been anywhere on the 3200m runway but procedures require you to land on the numbers. Yes, flying in Jordan is easy. Getting to the parked aircraft is more difficult and requires some pre-planning. Once airborne, it’s unfortunately very limited, but when you look at a map of the region, you can perhaps understand why. The costs are very similar to Europe. Jordan’s king is also a pilot, as was his father. Possibly because of this, aviation as a whole is very developed in Jordan. Even VFR general aviation exists, unlike in many other neighbouring countries. ^ dp@the-controller.net

Even for small altitude changes clearances have to be obtained. 4 Philippe and Malek above Amman city All Photos: DP

4 The Royal Jordanian Flight Academy Piper PA 28

4 Approach towards Amman old airport (OJAM)

No need to elaborate about the PA28: it’s a truck, in which if you just follow the speeds in the manual, will allow you to do everything safely without too much thinking. This one had 180 HP, but you did not notice the

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4 ATC Global

ATC GLOBAL 2011 FOCUS ON A SINGLE, GLOBAL ATM SYSTEM Philippe Domogala, ^ by Deputy Editor ATC global was held this year in Amsterdam from 8 to 10 March 2011. It attracted 5500 trade visitors from 110 countries. In total, 220 different organizations were represented. The focus this year was “Single global ATM system“. The event is in fact a spacious exhibition in 3 large halls and a series of presentations (32 this year), workshops and forums (6 this time) organized by SESAR, ICAO and Eurocontrol.

The Exibition The exhibiting companies had many new products to show – in fact too many to mention all of them. Two attracted my attention: as part of their SESAR research, THALES has finalized its SESAR HMI controller work-

Single Sky is still a dream.

ing position which was available to play with. The design is standard, but it is extremely fast and supports a lot of applications. These include Traffic Synchronization by Time over Point; automatic recalculation of trajectories; sequencing at converging routes; support for 4D data link (ATN/VDL2); advanced conflict detection and dilution with minor speed adjustments; clearance deviation detection; etc. Before you ask, yes a human being is still required to make inputs. The next interesting development was the German DFS “Distant Aerodrome Control Service“. This is similar to what the Swedes are doing with their “remote tower“ trials reported already in this magazine in the past. The idea is still to be able to close down TWRs in small airports and do the control from a central distant control room. To do this, they use high resolution video cameras to reproduce the visual part and a sophisticated air + ground situation displays based on various sensors (radar, multilateration, etc..). One of their strong selling points is that the system functions as well in low visibility operations, therefore increasing safety while reducing costs. The DFS claims, that like pilots are able to chose between VFR and IFR, control-

4 The SESAR controller working position by THALES Photo: DP

lers will be able to use visual or instrument control rules: they even use VCR and ICR to refer to this. The displays are impressive (see photos). For many controllers, these would be a huge improvement to what they have today, especially in small regional airports. The DFS could not say when the system will be operational nor where, but under-utilized former East German airports were rumored to be the target.

The Bar Discussions During such events, there are of course also the less formal meetings, during which there’s always news that everyone talks about. In the exhibitions’ margin, it was announced that Denmark and Sweden have left Scandinavia and are teaming with UK and Ireland to create a Functional Airspace Block, as stipulated by SESAR. Norway and Finland (also in bed together with Latvia and Estonia) are now left with a new FAB (called NEFAB) with a big hole in the middle.

The Conference There were many sessions with basically the same speakers as every year. The main un-

4 DFS distant aerodrome working position Photo: DFS

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4 ATC Global derlying theme is always what are SESAR and NEXTGEN doing and when are we going to see some of the “revolutionary “ magic solutions implemented. Same issues different year it would seem.Some remarks made during the presentations are an indication of where the problems are: below are a few heard during the Conference presentations or the debates: BOEING – Aircraft capabilities are considerably higher than ATC. You have today the 7th generation of aircraft (B787 and A380s) flying into 1st generation ATC areas. KLM – Single Sky is still a dream: we still haven’t seen any progress yet. FAA – once airborne aircraft are nearly completely disconnected from the outside world. They depend on VHF or HF to communicate. KLM – The old ICAO “first come, first served” principle should be replaced by “best equipped, best served” if you want airlines to equip with new technology. SESAR – we got it wrong the first 5 times, but this time it is OK, you will see benefits. British Airways – on data link: For an airline it is a risk. It is unclear which system will work. Today, we also have one system in the USA and a different one in Europe. KLM – We’ve put new equipment on aircraft and in 30 years, it’s never been switched on. It would seem that SESAR and NextGen still have some challenges to overcome and some minds to win over...

4 ATC Global Boeing Stand Photo: DP

UAVs A remarkable session was on the integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs or more recently referred to as UASs – Unmanned Aircraft Systems) into civil controlled airspace. A NATO general involved with the introduction made a bold statement that raised eyebrows: “We are all partners as airspace users. We are all responsible for anti-collision, this is not only an issue for UAVs operators. The responsibility for separation procedures is one of both parties. The Global Hawk UAVs are flying regularly today between the USA and Sigonella AFB in Italy. They are using civil, non-segregated airspace to do so. So the civil side will have to adapt its working methods to accommodate them.“ In other words it is our problem if we do not adapt quickly. The new UAV/UAS motto is: sense, detect, avoid and work together to avoid a collision.

Reversing Roles One of the more interesting sessions involved a role reversal play: managers were asked to play as if they were unions, airlines pretended to be an ANSP etc. IFATCA President Alexis Brathwaite was asked to be an ANSP manager. Mr. Brathwaite made a very clever presentation: he said that the issues between controllers and management are well known. But we each carry on as though it is only the other entity that has to change. A company needs a powerful vision to drive everyone to work together with the understanding that they were all striving for something outside the narrow confines of their own domain. He further said: “We all talk now about COLLABORATION, but are we really committed

We require two key elements: pragmatism and compromise. to it? And what do we mean by collaboration, anyway? IFATCA believes that for collaboration to be successful, we require two key elements: pragmatism and compromise. We need to understand and accept that we may have to give up something in order to get something else”. He continued: “If I had the fortune – or misfortune – to manage an ANSP, I would say: as important as technology or procedures are, what is more crucial is what makes them work; and that is people working together, cooperating and collaborating through a shared understanding of what is important“. If only every management would understand this and abide by these principles , we would make a giant step forward. Many CEOs from service providers were in the room when Alexis spoke, so here’s to hoping they got the message… ^ dp@the-controller.net

4 IFATCA President Brathwaite during conference Photo: DP

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NEW ZEALAND EARTHQUAKES A COMBINED PERSPECTIVE OF THE IMPACT ON ATC Jim Dunn ATC Director, NZALPA and ^ by Kim Smith Operations Support Manager, Airways New Zealand It was the day the earth did not stand still – Saturday September 4, 2010. At 0435 the residents of Christchurch, New Zealand’s second-largest city, were rudely awakened by a massive 7.1 magnitude earthquake – the second largest quake in the country’s history. Forty seconds of violent shaking cut power and communications across the region and caused billions of dollars’ worth of damage to homes, buildings and infrastructure. Aftershocks rocked the city and rattled nerves for months afterwards emanating from a previously unknown fault line some 20km west of the city. But the worst was still to come – on Tuesday Feb 22nd 2011 at 1255 in the afternoon, a magnitude 6.3 earthquake centred beneath the eastern suburbs of the city caused far more damage than the September quake and especially in the central business district. The collapse of two larger buildings killed more than 100 people. Approximately another 80 were killed and many hundreds injured. Christchurch is home to around 350 Airways Corporation staff, including 180 ATCs working in

Flood was considered the most likely catastrophic event.

the Control Tower at Christchurch Airport and at the nearby Christchurch Centre. Contingency Plans have been in place for evacuation of the centre in scenarios including fire, flood and earthquake. An immediately adjacent building contains a “hot standby suite” for traffic recovery after an evacuation of the ops building and a simulator room that can accommodate all radar sectors after traffic recovery is complete. A full contingency centre is available in Auckland for use if both Christchurch buildings are evacuated. However staff would need to be relocated from Christchurch to operate it and this in itself presents significant logistical problems. There will be a period of time between a major event and relocation when the only services available in the NZ FIR would be from two major airports (Auckland and Wellington) and fourteen regional airports. There would inevitably be a period where Traffic Information Broadcast by Aircraft (TIBA) procedures would apply. Flood was considered the most likely catastrophic event and reasonable warning could be expected before the need for evacuation. An earthquake was considered possible on the Main Alpine Fault some 100km west of Christchurch and thus unlikely to have a major impact on the city. All Airways buildings met the local council’s earthquake requirements when built – the oldest of them houses the Radar Centre, which was built in 1990. Given New Zealand’s nickname as ‘the shaky isles’, thanks to the Main Alpine Fault that runs through the middle of about two thirds of the country, most New Zealanders are educated and trained about what to do when an earthquake strikes. Children are taught to “Drop, Cover, Hold” in schools. However the majority of the population has never experienced an earthquake of any significant magnitude. After the September quake, the less than ten staff on duty handled the few aircraft in their

4 New Zealand’s nickname is “the Shaky Isles”

Photo: Geonet

airspace but were persuaded by a significant after shock 20 minutes later to evacuate the building. No aircraft were left uncontrolled but many were held on the ground over the forty-five minutes it took management to arrive on site and technicians to inspect the building prior to re-entry. Christchurch Tower staff evacuated and continued to provide service from an alternative location despite the runway being closed for 8 hours and traffic was delayed for longer due to damage sustained at the Christchurch Passenger Terminal. Over the months that followed literally thousands of aftershocks occurred (7087 to date) but perhaps one in ten would be felt depending on your location. There were at least two occasions before February where evacuation was seriously considered. On Feb 22nd, those in the Centre and in the Tower had no way of knowing the extent of the devastation that had just occurred. The Centre was again evacuated but the engineer contracted to inspect the building took longer than expected to arrive and it was around

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4 Asia/Paciﬁc 90 minutes after the event that staff were cleared back in. The Tower staff chose not to evacuate and there was significantly less runway or Terminal damage than in September. During the 90 minutes of Centre evacuation, 60 odd aircraft operated TIBA procedures and/or contacted one of the Towers.

have been some controllers that have been displaced from their homes or are living in homes that are damaged. They continue to deal with this situation while still providing a very professional ATC service. The end is not yet in sight and no doubt there will continue to be unrest for some time to come.

These events have taken their toll on the controllers in Christchurch. Many still struggle to cope with the incessant aftershocks and the uncertainty of knowing what will come next. Various geological institutions put their spin on events but give little assurance that there is smooth sailing ahead. The dedication of the staff to the profession here is certainly being put to the test but has not been found wanting. Until one has experienced a situation like this it is very difficult to gauge how one would react. It is impossible to prepare entirely for such an event; it is more akin to a bombing than any other natural disaster. It is totally unexpected. Initial reaction is likely to be influenced by gut instinct and trained response.

The Airways buildings suffered minor structural and moderate cosmetic damage. Electricity supply was continuously available despite loss of the mains thanks to a UPS and diesel powered generator. The CH MSSR had broken network router connections and the antenna was out of alignment. The PAPI and ILS alignments at Christchurch airport needed to be checked and as a result full technical services were not restored until approximately six hours after the event. The emergency response was guided by the principles of being swift, sensible and safe. We were lucky in that our buildings remained structurally intact and that we had a workforce willing to get services back up and running, despite many of them having to leave traumatized family members to either remain at or come into work.

This is particularly important in contingency planning because there is no time to react. The Richter scale doesn’t really tell you how much damage will result. Fault line orientation, depth, direction of movement and acceleration all have a say in what will happen. The lateral ground acceleration in the February quake was almost twice that which had been previously measured worldwide. One of the most difficult aspects of both the September and February events was the uncertainty around the whereabouts and safety of staff and families. There were areas of Christchurch that were significantly more damaged than others and as a result there

That doesn’t mean our response was without fault however. Because the quake hit where our main operations are situated, the staff most affected by it were also those responsible for managing the response. Often they were operating in a vacuum of information – people outside Christchurch had more information on the scale of the disaster than those within Christchurch. Communicating with staff, customers and stakeholders was haphazard initially and we struggled with managing the unknown. Overall we coped

4 Aftermath of the September 2010 earthquake Photo: Airways NZ

well given that the September Canterbury earthquake was the second largest natural disaster ever to have occurred in New Zealand’s history. Once the initial operational response had been implemented, we made a conscious decision to focus on the welfare of our staff and their families and in hindsight that was the right thing to do. ^

The Richter scale doesn’t really tell you how much damage will result.

4 The moment the earthquake struck Christchurch in February 2011 Photo: Airways NZ

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CAGLIARI ACCIDENT ITALIAN HIGH COURT CONFIRMS VERDICT Philippe Domogala, ^ by Deputy Editor In the December 2009 edition of The Controller, we reported at length on the aftermath of the now famous Cagliari accident, and the outcome of the first court cases against the 2 controllers. In the mean time, the case went to the High Court, the highest judiciary body in Italy, and the sentence passed in December 2010 is causing turmoil.

The Accident On 24.02.2004, an Austrian Cessna Citation 500 (OE-FAN) collided with the top of Mt Sette Fratelli at 3300ft just north of Cagliari airport while performing a visual APP at night. All 6 occupants died. The pilot was initially cleared for an instrument approach. He however reported having the field in sight and requested a visual approach. The controller replied: “Confirm able to maintain your own separation from obstacles, Sir, performing visual APP runway 32?” The pilot replied “Affirm” (extract from ANSV investigation – see the final report on www.ansv.it)

The 1st Trial The military controllers had followed the technical rules and regulations in place, both international (the ICAO DOC 4444) and national (Italian AIP and national Italian Air Force

This trial was an attempt to criminalize professionals.

ATS Manual). None of these specified any additional conditions for visual approaches at night. Different experts appointed by the court also confirmed this. The behaviour of the controllers that day was in accordance to the technical rules and regulations in force at the time in their unit. On March the 17th, 2008, Cagliari court sentenced the two controllers on duty to 3 years imprisonment (reduced to 2 years due to the choice of abbreviated procedure). They also had to pay 75,000 Euros in civil damages and trial expenses. The verdict created reactions from everyone in aviation circles in Italy. The main argument for the verdict was the authorization, requested by the pilot, for a visual approach at night “without supplying the pilot with all the necessary information on the topography of the land.” According to the Italian controllers Association ANACNA representatives present at the trial, it would appear that from the beginning, this trial was an attempt to criminalize professionals. The controllers appealed.

2nd Trial: Appeals Court On March 18, 2010 – The Court of Appeal of Cagliari, in just 100 minutes of hearing, delivered a verdict confirming the sentence imposed in the first trial (3 years reduced to 2 for having chosen the abbreviated procedure). ANACNA noted that the Public Prosecutor of this Court of Appeal was the same prosecutor of the original trial. They wrote: „The Public Prosecutor reaffirmed point by point his own accusatory thesis he himself already built during the first degree trial.” The controllers again appealed to the High Court, the supreme judicial body in Italy.

3rd Trial: High Court Main subject debated during this 3rd and final trial centred on Directive 41/8880/AM.0: ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS, which according to the prosecution, the 2 controllers should have observed before issuing a visual approach clearance at night. The defence argued that this directive was no longer in force in Italy at the time of the

accident: it was overridden by subsequent national (when DGCA was replaced by ENAC-Civil Aviation General Directorate) and European (JAR-OPS) provisions. But despite this, on 10 December 2010, the Cagliari High Court rejected the appeal against the previous verdict, thereby confirming the previous sentence for not having applied the technical regulations on visual approaches. In Italy, this outcome has raised a lot of questions and anger. As can be expected, it’s already had direct consequences for the aviation community.

The Court Reasoning For the Italian High Court, the Chicago Convention, the ICAO documents and annexes do not override the Italian legal codes. Article 40 of the Italian penal code stipulates: No one shall be punished for a fact foreseen by the law as an offence, if the detrimental or dangerous event is not a consequence of his/ her deed or omission. Refraining from preventing an event, when it is one’s duty to do so, is equivalent to causing it. The Cagliari High Court, following a trend set in earlier trials, attributed a “position of guarantee” to the controllers, which is different (and higher) than their natural position of competence (according to which they provide services). The court reasoned that this “position of guarantee“ would ALWAYS “imply” the competence to prevent harmful events. The controller, having become owner of this position of guarantee is therefore LIABLE for not having avoided the damaging event that he had the juridical obligation to prevent.

Consequences If the Court reasoning in fact implies that controllers should apply of a series of procedures to verify, check, assess, evaluate, judge on how a flight should be conducted in such circumstances, this may, according to ANACNA, require the closure of all the Italian airports located in the proximity of mountainous ground whose departure and arrival procedures are necessarily conducted visually in absence of any prescribed separation from the obstacles.

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4 Europe 4 Aerial view of Cagliari’s Elmas airport

from the east – the direction OE-FAN was coming from. Photo: Luigi Rosa via flickr

M banning

visual

TA 4 Italian NO traffic. hes for IFR approac

Repercussions Upon the publication of the motivations of the Cagliari High Court sentence, ANACNA requested of suspension of any Visual Approach approval on a voluntary basis.

Thanks to ANACNA for help in preparing this article. ^ dp@the-controller.net

The Italian Air Force (IAF) (the second ANS Provider in Italy and employer of the two controllers now definitively condemned by the Cagliari High Court) issued of a series of NOTAMs informing that visual approaches were prohibited for all civil traffic in all the airports/TWRs/APPs managed by them. In addition, the IAF is now exploring the feasibility to extend this prohibition to all IFR procedures ending with a visual circuit.

4 The normal Instrument approach coming from the North East (Rome) is via the CAR VOR, over the sea. The more direct visual APP goes over high terrain, with a minimum safe altitude of 5000 ft.

[the verdict] may require the closure of all the Italian airports located in the proximity of mountainous ground.

The Civil Italian Agency, ENAV, in a move supported by all the national controller trade unions, issued a NOTAM on 16th March 2011 banning visual approaches for IFR traffic in Italy. The Italian Regulator President asked the Italian Government for a specific law able to lay down precisely Air Traffic Controllers duties. Part of his letter read: “[The court] established controllers responsibilities that include supervision and management powers disregarding ICAO Documents and Annexes, [creating] an area of endless responsibility which exposes controllers, in the event of an accident, to unlimited compensation towards the relatives of the victims”.

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GERMANY’S NEW FAVORITE? CUTOVER TO VAFORIT AT KARLSRUHE UAC, GERMANY Wilfried Wörz, ^ by ATCO Karlsruhe UAC December 2010 12th, marked the start of a new era at Karlsruhe UAC (Rhein Radar), Germany’s Centre controlling the majority of the country’s upper airspace. VAFORIT, a fundamentally new ATM system, was successfully put into operation after numerous delays and careful preparation. VAFORIT succeeded the excellent, yet dated KARLDAP system. Given the latters’ undisputed reputation among ATCOs, they were understandably reluctant to switch to something new. KARLDAP was the longest running operational ATC system in Europe, online for nearly 34 years; in that period, traffic went from

Controllers’ opinions about VAFORIT are mixed.

200.000 to almost 1.5 million/year; originally designed by Eurocontrol in the early 70’s, it’s reliability in 2010 was 99,97%. Controllers were very reluctant to give it up... Development of VAFORIT – Very Advanced Flight Data Processing Operational Requirement Implementation – was started in the mid-90s. It suffered twice from a 2-year delay, making it 4 years late altogether. In 2006, a first attempt was made to start training, but flaws in the system were such that this had to be stopped before long. This also put a serious dent in the controllers’ confidence in the system. A task force was set up to help OPS staff regain trust. Training was restarted in February 2010. This consisted of 4 modules of 3 days each. While there was a theoretical part, most of it was simulation to gain a better understanding of VAFORIT’s features, HMI, etc. Before the official switch, live operations during 6 nights were planned: VAFORIT was used as the main system during very low traffic nightshifts at the weekend. The next step consisted of 3 operational weekends (Fri night until Sun night) with considerably lowered capacity. While this was mostly uneventful, in two cases controllers noticed that a target was lost. In one case, for nearly 2 minutes! The problem was found and

Screenshots of the VAFORIT system

Photo: DFS

rectified, but not before controllers highlighted their concerns to management. As many ATCOs as possible were rostered to gain live operational experience, which proved valuable. The cutover night on 11th/12th December was chosen at the beginning of the winter months, with flow measures having a lower impact on the traffic. VAFORIT’s main features include 4D-trajectory calculation; Medium Term Conflict Detection (MTCD) and track deviation warning. The automatic conflict detection takes the planned track into account as well as the current track to predict crossings of 15NM or less. Another tool can detect all possible conflicts for a vertical movement. As all relevant information is available and accessible on the Air Situation Window (ASW), the controllers can stay focussed on this. Clearances require an input to the system, which allows the system to coordinate downstream, making most telephone coordination obsolete. The Monitoring Aid (MONA) checks continu-

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THE VIEW OF A TASK FORCE MEMBER Ole Simon, air trafﬁc controller & ^ By VAFORIT task force member With the new system in development for more than 15 years and controller confidence at an all time low, a task force was established at the beginning of 2008. It consisted of 5 active controllers, one flight data specialist, a Chief Of Section (COS), staff from the OPS office and two already involved developers. The main task for this group was to prepare a consistent operational working concept, based on the new system tools. To achieve that goal, we compared the different controller tasks with the system tools available. This clearly highlighted some missing requirements. DFS management eventually agreed with our proposals to introduce more than 80 changes, which would take an additional 2 years.

ously whether aircraft behave according to their clearance. The ability to pass revisions between centres will be gradually introduced from late 2011. On the flight data side, VAFORIT set off better than expected. To allow for exact trajectory calculation, flight data needs to be „better“ than it previously was. Work processes for inputs are very complex and time-consuming.According to DFS management, VAFORIT will allow for major capacity increases. They expect to maintain or even increase the excellent safety situation at Karlsruhe UAC. In 2011 there will be 3 new software releases plus several software changes. From October/November, datalink is expected to be operational. And a test of the Online Data Interchange (OLDI) for centre/centre communication is planned for late 2011. Controllers’ opinions about VAFORIT are mixed. On the positive side, there’s less telephone coordination; better recognition of anticipated flights; better recognition of conflicts; multi-coloured labels; eyes can remain on screen; Mode S readout with automatic processing to trigger „level bust“ indication; and the OPS room is quieter without the clicking of falling strip holders. At the moment however, the negatives are still more pronounced: the system has personal preference settings for each controller. However these are lost after every software

To ensure the quality of the software and to make engineers understand what was needed, the task force cooperated closely with the software engineers from Spanish company INDRA. Looking back, this was a key factor for the final success. To give you an idea of the work involved: each task force member accumulated around 600 extra hours in these two years to fulfil all the necessary tasks. After training was re-started in 2010, for us it became a balancing act between further software development and coaching the colleagues. But it paid off in the end! The controllers at Karlsruhe finally accepted the system as well as the new working procedures. After 5 months, capacity is almost back to the old numbers (or even higher) without any unplanned system shutdown! Of course

change – currently about once every 1-2 weeks. This means all settings for each position need to be reset. Given all the different settings, it’s a serious distraction, with possible safety consequences. My personal best is 6 minutes before it looked the way I wanted it to. Furthermore, the system will trigger irrelevant coordinations; system workload is considerably higher in sectors with a lot of vertical movements; controllers feel they are currently supporting the system instead of the other way round; there’s a high number of nuisance alerts, which take a lot of time to distinguish from the real ones; HMI is not state-of-art; new STCA has issues compared to the old one; contrast issues with the white background, which makes some colours difficult to differentiate; instructors have no mouse and it’s difficult to check what inputs trainees are making; labels are too big, creating screen garbling and possible oversights in high traffic; as the system takes over a lot of monitoring tasks, controllers may loose situational awareness: when there are no warnings, everything must be safe... Since the introduction, VAFORIT has been running stable with no safety-relevant faults. However, the system still has a lot of flaws which require workarounds. Colleagues found the big-bang solution a hard struggle: they had to get used to an entirely different work philosophy, changing to an environment without strips. Workload to keep the

there are still complaints about inadequate system support in very complex traffic situations or especially the system’s non“state of the art” HMI. Something that is not easy to solve in the given timeframe and with limited hardware (being already 15 years old). But development still goes on and at least we do now have the possibilities to introduce datalink and electronic coordination with our external partners in the near future. ^

Colleagues found the big-bang solution a hard struggle. flight plans up to date is high, as every change needs to be inserted into the system. However, as familiarity and trust in the system and the new work philosophy grows, belief is that VAFORIT will allow higher capacity. Due to some system features not yet working as designed, this is still some way off. That however hasn’t stopped local management from setting flow rates already higher than what they were in KARLDAP! In addition, incident figures have seen a serious increase, which surely will need to be looked at! ^ wilfried.woerz@gdf.de

Impression of the new OPS Room using the VAFORIT system Photo: Indra/DFS

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OPERATIONAL USE OF MODE S DOWNLINKED AIRCRAFT PARAMETERS IN EUROPE’S BUSIEST UPPER AIRSPACE. Kris Vermeiren, ^ by Operational Concepts and Validation, Maastricht UAC Over the past years, radar stations in central Europe have been upgraded to be able to receive mode S data from airborne transponders. When this information became available in Eurocontrols’ Maastricht Upper Area Centre (MUAC), a number of system enhancements were made to increase both safety and efficiency.

Identification Mode S has two parts: Elementary Mode S (ELS) and Enhanced Mode S (EHS). Elementary Mode S is a selective interrogation of the aircraft, resulting in less radar garble and fruit. The transponder returns the mode S flight ID as set onboard an aircraft. At the moment, for selected city pairs, the flight ID is used for correlating a track in the system to the relevant flight plan. As the flights are assigned a common Mode A code 1000, this frees up discrete mode A codes, which are increasingly sparse. But from the controllers’ perspective, it is the information provided by Enhanced Mode S that has had a significant impact on the way they work. EHS provides several Downlinked Airborne Parameters (DAPs). Currently, the following ones are operationally used

in Maastricht UAC: Final State Selected Altitude (FSSA), which is the level the pilot inserts in the Flight Management System; Magnetic Compass Heading; and the airframe’s speed, in both Indicated Airspeed (IAS) and in Mach-number. Other parameters, such as groundspeed, vertical rate, true track angle, track angle rate, roll angle and TCAS RA Downlink are available but for various reasons not currently used operationally in MUAC.

Safety Improvement Maastrichts’ system provides the controllers with an automatic warning in case the airborne FSSA does not match the cleared level (CFL) inserted by the controller. In such a case, the CFL in the label is displayed in yellow, prompting the controller to cross check with the crew. This greatly reduces the risk of level bust and loss of separation caused by misunderstood flight levels on either pilot’s or controller’s side, caused by callsign confusion and/or misidentification.The FSSA should reflect the ATC clearance as inserted by the pilot and being flown by the FMS, but it is not a complete guarantee (e.g. aircraft not being flown on autopilot). For this reason, the FSSA replaces in no way the need for a voice readback. Since the information is also available for unknown/uncorrelated tracks, the controller can verify or confirm the level clearance given by colleagues in neighbouring ACCs/UACs. In addition, unknown traffic with an FSSA inside MUAC’s airspace will be displayed as a potential intruder. In addition, the FSSA parameter is also used in a contextual conflict detection mechanism, called “The Probe”. This shows possible

4 A discrepancy between the airborne

parameter (FSSA) and the level inserted in the ATC system (CFL), is visible as a passive warning (only visible with mouse over flight) in the flight information message window. If this is not resolved after a number of updates, an active warning is triggered in the track label (yellow CFL indication). Photo: Eurocontrol

conflicting traffic as the controller moves the mouse over an intended CFL-value in the input menu. For unknown traffic and traffic were the FSSA goes beyond the CFL, the FSSA value is used for highlighting them as potential conflict. Integration of FSSA to enhance the short-term conflict alerts is under development.

Efficiency With the availability of EHS data, valuable R/T time is saved as there is much less need for controllers to ask flights to report their Mach-number, indicated airspeed or heading. In addition, the HMI uses this information to centre menu values around the downlinked one, making the most likely values to be input quickly accessible by the controller.

Conclusion A little over a year in operational use, mode S parameters have shown a very popular system feature for Maastricht UAC controllers. The number of level busts has roughly halved, despite the fact that not all aircraft are equipped to downlink EHS parameters yet (about 6% of the MUAC flights are not sending their FSSA). In addition, by reducing the frequency load, controllers have more “thinking” time – something that is very welcome in one of Europe’s densest and busiest airspaces. ^

kris.vermeiren@eurocontrol.int

4 By moving the mouse over 30

a track, the available data for that track is instantaneously Photo: Eurocontrol

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4 50TH Anniversary

ONE SKY, ONE VOICE, ONE FUTURE IFATCA MARKS 50TH ANNIVERSARY IN MONTREAL, CANADA ON 20TH OCTOBER 2011 Alexis Brathwaite, ^ by IFATCA President and CEO In October 1961, 39 controllers from 12 European Countries met in Amsterdam, the Netherlands and on 20 October founded the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations. In 2011, IFATCA has members associations in 137 countries that employ more than 50, 000 air traffic controllers. IFATCA recognized and celebrated our fifty years of achievements at our recently concluded 50th Annual Conference in Amman, Jordan. We now look to the future! Each year, air traffic controllers around the world celebrate 20th October as the International Day of the Air Traffic Controller. This year’s celebration will be very special, as it will mark exactly our 50th anniversary; significantly, at the same time that ICAO seeks to lead the aviation community in the challenge of creating the future aviation system. The visionaries who founded IFATCA had a

clear understanding of the challenges that lay ahead. They and those that came immediately after, built a Federation that was able to meet these challenges. We can therefore participate as respected members of the aviation community as part of the solution. On 20th October 2011, as our member associations celebrate in their respective countries, the IFATCA executive board will address on their behalf, the leaders of the aviation community at an event in Montreal, Canada. We chose Montreal because this is where the international aviation community comes together at the International Civil Aviation Organization. Their leadership is paramount to ensuring that we meet the needs of all stakeholders as we seek to achieve the objective a of seamless, global

ATM. At this event, IFATCA will promote our vision for future collaboration and invite our partners to join us in creating a true community in which all members have rights and responsibilities and each of us are fully involved in the process and the consequences. Please visit www.ifatca.org for continuing updates on this event. ^

RETURN TO IFATCA’S CRIB A PERFECT OPPORTUNITY TO CELEBRATE WITH FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES! Photo: Mihai-bogdan Lazar | Dreamstime.com

IFATCA was founded on October 20th 1961, in Amsterdam (the Netherlands). Even though most of us were not part of that historic moment 50 years ago, it would seem like the perfect opportunity to celebrate with friends and colleagues from across the world. We had exactly the same idea…

In addition to the official, more formal events to celebrate this milestone, we thought it would be appropriate to return to the birthplace of our Federation. We took the initiative to organize a party, coinciding with the International Day of the Controller and the birthday of our Federation. On Thursday, October 20th 2011, we therefore invite Air Traffic Controllers from all over the world back to Amsterdam, to celebrate. All details on the programme, travel, hotels etc. can be found on the website – www.50yearsifatca.com – where you can also register until July 22nd. This event is not organized by IFATCA. It is however organized by strong IFATCA believers who have been part of the Federations’ activities. The Executive Board has been in-

4 IFATCA’s founding fathers

50 years ago in front of the Centraal Hotel in Amsterdam

formed about this non-official event. As said, it is organized to give all those who cannot attend the official activities in Montreal the opportunity to celebrate IFATCA’s 50th birthday with friends and colleagues. Don’t hesitate, register and join us for a great party in Amsterdam. We look forward to seeing you there! ^

Matthijs Jongeneel / Akos van der Plaat / Willem Zuidveld Organizers 50 Years IFATCA Anniversary Event Amsterdam

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THE D.B. COOPER STORY Philip Marien, ^ by Editor After the article on hi-jacking two issues ago, reader Al Cowen from Canada remarked that the most famous and by far most mysterious case of all had been overlooked. Not wanting to disappoint our readers, I shall hereby attempt to rectify this. In fact, in writing the previous article, I had come across the case in question. Unfortunately, the story required so much space, that I couldn’t do it justice in between the other hi-jacks. So here goes the story of D.B. Cooper…

He wanted $200,000 cash, a couple of parachutes and a fuel truck. On November 24th 1971 Northwest Orient flight 305, a Boeing 727 took off from Portland, Oregon to Seattle, Washington. On board were 36 passengers and 6 crewmembers. In seat 18E, wearing a black raincoat, a dark suit, white shirt and a black necktie was a middleaged man who had bought a

ticket under the name of Dan Cooper. After drinking a couple of whiskeys – for which he paid cash – he handed one of the stewardesses a note. She simply put it unread into her pocket, believing it was just another passenger slipping her his phone number. A little later, the passenger whispered to her: “Miss, you’d better look at that note. I have a bomb.” Cooper briefly opened his briefcase, long enough for her to see six red cylinders, a large battery, and wires. He then stated he wanted $200,000 cash, a couple of parachutes and a fuel truck ready to refuel on landing in Seattle. Seeing he was serious, the stewardess passed the demands on to the flight deck. Via ATC, State police and the FBI were informed of the situation. Consulted by the FBI, Northwest Orient ordered full compliance with Cooper’s demands. The FBI ran the 10,000 unmarked twenty-dollar bills through a machine that made a microfilm photograph of each of them. Seattle police meantime obtained the parachutes from a local skydiving school. After about 2 hours, Cooper was informed that his demands had been met. After landing at Seattle-Tacoma Airport, the jet taxied to a remote section of the tarmac. A Northwest Orient employee drove to the plane and delivered the cash-filled knapsack and parachutes to one of the flight attendants via the back stairs. After the aircraft was refuelled, Cooper released all passengers and all but one flight attendant.

4 The Northwest Boeing 727 on the ramp at Seattle on November 24th 1971.

Cooper had briefed the crew on what was to happen next: a southerly course toward Mexico City, at the minimum air speed – about 100 knots with gear down and flaps at 15 degrees. To ensure the aircraft wouldn’t fly above 10,000 feet, he ordered the cabin to remain unpressurised. The crew argued that with this configuration, the aircraft wouldn’t make it to Mexico. Cooper agreed to stop for fuel in Reno, Nevada. After about 2 hours on the ground, the 727 took off again, discretely tailed by two F-106 fighters. Cooper told the 4 crew members to remain in the cockpit. At approximately 8:00 pm, a warning light showed the aft stairs were being lowered. Approximately 13 minutes later, the aircraft’s tail section sustained a sudden upward movement, which was significant enough to require trimming to bring the plane back to level flight. At 10:15 pm, the 727 landed at Reno airport with the aft stairs still deployed. Law enforcement officers boarded the jet and a search quickly confirmed that the lone hijacker was gone… Authorities went all-out, trying to try and identify the hijacker of flight 305. Fingerprints, Cooper’s black clip-on tie and tie clip were recovered from the aircraft. Based on eyewitness accounts, a series of composite sketches were released. Police questioned several people, including an Oregon man named D.B. Cooper. He had a minor police record, but he was quickly

4 Part of the ransom money was found far from where Cooper is believed to have jumped/landed.

Photo: FBI

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4 Feature ruled out as a suspect; despite this, an inexperienced reporter, rushing to meet an imminent deadline, used the eliminated suspect’s initials to refer to the hijacker. Instead of “Dan Cooper”, he became forever known as “D.B. Cooper”. Back north, police tried to identify a search area around Cooper’s projected landing point. This proved extremely difficult given a number of unknown parameters: exact time he jumped, windspeed, time to opening his chute, … Using the same aircraft and crew, FBI agents tried to simulate the jump by pushing a 200-pound sled out of the open airstairs. This created the same upward movement of the aircraft’s tail section, leading to the conclusion that 8:13 was the most likely jump time. At that time, the aircraft was flying through a heavy rainstorm just south of Lake Merwin, Washington. Despite large-scale search efforts in the area, no trace of Cooper was found. The wilderness and winter weather made searching very hard. In spring 1972, a large team conducted another thorough ground search for over a month. They didn’t find anything that could be connected to the hijacking. It wasn’t until 1978 that a hunter found a placard from the hijacked airliner: it contained instructions for lowering the aft stairs. It was found to the north of the search area, but within the flight path. Then in February 1980, an eight-year-old boy playing on the shores of Columbia river uncovered three packets of cash. FBI analysis confirmed that the money was indeed a portion of the ransom. The two packets of 100 bills and a third packet of 90 were still arranged in the same order as when they were given to Cooper. The discovery confused investigators, as the money was found well outside the probable landing area. Quite

4 View of the rear cabin of a

B727, with the stairs lowered. Inset is an FBI composite sketch of Dan Cooper.

4 One of the bills found in 1980.

Photo: FBI

how and why the money ended up where it was found remains as unknown as the real identity of Dan Cooper. In trying to profile the hijacker, the FBI has several clues: Cooper seemed quite familiar with the 727-100 aircraft: not only that its aft airstair could be lowered in flight, but that it could be refuelled through a single fuel port. He knew that it could fly relatively and knew the unique flap setting of 15 degrees (which was unique to that aircraft), and the typical refuelling time. At the same time, it seems he lacked crucial skydiving skills and experience. No experienced parachutist would have jumped in the pitch-black night. He also failed to bring or request a helmet, and he chose to jump with the older and technically inferior of the two primary parachutes supplied to him. One theory is that Cooper could have been an aircraft cargo loader. Such an assignment would have given him knowledge and experience in the aviation industry; and because Air Force loaders throw cargo out of flying aircraft, they wear emergency parachutes in case they accidentally fall out, thus providing Cooper with a working knowledge of parachutes — but not necessarily sufficient knowledge to survive the jump he made. It’s highly probable that Cooper did not survive his jump. Even if he did land safely, survival in the mountainous terrain in arduous weather conditions would have been all but impossible without an accomplice at a predetermined landing point. This would have required a precisely-timed jump and therefore cooperation from the crew. There is no evidence that Cooper had any such help, or any clear idea where he was when he jumped into the overcast darkness. In 2007, a partial DNA sample was retrieved from the tie that Cooper left behind on the aircraft. While it has allowed the FBI to eliminate some suspects (and people who claimed to be Cooper), it hasn’t lead to any breakthrough in the investigation. The hijacking inspired quite a few others: some 15 hijackings similar to Cooper’s were attempted over the course of 1972. Only Cooper, however,

He lacked crucial skydiving skills and experience.

4 The “Cooper vane”: when

airborne, airflow pushes the paddle underneath the stairway, preventing it from being lowered. Photo: Wikipedia

has eluded capture or identification. In the wake of these “copycat” hijackings, the FAA required that all Boeing 727 aircraft be fitted with a device, later dubbed the “Cooper vane”. It’s a simple spring-loaded paddle, which prevents lowering of the aft airstairs during flight. Despite the obviously criminal act that he committed, D.B. Cooper is regarded as somewhat of a legendary figure. After nearly 40 years, some still haven’t given up hope of finding out who he was and what drove him – and that includes the FBI: If you have any information, you can mail their Seattle field office at Seattle. FBI@ic.fbi.gov. Ask for Special Agent Larry Carr, who took over the D.B. Cooper case two years ago… ^ ed@the-controller.net

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Charlie

SUMMER CHARLIE ^ by Charlie Power Nap Tools

Everyone can Fly…not!

According to kawamura-ganjavian, an architecture and design studio, their ‘ostrich’ concept offers “a micro environment in which to take a warm and comfortable power nap at ease. It is neither a pillow nor a cushion, nor a bed, nor a garment, but a bit of each at the same time. Its soothing cave-like interior shelters and isolates our head and hands (mind, senses and body) for a few minutes, without needing to leave our desk console.” It looks like it would even work wearing a headset! And you can tell your supervisor that it’s a type of hat… More information on http:// www.studio-kg.com/ostrich

Choosing a logo or a catchphrase can be a tricky business, as a new low cost Malaysian airline Air Asia found out. They thought “Now everyone can fly” sounded quite catchy and painted it on all their aircraft. When last January one of its Airbus 320 skidded off the runway and ended up in the mud during a bad landing in rain, the catch phrase took on a whole new meaning. Perhaps they should add: “… but not everyone can land!”

Photos: kawamuraganjavian

Gathering eyewitness accounts after this particular event, a local newspaper came across an interesting story when they interviewed passengers after the evacuation. A local politician was on board the aircraft with his wife. He told the journalist: “As we were seated in front, my wife and I were among the first to get off the plane. The first thing I did, was to grab my iPad. In fact, I pushed ahead of my wife, as I had to save the iPad.” The (ex-?)wife was not available for comments.

gage. Clearly visible on their scanners, security officials took one look at the rifle held by the figurine and ruled it was a firearm. ”As the figurine was pulled from the box, the security search officer contacted her supervisor. The rifle ‘could not pass’. My wife Julie asked the staff whether they were serious. It’s a 20 cm hand-painted model soldier with a rifle that is part of the figure”. Regulations are regulations and a firearm is a firearm. The 7 cm rifle had to be pried from the little soldiers’ hand, was put in an envelope and mailed to Canada.

4 If they has confiscated it for being ugly, no one would find this a silly story… Photo: Internet

Plastic Spoon and Metal Knife Or if you’re the more claustrobific kind, yet hate having that microphone/keyboard imprint on your forehead, SkyMall offers the SkyRest Travel Pillow™. From their website: “The miraculous, wedge-shaped travel pillow makes even the most uncomfortable spots downright pleasant.” If they made a transparent version, you could even see the radar screen… Photo: skymall.com

One of the major airlines, which shall remain nameless, is apparently more afraid of people using spoons to highjack their planes than knifes. On a recent flight, passengers were given metal knives while the spoons were in plastic. Different culture I guess, „Open the door or I spoon you !“ might work there. ^

4 Everyone can fly an Air Asia A320…NOT Photo: Internet

Security News UK newspaper The Sun reported a Canadian couple flying back home after visiting the UK, were caught trying to smuggle a rifle on board their flight. Alert officials spotted this security risk and confiscated it before serious harm was done. The firearm was part of a 9 inches tall statue of a British soldier. To make sure it got home in one piece, the unsuspecting Canadians had put the item in their hand lug-

Photo: dimi

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IFATCA

50th Anniversary edition

To mark and celebrate IFATCA’s 50th birthday, a special anniversary edition of The Controller will be published and distributed to an exclusive readership including all IFATCA members plus key professionals associated with the ATM industry. This special edition will be published and distributed in October 2011.

Photo courtesy of EUROCONTROL

Promotional Opportunities Promote your company, products and services by advertising in the IFATCA 50th Anniversary edition and benefit from: • Connection to more than 50,000 air trafﬁc controllers worldwide • Distribution to key ATM events in 2011 & 2012 • Special circulation to key inﬂuences across the industry • Penetration into developing country markets

The current global expenditure of ATC equipment is estimated at $5 billion a year.

TO FIND OUT MORE, CALL +44 (0)1293 854407 IFATCA 50th Anniversary edition, c/o McCullough Moore Ltd, Faygate Lane, Faygate, West Sussex RH12 4SJ, United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0)1293 854407 Fax: +44 (0)1293 852375 Email: colin.martin@mcculloughmoore.co.uk