THE
CONTROLLER October 2013
Journal of Air Traffic Control
4 A New Approach to Safety
4 ALPA/NATCA NextGen User Symposium
INTER-
4 New Slovenian ACC
TION OF AIR TRAFF ERA IC C FED
LLERS’ ASSNS. TRO ON
4 Communications Failure
NATIO NAL
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Contents
THE
CONTROLLER
October 2013 Volume 52 Issue 3 – ISSN 0010-8073
THE
CONTROLLER Journal of Air Traffic Control
INTER-
TION OF AIR TRAFF ERA IC C FED
LLERS’ ASSNS. TRO ON
NATIO NAL
October 2013
In this issue:
Cover photo: Klemen Korenjak
EXECUTIVE BOARD OF IFATCA
Editorial & Foreword ...………………………………………………… 4
Alexis Brathwaite President and Chief Executive Officer
A New Approach to Safety ...…………………………………………... 6 Just Culture and the Media ...……………………………………………... 10 Communication Failure ...…………………………………………………….. 12
Patrik Peters Deputy President
Europe:
Duncan Auld Executive Vice-President Technical
Scott Shallies Executive Vice-President Professional
Darrell Meachum Executive Vice-President Finance
Americas:
Flight Plan Adherence ...………………………………………….. 14 New Slovenian Centre ...…………………………………………. 15 Still Controlling at 80! ...………………………………………….. 18 ALPA/NATCA NextGen Users Symposium ...………………….. 20
Industry:
Le Bourget 2013 ...………………………………………………… 22
Flying:
VFR in Kenya ...…………………………………………………….. 24
Opinion:
Do We Rely Too Much on Automation? ...…………………….. 26
Feature:
Supersonic Passenger Aircraft: Concorde ...………………….. 27
Charlie ...…………………………………………………………………………………. 30
Keziah Ogutu Executive Vice-President Africa and Middle East Vacant Executive Vice-President Americas Mike O’Neill Executive Vice-President Asia and Pacific Željko Oreški Executive Vice-President Europe
Philippe Domogala Conference Executive
Tatiana Iavorskaia Office Manager and Secretary
The editorial team has endeavored to include all owner information, or at least source information for the images used in this issue. If you believe that an image was used without permission, please contact the editor via http://www.the-controller.net
PUBLISHER IFATCA, International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers‘ Associations 1255 University Street · Suite 408 Montreal, Quebec · H3B 3B6 · CANADA Phone: +1514 866 7040 Fax: +1514 866 7612 · Email: office@ifatca.org
REGIONAL EDITORS Phil Parker, Asia Pacific Serge Tchanda, Africa & Middle East COPY EDITORS Paul Robinson, Jez Pigden, Brent Cash, David Guerin Alasdair Shaw & Helena Sjöström
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Philip Marien Van Dijcklaan 31 B-3500 Hasselt, Belgium email: bm@the-controller.net
LAYOUT & PRINTING LITHO ART GmbH & Co. Druckvorlagen KG Friesenheimer Straße 6a D 68169 Mannheim GERMANY
Deputy EDITOR Philippe Domogala email: dp@the-controller.net
Tel: +49 (0)621 3 22 59 10 Fax: +49 (0)621 3 22 59 14 email: info@lithoart-ma.de
CORPORATE AFFAIRS Vacant
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this magazine are those of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations (IFATCA) only when so indicated. Other views will be those of individual members or contributors concerned and will not necessarily be those of IFATCA, except where indicated. Whilst every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in this publication is correct, IFATCA makes no warranty, express or implied, as to the nature or accuracy of the information. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or used in any form or by any means, without the specific prior written permission of IFATCA, except where indicated (e.g. a creative commons licence).
VISIT THE IFATCA WEB SITES:
www.ifatca.org and www.the-controller.net
THE
CONTROLLER
3
Foreword/Editorial
Regional Challenges, Systemic Safety and The Day of The Controller Philippe Domogala, IFATCA Conference Executive & Deputy Editor ^ by Patrik Peters, IFTACA Deputy President and Philip Marien, IFATCA Editor
4 Patrik and Philippe 10 years ago after
the Buenos Aires conference, before the talk about ‘Safety’ added the grey hair they have now.
As you’re reading this, controllers from all across the globe are getting ready to celebrate the Day of The Controller. Not the magazine, but rather the profession of Air Traffic Controller – surely one of the more obscure jobs in the world, at least to the general public. As the profession is generally ignored by the media, Joe and Jane Average are generally ignorant about our profession. That is, until something negative happens: when controllers stand up for their profession and working conditions, or when something goes wrong, everyone suddenly has an opinion and it’s usually not favourable towards the controller...
4 Tunis by night. Photo: tom.z
4
This is also the time of the year that IFATCA holds its Regional Meetings: these are arguably at least as important as the Annual Conference. While aviation is a global industry, the regional differences and problems can be beyond a global approach. During the Regional Meetings, Member Associations have a hands-on opportunity to discuss issues that affect them the most – from operational issues between two neighbouring ACCs to the challenges ahead at a regional level. Undoubtedly, the European meeting will bring up the Europe-wide industrial action that's planned for October 10th. Aimed at protesting against the European Commission’s plans for reforming air traffic management in the region, these plans are forecast to cost around 10,000 jobs. At the same time, the predicted benefits in safety and efficiency are highly questionable, especially given our industry’s pathetic forecast record… In Asia, the traffic explosion in the region presents its own unique challenges. Judging by several recent monster orders to the major aircraft manufacturers, the trend is set to continue and one of the questions that needs an answer is whether and how ATC in the region will be able to cope.
The Americas are divided into a part that is trying to cope with moving from a predominantly military system, to one that concentrates on providing a service to civil aviation. Brazil in particular, will face a gruelling test in the coming years with several high profile sporting events putting their country and its ability to cope with high traffic level in the direct spotlight. And the northern part of the region has its own challenges to make NextGen work under increasing budgetary constraints. In Africa and the Middle East, growth is clearly restricted by the lack of investment in people and infrastructure. Oddly enough, some countries appear to be happy to invest in equipment, only to ignore that well trained and motivated people are needed to make it work. In other cases, the focus is on income rather than on security and controllers are reduced to administrators who have to make sure that airlines can be billed for a service they didn’t get. Lastly, conflicts remain a major concern in the area, with the war in Syria putting heavy strain on the countries around them. But as indicated, the general public doesn’t realise this. Which is why a Day of
Foreword/Editorial Sarajevo by night. Photo: © Mesut Dogan | Dreamstime.com
The Controller is a worthwhile initiative. And why IFATCA, its Regional Meetings and Annual Conferences remain relevant: it allows us to positively focus on our profession, the many things we do right and fantastic service each and everyone of us provides. Coming back to the traffic demand exploding in several regions of the world (for example in the Asia Pacific Region & Africa), we urgently need to look at all ways to improve safety levels in order to maintain a safe and orderly flow of traffic in the years to come. We cannot afford to wait for incidents and accidents to occur to improve safety. At our last Annual Conference in Bali, we enjoyed a rather long and heated discussion about Systemic Safety. Tom Laursen (Danish Air Traffic Controllers’ Association) presented the subject, based on a conference working paper written together with Dr. Anthony Smoker (UK Guild). It is a new concept, which requires more explanation and debate before it can be adopted as IFATCA policy. The Executive Board therefore decided to use Systemic Safety as our regional seminar theme this year. The IFATCA Seminar will be presented at our four regions, moderated by Philippe Domogala (Conference Executive) and Patrik Peters (Deputy President). What is Systemic Safety? Turn to page 6 for an in-depth view, but essentially this
new approach goes beyond finding a root cause, especially beyond what is often referred to as “human error”. For the past decades, safety cultures, including those in ATC, have been trying to move towards a “just culture“, where people are encouraged to report rather than punished. The approach assumes that incidents and accidents are caused by something “going wrong” or by failures. To find the underlying cause, it encourages people to report things going wrong. The new approach, called Systemic Safety does not solely focus on mishaps, incidents and accidents alone, but on everything (e.g. production pressure, social factors, etc.) including what “goes well” in the system. The focus of Systemic Safety is on studying how things usually go right, as a basis for understanding how they can go wrong and how we can improve the overall system performance. Systemic Safety is a very complex subject and the intention of the IFATCA seminar is to try to explain in simple terms the philosophy behind it and the gains such an approach might provide. It might be a big jump from the present and there are certainly many hurdles in todays ATC environments standing in the way of this approach, but we wish to open the debate. We want you to examine the concept and the ideas behind this approach to improving safety.
4 Cancun at night. Photo: pictophile
Over the next few months and conferences, this new approach will be explored further, with the intention of developing it into an approach to safety that can benefit all players: from controllers to service providers and ultimately the whole industry. It’s another opportunity where we are convinced IFATCA can and will make a difference! On behalf of the Executive Board, we wish all colleagues an excellent and safe Day of The Controller. ^
dp@ifatca.org dp@the-controller.org ed@the-controller.org P.s.: Don’t forget to send us your stories and photos of how you celebrated The Day of The Controller. We’ll publish a compilation in the next issue of our magazine.
4 Theran by night. Photo: Hamed Saber via wikipedia
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4 Safety
Resilience and a new Safety Approach Do we have the right model to learn from past and future events? Tom Laursen and Dr. Anthony Smoker, ^ by IFATCA Global Safety Team
4 Investigators had no trouble identifying the root cause‌
Striving to realise the immense potential of technology, the integration of the human and technical system or the humanmachine system (in other words how work is carried out) has evolved since the step change in technological capability that resulted from the second world war. Systems that are being de-
signed today are exponentially more complex compared to those of the past. Complexity is used here in the sense that total system behaviour becomes less predictable, because it is not possible to conceive definitive system interactions or behaviours from the myriad combinations of the numerous sub-systems or components. This puts a heavy strain on traditional safety engineering for a number of reasons. Firstly, technology changes faster
than our knowledge of system behaviour can be kept up to date. Because of this, the role of the human in highly integrated human-machine systems becomes confounded. Lessons from the past are often irrelevant for foreseeing the future in these circumstances, as the past restricts the necessary imagination required to predict a future outcome. And at the same time, our organisations no longer have the organisational memory of why systems have evolved in the way that they have. Validating highly integrated human-machine systems therefore needs a new and more rigorous approach. Unfortunately, increasing pressure to implement new systems reduces the time to test and validate new systems – thereby reducing the opportunity to learn about new system behaviours. Too often, this learning is done at the front line rather than at the design phase. Increased complexity and emergent interaction paths have resulted in different types of accidents and hazards, all while making it harder to anticipate these. Front line operators are increasingly confronted with difficulties in selecting priorities and making tradeoffs. Lastly, regulatory and public perception of safety has evolved dramatically as well. The result is that a front line operator is often stuck between a rock and a hard place: in one instance, s/he is considered an unreliable factor in an otherwise perfectly working system. But given society's need to keep a human responsible and accountable, it is also expected that s/he can solve problems and situations, which are outside the system’ design envelope. In other words, the human in a complex system can be both the hero and the anti-hero.
4 The outcome determines whether an investigation is launched.
Photo: adapted from Eric Hollnagel (2013)
6
The Linear Approach The traditional safety approach is founded on the notion that safety is defined by its oppo-
4 Safety
4 Success or failure is determined by the outcome…
If people had perished in the Hudson accident, would the public opinion have hailed Capt. Sullenberger as a hero? Photo: www
site: by what happens when safety is missing. A system should learn what failed and then fix the problem to avoid re-occurrence. This means that safety is measured indirectly, not by its presence or as a property in and of itself, but by its absence. Prof. Hollnagel described safety as the consequence of its absence. Focusing on what goes wrong, safety can be improved by determining the causal factors(s) that led to the event: incidents, accidents, errors, failures and other inadequacies. Removing or mitigating these causal factors will therefore prevent these events. This reduces often-complex system behaviour to a simple cause-and-effect relationship. Such a linear approach - using a simplistic cause and effect relationship – is applied irrespective of the complexity of the system itself. It is the basis of well-known, traditional models proposed by safety science, including the “Barrier Model” (Heinrich); the ‘Iceberg’ Model’ (Heinrich); and the ‘Swiss Cheese’ model (Reason). Such models all presume that safe and unsafe system behaviour come from different modes of the one system. Similarly, methods that try to determine hazards (e.g. fault tree, bow tie, SAM, Human Reliability Analysis and Tripod, just to mention a few) were developed from the assumption that systems fail because a number of small problems line up to trip up the whole system, and are then abstracted to simple linear relationships. Such an analysis then yields to the quantification of risk and assumes trivial mitigations can be found. Frequently, these propose the human component as the mitigation strategy to manage the identified risks without any true regard for how the technical system interferes with the human’s ability to fulfil this, or indeed if they are compatible with human capability at all.
entity that can be modelled, measured and quantified with mechanistic and deterministic methods and therefore with precision. This leads to huge and unwieldy ‘fault trees’ and diagrams where we can qualify and quantify the behaviour of the human, machines and the interaction between them – but reduces the safety space to, at best, an unwieldy, overly simplistic, approximation of the real world. However, the human element is the least predictable compared to that of the engineered technical system. Therefore if systems fail, it must be because of the unpredictable and unreliable human element. Another consequence of the cause and effect thinking is that we tend to separate incidents and accidents from the processes that create positive results and system behaviours. By taking this approach, we re-create a situation where there is a difference between the processes that create a negative result compared to the processes that would have created a positive result. This severely skews the ability to see the whole picture and we therefore tend to focus on single events to solve problems.
Beyond Linear Over the last two decades, the linear model has come under increasing pressure, primarily because it has not only been unable to account for more and more complex accidents, but also because of the number of repeat events that have occurred and continue to occur despite having learnt the lessons. As a system’s complexity increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to predict its behaviour. This is largely due to the number of interactions between the different elements, but also due to the limited overview single individuals have over the whole system. To cope with the more complex system behaviours, i.e. accidents and incidents we face, the systemic model has emerged as an alternative. Instead of decomposing system
Photo: adapted from Eric Hollnagel (2013)
In these linear descriptions of safety, humans and their behaviour are constructed as an
7
4 Safety behaviour into events over time, the systemic approach focuses on systems as a whole – holistically as socio-technical systems. This approach assumes that system properties can only be treated adequately in their entirety, taking into account all facets relating the social to the technical aspects and their emergent properties. There is no or little separation of humans, technology, organisations and society. Systemic models assume that failure and success originate from the same sources and that a system is in fact much more than the sum of its components. This means that it is not possible to observe incidents and accidents in isolation, if we want to improve the systems we try to control. One example of this is when software engineers have to improve a device; they are no longer able to say what exactly is going to happen, when they implement an updated version. The complexity is simply too high. The systemic model assumes that systems work because people learn to identify how technology works, by recognising the actual demands and adjust their performance accordingly, and because they interpret and apply procedures to match current conditions. If this assumption is correct, it asks for a more holistic view on safety and the systemic approach requires us to understand the system as a whole instead of by its parts. As our world rarely challenges the principle that more technology is the key to more safe production, systems will only continue to grow in complexity and it will become harder and harder to link an undesirable outcome to a linear path within these systems. As an example consider a human on a bicycle and compare safety of this every day activity through the lenses of a linear approach to cycling safety and a systemic approach.
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4 Language in accident reports often supports the notion of linearity. Photo: © Alexskopje | depositphotos
The Linear Model The different components that make up a bicycle can easily be described using a linear model: it can accurately describe the effects of a problem with tyres, a chain or other parts on the functioning of the bicycle. By abstracting the human as a part of the mechanical system, we can probably also expand the model to explain what happens if someone actually cycles. But linking all of this together to share a bicycle on a road with cars, other bicycles, and pedestrians. Taking additional elements such as road works, time pressure, weather etc. into account and the event becomes a lot more complex to explain using the linear model. If something unexpected happens, an analysis of the linear model will consider the different elements in isolation. Once a failure is identified, this is considered the ‘root cause’ and the investigation can be closed. It is quite likely that the “explanation” will specify what would normally have happened: the cyclist should have done A rather than B and the event would not have occurred.
The Systemic Approach The systemic approach differs in many ways, but most notably it considers the context of the activity being undertaken. When the point or decision is reached in the analysis where human behaviour is considered, the systemic approach does not end, but it is used as a starting point to understand what happened and why decisions made sense to those making them. It strives to understand the local rationality of the human in the system and how the system influences such decisions. The systemic approach may involve exploring the historical trajectory of how decisions were made and the limitations or practicality of the work undertaken. Thus in the cycling analogy, when a cyclist reports that he did not see the other vehicle, this leads to the question why not? Perhaps it was
obscured due to the layout of the road, the car was driving too fast or the cyclist was in a hurry, which limited his awareness and altered risk acceptance? A single failure no longer explains the failure of the whole system. If this doesn’t work for what can be considered a relatively simple system, one must conclude that the linear approach must have profound limitations for more complex systems. The conclusion, on the basis of the above, is that there is a need for more powerful models to help and account for events in the ATM system.
Cultural Aspects In addition, the linear model has a number of cultural aspects. Taking into account that culture is a difficult term with little meaning other than to a cultural anthropologist, the argument is considered in three dimensions: responsibility, language and ‘Just culture’. Because of the explicit direct linkage between causality and effects, there is also an implicit direct linkage with responsibility of the human operator and system outcomes. This makes the linear model very attractive when one wants to make safety interventions and remove causes. Significantly, it also makes it very attractive for society because outsiders can see that causes are being removed, making the system safe again. Quite often, it even facilitates judicial systems by delivering the human operator as errant system component. People are turned into deterrents for others not to make the same mistakes. However, if there even are positive effects of allocating responsibility, these are usually overshadowed by individuals avoiding taking responsibility. Early on it was mainly operators who were the focus of attention after accidents and incidents, but today there is a tendency to focus on managers as well. The pressure produced by the linearity of responsibility results in a huge amount of ‘save your own back’ and ‘tick in the box’ procedures and regulations, which hampers the systems ability to respond to problems that occur.
4 Safety Additionally, when the focus is on causes and inadequacies, it often results in a language that is restricted to that of personnel shortcomings – the human as errant system component. Too many accident and incident reports include internalised language, speculating motives, attitudes and behaviour. Aviation language is very rich in helping the responsibility argument by expressing error in all kinds of disguises (situational awareness, poor airmanship, etc.). Even when it is not the intention, the emphasis and blame that everyday language puts on personal responsibility and individual shortcomings is huge. Often it is not at all proportionate to what real-life work is about, namely that it takes teamwork (humans, organizations, technology and society) to succeed as well as the fact that it takes teamwork to fail. In contrast to this, the systemic model underpins resilience. It introduces a language of understanding, defines processes and how these can be strengthening. Systemic models consider failure and success as two sides of the same coin. Failure is the inevitable by-product of striving for success with limited resources. This area hasn’t been explored in depth as yet, but at least it is open to speculation, that upon introducing it, a more positive way of looking what has been achieved and where to look for improvement of systems will be the result. ‘Just Culture’ has been defined as: a culture in which front line operators or others are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training, but where gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated. It’s hard to argue against this definition. But when used in the context of investigations, there is a tendency to rationalise based on the seductive benefits and utility of the linear model: the focus on individual responsibility and human error logically opens the discussion on whether actions were gross
negligence or not. This discussion opens a bias and skewed focus on individuals and their responsibilities and makes it difficult to learn from experience. Gitte Haslebo, a Danish psychologist puts it this way: the desire humans have to learn from personal mistakes is cumbersome in an environment where thinking, discussions in meetings, reward systems, etc. are based on the linear explanation model. Haslebo continues to explain the close connection between the innocent question: ‘what caused the incident’ to ‘who was responsible’. In the quest for learning from mistakes we tend to hamper the learning process with the language we use and the model behind our words. This way our fundamental understanding of how we learn and make progress becomes a hindrance to learning and creates distance between members of the organisation. Another issue that makes it difficult to report and learn from mistakes is the concept of human error. Society as a whole still prefers to talk about the concept of human error and to play a blame game. Human error is part of society's daily language and can be found in the news, amongst ATCOs, amongst managers, in accident reports, in public statements, etc. Most intriguingly: if ‘human error’ is the cause of events that goes wrong, what is the cause of all other events that go right? The same humans that err are also the ones that are present when things go right. The only possible answer therefore is: humans. However, they behave in the same manner regardless of whether the outcomes of their actions turn out to be positive or negative, simply because they cannot know the outcome at the time that actions are taken. It follows that ‘human error’ should not be used to explain adverse outcomes since it invokes an ad hoc 'mechanism'. Instead, a more productive view is to try to understand how performance varies, and determine why the behaviour that usually makes things go right occasionally makes things go wrong.
Conclusion The linear approach to safety has helped to achieve remarkable results. Aviation is one of the safest ways of travel today and linear safety models have played a prominent part in achieving this. However, there are signs that there is no further ability to improve the safety levels achieved today using such methods and philosophies and new approaches are required to make progress. ATCOs, managers and society must find the way to be able to think in terms of systemic relationships in ATM. This is also the best outcome for 'just culture'. Today the industry and regulation are, although not deliberately, hindering a systemic approach of incidents, accidents and safety assessments. Methods and tools are still developed and promoted that are linear based and thereby tend to focus on individual human performance and responsibility – humans as bad apples. The balance between the more systemic findings and focus compared to the focus on human causes needs to change. IFATCA, in close cooperation with other ‘sharp-end’ users, have to be frontrunners in that process. This approach should help companies and organisations to correctly allocate resources that can increase their understanding of safety and thereby positively enhance their safety performance. ^
4 Linear description of relatively simple processes such as riding a bicycle do not take all elements into account. Photo: © Madrabothair | Dreamstime.com
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4 Safety
Just Culture and the Media Tony Licu, ^ by Head of Safety Unit, EUROCONTROL, Directorate of Network Management stand the part that incident reporting plays in ATM Safety, and therefore the need for a Just Culture to encourage reporting.
Interfacing with the Media
4 Tony Licu. Photo: EUROCONTROL With the sunset of ICAO Safety Information Task Force, discussions on European new regulation on Safety reporting, ICAO Assembly 2013 to be held in early October 2013 and of course with EUROCONTROL and IFATCA Prosecutor expert initiative in full swing there is a lot of debate on Just Culture, especially at its leading edge between aviation and judiciary domains. However, we all agree that Just Culture is not limited to the interface with judiciary. There are organisational, managerial and media issues on just culture. This article will try to recap some of the issues and practices to deal with media within the boundaries of Just Culture. If the media are to be successfully persuaded of the need for a Just Culture in ATM, they have to understand at least the fundamental principles of ATM operation, of what an ANSP’s tasks, purposes and responsibilities are, how its people work, and what kind of tools they have to help them. They also need to know what its limitations are – especially human limitations. If they understand this, they will be able to under-
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Understanding the lack of knowledge among most journalists about how ATM works, is an essential starting point for any organisation that wishes to influence media reporting on the subject of Just Culture. What the media reports, influences the perception of the general public. The media can be seen as the gateway to the public – educating them will improve the knowledge and expectancy of the public at large. In a country where a Just Culture does not exist – in any industry, not only ATM – the organisation should ideally declare its intention to operate a just internal culture, and make public its policy for administering a Just Culture within its own organisation. An ANSP must, however, be confident that it will be permitted by the Government, the Judiciary, the NAA and the AAIB to protect the confidentiality of individuals who report incidents; otherwise the company’s Just Culture programme might be discredited.
Operating a Just Culture should be used as a management technique – one that is associated with modern companies that use the very latest business philosophies to produce optimum results in everything they do, includ-
4 Safety ment in any organisation, yet is one that, very often, is not recognised or budgeted for. The best results would be obtained by employing a mixture of professional journalists and PR experts, because their training fits them for the media interface task. Unless they have specialised in reporting on aviation before, they will need to learn quickly how the ATM system works, and they must be authorised to approach specialists inside organisations for advice on technical or operational issues.
ing the management of safety. Just Culture, as a cutting-edge management technique, enhances an organisation’s image. Organisations must be prepared to take the time to explain to the press what the essential components of a Just Culture are (see “What is Just Culture?” – chapter 2 - Edition 2009*), and what benefits it brings. This is necessary because, in most states where the Government and Judiciary operate a traditionally punitive system on the basis that deterrence through the criminal justice system is the most effective way of preventing accident recurrence, the journalists usually display the same philosophy in the way they investigate a story and report it. It is essential that an understanding of the logic behind the operation of a Just Culture has been embedded in the media before an accident or incident occurs because, after the event, the media competition to get the story out first means there is no time for journalists to fully understand such concepts when they are in search of a good story.
Fostering relations with the media – Dealing with the press in general
If the issue is sufficiently serious, for example after an ATM-related accident, the CEO or the head of Corporate Communications should make themselves available for interview to high profile media. This is an established practice among airlines involved in an accident, and the signal it sends to the public is that the organisa-
tion cares about the event and its consequences, and does not try to avoid responsibility for its actions. Because of the importance of this function, all senior managers who might be called upon to be interviewed live by the media must undergo training in how to handle journalistic questioning.
(*) You can request a copy of the publication “What is Just Culture?” and/or send questions to Tony Licu, Head of Safety Unit, Network Manager Directorate (antonio.licu@eurocontrol.int) To find out more on the Just Culture interface with Media, visit http://www.skybrary.aero ^
Best practice in media relations in a crisis – an example from the real world: In January 1989, a British Midland Boeing 737-400 crashed on the final approach to East Midlands Airport, UK, killing almost half the people on board. The broken wreckage of the aircraft came to rest on an embankment at the side of the M1 Motorway, one of England’s major auto routes. Television access was guaranteed by the nature of the site and was fully exploited by the media. Within little more than an hour of the accident, the airline owner and chairman Sir Michael Bishop was standing in front of the television cameras at the accident site answering questions. An analysis of his replies shows he provided very little information because so much about the cause of the event was still unknown, but the fact that he cared enough to attend the crash site and talk to the media was a successful exercise in corporate damage-limitation, and has since been hailed by PR consultants worldwide as the ideal way to handle media relations in the public relations crisis following a serious disaster.
Photo: © Picsfive | Dreamstime.com
If we are to influence the way in which the media report ATM related news, which could in turn influence our perception of the media, we need to change the way in which we deal with the media. Our Organisations should have Press Officers/spoke persons that must be trained to deal with the media. Communicating is all about getting a message across to an audience in the way it is intended. How we do this can influence greatly how the message is received. As such, training in how to communicate effectively is a fundamental require-
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4 Procedures
Do You Read Me? THE ISSUE OF COMMUNICATION FAILURE Ignacio Baca, ^ by Chairman IFATCA Technical and Operations Committee (TOC) the Bali conference by Willem Zuidveld (the Netherlands). While studying the subject it was noted that there is no ICAO definition on communication failure. In order to properly establish the issue we were dealing with, TOC decided it was necessary to draft one. In all the examples above we have referred to “radio cover” or “the frequency” but RTF (radiotelephony) is not the only way to communicate between aircraft and ground and other means as CPDLC had to be considered. A definition was consequently drawn up as the first result of the working paper. It was later adopted by the Committee B in Bali to be included in the IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual. It reads as follows: A communication failure is a breakdown or unintentional downgrade in the designated means of air-ground communication required for ATS. Photo: © Shutterbas | Dreamstime.com
As air traffic controllers we all have experienced situations of Radio Communication Failure. We are familiar with them and know that usually the solution is just a matter of some minutes. Sometimes we just have to switch to a second transmitter or wait until the plane unable to contact us enters an area with a better radio cover. Maybe the pilot just misunderstood the frequency when the traffic was being handed over to another sector or just missed the particular message that we were addressing. These situations are rather common, but communication failure may be very difficult to manage if there is some kind of malfunction that prevents an airplane to report intentions and receive clearances. This rare eventuality was the subject of a study carried out by the TOC and presented in
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Current procedures ICAO addresses the problem of communication failure in Annex 2, Rules of the Air; Annex 10 Volume II, Aeronautical Telecommunications; and Doc 4444, PANS/ATM. A Communication Failure Coordinating Group (CFCG) par-
ticipated by IFATCA has also been established. Description of the procedures to be followed by an aircraft unable to communicate is in Annex 2, under 3.6.5.2. To summarize it: • If in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) the aircraft shall continue in VMC and land at the nearest suitable aerodrome or if considered advisable complete an IFR flight. • If in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) or in VMC when the pilot of and IFR flight considers advisable to complete an IFR flight, the aircraft will continue according to the assigned speed and level during an amount of time that depends of the aircraft being under radar control or not and then will proceed according to its filed flight plan. These provisions contain some ambiguity. For example, it is not explained what should be considered as a suitable aerodrome to divert to when a communication failure arises in VMC. Following the rules, a pilot experiencing a communication failure in VMC while overflying cities like London or Amsterdam, could divert to one of the most congested airports in the world causing a severe disruption of traffic. Of course we can think that
4 Procedures
4 Annex 2 requests that aircraft attempt to establish communication by all available means‌ Photo: Robyn Von Swank via imgur.com
these airports are not suitable due to being so busy and so the pilot may consider it advisable to complete an IFR flight as allowed by the rules but the real thing is that in such a situation, the concerned ATC unit would not have a clue about the action to be decided by the crew of the aircraft. The pilot on the other hand would have to take a decision if considered advisable with no way of having important information to support his choice, like the traffic situation or the meteorological conditions around an aerodrome. To make things more complicated there are also local provisions, which can be found in the national AIPs, to be taken in account when dealing with such a situation. This results in additional complexity in already complicated circumstances. These procedures often concern the approach phase of the flight, which is a critical phase. For air traffic controllers communication failure, when prolonged, is always a source of incertitude. Will the aircraft fly according to the filed flight plan or will it proceed to what the pilot considers a suitable aerodrome? What if the aircraft encounters significant weather ahead and needs to deviate? Will the pilot have all the information about local procedures at his disposal when arriving at this new destination?
Proposals for improvement IFALPA, which also participates in the ICAO Communication Failure Coordinating Group, believes that ICAO should develop a global solution for IFR. Some options have been proposed, for example several codes might be used under radar environment to indicate the intended course of action. 7601 would mean continuation in VMC, 7602 return to departure aerodrome with a left turn, 7603 return to departure aerodrome with a right turn, 7604 would indicate fuel dumping, etc. To avoid having the codes reserved all time, an option would be to squawk 7600 for 10 minutes to give ATC time enough to reassign codes in the 7601 to 7607 range and make them available. Fortunately communication failure is a rare event and it may be even more exceptional due to all the means to communicate apart from the traditional RTF. At present a plane may be able to establish contact by additional VHF equipment, HF, CPDLC, ACARS... even cellphones. Annex 2 requests that aircraft attempt to establish communication by all available means. A good example of what this implies is an incident in Madrid where a plane unable to contact via RTF was able to report its intentions via ACARS to the operator who contacted ATC. The aircraft concluded its flight by a safe landing with ATC knowing perfectly in advance the flight path
and approach to be followed by the aircraft so ensuring separation almost in a normal way. In the opinion of TOC, a unified procedure would require that flight crews should have access to CPDLC codes and dedicated telephone numbers for every State or FIR in order to use them in case of communication failure. Another suggestion is the development of a clear and systematic approach, which can be summarized as a diagram to be used as a follow up when contacting ATC becomes impossible. An example of how such a diagram could be is shown in the image below, which is just a draft to be considered for development. At present, when more and more airlines are implementing the use of tablets onboard the aircraft instead of the traditional paper documents, a fully developed diagram could easily be turned into an application for quick reference by the pilots. ^
toc.chair@ifatca.org 13
4 Europe
The Benefits of Improved Flight Predictability Christian Faber, ^ by ATFCM Expert, EUROCONTROL, Network Manager Directorate
Photo: EUROCONTROL
may enter a sector which was not predicted. These flights are classed as intruders and can increase the possibility of an overload in that sector while wasting precious capacity in the sector that was on the original flight profile. If maximum use is to be made of the capacity of the European ATC network, it is essential that flight plan data is as accurate as possible. In other words, that an aircraft flies what has been filed in the flight plan. Daily across Europe regulations are put in place to protect ATC from receiving more traffic than the controller can safely handle. However, more aircraft than planned sometimes enter these protected sectors exceeding their capacities by more than 10%. This is considered as an ATFCM “over-delivery”. There have also been reports by ATC of overloads where the lack of adherence to the planned flight level has been identified as a contributory factor both during periods of regulation and non-regulation. Flight plan information is essential information used by the Network Manager Operations Centre (NMOC) to accurately predict traffic loading in ATC sectors. If a pilot asks ATC to cruise at a flight level different from the one specified in the flight plan, then the aircraft
vide the most accurate flight plan reflecting the true intentions of the flight. This reduces the need to make tactical modification to the flight profile. If in addition, both pilots and controllers, stick as much as possible to the trajectory planned in the ATC flight plan, then those above mentioned benefits will materialise.
More accurate data can lead FMPs to have greater confidence that what is predicted will actually happen. In some cases this could lead to an increase in declared sector capacities as there is less need to apply a capacity buffer to take account of unpredictable traffic delivery.
Controllers can play their part in encouraging operators to fly what they have filed, and coincidentally save a significant amount of R/T time, by not asking pilots for their requested cruising level. Studies at Maastricht UAC and Karlsruhe UAC have shown that by adopting this practice adherence can be improved by 20-25% in downstream neighbouring sectors, and as a consequence risk of over delivery equally reduced.
In 2010 EUROCONTROL co-ordinated a Flight Level Adherence Days trial in which pilots and controllers were requested to adhere to the requested flight level submitted in the ATC fligh plan. The following diagram shows an improvement in flight level adherence for flights in the upper airspace during the trial.
Of course there will still be situations when a change to the cruising level is needed due to factors such as turbulence and stronger than expected head winds or to safely manage traffic within sectors. It is clearly not intended to prevent or limit pilots’ and ATCOs’ ability to accommodate these changes.
An independent study following this trial has estimated that improved predictability could provide an additional 5-10% local capacity for ATFCM planning purposes, with an associated reduced need for regulation.
Improved accuracy and consistency of the flight trajectory will contribute to network performance. This will help to achieve the most effective use of the European ATC network, protecting sectors from overloads while at the same time minimising the need for regulations and unnecessary delays.
Other benefits have clearly been identified such as fewer ATFM delays, improved vertical flight efficiency and sector productivity, and fewer occurrences of over deliveries. In order to achieve those considerable benefits, it is important that aircraft operators pro-
Such an initiative needs to be seen in the context of other activities to improve ATM. Foreseen Network Manager activities include a consolidated approach to further optimise the delivery to further optimise the delivery of traffic into ATC sectors and airports and minimise the need for ATFM regulations, through improved predictability and use of Target Times. Despite the inevitable focus on issues faced by the ATC network today, it should not be forgotten that in the years ahead better flight plan adherence, with managed flexibility, is in fact a prerequisite towards realising the benefits of SESAR 4D Business Trajectories. ^
christian.faber@eurocontrol.int 14
4 FLAD trial results – 30/09-01/10 2010. Photo: source EUROCONTROL
4 Europe
It Can Be Done! How controllers took fate into their own hands
^ by Dalibor Jovanovic, Air Traffic Controller at Slovenia Control In 1992, Slovenia gained independence from the rest of Yugoslavia. This meant among other things that many State institutions and services needed to be put in place. An air navigation service was one of them: until then, Zagreb ACC had handled Area Control for the region and only approach and tower units existed at the three airports. Within one year however, all necessary legal and administrative frameworks were in place and an Air Navigation Service provider was formed. In line with the practice across the world, it was an integral part of the Ministry of Transport. The administrative headquarters was located in the centre of the capital, Ljubljana. With training of the first controllers underway, there was urgent need to set up an operations room as soon as possible. The easiest solution was to equip a small room in the tower building at Ljubljana airport. Despite it being barely 30 square meters, it had enough space for one area and one approach controller plus one flight data operator. As there was no additional space, the positions were single person operations. The area controller used a synthetic radar picture, while the colleague on the approach had an antique Gilfillan Mk IV radar with transponder codes only and light pen for height readings. Despite the very basic equipment, spirits were high as was the hope to one day get better conditions. Since air navigation services was so new for our State and only a
4 Panorama of the new HQ. Ops room is on the first floor overlooking airport. Photo: Klemen Korenjak
Photo: Klemen Korenjak
4 Old ops room in downtown, located in what used to be a macaroni factory. handful of experts was available – virtually no one outside the company had any notion of air traffic control - more and more decisions about the equipment, procedures and other particularities of our work were left over to us, the controllers. So virtually from the start, we had quite a big influence on what direction our work environment evolved. In 1996 we moved the operations centre from the tower to the HQ building in the middle of the city. While this was much more spacious, it was hard not to notice it was actually located in a basement, four meters below ground. But it had proper consoles, two-man working positions with an executive and an assistant controller and for the first time, a senior
controller. In addition, work for Flight Data Operators changed dramatically: they were no longer required to phone estimates and write strips. An automated system was doing that for them. LAS, the Ljubljana Automated System was customised to our needs: the support team, consisting mainly of active ATCOs had had a substantial say over the specifications and installation. Close involvement of active ATCOS in the development of ATM systems continued in the following years and paid off in 2006 with the implementation of a new Flight Data Processing System (FDPS). It was the result of a close cooperation of an expert group of air traffic controllers and a team of engineers. This experience contin-
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ued to be extremely valuable in the upgrade of the FPDS and Radar Data Processing System (RDPS), which took place two years later. These upgrades followed the very simple philosophy that the end users of the ATM systems, want software and hardware to serve us, not the other way around. To achieve this, we had not only the influence, but the final say on the complete package – from design, writing the requirements, testing and deployment. During this process we’ve learned a lot about the design processes, safety assessments, testing procedures, tracking implementation of requirements, writing clear and unambiguous requirements... Everything you would normally expect your engineering team or even worse, the sales representatives of <insert name of your favourite ATM software company> to do…
4
4 View of the new Operations Room, Senior & FIS position. Photo: Joze Kovacic
irst production console, which was used F for operational testing. Photo: archive ODM o.d.d
The idea of what an average ATCO in your organisation needs and what tools are required to best cope with goals embedded in the core of our profession – to maintain an orderly, safe and expeditious flow of traffic. We learned rather quickly, that so called “of the shelf products”, which are usually offered to your engineering departments and your management, are often far from what they advertise. Since we had no desire to purchase a big white elephant with all the bells and whistles (of which usually only handful are actually usable) and with a price tag, which that would make our management promptly swallowing fistful of nitro-glycerine tablets. We are a small ANS provider, you know.... So with the support of our management we chose a different path. At the centre of our design process is our working culture, the way we do our job in Slovenia. It is not very complicated or complex, it has evolved over the years and we think we’ve picked up quite a lot of good practices from other countries. The vast majority of us were trained by such fine institutions as the Eurocontrol Training Institute (IANS), Bailbrook College, Dundridge College, the DFS Academy, Pan Am Academy and the
4 Last minute in the old ops room. At 23.00 the shadowing phase came to the end.. Photo: Gorazd Ursic
Czech Air Navigation Institute. As we shaped and constructed the company from scratch, we were open for constructive suggestions and experiences we gained during training. We weren’t constrained by long-established cultural patterns. In a way, we were some kind of melting pot of different ways of doing the ATC. This rich variety of experiences and insight in how others do their job, only made us more determined. We we were going to be masters of our destiny, at least when it came to the tools and environment we have at our disposal. So, having our working culture and common practices developed over the years, we wanted the ATM system to evolve around it, and not vice-versa. We were increasingly successful in this endeavour. At a certain point, we started introducing new practices and tools, which changed our working culture, but for the better, since active ATCOs designed those tools and changes and thus using the bottom up approach. Having complete freedom in designing the environment may seem to be an expensive way, and maybe slow,
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4 Europe
Photo: Joze Kovacic
4 Space ship command bridge: there are two groups of three
sectors in semicircle, plus a military and Flight Information sector.
since we follow a step by step approach, but this is a double negative. No, it doesn’t cost you millions and it is not slow. Many of today’s software providers simply don't have an interest to offer you a simple, but usable (in the sense, that it does the job required and it doesn't have tons of functionality only an engineer would love to have) ATM system at hand. It seems that is a popular belief among the ANS provider CEOs, that the more millions they spend on software, the better it does the job. Well...worldwide experiences don't always concur with that.
Shifting into a higher gear Designing and playing around with FDPS and RDPS is one thing, design of a new operations room and controller working positions (CWPs) is ...well...something much bigger. But this was the task we were confronted with in 2005. That’s when the decision was finally taken to migrate to a new building. One of the first working groups we found ourselves participating in was the one designing all the CWPs, for controllers, supervisor and Flight Data Operators. The design process was such that ATCOs defined the requirements for the ops room before an architect bureau even started working on the building plans. And from the start we were resolved to part with old-fashion bulky consoles and to have a computer-free environment. We largely based ourselves on some Eurocontrol designs and ideas of how CWPs could look like in the future. We liked the idea of lean and elegant consoles, fully adaptable to the needs of modern ATCO. So the architects drew a pentagon shaped room, our future ops room. Exactly the same room was put one level bellow, where all the computers, trackers and other hardware were going to be installed. It took us six years to finalise a working prototype. It was tremendous task, the learning and designing process running in parallel. Since we had absolutely no experience in de-
signing anything remotely like an ATCO CWP, we were testing many ideas, scrapping them, searching for new ones, testing, scrapping, designing again... even on the working prototype we were changing many details, which skipped our attention during the paper phase of the process. At the end, when we were satisfied with how our new CWP was operating, architects took over for some fancy industrial design and the result was a console like no other in the world. It consists of one main LCD Barco monitor and two auxiliary monitors at the side, one home to the electronic strips and the other to the information panel, or Info Pages as we call them. They contain many useful information, from maps, LoAs, all kinds of operational information and even a small fancy piece of software, programmed by our subcontracted software engineer (who grasped the essence of ATM software in astonishingly short time and with tremendous ease and in detail), who actually merged wider map of Europe with dataset points and routes and data from Eurocontrol SkyView software. Infopages have variety of possibilities, since they run as web page and all the programming is done in java and in html. Our persistence in having a computer-free ops room and that we firmly kept the hand over its development paid off: we now work in a pleasantly quiet room, where the biggest creator
of noise is the incoming fresh air...the console has no rotating parts, except small fans in the main monitor. All this would not be possible if all previous CEOs and especially our current one, Mr. Franc Željko Županic, the engineers and the rest of the staff would not have believed in us, gave us a free hand in designing our own working environment, fully placing their faith in us. We have collected enormous quantities of knowledge, know-how and experience that we would ever have had the opportunity to otherwise. We have made a long journey, from small and overcrowded room in the tower, lack of radars, basic equipment, from troubles with recognizing our profession and poor working conditions, to the point, where we are not only allowed to have a word, but to steer our ship ourselves with the blessing of the Captain. So...it can be done! ^
dalibor.jovanovic@gmail.com
Photo: Joze Kovacic
4 Andreja working at APP sector. Note the infopages on the lefthand monitor. 17
4 Europe
Still Controlling at 80! Interview of (probably) the oldest active Air Traffic Controller
^ by Philippe Domogala, Deputy Editor spent at the family holiday home in Sussex, where it was thought to be a safer place to live, in order to avoid the expected German bombing of London. From the coast of Sussex during the Battle of Britain, the sky overhead was a source of excitement, and a great deal of my time was spent watching the aerial activity. This was when my enthusiasm for Aviation first began.
4 Freddie Frost at work in EGLH in 2013. Photo: FF
Yes, there is still a controller working at 80, in Lasham (EGHL) in the UK. His name is Freddie Frost, and he celebrated his 80th birthday last February. I had a chance to talk to him and his interview is full of anecdotes and stories worth of a bookâ&#x20AC;Ś Ph: Freddie, are you really 80? You look much younger! Freddie: Yes, I was born on 8th February 1933. So here we are in 2013, and the years pass by too quickly. Much of my childhood during World War 2 was
4 A United B787 in 2013. Photo: Boeing
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Ph: This is when you decided to become a controller? Freddie: No, I wanted to fly. The opportunity to make a career in Air Traffic Control came later. From 1944 until 1952, I was educated at a Prep and Main School in West London. A period of training was required, out of School hours, to attend the Combined Cadet Force, and during service as a cadet I managed to gain an R.A.F. Flying Scholarship to be trained as a Pilot to PPL standard. I was then able to continue flying in the R.A.F. Volunteer Reserve, - and to be paid to do so! National Service in the R.A.F. was completed, despite the great disappointment of my flying training being curtailed by the end of the Korean war. Whilst attempting to obtain a CPL in 1956, I responded to an advertisement for the appointment of ATCOs. Civil Air Traffic Controllers were being recruited at a minimum age of 23. Following a Selection Board, in
January 1957 I was offered a post, to join No. 24 Primary Course at the School of Air Traffic Control, Bournemouth (Hurn) Airport. I qualified a few months later as an ATCO Grade III. Ph: Where were you posted after graduation? Freddie: During the next 37 years I served at several locations. My first posting was to Southampton Airport, with a short detachment to Heathrow when Southampton was flooded. After the Radar Course, my next posting was to Bournemouth as a GCA Director. An Area Course followed, and I was posted to the Southern Centre, which was located at Heathrow in 1960. In the mid 60s the Unit was transferred to West Drayton, and renamed the London Air Traffic Control Centre. I remained at LATCC for the next ten years, with promotion to ATCO II and eventually ATCO I as a Chief Sector Controller, with various detachments during this time. One of them was to the Joint Air Traffic Control Radar Unit at R.A.F. Watton in Norfolk, as the Senior Civil ATCO. It was an interesting job, and I must admit to enjoying a lot of airborne time on the USAF KC 135s based at Mildenhall. They appreciated the help that we were able to provide from Eastern Radar at Watton. The final tour was back to LATCC in 1980, as a Chief Sector Controller, Watch Supervisor, and then SATCO/Watch Manager just prior to my retirement from CAA/NATS in February 1993.
4 Europe Ph: And you are still controlling today, can you explain this? Freddie: Well, when I retired from NATS I accepted the offer of a part-time appointment as a Controller at Lasham Airfield in Hampshire. The opportunity of some ‘hands on’ work appealed to me, and with a daily average of just one jet movement, the separation standards appeared to be not too demanding, - but nevertheless, certainly quite interesting at times. Lasham is a mainly a glider Club with lots of VFR movements, but also the base of a large jet aircraft maintenance facility. Rules require a licensed controller to handle those jets when they come in and out, and this is where I come in. Ph: So you still have an ATCO licence? Freddie: Yes, I still hold a licence. My only complaint being that my original document, number 555, has been purloined over the years, and replaced by something like 212209K. Ph: And no problem with medicals? Freddie: No. My medical is renewed annually, and I’m very lucky in being able to remain reasonably fit and well. The only extra check required after the age of 65, is that an ancient ATCO has to undergo a stress ECG every four years. I joke that perhaps after the age of 90, we might be required to take a stress ECG more often. I’ll face that hurdle later. Ph: Starting as a controller in 1957 you must have seen a lot of changes. Freddie: Yes, in addition to all the improvements we have seen in ATC technology and procedures, perhaps the most dramatic change will have been in aircraft design and performance.
4 A de Havilland “Express” as seen in 1950. Photo: Ringwayobserver via wikipedia Ph: And did you enjoy being a controller all that time? Freddie: I certainly did. In 1974 I was asked to attend a Senior Management Course at the Manchester Business School. This was a residential course lasting three months, and all of the other participants were from the business world. I must have qualified as being the ‘odd ball’ on the Course. Most of what I was being taught seemed to be plain common sense to me, in any case. However this experience, certainly made me appreciate my good fortune in my choice of careers. In ATC we were trained to make rapid decisions, and they had to be the right ones. At MBS, my fellow students never did seem
to understand the satisfaction that I gained from a day’s work at a busy unit. As a bonus, we had a lot of fun in ATC, - perhaps our own brand of aviation humour, and I must admit to it being quite childish at times.
I will always be grateful for having had the privilege of working as part of a great Team of good friends and colleagues, and for being able to say that I have enjoyed every single day of a wonderful career. ^
4 Freddie flying a Piper PA28. Photo: Malcolm Hemming
In 1958, I was offered a flight as co-pilot on a DH86A ‘Express,’ – a four-engine biplane carrying 12 passengers at 120 knots. Some 30 years later I flew on the jump seat of a BA Concorde from Heathrow via Washington to Miami and back. The changes in those thirty years and the differences between those two aircraft were just tremendous. 100 passengers at Mach 2!!! Earlier this year, I visited the flight deck of a United Airlines B787 on a flight from Houston to London. Lots of Avionics, more plastic and larger windows, - but perhaps no great change in behaviour from a 777, except for added comfort and a higher Mach number. What a great shame that we still had to hold on arrival at LHR for 15 minutes due traffic.
Freddie is member of the Royal Aeronautical Society, and has been a member of GATCO (the UK Guild member of IFATCA) since 1960. He served as their ATS Study Group representative with the British Pilots association (BALPA) for twenty years before retirement. Freddie is still an active private pilot, having logged 1300 hours. He started to fly on Miles Magister and Tiger Moths and currently flies a Piper PA28.
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4 Americas
NextGen is Happening now! FIRST ALPA-NATCA USERS’ PERSPECTIVE ON NEXTGEN SYMPOSIUM
^ by Amy Treutel, NATCA Communications Specialist The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) implementation has evolved into a collaborative effort, and one that has become increasingly vital as stakeholders are faced with ongoing challenges caused by sequestration. The National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) is highly focused on this collaboration and various safety and technology partnerships to increase NextGen’s breadth throughout the National Airspace System (NAS). On June 27, over 800 aviation safety professionals, air traffic controllers, pilots, government representatives and industry groups gathered in Washington, D.C., and via webcast, for the first ALPA-NATCA Users’ Perspective on NextGen Symposium. The symposium panels focused on background information on NextGen, the value of NextGen, funding and continuing the collaborative nature to ensure NextGen is successful. “How do we enhance this system and make it grow for the future?” asked NATCA President Paul Rinaldi, to set the
stage for the day’s panel discussions. “One of the most frustrating things we hear is, ‘When is NextGen going to be implemented?’ Parts of NextGen are being implemented right now. … NextGen is happening now. Is it happening so fast that you’ll have this switch to turn on? No.” But it is happening, he added, citing several examples including En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM). “That is a very important task,” he said. “It’s the biggest transformation and the biggest program that the FAA and NATCA have taken on together. And it’s a wonderful success story. In 2009, we were not involved in developing and testing, and ERAM was not working. Today, we’re involved in every detail.” Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) President Lee Moak echoed Rinaldi’s remarks about NextGen. The symposium, Moak said, is “focused on line pilots and controllers, the true practitioners of NextGen. Few know better than [those] in this room how to make NextGen a reality in the air and on the ground. The great news is that it’s paying off. But we need more.” NATCA Executive Vice President Trish Gilbert spoke on the first panel of the day and highlighted NATCA’s involvement in NextGen. She described how air traffic controllers make up such a small workforce, with just over 12,000 certified controllers throughout
the country, but that they are relentless in overcoming challenges. “When they’re plugged in and a situation gets complex and daunting, they stay plugged in and find a way to make it work,” she said. “That is no different when we ask them to get involved in redesigning airspace or technology projects, or anything that we ask them to do.” Gilbert went on to describe how, in a new era of collaboration, controllers are involved in the development and implementation of NextGen. However, that wasn’t always the case. She emphasized that controllers were always able to find a way to make new technology work, but collaboration has allowed NextGen to really be beneficial to the end user. “Controllers just want it to be safe and they want it to work,” she said. “If it doesn’t do that, they’ll find a way to make it work, but we can’t continue to depend on that. We need to get it funded at the beginning and deploy things that are safe and that work.” The next panel at the symposium focused on assessing whether NextGen users have achieved value. From airspace to operations to aircraft equipage, the panel engaged in an in-depth discussion of where NextGen has produced the most tangible benefits and what is needed moving forward. The panel was asked, “What has worked well?”
4 Over 100 attended the event, with some 700 following the symposium via webcast. Photo: © ALPA
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4 Capt. Sean Cassidy, First Vice President/National Safety Coordinator, ALPA, International (left), NATCA NextGen Representative Mel Davis (center), Dan Elwell, Senior Vice President for Safety, Security and Operations, Airlines for America (right). Photo: NATCA
“We have learned how to do workgroups better and how to include people,” NATCA Director of Safety and Technology Dale Wright said. “We’ve also learned what we need; what type of controller we need for certain programs, such as PBN (Performance Based Navigation). When we establish a team, just like in the Greener Skies project for example, we sat down internally to discuss what we needed to make sure we sent a good team out there. You have to have a complete team and include everybody. We have learned to be more thorough.” Other panellists agreed that the inclusion of multiple stakeholders in the workgroups is working well. In fact, NATCA is taking the lessons learned from its involvement in the collaborative success of the ERAM program and is working to apply them to other NextGen programs, like DataComm and Terminal Automation Modernization and Replacement (TAMR). Nearly every panel brought up the critical issue of unstable NextGen funding, especially in light of sequestration. Though the details of their ideas differed, all the panellists agreed that now is the time to have a discussion about alternative options for funding the NAS because it isn’t being treated as the priority it should be. “Now is the time for us to have this conversation, now is the time for us to invest in our future,” Rinaldi said. “We all love aviation, we all have a passion for aviation, and everyone in this room should have ownership to have this
discussion and see exactly which is the best to fund the system so it grows, it thrives, and continues to be the economic engine of this country and the job creator it is. Every single one of us owes it to the aviation system.” Moak discussed funding from the pilot’s perspective, and agreed with the panellists. “Remember, we’re here today to talk about perspectives on NextGen,” Moak said. “As a pilot, I’m tired of seeing equipment in my airplane that I can’t use, either because the supporting infrastructure isn’t there, or because the procedures haven’t been developed, or the training hasn’t happened. We don’t have all the answers, but if we don’t have this conversation, we’ll never move closer to solutions.” After thorough discussion of the hot button issues surrounding NextGen, the final panel of the symposium provided a launching pad of sorts for ideas on what needs to happen moving forward to meet the expectations of NextGen and properly define the success of its many modernization projects. NATCA NextGen Representative Mel Davis, a self-proclaimed eternal optimist, offered a very positive outlook for NextGen that maximizes the full potential of the dedication and collective work being done by so many stakeholders. Citing the importance of the financial markets and how they affect aviation and its impact on the economy, Davis referenced a quote from H.L. Mencken, an American journalist, essaying and satirist of the early to mid 20th Century:
versely, Davis stressed, “When we come together as a group, like in RTCA, each of us offers strong opinion and we come out with better opinions. That is the key element. What we can’t do is hide behind this system as so complex and then go and say, ‘give us more money.’ No. What we have to do is come together, make tough decisions and press forward.” NextGen is working and being deployed thanks to the deep involvement of NATCA and its successful relationship with pilots on safety and technology matters. Symposium leaders encouraged the continued collaboration to further promote and expand NextGen as well as decrease setbacks. “We can have all the symposiums in the world, but we really have to focus on where the inhibitors are to success,” Rinaldi said. “If you leave this symposium with one thing, it should be that NextGen is happening now. It’s very important to stay focused on what we’re doing now.” ^
4 NATCA Executive Vice
President Trish Gilbert. Photo: NATCA
“For every complex problem, there is an answer that is clear, simple and wrong.”
4 NATCA President Paul Rinaldi, right, with
ALPA President Capt. Lee Moak. Photo: NATCA
“When I talk to people about NextGen,” Davis said, “it is the same thing. They have clear, simple opinions and they are wrong.” Davis said the same has been true for himself as well when he brings an individual perspective to the massively large undertaking of NextGen. Con-
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The Propellers are Definitely Back! PARIS AIR SHOW 2013
^ by Philippe Domogala, Deputy Editor 4 A400M with its high-tech propellers. Photo: Airbus/Ramadier
4 Smaller crowds at the 50th anniversary edition. Photo: Gifas
This year’s edition of the Paris Air Show was the 50th. Such an anniversary raises big expectations, but the poor weather ruined lots of plans and quite a few ambitions. Despite over 2200 firms booking exhibition stands (a healthy 5% increase compared to last time), visitor numbers were down some 10%. Around 150 aircraft were on display, but here again, the poor weather limited the flying demonstrations to a minimum.
4 ATR – The Future is Back. Photo: ATR
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The most anticipated performance of the show was of course the visit of the brand new Airbus A350. On its third ever test flight - having made its maiden flight only a week before - Airbus’ newest had received special authorisation from the French aviation administration to make a fly-by at Le Bourget. While relatively short, spectators got to see some of the unique features of this aircraft. Its wings, made of composite, are just like those of a glider: small long sleek ailerons and flaps cover the whole trailing edge of the wing. The wing tips curve smoothly into winglets, similar to those of a modern, highperformance glider. The cockpit windows are also very distinguishable, as if the aircraft wears a pair of sunglasses! It will be another year before we see it in actual airline operations (launch customer Qatar Airways, is expecting the first of 80 aircraft mid-2014). Hopefully, they will not encounter the same problems as their direct competitor, the Boeing 787. Having just returned to service after sorting out the infamous battery issues, Boeing had two of them on show in Paris. “No smoke and no jokes” was their slogan…
4 Industry Another major point of interest was the return of the turboprop (see previous issue of The Controller, p29). One of the stands, that of European manufacturer ATR, even featured an old DeLorean car – of Back to the Future movie fame – and the slogan: “The Future is Back“. This year was the best ever for the FrenchItalian manufacturer: including the 83 orders secured during the show, they announced a total so far of 173 aircraft. It looks as if the new generation of ATRs are a much bigger commercial success than the DeLorean car ever was... After many problems and delays, the first Airbus A400M military transport to be delivered was also shown. The aircraft was scheduled for delivery to the French Air Force in August 2013. It has very impressive engines but most spectacular are the propellers. Yes the turboprops really are back! Those funny looking props are probably the future. Extremely efficient, they are made by Hamilton Sundstrand in the UK and are so far the largest composite blades ever built. Each propeller is made of 8 curved blades. Each wing has one propeller rotating clockwise and the other one anticlockwise. This creates a more efficient aerodynamic effect
4 Turning the propeller of the Connie. Photo: Gifas
4 Brand new Airbus 350-XWB on its third test flight. Photo: Airbus/Gousse
over the wing and enables the aircraft to fly higher and faster. The aircraft is able to cruise at Mach 0.72 and up to FL 370. Certainly something to be wary of for our enroute colleagues… The other propeller star of the show was, like last time, the Breitling Lockheed Super Constellation. Louder than an A380(!), the noise is very characteristic. Its iconic beauty never
fails to turn heads and this time was no different. Turning the blades to start the engines remind us how far we've come in a short time. Yes, the propellers are definitively back! ^
dp@the-controller.net
4 Very distinguishable cockpit of the A350. Photo: Airbus/Masclet
4 Breitling Super Constellation. Photo: Bastien Mejane 23
4 Flying 4 The typical Great Rift Valley landscape.
All Photos: DP
4 A map of the area.
Flying VFR in Kenya ^ by Philippe Domogala, Deputy Editor Last May, during a visit to Kenya, I managed to rent a 1967 Piper Cherokee from Nairobi Wilson airport. The aircraft was equipped with a variable pitch propeller, a 200HP turbo engine, retractable gear, leather seats, etc.
Keziah Ogutu, our IFATCA EVP Africa and Middle East who lives in Nairobi, introduced me to David, of Skylink aviation, the owner of the aircraft. After some easy paperwork and paying US$6 airport tax to enter the airfield, we had to try and find our Cherokee among dozens of aircraft parked the African way: not everyone is parked facing the same
4 The old Cherokee parked at Wilson airport.
direction. The lack of parking space in many African airports leads to some very innovative parking solutions! A bit of precision manoeuvring was needed to steer our aircraft onto a taxiway. Wilson airport (HKNW) has 2 main runways of 1500m each. Counting the number of movements, itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s the second busiest airport in Africa. Taxiing out was easy but there was quite a backlog of traffic, so we had to wait a long time. Eventually, we made it onto runway 12 for take-off. Good engine leaning is required as airport elevation is 5500ft, and it is very hot. After getting our clearance, we took off, climbing to 1000ft. We made a 160 degree turn north and stayed low until out of the CTR. Leaving Nairobi city centre on our right, we entered the famous Great Rift Valley. This is a part of one of the geologic wonders of the world, a place where the earth's tectonic forces are presently trying to
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4 Flying create new plates by splitting apart old ones. It stretches a few thousand kilometres north from Kenya and fossils of many hominids, ancestors of humans, were found all along its length. It’s widely considered as one of the birthplaces of humankind: genetic studies have shown that all present-day humans came from a population of less than 10.000 people, who lived in this region! Surprisingly few people live in the valley today. We headed to Lake Naivasha, some 100km northwest of Nairobi. On the way, we passed the old Longonot Volcano and the famous Hells Gate National Park and canyon. We kept our altitude between 1000 and 1500ft AGL, so we could enjoy the beautiful landscape and wildlife. We were the only aircraft in the area despite the many small airports in Kenya. These include many private ones, which are usually open on request. Often the easiest and fastest way to get around, VFR flying is easy and long considered ‘normal’ in Kenya, as remote places are often only connected via bad dirt roads…
4 Hells Gate canyon.
After about an hour, it was time to head back to Wilson. This was a bit more complicated as we had to remain low and city smog against the sun made for relatively poor visibility. I was glad to have my local safety pilot along! We finally found the airport and were told we were number 4 for approach. We had to make an orbit until we spotted number 3, after which it was our turn. Landing the old Cherokee was a breeze on that long runway 07, especially as there was no wind. We returned to the parking area and pushed the aircraft by hand to a vacant spot in between the other aircraft.
dollars. Be aware that Kenya is a mountainous country (Mt Kenya is 5200m/17.000ft) and as the country is on the equator, the weather can be treacherous, including massive thunderstorm clouds. But it has to be one of the most beautiful countries to fly in! ^
4 VFR flying is fun!
It was definitely another very nice experience, in a different environment. Flying in Kenya: easy. The all-in cost for the Cherokee was US$200/hour with instructor. See http://www. skylinkflights.com If you want to fly alone, you need to convert your licence. This will take a day, including a new medical check and a couple of hundred
4 The Longonot Volcano crater.
4 Overhead the Great Rift Valley.
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4 Opinion
Do We Rely Too Much on Automation?
4 Crash of Turkish Airlines at Schiphol,
^ by Philippe Domogala, Deputy Editor When the Asiana Boeing 777 tail hit the embankment of runway 28 in San Francisco last July, the first comments in the media were that it was again “pilot error” or misjudgement. Same initial comments we heard after the Turkish airlines B737 accident in Amsterdam in February 2009 or the Air France A330 off the coast of Brazil in June 2009. The easy way out. Always was, always is. While the full investigation of the Asiana 777 is still on-going, first indications from the NTSB point out at a too low speed on APP combined with inappropriate control inputs. There are similarities between the 3 accidents. Perfectly flyable aircraft ended up stalling and killing people because at one point in a complex sequence pilots (humans) automation failed or was no longer there, the crew did not recognise it, unknowingly let their aircraft stall and did not revert to basic flying rules in time to recover. The failure of a component, i.e the radio altimeter/auto throttles for the TK, the pitot tube/ unreliable IAS for AF and the ILS/auto throttles in Asiana) started the chain of event that led to the accidents. Taking Asiana, of course an ILS can be unserviceable, this a not
unusual, and a visual APP is something done everyday by tens of thousands of aircraft. Yet, the combination with other factors, like fatigue, lack of experience on that aircraft type, confusion perhaps, etc. contributed heavily as I anticipate the final report will show. But the point I want to make is not there: it is that for many of us, and this is where I add “us”, air traffic controllers, we are given more and more automation to perform our tasks, often one on top and after the other. A whole new generation of pilots and controllers are out there using automation everyday as if it was always there. When one part fails, or is unavailable, how do we cope? Are we well trained for it? And if we are, do we take this training seriously? Can we recognise an unreliable component in a system? And can we actually judge the impact of this failure on the rest of the system? The reliability of current electronic systems, both in the air and on the ground are such today that one may forget how it is to work without it. Hundred of thousands of hours are performed before one component fails, and when it does, the chance it would occur on your shift is making it even more remote for you to experience it. Old controllers having worked in previous lives in Towers with nothing but a pen and a VHF radio might be able, as the old generation pilots with many hands-on hours on propeller aircraft. But how do the current generation of pilots and controllers cope? What percentage of current en-route continental ACC or APP controllers can still control safely with a sudden blank traffic display?
4 Asiana wreckage at San Francisco airport in 2013. Photo: NTSB
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Amsterdam, The Netherlands in February 2009. Photo: © Fred Vloo/RNW
And what about all the levels of system degradation in between (e.g STCA, missing labels ID blocks, SSR, etc.)? Are the necessary skills to recognise and cope with these still there? The same question applies for pilots and basic flying skills. Reverting rapidly to basic flying skills when you practiced those decades before and never since is not that simple. Air France has understood this and sends now its pilots into gliding courses. The similarity with us controllers is there. We learn procedural control and the basic “raw” control techniques while at the ATC school, learning the job, then some of us are placed in a highly automated environment and slowly take automation for granted. There has not yet been an accident or serious incident (to my knowledge) because a controller lost automation and failed to revert to basic control techniques to separate aircraft. But what those recent airline accidents are telling us is that perhaps it would be worthwhile to learn from them, and also train our people to remember the basic ways. We have a chance to do it before such a case occurs, on our shift this time. ^
dp@the-controller.net
4 Feature
Supersonic Passenger Aircraft Part Three: Concorde – Technological Triumph Philip Marien, ^ by Editor As discussed in parts one and two (The Controller, April 2012 and July 2012), France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union were trying to develop supersonic transport aircraft from the late 1950s. The British Bristol Aeroplane Company and the French Sud Aviation had their own designs, respectively called the Type 223 and Super-Caravelle. Both projects were primarily government funded. Both designs looked virtually similar, with both companies initially intending to build a medium- and long-range version for 100 people. By the early 1960s, both designs were essentially ready, but the cost of building the prototypes was considered excessive. The British government found a solution by forcing the newly formed British Aircraft Corporation (which by now consolidated a number of British aircraft manufacturers, including the Bristol Aeroplane Company) to look for international co-operation. They approached a number of partner countries, but only France showed real interest. The development project was negotiated as an international treaty between the two countries rather than a commercial agreement between companies. On the insistence of the UK, it included a clause that imposed very heavy penalties for any party that withdrew from the project. The draft treaty was signed on 29 November 1962. By this time, both companies had been merged into new ones; thus, the Concorde project was between the British Aircraft Corporation and Aérospatiale. Initially, the new consortium intended to come up with one long-range and one medium-range version of the SST.
4 Undoubtedly a strong contender for the ugliest aircraft ever designed, the Handley Page 115. Photo: TSRL via wikipedia
4 Fairey Delta 2 BAC221 at the Fleet Air Arm Museum, UK. Photo: wikipedia However, prospective customers showed little or no interest in the shorter-range version and it was scrapped. The consortium secured non-binding options from most of the major airlines of the day. In total, over 100 aircraft would need to be built. Pan Am, BOAC, and Air France would be the launch customers, with six airplanes each. Other airlines in the order book included Panair do Brasil, Continental Airlines, Japan Airlines, Lufthansa, American Airlines, United Airlines, Air India, Air Canada, Braniff, Singapore Airlines, Iran Air, Olympic Airways, Qantas, CAAC, Middle East Airlines, TWA and even SABENA.
4 British Bristol Aeroplane Company’s Type 223.
The design used earlier research on the flight characteristics of low ratio delta wings. To test the design, BAC rebuilt a Fairey Delta 2 aircraft, which had been the first aircraft to fly faster than 1000 mph in level flight. This aircraft, designated BAC 221, was modified and used for flight tests of the high-speed flight envelope. A Handley Page HP.115 provided valuable information on low speed performance of the delta wing design.
Engines Powering the Concorde were 4 Rolls-Royce/ Snecma Olympus 593 reheated turbojets. The basic design of the Olympus engine is much older than Concorde. As early as 1953, a Canberra aircraft powered by two early versions of Olympus engines broke the world altitude record. The Olympus-powered Vulcan began RAF service in 1956.
4 Sud Aviation’s
Super-Caravelle.
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4 Feature the Olympus 593 produced a lot of smoke during take-off and landing. To counter this, Rolls-Royce and SNECMA incorporated a type of combustion chamber which had already demonstrated its ability to eliminate smoke in other engines. This “annular” type combustion chamber, in conjunction with a new vaporizing fuel injector system, made Concorde among the cleanest aircraft of its generation.
4 An Olympus 593 engine at the Imperial War Museum Duxford, UK.
Photo: nimbus227 via wikipedia
With each iteration, thrust and efficiency increased and the version installed on Concorde was according to Rolls-Royce engineers, the world's most efficient jet engine. The Olympus had two independent compressors each linked to its own turbine. This results in a higher compression ratio and thereby a greater efficiency. A supersonic version of the Olympus, designated 320, was developed for the BAC TSR2 military aircraft (the initials standing for “Tactical Strike Reconnaissance”). To cope with the higher operating temperatures, changes were made in materials. At Mach 2 air will enter the intake at about -60°C, will be compressed in the intake and be at about 130°C when it reaches the face of the engine, and will leave the high-pressure compressor at 550°C. When the TSR2 project was cancelled, a supersonic engine was available without an aircraft to fly it in… When deciding on an engine for Concorde, other contenders were still at the drawingboard stage, but the Olympus had been built, had run on the test-bed, and had flown first in a Vulcan flying test-bed and then in the TSR2 itself. By the time it was installed on Concorde, the engine was more than 4 times more powerful than the initial design. One particular engine modification for Concorde deserves a mention: the early versions of
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Fuselage Air friction at high speeds causes the entire structure to heat up during flight. Every surface, including windows and panels, was warm to the touch by end of the flight. Engineers used Hiduminium R.R. 58, an aluminium alloy for most of the aircraft. The highest temperature this could sustain was 127 °C, which limited the top speed to Mach 2.02. Concorde went through two cycles of heating and cooling during a flight: it first cooled as it climbed, to then heat up as it accelerated to supersonic speeds. The opposite happened when descending and slowing down. These cycles were extensively tested using a full-size section. This showed the Concorde airframe had a life expectancy of 45,000 flying hours. When it heated up, the fuselage would expand up to 30cm (±1 ft.). This was most obvious on the flight deck, between the flight engineer's console and the bulkhead. The story goes a flight engineer once placed his hat in this gap that had opened up while the plane was in supersonic flight. After landing however, his hat was firmly stuck in the now closed gap… All this also meant that a powerful cooling system was needed for the cabin and other sensitive areas. This was solved using an ingenious heat exchange system, which used the aircraft’s fuel rather
than a separate circuit of cooling fluids and radiators. When an airframe passes the critical Mach, its centre of pressure shifts towards the back. This causes a pitch down force on the aircraft. While engineers partially countered this by designing the wings to reduce this effect, a shift of ±2m remained. Rather than using trim controls (like on the Tu-144), which would have dramatically increased drag, pumps redistributed the fuel during acceleration and deceleration, thereby moving the centre of mass and effectively acting as an auxiliary trim control.
Nose Concorde’s characteristic drooping nose was developed and built by Marshall Aerospace. Raising it in flight reduced drag to achieve optimum aerodynamic efficiency. It would be lowered during taxi, take-off, and landing to give the pilots an outside view, which would otherwise be obstructed by the long pointed nose and the high angle of attack. In addition to the nose itself, a moving visor retracted into the nose prior to being lowered. When the nose was raised to horizontal, the visor would come in front of the cockpit windscreen for aerodynamic streamlining. During taxi and take-off, the nose was lowered to 5° below the standard horizontal position. During the approach, the nose lowered to 12.5° below horizontal for maximum visibility. Upon landing the nose was raised to the five-degree position to avoid the possibility of damage. The FAA had insisted that the initial design of the visor be modified to ensure it didn’t restrict visibility for the pilots. The friction at supersonic speeds required manufacturer Triplex to develop glass which could endure temperatures in excess of 100°C.
4 The nose cone separated from the cockpit during reconstruction at the Brooklands Museum, UK. See - http://www.brooklandsconcorde.com for more photos. Photo: © Brooklands Museum Trust
4 Feature the future production aircraft. They were retired in 1977 and 1976 respectively.
What's in a Name? Every project needs a name and this one was no different. Trying to reflect the treaty between the British and French governments, they came up with Concorde. French for agreement, harmony or union, which is very similar to the English spelling: concord, without the trailing 'e'. Prime Minister Macmillan officially changed the UK name to Concord in response to a perceived comment by French president Charles de Gaulle. In 1967, at the French rollout in Toulouse the British Government Minister for Technology, Tony Benn, announced that he would change the spelling back to Concorde. This created an uproar that died down when Benn stated that the suffixed 'e' represented “Excellence, England, Europe and Entente (Cordiale).” In his memoirs, he recalls a letter from an irate Scotsman claiming: “[Y]ou talk about 'E' for England, but part of it is made in Scotland.” Given Scotland’s contribution of providing the nose cone for the aircraft, Benn replied, “[I]t was also 'E' for 'Écosse' (the French name for Scotland) – and I might have added 'e' for extravagance and 'e' for escalation as well!” Unusual about the name is that generally, the aircraft was known as Concorde without an article, rather than the Concorde or a Concorde.
Building Concorde Prior to commercial operations, six aircraft were built: two prototypes, two pre-production aircraft and two development aircraft. Construction of two prototypes began in February 1965: F-WTSS (Serial No 001), built by Aerospatiale at Toulouse, and G-BSST (Serial No 002), by BAC at Filton, Bristol. Concorde 001 made its first test flight from Toulouse on 2 March 1969. It first went supersonic on 1 October that same year. The first UK-built Concorde flew from Filton to RAF Fairford on 9 April 1969. Both prototypes were presented to the public for the first time in June 1969 at the Paris Air Show. As the flight program progressed, 001 embarked on a sales and dem-
onstration tour on 4 September 1971, which was also marked the first transatlantic crossing of Concorde. Concorde 002 followed suit on 2 June 1972 with a tour of the Middle and Far East. Both prototypes were retired in 1973 and 1976 respectively. Using the experiences gained from the prototypes, two pre-production models were commissioned. G-AXDN (serial no 101) was built in the UK and first flew in December 1971. It’s twin, F-WTSA (102) took off one month later in Toulouse. Changes to design included different wing plan form, more fuel, different engine standard, different air intake systems and many more. But 102 was the first one with the dimensions and shape of
4 Pre-production 101 at Duxford, UK. Photo: draco2008 via flickr
The development aircraft were mainly used for the final certification. Since they were quite some differences in many areas, they required to be reexamined before they could be certified for commercial use. F-WTSB (201) first flew in December 1973 from Toulouse. By 1985, after a mere 900 hours flying time, it was retired. GBBDG (202) accumulated nearly 1300 hours between December 1974 and December 1981. It was stored in a hangar at Filton Airfield and was used as a spare parts source by British Airways for their Concorde fleet. Production of the first commercial versions began in 1975, but the world had changed: while Concorde had initially held a great deal of customer interest, the project was hit by a large number of order cancellations. The Paris Le Bourget air show crash of the competing Soviet Tupolev Tu-144 had shocked potential buyers, and public concern over the environmental issues presented by a supersonic aircraft – the sonic boom, takeoff noise and pollution – had produced a shift in public opinion of SSTs. By 1976 four nations remained as prospective buyers: Britain, France, China, and Iran. While a technological triumph, commercially Concorde was in dire straits. More on that part of the story in the final part four of the series. ^
editor@the-controller.net
4 Climbing through 48500ft
at Mach 2 during one of the last flight of Concorde.
Photo: ijr65 via flickr
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Charlie
Charlie’s Column
^ by Charlie
survived. The aircraft was a Chinese Xian MA-60 operated by Merpati airlines. The airline’s press release is worth quoting: “The aircraft sustained heavy damage to its engines when landing...” Looking from the back, I think that the least of the aircraft’s problems, as the wing and fuselage don’t look too healthy either…
Passengers in Containers Engineers at work again... A couple of them have noticed that delays are too often due to moving passengers around airports. To improve this, they propose a radical – revolutionary in their own words - solution: they want to build a flying wing that can transport containers. These capsules or modules are filled elsewhere, e.g. in the city centre with passengers or freight and transported via road or rail to the airport. There, they are clipped to the clip-aircraft, which is essentially a wing with engines, fuel and pilots (good, they’re still there!) In fact, it’s just like shipping containers today on boats. Apart from saving time at airports, I can also imagine that in case of problems, the “containers“ could be jettisoned from the wing, just like external fuel tanks on fighter aircraft. They could even have automatic parachutes to make sure everyone survives...
Photo: INT
Fast Taxi Some photos do not need an explanation. Apparently, the guy was taxying a bit too fast and had problems with the brakes (Chino, California last June). In Europe, we all thought that Ryanair was the fast-taxi champion: as one of their pilots answered, when asked what they would consider maximum speed while taxying: ”Anything below V1 is OK for us!”
Our competition for hard landings continues: this issue’s entry should win a special prize. It occurred on 10 June 2013 in a small Indonesian airport, Kupang. Fortunately, all 42 passengers and 4 crew
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After the mishaps, this backfired somewhat as the Internet came up with a few alternatives: most commonly heard is the “Nightmare-liner”, which is especially appropriate for Boeing, the airlines that bought it and the passengers stranded because of it. More original but even less respectful is the “Tupperware aircraft“, as they started putting the self-combusting batteries in little boxes to contain any fire. But Charlie’s favourite comes from the car industry: the “Firebird“.
M.Farrokhi Yekta wrote to Charlie: “I don't know if it is coincidence that the Alitalia ATR you talked about in the April issue has YR-ATS as registration! I also know of an EP-ATS with a not much better fate, a dilapidated one in our airport in Iran!” Maybe those aircraft are haunted by the miseries of ATS! Photos: M.Farrokhi Yekta
Hard Landing Again
The “teething problems” of the Boeing 787 have received a healthy dose of media coverage. Most have heard about the batteries and other electrical components overheating or catching fire. But the aircraft is full of new features: electric pressurisation and brakes help to reduce weight and thereby fuel. The aircraft is also made of composite material (read plastic) instead of aluminium. The aircraft was supposed to be a dream to fly in, hence the Boeing PR department came up with the name “Dreamliner”.
Letters to Charlie
Another huge advantage is that you WILL arrive together with your luggage. Of course, you might be in the wrong place, if they clip your container to the wrong aircraft, but at least you’ll have a suitcase. I really like the future...
Photo: INT
787 Nicknames
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