A Countermeasure for Double Spending Attacks on Blockchain Technology in Smart Grid

ACountermeasureforDoubleSpendingAttacks onBlockchainTechnologyinSmartGrid

LanqinSang,HenryHexmoor SouthernIllinoisUniversityatCarbondale

March31,2023

Abstract

Asadistributedtechnology,blockchainhasbeenappliedinmany fields.Muchresearchhasbeendoneonitsinherentsecurityissues.Among thesesecurityissues,doublespendingisoneofthemostpernicious.Currentcountermeasuresarenotsystematic,theyeitherfocusonmonitoring ordetectionwithnoeffectivestrategytopreventfuturedoublespending.Thesecountermeasuresalsohaveseriousdrawbacks,suchashigh networktraffic,highCPUutilization,andheavymanagementoverhead. Inthispaper,wepresentasystematicapproachtoaddressdoublespendingattackonsmartgrid.Areputablenodeisselected,whichconstantly comparesalltransactionsincurrenttimewindowwithpreviouslyvalidatedblockandcurrentblock.Upondiscoveringconflictingtransactions, awarningmessagewiththeconflictingtransactionandtwopenaltytransactionsarebroadcastedtothenetworktostopthecurrentattackandto preventfutureattacks.Ourexperimenthasdemonstratedourdesignis highlyeffectivetodetectdoublespending,withshortdetectiontimeand lowCPUutilizations.

Keywords:DoubleSpending,SmartGrid,Blockchain,Reputation-Based, Consensus.

Asadecentralized,distributed,andimmutableledgertechnologyoperatingonp2pnetwork[1],blockchaintechnologyhasbeenappliedinmanyfields toimprovesecurityindistributedsystems,suchasInternetofThings(IoT), healthcare,supplychain,financialservices[2],andfutureenergysystems[3]. Forexample,blockchainhasbeenusedtoperformsecurityandderivativetransactions[4],[5],digitalpayment[6],[7],[8],datasharinginenergymanagementto addressenergytraders’privacyinsmartpowergrid[9],[10],anovelblockchainbasedenergyframeworktoexchangeexcessenergyamongneighboringnodesto ensureprivacypreservation[11].

Blockchainconstructsblocksregisteringofdifferentdistincttransactions. Withaninternalconsensusmechanism,itguidesthesystemtoproduceaccurateandidenticalinformationacrosstheentirenetwork.Blockchaintechnology isdesignedtoovercomesecuritychallengesandenhancedataintegrity.Thus, securityplaysanimportantroletoguaranteeblockchainacceptability.However,theinvolvementofmonetaryassetsraisessecurityconcerns[12].Double spending,eclipseattacks,selfishattacks,andflashattacksareallcommonexamples[13].Accordingto[14],Sybilanddoublespendingrisksaretheutmost concernsinblockchainsystems.

Doublespendingattackisatypeofdataintegrityattack.Adoublespending attackoccurswhenanattackertriestospendthesametokenormoneymore thanonce[15].Ingeneral,doublespendingisatechniquethatisusedtodeceive someoneaboutthestateofatransaction[16].Inrecentyears,theproposed strategiesagainstdoublespendingandselfishminingconsistofmonitoring, checking,alterforwarding,alterbroadcasting,aswellasconceptualresearch proposals[2].Afewcountermeasurestodoublespendinghavebeenproposed [18],[19],[20].Thesemethodslargelyfocusonbroadcasting,confirmation,and enforcinglisteningperiods.Theyalsosuggestinsertingobserversintothenetworkandblockingincomingconnectionrequests.Broadcastingwouldalertthe systemofanattackandprovidetheminerswiththeproblematictransactions. Confirmationisthestrategytocheckthenumberofblockswhereatransaction appearsortoinspectpropagationdepthoftransactions.Duetothetimethat ittakestoauthenticateatransactionbetweenavendoranditsclient,atransactionmayberecordedwithoutfullconfirmationdepthreview.Althoughno amountofconfirmationdepthwillbeabletocompletelypreventsuchattacks, itisaneffectivemeasuretomitigateattacksinthesystem.Implementinga listeningperiodallowsneighboringminersorevensensorstobeabletospyon andwatchovertheblockchain[15].Theeffectofenforcinglisteningperiodsis alsolimitedbecausetheattackcanoccurafterthelisteningperiod,thoughit ishelpfultocounterdoublespendingattacks.Insertingobserversintothenetworktoforwardalltransactionstothevendorincreasestheopportunitythat thetransactionscanbedetectedinalisteningperiod.Thismethodrequires managingtheobservers.

Inthepreviouslyproposedstrategies,theconflictingtransactionswerenot handled,theresourceswerewastedbecauseallpeerswerecheckingdouble

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spendingtransactions,andthemonitoringwindowwasshort.Sincetheobserversinsertedintothenetworkrequiredmanagementoverhead,theydemand increasednetworktrafficandCPUutilization.Theobserversmayalsocause DDoSattackduetoitsspecialtrafficpattern.Thesestrategiesdonotexplain howconflictingtransactionswillaffecttheconsensusresultsandhowtoprevent theoffendingnodestoimplementdoublespendingattackagain.Anotherissue withblockchainisevenifablockpassedtheconsensus,itonlymeansthatall thenodesreceivedthesamesetoftransactions.Thisdoesnotmeanthatall thetransactionsintheblockaretrulyaccurate,eventhoughallthenodesare honest.Thisisbecausetherearenomechanismstotestifthesetransactionsare correctfromtheirsources,i.e.,onenode’sevaluationtoanothernode,themoney anodeneedstopay.Incorrecttransactionswillcausedisputesamongusersand damagenetworkreputation.Inthispaper,weproposeadesignthatwilladdresstheseissues.Ourcontributionisweuseasinglereputablenodeasthe detectortocheckdoublespendingtransactions,andourdesignisasystematic countermeasure,whichwillmonitor,detect,warn,penalizedoublespending, andpreventitinfuture.Belowarethekeypointsinoursolution:

1. Thedetectionresultsofdoublespendingattackswillbeincludedinthe blockconsensus.

2. Onenodespecificallyactsastheattackdetector,whichfreesothernodes toperformotherduties.Thisdetectorchecksthetransactionsduringthe wholetransactionreceivingandconsensustime.

3. Onlyoneofthemostreputablenodesisselectedasthedetector,the detectorchangesfrequently,anditscommunicationisnotmuchdifferent thanothernodes’.Thesetwofeaturesreducethechanceofthenodeto bethetargetofDDoS.

4. Theattackdetectorandothernodesworkinaparallelfashion.Thedetectionnodechecksdoublespendingduringthewholetransactioncollecting timeintervalandsendsoutitscheckingresultsuponfindinganyconflictingtransactions.

5. Aspenalty,thedetectorwillcreatetwotransactions,onerequiringthe offendingnodetopaythevalueintheconflictingtransactiontothedetector,theotherreducingtheoffendingnode’sreputationscores.Lower reputationscoreswillreducethenode’schancetoparticipateinimportant tasksinthefuture,includingcreatingtransactions.

Therestofthepaperisorganizedasfollows.Section2reviewsrelated work,Section3discussessystemdesign,Section4presentsexperimentalresult analysis,andthelastsectioncontainstheconclusion.

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2Relatedworks

Asecureblockchainnetworkdependsonthesafetyandsecurityofthenodes involved.Asmorenodesjointheblockchainnetwork,theingenuityofattacks inthechainwillprogressivelybecomemoresusceptible.Amongallthesecurity attacks,doublespendingcausesthemostconcern.Doublespendingusually targetssellersorvendors.Asuccessfulattackwouldbethatthemoneyand servicearetakenbytheattacker,leavingthesellerwithnothing.Thiswould causehonestnodestohinderfunctioningduetothelackofsecurityintheir transactions.Muchresearchhasbeenconductedtofindsolutionstomitigate oreliminatedoublespendingattackinblockchainnetwork.

Amethodthatblocksincomingconnectionrequestswasproposed[20].This essentiallypreventsonekindofdoublespendingthatrequirestheattackerconnecttothevendordirectly.Byblockingincomingconnectionrequests,the attackercannotestablishadirectconnectiontothevendortosendthevendor theoffensivetransaction.However,newlyjoinedvendorsmustrequestconnectionstootherpeerstoensuretheyhavethelatestblockchaininformation.The attackercanusethisopportunitytocreatemaliciousnodesanddistributethem throughoutthenetwork.Theattackerhopesthenewvendorswouldrandomly connecttosomeofthesemaliciousnodes.

Aforwardingframeworkin[21]increasestheamountofconfirmationtomake ithardertoattack.Increasingconfirmationwouldrequiremoreauthentications tobemadeinthesysteminordertoconfirmatransaction.Basedonthehash rateofasender,theamountofconfirmationwascalculated,whichwouldbe adequatetomitigatedoublespendingattacks.Theresearcherconcludedthat whentheirprobabilitymethodstocombatattacksisapplied,ifanattackercontrolsmorehashratethanthehonestminingnetwork,thesuccessrateofthe attackwillstillbe100%.Aforwardingmechanismin[22]usespeermonitoringtechniquestoalertthenodesinthesystemthatthereareattacksonthe blockchain.Ifthenodesconfigurethealertsystemtoavoidreceivingalerts, theywillbevulnerabletoattacks.Amethodproposedin[20]requiresthevendortowaitforatransactiontopropagateanumberofstepsbeforeaccepting it.Theideaisthatifmorenodeshaveseenthetransaction,itismorelikely trustworthyandthegreaterdepthisassumedtobebetter.However,witha chainofmaliciousnodes,anattackercouldsimplymoveoffensivetransactions alonguntilthepropagationreachestherequireddepth.

Adynamicobservationmethodin[23]proposedtheENHOBS(enhanced observers)method,whichusedactiveobserverswithindistinguishabletraffic patternsforvaluabletransactioninspection.Todetectdoublespendingattack onthenetwork,aone-timescanwasrunontheblockchaintofindduplicate transactions.Whenmatchingtransactionsweredetected,analertwouldbe sentthroughthenetwork.Oncethealertwasreceivedandwasseenashaving verifiableproofofanattack,anytransactionsmatchingthesameinputvalue wouldbedroppedfromthememorypoolimmediately.Amethodproposedin [19]requirespeerstoconductadeeperinvestigationofconflictingtransactions andbroadcastalertstoallpeersifadoublespendingattackisdetected.This

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approachcancatchdouble-spendersonlyafteranattackhasoccurred,and thereisnopreventionforfutureoccurrence.Eveniftheattackerwasputona blacklist,theattackercouldcreateanewpseudonymeasilyandattackagain.

Alisteningperiodwasusedin[18]tomonitoralltransactionsthathavebeen previouslyreceivedandcheckediftherewereattemptstodoublespend.Ifthere were,analertwouldbesentouttothenetwork.Thiswillnotbeeffectivein detectingattacksbecausetheattackercandelaysendingtheattackingtransactionsuntilthemonitoringwindowhasexpired.Anothertechniqueproposedin [18]istorandomlyinsertobserversacrosstheP2Pnetwork,whichforwardsall transactionsinthemonitoringperiodtohelpdetectdoublespendingbecause atleastoneoftheobserverswillreceiveconflictingtransactions,ifthereare any.Ifanattackisdetected,analertmessagewillbesenttothenetwork.This approachissomewhateffective.However,itdoesnotdirectlypreventthedoublespendingattackorthepropagationoftheoffensivetransaction.Plus,the observer’strafficpatternscanbeeasilyanalyzedbyanattacker[24],whocan carryoutDDoSattacksagainsttheobserversandre-enabledoublespending.

Abroadcastingprogrammingstrategyin[25]proposedamechanismtoconstructspecialtransactionoutputstocombatdoublespending.Theoutputof abitcointransactionincludestwofields:thefirstoneindicatestheamountof bitcoinsthatwillbedeposited,thesecondfield,namedFR-P2PK(fixed-r-payto-pubkey),definestheconditionsunderwhichthisoutputcouldbespent.Such outputcanbespentwithasinglesignaturebuthasthepropertythatiftwo differentsignatureshavethesameoutput,whichindicatesadoublespending attack,theprivatekeyusedtosignthetransactionisrevealed.Thentheobservercangenerateathirdtransactionspendingthesameoutputandsendthe amounttohimself.

Adetectionmethodin[26]usesblindsignaturecryptographywithapublicly verifiabletime-basedpaymenttranscriptasdoublespendingcountermeasure. Forthecointobecashedbytheclient,thevendormustpresentaNIZK(noninteractivezero-knowledge)proof,whichwillbindthepaymenttranscriptto thetargetclientandtime.Anothersolutionpresentedin[26]isacoinrenewal protocolwhichprovidesacoinwiththreestages.Beforereachingthedates,the coincanbecashedorrenewed.Ifthecoinreachesthefirstdate,itcanonlybe renewed.Ifitreachestheseconddate,thecoinwillbetotallyvoid.

3SystemDesign

3.1DoubleSpending

Toimplementadoublespendingattack,theattackerfirstcreatestwotransactions.ThefirsttransactionTV,transactiontovendor,liststhevendoras therecipientofthepayment,andthesecondtransactionTA,transactionto attacker,liststheattackerastherecipientofthepayment.Theattacker’sgoal istohavethevendoracceptTVlongenoughtodeliverthegoodsorservicesand havetherestofthenetworkacceptTAsothattheattackerkeepsthemoney.

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Theattackersendsoutbothtransactions.TVistransmitteddirectlytothe vendor,whileTAisbroadcastedtotherestofthenetwork.Inorderforadoublespendingattacktobesuccessful,1)Theattackermustknowthevendor’s IPaddresssoitcanconnecttothevendordirectlyandsendTVtothevendor; 2)ThevendormustreceiveTVbeforeTAarrives[20]toensurethatTAwill beautomaticallydroppedwhenthevendoreventuallyreceivesit;3)TAmust beconfirmedintheblockchainfirstorelseTVwillactuallybeconfirmedand thatblockwillbecometheacceptedblockinthenetwork;4)Givenanequal propagationofbothtransactions,thereisa50percentchanceforeithertransactiontobeconfirmed.MorenodesarerequiredtoworkonTAthanonTVto increaseTA’slikelihoodofbeingacceptedintotheblockchain,anditrequires thatthevendoronlyseesTV.Becausetheneighborsofthevendorwilllikely getTVfirst(directlyfromthevendor)andthusdropTAratherthanpropagateittothevendor.Thiskindofdoublespendingcansucceedinfast-paying transactionsinwhichthevendordoesnotwaitforconfirmation.Figure1shows 0-confirmationdoublespending.

Figure1:0-confirmationDoubleSpending

Anotherformofdoublespendingattackisblockwithholdingattack[27], [28]inwhichtheattackerpoolsresourcestocreateablockBV,whichcontains TV.Theattackerblocksallotherconnectionstothevendorandpreventsthe vendorfromeverreceivingallotherblocksconfirmingTAwhilesendingBVthe momentitiscalculated.BVrepresentstheblockcontainingTV.Theattacker essentiallycreatesaforkintheblockchaincontainingBVthatwilleventually bedisregardedsincenootherminingpoolsworktoextendthissideofthefork [19].Thismethodofdoublespendingcansucceedinslow-paytransactions inwhichthevendorawaitsconfirmation.Figure2showstheN-confirmation doublespending[16].

3.2DesignAssumptions

1. Ourdesignisbasedonenergytradinginsmartgridandthepayment methodscanbetokens,moneyorders,checks,oranyotherpaymentsthat canbedefinedasuniqueandcanbereusable.

2. Ourdoublespendingcountermeasureisforslow-paymentsituations,such aspayingelectricitybillorbuyingrenewableenergybyconsumers.We assumetheattackerwilltrytousethesamepaymentinatmosttwo

consecutiveblocks,oneisapreviouslyvalidatedblockandtheotheris currentlycollectingtransactions.Iftherearetwoconflictingtransactions inonevalidatedblock,thetransactionwiththelatertimestampwilldecide theblock’sfinalstatus.

3. Ourdesignisbasedonourpreviouspaper[29]andaddsanotherreputation score,detection,tothereputationformula.ThescoreofdetectionDTis cumulativeandDTiscalculatedthesamewayasthevoter’sscore. DTi = ±

ThetotalreputationscoreiscalculatedwithOffensecontainsallother attackingbehaviorsexceptdoublespending.

Reputation = Resource + Defense + Availability

+ Offense + Service + Function

+ Detection + DoubleSpend

(3)

4. Whenanewtransactionarrives,everynodechecksifthetransaction timestampislaterthancurrenttimestamp[16],ifitis,thistransaction isillegalandwillbedropped.Otherwise,thetransactionwillbesavedin thenode’slocalmemorypool.

5. Wealsouseasimilarconsensusalgorithmasin[29]byaddingdetection stepstotheconsensusin[29].

Figure2:N-confirmationDoubleSpending

6. Allthefieldsinthebusinesstransactions,exceptthesetwofields:the timestampandthepayment’sreceiver[29],arecomparedtodecideiftwo transactionsareconflictingornot.

7. Theexperimentalenvironmentisthesameasin[29]

3.3DoubleSpendingAttackModels

1. Case1:SupposetheattackonlysendsavendorTV,thenonlythevendor’s localblockBVcontainsTV.WhenthevendorreceivestheblockBL,which representstheblockproposedbytheleader,andfindsout:

BV = BL

ThevendorwillfailBL.IfBLispassed,thevendorwilldropitslocal blockBVandtakeBL.Theattackerwillnotgetthegoodsorservice.

2. Case2:TVisinavalidatedblock.TAisaddedtothecurrentblock andwaitsforvalidation.ThedetectorwilldiscoverTAisaconflicting transactionwhencomparingitwiththetransactionsinthepreviously validatedblock.TAwillbereplacedwiththetransactionscreatedbythe detector(TDs).IfBLisvalidated,theattackerwillbepenalizedwiththe sameamountpaymentitmadeinTA.

3. Case3:IfbothTVandTAareputintooneblock,thetransactionwith thelatertimestampwillbediscoveredbythedetectorandreplacedby TDs,whichiscreatedbythedetector.Thedetectorisrewardedwiththe sameamountofpaymentinTA.IfBLisvalidated,theattackereither getstheserviceorkeepsitsmoney.Italsogetsapenaltyatthesame time.

4. Case4:Thevictimistheblockleader,whichisaspecialcaseforCase 1.BLisdropped,andtheattackerfaileditspurpose.Thedetectorisnot awareoftheattackandtherewillbenopenaltytotheattacker.

5. Case5:Thedetectoristhevictim,anotherspecialcaseforCase1.Any doublespendingwillbediscovered.

3.4DoubleSpendingDetectionProcedure

Figure3showsthedoublespendingdetectionflowchart.

1. Atthebeginningofeachtimeinterval,eachnodeselectsnodeswithat least90%ofthehighesttotalreputationscoreamongallnodesaspotential detectorpool.

2. Selectthenodewiththehighestdetectionscorefromthepotentialdetector poolasthedetector.

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3. Thedetectorcontinuouslychecksandbroadcastsconflictingtransactions againstthepreviousvalidatedblockandthetransactionsincurrenttime interval.Ifanoffendingtransactionisdiscovered,asarewardtothedetectorandapenaltytotheattacker,thedetectorwillcreatetwotransactions, onetransactionwillpaythesameamountasintheconflictingtransaction tothedetector,theotheronewillbeanoffendingreputationtransaction totheattacker.Theoffendingtransactionandthetwopenaltytransactionswillformawarningmessageandbebroadcastedtoallnodesinthe network.

4. Uponreceivingthedetector’swarningmessage,allnodesdroptheoffendingtransactionandaddthedetector’srewardtransactionandthe attacker’soffendingreputationtransactionintheirmemorypools.

Uponfinishingtheconsensus,allnodesupdatetheoffendingnode’sscoresaccordingly,andupdatethedetector’sreputationscoresthesamewayasupdating anode’svotingscores.

Figure3:Double-SpendDetectionFlowChart

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Table1:DetectionandConsensusPerformance

4ExperimentalResultsandAnalysis

4.1ExperimentalTransactionCreation

Figure4showshowtheexperimentaltransactionswerecreated.Whenitis timetosimulate,aloopnumberwasset,whichcontrolsthenumberoftransactionstobecreated.Ineachloop,onebusinesstransactionandonereputation transactionwerecreated.

Figure5showsthecasetestingflowchart.Ineachtestingcase,thetesting transactionswereeithersenttoaspecificnodeorwerebroadcastedtotheentire network.

4.2DetectionandConsensusPerformance

Table1andFigure6displaytheexperimentaldataandgraph,respectively. Thenormaldetectiontimewasfivesecondsforonedoublespendingdetection, whichwasnotaffectedbythenumberoftransactionsintheblock.Thetime wasjustnecessarytorunthedetectionprogram,whichperformedmuchbetter thanallthethreecasesin[23]:ofAllENHOBS,1%Skinny,and2%Skinny. Theconsensustimedidnotchangeuntilthenumberoftransactionsreached 400.Thepatternandvaluesoftheconsensusareliketheresultsweobtained previously[29].Thisisexpectedbecausetheconsensuswasconductedina similarway.

OurapproachusedmuchlessCPUtimethan[23].Ourdetectionnode used0.1%ofCPU,whilewitheverynodeactingasobserversin[23],theCPU utilizationjumpedfrom31%to50.6%,withthemaximumCPUutilization reachingashighas96%.Thisisunderstandablebecauseonedetectionnode willusemuchlessresourcesthanmanynodesasdetectionnodesatthesame time.

Wetestedallfivedoublespendingcases.Thedetectionrateis100%forC2, C3andC4,and0forC1andC5,asshowninFigure7.Wetestedthedetection rateswithblockchainstandardmaximumblocksize1.1MB,whichisequivalent to2000transactions.Worthnoticingisthatthedetectionrateis0whenthe doublespendingvictimisthevendorortheblockleader.Thisisbecausethe

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No.2, March 2023

4.3DetectionComplexity

ThecomplexityofthedoublespendingdetectionisO(N),whereNisthe numberoftransactionsinablock.Theconflictingtransactionwillbesearched throughoutthepreviouslyvalidatedblockandcurrentblock,sothedetection timeshouldbe2O(N).Thecomplexityofconsensusalgorithmis O(N 2)because thetransactionsintwoblockarecompared.

Figure5:Double-SpendCaseTestFlowChart blockwasdroppedafterallthenodesinthenetworkhadverifiedit.

Figure7:Double-SpendDetectionEffectiveness

4.4SecurityAnalysis

1. TVwasonlysenttothevendor,whereasothernodesreceivedTA.The blockBA,whichcontainedTA,wasvalidated,andthevendordroppedits localblockBV,whichcontainedTV.Theattackfailedtogetserviceand didnotgetpenalizedeitherbecausetheattackwasnotuncovered.

2. WhenTVwasincludedinthepreviousblock,andTAwasincurrent block,thedetectorfoundTAwasaconflictingtransactionandsenta rewardingtransactiontoitselfandareducingreputationtransactionto theattacker.Theblock,whichdidnotcontainTA,wasvalidatedbyall nodes.Theattackerdidnotrecoveritspayment.

3. WhenTVwasincurrentblockalreadyandTAwasbroadcastedagain, thedetectorfoundTAandsentarewardingtransactiontoitselfanda reducingreputationtransactiontotheattacker.TheblockcontainingTV wasvalidated.Theattackeronlyreceivedservice.

4. Whentheleaderwasattacked,thedetectionfailedbecausetheoffending transactionTAwasonlysenttotheleader.TheproposedblockBLbythe leaderfailedbecauseothernodesdidn’thavethesametransactionsasthe leader.Nodamagewasdonetoanynodesbutthesystemresourceswere wasted.Theattackeronlyreceivedserviceandfailedtogetitsmoney back.

5. Whenthedetectorwasattacked,thedoublespendingdetectionratewas 100%,thiswasbecausethedetectorhadbothTAandTV.Besidefailing togetitsmoneyback,theattackergottwopenaltytransactions,payment tothedetectorandlostitsreputationscores.

5Conclusion

Inthispaper,weproposedadoublespendingcountermeasure,whichcan effectivelydetectdoublespendingintwoconsecutiveblocks.Ourdesignputs detectionresultsintotheconsensusmechanism,handlestheoffendingtransaction,andhasamechanismtopreventtheperpetratortodoublespendagain. Comparingtoothercountermeasures,suchastimeperiodmonitoringandinsertingobservers,ourmethodconstantlymonitorstransactions,useslesscomputing resources,andreducesnetworktrafficandthemanagementoverhead.Another advantageofourdesignisourdetectionnodeisnotfixatedanditdoesnothave aspecificcommunicationpattern,whichwilllesslikelyattractDDoSattack. However,therearesomelimitationsforthecurrentresearch.Forexample,becauseitonlycheckstheconflictingtransactionsintwoconsecutiveblocks,it willnotbeabletodetectdoublespendingifatransactionconfirmationislarger than1.Anotherlimitationisthesingledetectormightbehavemaliciously,or itmightnotbeabletoprocessalltransactionsifthenumberoftransactionsis

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huge.Futureresearchwill:1)handlethesituationwhentheblockleaderisattacked;2)becheckingallkindsoftransactions,suchassybilattack,self-mining attack,business,andservicetransactions;3)expandthedetectiontotheentire blockchaintoovercomeN-confirmationsdoublespending;4)useasetofdetectortocheckthesecurityattacktransactions.Ofthefourfuturedirections,2 and3arepartsofthereasonswechosetohaveasinglenodetoperformthe detectionduties.

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