Turkish Naval Forces’ Thwarted Ambitions 1.
Introduction:
“Turkish Naval Forces have Set Sail Towards Becoming a Medium Global Force Projection Navy” was the title that Defence Turkey Magazine chose when they released their interview with the Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces Admiral Bülent Bostanoğlu (Issue 56 Interview, 2014-11-25). The Admiral informed Defence Turkey Magazine about Turkish Naval Forces’ vision, planned strategies, priorities, field of training activities and capabilities of Navy as well as the restructuring plans to be implemented in his term. Admiral Bostanoğlu gave a very bright picture with regards to ambitious procurement and modernization programs that aim to create a modern, versatile, interoperable and deployable navy through exploiting local defence infrastructure. Though almost every nation in the world with a coastline has a navy of some sort, the capability to deploy and sustain a meaningful naval force far afield (force projection) is a demanding and distinctive quality. This is a multifaceted and complex capability that demands having a naval tradition, the manpower, the logistic support chain and last but not the least the right platforms. This article will put some facts together to find out whether Turkish Naval Forces’ ambitions have some ground, or these ambitions are thwarted with the realities on the ground. With its centuries-old naval heritage and 60+ years of NATO experience the Turkish Navy definitely has the naval tradition, the manpower and the logistic support chain under its belt. Hence, the focus of this article is narrowed to the question of “having the right platforms.” The findings in this article conclude that although Turkish Naval Forces has the procurement plan, strategy and ambition for acquiring the right assets, the highly politicized structure in support of ruling party (AKP) and dysfunction of Turkish Defence Industry under the current leadership of mismanaged Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM) thwart Turkish Navy’s ambitions. Whether the top cadre of the Turkish Navy will do something to rectify this highly politicized and dysfunctional the procurement process is out of the scope of this article. However, the future does not bode well for the Turkish Navy, unless the top cadre of the Navy does something about politicization of the procurement process. 2.
Delays in the Turkish Navy Procurement Plans:
Our previous article on Turkish Navy (Turkish Navy’s Challenge with the Ruling Party) has succinctly and rightly summarizes Turkish Naval Forces’ Thwarted Ambition. “Analysing Turkish Navy, there are two different pictures. On one side Turkish Navy strives to acquire new capabilities (LPD, AIP Submarines etc.), modernize its equipment (GENESIS, MILGEM Corvettes, TF 2000 Frigates), become more involved in NATO and active in the region in order to defend the national rights at sea especially in Eastern Mediterranean and finally define new areas of interests such as Africa and Indian Ocean as part of its outgoing Naval Strategy. On the other side Turkish Government’s frequently changing political decisions and use of lucrative naval projects as an award in exchange of political loyalty seem to jeopardize Turkish Navy's future plans to acquire new capabilities and gain operation flexibility with a strong domestic naval industry. Moreover creating a non-marketing environment will do even more harm and even if AKP steps down from power in the near future, making foreign firms believe that Turkish Government always binds itself with the laws will take years.” -1-
Time has proved this conclusion right. The politically motivated stoppage of Turkey’s National Warship Project’s production schedule has created a window of vulnerability in Turkey’s naval defences in the face of rapidly rising maritime related risks and threats in the Black Sea, in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as in the face of the outstanding Aegean Sea disputes. The $3 billion “National Warship” Project, known by its Turkish abbreviation MILGEM, seeks to upgrade the Turkish fleet by replacing and augmenting its older foreignmade warships with eight domestically produced Ada-class anti-submarine warfare corvettes. After gaining experience from this project, Turkey intends to build a series of TF 2000 frigates. The TF 2000 anti-air warfare frigates will significantly advance the Turkish Navy’s transformation into a blue-water navy. However, in September 2013, upon the commissioning of the TCG Büyükada, the second of MILGEM’s eight Ada-class corvettes, the Turkish government abruptly cancelled RMK Marine’s (a subsidiary of the Turkish conglomerate Koç Holding A.Ş.) contract to build the remaining six corvettes., This cancellation was appeared to be part of the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political vendetta against the Koç family for providing assistance to anti-Erdogan protesters from a Koç-owned Istanbul hotel during the summer 2013 Gezi Park demonstrations. The third and forth corvettes will be produced by Turkey’s national shipyard while the government still evaluates bids for the building of the four remaining corvettes. Despite Bayar’s, the former Undersecretary for Defence Industries, optimistic forecasts that the government’s cancellations would delay the production schedule for the Ada-class corvettes by only one year, the cascade effect of the production stoppage is expected to create a four- to eight-year window of vulnerability for Turkey in the maritime domain vis-à-vis a resurgent Russia in the Black Sea and vis-à-vis an “anti-Turkey camp” in the Eastern Mediterranean. The cancellation of production schedule for the Ada-class corvettes will also set back the building of the TF 100 frigates, as well as the subsequent TF 2000s. Other major procurement and modernization programs of the Turkish Navy do not bode well either. Turkey’s largest ever single naval contract, a US $3.5 billion deal with a German shipyard for the co-production of six submarines, is facing major delays and disputes over modality according to Turkish officials and industry sources. In 2009, the Turkish government sealed the deal with Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW), a subsidiary of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, based in Kiel, to co-produce six U 214-type diesel AIP submarines for the Turkish Navy. The subs would be manufactured at a naval shipyard in Golcuk, northwestern Turkey. Production was to start in 2011, and the first sub was planned to be delivered in 2015. However, a senior procurement official familiar with the program, admitted the program will face four to six years delay. When asked about the reasons behind this delay he commented as “a set of setbacks varying from technical reasons to political motives.” Another veteran insider of SSM has commented that “Germans try hard to put the program back on track, however SSM officials take a political and opportunistic approach to the problem.” He also added that many of the critical posts in SSM have been filled with inexperienced pro-AKP officials and as a result almost every project overseen by the Undersecretariat faces similar problems. “These officials are not adequately qualified to make -2-
sound decisions for the best of the Navy, or the country. They look at the projects with greedy eyes and only seek to maximize pro-government business benefits” he further elaborated. In August, Turkish defence electronics specialist ASELSAN won the tender which defence analysts view as an ambitious contract to design, develop and produce a strategic, multi-mission phased-array radar known by its Turkish acronym, CAFRAD Faz-1. The CAFRAD will be similar to the ALPHA multi-mission M-2258 advanced lightweight phasedarray naval radar developed by Israel Aerospace Industries and Elta for blue water and littoral warfare support. ASELSAN, Turkey’s biggest defence firm, will work on CAFRAD with State Scientific Research Institute TÜBITAK. TÜBİTAK is known as the “powerhouse” of science based technology and has proved itself competitive in world stage especially in software and cryptology, both of which are crucial for the development of CAFRAD by national means only. However, TÜBİTAK has found itself in the front-line of Turkish Government’s patronage campaign against the non-AKP officials and over the last year nearly 1000 employees were fired. As TUBİTAK no more has the “right brains” to work on this project, the future work on the CAFRAD may not be in capable hands. The CAFRAD will define the primary antenna mast architecture for the TF-2000 and also the vessel’s combat management and area air defence missile systems. As a result of AKP’s patronage in TÜBİTAK, some major problems and delays may also be seen in this project. Turkey announced in late December 2013 that it had awarded a contract for the country’s first landing platform dock (LPD) to local shipyard Sedef, which is partnered with Spain’s Navantia. Although Sedef Shipyard did not have the experience, capacity or the infrastructure for building the sophisticated amphibious assault vessel, it had the right proAKP connections. The negotiations has been initiated with Sedef Shipyard in January 2014, but as of April 2015 contract negotiations have not been concluded in a deal. This extended period of contract negotiations brings about some questions on the selection process of Sedef Shipyard and its capacity to undertake the challenging LPD project. When asked for an honest opinion on this issue, an official in Navantia stated that “main construction would take place in Turkey, but Navantia would get nearly 900,000 manhours of work, including critical features like engines, the propulsion system and the integrated platform control system.” The official further commented that he doubts Sedef Shipyard’s capacity or will to accomplish this project. “In the beginning they did not even have a sound idea about what they were bidding for. They only considered this project as a big pie to bring much profit. As the details began to unfold during the contract negotiations, Sedef officials started to realize the complexity and pitfalls of the project.” he summarized. At this point, whatever the real reason behind the over-extended periods of contract negotiations or procurement plan delays, the looser by every means is the Turkish Navy. Turkish Navy has to continue its demanding and increasing tasks with the already over-aged fleet of warships. 3.
Strategic Implications of the Delays in Turkish Navy Procurement Plans:
With the annexation of Crimea, Turkey faces a stronger and bolder Russian naval power in the Black Sea. A resurgent Russia may be tempted to exploit its temporary naval dominance to alter current Black Sea energy exploitation and transportation arrangements more in its favour and to the detriment of Turkey. Turkey’s strategic vulnerability was not anticipated because of the view in Turkish policy circles that Turkey enjoys a relative parity with Russia in the Black Sea. However, Russia now possesses the Ukrainian navy’s -3-
submarine and several, if not most, of Ukraine’s 11 major surface combatants. Even without the Ukraine’s naval assets, Russia’s own new additions to its Black Sea Fleet will enable Moscow to dominate the region. Russia has already put to sea the first of its six Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates. All six frigates are designated for service in the Black Sea Fleet. Larger and more advanced than Turkey’s four modified Meko 200 Barbaros-class frigates, each of the six Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates will be the first vessels equipped with the state-of-the-art, supersonic Shtil-1 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) air defence system. Moscow expects all six frigates to be in service in the Black Sea Fleet by the end of 2016/ 2017. Within the same timeframe, Russia will also add six newly improved Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines to its Black Sea Fleet, way ahead of Turkey’s deployment of an equivalent number of Ada-class anti-submarine corvettes. These two Russian procurement programs alone will quickly tilt the balance of naval forces in Russia’s favour, giving Russia a significant strategic advantage for a window of four to eight years depending on the pace of Turkey’s resumed production schedule. A Mistral-class helicopter carrier (the Sevastapol) in the Black Sea Fleet would provide Russia with unprecedented power projection capability in its greater Black Sea region. Although this seems to be a nascent risk as France rescinded the sale as a result of Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. However, Turkey cannot discount the likely possibility that the Sevastapol will serve at the Black Sea Fleet base after which it was named. Russia’s reassertion of naval power in the Black Sea has already been accompanied by Moscow’s first action to change the status quo in relation to Black Sea energy exploitation. With the formal annexation of Crimea, Ukraine’s Black Sea Oil and Gas Company, ChronomorNaftohaz, was made into a whole-owned subsidiary of the Russian state-controlled joint-stock company Gazprom. Between the acquisition of ChronomorNaftohaz itself and Gazprom’s now exclusive license for all offshore energy development in Crimea’s continental shelf, the Russian energy giant has acquired an estimated $50 billion in capital assets. Turkey’s national oil and gas company TPAO has itself spent $2.5 billion on offshore energy exploration in Turkey’s continental shelf. Current estimates predict Turkey’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Black Sea contains 10 billion barrels of crude oil and two trillion cubic meters of natural gas. However as ultra-deep-water wells are drilled in the region, more hydrocarbon resources may be discovered. Even if Russia, whose continental shelf now projects from Crimea and therefore closer to Turkey, does not attempt to dispute the demarcation of Turkey’s EEZ, Turkey’s drilling platforms can no longer be defended as easily from Russian warships. The picture does not look bright on the Eastern Mediterranean either. When Turkey’s military planners and defence financing authorities decided to go ahead with the above mentioned procurement plans in early 2010s, the two seas of traditional disputes around Turkey, the Aegean and Mediterranean, appeared calmer: Worsening but still good relations with Syria, worsening but manageable relations with Israel, better than "just good" relations with Egypt, normalization with traditional rival Greece and the usual no-relations status with (Greek portion of) Cyprus. But, today as the Turkish Navy still waits for its new assets, the Mediterranean looked much less calm. AKP government’s enmity for Israel in the last few years has changed the naval -4-
balances on the Eastern Mediterranean against Ankara, especially in view of the Turkish state’s long dispute with Cyprus and the discovery of unknown quantities of natural gas reserves off Cypriot and Israeli shores. Turkey views Cyprus and Israel as rivals and has also threatened to militarily intervene if Cyprus continues with its plans to develop natural gas. Eastern and southern waters of Turkey also border countries that are growing increasingly hostile (Syria, Egypt and Libya) or nearly hostile (Lebanon) to Turkey. In summary, the strategic implications of delays in Turkish Navy procurement plans do not present a smart picture for the Turkish Navy or for Ankara. Every politically motivated and short-sighted move by the government and SSM results in four to six years loss on Turkish Navy’s modernization program. 4.
Conclusions:
The politically motivated and opportunistic approach of SSM to Turkish Naval Forces procurement and modernization projects have created a window of vulnerability in Turkey’s naval defences in the face of rapidly rising Russian naval power in the Black Sea and also in the face of the mounting anti-Turkey camp in the Eastern Mediterranean. The delayed production of the Ada-class anti-submarine corvettes, major delays and setbacks in the AIP submarine project, looming delays and problems for the TF-2000 and the over-extended contract negotiation process of the LPD will put Turkey at a strategic disadvantage in the face of mounting risks and threat in her environ. Until Turkey can build and deploy these naval assets, Turkish Navy’s deterrent capability will continue to erode. By the time Ankara can rectify the gap in naval capabilities created by politically motivated and short-sighted moves, Turkey will risk defending its national interests in the maritime domain adequately. As stated upfront; Turkish Naval Forces has the procurement plan, strategy and ambition for acquiring the right assets, however the highly politicized and dysfunctional Turkish Defence Industry under the leadership of mismanaged Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM) thwart Turkish Navy’s ambitions. The future does not bode well for the Turkish Navy, unless the top cadre of the Navy does something about politicization of the procurement process. In the past, admirals such as Güven Erkaya and Uğur Yigit were known to make ‘straight talks’ when it came to vital interests of the Turkish Navy and the country. Time will only show whether today’s admirals will make such straight talks, or they will choose to keep silent. One thing is certain and that is the decisions they make today will be judged by next generations tomorrow.
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