HHS ILSA Law Journal Issue 2 - 2023 by HHS ILSA Law Journal

CONTENTS Editor-in-Chief’s Note ............................................................................................................. 4 The Guest Editors .................................................................................................................... 5 Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. 7 The UN’s Role in the Development of Legal Frameworks Tackling Forced Environmental Migration By Aurélie Lévesque .................................................................................................................. 8 UNSC Resolution 1973 and its Impact on the Libyan Conflict By Tatiana Khokhlova ............................................................................................................. 32 The UN&I Project .................................................................................................................. 48 Improving Access to the UN bSy Youth By Artur Talpa .......................................................................................................................... 49 Global Imperialism by the United Nations Security Council and its Impact on Youth: A case study on the United Nations Missions in Haiti By Tolga Doğan ....................................................................................................................... 64 UNjustified and UNethical: A Critical View on the UN Unpaid Internship System By Soraya Oumansouri ............................................................................................................ 85 The Youth and the Conference of the Parties - Climate Change By André De Jesus Ramos ..................................................................................................... 109

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF’S NOTE Dear readers, On behalf of the Editorial Board, it is my distinct pleasure to officially present you the second issue of the HHS ILSA Law Journal for 2023. First launched in 2016 under the auspices of the Hague Chapter of the International Law Students Association (HHS ILSA), the HHS ILSA Law Journal invites students and alumni of the International and European Law Programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences to respond to our biannual Call for Submissions. We aim to promote scholarly reflection on current and emerging topics of International and European law. By encouraging the critical study of contemporary developments, the Journal strives to give voice to an array of perspectives in identifying impending challenges, as well as offering possible solutions to them. This issue of the Journal focuses on the topic of The Role of the United Nations in the Development and Enforcement of International & European Law. The UN has risen to become the most important international organisation in the world. With its organs, subsidiaries, and specialised agencies tackling a wide range of crucial issues to the functioning of the international community, it has borne witness to how technological innovations, the perpetuation of conflicts, and transforming social norms are redefining the boundaries of international law. It is on these shifts that we wish to reflect on by publishing comprehensive articles which discuss the successes achieved and challenges encountered by the UN in the development and implementation of international law. We are pleased to present you with a great selection of contributions that illustrates the diversity and pertinence of the issues explored in this publication. We hope that you enjoy this issue and find its contents curious, stimulating, and thought-provoking. On behalf of the editorial team, I wish you a pleasant read! Ms Vedika Sajnani 2023-2024 Editor-in-Chief of the HHS ILSA Law Journal

THE GUEST EDITORS Ms Szilvia Csevár LL.M. Ms Szilvia Csevár is a lecturer in Public International Law at The Hague University of Applied Sciences (THUAS). She also holds a researcher position at the Chair of UN Studies in Peace and Justice, shared between Leiden University and THUAS. Her current research is focusing on environmentally fuelled (sexual) violence against Indigenous women with a particular focus on the interaction between environmental factors, colonialism and the root causes of conflict. She was one of the contributing authors of the UN report Gender, Climate and Security, coordinated by the UN Environment Programme. Ms Csevár worked with the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone for several years as a Legal Researcher. Other professional activities included serving as Registrar with the International Peoples Tribunal on Crimes against Humanity in Indonesia 1965, as well as chairing the working group International Protection of Human Rights of the Dutch section of the International Commission of Jurists. Mr David den Dunnen LL.M. Mr David den Dunnen is a lecturer and researcher in international law at The Hague University of Applied Sciences (THUAS) since 2010. He currently teaches courses on the law of international organizations, international security, and international relations. Mr den Dunnen coordinates the modules Introduction to Law and Conflict, Peace and Security. He serves as a tutor (study and career coach) and mentor for students of all years, and as a coach of the team representing THUAS to the National Model United Nations in New York. He participates in the research group of United Nations Studies in Peace and Justice and has published on the role of non-permanent members in the UN Security Council. Previously, Mr den Dunnen served as the editor of Atlantisch Perspectief, a Dutch journal on international security (2003-2010). In 2001 he conducted an internship at the European Parliament. Mr den Dunnen holds an LL.M. in European, international and comparative law from Maastricht University (2002) with an exchange to Université d’Aix-Marseille III, France.

Ms Christine M.G. Tremblay, LL.M. (adv.) Ms Christine M.G. Tremblay has been a lecturer in the International and European Law Programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences (THUAS) since 2015. She is also a researcher for United Nations Studies in Peace and Justice research group. Her research focuses on targeting the invisibility of women in the international criminal justice system as well as how gender is constructed by international law and the United Nations system. Additionally, she is a PhD Candidate at Leiden University working on the impact of feminist scholarship on International Criminal Law. Ms Tremblay obtained her law degree (BCL and LLB diplomas) from McGill University in 1999. She is a qualified lawyer and member of the Quebec Bar. After working at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, she completed her LLM (Adv) in Public International Law with a specialisation in International Criminal Law at Leiden University (2001-2002). Since the foundation of the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies in 2003, she has occupied the position of General Coordinator, managing and coordinating the activities and the finances of the Centre and coordinating the Marie Curie Project sponsored by the European Commission. She was also the Managing Editor of the Leiden Journal of International Law from 2008-2011. Ms Tremblay is currently a member of the Advisory Board of Cyber Rights Organisation (CRO) and participates as a judge in The Hague Inter-University Law Debate Tournament and the Concours Inter-Universitaire de Débat de La Haye organised by the Corax Foundation. Her areas of expertise are Public International Law, International Criminal Law, International Humanitarian Law, Feminist scholarship and Gender and Law.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The ILSA Law Journal would first like to thank the authors who shared their outstanding contributions in this issue. We are incredibly grateful for the unwavering trust, patience, and enthusiasm they showed towards the realization of this publication. We would also like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the Guest Editors: Ms Szilvia Csevár, Mr David den Dunnen and Ms Christine M.G. Tremblay. We are deeply thankful for the unparalleled support and guidance they have provided us in conducting the selection and editorial process. The Journal would also like to thank the 2023-2024 ILSA Management Board for its continuous support and encouragement. We would like to extend our gratitude to President and Treasurer Mr Tolga Doğan, Vice-President and Head of Social Events Mx Paolo Quattrone, Head of Main Events Mr Áron Moravecz, Head of Marketing Ms Theodora Mrejeru, and Editor-in-Chief of the HHS ILSA Law Journal Ms Vedika Sajnani. Finally, we would like to thank the editorial team for their diligence and determination. The Journal would like to express its most sincere appreciation for the participation of its members including Secretary Ms Eliane Solis Vazquez, Managing Editor Mr Illia Gats and Editors Ms Aiysha Malik, Ms Alessandra Cao, Ms Alice Frîncu, Mr Brandon Fitzpatrick, Ms Emily Warchala, Ms Grace O'Halloran, Ms Hannah Leonie Doerpinghaus, Ms Lara Dietel, Ms Olesia Liashevich, Ms Orla Harris, Ms Romina Ruszin, Mr Tikhon Filonov, Ms Victoria Peña Morante, Ms Wiktoria Sumpf, Ms Yemissrach Miggelbrink and Mr Zoltán Miholics. The selection process was solely conducted by the Guest Editors so as to avoid any bias and to ensure that the selection was based on merit.

The UN’s Role in the Development of Legal Frameworks Tackling Forced Environmental Migration

By Aurélie Lévesque*

Abstract The following article explores the issue of forced environmental migration, its root causes, and its effects on vulnerable populations. A brief background to climate change, its effects and the causes and impacts of forced environmental migration is given, followed by an evaluation of the interrelatedness of human rights and climate change. The issue presented is the lack of legal recognition of Environmentally Displaced Persons (EDPs) in international law, leading to increased vulnerability from the lack of legal protection offered, and the consequent risk of violation of their rights. The historical and current involvement of the United Nations as a developer and enforcer of international law is then assessed, and an analysis of potential solutions to be investigated to address the issue of EDPs. The solutions presented include the possible expansion of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the implementation of a new international legal framework, and the adoption of regional legal frameworks and cooperation efforts as possible solutions for the legal recognition of EDPs, as well as the assistance that could be provided. The article concludes that the UN should promote regional cooperation in order to foster a cooperative solution on a global level.

* LL.B. Candidate, International and European Law Programme, The Hague University of Applied Sciences.

I. Introduction Earth’s climate has seen significant changes over its history. Natural cycles of cooling and warming have been taking place for a long time, such as extreme periods of ice ages last seen 11,000 years ago.1 The concept of ‘climate change’ itself is defined by scientists as “the significant variation of average weather conditions […] over several decades or longer”.2 However, temperatures are increasing at historically unprecedented rates,3 and it has been established that the rapidly warming climate is now directly related to human activity.4 Human activity produces a significant amount of greenhouse gases, that trap more of the Sun’s energy, leading to global changes in atmospheric and environmental conditions.5 These include stronger, more extreme, and destructive natural disasters, such as hurricanes, droughts, flooding, and rising sea levels.

These meteorological events are more often

affecting low and lower-middle-income countries, as they are geographically located where more natural disasters occur. Migration has historically been the natural human response to changes in an environment. The destructive nature of these extreme events on a socio-economically vulnerable population has led to a new migration pattern; namely, a pattern known as ‘forced environmental migration’. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has defined environmental migrants as “persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad”.6 From the continuously exacerbated effects of climate change, there is currently an emerging trend of increasing migration due to parallel ongoing environmental factors.7 Scholars now argue that it is insufficient to consider the issue of environmental degradation solely concerning the ‘How Do We Know Climate Change Is Real?’ (NASA, 2023) <https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/> accessed 28 September 2023. 2 ‘What is climate change?’ (The World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal, 2023) <https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/overview> accessed 28 September 2023. 3 NASA (n 1). 4 ibid. 5 ibid. 6 IOM ‘Discussion Note: Migration and the Environment’ (1 November 2007) MC/INF/288. 7 Erika Pires Ramos, ‘Climate Change, Disasters and Migration: Current Challenges to International Law’ in Oliver C. Ruppel, Christian Roschmann, and Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting (eds), Climate Change: International Law and Global Governance Volume II: Policy, Diplomacy and Governance in a Changing Environment (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 2013). 1

environment; it is also today an issue of human rights protection and respect, especially for populations in socio-economically vulnerable positions.8 By 2050, an estimated 200 million people will have had to leave their homes due to environmental degradation and natural disasters stemming from climate change.9 Scholars and the international community itself have begun to research and assess the situation to find a way to ensure the protection of human rights and dignity. However, when looking at existing instruments of international law aimed at protecting refugees, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention, the definition of a refugee in Article 2 does not comprise a clause that includes environmental migrants. This is partially because the Convention was adopted before the idea of climate change itself even came to the attention of the international community, and because climate change is not a source of persecution, as it does not discriminate. Thus, environmental migrants are not legally recognized under international law, enhancing their vulnerabilities as there is no legal obligation for states to uphold and maintain their rights. This article aims to provide context for the reasons behind the rise in forced environmental migration and evaluate potential solutions which the UN and the international community could implement in order to address the emerging crisis. Three potential strategies to tackle the issue will be presented; the expansion of the 1951 Refugee Convention, creating a new international legal framework to provide legally binding obligations for states to respect towards EDPs, and lastly the adoption of new regional frameworks. The article recommends that the best, most plausible solution to the issue is the UN´s promotion of regional cooperation and the implementation of regional frameworks towards tackling climate migration. II. Causes and impact of forced environmental migration A. Key environmental factors triggering migration

8 9

ibid. ibid.

Climate change creates longstanding effects on the environment. Scientists estimate that human activity as early as the 1830s began to affect the Earth’s climate.10 Since the industrial revolution in the 19th century,11 global temperatures have steadily increased. As the human population has exponentially grown and continues to do so, natural resources have continued to be used, new technologies have rapidly developed, and greenhouse gas emissions have risen. The causes of climate change itself are due to several different types of human activity. Generating power through non-renewable sources such as fossil fuels is highly prevalent today,12 as the energy industry tries to cater to the planet’s ever-growing population. However, the use of non-renewable sources such as fossil fuels, albeit a cheap, reliable, and easily obtained source of energy causes carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions from the burning of coal, oil, or gas.13 Both these gases cause serious damage to the environment. The manufacturing of goods also produces emissions from burning fossil fuels to produce goods used by populations worldwide. These include textiles, electronics, plastic, and other materials such as iron or steel.14 The process of logging to create additional farmland also exacerbates greenhouse gas emissions. Logging involves cutting down large areas of forests in order to create farmland, amongst other things. Each year, approximately 13 million hectares of forest are destroyed.15 Though this is intended to be able to meet the high demand for food for the 8 billion people living on Earth, cut-down trees release the carbon they stored into the atmosphere, further enhancing the greenhouse effect. Due to globalisation, transport is also a contributor to greenhouse gas emissions.16 Most modes of transport (cars, trucks, ships, and planes) run on fossil fuels producing greenhouse gases. Globally, the transportation of goods and people accounts for one-quarter of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions.17 Lastly, food production is one of the largest producers of greenhouse gases worldwide. Livestock greenhouse gas emissions are 44 per cent methane, which is the second most 10

Roz Pidcock, ‘Scientists clarify starting point for human-caused climate change’ (Carbon Brief, 24 August 2016) <https://www.carbonbrief.org/scientists-clarify-starting-point-for-human-caused-climate-change/> accessed 12 August 2023. 11 ibid. 12 ‘Causes and Effects of Climate Change’ (United Nations Climate Action, 2023) <https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/causes-effects-climate-change> accessed 12 August 2023. 13 ibid. 14 ibid. 15 ibid. 16 ibid. 17 ibid.

important contributor to greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, following carbon dioxide.18 Additionally, the high demand for farmland leads to deforestation, desertification, and land degradation creating a myriad of environmental consequences.19 B. Environmental effects of climate change The causes of climate change inevitably lead to a series of consequences for the environment. Firstly, hotter atmospheric and surface temperatures from the greenhouse effect.20 As greenhouse gas concentration rises, so does the global surface temperature. In addition, wildfires start and spread more easily and rapidly due to the hotter conditions, and desertification caused by hotter temperatures is much more frequent.21 Secondly, destructive storms such as hurricanes are more frequent and severe, causing drastic destruction as extreme environmental conditions exacerbate the strength and severity of storms.22 Thirdly, there are increased droughts. Hotter temperatures due to the aggravated greenhouse gas effect change water availability, causing scarcity in some regions.23 Consequently, agricultural droughts affect crop production, and ecological droughts destroy ecosystems and create vulnerabilities.24 Additionally, desertification is rapidly increasing, reducing farmland, and drying out water sources.25 Next, the threat of warming and rising oceans is often ranked as the largest threat to populations. Water expands as it warms, thus melting ice caps and glaciers causing sea levels to rise, threatening coastal communities and islands.26 Warmer waters also lead to more extreme tropical storms, including hurricanes and cyclones. The ocean is also the largest carbon sink on Earth.27 Rising levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere have led to oceans reaching their maximum capacity for carbon dioxide storage, causing a surplus in the atmosphere.28 Furthermore, large amounts of carbon dioxide in the ocean change the pH 18

‘Methane emissions’ (European Commission, 2023) <https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/oil-gas-andcoal/methane-emissions_en> accessed 12 August 2023. 19 United Nations Climate Action (n 12). 20 ibid. 21 ibid. 22 ibid. 23 ibid. 24 ibid. 25 ibid. 26 ibid. 27 “The Ocean - the world’s greatest ally against climate change” (United Nations Climate Action, 2023) <https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/climate-issues/> accessed 28 September 2023. 28 United Nations Climate Action (n 12).

levels, and increased acidity of the ocean endangers marine life and coral reefs.29 Lastly, climate change leads to a significant loss in biodiversity, threatening the collapse of ecosystems and food chains,30 causing potentially irreversible damage. It is estimated that one million species are at risk of becoming extinct in the future.31 C. Causes of forced environmental migration The environmental consequences of climate change affect primarily the most vulnerable populations on the planet. This is mainly due to a lack of financial resources to mitigate the effects of climate change, such as the use of dams preventing extreme flooding. Consequently, affected populations are forced to migrate after extreme meteorological events, as their homes and livelihoods are destroyed after extreme storms or droughts. As these events increase in frequency due to the exacerbation of climate change’s effects, an increasing number of people must migrate elsewhere due to extreme environmental factors. This is known as forced environmental migration. Climate change-driven migration can be categorized in two ways; slow-onset (climate processes) and fast-onset (climate events) migration.32 Slow-onset migration occurs from ‘slower’ climate processes, including sealevel rise, salinization of agricultural land, desertification, and growing water scarcity.33 These climatic processes occur over longer periods of time and are the primary drivers for migration in places such as Tuvalu.34 Fast-onset migration concerns ‘faster’ climate events, such as flooding, storms (cyclones, hurricanes, etc.), and glacial lake outburst floods.35 Extreme events such as flash floods cause large population movements in a short amount of time, due to the almost instant destruction of habitat and livelihoods. Such events drive a significant amount of migration in countries such as Bangladesh, where extreme flooding now frequently occurs. In addition, Bangladesh has been targeted by numerous cyclones,

ibid. ibid. 31 ibid. 32 International Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change (IOM 2008), No. 31, 17. 33 ibid. 34 Jane McAdam, ‘Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer’ (2011) 23 International Journal of Refugee Law 2. 35 IOM (n 32) 18. 30

including one of the most destructive, Cyclone Sidr, with 8 million people affected by the storm.36 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports four key findings relevant to migration due to climate change effects. These are, firstly, a reduction of available water,37 either by salinization or drought. Secondly, a decrease in crop yields, mainly caused by droughts, water salinization, or extreme flooding events.38 Thirdly, the risk of extreme and coastal flooding, or violent storms,39 and lastly, negative overall impacts on health, especially for the poor and elderly.40 D. Impacts of forced environmental migration Having established the causes leading to forced environmental migration, it is important to note the socio-economic consequences of increasingly frequent forced environmental migration due to the exacerbation of climate change effects. Forced migration hinders development in several ways.41 First, it increases pressure on and strains urban infrastructure and services.42 With a higher population density, host urban settlements find an increased pressure on resources such as food, water, housing, and healthcare.43 In addition, overcrowding and inadequate infrastructure in seen in informal settlements for climate migrants, as host areas often cannot cater to such large influxes. Secondly, economic growth is undermined.44 Climatic processes and events result in the loss of livelihoods or migrants leaving the climate-affected areas, which consequently leads to a decrease in economic activity in their area of origin. Likewise, host areas also find an undermining of activity, as overcrowding limits job opportunities, resulting in unemployment and poverty.

‘Disaster Information: Bangladesh: Tropical Cyclone’ (Asian Disaster Reduction Centre, 15 November 2007) <https://www.adrc.asia/view_disaster_en.php?lang=&KEY=1111> accessed 17 August 2023. 37 European Parliament, ‘The concept of a ‘climate refugee’: towards a possible definition’ (European Parliament Briefing, October 2021) PE 698.753, 4. 38 ibid. 39 ibid. 40 ibid 5. 41 IOM (n 32) 10. 42 ibid. 43 ibid. 44 ibid.

Third, there is an increasing risk of conflict between the host area and incoming migrants.45 Social tension and conflict can arise from competing for limited resources and job opportunities between the migrants and host communities. Lastly, these consequences can also lead to poor overall health.46 Overcrowding and lack of access to medical care can result in worsening health. In addition, crowded temporary settlements for migrants and lack of access to clean water can lead to the spread of diseases. An example of this would be the slums in Bangladesh’s capital, Dhaka. Research has proven how a lack of access to water and proper sanitation and hygiene facilities leads to the spread of diseases and increased health risks to climate migrants living in the slums.47 III. Human rights and forced environmental migration The causes and effects of climate change are proven to be closely related to the causes of forced environmental migration. As climate change continues to create more extreme weather patterns, forced environmental migration will be enhanced. This has clear socio-economic and humanitarian consequences, as well as concerns for the protection of migrant’s rights. However, scholars and the international community have yet to find a clear solution to the issue. The problem, at its root, begins with a definition. The 1951 Refugee Convention was created after the Second World War. At the time, millions had fled their homelands in search of refuge. Government responses resulted in the composition of the first international agreements providing travel documents and a clear status to the first recognized refugees.48 With these early agreements, the international community began to assemble a convention to protect the human rights of those forced to flee armed conflicts and persecution, known today as the 1951 Refugee Convention. The UNHCR was initiated by the UN General Assembly in 1951 and was created with the specific mandate of protection of refugees.49 Together with the Convention, the UNHCR aims at protecting and providing aid to refugees worldwide.

ibid. ibid. 47 Ayatullah Khan, ‘Livelihood, WASH related hardships and needs assessment of climate migrants: evidence from urban slums in Bangladesh’ (2022) 8 Heliyon 1. 48 “The 1951 Refugee Convention” (UNHCR, 2023) <https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/who-we-are/1951refugee-convention> accessed 25 August 2023. 49 Nina Hall, ‘Moving Beyond its Mandate? The UNHCR and Climate Change Displacement’ (2013) 4 Journal of International Organizations 91. 46

The original definition of a refugee, as stated in the 1951 Refugee Convention, is worldrenowned and at the core of all refugee and cross-border displacement matters. The concept of a ‘refugee’ is defined as any person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable […] to return to it”. 50 In the case of forced environmental migration, the use of correct terminology is of utmost importance for future policy development, as this allows for clear identification of rights and obligations.51 Whilst many would assume victims of forced environmental migration, when migrating in a cross-border scenario, could be deemed ‘refugees’, this is far from the case in reality. Under the Convention, those displaced only qualify as refugees if they were displaced due to a “well-founded fear of persecution”.52 However, the proof of persecution is too high a burden of proof for victims of forced environmental migration.53 Climate change itself is not a persecutor because it does not discriminate.54 Similarly, climate change is not the cause of environmental displacement, it “exacerbates social vulnerability which contributes to displacement”.55 The Convention does not acknowledge climate change or its hazards as grounds to claim refugee status.56 In addition, scholars and the international community have been quick to reject the term ‘environmental refugee’, as it not only creates an “oversimplified view of the problem”57 but it also confuses their rights with “the rights of conventional refugees”.58 Hence, scholars use the term ‘environmentally displaced persons’ (EDPs) “so as to not confuse their rights with conventional refugees”.59 However, this creates a cause for concern for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). As EDPs are not legally ‘refugees’, they are not covered by the Convention, nor protected by the UNHCR’s charter. 50

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) art 1(a)(2). 51 Victoria Mence, Alex Parrinder, ‘Environmentally related international migration: Policy Challenges’ in Marie McCauliffe and Khalid Koser (eds), A Long Way to Go: Irregular Migration Patterns, Processes, Drivers and Decision-making (ANU Press 2017). 52 Refugee Convention (n 50). 53 Narayan Subramanian, Johannes Urpelainen, ‘Addressing cross-border environmental displacement: when can international treaties help?’ (2014) 14 Springer 25. 54 Shweta Jayawardan, ‘Vulnerability and Climate Change Induced Human Displacement’ (2017) 17 Consilience 103. 55 ibid. 56 European Parliament (n 37). 57 Subramanian and Urpelainen (n 53). 58 European Parliament (n 37). 59 Subramanian and Urpelainen (n 53).

This therefore creates a legal protection gap for an increasingly large group of highly vulnerable individuals. This begs the question: does international human rights law have inherent safeguards to address the crisis? In short, the answer is no. Due to the lack of consensus between scholars, politicians, the international community, and the UN itself,60 few legal developments and policy changes have taken place around tackling forced environmental migration and providing legal assistance for EDPs. Despite a myriad of legal research, various opinions exist among top scholars and experts on the topic. Section VI will address these in more detail. However, there still exists the issue of a clear lack of human rights protection and enforcement for EDPs, as they do not fall into a distinct, clearly defined category. Article 25 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) outlines the right to an adequate standard of living, including food, clothing, shelter, social services, and healthcare.61 For EDPs in Bangladesh, most are displaced to its capital, Dhaka, where an estimated 3.5 million live in slums due to losing their homes and livelihoods elsewhere in the country.62 The fundamental rights outlined in the UDHR are not accessible to EDPs living in slums, where there is a lack of infrastructure, access to clean water and sanitation, and appropriate shelter.63 In addition, Article 6 UDHR states that everyone has the right to recognition before the law.64 EDPs are not yet recognized in most national and international legal systems, putting them at risk of mistreatment due to lack of legal recognition. Furthermore, international law is now tasked with handling a completely new challenge: the issue of rising sea levels and the risk of the disappearance of entire states, such as Tuvalu. Tuvalu is expected to be below sea level by 2050.65 The nation-state will have to face the legal challenges of nationality and representation while catering for homeless citizens after the sea levels have risen. Article 15 UDHR outlines the right to a nationality, which is internationally respected. Yet, if nations 60

ibid. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) UDHR art 25. 62 “Climate migration drives slum growth in Dhaka” (Cities Alliance, 10 September 2009) <https://www.citiesalliance.org/newsroom/news/urban-news/climate-migration-drives-slum-growth-dhaka> accessed 11 November 2023. 63 ibid. 64 UDHR (n 61) art 6. 65 Pat Brennan, ‘NASA-UN Partnership Gauges Sea Level Threat to Tuvalu’ (NASA Sea-Level Change, 15 August 2023) <https://sealevel.nasa.gov/news/265/nasa-un-partnership-gauges-sea-level-threat-to-tuvalu/> accessed 27 September 2023. 61

such as Tuvalu disappear, how can the UN and the international community tackle the issue of potential statelessness? Additionally, if international law still lacks legal recognition of EDPs, how can citizens of disappearing nation-states be recognized before the law? Some scholars argue that the principle of protection and non-refoulement, which is the idea that refugees should not be forced to return to their countries of origin, should be extended to EDPs on moral grounds.66 EDPs may be able to rely on non-refoulement obligations under international human rights law,67 if the appropriate protective framework is developed. In practice, however, there exists the issue of slow and fast-onset migration. For the principle of non-refoulement to be applicable, the threat must be sufficiently severe and ‘imminent’.68 In theory, a severe climate-change-induced weather event, such as a particularly violent cyclone may qualify as a ‘severe and imminent threat’, as it concerns fastonset migration. However, sea level rise or desertification may fail to qualify as ‘imminent’, and migration anticipating slow-onset climate change impacts may be classified as voluntary,69 as opposed to a severe natural disaster, such as a cyclone. Thus, if a legal protection gap for EDPs exists, and international law lacks inherent safeguards to assist EDPs, it is evident that a development in international policy must take place to address the crisis. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, over 318 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced by climate events such as floods, windstorms, or droughts.70 In 2020 alone, 30.7 million people were affected by a climate change-induced event.71 The growing number of EDPs worldwide demonstrates why changes must take place to legally recognize EDPs, to ensure the protection of their human rights in international law. IV. Involvement of the United Nations and international law A. Historical approaches towards the issue The push for a recognition of EDPs in international law and politics is only a very recent one, as is the push towards climate action. Though the concept of climate change impacting 66

Subramanian and Urpelainen (n 53). Mence and Parrinder (n 51). 68 ibid. 69 ibid. 70 European Parliament (n 37). 71 ibid. 67

the environment was first recognized by the scientific community in the 1950s,72 the tangible and visible impacts of climate change were far off. When signed, the 1951 Refugee Convention gave no regard to EDPs as they simply did not exist yet. Due to the lack of prominent cases concerning forced environmental migration, the issue is only newly researched and regulated. The UNHCR itself does not endorse terms such as ‘environmental refugee’ and ‘climate refugees’, as they have no legal basis in international law, and the use of such terms could lead to confusion of environmental effects with persecution, “potentially undermining refugee standards”.73 Scholars further argue that the term ‘refugee’ implies forced displacement due to a particular form of persecution; and though this may apply in circumstances of fast-onset migration, the application of the term becomes ambiguous in situations of slow-onset migration, where displacement may be considered more preventative rather than necessary.74 In addition, the UNHCR has made it clear that it does not support a revision nor expansion of the Convention to encompass EDPs.75 B. Current approaches & stance The 2020 case Teitiota v. New Zealand (Teitiota) proved to be a landmark case in the development of climate migration law, as the UN Human Rights Committee notes that under human rights law, migrants displaced across borders due to climate change “have the right to not be returned to a country where they would face a serious risk of irreparable harm to their right to life”.76 This confirmed that non-refoulement obligations, as discussed in section III, are also applicable to EDPs, where there is a risk of an infringement of the right to life. However, the Committee stated that “the risk must be personal”77 and “cannot derive merely from the general conditions in the receiving State”.78 By implementing strict requirements, Teitiota provides a new legal precedent for future cases of EDPs seeking refuge across international borders. 72

Patrick Pester, ‘When did scientists first warn humanity about climate change?’ (LiveScience, 12 December 2021) <https://www.livescience.com/humans-first-warned-about-climate-change> accessed 18 August 2023. 73 ‘UNHCR master glossary of terms’ (UNHCR, 2023) <https://www.unhcr.org/glossary> accessed 2 December 2023. 74 ibid. 75 ibid. 76 UNHRC ‘Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2728/2016’ (2020) CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016. 77 ibid para 9.3. 78 ibid.

Though the UNHCR has historically been reluctant to recognize EDPs as refugees, 79 there have been changes in the UN’s current stance towards climate change and the interrelated nature of human rights. In October 2021, the General Assembly (UNGA) adopted resolution 48/13, which recognized the “human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment”.80 The resolution states that the “pollution of air, land and water” and that “unsound management of chemicals and waste” can lead to an interference to the enjoyment of all human rights. In addition to this, the UNGA acknowledged that the consequences of environmental degradation are felt “most acutely” by the already vulnerable populations, including those living in poverty, indigenous communities, as well as women and girls.81 This development is a landmark step in the recognition of climate change and human rights within international law. Though landmark rulings and resolutions are bringing about a change in perspective and recognition towards EDPs, the UNHCR still argues against an expansion of the Convention, as well as the implementation of a new treaty or convention. The UNHCR asserts that those displaced through environmental change can still rely on the protection of their own national governments, whilst this is not the case for traditional refugees who are often persecuted by the State itself.82 However, as contended by the European Parliament’s briefing, the reality is different. Regions primarily in the global south, struck by climate events and disasters, will struggle to recover from such events, as they often aggravate existing structural socioeconomic problems and in turn decelerate disaster recovery.83 Despite new rulings and the recognition of the interrelatedness of human rights and climate change, the current approaches towards EDPs and forced environmental migration are slow to change from historical approaches. Thus, both international organizations and scholars encourage the endorsement of legislation to recognize and support climate-displaced persons.84 V. Focus: Bangladesh’s climate change vulnerability

Mence and Parrinder (n 51). UNGA Res 48/13 (8 October 2021) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/48/13. 81 ibid. 82 European Parliament (n 37). 83 ibid. 84 ibid. 80

Bangladesh, located in Southeast Asia and bordered by India, ranks as one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change, and specifically, sea level rise.85 The country is home to the Ganges River delta and the Sundarbans, the world’s largest continuous mangrove forest, and a UNESCO World Heritage Site.86 Despite ranking 7th for countries most vulnerable to climate change, it only produces 0.56 per cent of global emissions contributing to the greenhouse effect.87 Its vulnerability to climate change is explained by its topography. Two-thirds of the country is less than 5 meters above sea level, located on floodplains.88 Due to the Ganges River delta, Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to flooding and salinity intrusion.89 Currently, an estimated 14.6 million people located in coastal areas of Bangladesh are vulnerable to flooding, due to the increased frequency of cyclone storm surges.90 By 2050, this number is expected to rise to 18.5 million under “moderate climate change scenarios”.91 Cyclones in South Asia have not only increased in frequency but also in severity.92 As covered in section II, exacerbated climate change effects resulting in warmer oceans fuel stronger cyclones, as heat is a cyclone’s principal source of power. 93 Stronger, more intense cyclones cause larger storm surges, worsening the damage, particularly in areas with unstable informal settlements. Storm surges, as well as sea level rise, cause soil and water salinization; impacting crops, livelihoods, ecosystems, and the overall health of the population. Bangladesh is not only highly vulnerable environmentally due to its topography, but also on a socio-economic level. Bangladesh is classified as a lower-middle-income country,94 meaning its GNI per capita ranges between 1,036 USD and 4,045 USD. Approximately 50 85

A.N.M Muniruzzaman, ‘Security implications of climate change: A case study of Bangladesh’ (Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies 2013). 86 Diego Rojas, ‘How the Climate Crisis is impacting Bangladesh’ (Climate Reality Project, 9 December 2021) <https://www.climaterealityproject.org/blog/how-climate-crisis-impacting-bangladesh> accessed 12 August 2023. 87 ibid. 88 ‘Bangladesh and Maldives Respond to Climate Change Impacts’ (World Bank, 7 December 2012) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2012/12/07/bangladesh-maldives-respond-to-climatechange-impacts> accessed 18 August 2023. 89 ibid. 90 Muniruzzaman (n 85). 91 ibid. 92 ibid. 93 ‘How climate change makes hurricanes more destructive’ (Environmental Defense Fund, 2023) <https://www.edf.org/climate/how-climate-change-makes-hurricanes-more-destructive> accessed 23 August 2023. 94 “The World Bank in Bangladesh” (World Bank, 6 April 2023) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview> accessed 23 August 2023.

per cent of workers are employed in the agricultural sector, and 87 per cent of households are at least partially dependent on agriculture for survival and income. 95 The primary agricultural sector is rice farming. However, with rising sea levels, increased flooding and increased soil and water salinity, rice production is expected to decrease by 8 per cent by 2050. 96 This will lead to a significant loss in livelihoods and an increase in food insecurity.97 Bangladesh already suffers from food insecurity; approximately 30 million women, and 12 million children under 5 suffer from malnutrition.98 With increased pressures faced from the exacerbated effects of climate change, this number is set to increase even further.99 An estimated 2000 people move to Dhaka daily, Bangladesh’s capital, 70% moving for reasons related to climate change.100 This is due to the increased vulnerabilities felt by the population living outside of the cities. Vulnerabilities include loss of livelihood and food sources from natural disasters, rising sea levels, and water salinization. In addition, a major issue faced by populations in Bangladesh is riverbank erosion. This is primarily caused by the “braided nature”101 of the river delta. Climate change is aggravating riverbank erosion rates, as the monsoon season now sees heavier rainfall.102 Bangladesh is not only seeing flooding from extreme monsoon seasons, but also from melting glaciers. The country is located close to the Himalayas, which are seeing unprecedented melting of its glaciers.103 As Himalayan glaciers melt, water travels downstream into Bangladesh’s primary rivers, providing its population with fresh water.104 However, increased melting rates cause more water build-up in rivers, leading to flooding for

“Bangladesh: Growing the Economy through Advances in Agriculture’ (World Bank, 9 October 2016) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2016/10/07/bangladesh-growing-economy-through-advances-inagriculture> accessed 23 August 2023. 96 Muniruzzaman (n 85). 97 ibid. 98 ibid. 99 ibid. 100 Shamsuddin Illius, “Stability eludes climate refugee in Bangladesh’s sinking cities” (The Third Pole, 25 January 2023) <https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/climate/stability-eludes-climate-refugees-in-bangladeshssinking-cities> accessed 25 September 2023. 101 “Disaster Summary Sheet: Bangladesh – River Bank Erosion” (ACAPS, 21 March 2019) <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/disaster-summary-sheet-bangladesh-riverbank-erosion-21-march-2019> accessed 28 September 2023. 102 ibid. 103 Gloria Dickie, ‘Himalayan glaciers on track to lose up to 75% of ice by 2100, report says’ (Reuters, 20 June 2023) <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/himalayan-glaciers-track-lose-up-75-ice-by-2100-report2023-06-20/> accessed 11 November 2023. 104 ibid.

riverbank communities,105 as well as aggravating riverbank erosion. This results in the collapse of riverbank settlements, communities losing their homes, and millions losing their farmland.106 Climate change has noticeably exacerbated vulnerabilities, particularly in low and lowermiddle-income countries (such as Bangladesh), and this is rapidly augmented by the effects of climate change. This will consequently lead to increased migration as more people are affected by climate change, losing their homes and livelihoods. Thus, a solution must be adopted to provide such migrants legal recognition and assistance. VI. Approaches for tackling the issue of EDPs There are several solutions existing in scholarly debates on the subject. The following section will synthesize these approaches, and discuss which is preferable for addressing the problem, as well as outline why an expansion of the Convention, and the adoption of international frameworks are not the appropriate solutions for the issue, and instead, why the adoption of regional legal frameworks and fostering of overall regional cooperation is likely the most plausible solution. A. Expanding the 1951 Refugee Convention In recent years, as the climate change crisis came to light and NGOs and academics began focusing on the issue, several have argued that climate change will force people to move.107 Some claimed that an expansion of the Refugee Convention would be needed to cater to this new type of displacement, which was yet to become an issue when the Convention was first established. With Teitiota establishing that the principle of non-refoulement, the core customary principle of the Convention,108 applies to all refugees including EDPs,109 some scholars have taken an affirmative position towards expanding the Convention. The primary

105

ibid. ACAPS (n 101). 107 Hall (n 49). 108 Caitlan M. Sussman, ‘A Global Migration Framework Under Water: How Can the International Community Protect Climate Refugees?’ [2023] 2(1) Chicago Journal of International Law <https://cjil.uchicago.edu/onlinearchive/global-migration-framework-under-water-how-can-international-community-protect> accessed 11 November 2023. 109 UNHCR (n 76). 106

arguments are the issues of violence and persecution arising from the issues created by climate change.110 The Convention’s persecution requirement requires a “human agency” contributing to the harm, rather than the mere threat of climate change.111 The effects of climate change, particularly natural disasters may lead to “marginalized individuals […] disproportionately affected by unintentional or deliberate exclusion from government aid”.112 Additionally, the exacerbated effects of climate change may lead to conflict or violence due to the instability of the state after a natural disaster.113 This allows climate refugees to potentially be covered in such situations. Hence, scholars have argued that the definition should be expanded to include EDPs.114 However, the Convention and UNHCR have several limitations that prevent them from being able to provide for EDPs.115 The UNHCR occupies a unique position as an international provider of refugee protection but has no mandate for responding to people displaced by environmental and climate-change-induced disasters, as it falls beyond the scope of its statute and the Convention.116 This is mainly because EDPs do not fit within the definition of a ‘refugee’, as covered in Article 1 of the Convention. As it was not designed to address EDPs, most cases concerning environmental displacement do not meet the necessary criteria to qualify under the definition of a refugee, making the Convention incompatible with the circumstances of EDPs.117 It is also challenging to prove that climate change qualifies as persecution, and even more challenging to prove that such persecution is on the grounds described in Article 1 of the Refugee Convention. Currently, most displacement by EDPs is internal, though cross-border displacement is expected in low-lying areas and island nations, as well as border areas. 118 This is another argument presented by some scholars against the expansion of the Convention. A key criterion to the definition of a refugee is being outside of one’s country of nationality, referring to cross-border displacement. Overall, both the UNHCR and the IOM have 110

Sussman (n 108). ibid. 112 ibid. 113 ibid. 114 ibid. 115 Hall (n 49). 116 ibid. 117 Shweta Jayawardan (n 54). 118 Subramanian and Urpelainen (n 53). 111

expressed that environmental displacement does not meet the criteria of the definition of a ‘refugee’ under the Convention. Thus, the Convention itself is unfit to address forced environmental migration because it was simply not its original purpose. Scholars and international organizations alike agree that restricting the issue of EDPs as ‘refugees’ will both weaken the Convention119 and reduce the scope of the issue by using a framework that lacks compatibility with the issue at hand. B. Adopting a new international legal framework As climate change effects continue to worsen, and sea levels continue to rise, an increase in international displacement will take place, with nations such as Tuvalu at risk of disappearing from rising sea levels. Thus, other alternatives need to be discussed to ensure the legal protection of EDP’s human rights. It has already been established that there is a lack of safeguards to address the emerging crisis of rapid forced environmental migration.120 Some scholars have questioned whether fostering international cooperation to create a new international legal framework catered for international displacement due to climate change could aid in addressing the issue of EDPs, given that the Refugee Convention itself was not designed to tackle this issue. A legally binding treaty could provide benefits to countries facing extreme environmental degradation by ensuring that their nationals will be legally protected at the international level.121 An international convention for EDPs, which provides a clear definition of an EDP, as well as what constitutes environmental degradation has been proposed by some scholars.122 The temporary nature of the protection that such a convention would provide has been emphasised, as states would likely be more willing to provide assistance to EDPs when the protection is regarded as temporary. 123 Scholars such as Biermann and Boas have suggested that such a regime could take the form of a protocol to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change, with the UN Development Programme and World Bank serving as potential implementing agencies.124

119

European Parliament (n 37). Paramjit S. Jaswal, Stellina Jolly, ‘Climate Refugees: Challenges and Opportunities for International Law’ (2013) Journal of the Indian Law Institute 45. 121 Subramanian and Urpelainen (n 53). 122 ibid. 123 ibid. 124 Jayawardhan (n 54). 120

However, there are also several arguments against the implementation of a new international legal framework for the legal recognition of EDPs. Jane McAdam’s 2011 publication on “Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer” 125 best reflects the counterarguments towards such a framework. McAdam sets out three main arguments for such a claim: 1. Primarily internal movement McAdam argues that currently, EDPs primarily originate from lower-income countries.126 When looking at Bangladesh, the EDP movement is primarily internal, as seen with the mass migration waves towards its capital Dhaka. This is due to a range of socio-economic factors. Nevertheless, as the fieldwork in Bangladesh has shown, even if there is rapid initial movement after a disaster, McAdam argues that it remains primarily internal.127 Populations in lower-income countries often do not have the financial resources for a cross-border move. This is especially true when looking at Bangladesh, given that they are also surrounded by India, which has implemented physical restrictions, such as barbed wire border fencing, to restrict Bangladeshi cross-border migration.128 McAdam also notes that many communities in Bangladesh are focusing on adaptation as a strategy towards rising sea levels and other climate change effects, such as adjusting their farming techniques by switching to floorresistant rice strains, or shrimp farming (as seen in Section V) to retain their livelihoods.129 Since McAdam contends that the rationale behind such a treaty would be to address international movement, she argues the international community risks using significant time, resources, and energy in this process, where the treaty may not even properly address such an issue due to its internal nature.130 Furthermore, McAdam builds on this by arguing that impacts from slow-onset climate processes take time before effects can be seen, or that they amount to sufficiently serious harm, which in reality presents a rare opportunity to plan for responses tailored to climate change displacement,131 instead of “relying on a remedial instrument in the case of spontaneous (and desperate) flight.”132 Thus, McAdam asserts that 125

McAdam (n 34). ibid. 127 ibid. 128 Abhimanyu Datta, ‘Barbed Wire Border Fencing’ (2018) India Quarterly 42. 129 McAdam (n 34). 130 ibid. 131 ibid. 132 ibid. 126

creating binding international treaties would waste time and resources that should be channelled into more appropriate and planned responses to address the issues faced by EDPs. 2. Climate change itself is not causing the movement of EDPs Charters such as the Refugee Convention target specific categories of persecution, however, it is key to remember that “climate change alone does not displace people, it exacerbates social vulnerability which contributes to displacement.”133 Climate change is not classified as a source of persecution, as originally outlined in the 1951 Refugee Convention.134 An example of this, is the urban slums in Dhaka, Bangladesh, where there are few distinguishing factors between those who move from general poverty from those who have been affected by climate change; the reasons and effects are highly convoluted together.135 Thus, McAdam argues that identifying ‘climate change’ as a driver of forced migration is highly arbitrary, as this overlooks other driving forces including poverty, conflict, or general lack of opportunity.136 Though McAdam makes an important argument here, it can also be counter-argued that such driving forces are derived from the issue of climate change in the first place. Additionally, it is not necessarily increased global temperatures or rising sea levels that cause migration; high temperatures, for example, leading to droughts cause the loss of livelihoods and primary sources of food which then leads to migration. Thus, with a lack of a clear persecution factor, establishing a legally binding international framework would prove to be difficult. 3. Political obstacles to a new treaty The third argument that McAdam poses, is the numerous political obstacles towards the implementation of a new treaty. States already have legal obligations towards an estimated 10 million refugees today, and 43.3 million other displaced persons.137 Despite 147 states parties to the Convention, an abundance of soft law instruments as well as an international agency

133

Jayawardhan (n 54). ibid. 135 McAdam (n 34). 136 ibid. 137 ibid. 134

dedicated to refugee rights, global refugee crises remain unsolved.138 Given that the ongoing migration and refugee crises still lack clear to ongoing migration and refugee crises, states would likely be reluctant to commit to another treaty creating further international obligations towards people displaced by climate change.139 A counterargument towards this would be looking at the root cause of the problem and identifying those responsible for the exacerbated effects of climate change. As established in Section V, countries experiencing the most extreme consequences of climate change are primarily countries with low carbon footprints that contribute very little (if at all) to the climate crisis. The example used in this case is Bangladesh, which only produces 0.56 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions.140 This can almost be qualified as a negligible amount in comparison to the top five largest polluters in the world, which are responsible for approximately 60 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions.141 It is clear that there is an increasing number of persons impacted by the climate crisis, and when assessing emission trends which have been continuously increasing,142 it is evident that the effects of climate change will continue to be exacerbated. This will therefore lead to an increased amount of EDPs as weather patterns continue to push towards the extremities. The question posed is whether the largest contributing nation-states to climate change should take the initiative to foster international cooperation for a climate migration treaty and provide aid to EDPs. Under the concept of state sovereignty, states have supreme authority within their territory.143 Thus, states themselves must assume such responsibilities under their own authority and competencies. A key issue here is likely to be the reluctance of states to be held responsible for aggravating the effects of climate change, as well as to host EDPs. On the international level, there currently is no authority recognizing and upholding state

138

ibid. ibid. 140 Rojas (n 86). 141 “Distribution of carbon dioxide emissions worldwide in 2021, by select country” (Statista, 12 September 2023) <https://www.statista.com/statistics/271748/the-largest-emitters-of-co2-in-the-world/> accessed 26 September 2023. 142 “Greenhouse gases continued to increase rapidly in 2022” (NOAA, 5 April 2023) <https://www.noaa.gov/news-release/greenhouse-gases-continued-to-increase-rapidly-in-2022> accessed 27 September 2023. 143 Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty’ (Oxford Public International Law, April 2011) <https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1472> accessed 2 December 2023. 139

responsibility towards mitigating climate change.144 Consequently, the concept of responsibility for states further enabling the effects of climate change is still abstract in the international community, as this would require states to acknowledge their carbon emissions and prioritise climate action over their economic development.145 In addition, states have stated the importance of reciprocity in assuming responsibility for climate change,146 as they do not want to be the sole actor in environmental protection to avoid free riding from other states.147 It is therefore unlikely that this will happen in the near future, as a collective acknowledgement of responsibility towards climate action would require considerable international cooperation between states that, when addressing climate change, does not exist yet. Hence, solutions to the issue still need to be assessed, as a new “climate change treaty”, according to scholars, is not the solution,148 and it is highly unlikely that, for the moment, states assume responsibility for carbon emissions and begin to take climate action. Though a new international legal framework may not be optimal for addressing the crisis, part C will address the potential adoption of regional frameworks, which presents the most plausible solution to the issue. C. Adopting new regional frameworks Whilst McAdam has argued why the implementation and use of international treaties may not be ideal for the issue of EDPs, the UN could instead encourage, support, and act in regional cooperation. This is because of the significant wealth gap across nation-states, impacting how much they can adapt or mitigate the effects of climate change at an internationally agreed-upon level. The implementation of regional cooperation and treaties could be better suited to addressing the issue of EDPs because vulnerability is more likely to

144

Vanessa S. W. Tsang, ‘Establishing State Responsibility in Mitigating Climate Change under Customary International Law’ [2021] Columbia Law School <https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=llm_essays_theses> accessed 2 December 2023. 145 ibid. 146 ibid. 147 ibid. 148 McAdam (n 34).

be mutual at a regional level.149 Additionally, low-vulnerability countries are unlikely to support an international agreement, as they would have to take on a larger financial burden.150 Analysis has shown that countries will join cooperation efforts and other treaties only if the expected benefits of assistance from participating states will outweigh the costs of assistance needed to provide to other states.151 In addition, attempting to develop a standardized set of rules in an international treaty for all states is unrealistic given the general nature an international treaty would need to adopt, as well as the vast differences in different types of needs and vulnerabilities from states globally. A regional treaty can address and be tailored to a region’s specific needs, challenges faced from climate change, and ability to provide assistance,152 given that environmental factors will also likely be similar, and so countries in the same region will likely be facing the same effects and consequences of climate change. An example of a regional agreement tailored to a region’s specific needs is the Kampala Convention, a treaty adopted by the African Union.153 The convention covers an array of different cases concerning displacement, including those “due to natural or human-made disasters, including climate change.”154 The treaty aims to mitigate the cause of internal displacement, as well as provide preventative measures for internal displacement.155 Additionally, the convention collaborates with humanitarian agencies and NGOs if a state is incapable of providing assistance.156

All ratifying countries have similar levels of

vulnerability; more specifically, they are all classified as “above median vulnerability”.157 Furthermore, the ratifying countries are similarly positioned in terms of GDPs and needs in order to be able to address internal displacement, especially regarding the effects of climate change that states in the African Union face. Thus, each ratifying state can contribute and fulfil its obligations under the Kampala Convention, and has its needs met by the Convention, due to its specific nature to the challenges faced in Africa from the effects of climate change. 149

Jayawardhan (n 54). ibid. 151 ibid. 152 Subramanian and Urpelainen (n 53). 153 Jayawardhan (n 54). 154 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (entered into force 6 December 2012) (2009) African Union (Kampala Convention). 155 Jayawardhan (n 54). 156 ibid. 157 ibid. 150

VII.

Conclusion

The issue of forced environmental migration is complex and affects many low and lowermiddle-income countries. The crisis is an emerging one, and the international community and scholars alike are only beginning to focus on the issue due to its ongoing nature. Additionally, it is difficult to evaluate potential solutions when the issue of climate change and environmental degradation is ever evolving. Cooperation between states is vital in tackling not only the issue of EDPs but climate change overall. However, the UN could consider taking a leading role on this issue, as it plays a key role in the development and enforcement of international law. The promotion and adoption of regional frameworks not only allows for certain regions to tailor agreements to their specific abilities in terms of assistance and obligations but also to their needs, as different regions will face different types of environmental degradation. The UN plays a pivotal role in the promotion and encouragement of regional cooperation as it strives to maintain the protection of human rights worldwide and foster international peace. In the case of environmental migration, the promotion of cooperation is key to ensure peaceful relations between states, as these may risk becoming strained from increasing migration. Overall, the issue of forced environmental migration does not comprise of one simple solution; instead, cooperation efforts between States and the UN must continue in tackling climate change and migration, and the conversation must be continued on the international level between states, international organizations, NGOs, and scholars alike to ensure the legal recognition and protection of EDPs.

UNSC Resolution 1973 and its Impact on the Libyan Conflict By Tatiana Khokhlova* Abstract The article aims to analyse United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorised Member States to use ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians in the Libyan war of 2011. As a response to the suppression of the protests by the Libyan government in February 2011, Resolution 1973 called for the use of force to protect the Libyan population from governmental violence. While presenting human rights protection as the legitimate purpose of intervention, some states, including NATO members, assisted rebels against the government and targeted Gaddafi’s infrastructure while presenting the removal of Gaddafi as necessary to protect the Libyan population. After Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown and killed, the ambiguous Resolution 1973 was marked by some states and regional organisations as a tool used by the Western powers and allies to remove Gaddafi.

* LL.B. Candidate, International and European Law Programme, The Hague University of Applied Sciences.

Introduction

Resolutions serve as the main instruments to pursue the United Nations Security Council’s (hereinafter ‘UNSC’ or ‘Security Council’) purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The resolutions are drafted as a response to armed conflicts, humanitarian crises, and other threats to peace and security.1 They serve as a benchmark of the UNSC’s dedication to solving global issues and express the consensus of SC member states regarding conflict situations. However, not all United Nations (hereinafter, UN) Resolutions manage to satisfy the goal of achieving peace. The central issue addressed in the article is whether Resolution 1973, drafted by the UNSC during the Libyan conflict, authorized the change of the political regime in Libya. To better understand the key issue presented in the article, it is also important to shed light on subsequent questions, namely grounds for military intervention, international support of Resolution 1973, key provisions of the document, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (hereinafter, NATO) and its allies’ role in implementing the Resolution’s clauses. The article provides the historical context for the adoption of Resolution 1973 and introduces readers to the Responsibility to Protect concept,2 which the UN has used as a basis for authorizing use of force in Libya. Further, this article analyses the measures taken by Resolution 1973, while examining their interpretation and its implementation regarding the intervening parties. The article also mentions the consequences of the military intervention in Libya and the current political situation in the state. Finally, the paper provides recommendations on for improving the UNSC resolutions’ efficiency regarding restoring international peace and security. By synthesizing various articles, reports, books, and scholarly works, this article strives to contribute to the ongoing academic discussion regarding Resolution 1973 while presenting a range of viewpoints to offer a detailed analysis of the foundation for intervention in Libya. II.

Historical background

‘UN Security Council Resolutions’ (UNRCCA) <https://unrcca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/6unrcca_handout_unsc_resolutions_eng_2020_1_2.pdf > accessed 11 November 2023. 2 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (UNGA Res 60/1). 1

The so-called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 is remembered for its wave of revolutions spreading across the Middle East and North Africa. Mass protests, civil movements, and urges to change political regimes took place in Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya.3 On 15 February 2011, a group of revolutionaries in Benghazi started uprisings against Libya’s leader, Muammar Gaddafi. Even though the demonstrations were peaceful, the government used lethal force against protesters. As disagreement with governmental actions grew around the country, the demonstrations continued to occur in other Libyan cities and faced excessive use of force by the government.4 The International Commission of Inquiry on Libya reported shootings at protesting crowds, leading to the deaths of at least 233 people in four days from 15 February to 20 February, followed by 62 deaths after firing at protesters in the capital on 20 and 21 February.5 Tensions in Libya increased and attracted the attention of the United Nations. On 26 February 2011, the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, unanimously drafted Resolution 1970 on the Libyan matter.6 The resolution governed by Article 41 of the UN Charter condemned the use of lethal force by Gaddafi’s government, urged the Libyan government to end violence,7 impose an arms embargo,8 a travel ban,9 and an assets freeze in connection with the situation.10 The plea to cease fire was ignored by Gaddafi’s government as the conflict intensified.11 While regional organisations such as the League of Arab Nations insisted on the creation of a no-fly zone to protect civilians, Gaddafi was making explicit threats against civilians in Benghazi.12

Kali Robinson and Will Merrow, ‘The Arab Spring at Ten Years: What’s the Legacy of the Uprisings’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 3 December 2020), <www.cfr.org/article/arab-spring-ten-years-whats-legacy-uprisings> accessed 3 October 2023. 4 Ian Martin, All Necessary Measures? The United Nations and international intervention in Libya (C Hurst & Co 22) 8-9. 5 United Nations Human Rights Council ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya’ (2 March 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/19/68, paras 51-60. 6 Martin (n 4) 13. 7 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970 para 1 (UNSC Res 1970). 8 ibid para 9. 9 ibid para 15. 10 ibid para 17. 11 Martin (n 4) 15. 12 ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the authorization of use of force in Libya: Did the coalition exceed the mandate’ (Master thesis, University of Oslo 2016) <www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/50779/678.pdf > accessed on 15 October 2023 (‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the authorization of use of force in Libya: Did the coalition exceed the mandate’ (Master thesis, University of Oslo 2016)). 3

Meanwhile, the UN started working on the next Resolution concerning the authorization of a no-fly zone.13 On 17 March, the UNSC drafted Resolution 1973, which became one of the most criticized and controversial Resolutions ever adopted by the UN Security Council. III.

R2P and the UNSC authorization of the use of force in Libya

Resolution 1973 was adopted by the UNSC as a response to the international community to Libya’s failure to protect its population from atrocities. The decision of the Security Council to intervene in the conflict with the goal of protecting the civilian population was based on the new Responsibility to Protect doctrine.14 In 2005, the UNGA set out the parameters for the Responsibility to Protect principle (hereinafter, R2P) in Resolution of 60/1, which was adopted as the outcome of the 2005 World Summit.15 Paragraphs 138 and 139 of that resolution outlined the duty to protect civilian populations against war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.16 The Resolution served as a response to the question addressed by to the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan in the March 2000 Millennium Report: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”17 The R2P principle sets out three main pillars: the responsibility of the state to protect the population within its own jurisdiction,18 the responsibility of the international community to support the state in exercising such duty,19 and the responsibility of the international community to conduct humanitarian intervention in a state that fails to exercise responsibility to protect its own population.20 According to a scholar Monica Lourdes’ paper dedicated to the UNSC mandate of using force under the UN Charter, the fundamental concepts of R2P can be linked to the broad

Martin (n 4) 19. UNGA Res 60/1 (n 4). 15 ibid. 16 ibid. 17 UNGA Res 55/2 (18 September 2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/2. 18 UNGA Res 60/1 (n 4). 19 ibid. 20 ibid. 14

interpretation of Article 39 of the UN Charter,21 which authorizes the UNSC to intervene in a situation that may constitute ‘any threat to international peace and security’.22 Previously, the UNSC had recognized civil wars, lack of democracy, and human rights violations as threats to international peace and security under Article 39.23 Later, in 2011, United Nations referred to the situation in Libya as a reason to intervene under the 3rd Pillar of R2P. Thus, UN Secretary General Ban-Ki-Moon characterized the crises within the R2P Framework while stating that ‘when a State manifestly fails to protect its population from serious international crime, the international community has the responsibility to step in and take protective action in a collective, timely, and decisive manner’.24 IV.

Relevance of Resolution 1973 for international law

Resolution 1973 sets a new precedent for the UNSC by authorizing military intervention based on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. In comparison to the previous UNSC Resolutions on Bosnia,25 and Somalia,26 the UNSC approach in the Libyan Case represents a new concept. Firstly, it acted much more expeditiously. While the UNSC deliberated for months about whether to intervene in the Bosnia and Somalia, it made a decision several days after the conflict in Libya had broken out.27 Secondly, the Security Council implemented measures to protect the population from the attacks that “may constitute the crimes against humanity”,28 even though at the at the time of the Resolution’s adoption the UN was not certain on the existence of the real threat to civilians and the situation in Libya had not yet amounted to the civil war contrary to Bosnia and Somalia.29 V.

The road to adoption of Resolution 1973

ibid. Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 892 UNTS 119 art 39 (UN Charter). 23 UNSC Res 668 (5 April 1991) S/RES/668. 24 ibid. 25 UNSC Res 824 (6 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/824. 26 UNSC Res 774 (28 August 1992) UN Doc S/RES/774. 27 ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the authorization of use of force in Libya: Did the coalition exceed the mandate’ (Master thesis, University of Oslo 2016) (n 12). 28 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973. 29 ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the authorization of use of force in Libya: Did the coalition exceed the mandate’ (Master thesis, University of Oslo 2016) (n 12). 22

As the main contributors to the resolution, UK, France and the US had concerns about potential vetoes by China, Russia, and the African states which at that time had a seat in the Security Council.30 African states were concerned that “western Powers [would use] this resolution as a pretext for full-scale military intervention in the region and deciding the African future regardless of the view of African people”.31 At the same time, China and Russia expressed reluctance to accept the principle of R2P.32 With regards to Russia, after the meeting between the Russian president Medvedev and the US ambassador Biden on the 9th of March 2011, the Russian president stated that he is not going to veto a resolution.33 When it came to China, it became clear that the state did not have any sympathy towards Gaddafi and, therefore, did not plan to veto the resolution. Both China and Russia abstained.34 To gain support from three African states and encourage them to vote in favour of Resolution 1973, President Obama personally called South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma and promised to assign the African Union (hereinafter ‘AU’) with a special role in conflict resolution.35 The inclusion of the AU in the resolution was not initially planned by the UN.36 However, South Africa insisted on the involvement of the Union and, to save South Africa’s positive vote on the Resolution, the Council decided to empower the role of the AU in the Libyan Conflict resolution matter. Nigeria and Gabon, following the decision of South Africa, also gave their votes in favour of the Resolution 1973.37 In the end, Resolution 1973 was adopted on 17 March 2011 with ten votes in favour and five abstentions.38 VI.

An analysis of the UNSC Resolution 1973

The Resolution’s preamble states that the international community “recognises the situation in Libya as a threat to the international peace and security”. 39 Such recognition of the threat to international peace further allows the UN Security Council to act under Chapter 30

UNGA Res 60/1 (n 2) para 23. Martin (n 4) 23. 32 ibid. 33 ibid. 34 ibid. 35 ibid 25. 36 ibid. 37 ibid. 38 ibid. 39 ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the authorization of use of force in Libya: Did the coalition exceed the mandate’ (Master thesis, University of Oslo 2016) (n 12). 31

VII of the UN Charter and intervene in the situation.40 The Resolution’s body contains four aspects which are particularly relevant for the Libyan conflict and were open to various interpretations by intervening states. A. Cease-fire The operative part of the Resolution 1973 begins with the call to immediately cease fire and end all violence against civilians.41 In line with the demand to cease fire, the Security Council requested the UN Special Envoy and the African Union High-Level Committee to conduct visits to Libya “with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful; and sustainable solution”.42 B. Protection of civilians Paragraph 4 of the Resolution authorises Member States to take “all the necessary measures (…) to protect civilians in civilian populated areas under threat an attack…excluding foreign occupation”.43 The clause further calls the Member States to notify the UNSC on the measures taken.44 The UN referred the political situation in Libya as a reason to intervene under R2P’s 3rd pillar. The UN Secretary General Ban-Ki-Moon characterized the crises within the R2P Framework while stating that “when a State manifestly fails to protect its population from serious international crime, the international community has the responsibility to step in and take protective action in a collective, timely and decisive manner”.45 Thus, the protection of civilians became the main purpose of the Resolution along with the UNSC’s authorization of the use of force. The clause was referring not to the confirmed attacks committed against Libyans, but to the potential threat of the population being attacked by Gaddafi forces.46 Andrew Garwood-Gowers, ‘The Responsible to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the Exception, Syria as the Norm?’ 2013 36(2) UNSW Law Journal <www.unswlawjournal.unsw.edu.au/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/36-2-5.pdf> accessed 10 October 2023. 41 ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the authorization of use of force in Libya: Did the coalition exceed the mandate’ (Master thesis, University of Oslo 2016) (n 12). 42 ibid. 43 ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the authorization of use of force in Libya: Did the coalition exceed the mandate’ (Master thesis, University of Oslo 2016) (n 12) 4. 44 ibid. 45 ibid. 46 Bruno Pommier, ‘The use of force in Libya to protect civilians and humanitarian action: the case of Libya and beyond’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 1063. 40

C. All necessary measures As the objective of the Resolution was to protect civilian population, and the scope of the ‘use of all means’ was limited to the necessity of protecting civilians. Thus, all the measures used by the states should have stayed within the framework of civilian protection, and all kinds of using force exceeding that goal could be considered illegitimate.47 However, the UNSC did not specify the permitted measures and did not set any limitations to the use of force by Member States acting under the authorisation nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements.48 The only established requirement was that the intervening parties refrain from occupying any part of Libya. This clause created a debate on the later deployment of ground troops and caused doubts on whether the foreign intervening forces acted as occupying powers. 49 In addition, Resolution 1973 authorised using all necessary measures notwithstanding paragraph 9 of Resolution 1970 introducing arms embargo.50 Under Resolution 1973 provision’s states and organizations using force in Libya were only required to notify the Secretary General and the Security Council on the measures they were implementing.51 D. No-fly zone A no-fly zone was created over Libya upon request of the League of Arab states with two limitations.52 Firstly, the only purpose of the establishment of the non-fly zone was to protect the civilian population. Secondly, the flight ban did not apply to aircrafts engaged in the protection of civilians and other flights that were ‘deemed necessary by States acting’ to enforce compliance with the ban on flights.53 VII.

Enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1973

UNGA Res 60/1 (n 2) para 34. ibid. 49 UNGA Res 60/1 (n 2) para 26. 50 UNSC Res 1970 (n 7) para 9. 51 Mónica Lourdes de la Serna Galván, ‘Interpretation of Article 39 of the UN Charter (Threat to the Peace) by the Security Council. Is the Security Council a Legislator for the Entire International Community?’ (2011) 11 Anuario mexicano de derecho internacional <www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S187046542011000100006> accessed 14 December 2023. 52 ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the authorization of use of force in Libya: Did the coalition exceed the mandate’ (Master thesis, University of Oslo 2016) (n 12) 6. 53 ibid 7. 48

As soon as Resolution 1973 was adopted, the Libyan government responded with an agreement to cease fire and sent a letter to the Secretary General about its readiness to stop violence under international monitoring mechanisms.54 In practice, no ceasefire happened and Gaddafi’s forces continued the bombardment of rebelling territories and began moving to Benghazi.55 As a result, in the evening of 19 March, the ‘Friends of Libya’ group consisting of France, the UK and the US launched their first airstrikes on Libya. 56 These joint forces destroyed command installations and the main military objects of the Ghaddafi’s government. The operation conducted by the coalition forces then immediately transitioned into the operation called ‘Unified Protector’ organized by NATO.57 The permission for NATO military campaign in Libya was outlined in Article 48 of the UN Charter which states that UN members shall carry out the SC decisions for maintaining international peace and security directly or through appropriate international agencies if such actions are approved by the SC.58 A coalition comprising NATO members and Arab League member states launched operation ‘Unified Protector’, which imposed a no-fly zone and a blockade.59 NATO activated an arms embargo operation on 23 March with the help of submarines and patrol aircrafts.60 While discussing the limits of NATO actions and its compliance with Resolution 1973 provisions, coalition forces agreed that NATO will not use any ground forces and will not assist the rebellions in a fight against Gaddafi.61 As the resolution did not define any end for its implementation the intervening states agreed that they will continue the operation until three conditions are met: ‘all attacks and threats of attacks against civilians have ended, regime has withdrawn to bases all military forces, and the regime must permit full, safe humanitarian access to all Libyans’.62

ibid 27. Martin (n 4). 56 ibid. 57 ibid. 58 UN Charter (n 22) art 48(b). 59 ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the authorization of use of force in Libya: Did the coalition exceed the mandate’ (Master thesis, University of Oslo 2016) (n 12). 60 ibid. 61 ibid. 62 ‘Statement on Libya following the Working Lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with non-NATO Contributors to Operation Unified Protector’ (NATO, 14 April 2011) <www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_75177.htm> accessed 12 December 2023. 55

However, later, NATO admitted that following the rule on avoiding civilian casualties would make it impossible for the alliance to strike around 70% of the outlined targets.63 Politicians were pressuring NATO and called ‘Unified Protector’ slow and ineffective. 64 In April 2011, British and French Foreign Ministers “called on NATO to be more aggressive as its efforts were not sufficient”.65 The Alliance’s forces decided to strike not only the governmental forces but also command points and infrastructure objects indirectly used by Ghaddafi’s army. Later, the member states started sending their troops and military advisors to “recommend the opposition on the internal structures and improving precision in targeting”.66 Alongside NATO, other interested parties also showed explicit support to the rebellions. For instance, Qatar, without notifying the UNSC supplied military personnel and weapons to the opposition.67 The justification Qatar used was “communication on the rebel’s location and avoiding mistakenly striking them by air forces”.68 Other countries like the UK, Canada and France also stopped hiding the fact of the ground operation led by their forces by referring to acting in their national and not NATO capacity.69 It became obvious that the military intervention aimed to change the governing regime in Libya and to remove Gaddafi and his supporters from power. Operation Unified Protector ended when the National Transitional Council (NTC) declared the removal of Gaddafi from power on the 31st of October 2011.70 On the same day, NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen arrived in Tripoli where he faced gratitude from NTC forces and made a long speech on the significance of the operation addressing to Libyans with the message that “when the United Nations took the historic decision to protect you, NATO answered the call. We launched our operation faster than ever before. More than 8,000 servicemen and women took part in our mission for Libya.

David Kenner, ‘Oil, Guns and Money: Libya’s revolution isn’t over’ (Foreign Policy, 21 December 2011) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/21/oil-guns-and-money-libyas-revolution-isnt-over/> accessed 10 October 2023. 64 Florence Gaub and Rob Weighill, The Cauldron, NATO’s campaign in Libya (OUP 2018). 65 ibid. 66 Martin (n 4) 57. 67 UNGA Res 60/1 (n 2) para 46. 68 ibid. 69 Jeffrey H Michaels, ‘Able but not willing: A critical assessment of NATO’s Lybia intervention’ in Kjell Engelbrekt, Marcus Mohlin and Charlotte Wagnsson (eds) The NATO Intervention in Lybia: Lessons learned from the campaign (1st edn, Routledge 2013). 70 Gaub and Weighill (n 64). 63

We were effective, flexible, and precise”.71 In addition, NATO highlighted that the requirement of non-intervention in a ground war was met by NATO as the alliance was only conducting airstrikes. Overall, Mr Rasmussen praised the intervention for bringing together the efforts of NATO states and their’ partners and achieving all military objectives outlined by the Alliance.72 The UN-appointed Commission of Inquiry on Libya investigated some of the airstrikes and found that as a result of NATO operations, 60 civilians were killed and 55 were wounded. VIII.

Criticism

Following the discussion on the implementation of the UNSC decisions on Libya contained in Resolution 1973, the most asked legal question is whether NATO forces and other partnering states exceeded the mandate of civilian protection stated in Resolution 1973 while conducting military operations in Libya. However, the response to this question could never be answered without considering another question. What did Resolution 1973 permit, and how did the rules on paper differ from their implementation in crucial reality? A brief response to the question it is a matter of interpretation. Thus, for instance, right after the launch of NATO’s Unified Protector States, that either voted in favour of Resolution 1973 or abstained, began criticising military intervention and foreign use of force in the Libyan Conflict.73 Again, in his book, Ian Martin described concerns some states expressed regarding enforcing Resolution 1973. While China and Russia were claiming that the decision to use force in Libya was wrong and the international community should have insisted on a ceasefire instead of intervening in the conflict, 74 South Africa claimed that its positive vote never supported the military intervention of NATO,75 and such actions were never authorised by Resolution 1973.76 At the same time, the African Union Assembly expressed deep concern about so-called ‘one-sided’ interpretation of Resolution 1973 by the intervening forces. In June 2011, the ‘“We answered the call”’ - the end of Operation Unified Protector’ (NATO, 31 October 2011) <www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_80435.htm> accessed on 10 October 2023. 72 ibid. 73 Martin (n 4) 53 74 UNGA Res 60/1 (n 2) 35. 75 ibid. 76 ibid. 71

Chairperson of the AU publicly stated that it became obvious that the military operation undermined the very purpose of Resolutions 1970, and 1973 as military actions were exceeding the necessity of civilians’ protection and were leading to the governmental change, such actions went beyond what was permitted by the Resolution 1973.77 Earlier on 26 April, the foreign affairs minister of Russia Sergei Lavrov claimed that NATO and partnering States had exceeded the mandate given by the UNSC and started pursuing the goal of chasing Ghaddafi and not protecting civilians.78 In late October 2011, Marcel Boisard, former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, wrote: “Nothing has been respected. No real negotiations towards a ceasefire have taken place. The exclusive control of the air was used to support the insurgents. Protection of civilians was the pretext to justify any operation...It was no longer a question of protection but of regime change. (...) The principle of ‘responsibility to protect’ died in Libya, just as ‘humanitarian intervention’ died in Somalia in 1992”.79 In summary, the conduct and the consequences of the operation caused a lot of criticism regarding exceeding the mandate of civilians’ protection given by the UNSC. However, this led to another question, could the regime change be implicitly permitted by Resolution 1973? Further, the Secretary General of the UN Ban-Ki Moon admitted that “the question of whether Resolution 1973 allowed military activities in pursuance of a regime change has been one of the most controversial issues concerning Libyan intervention”.80 For instance, the argument established by Mr Julian Lehmann, a former UNHCR human rights researcher paper,81 supports the position of non-compliance with the UNSC mandate. The argument the author uses states that the mandate given by the Security Council in Resolution 1973 permits the use of all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack. That means that the mandate permits the use of force

(n 2) 73. ibid, 48. 79 Pommier (n 46). 80 Geir Ulfstein and Hege Føsund Christiansen, ‘The Legality of the NATO Bombing in Libya’ (2013) 61(1) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 159, 162. 81 Julian M Lehman, ‘All Necessary Means to Protect Civilians: What the Intervention in Libya Says About the Relationship Between the Jus in Bello and the Jus Ad Bellum.’ (2012) 17(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 117. 78

solely to safeguard civilians and civilian-populated areas when they are at risk of attack.82 This implies a “stated willingness to employ force”.83 Furthermore, within the mandate, the UNSC has deemed it necessary to underscore its unwavering commitment to Libya’s sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity. The legality of employing force is determined by the mandate's strict limitation of military activities to those aimed at protecting civilians and civilian-populated areas facing the threat of attack. The authorized objective was neither the general protection of human rights in Libya nor the removal of the government, or the imposition of democracy. Consequently, the coalition’s use of force to enforce regime change falls outside the scope of the mandate.84 The UN, as an organization, is governed by the principle of respecting each state's sovereignty, as stipulated in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. While the use of force is authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter, it does not negate the fact that the UNSC, in fulfilling its responsibilities, must “act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”, as stated in Article 24 (2).85 Member States are prohibited, under Article 2(4), from employing force against another state’s political independence in their international relations. By aiding the resistance to remove Gaddafi, the coalition states have violated the principle of ‘state sovereignty’.86 On the other hand, the statement used by the intervening states to support their actions, says that although UNSC did not explicitly permit the change of regime in Libya, they imposed certain measures against it such as arms embargo and freeze of assets with the same goal of protecting civilians, such measures significantly weekended the regime of Gaddafi and his removal from power became just natural consequences of protecting the Libyans. Moreover, intervening powers made a clear distinction between means and objectives in a UNSC Resolution. The objective of the resolution is the protection of civilians and civilianpopulated areas. It does not specify on the admissible means that may be employed to implement and achieve this goal other than the use of ‘all necessary measures. Thus, the argument is that while regime change may not have been a legitimate goal to be pursued on the legal basis of the resolution, it might have been a legitimate means to pursue the objective 82

ibid. ibid. 84 ibid. 85 ibid. 86 ibid. 83

to protect civilians which was started by the mandate. Mr Dapo Akande, an International Law Professor at Oxford University quotes in his article ‘What does UN Security Council Resolution 1973 permit’ describes the most common understanding of Resolution 1973: “My reading of the resolution is that it is about stopping Gaddafi’s forces from winning the civil war in Libya. So, the resolution seems to be more than what the advocates of the responsibility to protect doctrine would suggest. This is not just about stopping international crimes it is about the restoration of peace, something closer to the original design of the Council (except that it is an internal conflict, which was not in the original design). What sort of peace though?”87 To show agreement with Mr Akande’s statements it is important to note that Resolution 1973 was initially formulated by the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.88 Criticizing these nations for violating their own provisions may prove futile, given that the resolution was initially crafted without explicit means and limitations. The initial vagueness in its formulation let the intervening forces adjust their strategies according to their own needs and changing circumstances. Thus, if the word ‘peace’ was perceived by some parties as a ceasefire, for others it could mean the freedom from Gaddafi’s regime. However, even without Gaddafi, the modern Libyan state cannot be classified as peaceful and democratic. IX.

Recent situation

The Libyan crisis is still ongoing. After the removal of Gaddafi, Libya faced casualties of the civil war between several militias, and religious and tribal groups. Governmental institutions were not prepared for the transition from the old regime to any kind of new governmental system. In 2014 a new civil war with involvement of terrorist groups began. 89 The tensions decreased only by 2020. However, terrorist attacks, drone strikes, and shootings remain common in Libya.90

Dapo Akande, ‘What does UN Security Council Resolution permit? (EJIL Talk, 23 March 2011) <www.ejiltalk.org/what-does-un-security-council-resolution-1973-permit/> accessed 11 October 2023. 88 Martin (n 4). 89 Mattisan Rowan, ‘Libya Timeline: Since Qaddafi’s Ouster (United States Institute for Peace, 1 July 2019) <www.usip.org/libya-timeline-qaddafis-ouster> accessed 20 November 2023. 90 Wolfram Lacher, ‘Drones, Deniability, and Disinformation: Warfare in Libya and the New International Disorder’ (Texas National Security Review, 2020) <https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/drones-deniability-anddisinformation-warfare-in-libya-and-the-new-international-disorder/> accessed 17 October 2023. 87

According to the Fragile State Index,91 Libya is ranked 17th among the most fragile states in 2023. Despite the attempts of the UN peacekeeping mission in Libya, several UN economic funds and other UN Agencies “attempts to save the economy and improve living standards in the state, Libya has a long way to go to recover after a long time of tension”.92 The report on the outcomes of the Arab Spring published by Kali Robinson presented statistical data on the freedom of speech, level of democracy, and economic stability in the region, by showing a tragic reality; military intervention in Libya did not lead to the improvement of political environment in the state.93 Moreover, the factors like freedom of speech and democracy level even dropped after events of 2011.94 The picture of modern Libya reflects all the shortcomings of Resolution’s 1973 unclear wording. Ambiguous Resolution 1973 gave a lot of freedom to intervening parties and with time it became obvious that no party was interested in stabilizing the situation in the region. X.

Conclusion

To conclude, the case of UNSC Resolution 1973 and its effect on the Libyan conflict serves as an example of unlimited interpretation and implementation of the UN resolutions with pursuing the goals different from the ones prescribed in the SC’s documents. The UN resolutions, often leave room for interpretation. However, this inherent vagueness has both positive and negative impacts. On one hand, it allows for adaptability in addressing rapidly changing situations. On the other hand, it can lead to ‘the most convenient’ interpretations of the legal provisions, as was the case with Resolution 1973. The interpretation matters reflect the issue of translating broad SC mandates into effective, real-life actions. In the case of Libya, the resolution’s urge to ‘protect civilians’ and use “all necessary measures” was open to varying interpretations based on the goals of every intervening state. Some parties like the US, France, the UK, and Qatar saw it as a mandate implying regime

‘Fragile State Index 2023’ (The Fund for Peace, 2023) <https://fragilestatesindex.org> accessed 16 October 2023. 92 United Nations, UN Common Country Analysis 2023. (2023) < https://libya.un.org/en/244706-un-commoncountry-analysis-update-2023> accessed 20 November 2023. 93 ibid. 94 ibid. 91

change, while other parties like China, Russia, and South Africa believed it was limited to the protection of civilians and all actions exceeding this aim were not authorized. Despite being a political body, the UNSC shall show its devotion to legal provisions of the UN Charter, especially while adopting resolutions on the use of force. The Security Council shall clearly identify the purpose and all permissible measures to achieve it. UNSC Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII should be formulated based on a shared understanding among UN Members regarding the interpretation of their purposes and means. While the concept of international community shall not consist only of economically powerful states such as the US, UK, China or Russia, the SC shall give the priority of decision-making process to the states and Regional Organizations most affected by the situation. The specifics of the region’s, political, cultural, and religious views shall be well considered. Before authorizing the use of armed force, the UN shall use all accessible diplomatic means to regulate the dispute, especially in the early stages of the conflict. If the use of force is necessary, it shall only be used as a last resort. The UN should not solely rely on the submitted reports but encourage the proportionate use of force and send the UN officials to monitor compliance of states exercising the SC mandate. Achieving a balance between flexibility and precision in the

UNSC

mandates

necessary step that requires an international cooperation approach and will result in a more efficient process of maintaining, promoting, or restoring peace in line with the core values of the United Nations.

THE UN&I PROJECT The UN & I project is led by Ms Christine Tremblay, Ms Szilvia Csevár and Mr David den Dunnen, who serve as Guest Editors of this special edition of the ILSA Journal. The UN & I has been initiated by Dr Alanna O’Malley, the former Lector of UN Studies in Peace and Justice at The Hague University of Applied Sciences and Leiden University. Throughout 76 years of the UN’s history, the city of The Hague has played an important role as an epicentre of peace and justice, a locale of inspiration and knowledge-generation about the UN, its origins, meaning and purposes. As the reputation of the city continues to grow in this regard, in response to the increasing pressures on the global system, including escalating conflict, growing inequality and not least the recent pandemic, a new generation of scholars and activists have increasingly oriented themselves towards the UN. On one hand, it is clear that young people are actively engaged in these issues and demand fairer and more sustained engagement with the UN and the system of global governance in order to tackle them. On the other hand, however, young people have been highly critical of the fragmentary attention they have received from national leaders and UN representatives, and they demand better access and more urgency on this issue in particular. The research conducted in this part of the project will look at the sources of this frustration with the system and investigate new possible avenues for the operation of their agency and possibilities to engage the system in different ways. What does the United Nations (UN) mean to you? What are your frustrations with the UN system? How would we improve access to the UN by youth? These are some of the questions that the project ‘the UN & I’ intends to explore. The project aims to contribute to establishing The Hague as the first ‘UN City for Youth’. It intends to showcase ways in which young people realize UN ideas and principles in shaping their future. Part of the project is to publish innovative papers written by students in a special edition of the double-blind peer-reviewed HHS ILSA Law Journal.

Improving Access to the UN by Youth

By Artur Talpa*

Abstract The United Nations (UN), established in 1945, represents the guarantor of peace, stability, justice, and solidarity between the world’s continents. In contrast to the literature depicting the UN as an organization facilitating dialogue between the world’s states, this paper looks at the organization as a mechanism for implementing creative and innovative solutions to global problems and improving the conditions of life for people. The seventh SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, explained the reason why the UN exists as follows: “More than ever before in human history, we share a common destiny. We can master it only if we face it together. And that, my friends, is why we have the United Nations.” The importance of human capital, especially problem-solving, communication, and interpersonal skills, has increased in all economies, because of its successful application in practice. That is why, citizens of the world should energetically contribute and participate in the administration of our multinational community, using available and efficient means.

* LL.B. Candidate, International and European Law Programme, The Hague University of Applied Sciences.

I. Introduction General Assembly Resolution 58/133 underscores the “importance of the full and effective participation of youth and youth organizations at the local, national, regional, and international levels”.1 Ergo, the youth should be granted the opportunity to actively participate in the United Nations (hereinafter, UN) operational system because the young generations are the ‘future’ of our world.2 The UN and its Member States must actively cooperate to make the access of the youth to the organization visible.3 The central issue of the present paper consists in discovering personal skills and qualities necessary the youth have to possess to gain access to the United Nations. Access to the UN is based on two premises: firstly, young people are voluntarily aspiring to facilitate the UN’s aims, and, secondly, the UN is ready to open the door of cooperation with the younger generations. As it is commonly known, the successful development of personal traits constitutes the imperative foundation for bright achievements in later years.4 Therefore, by helping young generations to build positive qualities in the present, the United Nations can obtain considerable advantages in the future.5 This paper aims to convince young people of the significance of developing personal skills and extensive goals because they determine the individual’s future development and his or her potential to become a part of the United Nations system. From my point of view, the process of becoming a powerful agent for peace stands on three main pillars: education, courage, and integrity. It is self-explanatory that access to the United Nations is dependent on nurturing these traits in young people. The reason behind this statement is that a big percentage of youth lack proper education and governmental support and experience underestimation of their capacities by older generations. The IPU report revealed in 2016 that only 1.9 per cent of the world’s 45,000 parliamentarians are aged below 30.6 The present paper aims to disclose the strong interconnection between an individual’s education, courage, 1

UNGA Res 58/133 (22 December 2003) A/RES/58/133. UNGA Res 2633 (11 November 1970) A/RES/2633(XXV). 3 ibid. 4 Kautz, Tim, James J. Heckman, Ron Diris, Bas ter Weel, Lex Borghans, ‘Fostering and Measuring Skills: Improving Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills to Promote Lifetime Success’ (2014) (revised 2017) National Bureau of Economic Research < https://www.nber.org/papers/w20749> accessed 21 October 2023. 5 Someshwar Rao, Jianmin Tang, Weimin Wang (n 1) 16. 6 Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Youth Participation in National Parliaments’ [2016] United Nations Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth < https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2016/03/ipu-report-reveals-chronicrepresentation-young-people-worlds-parliaments/> accessed 21 October 2023. 2

and integrity and the individual’s access to the UN. Reiterating, it is significant to understand that ‘access’ does not solely mean acquiring a job at the UN but also implies personal contribution and support for the organization to effectively perform its functions. For this research article, doctrinal methodology was used, applying international primary and secondary legal instruments to the identified issues. The research method used was deskresearch. Firstly, this work will focus on the historical foundations of the three pillars of becoming a peace agent. Secondly, the document will discover how the United Nations currently fosters future leaders. Thirdly, the paper will elaborate on points of improvement in the UN system’s agenda and policies addressing the youth. Finally, this research will allow the reader to recognize the relationship between a peace agent’s most crucial qualities, as described above, and the political, social, and economic progress in the world. Portraying the importance of individuals’ endowment and interest in the success of the UN, I would like to cite the Swedish diplomat Dag Hammarskjold, who voiced concerns about people’s indifference to the development of the world: “Everything will be all right you know when? When people, just people, stop thinking of the United Nations as a weird Picasso abstraction and see it as a drawing they made themselves.” II. Education A. Legal basis According to Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter, UDHR), “Everyone has the right to education.” 7 The Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 highlights quality education as the primary element in the establishment of a peaceful and flourishing world.8 SDG 16 aims at promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development and building effective institutions at all levels. 9 SDGs’ purpose represents the positive transformation of our world, eliminating harmful elements for our society and striving for a better and stronger future. B. The link between education and the future of the United Nations

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217 A(III) (adopted 10 December 1948) (UDHR) art 26. UNGA Res 70/1 (25 September 2015) A/RES/70/1, SDG 4. 9 ibid, SDG 16. 8

The first pillar of a powerful peace agent is education. Education represents the key to professional and personal success.10 The skills, knowledge, and experience gained in this interesting and exciting ‘journey’ of life help develop the ability to construct lasting social and inter-state relationships. From my perspective, every single person plays an ambassador’s role for his or her family, city, and country. The improvement of youth’s access to the UN will determine the future advancement of the organization and individuals’ beliefs in the UN’s functionality and practicability. 11 The United Nations is a political institution. Therefore, the understanding of disciplines such as politics, diplomacy, and social science is critical in opening doors to this institution. Nowadays however, there is only a limited understanding of socio-political dynamics among young people, which deters their involvement in the UN.12 Young generations are in great need of valuable educational resources that could broaden their knowledge of international working mechanisms,13 and consequently, provide a strong basis for discovering and being eligible for work opportunities at the UN. Additionally, global awareness is a substantial part of young people’s progress, adducing a plethora of lucrative outputs for the entire world in terms of skilled representation of a state and energetic cooperation. For this reason, it is crucial to offer attention to and invest in education.14 ‘Investing’, in this case, does not solely mean financial contribution to the creation of proper training programs and a learning atmosphere, but it also signifies the genuine will of the older generation (authorities, teachers, tutors) to share their expertise with the “leaders of tomorrow”.15 C. National Model United Nations project

Toni Fuss Kirkwood-Tucker, ‘Empowering Teachers to Create a More Peaceful World Through Global Education: Simulating the United Nations’ (2004) 32 Theory & Research in Social Education 56. 11 Brock Bersaglio, Charis Enns and Thembela Kepe ‘Youth under construction: the United Nations’ representations of youth in the global conversation on the post-2015 development agenda’ (2015) 36 Canadian Journal on Development Studies 57. 12 European Commission, European Education and Culture Executive Agency, Citizenship Education at School in Europe (EU Publications 2017). 13 UNGA Res 2633 (n 3). 14 Loxley, Andrew, Aidan Seery and John Walsh ‘Investment in Education and the tests of time’ (2014) 33(2) Irish Educational Studies 173. 15 UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning (UIL) ‘Intergenerational Learning between Older Adults and Students’ (UNESCO, 6 September 2021) < https://uil.unesco.org/case-study/effective-practices-database-litbase0/intergenerational-learning-between-older-adults> accessed 18 September 2023. 10

The UN supports the National Model United Nations (NMUN) – university-level conferences, during which undergraduates reproduce the work of various bodies of the organization.16 The project helps youth to acquire diplomatic, leadership, oratory, and language skills, as well as the ability to make compromises.17 Participation in this project is facilitated by collaboration between the NMUN and its partner universities. The National Model United Nations project shows students the operational processes of the UN bodies. During the committee hearings, student representatives of the UN’s Member States, have the chance to present their ideas and arguments in a plenum together with fellow diplomats. The goal of this setting consists in finding partner states to draft a committee’s resolution. Taking into consideration that countries have different political and economic interests, building strong relationships with other states is challenging. However, this difficulty of finding common ground with other delegations and trying to persuade others to vote in favour of a particular course of action, allows students to enhance their negotiation and interpersonal skills. The most exciting part of the conference, however, is the ability to work and negotiate in a multicultural environment. This is a significant element in today’s world, as it mirrors the atmosphere of international diplomatic discourse and cooperation. The competition represents a perfect place to expand personal and professional knowledge and to make life-long connections with different people. Furthermore, by participating in this conference, students understand the importance of long-lasting diplomatic connections between UN Member States for the ability to tackle global issues in a coordinated way. Moreover, the NMUN offers participants the opportunity to visit the UN General Assembly premises in New York.18 This experience may incite people to think about the possibility of becoming an ‘agent for peace’ themselves. It motivates undergraduates to believe in their abilities and work hard to, one day, take the diplomatic seat of their country in the General Assembly Hall. Being inside the world’s most well-known building, students can grasp the real power of high-quality education and the resulting, indefinite possibilities to grow, and make the world a better place.

‘Fostering Global Citizenship Since 1927’ (NMUN, 2022) < https://www.nmun.org> accessed 5 June 2023. ibid. 18 ibid. 16 17

It is necessary to underline the majority of students’ lack of possibilities to participate in NMUN. Unfortunately, not everyone has the opportunity to take part in this project, and there are two reasons for this. The first reason consists in the lack of financial opportunities for most of the students to travel to the United States for this project. To remove this obstacle, the UN should elaborate financial programs for these trips to support students, who have a high interest in the United Nations’ work but do not have the necessary economic means. Such programs would attract a plethora of young people interested in the UN institutions and raise future leaders who will promote the organization’s activities globally. The second issue is connected to the first one and concerns the lack of popularity of the project in certain parts of the world so that some states do not have the necessary tools or capacity to organize the NMUN project. To increase undergraduates’ awareness of the UN, the geographical scope of the Model United Nations Conference should be extended to all Member States. What are the consequences of this status quo? Education is one of the sources of courage in the professional and personal lives of young people. Subsequently, the inability to take part in such projects deprives students of an opportunity to foster their self-confidence, by acquiring new knowledge and capabilities. This could undermine the potential of millions of young people who could participate in the UN’s effort to improve the world but are not given the “access key” to the UN system and education. The world must not forget that the most rewarding investment is investment in education and personal skills. This is because education is always “in fashion”, by being able to generate many times greater wealth and prosperity, than the resources necessary for its acquirement. D. Online or in-person educational activities Online and in-person workshops are met with increasing popularity nowadays. Therefore, arranging such trainings and workshops for young people from all around the world would support their journey in becoming global citizens. The elaboration of UN-led programs, in which qualified specialists from different industries provide topic-related workshops, would broaden the young generation’s knowledge of social, economic, and political issues around the world. Additionally, these expert classes, could discuss the possible ways in which the youth can implement the skills learned for their community’s benefit. For example, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN has implemented a project named “Evidence-Based Policy Action on Youth Development in Africa” in Burkina54

Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Togo.19 The project’s aim consists of strengthening youth civic engagement at the local level, and the formulation of more inclusive policies that are responsive to the needs and priorities of youth in Africa.20 At the end of the project, a regional workshop was convened, during which representatives of different stakeholders, including intergovernmental bodies and academia, shared best practices and recommendations relating to youth policies in subSaharan Africa.21 By providing information to and sharing skills with the large public, this project stimulated young people’s interest in discovering the system of international relations within and outside the United Nations. E. Safe and inclusive learning environments It is highly recommended to pursue projects under the United Nations administration to create safe and inclusive learning environments.22 Firstly, there is an urgent need to upgrade the education in developing countries and remote areas, by providing high-quality working materials and qualified specialists to ensure the efficiency of the learning process.23 Secondly, the UN should work towards guaranteeing the inclusivity of all young people, 24 by helping those who cannot afford school or sport facilities themselves.25 Thirdly, the UN should set aside a budget for the construction of new educational facilities (preschool, primary school, high school, and university education) in regions where such institutions are not accessible to everyone or not available at all.26 Generally, one of the most commonly used advances in dealing with the lack of education problem is trying to provide more equal access to academic resources for the young generations.27 This includes the creation of libraries or training centres in areas all around the world. For example, UNICEF has launched the Giga Initiative to connect every school to the

‘Evidence-based policy action on youth development in Africa’ (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Capacity Development, 16 November 2020) <https://capacity.desa.un.org/node/3175> accessed 10 May 2023. 20 ibid. 21 ibid. 22 UNGA Res 2633 (n 3). 23 ECOSOC, High-Level Political Forum, Speakers Call for Educational Systems’ Wholesale Transformation with Students’ Needs at Heart of 2030 Agenda, as High-Level Political Forum Continues (UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases 2022). 24 UNGA Res 2633 (n 3). 25 Moulton (n 25). 26 ibid. 27 UNGA Res 70/1 (n 9), SDG 4. 19

Internet and every young person to information, opportunity, and choice.28 This project is funded by corporate and non-profit organizations, but also supported by UNICEF and individual governments.29 Additionally, Beca a Un Pana civil society organization has elaborated and designed the University Scholarship Program with the support of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN in Venezuela, financially aiding young people in this country to gain access to higher education.30 This project has to be seen in the light of recent statistics, which suggest that only 25 per cent of young people in Venezuela have access to higher education and 40 per cent are unable to complete it because of monetary restraints.31 Besides the activities dedicated to young generations, it is also critical to provide academic, and instrumental support for teachers. The UN should, through its organs and specialized agencies, organize and hold webinars or advanced training courses for teaching staff in distinct regions of the planet to keep them up-to-date with new technologies and innovative teaching methods. III. Courage A. The significance of courage The second pillar of a powerful peace agent is courage. The concept of ‘courage’ does not exclusively depend on the internal state of a person, but also on the external ambiance where we grow up.32 Paul Tillich noted in his book ‘The Courage to Be’ that courage is necessary to surmount life’s difficulties, but that this quality only comes from experiencing adversity.33 By granting youth the freedom to reflect, latitude to act, and liberty to express their views, young people will become more independent and efficient in their activities, positively changing the

‘Giga: Connecting Every School to the Internet’ (UNICEF, 16 February 2022) < https://www.unicef.org/innovation/giga> accessed 14 June 2023. 29 ibid. 30 ‘University scholarship program: promoting professionalization and employability through a comprehensive approach and support of young Venezuelans in vulnerable situations’ (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Capacity Development, 11 June 2017) < https://sdgs.un.org/partnerships/universityscholarship-program-promoting-professionalization-and-employability-through > accessed 6 June 2023. 31 ibid. 32 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (1st edn, Collins 1962). 33 ibid, 17-22, 86-112. 28

world. Having these tools, youth acquires the spirit to pursue new strategies and projects to cope with the challenges of life.34 According to Aristotle, courage is as virtue – a marker of moral excellence.35 In fact, courage is an outstanding personal quality, which is very rare nowadays. C. S. Lewis claimed that courage is “not simply one of the virtues, but the form of every virtue at the testing point”.36 French writer Herve Bazin on the other hand expressed: “There are three categories of people. The essence of some is to have, of others - to be, of others - to do.” Combining the spirit of C. S. Lewis’ words with the Herve Bazin’s one could say that there are four categories of people. The essence of some is to have, of others - to be, of others - to do. However, the essence of the fourth category of people lies in the courage of both having, being, and doing for the benefit of the world’s society – and those are the global citizens. Everything great and special in this world was created thanks to courageous people, being confident in their ideas and characters.37 Most importantly, they believed in their capacity to contribute to the improvement of political, social, or economic systems. 38 In this context, it is essential to mention the most important constituent element of ‘courage’ - self-confidence. Despite the conflicting opinions of some scholars and philosophers, I consider that the feeling of self-confidence is a foundation, on which ‘courage’ is built. For instance, if a person is confident in his or her abilities and is offered an opportunity to improve something, then that individual will have the courage to take on this challenge. On the contrary, a person who does not have any confidence in him or herself, will not be willing (or, in other words, will not have the courage) to take on any responsibility to pursue a particular goal. In my opinion, courage is an external manifestation of self-confidence feeling, which is internal in its nature. That is why, I dedicated the following paragraphs to the concept of self-confidence which enables people to become courageous in their actions. B. The link between education and self-confidence as a premise to courage

ibid, 113-154. Matthew Beard, ‘Courage Isn’t About Facing our Fears, It’s About Facing Ourselves’ (The Ethics Centre, 22 August 2019) <https://ethics.org.au/courage-isnt-about-facing-our-fears-its-about-facingourselves/#:~:text=The%20Greek%20philosopher%20Aristotle%20believed,that%20are%20worthy%20of%20f ear.> accessed 8 June 2023. 36 C. S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters (1ed, Fitzhenry 1993) 111. 37 Debbe Kennedy, ‘The Courage to Change’ [2011] Burbank 61. 38 Sarah Pickard, ‘Young environmental activists and Do-It-Ourselves (DIO) politics: collective engagement, generational agency, efficacy, belonging and hope’ (2022) 25(6) Journal of Youth Studies 1. 35

Professor Nikolay Miron highlighted that the goal of education is not only providing theoretical knowledge, but above all inciting action.39 Therefore, education is an instrument, which has the power to raise confidence in young people to apply their knowledge and skills in practice.40 Consequently, the link between education and courage is a direct one – courage evolves from the person’s internal confidence in his personal and professional abilities.41 Since education is so essential, UNICEF has launched the Global Partnership for Education project, which is focused on furnishing quality education to children in lowerincome countries.42 The initiative provides a stimulating study environment and conditions, by assuring youth that they possess everything necessary to become a specialist in their domains, no matter where they come from.43 The availability of learning tools encourages young people to go forward with their vocational and personal training and represents a strong psychological basis for young people’s progress. For instance, the Division for Sustainable Development Goals (DSDG) and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) have designed the ‘Stakeholder Engagement and the 2030 Agenda: A Practical Guide’ e-learning course for stakeholders interested in the fulfilment and facilitation of the 2030 Agenda at all levels, which is a great initiative for young people to partake in and collaborate with other specialists.44 C. How to aid young generations in the process of acquiring self-confidence? 1. Opportunity for youth to express their views and actively participate 45 The eighth Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, has proclaimed: “... with half the world's population under age 25, young people 'can and must' play a central role in overcoming global challenges ... “. Following this impulse, the United Nations should create regional platforms for young people to share their views on the organization’s work or specific activities, propose solutions, or indicate weak points within the UN system.46 The N. I. Miron, ‘Golden Pedagogical Aphorisms’ [2014] The World of Science, Culture, Education 358. ibid. 41 ibid. 42 ‘Global Partnership for Education’ (UNICEF, 24 January 2020) < https://www.unicef.org/chad/globalpartnership-education> accessed 20 May 2023. 43 ibid. 44 ‘Stakeholder Engagement and the 2030 Agenda: A Practical Guide’ (UNDESA & UNITAR, 2 July 2020) <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/StakeholdersGuide> accessed 12 July 2023. 45 UNGA ‘Statement of the Secretary-General’ (2009) SG/SM/12076. 46 UNGA Res 2633 (n 3). 39 40

notion of courage represents the individuals’ aspirations to change the existing status quo of the system.47 That is why, nowadays, young generations want world leaders to hear their voices and implement their visions.48 Taking the example of the National Model United Nations Project, the resolutions passed in the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) committee during the Conference in 2023 were sent to the actual UN body for consultation. Thanks to this, the UNHCR will be able to understand the young generation’s ideas concerning the protection of refugees from human trafficking. This powerful collaboration between the young generation and the United Nations motivates youth to continue working hard and reassures them in their strong abilities to contribute to the well-being of everyone. Youth want to have certainty that the world’s society takes into consideration the social implications of global problems, rather than political divergence. 2. Believe in youth’s potential and appreciate their endeavours 49 There is a popular approach among employers to underestimate young professionals applying for job positions.50 Even though often young people have valuable knowledge that qualifies them for that job, many individuals don’t dare to challenge this prejudice. By offering young people a level of trust and confidence, employers will see various positive outcomes, such as high productivity and innovative ideas.51 Nevertheless, it is critical to take into account certain issues in dealing with youth,52 such as lack of experience, emotional reactivity, and impatience. However, these difficulties can be overcome by a cautious and diplomatic approach aimed at accelerating the adaptation of young people to a given work

Douglas M. Lambert and Matias G. Enz, ‘We Must Find the Courage to Change’ (2015) 36 Journal of Business Logistics 9. 48 Sarah Pickard (n 40). 49 UNGA Res 58/133 (n 2). 50 Natalia Goryainova, ‘About the Problem of Employment of Young Specialists and the Possibilities of Interaction Between Educational Organizations and Employers in its Solution’ [RU] [2016] The Management in Modern Systems. 51 ibid. 52 Natalia A. Orekhovskaya, Sergei Y. Lavrentiev, Elmira R. Khairullina, Olga G. Yevgrafova, Zavgaria M. Sakhipova, Irina V. Strakhova, Natalya V. Khlebnikova, Marina N. Vishnevskaya, ‘Management of Young Professionals Success in the Labor Market’ (2016) 6(2) International Review of Management and Marketing 264. 47

environment. At the initial stage of their professional career, young professionals need trust, just as ‘a bird needs wings’ to live up to their full potential.53 3. Provide support and assistance for youth 54 High-quality education in pedagogical institutions is priceless.55 Researchers from Pennsylvania State University concluded that individuals who work with children need to respond to their needs instead of reacting to their problems. 56 According to the study published in June 2013, improving teacher-student relationships, causes young people to be more efficient in their studies and open to establish trustful relationships with their mentors.57 Young people feel more comfortable in a supportive atmosphere, where mentors facilitate the learning process by advising and directing the youth. The same conclusion can be drawn with regard to the working field, especially in the UN. Entering such a large system as the United Nations, it is easy for young people to give up when confronted with such a substantial amount of responsibility and the high complexity of tasks. Young people are in great necessity of hearing supportive words from their supervisors, especially when they make mistakes, to create a secure atmosphere of cooperation and mutual reliance. The purpose of the United Nations consists in changing our world and making it a better place to live.58 Therefore, the Organization should have closer dialogues with its Member States to highlight the significance of educational programs and individual mentoring for the youth.59 IV. Integrity A. Historical development and definitions

Louise Young and Kerry Daniel ‘Affectual trust in the workplace’ (2003) 14 The International Journal on Human Resource Management 139. 54 Larry K. Brendtro, Martin Brokenleg, Steve Van Bockern ‘The Circle of Courage: Developing Resilience and Capacity in Youth’ (2013) 1 International Journal for Talent Development and Creativity 67. 55 Zulfa Sakhiyya, Elizabeth Rata ‘From ‘Priceless’ to ‘Priced’: The Value of Knowledge in Higher Education’ (2019) 17(3) Globalisation, Societies and Education 285. 56 Larry K. Brendtro, Martin Brokenleg, Steve Van Bockern (n 56). 57 ibid. 58 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘Empowering the United Nations’ [1992] Foreign Affairs (1 December 1992) 89 <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/san-marino/1992-12-01/empowering-united-nations> accessed 10 May 2023. 59 UNGA Res 2633 (n 3). 53

The third crucial pillar of a peace agent is integrity. The idea of integrity is a very broad philosophical notion, having a long list of different meanings and definitions. For instance, Montefiore and Vines have interpreted this concept in line with the meaning of the Latin word ‘integritas’ (wholeness), which relates to the consistency between beliefs, decisions, and actions, and continued adherence to values and principles.60 English philosopher Bernard Williams supports a similar understanding of integrity, praising the 1977 edition of the Chambers Dictionary’s definition of integrity in his essay,61 which defines it as “entireness, wholeness: the unimpaired state of anything.” 62 Nevertheless, there also exists a slightly different understanding of integrity, which is narrower in its nature. Some philosophers define ‘integrity’ as a notion of ‘accountability’ in society. For instance, Margaret Urban Walker mentions in her article ‘Historical Accountability and the Virtue of Civic Integrity’ that accountability ranges more widely than morality.63 She writes that accountability connects individuals through the recognition of their responsibilities under various shared norms: norms of law, morality, agreement, institutional roles, or common understanding.64 Professor Dr. Edgar Karssing supports this view, seeing integrity as a professional responsibility towards society, in which a professional exercises his tasks adequately and carefully, taking into account all relevant interests and stakeholders.65 As described above, integrity represents a crucial personal quality, which helps people to become successful in their careers and relationships with other people. By providing many different perspectives on the idea of integrity, the reader can discover a great collection of positive qualities and characteristics an individual can acquire, developing this crucial character trait. From my standpoint, aspiring future leaders have to develop such characteristics, because these traits are facilitating the achievement of durable and valuable results for our society.

Visser, Wayne, Dirk Matten, Manfred Pohl, and Nick Tolhurst, The A to Z of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Complete Reference Guide to Concepts, Codes and Organisations (1st edn, John Wiley & Sons Inc 2007). 61 Williams, Bernard, John Smart, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge University Press 1973). 62 A. M. Macdonald (ed), Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary (Chambers 1977). 63 Margaret Urban Walker, ‘Historical Accountability and the Virtue of Civic Integrity’ in William Werpehowski and Kathryn Getek Soltis, Lanham (eds), Virtue and the Moral of Life (Rowman & Littelfield 2014). 64 ibid. 65 Edgar Karssing, Integrity in Professional Practice (1st edn, Erasmus University Rotterdam 2006) 3.

In contrast, David Brooks, a New York Times writer, defines the life of a person without integrity, which signifies moral mediocrity, personal stagnation, and lack of the deepest meaning in life, causing sadness and discouragement.66 B. Relationship between integrity and political, social, and economic stability The implications of having many persons of integrity in society are significant for the well-being of our planet. They include the promotion of economic growth by cultivating a level playing field for business, and support for environmental sustainability goals by truly dedicating all the resources, work, and time for the achievement of common objectives. In addition, integrity fosters the construction of lasting cooperation with other UN Member States on a trustful and peaceful basis.67 Furthermore, strengthening the idea of ‘integrity’ in society makes public policies more effective and increases the legitimacy of governmental authorities.68 As Adlai E Stevenson said, “Public confidence in the integrity of the Government is indispensable to faith in democracy; and when we lose faith in the system, we have lost faith in everything we fight and stand for”. According to David Brooks, character building is not like going to the gym – a person cannot build up honesty, courage, integrity, and grit like muscles.69 Instead, a person’s character is a byproduct of society and interpersonal relationships.70 Similarly, Patrick Dobel defines the notion of integrity through specific values such as incorruptibility, honesty, impartiality, and courage, which could be raised in the educational environment.71 This argument is further supported by Richard De George who wrote in his book that “acting with integrity is the same as acting ethically or morally”.72 The development of a young person’s personality is determined by a person’s family, morals, ethics, and values. We adopt morals, ethics, and values from our family and at school, so there is a direct link between a person’s level of education and the quality of life in the household, where a child grows up. That is why, states and international organizations should 66

David Brooks, The Second Mountain: The Quest for a Moral Life (1st edn, Random House 2019). OECD, Governance as an SDG Accelerator: Country Experiences and Tools (OECD Publishing 2019) <https://doi.org/10.1787/0666b085-en>. 68 ibid. 69 David Brooks (n 68). 70 ibid. 71 J. Patrick Dobel, Public Integrity (1st edn, John Hopkins University Press 1999). 72 Richard T. De George, Competing with Integrity in International Business (1st edn, Oxford University Press 1993). 67

focus on creating resistant economies and consistent politics, which provide youth with peace, qualitative healthcare, and basic opportunities for their professional development. In my opinion, a decent, peaceful, and economically stable life will never force people to go beyond the boundaries of generally accepted norms of ethics. That is the primary reason why, the world’s leaders should open the UN’s doors to new young personalities with constructive ideas, that concern “people” and not countries’ political or military ambitions. Such change will improve the conditions of life on every continent, preventing much regret and violence. Summarizing, a country’s political, economic, and social stability plays an impactful role in raising global citizens, who can guide our world in the right direction. There is a direct connection between integrity and education. On the one hand, education instils something new into youth, forming their initial ideals and lends a variety of principles to follow. On the other hand, education unlocks youth’s potential and abilities, being already present within them but not yet expressed externally. Youth has already the natural capacity and true desire to become global citizens, it is just necessary to grant them a pleasant atmosphere for the development of their traits and characters. In that sense, education plays the significant role of a safe environment, where the young generation is exposed to important knowledge and multilateral skills: a bird will never learn to fly, except when exposed to free fall. V. Conclusion Conclusively, this article aimed to highlight that one of the most important obstacles for accessing the UN consists in a lack of proper education, internal courage, and integrity in young individuals. It is essential to understand the causal relationship between these crucial human pillars and the aspiring bright and peaceful future for our world. The United Nations’ task remains to provide multiple opportunities for younger generations to contribute to the world’s well-being and peaceful development.73 Both younger generations and the United Nations have reciprocal responsibilities; the youth should work towards making the world a better place, and the UN should have an interest in granting the youth every opportunity to implement and realize these aspirations. Without any doubt, this goals can be exclusively achieved by investing in social sector and improving the world population’s standard of living.

UNGA Res 2633 (n 3).

Global Imperialism by the United Nations Security Council and its Impact on Youth: A case study on the United Nations Missions in Haiti

By Tolga Doğan*

Abstract This article examines the impact of UN involvement in Haiti, in backdrop of UNSC Resolution 2250, which recognises the role of youth (individuals aged 18 – 29) in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as their vulnerability during armed conflict. As a concept created by European states in the colonial era, international law has historically been used to construct the laws of sovereignty to allow domination over colonial territories. This legacy has manifested itself in the ability of Western states to justify military intervention under the guise of R2P. After removing Haiti’s democratically elected President Aristede from office in 2004, the US and France depicted Haiti as a failed state to justify their humanitarian intervention. Subsequently, the UNSC legitimised this intervention with the creation of the MIF, which was replaced by MINUSTAH. MINUSTAH’s narrow focus on security and its use of repressive force, legitimised opposition to the mission. Additionally, its CVR programmes lacked a developmental character, and, thus, were insufficient at preventing the recruitment of youth by armed gangs. Following MINUSTAH, MINUJUSTH, as well as BINUH, were also unable to stabilise Haiti sufficiently, leading to the authorisation of another Chapter VII peacekeeping mission in Haiti, led by Kenya in October 2023. The author argues that youth find themselves at the mercy of imperialist international power structures that act in their own interest by constructing the laws of the use of force, enabled by their place in the UNSC. Non-imperial peacekeeping is vital to safeguard the safety of youth worldwide. To reach this aim, it is necessary to question the current structure of the UNSC.

LL.B. Candidate, International and European Law Programme, The Hague University of Applied Sciences.

Introduction

This article deals with the United Nations’ (hereinafter ‘UN’) involvement in Haiti and its legacy that affects the state until today as an example of imperialism perpetrated by the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter ‘UNSC’). In particular, the UN missions will be analysed regarding their impact on youth, specifically individuals aged 18 to 29 years. This demographic is at the heart of UNSC measures that underline the importance of protecting their safety, as well as their vital role in establishing sustainable peace and security. The author intends to highlight how imperialist UNSC action has a negative impact on the safety and security of youth, despite their protection also seemingly being of interest to the Member States of the UNSC. By critically engaging with the history of imperialist UN involvement in Haiti and its impact on youth, the author hopes to underline the necessity for a reform of the UN system. This will be done by firstly, (II) outlining the UN’s Youth, Peace, and Security Agenda and its manifestation in Haiti. Secondly, (III) the author will explore the colonial origins of international law and how this manifests itself in the UNSC. Thirdly, (IV) this article will detail how imperialism has impacted youth in Haiti. Lastly, (V) the author will conclude the article with a call for action to re-consider the authority of the current UNSC, in consideration of the colonial origin of international law. The research for this piece is exclusively of doctrinal character, in which the relevant UNSC resolutions will be analysed. This will be supplemented by non-doctrinal research, in which reports of the consequences of the aforementioned legislation will be put into context. To further substantiate the author’s argumentation, as well as to provide the relevant context, various scholarly contributions will additionally be examined. The research is exclusively conducted in the form of desk research. As for methodology, the author engages in postcolonial legal theory (hereinafter ‘PLT’). PLT examines the law as a “tool of imperialism”.1 PLT entails the understanding of how colonial laws continue to have an effect on the contemporary legal landscape due to their “ideological effects”.2 Due to this, the theory can be utilised to describe the law as a Kumar, V, ‘A Proleptic Approach to Postcolonial Legal Studies? A Brief Look at the Relationship Between Legal Theory and Intellectual History’, 2003 2 Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/issue/2003-2/kumar.html> accessed 18 October 2023 3. 2 Alpana Roy, 'Postcolonial Theory and Law: A Critical Introduction' (2008) 29 Adel L Rev 315 319. 1

justification for imperial state violence.3 The author seeks to establish how this exact utilisation of the law can be seen with the conduct of the UNSC in relation to Haiti. II.

Youth, peace, and security: Resolution 2250

In 2015, with Resolution 2250, the UNSC recognised that youth, for the purpose of this resolution meaning individuals between 18 and 29 years of age, are often adversely affected by armed conflict and its consequences.4 Thus, the resolution underlines the importance of protecting youth during armed conflicts, as well as their possible contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.5 The resolution called for an independent study on youth, peace and security, which was published in 2018 under the title ‘The Missing Peace: Independent Progress Study on Youth and Peace and Security’.6 Briefly, the study also mentions the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti’s (hereinafter ‘MINUSTAH’) community violence reduction programme (hereinafter ‘CVR’), which supported youth through “psychosocial assistance, civic education, and access to vocational training and leadership opportunities”.7 These measures aimed to disengage youth from gangs but were also open to individuals who have been placed in correction facilities.8 Overall, CVR’s purpose was to “stabilise communities in the short term by providing alternative means of income to at-risk youth while simultaneously improving community cohesion in the long term”.9 Additionally, in order to allow the transfer of the programme from the UN mission to the Haitian authorities, it aimed at strengthening the state’s structures.10 This included developing national police forces, as well as the judicial sector, and facilitating social-economic recovery.11 Haiti’s provisional government at that time criticised MINUSTAH’s CVR initiatives, as the mission “tried to impose its own [CVR]

Kumar (n 1) 3. UNSC Res 2250 (9 December 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2250. 5 ibid. 6 Letter dated 23 February 2018 from the independent lead author of the progress study on youth and peace and security mandated by the Security Council in its resolution 2250 (2015) addressed to the Secretary-General UN Doc SC/12149. 7 Graeme Simpson, ‘The Missing Peace: Independent Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security’ (United Nations General Assembly 2018) 110. 8 ibid. 9 Moritz Schuberth, ‘Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in unconventional settings: the case of MINUSTAH’s community violence reduction.' International Peacekeeping (2017) 24(3) International Peacekeeping <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3026400> accessed 6 June 2023 15. 10 ibid. 11 OIOS, ‘Audit of the community violence reduction programme in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti’ Report 2015/052 (2015) 1. 4

programme and refused to support government programmes (…)”.12 This lack of agency led to mutual mistrust between the government and the mission.13 Even the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Officer has argued that most CVR measures that were implemented lacked a sustainable objective.14 Rather, they followed narrow objectives in specific subject areas, instead of being “developmental” in their approach.15 Thus, “former gang members that received professional training went back to gang activities for the lack of economic opportunities and because the root causes for the existence of the gangs were not addressed” by MINUSTAH.16 The following section will further discuss the history of UN intervention in Haiti and how this contributed to (gang) violence, to the detriment of Haitian youth. A. History of UN Intervention in Haiti In 2003, the Canadian government hosted a meeting with French and US officials to discuss the situation in Haiti.17 In a March 2003 article, the late journalist Michel Vastel describes this as a plot of “former colonial powers” to justify an intervention under the guise of the Responsibility to Protect (hereinafter ‘R2P’).18 Around that time, a rebel movement seized control of major cities shortly after the nation’s 200th anniversary of independence from French colonial rule.19 Their uprising was enabled by the nation’s economic situation and instances of political violence.20 This motivated the US and France to stage “a militarily imposed humanitarian intervention” in 2003, as planned during their meeting in Canada.21

Schuberth (n 9) 15. ibid. 14 Ibid. 16. 15 ibid. 16 Mariana Dos Santos Parra, ‘Minustah’s Legitimacy and the “Security-first” Approach: Reassessing Statebuilding and its Violent Features in the Case of Haiti’ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1(23) 14. 17 Nikolas Barry-Shaw, Dru Oja Jay ‘New documents detail how Canada helped plan 2004 coup d’état in Haiti’ (The Breach, 15 July 2021) <https://breachmedia.ca/new-documents-detail-how-canada-helped-plan-2004-coupdetat-in-haiti/> accessed 10 March 2023. 18 Jean Saint-Vil, ‘A Legacy of Canadian Intervention in Haiti, 20 Years On’ (NACLA, 31 January 2023) <https://nacla.org/legacy-canadian-intervention-haiti-20-years> accessed 31 October 2023. 19 ibid. 20 ibid. 21 Rita Kiki Edozie, ‘Cooperating Against Small-State Marginalization: A Postcolonial Perspective on UNSC Resolution 1529 in Haiti’ (2008) 5(1) Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race <https://www.academia.edu/4110809/COOPERATING_AGAINST_SMALL_STATE_MARGINALIZATION> 96. 13

On 29 February 2004, the democratically elected president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, reportedly resigned and fled to exile in the Central African Republic.22 Notably, according to US Congresswoman Maxine Walters in her 2004 speech, Aristide was coerced by US and French officials to flee the country, as they were involved in supporting rebel groups to increase pressure on him.23 In the same speech, the Congresswoman detailed how “U.S. officials told [Aristide] that he and many other Haitians would be killed if he refused” to abdicate his post as president.24 This indication of foreign intervention is further supported by France’s former ambassador to Haiti, Thierry Burkhard. In an interview with the New York Times, Burkhard shared that France and the US “effectively orchestrated the 2004 coup” that led to Aristide’s exile.25 According to Burkhard, France’s motive was to silence Aristide’s demands for financial reparations by the French for their colonial rule over Haiti and the latter’s payment that was necessary to ‘buy’ its independence.26 To address the situation in Haiti, the UNSC passed Resolution 1529 on 29 February 2004 and established a three-month-long Multinational Interim Force (hereinafter ‘MIF’) to support the US-French intervention.27 The MIF was mandated with enhancing security and stability in Haiti, providing humanitarian assistance and assisting law enforcement. 28 As the resolution was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the MIF could enforce its mandate by “all necessary means”, i.e., including the use of force.29 With Resolution 1542 on 30 April 2004, the UNSC established MINUSTAH, which took over the MIF’s authority on 1 June 2004.30 The purpose of the mission was to ensure stability and assist the provisional government that succeeded Aristide in reforming the police force, ‘Key Dates in Haiti’s History’ (Embassy of Haiti) <http://www.haiti.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/key_dates.pdf> accessed 10. May 2023. 23 ‘Coup d'Etat in Haiti - March 2004’ (Archives of Women's Political Communication) <https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/03/21/coup-detat-in-haiti-march-2004/.> accessed 10 March 2023. 24 ibid. 25 ‘Ex-Ambassador Admits France & U.S. Orchestrated 2004 Coup in Haiti to Oust Aristide’ (Democracy Now, 23 May 2002) <https://www.democracynow.org/2022/5/23/headlines/ex_ambassador_admits_france_us_orchestrated_2004_c oup_in_haiti_to_oust_aristide> accessed 10 May 2023. 26 ibid. 27 ‘Multinational Interim Force (MIF)’ (Government of Canada) <https://www.canada.ca/en/departmentnational-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/caribbean/halo-i.html> accessed 10 May 2023. 28 ibid. 29 ibid. 30 UNSC Res 1542 (30 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1542. 22

disarming rebel groups, and fostering reintegration programmes for civil society.31 The mission was not without controversy, as “MINUSTAH was viewed by many Haitians as an international force that legitimised an ‘illegitimate transitional regime’ that ‘subverted dissidents against the intervention’.32 In the words of the former Police Commissioner Beer, “the gangs viewed MINUSTAH as an occupying force: an extension of the Multinational Force, which had managed Aristide’s departure. Moreover, they saw it as supporting the country’s economic elite, the interim government, and Haitian National Police, and fundamentally anti-Aristide and anti-Lavalas”.33 Furthermore, the mission was criticised for its heavy focus on security, particularly its securitisation of social issues, i.e. addressing “fundamentally (…) social, economic, and cultural [problems]” through military means.34 For instance, MINUSTAH made use of “repressive means” to address pro-Aristide groups within Haiti.35 Within a time frame of roughly two years after the abdication of Aristide, it is estimated that 8,000 civilians were murdered and 35,000 were sexually assaulted by “criminals from pro- and anti-Aristide groups, the national police - and UN peacekeepers as well”.36 Critics of MINUSTAH argued that addressing the post-2004 surge of violence “appeared misguided, as security issues were intertwined with equally important political and economic grievances”.37 Thus, the mission was accused of “responding only to the symptoms of violence rather than to its causes”.38 In 2007, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1743, which required increased action against armed groups “as deemed necessary to restore security”.39 During these missions, around 600

UNSC ‘Security Council establishes UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti for initial Six-Month Period’ (30 April 2004) Press Release SC/8083. 32 Edozie (n 21) 102. 33 Lou Pingeot, ‘United Nations peace operations as international practices: Revisiting the UN mission’s armed raids against gangs in Haiti’ (2018) 3(3) EJIS <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-ofinternational-security/article/abs/united-nations-peace-operations-as-international-practices-revisiting-the-unmissions-armed-raids-against-gangs-in-haiti/0B75F2F7B1F2060EFBCBC28FB47322AE> accessed 31 October 2023 375. 34 Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)’ in Joachim Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, Paul D. Williams (eds), The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (OUP 2015) 3, 6. 35 ibid, 6. 36 ibid. 37 ibid. 38 ibid. 39 UNSC Res 1743 (15 February 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1743. 31

civilians were left wounded as “collateral damage”, half of which were children and women.40 This perpetration of violence by UN peacekeeping troops exacerbated conflict and political instability, which disadvantaged already marginalised or economically lessprivileged communities in the affected areas.41 In this context, it is essential to note that that “vulnerable communities are the most likely to join gangs and fall into violence and delinquency”.42 This led to the antagonization of MINUSTAH action and thereby arguably legitimised the existence of armed gangs as opposition thereto.43 Thus, these violent encounters have been said to further contribute to the radicalisation of youth, facilitating the formation of armed gangs.44 Public perception of MINUSTAH additionally suffered from cases of sexual exploitation perpetrated by UN peacekeepers.45 For example, in 2007, 111 Sri Lankan soldiers were accused of engaging in the sexual exploitation of minors. Similarly, in 2011, Pakistani troops allegedly raped a male minor in the city of Gonaïves and sexually assaulted minors in the capital of Haiti.46 Notably, only “three of them were later found guilty of sexual exploitation and abuse and were condemned to a one-year jail sentence”.47 That same year, “Uruguayan troops were accused of sexually assaulting a young man […]” and only charged with “coercion offenses”.48 An additional strain on MINUSTAH’s reputation was posed by a cholera outbreak in 2010, with allegations that the disease originated from the Nepali UN peacekeeping troops, killing more than 8,000 individuals.49 Haiti’s lack of a properly functioning sewage and sanitation system at the time posed the ideal conditions to allow the cholera epidemic to unfold.50 This has been used by UN officials as a justification to evade responsibility for the

Lemay-Hébert (n 34) 6. Dos Santos Parra (n 16) 12. 42 Elise Varrey, ‘United Nation Peacekeeping Missions in Haiti (1993-2019)' (2021) 4(2) In Statu Nascendi – Journal of Political Philosophy and International Relations 3 23. 43 Dos Santos Parra (n 16) 12. 44 Lemay-Hébert (n 34) 6. 45 ibid, 7. 46 ibid. 47 ibid. 48 ibid. 49 ibid. 50 ibid. 41

outbreak.51 For some of the sexual abuse cases perpetrated by its peacekeeping troops and the cholera outbreak, the UN successfully invoked its immunity as an international organisation to evade accountability.52 As mentioned above, due to MINUSTAH’s focus on matters of ‘security’, its mandate neglected development tasks.53 Consequently, these were taken over by “willing donor countries and organisations”.54 However, due to Western states depiction of Haiti as a ‘failed state’, many donor states were hesitant to “allocate financial resources directly to the Haitian government, but have injected resources in a multitude of NGOs operating in the country instead”.55 Thus, the Haitian government lacked resources, which was detrimental for its legitimacy and credibility among Haitians.56 In 2013, “the Haitian Senate unanimously adopted a resolution requesting MINUSTAH to leave by May 2014”, without any success.57 It was not until 15 October 2017 that the UNSC decided to end MINUSTAH with Resolution 2350 and to implement a follow-up peacekeeping mission of a smaller scale to allow the government to strengthen the rule of law, to further develop law enforcement and to protect and monitor human rights.58 MINUSTAH’s successor was the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (hereinafter ‘MINUJUSTH’), which was concluded in October 2019, bringing an end to 15 consecutive years of UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti.59 After MINUJUSTH, the United Nations Office Integrated Office in Haiti (hereinafter ‘BINUH’) was called into life on 25 June 2019 by UNSC Resolution 2476 for an initial 51

ibid, 9. Mark Schuller, ‘Humanitarian Occupation in Haiti’ (Nacla, 28 July 2015) <https://nacla.org/news/2015/07/28/humanitarian-occupation-haiti> accessed 10 May 2023. 53 Marta Fernández Moreno, Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, Maíra Siman Gomes, ‘Trapped Between Many Worlds: A Post-colonial Perspective on the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)’ (2012) 19(3) International Peacekeeping <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2012.696389> accessed 31 October 2023 386. 54 ibid. 55 ibid. 56 ibid. 57 Rosa Freedman, Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, Siobhán Wills, The Law and Practice of Peacekeeping: Foregrounding Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2021) 27. 58 UNSC Res 2350 (13 April 2017) UN Doc S/RES2350. ‘Restoring a secure and stable environment’ (United Nations Peacekeeping) <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minustah> accessed 10 May 2023. 59 Carla King, Greg Ferraro, Sandra C. Wisner, Stéphanie Etienne, Sabine Lee, Susan A. Bartels, ‘MINUSTAH is doing positive things just as they do negative things: nuanced perceptions of a UN peacekeeping operation amidst peacekeeper-perpetrated sexual exploitation and abuse in Haiti, Conflict, Security & Development’ (2021) 21(6) CSD <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2021.1997453> accessed 10 May 2023 750. 52

period of 12 months.60 Due to the continuously deteriorating security situation in Haiti, which will be further discussed below, BINUH’s mandate is being renewed on a yearly basis.61 Only recently, on 14 July 2023, the UNSC extended its mandate until 15 July 2024 with Resolution 2692.62 Other than the previously discussed UN operations, BINUH is not a peacekeeping mission, but a special political mission established under Chapter VI of the Charter. 63 Its mandate is focused on advising the government of Haiti to enhance political stability and the rule of law, as well as to foster a peaceful environment and the respect for human rights.64 While hesitant to make the UN peacekeeping missions responsible for the current situation in Haiti, some scholars argue that the missions were unable to address the root causes of the structural violence that plagues the people of Haiti to this day.65 Currently, Haiti finds itself on the “brink of civil war”, according to the humanitarian group Mercy Corps.66 Again, the state is struggling with gang violence and political instability, due to “human rights problems and […] humanitarian crises”.67 The people of Haiti find themselves in a dire situation, worsened by the assassination of then-president Jovenel Moïse on 7 July 2021 by a group of mercenaries.68 Just days before his assassination, Moïse appointed Ariel Henry as Prime Minister, who now acts as the de facto leader of Haiti. 69 Since the president’s assassination, gangs were able to seize control of more than 60% of Haiti’s capital. 70 Due to the country’s current destabilised state, presidential elections cannot be held and are therefore

UNSC Res 2476 (25 June 2019) UN Doc S/RES/2476. UNSC Res 2692 (14 July 2023) UN Doc S/RES/2692. 62 ibid. 63 Varrey (n 42) 26. 64 ‘Mandate’ (BINUH: United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti) <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/mandate> accessed 31 October 2023. 65 Varrey (n 42) p 38. 66 ‘Haiti on ‘brink of civil war’, humanitarian group warns’ (Aljazeera, 1 May 2023) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/1/haiti-on-brink-of-civil-war-humanitarian-groupwarns?traffic_source=KeepReading> accessed 10 May 2023. 67 ‘Haiti: Events of 2020’ (Human Rights Watch) <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/countrychapters/haiti> accessed 10 May 2023. 68 ‘Haiti president's assassination: What we know so far’ (BBC, 1 February 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-57762246> accessed 10 May 2023. 69 ‘Haiti on ‘brink of civil war’, humanitarian group warns’ (Aljazeera, 1 May 2023) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/1/haiti-on-brink-of-civil-war-humanitarian-groupwarns?traffic_source=KeepReading> accessed 10 May 2023. 70 Tom Philliips, ‘UN calls for foreign intervention in Haiti as violence surges’ (The Guardian, 21 March 2023) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/21/haiti-un-international-specialized-support-force> accessed 6 June 2023. 61

postponed.71 Additionally, increasing gang violence is hindering civil society from accessing healthcare and crucial infrastructure, contributing to a major hunger crisis.72 Following UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s demands for a “rapid action force”, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2699 on 2 October 2923.73 The resolution, created under Chapter VII, authorises the deployment of a Multinational Security Support Mission led by Keyna.74 However, the “catastrophic track record of foreign interventions” has the people of Haiti worried about yet another foreign force interfering in the country’s affairs, without taking into consideration their interests and needs.75 In the next sections, the author will argue that this neglect of the native population’s interests is not the unfortunate by-product of a UNSC that is genuine in its approach to maintaining international peace and security for the prosperity of humanity. Rather, it is a necessary implication of the imperialist interests that the Member States of the UNSC (and their allies) are able to pursue through their position in the Council. III.

Imperialism and International Law

To understand how imperialism operates within the framework of international law, it is necessary to examine the latter’s beginnings. The scholar Anthony Anghie observes that international law finds its origin in Europe and was from there expanded to non-European territories, which were regarded as existing outside of that legal framework from a doctrinal perspective.76 In practice, this entailed that the Westphalian idea of state sovereignty – that there is no superior over equal sovereigns – did not apply to non-European territories.77 This perception of sovereignty could be utilised to justify imperial rule over the non-sovereign

‘Haiti on ‘brink of civil war’, humanitarian group warns’ (Aljazeera, 1 May 2023) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/1/haiti-on-brink-of-civil-war-humanitarian-groupwarns?traffic_source=KeepReading> accessed 10 May 2023. 72 ibid. 73 Tom Phillips, ‘UN calls for foreign intervention in Haiti as violence surges’ (The Guardian, 21 March 2023) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/21/haiti-un-international-specialized-support-force> accessed 6 June 2023; UNSC Res 2699 (2 October 2023) UN Doc S/RES/2699. 74 UNSC ‘Security Council Authorizes Multinational Security Support Mission for Haiti for Initial Period of One Year, by Vote of 13 in Favour with 2 Abstentions’ (2 October 2023) Press Release SC/ 15432. 75 Phillips (n 73). 76 Antony Anghie, ‘The evolution of international law: Colonial and postcolonial realities’ (2006) 27(5) Third World Quarterly <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600780011> accessed 6 June 2023 740. 77 ibid. 71

territories and subsequently allowed to integrate the non-European territories into the system of international law through the process of decolonisation.78 Especially during the age of European colonial rule, beginning in the 15th and 16th centuries, international law was utilised as a form of a universal standard by the Europeans to be imposed on the ‘uncivilised’ peoples the colonial powers were forcing their rule upon.79 In this power dynamic, European culture was universal and enjoyed full sovereignty, which legitimised its imposition on other cultures under the guise of liberalisation or as a humanitarian mission.80 This power dynamic continued to exist in the 19th century, during which imperialist expansion was justified by arguing that non-European societies lacked the prerequisites to have legal personality under international law, due to their uncivilised nature.81 Paradoxically, occupied native societies were given legal standing to enter into treaties that would limit their rights to property and sovereignty for the benefit of their imperial rulers.82 Additionally, nonEuropean states were held to the ‘universal standard’ of international law through the imposition of European rules that would facilitate the trade and governance of European settlers by their states of origin.83 Where non-European states failed to meet this standard, their subjugation to European rule was justified as a civilising mission.84 Anghie examines that “by the end of the 19th century European expansion had ensured that European international law had been established globally as the one single system that applied to all societies. It was in this way that European international law became universal”.85 In the aftermath of the First World War, the League of Nations established its Mandate System in an effort to decolonise the foreign territories of the losing parties, namely Germany and the Ottoman Empire.86 During that time, scholars began to call out the imperial nature of international law, so a new approach was necessary to delineate between Europe and nonEurope, as this was previously done through racial and cultural categories.87 Thus, the League of Nations “characterised the differences between the civilised and uncivilised in economic 78

ibid, 741. ibid, 742. 80 ibid, 744. 81 ibid, 745. 82 ibid. 83 ibid, 746. 84 ibid. 85 ibid. 86 ibid. 87 ibid. 79

terms, the ‘advanced’ and the ‘backward’”.88 The League’s Mandate System was tasked with creating sovereignty and self-governance among the non-European territories. However, this newly gained sovereignty nonetheless had to comply with Western interests, particularly through the economic subordination of former colonies.89 Post-Second World War, the UN introduced mechanisms to further self-governance, as well as self-determination, of newly decolonised states.90 The newly independent states altered the composition of the international community, as they eventually made up the majority of the UN system and demanded economic independence from their former colonisers through mechanisms available to them under international law. 91 In particular, they “sought to regain control over their natural resources through the nationalisation of foreign entities that had acquired rights over these resources during the colonial period”. 92 This was opposed by the European states on the basis that states, as sovereigns, could not be subjected to rules they do not consent to.93 Ironically, in the same breath, the West argued that their former colonies were bound by the colonial-era rules of international economic law, which acceptance was regarded as a prerequisite for statehood.94 Anghie argued that colonialism was subsequently replaced by neo-colonialism, i.e., former colonies “were economically dependent on the West, and the rules of international economic law continued to ensure that this would be the case”.95 With the emergence of human rights law, facilitated by the UN, protection was offered to the peoples of the former colonies from the situations they found themselves in after gaining independence.96 According to Anghie, human rights law could be utilised to justify “intervention by the West in the Third World”.97 This idea is further expanded upon by the legal scholar and academic B.S. Chimni, who argued that neo-colonialism was replaced by global imperialism.98 Chimni argues that “global 88

ibid. ibid, 747. 90 ibid, 748. 91 ibid. 92 ibid. 93 ibid. 94 ibid. 95 ibid,749. 96 ibid. 97 ibid. 98 Chimni S. Bhupinder, 'Capitalism, Imperialism, and International Law in the Twenty-First Century' (2012) 14 Or Rev Int'l L 17, 28. 89

imperialism, or imperialism in the era of globalisation […] is constituted by a new imperial economic, legal, and political formation” which includes an alignment of international law to the imperialist agenda.99 This particularly applies to the law on the use of force, as seen with the doctrine of R2P. It serves as a justification for military action in the name of humanitarian intervention.100 This marks a shift from the use of force being used as an “exceptional interference in the domestic affairs of States” to a measure that is ‘mandated’ by international human rights obligations.101 In this regard, it was the Canadian government that launched the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (hereinafter ‘ICISS’) in the year 2000.102 The ICISS worked on a draft to define the notion of R2P, initially without any success of its adoption.103 After continuous lobbying by the late UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Canadian government, the governments of the world adopted the 2005 World Summit Outcome and thereby mainstreamed R2P. 104 Notably, France was among the states that advocated for the adoption of R2P the most.105 A. The UNSC as a tool of Global Imperialism When the self-proclaimed ‘international community’, at that time comprising of fifty states, came together in 1945 to establish the UN, around a third of the world’s population at that time was still governed by colonial powers.106 The P5 states of the UNSC then made up 10 per cent of the UN’s member states and governed around 50 per cent of the global

ibid, 28, 31. ibid. 101 ibid. 102 Philipp Rotmann, Gerrit Kurtz, Sarah Brockmeier, ‘Major powers and the contested evolution of a responsibility to protect’ (2014) 14 4 Conflict, Security & Development 355 <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2014.930592> accessed 31 October 2023 363. 103 ibid, 364. 104 ibid. UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1. 105 Rotmann (n 102) 365. 106 United Nations ‘History of the United Nations’ (United Nations) <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-ofthe-un> accessed 15 February 2023; United Nations ‘The United Nations and Decolonization’ (United Nations) <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/about> accessed 15 February 2023. 100

population.107 Now, the P5 only form 3 per cent of the UN member states and hold around a quarter of the global population.108 As the UNSC is primarily tasked with maintaining international peace and security, under the Charter of the UN, (permanent) membership to the UNSC grants a lot of power. 109 The UNSC may detect a ‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’.110 Notably, the Charter leaves significant discretion to the UNSC to determine what constitutes such situations. When the UNSC determines such an occurrence, it may take measures, including the use of force, to maintain or restore international peace and security.111 Hereby, the UNSC may adopt binding resolutions under Article 25 of the Charter. 112 Such a resolution passes with nine affirmative notes, including the concurring votes of the P5, effectively granting them veto power.113 Notably, an abstention of a P5 nation does not equal a veto, as established by UNSC practice.114 Consequently, the P5 must only tolerate the actions of another, not actively support them to adopt binding resolutions. The imperialist structure of international law, as a successor to the colonial system of the discipline detailed above, again allows Western states to excerpt their influence over other territories. This is especially true for the UNSC, as it may order to ‘restore international peace and security’ where it deems necessary. This is because the UNSC, through its actions, has defined the notion of sovereignty in a similar fashion to the colonial powers of the past, in order to justify its interventions: The scholar Rita Kiki Edozie observed that the rules of sovereignty are constructed to allow intervention where states are in violation of international human rights law, mostly in developing countries.115 These developing states are seen as inferior due to “poverty and underdevelopment, but they are also deemed to be afflicted with chronic incivility and TRTWORLD, ‘The United Nations has a problem, and no one’s talking about it’ (TRTWORLD) <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/the-united-nations-has-a-problem-and-no-one-s-talking-about-it-39961> accessed 15 February 2022. 108 ibid. 109 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XV art 24. 110 ibid. art 39. 111 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XV arts 41-42. 112 ibid, art 25. 113 ibid, art 27. 114 Jan Wouters, Tom Ruys, ‘Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a New Century?’ (2005) Royal Institute for International Relations, 8. 115 Edozie (n 21) 99. 107

repression against their own citizens”.116 Thus, even though they enjoy judicial independence under the UN’s notion of state sovereignty stipulated in Article 2 of the Charter, their alleged lack of political and institutional capacities would not be sufficient to protect their citizens.117 The depiction of Haiti as a ‘failed state’ by Western media and governmental officials, as well as accusations of voter fraud against Aristede, thus enabled the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1529. Further, this resolution established the MIF, marking the beginning of 15 years of UN presence in Haiti.118 With Resolution 1529, the UNSC was able to “set aside Haiti’s international sovereignty rights” to justify its military intervention “on humanitarian grounds”.119 This notion of humanitarian intervention, as the doctrinal creation of Western states represented in the UNSC, is strikingly similar to the colonial and imperial origins of international law. The states in power used a ‘universal standard’, in this case, human rights law, as a justification to intervene in Haiti, thereby depriving it of its sovereignty. This aligns with Chimni’s observation that R2P is regarded as an intervention that is ‘mandated’ by human rights law.120 As France and the US are among the P5 nations, they wield significant influence in the UNSC. As discussed above, the Charter grants the UNSC the authority to determine, at its own discretion, what situations fall within Article 39 that warrant (military) UN intervention. The influence of Western states, such as Canada, France, and the US, allows them to shape the landscape of international law to a great extent and utilise it to further their own interests. This was evident in the case of Haiti. The notion of R2P, i.e., military action under the guise of humanitarian assistance, was used as justification by Canada, France, and the US to intervene in the affairs of Haiti to act against the unrest they have sponsored themselves, as detailed by Walters and Burkhard.121 The case of Haiti sets a precedent, in that “there was no

116

ibid. ibid. 118 ibid. King (n 59) 750. 119 Edozie (n 21) 99. 120 Chimni (n 98) 28. 121 Nikolas Barry-Shaw, Dru Oja Jay, ‘New documents detail how Canada helped plan 2004 coup d’état in Haiti’ (The Breach, 15 July 2021) <https://breachmedia.ca/new-documents-detail-how-canada-helped-plan2004-coup-detat-in-haiti/> accessed 10 March 2023; Iowa State University, ‘Coup d'Etat in Haiti - March 2004’ (Archives of Women's Political Communication) <https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/03/21/coup-detat-inhaiti-march-2004/.> accessed 10 March 2023; Democracy Now, ‘Ex-Ambassador Admits France & U.S. Orchestrated 2004 Coup in Haiti to Oust Aristide’ (Democracy Now, 23 May 2022) 117

peace agreement or political settlement supporting the establishment of the operation, nor a ‘conventional war’ taking place” to justify the intervention.122 Hereby, one of the ‘benefits’ of the 2004 coup against Aristide was the end of this campaign to demand reparations from France, as noted above.123 France’s membership in the UNSC thereby allowed the state to subjugate its former colony once more to its will by an UN-mandated (military) intervention. This served as a subsequent legitimisation of the US-French military intervention that preceded the mission. Edozie argues that, following UN military intervention in the form of the MIF, the UN virtually installed trusteeship over Haiti in the form of MINUSTAH, thereby ‘desovereigning’ Haiti.124 This is supported by the fact that, after the US-French intervention removed Aristede from office, MINUSTAH only recognised the provisional government and “ignored or considered illegitimate other involved parties”.125 By doing so, the UN imposed its own priorities in tackling the situation, disregarding the problems and priorities of the people of Haiti.126 Consequently, the UN missions failed to address the economic and social issues as such, and rather viewed them through a security lens.127 The cholera epidemic and sexual abuse brought upon Haiti by UN peacekeeping personnel, for which the organisation invoked its immunity to evade accountability, added to the population’s distrust towards the mission. This is evident in the calls for the cease of the operation, which remained unheard.128 Thus, the ‘international community’, spearheaded by the US, France, and Canada, engaged in Global Imperialism by shaping the legality of the use of force to justify its intervention in Haiti and thereby silenced the former colonies’ calls for reparations for colonial wrongdoings, under which the state of Haiti is suffering to this day. This unfortunate power-dynamic, in which former colonies are subjugated to the will of imperial powers through international institutions, has been summarised by the US-American scholar Patrick Bellegarde-Smith. In his words, “‘Globalisation’ has been with us for a very long time, but it changes methods over time. President Préval made a similar statement that <https://www.democracynow.org/2022/5/23/headlines/ex_ambassador_admits_france_us_orchestrated_2004_c oup_in_haiti_to_oust_aristide> accessed 10 May 2023. 122 Dos Santos Parra (n 16) 23 2. 123 ibid. 124 Edozie (n 21) 109. 125 Pingeot (n 33) 375. 126 ibid,110. 127 Lemay-Hébert (n 29) 6. 128 ibid. Freedman, Lemay-Hébert, Wills (n 47) 27.

angered the US ambassador: that Haiti had suffered from globalisation for the last five hundred years. Well, the methods have changed now. And now we no longer have to send the US marines. We can send the IMF and the World Bank, and we can send, certainly, MINUSTAH. (…)”.129 IV.

Imperialism and Haitian Youth

As detailed above, the UN interventions in Haiti are a manifestation of the imperialist character of international law, that allows for former colonies to be controlled by today’s imperial powers, for example under the guise of humanitarian intervention, known as R2P.130 By doing so, imperial powers are able to pursue their own agendas over that of their imperial subjects, to the detriment of the populations of the countries under their influence.131 Unfortunately for Haitian youth, MINUSTAH was no exception. The ousting of the democratically elected president Aristide, for his anti-colonial politics, with the support of the US and France, further fuelled Haiti’s political instability. This created fertile ground for rebels and armed gangs to recruit combatants.132 The UN’s ‘The Missing Peace’ study highlights how certain youths perceive that their demographic is seen as an issue to be tackled, rather than a meaningful actor in the contribution to peace and security by national and international governmental bodies.133 Alarmingly, the study pointed out that, regarding direct conflict deaths in 2015, “more than 90 per cent of all casualties occur among young adult males”.134 Overall, one in four young persons globally is affected by violence or armed conflict.135 In particular, the subjects of the study highlighted the “disproportionate victimisation and traumatisation of youth at the hands of armed groups, terrorists or violent extremist groups, gangs and organised crime networks,

Patrick Bellegarde-Smith and others, ‘Haiti and Its Occupation by the United States in 1915: Antecedents and Outcomes’ (2015) 21 2 JOHS 1915 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43741120> accessed 28 October 2023, 35. 130 Chimni (n 81) 28. Edozie (n 17) 110. 132 Lemay-Hébert (n 34) 6; Democracy Now, ‘Ex-Ambassador Admits France & U.S. Orchestrated 2004 Coup in Haiti to Oust Aristide’ (Democracy Now, 23 May 2002). <https://www.democracynow.org/2022/5/23/headlines/ex_ambassador_admits_france_us_orchestrated_2004_co up_in_haiti_to_oust_aristide> accessed 10 May 2023. 133 Simpson (n 7) 12. 134 ibid. 135 ibid, 13. 129

repressive governments and, in numerous countries, law enforcement personnel and criminal justice systems”.136 The author argues that Haitian youth were let down by MINUSTAH’s approach to CVR because it also embodied the imperial nature of UNSC action: The programme failed to factor in the perspective of the Haitian people and imposed its own policies and agendas, as detailed in Section II.137 As detailed by Anghie, such an imposition of foreign structures according to Western standards could also be observed with regard to European colonial rule over nonEuropean territories in the past.138 As CVR failed to address the economic and political causes for the existence of gangs, many former gang members saw no other opportunity but to join the armed groups again.139 MINUSTAH’s focus on security and the peacekeeping forces’ excessive use of force contributed to the further radicalisation of youth in Haiti by legitimising opposition to the mission.140 Weakened by 15 years of UN occupation, Haiti again faces rises in armed violence at the hands of gangs.141 As Haitian youth find themselves to be disproportionally affected by armed conflict, the author finds that the UNSC’s imperial imposition of peacekeeping in Haiti and the mismanagement of CVR directly contributed to endangering Haiti’s youth of today. This is done by creating conditions under which armed gangs’ formation and recruitment endeavours are facilitated.142 Therefore, the author finds that Haiti’s youth can only be elevated to meaningful actors in the creation of sustainable peace and security, as foreseen by Resolution 2250, of the UNSC and its peacekeeping missions become non-imperial in nature.143 To achieve this, Western states may no longer de-legitimise the governments of their former colonial subjects and set aside the interests and needs of those to further their own political interests. If military interventions can be ordered on the basis of crises endorsed or sponsored by members of the UNSC, youth find themselves at the mercy of institutions that are occupied by their former colonising nations. V.

Conclusion

136

ibid, 15 Schuberth (n 6) 15. 138 Anghie (n 76) 742. 139 Dos Santos Parra (n 13) 14. 140 Lemay-Hébert (n 29) 6. 141 Human Rights Watch, ‘Haiti: Events of 2020’ (Human Rights Watch) <https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2021/country-chapters/haiti> accessed 10 May 2023. 142 Simspon (n 4) 15; Lemay-Hébert (n 29) 6. 143 UNSC Res 2250 (9 December 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2250. 137

With Resolution 2250, the UNSC has underlined the importance of protecting youth, individuals aged, in this case individuals aged 18 to 29 years, from armed conflict and has additionally highlighted their importance in establishing international peace and security.144 One manifestation of this UNSC policy were the CVR programmes employed during MINUSTAH that aimed to de-radicalise youth to avert them from armed gangs.145 However, these programmes failed to tackle the root causes for the formation of gangs altogether and additionally ignored the wishes of the Haitian people.146 The need for such CVR in the first place, can be partly attributed to foreign involvement in Haiti: French and US governmental officials have detailed how their governments were involved in funding armed groups in opposition to the democratically elected President Aristide.147 Considering the political, economic, and humanitarian state of Haiti, after the president was forced to exile due to foreign pressure, the UNSC authorised the peacekeeping mission MIF to stabilise Haiti.148 Subsequently, the UNSC called MINUSTAH into existence in 2004, to expand governmental and executive powers in Haiti to further stabilise the region.149 These missions, however, rather focused on security aspects and heavily relied on employing the use of force against various factions in Haiti.150 Accompanied by other controversies, such as sexual abuse of Haitian minors and the UN’s responsibility for the Cholera outbreak in Haiti, the missions contributed to the radicalisation of youth in opposition to foreign intervention.151 MINUSTAH’s successor MINUJUSTH concluded in 2019 and ended 15 years of UN peacekeeping in Haiti.152

144

ibid. Schuberth (n 9) 15. 146 ibid, 16. 147 Iowa State University, ‘Coup d'Etat in Haiti - March 2004’ (Archives of Women's Political Communication) <https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/03/21/coup-detat-in-haiti-march-2004/.> accessed 10 March 2023. 148 Democracy Now, ‘Ex-Ambassador Admits France & U.S. Orchestrated 2004 Coup in Haiti to Oust Aristide’ (Democracy Now, 23 May 2022) <https://www.democracynow.org/2022/5/23/headlines/ex_ambassador_admits_france_us_orchestrated_2004_co up_in_haiti_to_oust_aristide> accessed 10 May 2023; Government of Canada, ‘Multinational Interim Force (MIF)’ (Government of Canada, 2018) <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-nationaldefence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/caribbean/halo-i.html> accessed 10 May 2023. 149 UNSC ‘Security Council establishes UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti for initial Six-Month Period’ (30 April 2014) Press Release SC/8083. 150 Lemay-Hébert (n 34) 3. 151 ibid, 6, 7. 152 King (n 59) 750. 145

The legacy of this UN involvement has left Haiti not sufficiently stable and has played a role in the rise of armed violence today.153 Again, the UNSC has authorised a Chapter VII peacekeeping operation, this time led by Keyna, despite opposition from the local population.154 An exploration of the origins of international law shows that the UNSC’s handling of Haiti is not an anomaly, but a consequence of the colonial origins of the discipline: During the colonial age, Western nations constructed the notion of sovereignty to justify their rule over their colonies.155 This subjugation of non-European territories by former colonial and imperial powers, during today’s age of Global Imperialism, is made possible by again redefining the rules of international law to allow intervention under the guise of humanitarian assistance.156 Such was the case with Haiti. Hereby, by virtue of membership in the UNSC, former colonial powers were able to exert influence over Haiti in the form of UN peacekeeping and virtual trusteeship.157 Thus, the imperialist nature of international law and the UNSC can be made responsible for the subsequent radicalisation of youth and the current political instability that Haiti is facing. This is due to the instigation of a coup sponsored by imperial nations and the subsequent mismanagement of the situation on the ground. Again, Haiti is plagued by armed conflict, which poses a danger to youth in the region, a danger to which an imperialist UNSC has contributed. To conclude, the author seeks to highlight that the imperial origin and nature of international law and its institutions puts youth in Haiti and worldwide, in danger. The authority that imperial powers, just like France and the US, hold by virtue of UNSC membership, allows them to construct the legality of their interventions according to their interests, which are put above those of the countries they deem unfit to exercise their own sovereignty freely. Truly enabling youth to prosper, within the spirit of Resolution 2250, must therefore also include minimising the power that imperialist institutions have over international law, in order to prevent further interventions that jeopardise the safety of youth by furthering power political objectives. Thus, the author strongly urges to critically assess Human Rights Watch, ’Haiti: Events of 2020’ (Human Rights Watch) <https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2021/country-chapters/haiti> accessed 10 May 2023. 154 ibid, UNSC Res 2699 (2 October 2023) UN Doc S/RES/2699. 155 Anghie (n 76) 741. 156 Chimni (n 98) 28. 157 Edozie (n 21) 109. 153

the current composition of the UNSC and its powers in order to consider how colonial and imperialist thinking allows intervening in the affairs of former colonies.

UNjustified and UNethical: A Critical View on the UN Unpaid Internship System

By Soraya Oumansouri*

Abstract This article is written as a critical analysis of the United Nations (hereinafter, UN) unpaid internship system, examining the culture of privilege and systemic inequality it perpetuates. Drawing from intersectional feminist and Marxist scholarship, it dissects the impact of unpaid internships on socioeconomic inequality, inaccessibility, classism, lack of diversity, and gender inequality. This article delves into the history of gratis personnel at the Organisation and its development over the recent years. Additionally, this Paper pays attention to the inconsistencies between the set legal principles and values of the UN and the organisation’s (in)actions regarding its implemented internship system. Lastly, this article aims to answer the question of to what extent the UN’s unpaid internship system (mis)aligns with its stated core values and seeks to provide a recommendation to address the issues identified.

* LL.B. Candidate, International and European Law Programme, The Hague University of Applied Sciences.

I. Introduction In today’s world, participating in an unpaid internship is a privilege, which excludes those who cannot afford the associated financial burden. Trying to make ends meet through multiple side jobs whilst balancing full-time studies is the harsh reality for many young people today. These unpaid internships enhance the career opportunities and skills of privileged individuals while excluding the underprivileged from worthwhile career experiences.1 The United Nations (hereinafter, UN) is led by various core values, such as human rights, the principle of equal rights, the promotion of social progress, and the rule of law. 2 Equality is considered a fundamental principle of the UN’s commitment to social progress and the promotion of human rights.3 This article will critically examine the culture of privilege and systematic inequality within the UN that is sustained through the unpaid internship system and provide a recommendation to address these issues. By using feminist and Marxist scholarship it will analyse the manners in which unpaid internships add to socioeconomic inequality, lack of accessibility, classism, lack of diversity, and gender inequality. By applying the theoretical frameworks of intersectional feminism and Marxism, this article will show the intersectionality of these issues within the realm of the aspect of the social responsibility this Organisation carries because it casts doubts on the UN’s commitment to building social progress and promoting human rights, more specifically in the aspects of fair opportunities for all labour practices. The intersectional feminist framework emphasises the importance of intersectionality,4 where aspects such as class, gender, sex, and race, intersect to the experience of privilege or oppression.5 This scholarship explores the structure of a social system upholding disparities to challenge and dismantle this system striving for equality. The essence of feminist theory is to

Andrew Silva, ‘Unpaid internships and equality of opportunity: a pseudo-analysis of UN data’ (2021) 28:15 Appl. Econ. Lett. 1288. 2 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1946) 1 UNTS XVI. 3 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Res 70/1 (25 September 2015) UN Doc A/RES/70/1. 4 Time, ‘She Coined the Term ‘Intersectionality’ Over 30 Years Ago. Here’s What It Means to Her Today’ (Kate Steinmetz, 20 February 2020) < https://time.com/5786710/kimberle-crenshaw-intersectionality/ > accessed 1 October 2023. 5 Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ [1989] Vol. 1989 U Chi Legal F 139. 1

promote social transformation and equal opportunities for all genders.6 This theory has its roots in the next framework, namely the Marxist theory.7 The Marxist framework dives into the power dynamics, wealth distribution, and exploitation within societal structures. 8 Through the Marxist lens we can reveal how the UN’s unpaid internship system contributes to economic disparities that perpetuate systemic inequality, hinder accessibility, and reinforce class-based division. This theory sheds light on how this system relies on the labour of interns who can afford to work without compensation, which reinforces the advantage of the Western, middle-upper class in this position. To provide a comprehensive understanding of these issues, we will begin with an explanation of what the UN unpaid internship system entails. We will thoroughly examine the culture of privilege and systemic inequality within the Organisation. As we progress, a light will be shed on the current developments. At last, we will offer a recommendation to address the challenges associated with this unpaid internship system and make a concluding remark on this article by summarising the key findings. II. The UN unpaid internship system explained A.

Emergence and growth of ‘gratis personnel’

Interns of the United Nations are categorized under the ‘Type I’ gratis personnel together with associate experts and technical cooperation experts.9 The term ‘gratis personnel’ was originally established for peacekeeping forces provided by Governments and other entities, at no cost to the Organization.10 Article 17 of the UN Charter sets out that Member States carry the responsibility to finance the UN.11 Even though interns have a direct working relationship with the UN, the Member States’ financial contributions to the UN budget can indirectly influence the internship program when considering the availability of stipends. Jo Ann Arinder, ‘Feminist Theory’ (PressBooks, n.d.) <https://opentext.wsu.edu/theoreticalmodelsforteachingandresearch/chapter/feministtheory/#:~:text=The%20core%20concepts%20in%20feminist,and%20against%20equality%20and%20equity> accessed 29 September 2023. 7 Elisabeth Armstrong, ‘Marxist and Socialist Feminism’ [2020] Smith ScholarWorks < https://scholarworks.smith.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=swg_facpubs> accessed 30 September 2023. 8 David Gartman, ‘Marx and the labor process: an interpretation’ [1978] Vol. 8 Insurgent Sociologist 97. 9 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff and consultants and individual contractors’ (2016) UN Doc A/71/360/Add.1 para. 3. 10 ibid. 11 UN Charter (n 2). 6

Since UN interns are not provided with financial compensation, UN internships are considered gratis, meaning free or better said unpaid.12 In 1996, a report was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly (hereinafter, UNGA), which covered the situation of interns who were unpaid at the time of the peacekeeping operations. This report addressed the general question of “gratis personnel”. More specifically, it explained that there was a budgetary shortfall which prompted the deployment of gratis personnel and the examination of their role. The examination aimed to understand how budgetary constraints necessitated the use of gratis personnel and contained an internal reassessment on their functions and responsibilities.13 The functions of gratis personnel were expanded from technical cooperation projects to humanitarian assistance, backstopping of peacekeeping operations, disarmament, and the functions extended to social and economic research, administration and management, and internal oversight services, which in the past were carried out solely by staff members.14 This report concluded that guidelines (the temporary basis for specific short-term projects or pending a transition to budgetary funds) have been established to ensure that unpaid interns were not expected to bear staff responsibilities and the UNGA was invited to reaffirm this principle.15 The UNGA received reports concerning the gratis personnel continuously every biennium. From the years 2003 until 2010 there was an increase in the engagement of interns. 16 It is important to take into consideration that ‘engagement’ and ‘person’ are different from each other. For example, in the biennium of 2008-2009, there was a total of 4,796 gratis personnel, with 4,277 of the totals being interns. However, the total number was less than the cumulative number of engagements (4,979), because one individual could have had other engagements or various types of engagement in one or numerous offices and departments.17 After the minimal dip in the number of interns in 2012, the numbers rose again in 2014. In 2020-2021, despite a

UN Secretariat, ‘Administrative instructions United Nations internship programme’ (2014) UN Doc ST/AI/2014/1 Section 7. 13 UN General Assembly, ‘Programme Budget for the Biennium 1996-1997’ (1996) UN Doc A/51/688 p 2. 14 ibid. 15 UN General Assembly, ‘Programme Budget for the Biennium 1996-1997’ (1996) UN Doc A/51/688 para. 69. 16 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retirees and consultants’ (2010) A/65/350/Add 1. 17 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retirees and consultants’ (2010) A/65/350/Add.1 para. 4. 12

14.6% decrease in interns because of COVID-19, the interns remained the largest group within the gratis personnel.18 B. The meaning of an internship at the UN The meaning of work has changed in the modern era. As a result of the Global North, internships have turned into labour in exchange for experience.19 Young workers are expected to have participated in an unpaid internship as this culture spread from the Global North onto the modern curriculum vitae.20 The purpose of the UN internship program is to serve two primary objectives: (i) to provide a framework where students from different academic backgrounds attain exposure to the UN (…) to build up their educational experience and gain experience in the work of the UN; (ii) to provide the UN offices assistance of promising students who are specialized in different professional fields.21 The value of a UN internship is set out in five ways. The first one is gaining real professional work experience, which prepares the individual for a future career. The second one is interns building a professional network because they meet and work alongside professionals around the world.22 The third is learning about global issues, as interns are provided with the opportunity to learn and gain a deeper understanding of the challenges the world faces today, ranging from poverty to climate change, to gender equality.23 The fourth is that interns may contribute to working on the Organization’s mission resulting in making a difference, which can be a rewarding experience. The fifth and last one is that interns engage with different perspectives and cultures, which increases cultural awareness. C. Overview of the Interns in the Internship Programme

UNGA, ‘Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff, consultants and individual contractors, and United Nations Volunteers’ (2023) UN Doc A/77/727 para. 7. 19 Jonathan Arlow, ‘Trading labor for experience: The role of unpaid internships in shaping Active Labor Market Policies in Ireland since the Great Recession’ (2023) EPA. 20 ibid. 21 UN Secretariat, ‘UN internship programme’ (2020) UN Doc ST/AI/2020/1. 22 Joint Inspection Unit, ‘Internships in the United Nations System’ (2009) JIU/NOTE/2009/2 Ch. 2 para. 8. 23 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘The 17 SDGs’ (n.d) <https://sdgs.un.org/goals > accessed 4 May 2023. 18

This sub-section aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the Internship Programme within the UN, offering insight in regard to the number of interns engaged in biennium years. In addition, we highlight the distribution of interns across the UN entities and their geographical placement. Biennium year

Engagement

gratis Individual

personnel

gratis Interns

personnel

total 2012 - 201324

4,531

4,426

3,929

2014 - 201525

5,091

5,008

4,475

2016 – 201726

4,995

4,812

4,206

2018 – 201927

5,424

5,146

4,454

2020 - 202128

4,708

4,565

3,797

Table 1: Number of interns per year Table one illustrates that interns consistently remained the largest group among gratis personnel. The second column presented the group ‘gratis personnel’, which included interns, associate experts, technical cooperation experts, and Type II personnel (someone whose expertise is not available within the Organization or who provides urgent and temporary assistance in case of expanded mandates.29 Both are provided to the Organization by Governments or other entities.30 These numbers were higher as they represented the cumulative numbers of engagement of gratis personnel, meaning that individuals could have had more engagements in different offices and departments.31 The third column measured ‘gratis personnel’ again but considered only those with no more than one engagement and

UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff, consultants and individual contractors’ (2014) UN Doc A/69/292/Add.1 4. 25 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff, consultants and individual contractors’ (2016) UN Doc A/71/360/Add.1. 26 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff, consultants and individual contractors’ (2018) UN Doc A/73/79/Add.1. 27 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff, consultants and individual contractors’ (2020) UN Doc A/75/591/Add.1. 28 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff, consultants and individual contractors’ (2022) UN Doc A/77/578. 29 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff and consultants and individual contractors’ (2016) UN Doc A/71/360/Add.1 3. 30 ibid. 31 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff, consultants and individual contractors’ (2014) UN Doc A/69/292/Add.1 4. 24

therefore is lower. The fourth column was derived from the numbers in the third column and showed the number of interns per biennium in internship positions. Position Entities (high to low) ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 1. Pacific) OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 2. for Human Rights) DESA (Department of Economic and Social Affairs) 3. UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) 4. UN-Habitat (United Nations Settlements Programme) 5. Table 2: Number of interns per entity 2018 - 2019 32

Interns

399 363 339 274 211

Table two illustrates the five UN entities with the most interns. In 2018-2019, there was a total of 58 entities that participated in the Type 1 gratis personnel category.33 Position Entities (high to low) ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia 1. and the Pacific) UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and 2. Crime) DESA (Department of Economic and Social Affairs) 3. OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High 4. Commissioner for Human Rights) UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) 5. Table 3: Number of interns per entity 2020 – 2021 38

Interns

(Paid) Staff

397

60034

339

50035

281

214

130036

202

50037

UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff, consultants and individual contractors’ (2020) UN Doc. A/75/591/Add. 10. 33 ibid. 34 Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, ‘ESCAP – United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific’ (n.d.) <https://www.data4sdgs.org/partner/escap-united-nations-economic-commissionasia-andpacific#:~:text=This%20makes%20ESCAP%20the%20most,region%20with%20over%20600%20staff.> accessed 5 June 2023. 35 United Nations Office at Vienna, ‘The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’ (n.d) < https://www.unov.org/unov/en/unodc.html > accessed 5 June 2023. 36 OHCHR, ‘UN Human Rights: Our organization’ (n.d.) < https://www.ohchr.org/en/about-us/where-wework/un-human-rights-ourorganization#:~:text=UN%20Human%20Rights%20is%20part,country%2Fstand%2Dalone%20offices.> accessed 5 June 2023. 37 UNEP, ‘Directory of statistical services of international organisations’ (n.d.) < https://unstats.un.org/unsd/ccsa/documents/UNEP.pdf > accessed 5 June 2023. 32

Table three shows the five UN entities with the most interns in 2020-2021 in relation to staff members. In the biennium of 2020-2021, there were a total of 68 entities that participated in Type 1 gratis personnel, which was 10 more compared to 2018-2019. Furthermore, the listed entities above, offer full-time unpaid internships (between 35 and 40 hours on weekdays). Moreover, in the UN system including the UN entities there were, in 2021, a total number of 78,649 staff members.39 Given that there were 3,797 interns in 2020-2021, it can be concluded that interns are a small portion in comparison with the staff members who were working at the UN. It is noted that ESCAP and UNODC (some UN entities) have a higher percentage of interns compared to their number of staff. Region

Interns

Percentage

African Group

586

12.1%

Asia-Pacific Group

1,318

28.3%

Eastern European Group

258

4.9%

Latin America and Caribbean Group

339

6.3%

Western European and Others Group

2,087

48.2%

Table 4: Geographical distribution of interns in 2018 – 2019 40 (Total interns: 4,454)

Region

Interns

Percentage

African States

410

10.5%

Asia-Pacific States

1,166

29.8%

Eastern European States

151

3.9%

Latin America and Caribbean States

302

7.7%

Western European and Other States

1,866

47.8%

Table 5: Geographical distribution of interns in 2020 – 2021 41 (Total interns: 3,797)

UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff, consultants and individual contractors, and United Nations Volunteers’ (2022) UN Doc A/77/578 18. 39 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: staff demographics’ (2022) UN Doc A/77/580. 40 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff, consultants and individual contractors’ (2020) UN Doc A/75/591/Add.1 para. 12. 41 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff, consultants and individual contractors, and United Nations Volunteers,’ (2022) UN Doc A/77/578 24. 38

It is noticeable that one region, Western European and Other States, comprised almost 50% of all the interns that did an unpaid internship at the UN and its entities.42 In the period from March to June 2020, interns could do their internship remotely because of COVID-19. This could explain the decrease within the intern group of Western European and Other States and the increase of percentages in Asia-Pacific States and Latin America and Caribbean States. D. The conditions In table six we set out the eligibility criteria for youth seeking an internship at the UN which covers educational qualifications, language proficiency, and family relations. Criteria

Description

Enrolled/Completed university

The applicant needs to be enrolled/completed, the final year of a first university degree programme – minimum of a bachelor’s level or equivalent – or be enrolled, or have completed, a graduate school programme.

Excellent command of English

The applicant needs to be proficient in English; knowledge of any other official language of the UN is considered an asset.

No family relations

The applicant should not be a child or sibling of a UN Secretariat staff member.

Table 6: Eligibility criteria 43 Outside the eligibility criteria mentioned in table six, there are additional terms to be considered. The duration of the internship program ranges between two to six months, which is a relatively short period and may impose limitations on the depth of learning.44 The interns are not paid, and therefore responsible for covering additional costs such as travel, insurance, 42

Australia and New Zealand fall within the Western European and Other States. However, the United States is not a member of ‘any’ regional group, though they have an observer status of the Western European and Other States. This raises the question of whether or not the interns of the United States are accounted for in the group where they have the observer status. United Nations, ‘Regional groups of Member States’ (Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, n.d.) < https://www.un.org/dgacm/content/regional-groups > accessed 2 October 2023. 43 United Nations Careers, ‘Internship programme’ (n.d.) < https://careers.un.org/lbw/home.aspx?viewtype=ip > accessed 7 May 2023. 44 ibid.

and accommodation. This results in an obstacle for individuals with limited financial means and perpetuates inequality. Expenses

Santiago Nairobi

Vienna

New

York Geneva

(USD)45

(USD)46

(EUR)

(USD)

Accommodation

400

300-800

500 - 100048 600 - 200049

600 - 1000

Health insurance

15050

30051

180-50052

200-70053

100

Travel

5154

12755

Food

112

160

35056

250-30057

300-600

(CHF)47

Table 7: Living expenses Table seven illustrates a comparative analysis of living expenses between the cost of living in non-Western and Western regions where UN offices are located. Furthermore, UN internships are mostly based in cities such as Geneva and New York. This leads to limited

Universidad de Chile, ‘Cost of living’ (n.d) < http://nexointernacional.fen.uchile.cl/cost-ofliving/#:~:text=Every%20student%20has%20different%20spending,on%20%241%2C300%20USD%20per%20 month. > accessed 2 October 2023. 46 RocApply, ‘Cost of living in Kenya’ (RA, 30 June 2020) < https://www.rocapply.com/study-in-kenya/aboutkenya/cost-of-living-in-kenya.html > accessed 2 October 2023. 47 Swiss School of Business and Management Geneva, ‘Student life in Geneva: Cost of Living’ (SSBM Geneva, 1 December) < https://www.ssbm.ch/blog/student-life-in-geneva-cost-ofliving/#:~:text=A%20student%27s%20monthly%20budget%20amounts,insurance%20(approximately%20CHF %20200) > accessed 5 June 2023. 48 STUWO, ‘Student accommodation in Vienna’ (STUWO, 2007) < https://www.stuwo.at/en/dormitories/vienna/ > accessed 2 October 2023. 49 Erasmus Play, ‘Erasmus Play: international student housing / Accommodation in New York’ (n.d.) < https://erasmusplay.com/en/new-york.html > accessed 5 June 2023. 50 International citizens insurance, ‘Health Insurance in Chile’ (n.d.) < https://www.internationalinsurance.com/health/south-america/chile.php > accessed 2 October 2023. 51 Jubilee Health Insurance, ‘Jcare’ (n.d.) < https://digital.jubileeinsurance.com/jcare?_gl=1*1ovjerc*_ga*MTc3NDAwNDMzNC4xNjgzNjMxNTg4*_ga_E MC06KEYRD*MTY5MDM1ODczNy44LjEuMTY5MDM1ODkxNi4wLjAuMA..*_ga_D4DBKKD3S1*MTY 5MDM1ODczNy41LjEuMTY5MDM1ODkxNi42MC4wLjA. > accessed 2 October 2023. 52 City of Vienna, ‘Health insurance’ (n.d.) < https://www.wien.gv.at/english/healthsocialservices/insurance/selfinsurance.html > accessed 2 October 2023. 53 Department of Health & Human Services, ‘How to pick a health insurance plan’ (n.d.) < https://www.healthcare.gov/choose-a-plan/your-total-costs/ > accessed 5 June 2023. 54 City of Vienna, ‘Transportation & Urban planning’ (n.d.) < https://www.wien.gv.at/english/transportationurbanplanning/public-transport/ > accessed 2 October 2023. 55 The MTA, ‘Everything you need to know about fares and tolls in New York’ (n.d.) < https://new.mta.info/fares > accessed 5 June 2023. 56 Study in Austria, ‘Living costs’ (n.d.) < https://studyinaustria.at/en/living/living-costs > accessed 2 October 2023. 57 Niyo, ‘Cost of Living in New York for Indian Student in 2023’ (Team Niyo, 2023) <https://goniyo.com/blog/cost-of-living-in-new-york-for-indian-students/ > accessed 5 June 2023. 45

accessibility and challenges as relocation and high living costs situations that come along with these cities. III. Culture of privilege and systematic inequality A. The issue of social exclusion The UN entity DESA stated in their report on identifying social inclusion and exclusion that there was no universal definition for social exclusion.58 However, in the same report, they described it as “a state in which individuals are unable to participate fully in economic, social, political, and cultural life, as well as the process leading to and sustaining such a state”. 59 While the UN acknowledged the premise of social exclusion, its own unpaid internship system fails to consider the systemic oppression of subordinated classes, or classism. This oversight becomes evident when we look at the empirical studies of scholars such as Barbara Ehrenreich (women working minimum wage) who found the issues women working for minimum wages encountered vastly different issues and were ignored by middle and upper-class women,60 and Diane Reay (examination of the relation amongst background of families and educational access) who discovered that women from manual labour family backgrounds acknowledge class differences of career possibilities and educational access.61 These class distinctions are further perpetuated by the UN internship system, which predominantly favours youth from high and upper-middle income countries and backgrounds. This continued exclusion of youth from low-income backgrounds is a direct example of social exclusion and classism, which undermines the principles of the UN. More specifically, one class dominates in these internships, namely, the privileged by socio-economic status,62 Western,63 and upper-middle-income class.64

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘Identifying social inclusion and exclusion’ (n.d.) < https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/2016/chapter1.pdf > accessed 8 May 2023, 18. 59 ibid. 60 Barbara Ehrenreich, ‘Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America’ (First ed., Metropolitan Books, | 2001). 61 Diane Reay, ‘Rethinking Social Class: Qualitative Perspectives on Class and Gender’ (1998) Sociology, 32 (2), 259-275. 62 Ross Perlin, ‘Intern Nation: How to Earn Nothing and Learn Little in the Brave New Economy’ (updated ed., Verso | 2012). 63 UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff, consultants and individual contractors, and United Nations Volunteers’ (2022) UN Doc A/77/578 para. 24. 58

Classism referred to people from a lower social class that were treated in manners that devalued or excluded them.65 However, describing classism as the systematic oppression of subordinated class groups to strengthen the dominant class,66 fits better when looking at the UN and its unpaid internship system. The culture of unpaid internships has not only spread from the US to Europe.67 It has infiltrated into the UN where the upper and middle class are predominantly present. Classism can be observed in several ways within the UN unpaid internship system. Firstly, regarding the unpaid internships themselves, the Fair Internship Initiative (FII) Report of 2019-2020 revealed that 87% of unpaid interns came from high or upper-middle-income countries.68 This resulted in a systemic barrier for young people who came from low-income countries. Numerous UN entities, like educational institutions, offer scholarships or programs specifically made for Least Developed Countries.69 However, privileged youth are still overrepresented in unpaid internships because they can afford to work for free. This privileged group gains valuable experiences and networks, while the UN perpetrates a cycle where this group has not only access to opportunities but also career success. Whereas qualified youth from low socio-economic backgrounds are underrepresented. Secondly, the FII concluded in their survey other issues such as legal inequities in visa applications and financial inequities to finance the internship period. This demonstrates that the UN internships are not accessible for everyone but for those whose finances can afford them such opportunities. Classism in the UN is depicted through preserving the internships for the privileged and the unequal outcomes and unequal opportunities for youth from different socio-economic backgrounds.

The graphics and statistics mentioned in Chapter II are found in UN Doc A/77/578 para. 24, which provides in-depth details on the distribution of unpaid internships at the UN and its entities among different socioeconomic classes and regions. Fair Internship Initiative, UN Internships Report, ‘4. Conditions of the internship programmes aligned to UN mandate’, 2019 – 2020 < https://fairinternshipinitiative.files.wordpress.com/2021/06/201920_un_internships_report_final_web-1-1.pdf > accessed 4 March 2023. 65 Regina Day Langhout, ‘Assessing Classism in Academic Settings’ (2007) 30:2 JHU Press 145. 66 Class Action, ‘What is Classism’ (n.d.) <https://classism.org/about-class/what-is-classism/ > accessed 8 May 2023. 67 Jonathan Arlow, ‘Trading labor for experience: The role of unpaid internships in shaping Active Labor Market Policies in Ireland since the Great Recession’ (2023) EPA. 68 Fair Internship Initiative, UN Internships Report, ‘4. Conditions of the internship programmes aligned to UN mandate’, 2019 – 2020 < https://fairinternshipinitiative.files.wordpress.com/2021/06/201920_un_internships_report_final_web-1-1.pdf > accessed 4 March 2023. 69 United Nations, ‘Scholarships, grants and other resources for education and research’ (LDC Portal, n.d.) < https://www.un.org/ldcportal/content/scholarships > accessed 6 October 2023.

Due to youth from the Global South, lower or different socio-economic backgrounds being underrepresented, the lack of diversity becomes evident within the internship system. Hence, a lack of opportunity leads to a lack of representation. Furthermore, Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states: “Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work”.70 The UDHR recognised ‘work’ as a fundamental human right. Although the UDHR does not mention nor defines ‘internships’, it does emphasize just and fair work conditions. “Just and favourable conditions of work” highlights fair wages and the absence of exploitative practices. The “equal pay for equal work” means that individuals should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value. Additionally, “just and favourable remuneration” includes adequate and fair compensation for their work, that ensures a standard of living that upholds human dignity. Even though the UDHR is not legally binding, the rights and principles based on human rights and the right to work specifically were enshrined in other legally binding instruments such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100)71 and Art. 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).72 However, when the UN offers unpaid internships, it contradicts the right upheld in Article 23. This internship system fails to provide monetary remuneration, which goes against the labour standards and human rights that the UN not only created and implemented but also supposedly valued. Article 23 mentioned that “everyone” has this right, yet the UN did not include interns within this scope. This contradiction goes further when the same article touches upon “just and favourable work conditions”. However, it is shown in the FII overview of internship conditions that UN entities that provide a monthly stipend do not offer them consistently the same wages.73 Due to no standardized stipend policies, together with entities who do not provide any financial remuneration to their interns at all, leads to a place with continued disparities in which the UN reinforces inequality. 70

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 by UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) Art. 23. 71 International Labour Organisation, Equal Remuneration Convention (adopted 29 June 1951, entered into force 23 May 1953) C100. 72 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966 by UNGA, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Art. 6. 73 Fair Internship Initiative, ‘Overview of internships conditions in the UN Secretariat’ (2023) < https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NqitccESC3-ZyqV8pfq7HS0Jv5yp_hVH/edit#gid=249941686 > accessed 14 May 2023.

The UN sends the message that the work of their interns is not labour that should be financially compensated to a living wage. It becomes an act of charity for the privileged. B. A crossroad of systemic inequality within the internship system The UN perceived the issue of economic inequality by stating that “one of the greatest discriminations in this world today is discrimination by rich people against poor people”.74 However, this statement carried a certain responsibility, especially since the resolution on “The future we want” to renew their commitment to the sustainable development by the UN was endorsed in 2012.75 Three years later, the resolution on “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” was adopted and set out 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) together with 169 targets, in order to complete the unfinished targets of the prior Millennium Development Goals.76 SDG 10 was established to reduce inequality and to ensure no one is left behind.77 Specifically, Target 10.4, aimed to reduce inequality, through the adoption of policies, in fiscal, wage, and social protection policies.78 The UN was expected to internalize these declared values and reflect them in its system. However, regarding internships, the considerations of economic equality, which were formally adhered to, were de facto violated.79 In 2015, the UN entity DESA understood inequality as a perception that looked further than the conventional outcome-oriented view, by using income as a proxy for well-being.80 Moreover, the perspective based on opportunity acknowledged that circumstances of birth were fundamental to the outcome of life and equal opportunity required a fair starting point for all.81

J. Carter, B. Boutros-Ghali (eds.), ‘Conference for Global Development Cooperation: Meeting Report’ (1992) DIANE Publishing 9. 75 UNGA Res 66/288 (27 July 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/288 (adopted 11 September 2012 by UNGA). 76 UNGA Res 70/1 (25 September 2015) UN Doc A/RES/70/1 (adopted 21 October 2015 by UNGA). 77 ibid. 78 ibid. 79 Marko Novakovic PhD, ‘United Nations internship programme policy and the need for its amendment’ (2017) Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 65. 114. 80 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘Concepts of Inequality’ (2015) < https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_dev_issues/dsp_policy_01.pdf> accessed 9 May 2023. 81 ibid. 74

Mr Antonio Guterres, the UN Secretary-General, spoke the words “inequality defines our time” during his Nelson Mandela lecture.82 And truer words could not be spoken. Even within the UN system inequality is maintained. 1. Lack of accessibility As internship positions are highly competitive, the main priority should be the quality of the applicant and not their wealth.83 However, the current internship system of the UN is set to pick wealth over quality. The reason for this is that the possibility of becoming an intern is limited to three groups, according to Marko Novaković. The first group belonged to individuals who could afford to live in expensive cities such as Geneva and New York for two to six months.84 These individuals belong to a privileged group that does not mirror all of today’s society. The second group belonged to individuals who live close to cities where the UN offers internship programs.85 These individuals enjoy the advantage of not having to worry about finding accommodation or bearing the financial burden of accommodation expenses. In addition, the travel costs contribute to their benefit. However, it must be noted that the UN has office entities and programs located around the world. This means it is important to look at other cities, such as Addis Ababa, 86 Beirut,87 Nairobi,88 and Santiago.89 Youth who live within the vicinity to these cities may rely on public transportation (because access to private automobiles is a privilege) that face problems like the deterioration of services provided and inefficiency. Furthermore, individuals from rural UN Secretary-General, ‘Secretary-General’s Nelson Mandela Lecture: “Tackling the Inequality Pandemic: A New Social Contract for a New Era” (2020) < https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-0718/secretary-generals-nelson-mandela-lecture-“tackling-the-inequality-pandemic-new-social-contract-for-newera”-delivered> accessed 9 May 2023. 83 Marko Novakovic PhD, ‘United Nations internship programme policy and the need for its amendment’ (2017) Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 65. 114. 84 ibid. 85 ibid. 86 K. Kenea, S. Kinnear, D. Akbar ‘Accessibility of Anbessa city bus service in Addis Ababa Ethiopia: An analysis of stakeholder’s opinions’ (2017) Australian Journal of Regional Studies Vol. 23, Issue 1. 87 Phd. A. El Zein, ‘Inequality of Mobility in the Transport System in Lebanon’ (Sálam w Kálam, March 2023) < https://www.salamwakalam.com/articles/636/inequality-of-mobility-in-the-transport-system-in/en > accessed 3 October 2023. 88 C. Zachary ‘Public transport problems in Nairobi: A study of management and operations of Kenya Bus Services (K.B.S.) Limited’ (1989) University of Nairobi Feng/ FBD 1431. 89 Center for Latin American Studies, ‘Accessibility in Santiago’ (James Gordy, 9 August 2019) < https://guclasblog.wordpress.com/2019/08/09/accessibility-in-santiago/ > accessed 3 October 2023. 82

areas may encounter additional challenges. The gap between rural and urban areas is seen through the obstacles such as transportation (lack of), infrastructure (inadequate), and access to resources (limited), that individuals from rural areas face.90 The third group belonged to individuals who were sponsored by a third party that is not the UN or themselves but rather the government or foundation.91 Moreover, when discussing lack of accessibility within this internship system a specific situation comes to mind that involved the UN. On the 24th of April 2013, an auction was organized by the Robert F. Kennedy Centre for Justice and Human Rights. This auction came with various prizes. The one prize that stood out was a six-week unpaid internship at the UN The bid for this prize was USD 22,000.92 Even though the UN stated that the internships are not to be used for an auction, they still can be seen as they ought to be bought. The internships are unpaid, and the intern must work 35 hours spread over five days a week. 93 This results in either that the intern must go through their savings (in so far a young individual, in this economy, can have savings) to be able to pay for their day-to-day life, the following two to six months or have the financial privileges to be able to pay and to deal with the external responsibilities that fall outside the scope of the internship. In addition, the threshold is set high to apply for an internship at the UN. While youth look at whether they meet the necessary minimum requirements, in the back of their minds they are calculating how much all of this is going to cost without the monetary compensation. As well as whether they can find an additional job whilst participating in the internship and which issues could arise if they need a work permit if they are not a national in addition to this, whether they must purchase work attire. Not to mention the additional emotional and mental stress and pressure that adds to this. The UN loses qualified candidates before they even apply to internships as the reality is: that no money means no access to these internship opportunities.

Noah Kaiser, ‘Rural Transportation Infrastructure in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Review of Impacts, Implications, and Interventions’ (2022) 14 Sustainability 4. 91 Marko Novakovic PhD, ‘United Nations internship programme policy and the need for its amendment’ (2017) Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu. 65. 115. 92 Sarah Kendzior, ‘Meritocracy for sale’ (2013) < https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/5/4/meritocracyfor-sale> accessed 11 May 2023. 93 UN Careers, ‘Job Opening’ (2022) <https://careers.un.org/LBW/jobdetail.aspx?id=176880#:~:text=Internships%20in%20the%20UN%20are,per%2 0week%20(35%20hours).> accessed 11 May 2023. 90

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2. Economic inequality Economic inequality is an issue that becomes evident when the UN insinuates that youth should have access to adequate financial resources, which is a prerequisite for eligibility. It becomes more problematic since there is a certain level of knowledge within the UN that young people coming from a household with the lowest economic standing were four times less likely to do an unpaid internship compared to a medium household standing, and eight times less likely compared to the highest economic standing households.94 This issue goes deeper when narrowing economic inequality down to income inequality. Income inequality hurts the achievement of the well-being of society due to it translating into unequal social power.95 Therefore, money as part of income matters. Furthermore, equality of opportunity means that individuals are provided with an equal chance to achieve their goals, no matter the individual’s circumstances or background. 96 Anne Phillips emphasised that the removal of systemic barriers (socio-economic disparities, unequal distribution of resources) are important to compete on equal footing. But in addition to equality of opportunity, there must be an equality of outcome that helps to address the socioeconomic disparities. Equality of outcome focuses on benefits, and how resources are distributed that ensures an equitable society. Anne Phillips argued that equality of outcome should be tested to see whether equality of opportunity is accessible because when the outcome is not equal, we can assume the opportunities will not be either. 97 When this is applied in the context of the UN’s unpaid internship system it results in a majority (that was seen in tables four and five) that came from the Global North, which had the financial resources and support system to do unpaid labour. The outcome is a disproportionate percentage of interns who came from the Global North, while the percentage of interns who came from the Global South is underrepresented. The lack of equality of outcome in this unpaid internship system illustrates a lack of opportunity. The internship system of the UN mirrors the inequality that is seen today. Hence, the cycle of privilege, in this current system, continues.

Dan Moxon, ‘The Costs of Unpaid Internships’ (2023) <https://www.youthforum.org/files/230111-DPCostUnpaidInternships.pdf> accessed 11 May 2023, 10. 95 Günseli Berik, ‘Feminist Economics of Inequality, Development, and Growth’ (2009) 15:3 Fem. Econ. 1. 96 Anne Phillips, Which Equalities Matter?, 1st edn, Polity Press, 1999, 44. 97 Anne Phillips, ‘Defending equality of Outcome’ (2004) 12(1) J. Political Philos. 1, 9. 94

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3. Social inequality and underrepresentation As discussed previously the geographical distribution of interns appeared almost fifty percent who came from the Western world. Due to the financial barriers unpaid internships exclude members of marginalised communities. Across economic, cultural, political, and social dimensions, marginalised groups endure discrimination and exclusion that comes from unequal power structures.98 Offering unpaid internships widens the socioeconomic gap by providing network opportunities and work experience only for those who can afford it. A critique that continuously resurfaces on underpaid or unpaid internship opportunities is that these positions discriminate against lower socio-economic backgrounds and further contribute to social inequalities.99 The cycle of individuals with a privileged background continues and the marginalised groups are forgotten once more. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, unpaid internships not only form barriers against youth based on their financial status but also contribute to excluding non-Western individuals. The UN is supposed to be advocating for representation all around the world, however, this diversity is not seen in the people who are able to do these unpaid internships. When internships are no longer accessible for youth from outside the Western world, it leads to underrepresentation and lacks diversity. The unpaid internship system becomes more of a Western contribution complex. The UN serves many communities of diverse backgrounds. That is why diversity among interns is necessary to improve representation and contribution to programmes, perspectives, and policies that affect them and their communities. When youth from low-income backgrounds are unable to participate in internship opportunities due to financial constraints, coming from an Organisation that fights for equality, is fundamentally and morally unjust. 4. Gender inequality

Bala Ramulu Chinnala, Marginalized Communities and Decentralized Institutions in India An exclusion and Inclusion Perspective, 1st edn, Routledge, 2021. 99 Fair Internship Initiative, UN Internships Report, ‘3.5.1 Geographical / Socio-economic Diversity’, 2019 – 2020 <https://fairinternshipinitiative.files.wordpress.com/2021/06/2019-20_un_internships_report_final_web-11.pdf > accessed 4 March 2023.

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In a new report in 2022, of the Secretary-General, it was shown that two-thirds of all gratis personnel in 2020-2021 were women.100 More specifically, 68.6 per cent were interns. There is a gender aspect related to unpaid internships.101 It is important to consider the cultural (stereotypical gender roles),102 economic (patriarchy and occupational segregation),103 and social (unpaid patriarchal104 work),105 aspects that create such choices. The gender pay gap cannot be fully explained, however, gender segregation of employment can be considered a compelling factor in the different earnings between women and men.106 The first aspect is occupational segregation by sex. This is influenced by labour demand, where women or men may be hired based on cultural bias or stereotypes, and labour supply which steer women to an occupation that is pushed by gender roles and societal expectations.107 Gender roles are formed through social institutions, where the majority associate working for pay as a masculine task, and unpaid care work is considered a woman’s domain.108 Unpaid work originated from unpaid housework which was expected of women. The issue of gender inequality is rooted in unpaid caregiving and is evident in three domains: quality of employment, gender gaps in labour force participation rates, and wages.109 However, unpaid domestic labour, extends into fields where women participate in unpaid internships, UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Composition of the Secretariat: gratis personnel, retired staff, consultants and individual contractors, and United Nations Volunteers,’ (2022) UN Doc A/77/578 para. 21. 101 Submission by Interns Australia, ‘Productivity Commission Review of the Workplace Relations Framework’ (2015) <https://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/193312/subdr0326-workplace-relations.pdf > accessed 13 May 2023. 102 C. Alonso, M. Brussevich, E. Dabla-Norris, Y. Kinoshita, K. Kochar, ‘Reducing and Redistributing Unpaid Work: Stronger Policies to Support Gender Equality’ (2019) Working Paper No. 2019/225. 103 Indira Hirway, ‘Unpaid Work and the Economy: Linkages and Their Implications’ (2015) Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 838. 104 Scholar Sylvia Walby uses the term ‘patriarchal’ instead of unpaid ‘domestic’ work as it more accurately denotes the form of exploitation in (marriage) relationships. This is because Walby argues that men benefit from women who do unpaid work within their homes. Sylvia Walby, Theorizing Patriarchy, 1st edn, Basil Blackwell, 1990. 105 International Labour Organisation, ‘World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends for women 2017’ (ILO, 2017) < https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--inst/documents/publication/wcms_557245.pdf> accessed 17 July 2023. 106 Maria Karamessini, ‘Wage determination and the gender pay gap: A feminist political economy analysis and decomposition’ (2007) 13(1) Fem. Econ. 31. 107 Richard Anker, ‘Theories of occupational segregation by sex: An overview’ (1997) 136 ILR 315. 108 G. Ferrant, ‘The role of discriminatoy social institutions in female south-south migration’ (OECD Development Centre, April 2014) < https://www.oecd.org/dev/developmentgender/SIGI%20and%20Female%20Migration_final.pdf > accessed 4 October 2023. 109 G. Ferrant, ‘Unpaid Care Work: The missing link in the analysis of gender gaps in labour outcomes’ (OECD Development Centre, December 2014) < https://www.oecd.org/dev/development-gender/Unpaid_care_work.pdf > accessed 4 October 2023. 100

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particularly in sectors of humanities. This continues the traditional cycle of gender inequality. Decades ago, society’s norms set out that men should work and receive a salary whereas women held the domestic role without a salary. In this capitalist era, where we are trying to make ends meet, women cannot afford to do labour or internships for free and nor should they be expected to do so. When most interns are women and their positions remain unpaid, the UN does not set an example for gender equality, but rather perpetuates the idea that women’s labour is less valuable and exploitable. Additionally, according to Mary Cornish, it perpetuates women’s secondary status in the patriarchy.110 Historically, women’s labour has been associated with how the higher percentage of women working in a field the lower the wages, and the consistency of being undervalued compared to men (irrespective of its value to the employer).111 Here is another aspect to consider, young people who have children but still would like to do their internship at the UN but due to the internships being unpaid cannot afford it and must apply elsewhere other than where their passion lies. The challenge for women to balance care responsibilities with paid employment may lead to “occupational downgrading”, wherein women pick employment below their skills level and accept poorer conditions.112 Ultimately, the UN must recognise and address gender inequality in their internship programme if they want to uphold their principles of fairness and equality to form accessible and inclusive opportunities. When the internships provide liveable wages, the UN will take a step forward in bridging the socio-economic disparities between women and men. IV. Positive development Eight years ago, Tribune de Genève published an article on the story of the unpaid UN intern David Hyde, who decided to sleep in a tent due to the expensive rent prices. 113 This caused outrage on social media and intern rights campaigners were shocked upon hearing the

Mary Cornish, ‘Closing the global gender pay gap: Securing justice for women’s work’ (2007) 28 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 219. 111 ibid. 112 G. Ferrant, ‘Unpaid Care Work: The missing link in the analysis of gender gaps in labour outcomes’ (OECD Development Centre, December 2014) < https://www.oecd.org/dev/development-gender/Unpaid_care_work.pdf > accessed 4 October 2023. 113 Tribune de Genève, ‘Stagiaire non rémunéré à 1’ONU, David vit sous tente’ (Luca Di Stefano, 10 August 2015) < https://www.tdg.ch/stagiaire-non-remunere-a-lonu-david-vit-sous-tente-222321544380 > accessed on 24 July 2023. 110

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news.114 This uproar resulted in various protests against the Organisation’s unpaid internship programme. On 22 September 2015, in New York, a protest for fair internship payment began.115 These protests continued on/until 10 November 2015, with demonstrations that happened across the globe.116 On 20 February 2017, there was another global intern strike.117 Subsequently, on 8 May 2019, and every year since then, interns have been making themselves heard and continue to advocate for fair wages.118 Circling back to 2015, Ahmad Fawzi, the director of the United Nations Information Service in Geneva at the time, explained that the reason UN interns do not get paid is because of a resolution of the General Assembly that is backed by the member states that offers internships but no payments.119 However, according to David Hyde in his TEDx Talks in 2016, the interns that had to find this document in the archives, concluded that such document did not exist.120 It is important to note that these intern strikes led to small steps in the UN to see the issues with their unpaid internship system. On 20 December 2018, the UN High Commission on Human Rights stated that the offer of unpaid internships “exclude de facto the most marginalised” and “unpaid internships are effectively blocking some young people”.121 The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, confirmed that the excessive use of unpaid internships is not in line with the right to work, limiting the freedom of young people to choose.122 However, the OHCHR The Guardian, ‘Unpaid UN intern who slept in tent quits after media uproar’ (Aisha Gani, 12 August 2015) < https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/12/unpaid-un-intern-who-had-to-sleep-in-a-tent-quits-after-mediauproar > accessed 24 Jul 2023. 115 VICE News, ‘Pissed -off UN interns protest unpaid internships outside UN Headquarters’ (Samuel Oakford, 22 September 2015) < https://www.vice.com/en/article/ev9zqa/pissed-off-un-interns-protest-unpaid-internshipsoutside-un-headquarters > accessed 6 October 2023. 116 Fair Internship Initiative, ‘International Interns’ Day’ (FII, n.d.) < https://fairinternshipinitiative.org/international-interns-day-in-geneva/ > accessed 6 October 2023. 117 Public Service International , ‘Global Intern Strike, the growing campaign against unpaid internships and the role of trade unions’ (PSI, February 2017) < https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Youth/PublicServicesInternational.pdf > accessed 6 October 2023. 118 Europe and me, ‘“Unpaid is Unfair!” – Demonstration for intern rights at the United Nations shows positive response’ (European and me, 8 May 2019) < https://europeandme.eu/unpaid-ist-unfair-demonstration-for-internrights-at-the-united-nations-shows-positive-response/ > accessed 6 October 2023. 119 The United Nations Office at Geneva, ‘Regular press briefing by the information service’ (Ahmad Fawzi, 11 August 2015) < https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/bi-weekly-briefing/2015/08/regular-press-briefinginformation-service-1 > accessed 8 October 2023. 120 TEDx Talks, ‘We will not be the unpaid intern generation any longer’ (David Leo Hyde, 24 June 2016) < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=79K9Q-6Nw9Q > accessed 8 October 2023. 121 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Realization of the right to work’ (2018) UN Doc A/hrc/40/31, 9. 122 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment (2016) No. 23, 47. 114

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concluded in their report that States should “remove all barriers and ensure equality and nondiscrimination in access to work” by “discouraging unpaid internships as they can be an obstacle for youth, especially for the most disadvantaged”.123 This should include the UN as the UN Charter affirms the Organisation’s commitment to protect, promote, and respect these rights. Entity

Stipend

UN Women

10%

UNDEP

10%

WHO

20%

World Food Programme

14%

UNHCR

50% of the monthly net salary GS level 3

Table 8: Stipends amounts offered by different UN entities n124 The World Health Organisation (WHO) in Geneva, began providing living allowances to eligible interns needing financial support in 2020 after a resolution was passed.125 This means an intern is solely responsible for their insurance and travel expenses to and from their internship location. The Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) stated in its 2018 Review that some progress was made and issued additional recommendations to the General Assembly to introduce compensation schemes to Type 1 gratis personnel.126 The JIU suggested funding the stipends for interns by involving Member States with UN entities, departmental budgets, and project funds.127 On 31 March 2023, the UN budget committee (GA Fifth Committee) adopted a resolution on Human Resources Management.128 The Resolution sets out that the Secretariat must create

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Realization of the right to work’ (2018) UN Doc A/hrc/40/31, 14-15. 124 Fair Internship Initiative, ‘Overview of internships conditions in the UN Secretariat’ (2023) < https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NqitccESC3-ZyqV8pfq7HS0Jv5yp_hVH/edit#gid=249941686> accessed 14 May 2023. 125 World Health Organization, ‘WHO Internship Programme’, (n.d.) < https://www.who.int/careers/internshipprogramme> accessed 11 March 2023. 126 Joint Inspection Unit, ‘Review of internship programmes in the United Nations system’ (2018) JIU/REP/2018/1. 127 Joint Inspection Unit, ‘Review of internship programmes in the United Nations system’ (2018) JIU/REP/2018/1 para. 105. 128 Human Resource Management, ‘Draft resolution submitted by the Chair of the Committee following Informal consultations’ (2023) A/C.5/77/L.31 52. 123

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proposals to provide stipends for all interns.129 In March 2025 the proposals will be presented to the Member States and their decision is final. Observing the gradual recognition of the issue of unpaid internships and the acknowledgment that there is a necessity to provide fair monetary compensation, is an encouraging step in the right direction. V. Conclusion When addressing the pressing issues that have been found in this unpaid internship system, it is essential for the UN and its entities to take a proactive stance. Firstly, the UN must alter the perception that (future) interns are exploitable. Interns are not merely a source of inexpensive labour. They are valuable assets to the Organisation which should be mirrored in their remuneration. While some UN entities provide low stipends, this is not enough. Providing low stipends does not eliminate the barriers the UN upholds with its unpaid internship system. Secondly, policy advocacy is important. The responsibility of justifying the need for monetary compensation should not rest on (future) interns but on the UN itself. The UN must actively advocate for its Member States, consistently emphasising the value that interns bring to the Organisation and the importance of providing them with liveable wages. This advocacy must happen until March 2025 and continue afterwards. Thirdly, internal policy reform is crucial. The UN should conduct a comprehensive review of its practices and policies regarding liveable wages. Lastly, fostering the collaboration between Member States for publicity and widespread adoption of paid internships should be pursued. In addition, engaging with civil society to encourage the adoption of paid internships as the standard is essential. Now, as we have come to the end of this article, it is imperative to highlight that the practice of offering unpaid internships goes against the core values of the UN. Unpaid internships maintain the cycle of socioeconomic inequalities and continue to contradict the principles of equality and fairness advocated for by the UN. Furthermore, interns should be valued as much as the internship itself is presented because interns bring enthusiasm, fresh perspectives, and contribute significantly to the success of the UN. Interns are not only the

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driving forces of the UN but also the very foundation the Organisation relies upon. Moreover, the unpaid internship system sustains a culture of classism where privileged individuals of certain socioeconomic backgrounds benefit greatly. This leads to a perpetuation of restricted accessibility for marginalised communities, it reinforces social exclusion and limits diversity. Additionally, the overrepresentation of women in unpaid internships points to the devaluation of their work, it undermines the principles of gender equality and halts the progress towards it. The UN has a choice: either stand in solidarity with their (future) interns and comply with their core values, contributing to the reduction of global inequalities as stipulated in SDG 10, or risk preserving the cycle of global inequality.

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The Youth and the Conference of the Parties - Climate Change

By André De Jesus Ramos*

Abstract This study scrutinizes the legal frameworks and mechanisms within the United Nations (UN) designed to enhance the inclusive and participatory engagement of young individuals, particularly in the context of climate change. Despite the UN's acknowledgement of youth's important role, challenges persist, hindering meaningful participation. The analysis centres on the Conference of Youth (COY) as a preparatory platform for the Conference of the Parties (COP), addressing a central research question aimed at diminishing power dominance and fostering a more participatory mindset among youth. The literature review explores existing legal mechanisms, frameworks, and critiques, emphasizing the UN Charter's commitment to engaging all segments of society. The Youth 2030 Strategy is examined for its role in promoting youth involvement and reducing top-down influence. Within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the establishment of the Youth Climate Movement as the official Children and Youth Constituency of the UNFCCC (YOUNGO) is considered, with attention to persisting challenges and the need for policy adjustments. The article contextualizes the urgency of climate change and links it to the COY initiative, positioning it as a crucial opportunity for youth engagement in COPs. Greta Thunberg's impactful environmental movement underscores the gravity of the situation, connecting global concerns to practical challenges faced by young delegates, as revealed in Bianca Martir's interview. Funding and logistical gaps are highlighted, advocating changes at international and national levels. The study concludes with actionable proposals to empower youth, encompassing education, training, mentorship programs and policies promoting gender diversity within COP negotiations. The implementation of these measures is crucial for fostering a more inclusive and participatory environment, reducing the dominance of top-down figures and empowering youth to influence climate policies effectively. In a world on the brink of climate catastrophes, this study offers a roadmap for an urgent continuation of changes within the UN to ensure the meaningful participation of the youth in shaping a sustainable future. * LL.B. Candidate, International and European Law Programme, The Hague University of Applied Sciences.

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I. Introduction The United Nations (hereinafter, UN), an international institution committed to tackling the world's most pressing global issues, has acknowledged youth’s essential role in shaping the future, especially regarding environmental sustainability. An integral platform designed to harness youthful enthusiasm and creativity in the pursuit of a sustainable planet is the annual COY. This preparatory introduction to the COP strives to empower the young generation by amplifying their voices and nurturing their passion for climate action. However, as we delve deeper into the practical realities of these well-intentioned initiatives, a stark contrast emerges. Despite its stated dedication to youth participation as seen in the World Programme of Action for Youth, the UN in practice often falls short of its ideals.1 Young people, eager to contribute to the global climate cause, frequently find that their actions do not bring immediate effects.2 These challenges have persisted since the inception of COY in 2015, casting a shadow over the noble objectives. This article undertakes a rigorous examination of these challenges, centring its analysis on the research question: What legal frameworks and mechanisms exist to promote a more inclusive and participatory mindset among young people in their engagement with the UN, and how can these be enhanced to reduce the dominance of power and top-down figures? These issues, as revealed in this study, have not gone unnoticed; they have been eloquently articulated by young delegates who have personally experienced the frustrations and disappointments of COY participation. This article aims to serve as an inspiring call, urging the UN to respond promptly to the persistent challenges. In doing so, it offers concrete and actionable recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the COY, thereby positively influencing the outcomes of subsequent COP gatherings. To achieve this, the article is structured as follows: the literature review provides a comprehensive review of the existing legal mechanisms and frameworks emanating from the UN as well as a body of scholarly work and critiques, elucidating the concerns and insights of other authors who have critically examined the dynamics of youth

United Nations Climate Change, 'Youth Leading on Climate: Interview with Elizabeth Gulugulu' (UNFCC, 28 April 2022) <https://unfccc.int/news/youth-leading-on-climate-interview-with-elizabeth-gulugulu> accessed on 30 November 2023. 2 World Federation of United Nations Association, ‘Coffee Chat Q&A: UN Youth Delegate Denis Naets’ < https://wfuna.org/youth/coffee-chat-qa-un-youth-delegate-denis-naets/> accessed on 14 November 2023.

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engagement in the COY and the COP. This is followed by a section that delves into the profound implications of the greenhouse effect on the younger generation, emphasizing the urgent need for their active participation in climate change mitigation efforts. The next section takes a meticulous and critical look at the principal obstacles young participants face within the UN system. It unveils the problems encountered during the COY and how they carry over to affect the subsequent COP events. Finally, the article presents a call for change providing a robust array of practical recommendations aimed at mitigating the challenges outlined earlier. These recommendations are intended to cultivate a more inclusive and participatory environment for young individuals within the UN framework. To gather the necessary information for this research, I adopted a comprehensive research approach, comprising desk research and interviews. The data sources include a thorough examination of the UN Charter, the 2030 Youth Resolution, previously published articles, personal narratives of COY and COP participants, and international speeches delivered by impassioned youth activists. Moreover, the article draws from valuable insights gathered during an online interview with a delegate who actively participated in the 2021 COY and COP events held in Scotland. This article seeks to shed light on the often-overlooked challenges faced by young individuals who aspire to make a meaningful impact in the global fight against climate change. It is my eager hope that this research will make a meaningful contribution to fostering a more inclusive and participatory environment within the UN, amplifying the voices of the youth, and paving the way for a more just approach to addressing environmental challenges. In the following sections, we will delve deeper into each of these aspects, laying the groundwork for a robust exploration of youth participation in environmental initiatives at the UN. II. Literature Review In the context of the research question, which focuses on the examination of legal frameworks and mechanisms designed to foster a more inclusive and participatory mindset among young people in their engagement with the UN, it is essential to explore how the UN Charter's foundational principles and purposes contribute to this objective. While the Charter itself does not explicitly address youth participation and inclusivity, it certainly opens the door for the initiative. The Charter's Preamble, with its eloquent reference to 'We the Peoples', 111

underscores a fundamental commitment to engaging diverse segments of society, explicitly encompassing youth, in the UN's overarching mission.3 It conveys an inherent recognition that the global challenges the UN seeks to address require the collective involvement of all, irrespective of age. The principles of non-discrimination and equality, as articulated in Articles 1 and 2, serve as the cornerstone for ensuring that age-based discrimination is actively discouraged, allowing young individuals to participate on an equal footing with their older counterparts.4 These principles set the stage for a more inclusive approach within the UN system. As we delve into the examination of legal mechanisms and frameworks, it is essential to recognize that the Charter's dedication to upholding human rights applies universally to individuals of all ages, reaffirming the importance of protecting the rights of youth.5 In this context, the Charter not only informs our understanding of existing legal foundations but also provides a profound backdrop for exploring avenues to reduce power dominance and foster a more participatory mindset among young people within the UN, aligning with the overarching goal of the research question. In addition, examining UN resolutions, like the Youth 2030 Strategy, is crucial for understanding how they affect youth involvement in the UN. The Youth 2030 Strategy was launched in 2018 and is aligned with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.6 It emphasizes empowering, including, and engaging young individuals within the UN system. This strategy is particularly important because it recognizes the essential role of youth in addressing global challenges, especially climate change.7 Youth engagement extends to platforms such as the COY and participation in the COP to the UNFCCC. By embracing youth involvement, the Youth 2030 Strategy shows the UN's commitment to reducing the influence of top-down figures and promoting a more inclusive and participatory mindset among young people. Implementing these resolutions effectively can lead to transformative changes in youth engagement. By reducing the dominance of

United Nations Charter (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI Preamble. United Nations Charter (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 1-2. 5 United Nations Charter (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI art 55. 6 Youth 2030 (2018) <https://www.unyouth2030.com/_files/ugd/b1d674_9f63445fc59a41b6bb50cbd4f800922b.pdf> accessed on 1 November 2023. 7 ibid. 4

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traditional top-down figures and promoting inclusivity, we empower young voices and leverage their fresh perspectives and innovative solutions. Youth's active role in addressing climate change aligns with the global need for sustainability and environmental action. When utilized effectively, the collective power of young people can drive significant positive change in addressing urgent issues such as climate change, contributing to the UN's broader goals of creating a fairer and more sustainable world. Moreover, legal mechanisms within the UNFCCC have played a vital role in promoting youth access to this global climate governance platform. The formal recognition of young people's engagement within the UNFCCC, notably the establishment of the youth NGO YOUNGO in 2011, reflects a positive shift toward inclusivity.8 This legal framework has enabled young individuals to transcend logistical barriers and participate more actively in UNFCCC events, contributing to the overall democratic legitimacy of the UNFCCC and allowing young participants to hold others accountable for prior commitments.9 However, despite these advancements, there are persistent challenges, including high turnover among youth participants, often due to volunteer status and limited resources, which hinder consistent involvement.10 These limitations underscore the need for further legal mechanisms and policy adjustments to create a sustainable and genuinely inclusive environment for young people within the UNFCCC. Furthermore, the extent of young people's impact on the COP is closely tied to the reputation of the delegates. Delegates, who have a busy schedule, tend to prefer those with a proven history of making valuable contributions.11 Youth engagement tends to flourish when they believe their messages will be received with attention. However, this confidence is not always justified, leading many young participants to feel that their voices go unheard.12 This issue, intensified by the lengthy

Harriet Thew, Lucie Middlemiss, Jouni Paavola, 2020. ‘Youth is not a political position: Exploring justice claims-making in the UN Climate Change Negotiations,’ Global Environmental Change 61, 878. 9 ibid, 877. 10 ibid, 887. 11 Harriet Thew, ‘Youth participation and agency in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ (2018) 18 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics <https://link-springercom.ezproxy.hhs.nl/article/10.1007/s10784-018-9392-2> accessed on 1 November 2023. 12 ibid. 8

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negotiation timelines, poses a significant challenge in achieving substantial agreements and fostering enduring relationships between decision-makers and young delegates.13 As depicted in the article, “(…) Lessons from UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties” written by Christine Wamsler and other authors, the current negotiation culture at the COP urgently requires a shift in mindset to support enhanced communication, collaboration, and effective climate action.14 The existing culture is predominantly characterized by power dynamics, top-down decision-making, male dominance, exclusivity, and judgmental attitudes.15 Furthermore, State Parties often exhibit narrow-minded approaches, fragmentation, and a lack of urgency in addressing climate challenges.16 This situation disproportionately affects young participants, who are primarily from Western nations, adhering to Northern Hemisphere norms.17 The elitist thinking and deep-seated distrust prevalent in COP negotiations only perpetuate existing divisions18. The historical context of colonialism still looms large within these negotiations, contributing to a pervasive lack of trust between developed and developing nations.19 This mistrust impedes cooperation, hindering the progress necessary to combat climate change. Additionally, the COP system itself inadvertently fosters self-isolation and disconnection among participating nations, driving them to compete for attention and influence.20 To address these challenges, it is crucial to examine legal frameworks and mechanisms that can promote a more inclusive and participatory mindset among young people and reduce the influence of top-down figures within the COP. Fostering a culture of dialogue and collaboration is essential.21 Initiatives that encourage constructive discussions, rather than confrontational debates, can break down barriers that hinder effective communication.

ibid. Christine Wamsler and others, 'Enabling new mindsets and transformative skills for negotiating and activating climate action: Lessons from UNFCCC conferences of the parties' (2020) 112 Environmental Science & Policy 229 <https://www-sciencedirect-com.ezproxy.hhs.nl/science/article/pii/S1462901120304706> accessed 1 November 2023. 15 ibid, 229. 16 ibid. 17 ibid. 18 ibid, 230. 19 ibid. 20 ibid, 230. 21 ibid, 232. 14

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Moreover, the COP should prioritize the development of global norms and values that respect the sovereignty of all nations, irrespective of their historical roles in colonialism. In conclusion, transforming the negotiation culture at the COP is vital to addressing the climate crisis effectively. By advocating for inclusivity, diversity, and participatory engagement, especially among young people, we can reduce the dominance of power and top-down figures. Legal frameworks and mechanisms can play a crucial role in facilitating this transformation. III. Greenhouse effects and effects on Youth A. The climate crisis unveiled Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Earth's temperature has consistently risen due to the increasing greenhouse effect.22 A noteworthy observation is that we must go back around 150 years to find a 30-year period hotter than the last three decades.23 These changes in climate are primarily caused by the growing release of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the Earth's atmosphere, leading to a noticeable rise in global temperatures.24 It is crucial to emphasize that although CO2 plays a significant role in climate change, it is not the sole factor in this environmental issue. Various other greenhouse gases, also impact global climate shifts. These gases include perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), methane (CH4), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), nitrous oxide (N2O), and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3).25 B. The future youth confronts a dystopia Additionally, it is worth noting that some of these emissions are not caused by human activities but originate from natural sources like volcanic eruptions and changes in forest coverage. Nonetheless, the issue lies in the fact that human actions are responsible for more than half of these emissions, thus playing a crucial role in shaping the Earth's climate. 26 To understand the magnitude of these changes, we need to compare them with the vast timeline

IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report < https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/> accessed on 15 March 2023. 23 ibid. 24 ibid. 25 Dieter D Genske and Giovanni M Pradipta, (2022), ‘Why There Is No Time Left. In: Establishing Plus-MinusEnergy-Regions,’ Springer, Cham. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93596-2_1> accessed on 15 March 2023 26 ibid, 1.

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of our planet's existence, estimated at 4.6 billion years.27 Humans emerged recently, only 6 to 2 million years ago.28 The factor that has triggered significant changes in the climate was industrialization, which began between 1760 and 1840, during the Industrial Revolution.29 C. Balancing activism amid educational priorities Younger generations are worried about the greenhouse effect because their future is on the line. The risk of losing the planet to a never-ending spiral of climate catastrophes is overwhelming. Greta Thunberg moved society with her environmental movement against the national leaders who refused to view the reality of the crisis. The famous speech from 2019 at the UN Climate Action Summit clearly showed the sad status of planet Earth. Scientific Calculations showed that on the 1st of January 2018, the planet had 420 gigatons of CO2 left to emit before triggering irreversible catastrophes,30 and in 2019 the number had dropped already to less than 350 gigatons.31 Greta went on to state that at the current rate of CO2 emissions, the world will have exhausted the budget of 420 gigatons by 2027.32 The world is close to entering a period of mass extinction where ecosystems fail, and entire populations will cease to exist due to the effects of Climate Change. The most recent catastrophe was presented in Pakistan last year (2022) when mass flooding took over the country affecting 33 million people of which almost 10 million are children.33 In addition to this more than 1700 lives were lost to the floods.34 As stated by UNICEF children are the most affected by climate change.35 D. Immediate action vs future technologies

National Museum of Natural History 2022, Smithsonian: ‘Introduction to human evolution’ <Introduction to Human Evolution | The Smithsonian Institution's Human Origins Program (si.edu)> accessed on 15 March 2023. 28 ibid. 29 United States Environmental Protection Agency 2023, Climate Change Science: ‘Causes of Climate Change’ <https://www.epa.gov/climatechange-science/causes-climatechange#:~:text=Since%20the%20Industrial%20Revolution%2C%20human,also%20affect%20the%20earth's%2 0climate.> accessed on 1 November 2023. 30 NPR Staff, ‘Transcript: Greta Thunberg's Speech At The U.N. Climate Action Summit’ (NPR, 23 September 2019) <https://www.npr.org/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speech-at-the-u-n-climate-actionsummit> accessed on 13 May 2023. 31 ibid. 32 ibid. 33 UNICEF, ‘Devastating floods in Pakistan.’ <https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/devastating-floods-pakistan2022> accessed on 13 May 2023 34 ibid. 35 ibid. 27

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While it is valid to argue that young people should ideally be focusing on their education and personal development, it is essential to consider the urgency and scope of the climate crisis.36 The young generation's engagement in climate activism is a response to the pressing reality of climate change.37 Real-life situations demonstrate that young activists have played a crucial role in raising awareness and pressuring world leaders to take immediate action. For instance, Greta Thunberg's Fridays for Future movement has mobilized millions of young people worldwide and prompted climate discussions at the highest levels.38 E. Youth-led reforms and global impact Counterarguments suggest that the young generation's activism might be viewed as detracting from their education and career aspirations. However, it is crucial to recognize that young activists often pursue their climate advocacy in parallel to their education. Many engage in activism during their free time, weekends, or school holidays. Furthermore, the urgency of the climate crisis necessitates immediate action, as delaying solutions until future technologies are perfected could be catastrophic. Additionally, it is true that some proposed technologies for combating climate change are still in their infancy, but this does not negate the need for immediate action.39 Critics argue that investing in unproven technologies is risky and could divert resources from more immediate, proven solutions.40 However, young activists argue that a multifaceted approach is required, which includes both immediate emissions reductions and long-term technological advancements. F. Global financial dynamics and environmental disparities Policies and initiatives led by young activists, such as the Sunrise Movement in the United States, have pushed for reforms and emphasized the importance of transitioning to renewable energy sources and reducing carbon emissions now, rather than relying solely on hypothetical

Sebastian Kettley, ‘Greta Thunberg UN speech in FULL: Read climate activist's condemnation of world leaders’ (Express, 13 Dec 2019) <https://www.npr.org/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speechat-the-u-n-climate-action-summit> accessed on 13 May 2023. 37 ibid. 38 Fridays for Future, ‘Who we Are’ (2023) <https://fridaysforfuture.org/what-we-do/who-we-are/> accessed on 1 November 2023. 39 Sebastian Kettley, ‘Greta Thunberg UN speech in FULL: Read climate activist's condemnation of world leaders’ (Express, 13 Dec 2019) <https://www.npr.org/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speechat-the-u-n-climate-action-summit > accessed on 13 May 2023. 40 ibid. 36

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future technologies.41 In this context, the young generation's involvement can be seen as a driving force for change, compelling world leaders to address the climate crisis more urgently and effectively. The current generation of young activists recognize that their future is at stake, and their proactive engagement is not only justifiable but necessary to ensure a sustainable planet for generations to come. G. Empowering youth to save the world Another famous speech by Greta at the COP25 that took place in Madrid stated that since the Paris Agreement, there has been an investment of USD 1.9 trillion on fossil fuels, and additionally only 100 hundred corporations bear 71 per cent of the total emissions of the world.42 These numbers contrast with the numbers coming from the European Union where the European Commission launched the Green Deal aiming at the decarbonization of the European economy and comprising three funds: the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Cohesion Policy Funds, and the Modernization Fund. The combination of the funds sets the budget at EUR 1.6 trillion for the years 2021 to 2027.43 The United States enacted a budget to combat climate change, it is currently at more than half a trillion dollars over the next decade.44 The American clean energy plan includes investments in Batteries, Solar Energy, Wind Energy and Nuclear Energy.45 The speech started a flow of support on social media for the activist. There were 1,395,054 tweets involving Greta where more than 1 million were in support of the environmental actions taken by Greta.46 More and more youth are creating the desire to save the world. This prompted an increasing number of youths to act upon their desire to save the world. 47 More so, given the

Sunrise Movement, ‘About’ < https://www.sunrisemovement.org/about/#objective> accessed on 1 November 2023. 42 ibid, (n 39). 43 European Commission, ‘Current funding’ <https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-efficiency/financing/euprogrammes/current-funding_en> accessed on 11 June 2023 44 Department of Energy, ‘National Renewable Energy Day: The Biden Administration is Charging Forward’ (21 March 2023) <https://www.energy.gov/articles/national-renewable-energy-day-biden-administration-chargingforward#:~:text=Thanks%20to%20President%20Biden's%20clean,part%20of%20our%20sustainable%20future. > accessed on 11 June 2023. 45 ibid. 46 Sergio A García and others, ‘Online hate speech and emotions on Twitter: a case study of Greta Thunberg at the UN Climate Change Conference COP25 in 2019’ (Springer Link, 10 March 2023) < https://link-springercom.ezproxy.hhs.nl/article/10.1007/s13278-023-01052-5> accessed on 15 May 2023. 47 Demiral Seran (2022), The Future is Ours: Youth Activism as a Matter of Equality.’ NEOS 14 (1) <https://acyig.americananthro.org/neosvol14iss1sp22/demiral/> accessed on 15 March 2023. 41

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fact that the burden is on this generation. Greta argues the necessary efforts to make a change are in the hands of young people.48 H. Addressing exclusion and encouraging inclusion In addition, the young are worried about the attempts of exclusion that are being subjected to by the general population.49 However, it is noticeable that in the broad political spectrum, there has been some change and there is more inclusion, namely through encouragement to be present at General Institutional Assemblies, to be more informed and to vote. Additionally, another positive factor is that it is more common to see young politicians presenting and giving speeches either at small-scale events or large conferences on TV. This shows the possibility of younger generations' input being considered in important decision-making. IV. The UN, the COY and the injustice at the COPs A. The role of YOUNGO and COY in youth empowerment The UN has established a movement designed for the youth, running in parallel with the UNFCC called the YOUNGO with the aim of empowering young minds to engage in climate change policies.50 The members of YOUNGO can participate in the COY which takes place every year and entails many variants. Relevance goes to the Global COY variant happening some days before the COP at the same location.51 The focus of the COY is on Policy Documents, Capacity Building, Skill-Building Workshops and Cultural Exchange.52 Throughout these focus points the COY aims to prepare input for participation in the COP where the relevant submissions will be scrutinized and used in possible negotiations.53 The submissions are made via a ‘youth policy paper’.54 B. Youth engagement in COPs: progress and challenges King Laura, (2016) ‘Future Citizens: Cultural and Political Conceptions of Children in Britain, 1930s-1950s.’ Twentieth Century British History 27 (3): 389-411 <https://academic.oup.com/tcbh/article/27/3/389/2451964?login=false> accessed on 1 November 2023. 49 Holden Cathie, (2006) ‘Concerned Citizens: Children and the Future.’ Education Citizenship and Social Justice 1 (3). doi:10.1177/1746197906068122. 50 United Nations Climate Change, Conference of Youth (COY) <https://unfccc.int/topics/education-andyouth/youngo/coy> accessed on 15 March 2023. 51 ibid. 52 ibid. 53 ibid. 54 ibid. 48

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The COY initiative provides young people with a valuable opportunity to engage more actively in the COPs. This achievement is supported by author Cathie Holden, who suggests that even very young children have a strong desire to participate in addressing climate change.55 Additionally, authors Harriet Thew, Lucie Middlemiss, and Jouni Paavol note that YOUNGO is growing quickly, with more young people showing enthusiasm for participating in the COPs. In recent years, there has been an increase in youth involvement, with many political leaders personally interacting with young participants at the COY events.56 However, merely participating is not enough. Recent COPs have shown that more substantial action is needed to influence the perspectives of political leaders.57 Younger generations feel that they lack sufficient decision-making power and are not taken as seriously as they desire during negotiations.58 For example, during COP 21 in 2015, young activists pushed for greater intergenerational equity in addressing climate change.59 While these concerns were included in the non-binding Preamble of the Paris Agreement, young advocates aimed to have them integrated into the main body of the Agreement.60 Furthermore, during COP 22 in 2016, young people encountered challenges as they were often excluded from negotiations and considered unsuitable for offering solutions.61 The specific status of the youth participants, whether they are observers with rights and obligations or they are excluded altogether, remains unclear.62 As a reminder, the young people referred to in this paragraph were enrolled and present at the COY that preceded both COPs, namely COY 11 (2015) and COY 12 (2016).63 C. Practical challenges faced by young delegates

C. Holden, 'Children as Citizens: An Introduction' in A Ross (ed), Citizenship Education in Society (CiCe, 2007) 19. 56 Harriet Thew, Lucie Middlemiss, Jouni Paavola, (2020) ‘Youth is not a political position: Exploring justice claims-making in the UN Climate Change Negotiations’, Global Environmental Change 61. 57 ibid. 58 ibid. 59 ibid. 60 ibid, (n 59). 61 M Hope, (2016), ‘Young People Express Disbelief at Older Generation's Trump and Brexit Choices, Say 'Join Us' to Solve Climate Change’ <https://www.desmogblog.com/2016/11/10/young-people-express-disbelief-oldergeneration-s-trump-and-brexit-choices-say-join-us-solve-climate-crisis> accessed on 15 March 2023. 62 ibid. 63 ibid.

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An interview of Bianca Martir,64 a delegate who participated in COY 16 and COP 26, offers invaluable insights into the practical challenges faced by young delegates during their engagement with the UN. These challenges are fundamental to the examination of how legal frameworks and mechanisms impact youth participation, particularly focusing on reducing the dominance of power and top-down figures. One of the most substantial hurdles highlighted in the interview is the acute lack of funding and support for young participants. This lack of resources places young delegates in a precarious situation, where they must independently manage the logistics necessary for their participation. These logistics include organizing travel, accommodations, transportation to various events, and navigating language barriers. It is crucial to address this lack of funding, as it directly affects young people's ability to engage meaningfully with the UN. As explained above, Christine Wamsler and others' research underscores the need for greater inclusion and respect within the UN events, particularly for young participants.65 D. Legal frameworks and mechanisms: foundation for youth inclusion In this context, the legal frameworks and mechanisms come into play starting with the UN’s Charter. While the Charter does not explicitly address youth participation and inclusivity, it establishes a foundational framework that emphasizes the commitment to engage diverse segments of society in the UN's overarching mission. The Charter's Preamble eloquently references “We the Peoples”, emphasizing the commitment to engage all segments of society, explicitly encompassing youth, in the UN's mission. The principles of non-discrimination and equality, as articulated in Articles 1 and 2, discourage age-based discrimination, allowing young individuals to participate on an equal footing with their older counterparts. This underscores the importance of creating an inclusive environment that can help mitigate the dominance of power figures within the UN. Building upon this foundational framework, the UN is intensifying resource mobilization efforts and facilitating partnership solutions with the implementation of the Youth 2030 Strategy.66 A 64

Bianca Elena Melara Martir participated in the COY 16 and the COP 26 held in Scotland, in 2021. Bianca was a delegate of El Salvador and applied through a registration form provided by YOUNGO. Bianca participated in the training sessions before the events and engaged in discussions at the COY and the COP. I found Bianca via LinkedIn and Bianca keenly agreed to answer some questions at an online interview later conducted via Zoom. 65 ibid, (n 14). 66 Youth 2030 (2018), 8 <https://www.unyouth2030.com/_files/ugd/b1d674_9f63445fc59a41b6bb50cbd4f800922b.pdf> accessed on 1 November 2023.

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crucial aspect of this strategy involves strengthening the funding base and mechanisms for youth-focused programming and youth-led actions at all levels.67 A proposed common resource mobilization strategy aims to formulate an innovative and coordinated approach, with a specific focus on mainstreaming youth across existing funding mechanisms.68 This includes identifying funding solutions for under-financed areas, such as support for youth-led initiatives, movements, networks, organizations, youth participation mechanisms, and youth policy work.69 Additionally, an effort is proposed to ensure dedicated funding for youth participation in all relevant UN entities and at all levels, solidifying the commitment to enhancing the involvement of young people in shaping the future of the UN.70 E. Transparency and preserving youth voices Another significant issue raised by the delegate pertains to transparency in accessing the big negotiations table, where proposals are considered. This aligns with the research by Harriet Thew,71 highlighting the selective approach taken by decision-makers when determining which delegates and proposals receive priority. The delegate’s concern about modifications to arguments to align with national leaders’ interests underscores the importance of preserving the original intent of youth proposals and avoiding alterations to make them more government friendly. Reducing such alterations would promote a more inclusive and participatory mindset among young participants, ensuring their voices are not overshadowed by top-down figures. Furthermore, the interview reflects the persistent challenges faced by the COY. The delegate describes a prevailing perception among young participants that their proposals are undervalued, and their potential to influence environmental policies is delayed. This situation underscores the urgency of addressing the concerns raised by young participants and reducing the dominance of top-down figures within the UN processes. To create a more inclusive environment, it is imperative to reevaluate how proposals from young individuals are considered and acted upon within the UN system.

ibid. ibid. 69 ibid. 70 ibid. 71 ibid, (n 59). 68

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In conjunction with these challenges, the Youth 2030 Strategy, embraces young people’s diversity, advocating for methods reflective of this diversity.72 The UN recognizes young people as rights-holders, promoting transparency, accountability, and responsiveness from duty-bearers.73 The strategy employs a human-rights-based, gender-transformative, -sensitive, and -responsive approach, crucial for understanding and addressing obstacles faced by young participants.74 F. Reevaluating preparation sessions and support The delegate's account of preparation sessions organized by YOUNGO presents issues related to participation levels and the time commitments expected from young activists. While these sessions are not mandatory, they significantly impact the number of negotiating tables and sessions that young delegates can engage in. Some participants find this situation unfair due to limited opportunities to contribute at the discussion table. Additionally, the absence of compensation for personal time spent on training is a barrier, especially for young participants with busy working schedules. These challenges can hinder the self-assurance and effectiveness of participants, potentially impeding the development of impactful projects within the COY. To foster a more participatory mindset and reduce the dominance of power figures, it is essential to consider alternative methods of participation and support of young delegates. G. Navigating challenges for a more inclusive future In conclusion, the challenges highlighted in Bianca Martir’s interview shed light on the practical difficulties faced by young participants within the UN’s system. These challenges are directly related to my examination of legal frameworks and mechanisms that aim to promote inclusivity and reduce the dominance of power and top-down figures. Addressing the lack of funding, transparency issues, and challenges in preparation sessions is essential for creating a more inclusive and participatory environment within the UN, aligning with the overarching goal of my research question. These practical challenges emphasize the urgency

Youth 2030 (2018), 5 <https://www.unyouth2030.com/_files/ugd/b1d674_9f63445fc59a41b6bb50cbd4f800922b.pdf> accessed on 1 November 2023. 73 ibid. 74 ibid.

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of reducing the dominance of traditional top-down figures and reevaluating existing processes to ensure that young people can effectively contribute to addressing global issues. V. Conclusion These cases highlight shortcomings in youth inclusion within the UN. To strengthen legal frameworks for youth inclusion in the UN, it is essential to advocate for changes at both international and national levels. At the international level, efforts should be directed towards better implementation and interpretation of the existing UN Charter in the context of youth participation. The implementation should require member states to actively involve the younger generations in decision-making processes related to global issues, especially those concerning climate change. The interpretation should emphasize the importance of youth engagement and their right to be heard on matters that directly impact their future. At the national level, the incorporation of international agreements and principles related to youth participation in domestic legislation should be advocated by the UN. The enactment of laws that facilitate the active engagement of young people in policymaking, with an emphasis on climate-related decisions, should be encouraged by the UN among member states. The commitment to youth inclusion on a broader scale would be reinforced through this step. Furthermore, the establishment of national youth councils or advisory bodies in each member state should be promoted by the UN. These councils should serve as platforms for concerns to be voiced by young people and for their input to be provided into national positions on global issues, particularly those relevant to climate change. Countries should be encouraged by the UN to allocate a portion of their budgets to support youth participation in international events and negotiations. For effective engagement in climate-related decision-making processes within the UN, the empowerment of youth through education and training is vital. The development and implementation of comprehensive training programs that equip young participants with the necessary skills and knowledge to actively contribute to international negotiations should be initiated by YOUNGO. These programs should encompass negotiation techniques, communication strategies, and an understanding of international climate agreements. Additionally, the establishment of virtual learning platforms that provide accessible and flexible education for young people worldwide, offering online courses, webinars, and 124

workshops, would ensure that geographical barriers do not limit youth participation. The curriculum should be tailored to the specific needs of youth engaged in climate action. Furthermore, mentorship programs that connect young delegates with experienced negotiators and policymakers should be facilitated by the UN in cooperation with YOUNGO. This mentorship can bridge the knowledge gap and provide valuable insights into the intricacies of international negotiations. A priority should be placed on gender diversity within COP negotiations, with policies implemented to mandate gender balance in delegations and leadership positions, promoting equitable representation and more inclusive decision-making. Additionally, academic research on youth engagement in the UN, climate policies, and international negotiations should be encouraged by the UN. Support for research initiatives that provide evidence-based insights into the challenges and opportunities young people face should also be extended. Through the implementation of these measures, young participants will be better equipped to participate effectively in climate negotiations, ultimately reducing the dominance of top-down figures and empowering youth to influence climate policies. Young participants at both COY and COP require increased credibility and speaking time. A new mandatory system of youth representation at negotiation tables is imperative. Currently, COY participation remains voluntary, with young individuals responsible for their travel, accommodation, and other expenses. Collaborations with Non-State Actors have yielded limited results. To allocate more of the UN budget to youth, reductions must target expenses, particularly those related to luxurious hotels and high-level events attended by officials.75 Furthermore, the UN continually calls for voluntary donations, emphasizing its 70-year history and path of half a trillion dollars.76 A similar appeal is needed to fund youth participation. Additionally, either the COY or the state parties sending delegates should establish a system to aid with accommodations and logistics, possibly involving local volunteers to enhance the safety and comfort of young delegates. In addition, YOUNGO should enhance preparation session efficiency, making them more volunteer-friendly to accommodate the less experienced youth delegates who require additional training. Gathering Melanie L, ‘How the U.N. Spends Its $1 Billion from U.S. Taxpayers’ The Heritage Foundation (20 January 1984) <https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/report/how-the-un-spends-its-1-billion-us-taxpayers> accessed on 11 June 2023. 76 Natalie Samarasinghe, ‘The UN spent half a trillion – so what?’ The Guardian (11 September 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/11/united-nations-un-spent-half-trillion-so-what-lifeline> accessed on 11 June 2023. 75

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feedback from volunteers to improve learning materials is crucial. Collaboratively, YOUNGO and COY staff can create an integrated approach, enabling participants to complete training sessions at COY under the guidance of experienced staff, thus saving time for research and argumentation. This practical approach benefits all stakeholders. Fostering inclusive dialogue and recognition is crucial to addressing the dominance of power figures in the UN and ensuring that the contribution of young people is valued. There is a need to advocate for greater diversity within national delegations attending international climate conferences. Encourage member states to appoint young delegates who represent a wide range of backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives. This diversity will enrich discussions and promote inclusivity. Furthermore, the UN should organize dedicated youthled panels and sessions during its major events. These sessions should provide young participants the opportunity to present their proposals and perspectives directly to decisionmakers and delegates. Such platforms ensure that youth’s voice is heard, and their ideas are considered. Moreover, the promotion of transparency in the decision-making processes of international negotiations should be undertaken by the UN’s Secretary General. Information regarding negotiation outcomes, priorities, and the reasoning behind specific decisions should be shared by member states and UN bodies, as encouraged. The negotiation process can be demystified, and the accountability of top-down figures increased through this transparency. Additionally, the publication of annual reports specifically focused on youth engagement in climate negotiations should be encouraged by the UN’s Secretary General. Data on the participation of young delegates, the impact of their proposals, and the challenges they face should be included in these reports. Progress made and areas requiring further attention will be illuminated by such reports. By fostering inclusive dialogue, recognizing the contributions of young participants, and promoting transparency, the reduction of the dominance of power figures and the creation of a more participatory and equitable environment within the UN, particularly in the context of addressing climate change, are aimed for by these recommendations. These measures will ensure that young voices are not only heard but valued in the global efforts to combat climate change. The COY was created with the intent to empower young activists. The planet is dying, and it is saddening to see an event such as the COY deprived of its fruits. The youth are exhausted and frustrated with the current system. Change must happen with urgency. 126

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HHS ILSA Law Journal Issue 2 - 2023

Articles inside

The Youth and the Conference of the Parties - Climate Change

UNjustified and UNethical: A Critical View on the UN Unpaid Internship System

Global Imperialism by the United Nations Security Council and its Impact on Youth: A case study on the United Nations Missions in Haiti

Improving Access to the UN by Youth

The UN's Role in the Development of Legal Frameworks Tackling Forced Environmental Migration

UNSC Resolution 1973 and its Impact on the Libyan Conflict